


AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.

Diaries and Notebooks

Item number: 3DRL606/253/1

Title: Folder, 1918 - 1939

Covers 1918 fighting and includes articles, reviews, maps and notes by Bean and A W Bazley.



AWM38-3DRL606/253/1

Pa Part I - AMIENS

253

1st SET. DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918

THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every reader and writer who may use them.

These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so—but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.

These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.

16 Sept., 1946.

C. E. W. BEAN.

OPEN

Army Quarterly.

Vol. II p. 267.

Some Notes on Tank Development During the War. Col. Sir H. Elles.

Hamel
Aug. offensive.

Vol. I p. 263-289 Marshal Foch. Long article by Col. C. J. Grant

Vol. VI
p. 298 An aspect of the Battle of Amiens, 1918. By Cyril Falls. X

Vol. VI
p. 11. A German account of the British Offensive of Aug. 1918
(Contributed by the Historical Section, C.I.D.) X

Vol. V p. 314 } The British Campaign in the West Aug-Nov 1918 X
Vol. VI p. 44 }

Vol. VIII
p. 295. Organization of the Tank Corps
(see p. 301 "projects" in 1918)

Vol. IX
p. 234 Intelligence at an Arranged on the W. Front during the
last phase of the Great War. By Col. F. S. G. Piggott X

Vol. X
p. 261 General Lord Rowleson
An Appreciation by Maj-Gen Sir Archibald Montgomery

Vol. XVI
p. 73. Douglas Haig. By Sir J. Davidson & Col. Boraston

Vol. XVI
p. 408. Article on the German Casualties in the Great War X

Vol. XXI
p. 329 The Last German Offensive. Rheims 1918
(Review of German Official Monograph)

to find Germans approaching on both flanks. About this time he received a welcome reinforcement from the supporting company of the 45th—a platoon under Lieutenant Allen⁴⁹ (brother of the battalion commander) being sent forward by order from Colonel Imlay. On its way from Pioneer Trench this platoon, to its surprise, had found itself under fire from Germans who had come up the hill-slope near the casualty clearing station. On reaching the 47th's support trench Allen, by order of Captain Symons, moved along to the extreme right and reinforced Goodsall just beyond the road to the quarry. The Germans were then getting round Goodsall's right, and Allen ordered twenty of his men to leave the trench and form a line to the right flank, in order to prevent encirclement; but no sooner was the line out in the open than a machine-gun was turned upon it, killing or wounding twelve men and forcing the rest back to the trench. The Germans had suddenly appeared in front of the left company, at only 100 yards' distance. Company Sergeant-Major Hare⁵⁰ ordered a Lewis gunner, by name Maumill,⁵¹ to fire at them. Captain Symons, thinking the men seen must be Australian, ordered fire to cease, but Maumill, recognising them clearly as German, kept on. The rest of the garrison, as soon as they were sure of the oncomers' identity, joined in. But one Lewis gun was disabled, and, though fire was maintained, the enemy's movement could not be stopped. The old French sap was without traverses, and the enemy on the right had now brought up pineapple-grenade throwers and was enfilading the right of the trench with these and machine-guns. Anyone attempting to line the front bank was shot from the rear, round which the Germans were now pushing; the only direction in which men could fire was to the flank, and they were falling so fast that Goodsall and the officers with him—Lieutenants Smith⁵² and Allen—

⁴⁹ Lieut. J. H. Allen, 45th Bn. Railway clerk; of Hurstville, N.S.W.; b. Hurstville, 3 Nov., 1892.

⁵⁰ C.S.M. H. J. Hare, D.C.M. (No. 2961; 47th Bn.). Carter; of Hobart; b. Hobart, 24 Aug., 1886.

⁵¹ Pte. J. H. Maumill (No. 2898; 47th Bn.). Miner; of Launceston, Tas.; b. Beaconsfield, Tas., 15 Jan., 1883.

⁵² Lieut. J. E. Smith, 47th Bn. Ironmonger; of Cheepie, Q'land; b. Burrangong, Young, N.S.W., 10 Oct., 1892.

August Offensive : Twelfth Anniversary

(By General Sir John Monash, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.D., who commanded the Australian Army Corps in 1918.)

In a few days we shall be commemorating the twelfth anniversary of the great battle of Amiens, fought in the tortured fields of Northern France, on August 8th, 1918.

This battle deserves the attribute of "great," not alone because of the magnitude and quality of the soldiery and armament which were employed, but also because of the decisive influence which that battle had upon the early termination of the Great War.

On such an occasion as this anniversary, every one of us who was privileged to have a share in those momentous happenings, however exalted or however humble, may be forgiven for casting his thoughts back across the vista of twelve years, in the endeavour to reconstruct his sensations during those glorious hours, and to reanimate the thoughts and memories of that decisive day of conflict.

Upon my shoulders was laid a great burden of responsibility. It was my business to see that a battle-plan was evolved, tested, expounded and realised, which would ensure that the already high prestige of the Australian Army Corps would be in no way dimmed; that we should all prove worthy partners of victory with the illustrious Army Corps of our great sister Dominion of Canada; and that the blow that we should jointly inflict upon the enemy would be of such staggering impetus that the end of hostilities might thereafter be counted by days.

But the very best of battle plans would have been hopelessly futile if the men who were destined to carry them out had not been of the highest quality of soldierly capacity and efficiency. It would take a volume to itemise the many factors which, in the actual result, ensured the victory. But I shall mention just a few.

Surprise is, perhaps, the most powerful weapon in the armoury of the tactician. That the battle-plans, the date and the zero hour were kept a dead secret from, not only the enemy, but indeed from all the outside world, reflected the highest credit upon the discipline of every man in the Corps. That all prior movements of troops, and guns and munitions were carried out as ordered, wholly in the hours of darkness, so that enemy observers, in planes and captive balloons, had no suspicion of what was afoot, demonstrated the efficiency of control down to the smallest unit.

That our infantry in the foremost assault advanced unflinchingly and irresistibly was a tribute to their determination and gallantry. That our artillery earned, by their accurate barrage-fire and counter-battery fire, the confidence and gratitude of the infantry was their highest praise. That our engineers and signallers so efficiently performed their difficult duties throughout every movement of the mighty conflict set the seal on their capacity and courage.

In short, from the Staff work down to the work of the smallest unit, the Army Corps, by seasoned experience, by willing co-operation, and by the will to victory, had become a mighty and invincible instrument of war.

Nor must we forget that we were valiantly assisted by many able formations of Tanks, Air Force, and heavy artillery, all manned by our comrades from the Mother Country. Neither time nor space is available to relate in more detail the many reminiscences which this great anniversary recalls.



General Sir John Monash.

Join

Notes of General Sir John Monash
General Sir John Monash
K.C.B., V.D., G.C.M.G.
Commander-in-Chief, Australian Army Corps
1918

Artillery: (B.G.R.A.) Brig.-Gen. W.A. Coker, Vice Brig.-Gen. W.L. Hopper, 8 Oct. 1917; (B.G.H.A.) Brig.-Gen. J.D. Fraser.
Engineers: (C.E.) Brig.-Gen. Hon. A.C. de L. Joly de Loche, replaced by Colonel G.H. Foott, 17 March; (C.R.E., Corps Troops) Lieut.-Col. E.L.H. Nicholson

up the offer, and a few British officers remained there. But Brigadier-General Coxen took the place of Brigadier-General Napier in command of the corps artillery; ~~Brigadier-General~~ Colonel Foott replaced Brigadier-General ^{Joly de} Lotbinière as Chief Engineer, and the chief staff officers of the divisions were now all Australians. On the 5th of March, 1918, General Birdwood informed G.H.Q. that he could replace the last four British commanders who were not actual members of the A.I.F. - Major-Generals Walker (1st Division) and Smyth (2nd Division), and Brigadier-Generals Lesslie (1st Brigade) and Hobkirk (14th Brigade) - and, ^{when} ~~so~~ suitable commands fell vacant in the British Army, these leaders were transferred to them. There remained till the end of the war ^{five} ~~three~~ exceptions - Major-General Sinclair-MacLagan (G.O.C., 4th Division), Brigadier-General Anderson (C.R.A., 1st Division), ~~and~~ Lieutenant-Colonels Marsh (1st Divisional Train), ~~and~~ Ross (later G.S.O. 1, 1st Division), and Davies (32nd Battalion), all of whom had been attached to the military forces in Australia ~~Battalion~~, of which, except Davies, they had been members before the war, and, except Davies, had been members of the A.I.F. since its formation by General Bridges. ³¹

29
30
31
30-27 Brig.-Gen. C.S. Davies, C.M.G., D.S.O. ~~Commanded~~ Employed at Royal Military College, Duntroon, 1913/15; commanded 32nd Bn., A.I.F., 1917/18, 8th Inf. Bde., ~~1918/19~~ A.I.F., 1918/19, 1st Bn., The Leicestershire Regt., 1927/31. Officer of British Regular Army; ~~Sept.~~ Sept. 1880.

31-28 The leading commanders and staff officers ^(at the end of January 1918) ~~now~~ were (British officers in italics):-

AUSTRALIAN CORPS HEADQUARTERS

G.O.C.: Lieut.-Gen. Sir W.R. Birdwood

General Staff: Major-Gen. C.B.B. White (B.G.G.S.), (Operations) Lieut.-Col. A.M. Ross, (Intelligence) Major S.S. Butler, replaced by ~~Major~~ Capt. S.A. Humm, 14 Jan. 1918. (Major Butler became chief of intelligence staff, Fifth Army)

Administrative staff: Brig.-Gen. R.A. Carruthers, Lieut.-Col. G.C. Somerville (vice Lieut.-Col. M.G. Taylor, 16 Dec. 1917)

Artillery: (B.G.R.A.) Brig.-Gen. W.A. Coxen, vice Brig.-Gen. W.J. Napier, 8 Oct. 1917; (B.G.H.A.) Brig.-Gen. L.D. Fraser.

Engineers: (C.E.) Brig.-Gen. Hon. A.C. de L. Joly de Lotbinière, replaced by Colonel C.H. Foott, 17 March; (C.R.E., Corps Troops) Lieut.-Col. E.J.H. Nicholson

of Lee-on-Solent,
Hampshire, Eng.;
6. Dunedin, N.Z., 6

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August 8 Offensive: Memories

(By Brigadier-General C. H. Brand, C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., who commanded the famous 4th Brigade in all its hard fighting on the Western Front, recalls events on the 8th August.)

The success of the 4th and 11th Brigades in the Battle of Hamel on July 4, 1918, is accepted as the beginning of the great allied August 8 offensive, which ended with the Armistice. In this engagement the lessons of the disastrous tank co-operation with the 4th and 12th Brigades at Bullecourt on April 11, 1917, and the brilliant British success with these improved weapons of warfare at Cambrai later in November were applied with the greatest results.

On July 13, the Fourth Army Commander (General Rawlinson) was directed by Sir Douglas Haig to prepare plans for a somewhat similar operation to Hamel, but on a much larger scale. G.H.Q. intelligence reports indicated that the enemy intended an early offensive against the French further south. Marshal Foch knew where and when this blow would fall. He, as Generalissimo, resisted all requests to part with any of his general reserves.

The blow fell on July 17 in the Chateau-Thierry salient. Foch was ready for it and by a beautifully timed counter attack, by French and American divisions, on July 18 gained a smashing victory. This ended the German offensive in the war and paved the way for the counter offensive on the Australian Corps front—an opportunity for which Sir Douglas had been waiting.

This particular sector was selected because of the enemy's weak and indifferently organised defences; the morale of German divisions there was below standard chiefly because of our local minor activities following the battle of Hamel; and the open nature of the country and the long spell of dry weather would assist an operation by tanks.

We enjoyed good observation over the enemy's position, the result of the brilliant counter attack at Villers-Bretonneux by 13th and 15th Brigades on Anzac morning. Further, there was sufficient cover to hide our extra artillery, tanks and troops until "Z" day—August 8, which was known only to a selected few until 48 hours before.

The whole of the resources of the Fourth Army was placed at the disposal of our Corps Commander (Sir John Monash), whose genius of organisation made us feel that the battle was more than half won before zero hour—4.20 a.m.

What are my recollections of that great day? They are: thick fog; troops on my left delayed; enemy enfilade fire; an artillery duel over open sights at 800 yards; tanks carrying the machine-guns and Lewis gunners of the 16th—my exploiting battalion; tanks knocked out by direct hits, anxiety for my exposed left flank; and the bombing of my headquarters at Morcourt at night.

The 4th Brigade had the roughest passage. Three villages—Cerisy, Morcourt and, if all went well, Mericourt—were included in our open warfare and exploiting task. To "leap frog" in an engagement under the most favourable conditions calls for careful timing judgment and initiative on the part of all ranks, but when a thick fog settles over attacking troops, confusion and chaos may result if units are unreliable and lack confidence. The first stage was easy. We followed the 11th Brigade until it reached the "green line"; whence the 4th Brigade "leap frogged" on a mile front, out into the still thick fog towards its objectives about three miles into enemy territory.

It is on such occasions that a brigadier is thankful that he has reliable young officers. Advancing on compass bearing in a fog has one advantage: the enemy is not sure where you are, but the control direction and communication are made very difficult. Before reaching the "red line" the fog lifted. The enemy on the north side of the Somme now knew our intentions. They turned their artillery and machine guns on to the 14th and 15th Battalions. Good platoon leading, and earlier training in open warfare, kept casualties down.

What were the troops on the north of the Somme doing? They had not progressed "according to plan," and this was considered as having been the cause of the 4th Brigade losses. The reason given for their failure to conform to the advance south of the Somme was the the enemy's activity on their front during the previous 48 hours. In the early morning of August 6 the British were heavily attacked and important high ground between Sailley-Laurette and Morlancourt captured. This ground offered cover for the assembly of the units and guns taking part in the August 8 push.

At all costs it had to be recaptured. Fresh battalions were brought up for the purpose and early on August 7 the high ground was restored after a stiff fight. The enemy had, during his temporary occupation, become aware of the forward dumps and other indications of an offensive. This put him on the alert. The troops which recaptured the lost positions had to be again relieved on the nights of August 7-8, to allow the original holders to be in their jumping-off positions at zero hour. The dislocation of the preliminary arrangements, the enemy's vigilance and the fog were contributing factors to the slow progress on that side of the Somme. Only those with first-hand knowledge can appreciate the difficulties that the brigade was up against.

At nightfall its leading units had advanced to the vicinity of Mallard Wood and were in communication with Brig.-General I. G. Mackay's 1st Brigade, which, as reserve brigade temporarily attached to the 4th Division, in place of the 13th Brigade, had come forward and formed a defensive flank to protect my left rear. Chipilly and the spur running

(Continued on Page 39.)



Brig.-Gen. Brand.

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Signals: Lieut.-Col. R.M. Powell, replaced by Lieut.-Col. C.H. Walsh, and succeeded by Lieut.-Col. T.R. Williams, 8, 19 April, June

Machine Guns: Lieut.-Col. L.F.S. Hore. Mechanical Transport: Col. W.H. Tunbridge. Medical: Surgeon-Gen. C.C. Manifold, replaced by Col. G.W. Barber, 8 April. Ordnance: Lieut.-Col. E.T. Leane, vice Lieut.-Col. R.H.V. Kelly, 9 Dec. 1917. Veterinary: Lieut.-Col. T. Matson. Chemical Adviser: Capt. H.W. Wilson. Postal: Capt. C.J. Fletcher. Police: Lieut.-Col. W. Smith. Camp Commandant: Major J.S.S. Churchill, replaced by Major W.W. Berry, 1 June.

DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS

1st: Maj.-Gen. Sir H.B. Walker. 2nd: Maj.-Gen. N.M. Smyth, V.C.
3rd: Maj.-Gen. Sir J. Monash. 4th: Maj.-Gen. E.G. Sinclair-MacLagan. 5th: Maj.-Gen. Sir J.J.T. Hobbs.

SENIOR G.S.O'S OF DIVISIONS

1st: Col. T.A. Blamey (Col. J.G. Dill held this position from mid-Sept. to 10 Oct. 1917, and Lieut.-Col. J.D. Lavarack from 11 Oct. to 8 Nov., during ~~the~~ the illness of Col. Blamey). 2nd: Lieut.-Col. C.G.N. Miles, vice Lieut.-Col. A.H. Bridges, 11 Dec. 1917. 3rd: Lieut.-Col. C.H. Jess, vice Lieut.-Col. G.H.N. Jackson, 20 Jan. (Lieut.-Col. J.D. Lavarack was for a few days with the 3rd Divn.). 4th: Lieut.-Col. J.D. Lavarack, vice Lieut.-Col. D.J.C.K. Bernard, 19 Dec. 5th: Lieut.-Col. J.H. Peck, vice Lieut.-Col. C.M. Wagstaff, 3 Sept. (All these Australian officers were permanent officers of pre-Duntroon days. The senior Duntroon graduate was G.S.O. 2.)

A.A. & Q.M.G's

1st: Lieut.-Col. H.G. Viney. 2nd: Lieut.-Col. J.M.A. Durrant.
3rd: Lieut.-Col. R.E. Jackson. 4th: Lieut.-Col. R. Dowse. 5th: Col. J.H. Bruche.

C.R.A'S

1st: Brig.-Gen. S.M. Anderson. 2nd: Brig.-Gen. O.F. Phillips.
3rd: Brig.-Gen. H.W. Grimwade. 4th: Brig.-Gen. W.H.L. Burgess.
(N.Z. Staff Corps). 5th: Brig.-Gen. A.J. Bessell-Browne.

C.R.E's

1st: Lieut.-Col. A.M. Martyn. 2nd: Lieut.-Col. J.M.C. Corlette. 3rd: Lieut.-Col. H.O. Clogstoun, replaced by Lieut.-Col. T.R. Williams, 12 March, and succeeded by ~~Lieut.-Col.~~ Major H. Bachtold, 19 April. 4th: Lieut.-Col. G.C.E. Elliott, replaced by Lieut.-Col. R.J. Dyer, 6 April. 5th: Lieut.-Col. V.A.H. Sturdee, vice Lieut.-Col. A.B. Carey, 25 Nov. 1917.

A.D's M.S.

1st: Col. R.B. Huxtable. 2nd: Col. A.E. Shepherd. 3rd: Col. A.T. White, replaced by Col. F.A. Maguire, 18 Jan. 4th: Col. G.W. Barber, replaced by Col. A.H. Moseley, 8 April. 5th: Col. M.H. Downey.

BRIGADE COMMANDERS

(replaced by Brig.-Gen. G. Mackay, 6 June)
1st Division: Brig.-Gen. W.B. Lesslie (1st); Brig.-Gen. J. Heane (2nd); Brig.-Gen. H.G. Bennett (3rd). 2nd Division: Brig.-Gen. R. Smith (5th); Brig.-Gen. J. Paton (6th); Brig.-Gen. E.A. Wisdom (7th). 3rd Division: Brig.-Gen. C. Rosenthal (9th); Brig.-Gen. W.R. McNicoll (10th); Brig.-Gen. J.H. Cannan (11th). 4th Division: Brig.-Gen. C.H. Brand (4th);

grade not reached
by a Duntroon

Brig.-Gen. J. Gellibrand (12th); Brig.-Gen. T.W. Glasgow (13th). 5th Division: Brig.-Gen. E. Tivey (8th); Brig.-Gen. C.J. Hobkirk, replaced by Brig.-Gen. J.C. Stewart, 23 ~~March~~ March (14th); Brig.-Gen. H.E. Elliott (15th).

A.I.F. STAFF

D.A.G.: Col. T.H. Dodds. Commandant, Admin. H.Q., London:
 Brig.-Gen. T. Griffiths. G.O.C., A.I.F. Dépôts in United Kingdom:
 Maj.-Gen. Hon. J.W. M'Cay. Director of Medical Services: Surgeon-Gen. Sir N.R. Howse, V.C.

Although this was a right and popular measure, all who knew ~~him~~ them regretted to see these ^{British} officers go, and with good reason; although the A.I.F. undoubtedly owed most to the old Australian militia, its debt to its small quota of British officers was beyond computation, especially in the standards set by them for personal conduct. They were far from being the only ones to furnish the troops with the exalted example of an "English gentleman" - there were many such among the born Australians of the A.I.F.; but it may safely be said that the influence of the British officer, from Birdwood and Walker ~~downward~~ downward, was in this respect outstanding. Such men as R.H. Owen, ³² Duncan Glasfurd, ^{and} Oswald Croshaw, by

³² Owen was an Australian by birth.

their regard for duty as the paramount principle of their lives, by consideration for others which bred the same quality in return, by ~~their~~ their noble standards whether in private or in public intercourse, exercised a continuing influence long after their service had taken its toll of their powers. Most of the British officers with the A.I.F. were men who, through ^{experience} ~~service~~ abroad, had already shed the shell with which the middle class Englishman protects himself against strangers. They had acquired the habit of appreciating men by their qualities rather than by their adherence to forms and ceremonies, and many of the warmest ^{on} ~~of~~ encomiums of the Australian soldier are from their mouths. For his part the "digger", when once the barrier of mere formality was lowered, and their true qualities were seen, conceived ^a deep admiration

August 30, 1930

The REVELLE

Airman's Bomb: Toll of Death

Lieut.-Col. G. E. McDonald, V.D., who, in this story, describes an incident during the big August push, when a bomb dropped by a German airman took a heavy toll of life, served throughout the war with the 3rd. Bn., A.I.F., commencing as a subaltern, and rising to C.O. An original member of the battalion, he landed with it at Anzac, and was wounded twice.

The 3rd. Battalion was with the support line on August 8, 1918, on that part of the flank where the 1st Bde. covered the very dangerous position at Chipilly. During the night which followed, we were moved across the front to Harbonnieres, where in the dawn of next morning, the whole of the Brigade advanced on Lihons; relieved the Second Brigade, and took over the old French trenches.

It was during the night march to Harbonnieres that the 3rd Battalion had an experience which will live long in the memory of those who were present. Moving off in the early evening, we had arrived at the recent German gun positions, when, some doubt arising as to which was the correct route, the battalion was halted in close formation on a track, while the acting C.O. (Major Burrett, D.S.O.) had a look around. The night was then fairly dark, only a pale moon peeping through the clouds from time to time.



Lt.-Col. McDonald.

Presently the too-familiar drone of a German 'plane was heard, and the sound left no doubt that the 'plane was flying low. The command was passed through, "Stand still everywhere!" As the 'plane flew overhead, it was so low that the German aviator could be seen looking over, but as no one moved it was hoped that we had not been seen in the darkness. Circling around, the 'plane turned back toward the enemy position, the battalion still standing perfectly still. Then it was found that we had been observed. Apparently the glint of the moonlight on our helmets had betrayed us, for the shriek of the first bomb was quickly followed by the rapid succession of the 'plane's whole complement.

When the first bomb burst, I was standing at the head of D Company. Immediately the bomb burst I shouted for the company to scatter and lie down. The order was executed very promptly. Myself, I took a couple of paces off the track and threw myself down just as a bomb burst where I had been

Revelle

standing a moment before. The concussion caused me to bounce on the ground.

The last bomb fell just about where the end of the company had been halted, and caused the only casualty in D. Company; one man, believing that the bomb was about to fall directly on him, crouched on hands and knees, evidently with the intention of jumping further away, and the bomb killed him.

Quickly re-forming, the battalion was steadied up. It was then found that the casualties were numerous; the first bomb, falling amongst Battalion Headquarters, killed Lieut. Fergusson and about seventeen N.C.O.'s and men, and the other bombs caused casualties throughout the battalion.

When the C.O. returned, and we moved through the circle of casualties, the doctor and the padre stood on either side of the track and warned the men, "Step softly over our dead," who were lying just as they had fallen.

This shook the battalion rather badly, because we had been halted in a comparatively quiet spot, and especially because there had been no shell fire at the time; the suddenness of the whole affair was startling, and the battalion standing closed-up offered a very easy target to the enemy. But if the advance in the morning was a little more grim and silent than usual, it was not to be wondered at. These things must pass, however, for the enemy was still in front, desperately trying to bar our way and stop our advance.

"So pass the 'word for the Fighting Third."

CHAPTER I

THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS

The five Australian infantry divisions in France emerged from the Passchendaele fighting ^{late} in 1917 with intense relief. The Third Battle of Ypres, notwithstanding that for them it had been, until its last stages, a particularly successful one, had been most bloody throughout and in the last stage intensely painful; and, although constant fighting and the long training in the summer had rendered them a highly efficient force, their prospect was not bright. This battle had, for the moment, made a clean sweep of more than half their infantry. Of 55,000 casualties suffered by the force during 1917, over 38,000 occurred in that offensive, and before its end the anxiety of General Birdwood as to the possibility of maintaining both the four divisions of his own army corps (I Anzac) and the 3rd Division in General Godley's (II Anzac) became acute.

Moreover, it was not only ~~in~~ in numbers that a falling off seemed probable. At least one careful and devoted observer of the A.I.F. seriously feared that the coming year might find the Australian soldier past the zenith of his quality also. With enlistment in Australia dwindling, the force would have to rely on the return to duty of its wounded and sick men. Not that these were likely to cause any perceptible change in the general physique - if the physical standard was lowered, it would be through the inferior physique of some of the new recruits.¹ The deterioration which was feared was a moral one.

¹ A diary of the 42nd Bn. (3rd Divn.) says: "9 Jan. 1918. New draft 48. About 60 per cent.....were up to the standard of the original men. At least 7....were unfit for service in the field; one man was 52 years of age, another 49, and one 46."

The A.I.F. would be feeding on itself, dependent largely upon its own used material; and there was all too good reason to believe that, whatever may have been the experience in

Reveille

May 30, 1931

REV

Brainy Work: Aussie Infantry

(By Major-General E. G. Sinclair MacLagan, G.O.C. 3rd Inf. Bde., and 4th Div. A.I.F.)

I was privileged to see an excellent example of brainy, clever work by a small body of Australian infantry. This occurred somewhere about the end of August, 1918, and in the vicinity of Lihons during the great advance of that month. We had relieved another Australian division, and had advanced some distance ahead of the division on our left, who were "held up" for a time. We had a platoon of our left brigade attached to the battalion on the right of the division on our left—for liaison purposes to keep touch and send information, etc. I was on some rising ground whence a good view of the ground on our left could be obtained, and had with me the C.O. our left battalion.

"It's like a tonic getting letters from A.I.F. people, and I love them all, and love to hear from them," says Major-General MacLagan, writing recently from his home at Glenquiech, By Forfar, Scotland, to the secretary of the Tasmanian A.I.F. Originals' Association (Mr. A. A. Orchard), of Hobart.

A message came through from the officer in command of the liaison platoon, asking if he could "do a stunt"—and that he had squared the C.O. the battalion he was with; if so, he would like us to send him a Lewis gun section, and he reckoned he could "do in" the Bosche. It took some time to get the Division Commander, but eventually we got his concurrence, and meantime a Lewis gun section was despatched to join the liaison platoon.

As soon as it arrived, the "stunt" started. We had a regular "gallery" view of the affair from our rising ground. We saw the men start and simply "melt" into nothingness, here and there a tin helmet showing progress was being made. About 20 minutes later a holocaust of machine-gun fire and bombs, with some rifle fire, started, and lasted for a short space, then a few scattered shots, and we saw the Bosche running—and falling—a few getting away. It turned out that as soon as our fellows had scuppered one machine gun the other crew bolted. These two guns had been well placed—as usual with the Bosche—and had covered the whole ground in front of them, inflicting a considerable number of casualties on the young and comparatively raw troops on our left, when they had made a regular, systematic advance.


Our platoon gave the "O.K." signal, and eventually we heard the result of the stunt, which was: Two machine guns and one light trench mortar, and a number of prisoners taken, at a cost of a few slightly wounded Aussies; at any rate, all were able to walk.

The cunning and resource of the Aussies were always considerable, but about this time were at its peak.

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*Reveille
Dec 1930*

The only V.C. winner in the 3rd Bn. was Lt. J. Hamilton, who, as a private, won the decoration at Lone Pine. Among the 3rd opinion is that that unit should have had the first V.C. of the A.I.F. Lieut. Evans, commissioned just prior to the embarkation for Anzac, was recommended for the V.C. on April 26, in respect of the landing operations (when he was killed). The papers were lost or blown up, and, although the matter was brought forward again at different times, the award was not made. Sergt. Bridle, of "B" Company, now employed at Anthony Hordern's, was also recommended for the V.C. by an English Company Commander in 1918 near Strazelle. Bridle was badly wounded in this particular action, and received the M.M., much to the indignation of the English officer. The 3rd Battalion, it is said, was very conservative in its recommendations for decorations—so much so, that a number of deserving cases were overlooked.



Sgt. H. Bridle

*24/6/18
all recommendations*

In a carefully prepared speech, Mr. Hughes paid eloquent tribute to the valour of the Australian soldiers, commenting especially upon their heroic defence of Amiens; the memorable attack upon the German front on the 8th of August, 1918, when victory was brought within the grasp of the Allies; and upon the Palestine campaign, which he described as the finishing blow "that shattered the last hope of Germany and snatched from her grasp that Empire of the East which was her cherished ambition". In the history of the world, he maintained, "there never was a greater victory than that which was achieved in Palestine, and in it, also, as in France, the soldiers of Australia played a great part". He stressed the greatness of the military achievement of Australia, a young community of 5,000,000 people, when she transported over 12,000 miles of ocean a greater army than Great Britain had ever sent out before. Mr. Hughes then described the steps he had taken in London to secure for Australia and the other British dominions direct representation at the Peace Conference, and the part taken by Sir Joseph Cook and himself in the preparation of the conditions upon which the Peace Treaty was based. He gave a detailed description of the constitution and functions of the League of Nations.

Coming to Australia's special interests under the Peace Treaty, Mr. Hughes reminded the House that the war had left this country with the huge debt of £350,000,000. It was right, he held, that Germany should pay for what the war had cost. But apart from the financial burden, in what position had the war left Australia? Her first concern was national safety. He had protested against "the great rampart of islands stretching round the north east of Australia" not being held by this country or by some Power "in whom we have absolute confidence". When the armistice terms were decided on November 5th, he had protested against them, because there was no guarantee that under them the possession of those islands would be vested in Australia. He had fought before

891

TEL. NO. CANBERRA, 661.

All official communications
should be addressed to the

COMMANDANT,

Royal Military College, and
not to any Officer personally.

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE:

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE,
DUNTROON,

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY.

20th June, 1939.

My dear *Beau*

In reply to your letter of 15th June re the attack on 9th August 1918, I am afraid you are putting rather too severe a strain on my memory for me to be able to tell you accurately exactly what happened, though probably I should be in the best position to do so as I was the one of the 2nd D.H.Q. Staff most concerned in the arrangements.

I cannot remember what orders we received about the attack or about co-operating with flank formations. After the attack on 8th August our brigades were somewhat scattered and there was some disorganisation owing to the fact that 5th Division had passed through us, also there was very little telephone communication. Rosenthal realised that he could not just order an attack without getting more accurate information about our troops and when they could get to the start line, so he ordered the three brigadiers to assemble for a conference at one of the Brigade H.Q., I think the 7th. I went to this conference to represent Rosenthal mainly I think because Rosenthal himself was still rather shaky after his wound and was not fit for much exertion. We were to arrange all details about the attack at this conference and put it in train without further reference to D.H.Q. I cannot remember the exact time of the conference but it was some time in the morning of 9th August. As far as I can recollect, the deciding factor in fixing the time of the attack was the earliest hour at which our troops could get to the start line. There was no consultation with 1st Division or Corps, but we tried to start as early as possible so as to fit in as nearly as we could with the division on our right, though I do not think we had very accurate information at the time about the move of 5th or 1st Division.

I went back to D.H.Q. and told Rosenthal the arrangements and as we were still rather worried about the show I went up to Advanced Brigade H.Q. some little time before the attack was due to start to watch the course of events and waited there till well after the attack had started.

Thus as far as my recollection serves me, the time of the attack was governed by the time our troops could get to the start line. Regarding whose was the decision, this is rather a fine point. My instructions when I went to the conference were that I was to tell the brigadiers the attack was to take place that day, giving objectives, but that the conference would be presided over by the senior brigadier who would give decisions on details. Therefore the decision regarding time of attack, though nominally D.H.Q., was actually that of the brigadiers on the spot.

/2.

I do not know whether you are aware of the fact that Rosenthal kept a very full private diary during all this time. Perhaps if you could get in touch with him he could give you more accurate and detailed information than I have been able to do.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

C.E.W. Bean

C.E.W. Bean, Esq.,
Official Historian,
Victoria Barracks,
SYDNEY

11308.

H/N

19 June 1939.

My dear Edmonds,

My chapters relating to the fighting of August 8th, 1918, will not be ready for some months, but I will send them as soon as completed. Meanwhile I send the chapter concerning the plans, as well as those preceding it.

Concerning Chipilly, the misunderstanding is due, I think, to the fact that Chipilly village was practically empty, but not the ridge above it.

A sergeant and a C.Q.M.S. from the 1st Battalion, A.I.F., went into the southern and western parts of the village at dawn on August 8/9th, hunting for souvenirs, and found no one. They were, strictly speaking, "absent without leave", and had to get back by dawn. On return they asked to be allowed to take a patrol there but were stopped, as the 58th Division was to attack the place. However, at 6 p.m. when the attack was seen to be held up, they were allowed to go in and did so. This time on the way they heard warning shouts from the company of the 2/10th London held up about half-a-mile short of Chipilly. They went over and saw its commander (Captain Berrell) and offered to reconnoitre the village for him. The men around warned them not to attempt to reach it, but by extending to about 12 paces and making a rush they all reached it through very heavy fire from the ridge north of it. They reconnoitred it, found it empty, but to the north, up the spur, was a German post intent upon its front. An Australian was sent back to guide Berrell's company to the chalk pit, Q 4 a 7 9, while the Australians continued to reconnoitre. The two platoons coming up with Berrell came under heavy fire from a machine-gun north of the village and had to fall back for a time.

The Australian leaders (C.Q.M.S. Hayes and Sergeant Andrews), however, led a platoon of the London to a position where it could enfilade the Germans on the spur; ^{but} when the British smoke barrage, now laid down, fell suddenly almost on to the platoon. It was ordered to withdraw. The Australians, however, making use of the smoke barrage, pushed on around the rear or eastern side of the spur, where they had located some posts near the river, behind the ridge (at K 35 a 8 8 and K 29 c 6 1). Four of them (Hayes and Andrews leading) crept around these and rushed them under their own covering fire, capturing an officer and about 35 men with two German machine-guns. One of these they set up and then attacked further posts. Captain Berrell and his company, who throughout were ready to follow the lead thus given, had come up just as the prisoners were being taken, and received them while the Australians went on and took another 30 prisoners, driving the enemy across the river and firing on him there with the German machine-gun.

About this time the line of attacking Americans appeared on top of the ridge in rear and opened fire on the Australians although these waved and shouted. They had to take cover until the Americans were close enough to understand.

This small Australian patrol was ahead of Berrell's company at every move, and Berrell sent them back with a most appreciative note of which unfortunately I cannot so far obtain a copy. I can find no mention of these events in the diary of the 2/10th London but have very detailed accounts from three of the Australians. The patrol actually captured about 80 Germans and 12 machine-guns, but only took back 28 Germans to the Australian side of the river, the rest being handed to the 2/10th London who were supporting them.

Yours sincerely.

Major P.L. Hall DSO MC

Canadian Liaison Officer
with Aust Corps 8/8/18

Address (Oct 1931)

National Trust Coy

St James Street

Montreal Canada

From Cusack

Aug 8

Book in Anon

Die ~~Kat~~ Katastrophe des 8 August
1918. (Schlachten des
Weltkrieges. Band 36)

By Major von Bose

German Books.

Note: "Sanitätler" has

Several references of
interest for ^{me}
when writing

Summer 1916
+ 1918 (any)

C. E. W. B.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE
DUNTRON, FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

TEL. NO. CANBERRA, N.S.W.
All official communication
should be addressed to the
COMMANDANT,
Post Office Box 100,
not to any other person.

This explains why White's proposals
are not with the diaries.

H.N. Vol. 6.
13. 6. 35.

Dear Dr. Bean,

In the course of a conversation this morning General White made a statement which may interest you.

He said that about a month before he left the Corps, General Rawlinson visited H.Q. and informed Gen. Birdwood that Sir Douglas Haig contemplated carrying out a big offensive, that plans were to be prepared but, to ensure secrecy, the proposals were to be written out by hand, not typed. General White then prepared proposals which, as far as he can remember, provided for the employment of the same number of divisions as were eventually used. When Birdy left the Corps General Rawlinson feared that Mr. Hughes might endeavour to have the Australian withdrawn. To lessen the risk of this + to get General Munro thoroughly interested in the plans, General Rawlinson ~~acted~~ induced General Munro to regard them as his own, but was very disappointed when General Munro in his book

claimed all the credit for having originated the proposals for the Aug. 8 offensive!

General White spoke as if his memory had recently been refreshed by a reference to his diary.

I expect that in Vol 6 you will have to determine the authorship of the Aug. 8 plans. The above may therefore open up a fresh line of inquiry. On the other hand you may know all this already.

Yours sincerely

Parsons

24 June 1936

My dear White,

Treloar sent me a very interesting note mentioning a conversation that you lately had with him about the early plans for an offensive on the Somme in 1918.

I have seen the letters from Army which were the occasion for drawing that plan, but have not seen the answer, and your statement to Treloar, that it was not typed, furnishes the explanation.

I should be grateful if you would let me know what the plan was and what happened to it, and, if you recall anything else about it. Treloar also tells me that Rawlinson told you (or someone) that he was anxious, later, to make Monash as much as possible the father of the subsequent plans as he feared that W.M. Hughes might agitate for the withdrawal of the Australians about that time. Hughes did, indeed, take steps about that time to get the Australians a rest - but I think that the matter hadn't come to a head before Aug. 8. I have some notes on that matter too, but have not yet collated them.

I trust that you and yours are all well.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

538 Collins Street,
Melbourne,

27th June 1935.

My dear Bean,

I have just received your letter of 24th inst.

Unfortunately I have not any records by me and can only give you information from memory. My mind is however perfectly clear upon the matters to which I will refer.

Whilst we were at Bertangles, and only a comparatively short time before we relinquished the Corps, General Rawlinson came down to us with Archie Montgomery his Chief of Staff and said he had an important and confidential matter to discuss with us and wished the utmost privacy. We therefore shut ourselves in General Birdwood's office and Rawlinson expounded to us a plan then in the Commander in Chief's mind for a big offensive as early as conditions would allow. Rawlinson said we could contemplate five divisions (I think he added we might have even two more) and that the Canadians would probably be on our right. He expounded his own and the C.in C's views as to passing one division through another adding that the aim was the greatest possible penetration and the best possible rearward organization to facilitate such penetration. He informed us further of the artillery and tank support on which we could rely. He then asked Birdwood to work out in skeleton a plan shewing the frontage (broadly this was indicated on the map) we could take up and the depth of our penetration at various stages. He instructed us very definitely that our plan was to be in our own handwriting, that it must not be typed and that no one but ourselves was to be informed of what had occurred during his visit. The plan was duly taken up by me to Archie Montgomery and that was the last I heard of it until I learned of what the Australian Corps had in contemplation for August 1918.

What I prepared is of no importance however. The important point is that the plan for the August offensive was the Commander in Chief's and Rawlinson's. *This is beyond dispute.*

When John Monash's book came out Montgomery wrote to me saying that Rawlinson and he were - what is the right word? - not annoyed and not offended but perhaps "quite surprised" that Monash had asserted that the plan was of his own

The offensive of August was on the same area as that indicated on the map.

devising and had been suggested by him to Army. Montgomery and I carried on a correspondence for some time on this subject the effect upon me of it being that Montgomery was practically confessing that Rawlinson encouraged Monash to believe he was conceiving and making it clear, that at the time they were deadly anxious not to do anything which might offend the Australian Corps or antagonise Monash, or Hughes who at that time was a cloud on the horizon on the subject of the employment of Australian troops.

The point of real interest to me is not John Monash's view - for which I think he had some justification and I am sure he wrote sincerely - but in the fact, of which I am sure, that credit has always been given wrongly to Foch for the August offensive plan whereas it was Haig who really conceived it and prepared for it.

If there is anything else in which I can help you I hope you will let me know

My very best wishes go to you,

Yours sincerely,

Bondurk White

Dr. C. E. W. Bean D.Litt.
 "Clifton",
 Ortona Road,
LINDFIELD, N.S.W.

A.N.

of Monash's own devising, and struck me at the time as being the most original detail in his plan.

When Rawlinson said you could think in terms of five divisions he was, of course, speaking of the Australian Corps. The Corps was then north and south of the Somme, and so I suppose that you would have played the role that was subsequently played by III Corps north of the Somme, as well as by Aust. Corps. Possibly the two extra divisions were for that purpose. I suppose the Canadians were to come in south of you and the French south of them. Do you remem-

My dear White,

your letter is most interesting, but before I ask you as to the one or two points on which I should like to be certain I should mention that the records that I have seen render it practically certain that Haig, when he proposed that offensive, was acting under a directive from Foch. Haig saw Foch on receipt of this instruction, and the main lines of the joint offensive were agreed upon at a conference between them on April 8.

your letter is most interesting, but before I ask you as to the one or two points on which I should like to be certain I should mention that the records that I have seen render it practically certain that Haig, when he proposed that offensive, was acting under a directive from Foch. Haig saw Foch on receipt of this instruction, and the main lines of the joint offensive were agreed upon at a conference between them on April 8.

I haven't had time to work out the chain of events carefully yet, but I think we now have all the material. I did not mean to tackle the subject until the last volume; but I think I shall have to ~~cover~~ cover it in Vol.V to the extent of making it clear to any careful reader that we know that Monash did not devise the August offensive, though of course he was responsible for many of the details in the plan for his own Corps. Otherwise it may be assumed that we contend that the plan was an Australian one, and, if Edmonds publishes an account of the matter before I do, it might appear that we had to be set right by a statement from the old country. It would be much better for the statement to come from us - even if it is only in a footnote in the volume dealing with April 1918.

Now as to what you tell me. In the first place it was news to me that under the plan projected in your time the Canadians were to be brought down, and it is very important. I had thought that this was John Monash's stipulation - I am under the impression that he once told me so, and that I have it so in my diary. *I take it you are sure of this - it really is a vital point.*

Secondly, it is interesting to know that the aim of the suggested offensive was the greatest possible penetration. When the project was put to Monash the aim was either to reach Chaules Junction, or to command it with artillery.

Third what you say about Rawlinson insisting on "the best possible rearward organisation to facilitate such penetration" suggests that he probably put the same requirement to Monash. The method of passing the leapfrogging brigades through the forward ones (or rather the way in which they were disposed before the move forward) was, I believe

of Monash's own devising, and struck me at the time as being the most original detail in his plan.

When Rawlinson said you could think in terms of five divisions he was, of course, speaking of the Australian Corps. The Corps was then north and south of the Somme, and so I suppose that you would have played the role that was subsequently played by III Corps north of the Somme, as well as by Aust. Corps. Possibly the two extra divisions were for that purpose. I suppose the Canadians were to come in south of you and the French south of them. Do you remember?

I have been constantly asked about this offensive and who was responsible for it, but I have always refused to say anything because until one had all the threads in one's hand one really did not know. Even now I am not confident enough to make a sure statement. But I think that I will give the indication mentioned above.

Edmonds has been most helpful, and I feel sure that I have been able to help him also. When Lloyd George referred to him about Passchendaele he told him that he ought to read our Volume IV. Edmonds wrote to me that L.G. evidently did not take his advice. As a matter of fact he did, and bought a volume of Australia House, which he used pretty largely at least, I am sure from internal evidence that he did so; but he has fenced or tried to fence our points, and of course he doesn't acknowledge it.

Yours sincerely,

Now as to what you tell me. In the first place it was news to me that under the plan projected in your time the Canadians were to be brought down, and it is very important. I had thought that this was John Monash's stipulation and I am under the impression that he once told me so, and that I have it so in my diary. Like of your own kind - it really is a vital point.

Secondly, it is interesting to know that the aim of the suggested offensive was the greatest possible penetration. When the project was put to Monash the aim was either to reach Chateau Junction, or to command it with artillery.

Third what you say about Rawlinson insisting on "the best possible rearward organization to facilitate such penetration" suggests that he probably had the same requirements to Monash. The method of passing the leading brigades through the forward ones (or rather the way in which they were disposed before the move forward) was, I believe

HN
Aug 8 plan
538 COLLINS STREET,
MELBOURNE.

3rd July 1935.

Dr. C. E. W. Bean D. Litt.,
Victoria Barracks,
PADDINGTON, N.S.W.

My dear Bean,

I have just received your letter of the 30th ultimo and think it well to reply to it at once.

The statement you make in your first paragraph is no doubt literally correct. I cannot give you chapter and verse but I know it was the opinion of my contemporaries that Haig had this offensive in mind and suggested it to Foch.

Just
I think you are right in resolving to refer to the subject in Vol.5. I would not like anything that you said to be overthrown by Edmonds.

I am in no doubt whatever of Rawlinson's statement to us respecting the Canadians. Yes, the Canadians were to go in south of us and the French were to be south of them. I am definite also on this point.

It may have been *Monash's* ~~Rawlinson's~~ plan to leap-frog brigades through the forward ones but as a matter of fact at our meeting Rawlinson asked us to arrange for leap-frogging division over division.

I am very interested to read what you write about Lloyd George. I hope that he read Vol.4 but you can be quite certain he would make no acknowledgment of it.

Yours sincerely,

Bondurk White

I Am glad about history. Tell our managers in Sydney speaks by highly opinion BN

COPY.

General Monash's notes.

22/7/18

BAYONVILLERS OFFENSIVE.

Preliminaries.

Relief of C Div. on July 29.
Shortening of front of C Div. - S. of Marrett Wood.
Readjustment of fronts of A, B, & C Div., i.e., A = II
B = III
C = IV

If (?) orders:- pull our IV.

Objectives. N. of Somme must preclude observation on us.
First objective - enemy gun line - artillery penetration.
Second * - distance - halt for rest - arty up.

Leave minor features for exploitation; - e.g., Somme Valley.

~~ALLOTMENT OF TROOPS~~

Allotment of troops to objectives.

(See at end)

Inter-Div. Boundaries.

Artillery.

Depth of penetration for 1st bound.

~~8,000~~

8,000^x - say 22 Brigades of Field Artillery.

Mobile Arty - 1st stage - 1 Bgde per Inf. Bde.

Counter-battery frontage -

Engineering. Pooling of engineers and pioneers - but leave some to each Div.

~~No Infantry~~ No Infantry to be added to engineers.

Opening of - main roads
mule tracks

Railways - Villers-Bretonneux
Corbie

Preparations. Hunn - collection of information.

Tanks. Total available.

Allotment to tasks.

Separate tanks for each objective, i.e., each body of troops.

Tank training - push on.

Div. H.Q. Ry. cutting dugouts.

Corbie

Cable buries ~~(to)~~ for and forward.

Employment of our Divs. (Shall we have a 5th?)

A & B for distant objectives. 4 Bgds in line.

C & D for nearer " more difficult, troops fresher,
4 Bgds in line.

Reorganisation of C & D and outpost line.

Exploitation by the reserve Brigades of A & B.

Agreements as to halting places - with Corps on flanks - on Corps boundaries. Our lines within our own territory are our own affair.

Liaison Work: Amiens Battle

"Reveille" is pleased to receive a letter from Major P. L. Hall, D.S.O., M.C., 24th (Victoria Rifles of Canada) Battalion, who acted as a liaison-officer between the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade during the opening stages of the great offensive from Villers Bretonneux in August, 1918.

An Australian officer, Lieut. A. Davis, of the 57th Bn., acted as Liaison-Officer, from the Australian side, with the 24th Canadian Infantry Battalion, and in his report dated August 10, 1918, spoke of the great race between those two battalions to be first to reach their objective.

In his letter written from 225 St. James Street, West, Montreal, Major Hall mentions that, with two runners, he arrived at the headquarters of the 15th Aust. Inf. Brigade on the night of August 7.

"To all appearances it was a quiet night, with desultory flares and sufficient firing activity to remind us that there was a war on. As was to be expected, the atmosphere on our side was charged with suppressed excitement. It seemed almost incredible that the Germans could still be unaware of what we were doing, and the fact that such was the case showed the efficiency which, at that period of the war, British arms had attained. It also showed of what the R.A.F. was capable, in keeping away the enemy aircraft.

"On arrival at Villers-Bretonneux I had the not-unusual experience of taking several false turnings and more or less losing my way before I located the 15th Brigade Headquarters dugout beyond the town. After reporting to the Brigadier and meeting the members of his staff, all of whom received me cordially, there was nothing for me to do but wait. The quiet continued throughout the night until 4.20—Zero Hour—when the guns opened their barrage, and Hell broke loose. I stood at the dugout entrance amid the most deafening noise imaginable, and saw that unforgettable sight of tanks, infantry, artillery and cavalry attacking — the spirit of victory was in the air already. The thrill it gave is beyond my power of description.

"Following shortly behind the attacking forces the Brigade moved to a new location in the captured territory. It was here that news was received that the objective of the 15th Australian Brigade had been gained, and later word came through that the 5th Canadian Brigade had been equally successful.

"My duties being thus ended, I reported back to my own Brigade Headquarters. When I eventually reached my Battalion, the 24th (Victoria Rifles of Canada), I had the pleasure of meeting Lt. Davis, an officer attached to it, from the Australian Battalion operating on its flank. He appeared to be as much at home in his surroundings as I had in those which I had just left. An example of the friendly rivalry and understanding which existed be-



Col. Kennedy, V.C.

tween our respective troops is illustrated by the following incident:—

"It was decided, previous to the attack, that it would be a help in keeping the Australians and Canadians in touch with each other if a platoon from each of the flanking battalions should operate away from its own unit, across the railway which formed the boundary line between them. Lt. Davis, when informed of the plan, felt a little uneasy lest the Canadians, with whom he had never previously co-operated, should be unable to maintain the speed of the advance. Our Colonel assured him that the 24th Battalion was quite capable of doing so, and suggested that the two Battalions should race to the final objective. The competition was keen; each Battalion had its particular obstacles to surmount; the finish was close; there still seems to be some doubt as to which one got there first.

"This was typical of the relationship between the troops of your Commonwealth and of our Dominion. Their common achievement of success at Amiens, and other occasions of co-operation in the common cause, will remain forever a lasting bond. Ex-soldiers of both countries have a special reason to feel gratified that our respective Governments recently brought into being a trade agreement which gives promise of mutual benefit, not only in a material way, but also in helping to maintain in peace that friendship which existed during the war."

The report of Lieut. Arthur Davis, 57th Bn., who died of illness on February 27, 1919, referring to his work as liaison officer with the 24th Canadian Battalion, says:

"At 5 a.m. (August 8) the Battalion moved into position on south side of railway, platoons in file, and moved forward. Shelling at this point was considerable, and a number of casualties were suffered. For about two hours touch with flanks was rendered difficult on account of fog. At about 7 a.m. the Green Line was reached and the Battalion was re-organised. At this point machine gun fire was rather heavy from an enemy strong point about 600 yards in front of the centre of Battalion sector. Tanks came up at this point, moved through, and engaged the enemy strong point successfully, enabling the advance to continue.

"About 800 yards further on a gully with woods was encountered containing both machine guns and artillery. A slight check occurred at this point, but the leading wave moved forward under covering fire from flanks and tanks and were able to penetrate the wood. The guns, machine guns, field and heavies fell into our hands. The village of Weincourt was reached at about 8.10 a.m. with very slight opposition. Tanks moved through the village, the Battalion moving round the flanks. Practically no further resistance was met until after the village of Guilla-court was passed. The woods east of the village were occupied by machine guns which gave some trouble, but by this time (about 9.30 a.m.) Whippet tanks had come up, and working in conjunction with the Mk V tanks, rendered valuable assistance.

"Progress from this point right up to objective became difficult, as right flank was unprotected and rifle and machine-gun fire was causing a number of casualties. Objective was reached at about 1 p.m. The C.O. (Lieut.-Col. Kennedy, V.C.) spoke in the highest terms of the work done by the 57th Battalion, and was disappointed that it had reached its objective before his Battalion had done so.

Capt. John Iley Snowball, 57th Bn., who died of wounds on August 14, 1918, had also made a report under date August 10, referring to the advance of the flank battalions of the Canadians and Australians. The enemy infantry, according to the report had made "a poor show." His report closed with the question whether in future operations it would be practicable to send forward with the advancing infantry trained men in the use of enemy artillery so that the captured guns could be used against the enemy.

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6-1

General Montgomery-Massingbird

No one has been more ardent in his admiration of the Australian soldier and more generous in his praise of him, than has been General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingbird, formerly Chief of Staff to the Commander of the Fourth Army (Lord Rawlinson), and since 1931 Adjutant-General of the British Forces.

In a letter written from the War Office, Whitehall, under date June 20, Sir Archibald, in forwarding copy of a lecture, entitled "August 8th, 1918," delivered by him at the Royal Artillery Institute, and published in the *Royal Artillery Journal*, says:—

"I have always considered, and I think I was in a good position to know, that the superiority of morale of the British side on Aug. 8 was due more to the effort of the Australians during the previous three months on the Somme front than to anything else.

"The moral superiority they had established over the Germans on this front was very remarkable and undoubtedly spread to other Corps and Divisions. I saw a great deal of the Australian divisions in France in 1916-17-18, more especially perhaps during the last eight months of the war.

"I think what struck me most about them was their individual initiative which is of such enormous value in war, and which was shown time and again during the advance in the last 100 days. . . .

"I am sorry to see my friends in the Australian Corps are gradually passing away, but there are still, I am happy to say, many of them of whom I still hear news."

[Extracts from General Montgomery-Massingbird's lecture will be published in our next issue. The lecture gives impressions of the Battle of Amiens, and includes detail about the German side which the lecturer had obtained from German sources.]

Start

of the commission were exclusively confined to enquiring and making recommendations; and criticisms which were made on the ground that it had not initiated price-fixing disregarded the limited degree of authority which it was capable of exercising.

The new Fisher Government came to the conclusion that the commission was not fulfilling the purposes which the needs of the time required. Mr. Tudor, the Minister for Trade and Customs, in reply to a member of the House of Representatives, complained that "they sat for some months and did nothing," and the ⁸⁹ Minister ^{acting} ~~of Home~~ ^{for External} Affairs, Mr. Mahon, wrote to Mr. Deakin (October 21st) that "in view of the information available to the Government through departmental channels, Ministers consider that further investigations by your Commission are not at present necessary." After further correspondence, Mr. Mahon informed Mr. Deakin (November 18th) that "the desire is that the Commission shall at once terminate." The Commonwealth Gazette of December 5th contained a proclamation notifying that the members of the commission had resigned on November 20th. ⁷¹⁰

Prof. Scott says "Home Affairs" Atkin date JA Arthur was Expt. Affairs, W.O. Mahon and Home Affairs, and Mahon Asst. Min. prob 11/28 Expt. Affairs as he succeeded Arthur, deceased in December Look up Revision

96 Parliamentary Debates, LXXVII, p.3632.

107 The report of the commission, and the correspondence between Mr. Deakin and Mr. Mahon, are printed in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1914-17, Vol. V, pp. 143-192.

There was doubt in the minds of some members of the Fisher Government whether the Commonwealth had power to regulate prices. The Minister for Trade and Customs, in reply to a member who urged action, said, "In my opinion, under the Constitution, ^{as it now stands} we cannot do all that the honourable

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TELEPHONE, VICTORIA 9400.



dictated.

W. G. ...
RECEIVED
22 Jul 1932

WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

20th June, 1932.

Dear Sir,

I have received your letter of the 15th April. I am sure you will realize that it is very difficult for me to write a fresh story about August 8th, especially as I am rather busy in my present appointment. I am, however, sending you a short account of the Battle of Amiens which was published by the Royal Artillery Journal in April, 1929. It gives you a brief resumé of what happened with certain detail about the German side which I got from German sources. I have obtained permission from the R.A. Journal for you to publish this article or any extracts from it you like, subject, of course, to your acknowledging its source.

If you have read the book I published in 1920 "The Story of the Fourth Army" you will know that I have always realized the large part the Australian Forces took in this victory. I have always considered, and I think I was in a good position to know, that the superiority of morale on the British side on the 8th August was due more to the effort of the Australians during the previous three months on the Somme front than to anything else. The moral superiority they had established over the Germans on this front was very remarkable and undoubtedly spread to other Corps
/and

and Divisions. As you probably know, I saw a great deal of the Australian Corps in France in 1916-17-18, more especially, perhaps, during the last eight months of the War from March to November, 1918. I think what struck me most about them was their individual initiative which is of such enormous value in war and which was shown time and again during the advance in the last 100 days.

I am sorry to see that my friends in the Australian Corps are gradually passing away, but there are still, I am happy to say, many of them of whom I still hear news.


I hope this will be in time for you, but to make sure I am sending it by Air Mail.

Yours faithfully,

A. A. Cunningham - he assisted.

General.

R.D. Hadfield, Esq.,
Secretary Returned Sailors & Soldiers'
Imperial League of Australia,
Wingello House,
Angel Place,
Sydney, Australia.



GERMAN SITUATION
AUG. 6TH 1918.

* (Excluding 4 dismounted Cavalry & 1 Austrian Div.)

ALLIED DIV.	
BRITISH	57 ^β
FRENCH	101
AMERICAN	30 [*]
BELGIAN	6
Total	194

^{*} 20 of these were untrained & had not been in the line.
^β Reduced to 10 Batt^{ns}

August 8, 1918

(By General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd*)

WHEN considering the Battle of Amiens it is important not to take it out of its setting. We have to remember, first of all, that it took place at the end of four years of very hard fighting, and whereas in 1914 the Germans had 72 divisions and 11 cavalry divisions on the Western Front, and the Allies—British, Belgian and French—78 Divisions and 8 cavalry divisions, those numbers had grown by August, 1918, to about 200 divisions on each side.

The battle of Amiens was really the beginning of the final round. The armies on both sides, or a considerable part of them, had taken part in the bitter fighting of 1914 and 1915; they had been decimated at Verdun and the Somme in 1916, and at Passchendaele, Arras and Champagne in 1917; and, finally, a large part of them had been through the big German advance of March and April, 1918, with the result that both sides were approaching exhaustion, and it was mainly a question of which side could stay the longest.

The attack of August 8 differed from the German attack on March 21, 1918, in several particulars. On March 21, 40 German divisions attacked the Fifth Army, which consisted of 14 divisions and 3 cavalry divisions, and the Fifth Army, during the next week or so, was only reinforced by one division—the 8th. So it was 40 German divisions attacking 15 British. On the British side, to start with, only 11 divisions attacked, 4 Canadian, 4 Australian, and 3 of the III. Corps, backed up by 3 cavalry divisions—a total of 11 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions. They attacked the Second German Army, which consisted of 15 divisions, two of which were opposite the French XXXI. Corps. That German army was reinforced during the next three days by another 12 divisions, while the Fourth Army was reinforced by 3 divisions, so that the Fourth Army and 14 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions during those four days' fighting engaged altogether 25 German divisions and destroyed a good many of them.

The two main factors of our success on August 8 were undoubtedly surprise and superiority of morale. August 8 is an example of what degree of secrecy can be obtained if proper steps are taken and every detail is worked out, and of the thorough staff work which it required to collect such a large number of men, horses, guns and material on a front of about 22,000 yards without the Germans having the slightest idea that such a force had been collected there. It was done solely by paying due attention to secrecy and by really efficient administrative staff work. It was the administrative arrangements on August 8 that made that victory possible probably more than anything else.

There has been a certain amount written as to who originated the idea of this attack, but the idea came to several people at approximately the same time. On July 12 Marshal Foch wrote to Lord Haig, and told him he wanted to free the Bruay Mines. On July 16, directly after the German attack on both sides of Rheims had failed, Lord Rawlinson saw Lord Haig personally, and put before him verbally a proposal for an attack on the Amiens front, because he felt that the German morale in front of the Fourth Army was very poor and the defences weak. Lord Haig's inclinations were undoubtedly



Late Lord Rawlinson.

in the same direction. He had had his eye on the Amiens front, too, and the result of that conversation on July 16—all these dates fit in very well—was that he wrote to Foch on July 17, saying that he did not like the Bruay plan at all, and that he wished to attack on the Amiens front, secure the junction between the British and French for good and all, and clear the railways.

On July 16 he had told Lord Rawlinson to carry on with his preparations, and on the 17th Lord Rawlinson sent up to G.H.Q. a detailed plan of attack. That, excepting in one important particular, was the attack which was actually carried out, and the important particular is an interesting one, because with all due deference to Marshal Foch I still feel convinced that the original plan would have been even more effective than the plan that was actually carried out. Lord Rawlinson's plan was that the attack from Amiens should take place between Moreuil in the south, and Morlancourt in the north, and should be entirely British; and his reasons for this are clear. One was that four years of experience had shown that an attack by two allied armies was not nearly so easy to keep secret as one carried out by a single army, whether British or French. That was his chief reason. The second was that strategically he considered that it would be much better for the French to collect all the available reserves they could further east and strike in from the south, from the direction of Montdidier, as soon as the British attack had shaken the German defence. This they actually did on August 10, but by that time the first shock of surprise was over, and German reserves had arrived. Lord Rawlinson's plan would have compelled the Germans to face both ways on the 8th, and would have been more effective than the purely frontal attack that actually took place.

That the German morale was very low we had discovered chiefly through the enterprise and dash of the Australian attacks during May and June, finishing up with a surprise attack at Hamel on July 4, in which six Australian battalions advanced on a 6000 yards front, assisted by 60 tanks, and took 1500 prisoners at a cost of 1000 casualties. The British divisions were at a decided disadvantage; they had difficult ground to advance over; they were all divisions which had been fighting in the March retreat; they had lost many of their best officers and had been filled up with 19-year-old boys, and although they had come on very well indeed and were improving every day, they were not, of course, of the same high standard at that time as the Australians or the thousand-strong Canadian battalions. But a remarkable fact about the morale in the British divisions is that out of all the divisions, British and Dominion, that took part in the battle of Amiens there were two (18th and 32nd) that went through the whole fighting up to and inclusive of November 4, which was the last battle that the Fourth Army fought. Those divisions at the end of all that fighting and on the top of what they had undergone before in March and April, were by November 4 probably the equal of any Dominion troops.

Many steps were taken to "mystify and mislead" the Germans. Two Canadian battalions were put in at different parts of the front near Kemmel on the Ypres front and prepared for an attack on Kemmel Hill, which had been lost by the French in April, 1918. Casualty clearing stations and aerodromes were established in that area, and wireless was erected there not only of the divisions in the

(Continued on page 32)

* Chief of Staff to the 4th Army Commander (Lord Rawlinson) in a lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institute, and reprinted from the Royal Artillery Journal.

after passing the wire the line lay down engaging in a fire-fight with the German posts. Then part of the 52nd worked forward and outflanked the Germans, and the whole line rushed them. The enemy - a weak line of machine-gun posts in small bits of trench - was killed, surrendered, or ran away, and the advance continued. The 7th Bedford at this stage were in touch with the right of the 52nd, and advancing as quickly.

(8-point)

The German posts that had been rushed had been formed by two companies of the III/5th Guard Grenadier in the attempt to connect the flank of its division (in the wood) with the right of the 77th Reserve Division, which had swung too far to the south in front of Cachy. They were out of touch with it, and were about to be relieved by the 7th company of the II/5th Foot Guard, whose commander had just visited them⁸² and gone back to bring up his platoons.

⁸²See p. .

The plateau was still brightly illuminated by flares rising ~~xxxx~~ continuously from positions ahead, as well as from Villers-Bretonneux to the left front and from the wood in the left rear. In front of the centre and right the 52nd met, about 500 yards beyond the German outposts, another line of posts in shell-craters. These troops fled before the attacking line reached them. But after the first attack had passed over the position, Captain Kennedy's company, advancing in the second line, heard a machinegun in action close ahead, and saw a bright stream of tracer bullets being fired into the backs of the first line by a German machine-gun crew, who had been overrun there. "There they are, boys," shouted Lieutenant Rogers, and the Germans in the posts were rushed and killed.

(8-point)

These posts apparently formed the northern end of the outpost-line of the 77th Reserve Division, which had been stopped in the morning west of the Villers-Bretonneux--Domart road. It had afterwards been routed by the whippet tanks, but at 5 o'clock its reserve regiment, the 332nd I.R., had advanced about 300 yards, across the

August 8, 1918

(Continued from page 13)

line but also of all reserve divisions. These preparations drew so much attention to the north that King Albert protested officially against an attack being prepared on his front without his being consulted. This was exactly what was wanted, because that rumour immediately spread everywhere. Further south on the front of the First and Third Armies the wireless of the various reserve divisions was erected. A tank battalion near Arras rehearsed attacks by day. Movement of transport by day was allowed in the First and Third Army areas. Several rumours were spread about as regards the destination of the Canadians; one that they were going to relieve the Australians.

On the Fourth Army front the precautions for secrecy were very carefully worked out. One of the most effective was a large coloured poster which was put up in every village in the front and back areas early in July, warning all ranks to keep their mouths shut and not discuss future operations, and pointing out to them what they should do if they were unlucky enough to be taken prisoner. A small leaflet was also issued which was to be stuck in every man's pay-book, giving the same sort of directions. The results were remarkable. Several cases came to light afterwards of men being taken prisoner from whom the Germans were able to find out absolutely nothing. This was ascertained from German intelligence diaries captured during the advance. The men played up extremely well and entered whole-heartedly into the spirit of the orders.

No movement of transport eastward was allowed except at night, and aeroplanes were up all days watching to see if there was any extraordinary movement visible from the air. The work in the back lines was continued up to the evening of August 7. The Canadians were kept well back; they did not actually take over the front line till two hours before zero, and the Germans had no idea at all that the Canadians were in the neighborhood. Officers going up to reconnoitre were warned to go up in very small parties and to avoid a not unusual custom of waving maps about when they got to the front line. No general registration of new batteries was allowed. One hundred and twenty-eight new batteries came into position, and they were only allowed to register a few rounds on a certain definite plan which was laid down by the M.G. R.A. of the army. The corps commanders were not allowed to discuss the plan with their divisional commanders till July 30.

There was intense air co-operation. Machines were swooping down and machine-gunning the guns and transport of the retreating enemy. There was also an intense battle for air supremacy fought during the morning of the 9th, in which I understand at least 70 machines a side took part, with the result that for the time being we had complete air supremacy, but we lost a large number of machines.

(Continued next page)

- 77 Lieut. C.F. Reed, 51st Bn., Draughtman and computer, W. Aust. Govt. Survey Dept.; of Guildford, W. Aust.; b. Guildford, 24 April 1881.
- 78 Lieut. H.A. Haslam, 51st Bn., Bank clerk; of Retanning, W. Aust.; b. Rochester, Vic.; 8 May 1894.
- 79 Lieut. H.A. Fraser, 51st Bn., Accountant; of Kalgoolie, W. Aust.; b. Braidwood, N.S.W.; 21 April 1889.
- 80 Lieut. A.J. Wilkes, 51st Bn., Auctioneer; of Timbora, W. Aust.; b. Gaborlan, 6'land, 8 Aug. 1894. Died in New Guinea, 1933.
- 81 Lieut.-Col. K.G. Watson, M.C., M.M., V.D.; 52nd Bn., Commercial traveller; of Toowoomba, 6'land; b. Toowoomba, 10 April 1897.

stoppage, they had together decided to blow their whistles and charge at it. Their men obeyed the signal, gaps were found, and the troops streamed through them.

(8-point)

With the shells bursting and Very lights going up (says Corporal Steadman⁷⁴, who led a bombing section) it was just like daylight. The machine-gun fire was the worst that ever happened on any front. By sheer luck I found a gap in the wire and led me section through.

A great part of the force had simply to struggle through the strands; the entanglement was constructed "apron fashion",⁷⁵ and each man struggling with the wires tightened them, making it more difficult for others. Among the officers Captain Cooke was killed here, and Captain Stubbings (52nd) and Lieutenants Chanter,⁷⁶ Read,⁷⁷ Haslam,⁷⁸ Fraser,⁷⁹ and Wilkes⁸⁰ (51st) were wounded. Next day the wire was lined with the dead of the two battalions.

The wire ran diagonally, and the line naturally tended to swing parallel to it. The British heavy guns and bombing aeroplanes, however, had now started fires in Villers-Bretonneux, and these formed a fixed landmark, by which officers quickly corrected the direction. A gap which opened between the two front companies of the 52nd was filled by a supporting platoon under ~~Xix~~⁸¹ Lieutenant Hatton. For a few minutes

⁷⁴ Cpl. E. Steadman (No. 3444; 51st Bn.). Wood machinist; of Perth, W.Aust.; b. Durham, Eng., 25 Jan. 1886.

⁷⁵ See Vol. VII, sketch on p. 146.

⁷⁶ Capt. J.R.C.B. Chanter, 51st Bn. Commercial traveller; of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Moama, N.S.W., 1 Aug. 1888.

⁷⁷ Lieut. C.W. Read, 51st Bn. Draughtsman and computer, W.Aust. Govt. Survey Dept.; of Guildford, W.Aust.; b. Guildford, 24 April 1881.

⁷⁸ Lieut. H.A. Haslam, 51st Bn. Bank clerk; of Katanning, W.Aust.; b. Rochester, Vic., 8 May 1894.

⁷⁹ Lieut. M.A. Fraser, 51st Bn. Accountant; of Kalgoorlie, W.Aust.; b. Braidwood, N.S.W., 21 April 1889.

⁸⁰ Lieut. A.J. Wilkes, 51st Bn. Auctioneer; of Tingoorra, Q'land; b. Cabarlah, Q'land, 8 Aug. 1894. Died, in New Guinea, 1933.

⁸¹ Lieut.-Col. N.G. Hatton, M.C., M.M., V.D.; 52nd Bn. Commercial traveller; of Toowoomba, Q'land; b. Toowoomba, 10 April 1895.

minutes....The bullets were still thick. I went forward and put my hand on the boy's shoulder... He said he wasn't hit but was just done up. "Well," I said, "we are all going up in a minute with one of these shells. You are just as safe with the boys." He nodded and said he believed I was right and went after them. He was the only boy I saw hesitate that night.... A little Tommy corporal came stumbling in, weeping like a kid and holding his arm. "Pain bad," says I. "No, Sir," he squeaked, "this is nothing, but I can't get the boys to go forward." He had evidently been trying to rally a very young platoon with a bullet in his arm. A wounded digger boys will hunt

Two disturbing events took place on August 3 and 6. On August 3 a small Australian post of one sergeant and four men was captured at Hourges, which is on the Roye road east of the Luce. On August 6 the 18th Division was attacked north of the Somme. It was a big attack, and was meant for the Australians, who had never ceased worrying, and the Germans sent down a special attacking division, the 27th Wurtemberger, for the purpose. Thirty-two mortars and 96 batteries supported this attack. Unfortunately for the 18th Division, it hit them instead of the Australians, and the Germans penetrated their line to a depth of 800 yards. They took over 200 prisoners and reached some of the artillery dumps. It was thought that they must discover something, but such was not the case. If the prisoners knew anything they gave nothing away, and the Germans found out nothing at all. At the time it was very disturbing.

It is not exaggeration to say that at zero on August 8 the battle was already won. The surprise was so complete, the confidence of the troops was so great, and the forces we had there so superior to the Germans in morale that once the attack was started the result of the battle was never in doubt. It was only a question of how far we could go, and that was largely dependent on the endurance of the troops.

On August 9 the British objectives were Roye, Chaulnes, Bray, Dernancourt. This was a deep objective, but if things were to go as well as they did on August 8 there was no reason why we should not have advanced as far as this. But a mistake was then made, and I am quite certain that the first person to admit it would have been Lord Rawlinson. Our attacks on the 8th were well concerted and on a wide front. Our attacks on August 9 were disjointed. The real reason for this was that the Canadian Corps were allowed to fix the zero hour, whereas it ought really to have been fixed by Army Headquarters. What actually happened was that everyone was so busy congratulating everyone else on their share in the victory that valuable time was lost in preparing for an advance next day. If the Army had fixed the zero hour and had continued to press everyone to lose no time I can see no reason now why the general advance should not have been continued at 6 or 7 next morning.

As we know now, the probability is if this had been done that the German resistance would have broken down completely and we should have reached the Somme during the 10th without much opposition. The lesson of this is an old one, and that is that once you have got your enemy on the run you must press on with every available man until exhaustion renders further pursuit impossible. The reason why the Canadians were allowed to fix the zero hour was that the main attack was to be made by them, while the Australians advanced in echelon on their left.

The III. Corps was to make an attack north of the Somme quite independent of the Canadian and Australian attack, and it was known would not be ready to attack till the afternoon.

What actually took place was as follows. The 4th Canadian Division attacked Le Quesnel at 4 o'clock in the morning and captured it. The 3rd Canadian Division then went through the 4th at 12 o'clock, and reached Bouchoir at 3.30 in the afternoon. On their left the 1st Canadians commenced their advance at 1 p.m. They reached Warvillers and Beaufort by 3.30 and Rouvroy at dusk. Next to them the 2nd Canadians advanced at 11 a.m. with both their flanks exposed for two hours or more. They captured Rosieres and Vrely after some heavy fighting with the 119th German Division, and with the aid of the cavalry reached Meharicourt that evening. North of the railway there was a delay in the arrival of the 1st Australian Division, which was brought up from reserve. The 5th Australians therefore made the initial attack against Vauvillers, which they captured at 1 o'clock. The 1st Australians passed through at 1.40 and attacked towards Lihons. They were not able to advance further than half-way up the Lihons Hill. Further north the 2nd Australians did not capture Framerville till half-past four. North of the Somme the III. Corps did not attack till 5.30. Owing to the German resistance on the previous day there was a good deal of confusion, and it was necessary to give time for an American regiment, the 131st, of the 33rd American Division, to be brought up. This regiment had to double for the last five minutes to enable it to arrive on the starting line in time for zero, and it then advanced, headed by its gallant colonel. This American regiment was largely instrumental in the capture of the Chipilly Spur and the success gained by the III. Corps on August 9. It was supported by the 58th and 12th Divisions. I have no doubt that lives could have been saved and a more satisfactory advance made on the 9th if the attacks of the various divisions had been properly co-ordinated; but even as it was a large further advance had been made, and many more prisoners and guns captured.

and captured this man one also. It had caused dreadful loss along the entanglements; but long before it was stopped the battalions had passed that obstacle. Captain Harburn had found Captain Cooke of the

75 Bvt. F.M. Dequall (No. 2222; 21st Bn.). Station hands; of Gerdidon, W. Aust.; b. Liverpool, Eng., 22 Dec. 1889.

73 Capt. G.E.A. Cooke, 21st Bn. Riflebrigade; of Bonibon, W. Aust.; b. North Victoria, Vic., 29 July 1891. Killed in action, 24 April 1918.

right company of the 5th, and to prevent a permanent

minutes.....The bullets were still thick. I leant forward and put my hand on the boy's shoulder...He said he wasn't hit but was just done up. "Well," I said, "we are all going up in a minute with one of these shells. You are just as safe with the boys." He nodded and said he believed I was right, and went after them. He was the only boy I saw hesitate that ~~night~~ night.....A little Tommy corporal came stumbling in, weeping like a kid and holding his arm. "Pain bad," says I. "No, Sir," he squeaked, "this is nothing, but I can't get the boys to go forward." He had evidently been trying to rally a very young platoon with a bullet in his arm. A wounded digger soothed him. "Never mind, kid," he said, "the boys will hunt Fritz without yous kids."

Some distance ahead of the Cachy Switch was the strong diagonal line of wire originally constructed for it, and, as this was approached, the fire became close and deadly. It was evident that the Germans attacking that morning had established their outpost-line on the other side of the wire. Five or six machine-guns were firing through it, and others from distant positions in the south-east; but most deadly by far was a gun away to the left flank where the wire, running towards Villers-Bretonneux, dipped into the hollow south of the town, and a single German machine-gunner was firing from one of the sunken roads that crossed there, directly along the Cachy road and the wire. The Australians nearest to him were the remnant of Sadlier's platoon, now under Sergeant Dagnall.⁷² The line was temporarily stopped. The Australians near by tried first to get round the open on the right of the gun; next round the open on its left. Eventually Sergeant

(TAKE IN SKETCH No. 178)

Stokes, in his skilful assault upon gun after gun, silenced and captured this ~~one~~ one also.

It had caused dreadful loss along the entanglement; but long before it was stopped the battalions had passed that obstacle. Captain Harburn had found Captain Cooke⁷³ of the

⁷²Sgt. T.N. Dagnall (No. 2529; 51st Bn.). Station hand; of Geraldton, W.Aust.; b. Liverpool, Eng., 25 Dec. 1889.

⁷³Capt. C.E.A. Cooke, 51st Bn. Electrician; of Boulder, W.Aust.; b. North Fitzroy, Vic., 29 July 1891. Killed in action, 24 April 1918.

right company of the 51st, and, to prevent a permanent

H.N. Montgomery

Coblentz,
19th. March, 1925.

My dear Bean,

I was in Cologne on Friday and Saturday on business, and was fortunate enough to find that my visit coincided with a lecture given by Major General Sir Archibald Montgomery, (Rawly's M.G.G.S.), on the Big push on the 8th. August. The lecture was a most interesting one, and possibly contained points which are not in the "Battle of 100 days", and which may be new and of use to you. Here are those which struck me as being the most interesting:

1. One of the chief reasons which gave Rawlinson the idea of an offensive on this front was the tremendous moral superiority which had been gained by the Australians over the Germans.
2. Rawlinson's original idea was for the British Army to push East from Dernancourt down to about Domart, and for the French to strike upwards towards Montdidier. Foch was against this, and Rawlinson was overruled, though Montgomery says he cannot remember that Foch produced any really decent arguments.
3. Rawlinson learned much from (a) the German Spring Offensive; (b) Hamel; (c) Mangin's counter-attack at Villers Cotteret. From (a) he learned that reserves should start moving at the same time as the troops in front hop the bags, the whole offensive thus moving at zero; (b), everything went like clockwork at Hamel, and the 8th. August show was all arranged on Hamel lines, Hamel being regarded as a miniature model attack; from (c) he learned that SURPRISE was everything.
4. Montgomery thought that Monash was a little unfair to the 3rd. Corps. They were badly knocked about on the 6th. August, the new Brigade brought in having never seen the ground; their cadres had been filled up largely with boys, and there was a great lack of experienced officers. The ground was undoubtedly very difficult and unsuitable for tanks, and they started the attack without the tanks, which were an hour late. The great anxiety all over the front was Gas, (This was why Abbey Wood was left absolutely empty, as it was the Germans' favourite gassing ground), and the 3rd Corps was the only one prior to the attack which got a dose. These are Montgomery's excuses for the 3rd. Corps.
5. In Montgomery's opinion the success of the whole battle was due to three things: Superior morale; Surprise; and Good Organisation.
6. German superiority in numbers on the 8th. August was pretty much the same as on the 21st. March, but there was a tremendous difference in morale. Mangin's attack, especially, had caused great depression, not only in the German Army, but also in Germany itself, the people not understanding that if German troops were winning, how the Allies could put up a successful counter-attack. This

/This opinion reacted again on the Army by correspondence.

7. Montgomery could never understand why the Cavalry could not get any further at Rosieres, Vrély and Varvillers. He knows now, (because I told him) it was the 119th. Division which had just come in, and the same reason holds good at Vauvillers and Framerville, where new troops also held up the attack.
8. Montgomery thought Ludendorff's plan of counter-attack to take place on the 10th. was sound, but owing to the speed of our attack and the progress made, he could not use the divisions he had massed to the North and South to strike downwards and upwards on each flank, and had to put them in individually, thus, of course, lessening the driving force which a massed and organised counter-attack would have had.
9. On the 9th. our attacks were very disjointed, and although progress was made, Rosieres, Vrély, Warvillers and Beaufort being captured, these successes did not bring with them the advantages which had been gained by an organised and united effort. Montgomery is of the opinion that had a general and organised attack been put in earlier on the 9th., we should have undoubtedly broken clean through. (I think you will agree with this: I certainly do). The reasons for the attacks on the 9th. being disjointed and at different hours of the clock are largely psychological: the troops had marched fighting a tremendously long way; they had been very successful, and both troops and staffs, from the highest to the lowest, were inclined to spend a little time in congratulating themselves. As the result of this, the Canadians, Australians, and 3rd. Corps (Americans) all gained their next objectives at different times, and as a matter of fact, the 3rd. Corps did not get on to theirs until 5.30 p.m., and did so by running the last mile, led gallantly by an American colonel of 60. There is no doubt that this officer's attack was the backbone of the 3rd. Corps effort on the 9th.

I think this is all, and hope that some of the above points are new to you.

It was delightful seeing Montgomery again, he was just the same. Long had been for a hurried chat with him after the lecture - annoying no doubt the generals crowd - would wonder who this blasted civilian was! Hope you are going strong.

Cheerio

*Yours ever
E.H.*

August 8th. Conference before the battle.

From Gellibrand, (9/11/35)

When Monash called his great conference before the battle of Aug 8 he stressed (as he did before Sept 29) that the crux of the operation would be the provision of roads & bridges behind the troops as they advanced. For this purpose he proposed to take all the pioneers & engineers & place them under Footscas corps troops.

Everyone sat quiet, but Gellibrand, whose training had ~~been~~ instilled into him & if he had a doubt he must make it known (in duty to his superior), asked whether it would not be better to leave the divl. commanders a small part of their engineers - say

2 corps of pioneers - for ^{urgent &} immediate tasks. He was rather sharply answered.

Later, when M^{had} expounded a plan of going for the first objve with the 2nd & 3rd Divs; waiting there 2 (?) hours; & then going on with the 4th & 5th - Gellibrand asked whether it might not be advisable to provide for the probable case of the 1st objve being very easily attained & the 2nd & 3rd Divs being fully fit to go on to the later objectives. ^{(This was, says G, what happened).} In that case Monash would have two fresh divs to go on with.

This second interruption was very forcibly answered; Gellibrand didn't go on with his suggestion which was that, if this happened, the signal that the 3rd & 2nd should go on should be given by 1 firing of 3 salvos by all batteries (an unmistakable signal, he thinks).

Hist. Notes. Original.

of explanation
Notes ~~from~~ Sir John Monash/to Wilkin
and myself on the evening before Aug 8th.

The Australians will have four divisions in the attack and one in reserve. The Canadians will have two divisions south of us - they are at present lying behind three ~~battalions~~ of our 13th Bde - one division behind each battalion. We have cavalry attached to us and the Canadians have a similar brigade attached to them and there is cavalry in reserve.

I want you to direct your mind to the big salient which we have here opposite us - Albert-Villers Bretonneux-Montdidier-Assenvillers-Noyon-Cer..... (unreadable)

We attack tomorrow with the 3rd and 2nd divisions. The 4th and 5th pass through them. And the 1st is in reserve. The 13th Bde has been left in to cover the Canadians and so the 1st Bde has been lent to the 4th divn.

The French First Army on our right will attack tomorrow and both they and our three Corps will be under Haig for the first day. After that they will be (if all goes well) an extension of the fight southwards involving other French armies, and the fighting will come under Foch.

Zero is to be 4.20.

1st line (green) Cerisy
Lamotte
Mezieres

2nd line (Red) Chipilly
Morcourt
Guillaucourt
Caveux exclusive.

3rd Line (blue) Meri-court-Harbonnieres-
Dotted line (i.e. line to which the cavalry
may go if they get through)
Caix
le Quesnel

This is the first days objective including that for the cavalry corps. The Canadians will have to leapfrog if the Cavalry do this.

The most that the Germans can materialise within 24 hours is 5 divisions. Within 48 hours they can materialise 6, that is 6 including the other 5. Within 72 hours they can get the number up to 8. Within 96 hours they can bring it to 10. If we deprive him of Chaulnes he will have to detrain at Nesle. If he has to detrain at Peronne or ~~Nesle~~ he will be 24 hours later.

Two of his 5 divisions immediately available are north of the Somme, and 2 have been put into the line in the last two days. Probably therefore, there can be no big attack by him before 4 day

The cavalry will push on to LIHONS on the 9th August if successful.

The red line is the necessary advance of the day. We have to get that. The blue line has been decided on as the objective in ~~the~~ case the advance is easy.

You will see that at the end of the first day the 1st divn is still unused, except that the 1st Bde has been lent to the 4th Divn. The moment the 1st Bde moves out the 2nd and 3rd Bdes will move into the Aubigny line (or from it?) The 1st Divisions use depends on what the Canadians do.

The blue line is the old Amiens defence line. All the wire has been taken away by the British during the salvage operations after the Somme. We have seen the Germans practising (?) there.

The Australian Corps under my command for this operation has 5 divisions of infantry, 18 brigades of artillery, 4 battalions of tanks, a battalion of motor machine guns, one regiment of light horse (which I am putting almost entirely on to traffic control), the cyclist battalion, the Corps flying squadron, There will be 24 other squadrons, 450 planes - some having special tasks. (I

think this was for the whole army)

reached in order to prevent the teams from getting the guns away.

On Zero the 4th and 5th divisions will move from the positions where I told you they were inhabiting (rather than garrisoning) the area -

	4
1	12
	8
14	15

They will move from valley to valley in such time as to cross the green line at zero plus four hours.

The battle from the green line to the red line is open warfare.

So much for the infantry.

Artillery.

The battle begins with 18 Field Artillery brigades in line for the capture of the first objective, as well as all heavy artillery. The barrage for the field artillery is a series of straight lines with 100 yards leaps - the simplest barrage map that has ever been drawn. For the 10 minutes when the barrage will be crossing Gun Valley the rate of fire will increase from Rapid to Intense.

It will be a two line barrage. There will be an 18 pdr line ahead of the infantry. And a line of 4.5 inches with instantaneous fuse bursting 200 yds beyond the 18 pdr.

There will be no heavy artillery back barrage in regular sense. Instead, there will be a H.A. bombardment of selected places in advancing zones. These zones are ruled like the barrage. And the artillery will advance from one to the other at stated times. All heavy artillery fire on the road is to be with inst. fuse so as not to destroy the main road.

The barrage opens with three rounds of smoke in the first three minutes to provide obscuration for tanks. After that it will be all H.E. If it is fine there will be ^{no} further smoke. But this depends on the state of the ground as regards dust.

On the arrival at the green protective barrage each gun will fire 3 rounds of smoke as a signal to the infantry that they are on their objective. The barrage, or rather a portion of it, is maintained here until Zero plus 4 hours.

The balance of the barrage, in order to keep the battle alive, sweeps forward in bursts of fire so that the enemy will not be able to tell that we have stopped. As soon as certain brigades reach the protective line they stop firing. Six brigades will stop thus. Teams are harnessed at zero, and the arrangement is that they shall reach their guns by zero plus 1½ hours. The guns limber up and pull out of the barrage. Six ^{artillery} brigades go forward and each joins one ^{infantry} brigade. i.e. the artillery of each division plus one Australian army brigade to each division.

Each infantry brigade has a machine gun coy and a Field Coy and a coy of pioneers. And a bearer subsection of ambulance.

Now these brigades in the second half of the battle have to push forward each with the utmost possible speed to the red line irrespective of what the others do. The barrages are laid down on the maximum possible speed of the infantry (heavy arty barrage, that)

In addition to 6 brigades of field artillery each division has a battery of 60 pdrs - 8 horsed - which also goes forward.

The 60 pdrs are under the C.R.A. of the division.

In addition, 6 other bdes of field arty (5 Australian 1 British) also pull out of the barrage and are allotted not to the brigadiers but to the divl commanders. Each divl commander has three further brigades of arty. These have to be definitely employed defensively.

These go straight on to a forward position to be ready to cover the infantry wherever they stop (to answer S.O.S.) There is thus a defensive organisation from the start.

This leaves 6 brigades which are the corps reserve of artillery (field artillery). These also move forward but are not allotted tasks till it is known how the battle develops. If the infantry reach the red line all artillery has orders to move east of

Warfusee valley. This is to leave that valley for the H.A.

HEAVY ARTILLERY go over with programme. Every battery, as it begins to get out of range starts moving forward to Warfusee Valley. All mark 19 ~~xxxxx~~ 6 inch guns are being pushed forward to engage Chaulnes railway junction. Only 12 inch can reach it at present. But 6 inch will be able to do so then. Counterbattery artillery also will move forward.

At first c/battery will engage 5 known groups of guns. The counterbattery guns amount to two-thirds of the h.a. A prisoner told us that none of the German groups had been shifted recently. We have lately been encouraging them to keep their guns where they are by not firing on them. We have been engaging pits which we knew to be empty.

As the battle shifts on and the guns have to lift off the nearer groups of batteries they will all concentrate onto the last group till all of them will be onto that group - all that are then in range, that is to say. That last group is his H.V.guns.

Tanks.

We have 4 battalions of tanks. That is to say:

1 Bde (3 bns) Mark V - 108 tanks.

1 Bn Mark V Star

1 Bn motor machineguns.

About 30 carrier tanks. These go mostly to front phase divisions. There are also supply tanks for the tank corps, which are not counted in this - that is an arrangement of their own - I don't know how many they have.

The Mark 5 tanks are allotted - 1 Bn to each division.

12 tanks in front of each brigade and 12 tanks in divisional reserve - i.e. 36 tanks each division.

That is to say to the divisions which start at Zero.

For the other divisions which leapfrog - the 5th divn gets the third battalion of tanks. The 4th Divn gets two spare companies.

Thus in the second phase there are 48 tanks plus any which have survived the first phase. The battalion commander will give them their tasks on the spot. Our tank resources in the area of the first phase are therefore 10 per cent better than at Amel. In the second phase we may have anything from 48 to 96 tanks.

So the advance will be: Van of tanks. Advanced guard battalion for each brigade. 2 main body battalions. Reserve battalion. There will be plenty of m.gs with the reserve battalion. Behind these will come the reserve brigade. (This apparently describes the advance in the second phase. C.E.W.B.)

If we reach the red line without employing 1st and 14th bdes, these will advance to the blue line. But if not, 36 Star Mark V Star tanks will be employed. Each will carry - in addition to 2 60 pdrs and 4 m.gs, three Lewis Gun detachments, plus infantry and an infantry officer. There will be 18 of these to each division 16 of these being to carry the m.gs; 1 for the C.O. and one for signals. These follow the battle. From a Rendezvous they are directed by fours to certain regular zones on the blue line. If they carry this out successfully there will be a machinegun every 80 yds right along the blue line. This is besides the m.gs of the tanks themselves. This effort is to supply the garrison to the blue line, a garrison strong enough to allow the reserve bdes to come up and garrison it. There will be also, for this third phase (Blue line) as many tanks as have survived the battle - possibly over 100 tanks.

The divisions will then hold the front line with 2 Bdes in line and one in reserve. If they are all right the 2nd and 3rd Divisions may go to sleep. The 1st Divn will go up to old front line

Motor Machine Gun Bn.

Two lines of advance on roads are planned for each division. Half the engineering of the Corps is on this. Half these roads are already trafficable. There should be an 8 foot track to Warfusee within two hours after zero. This will allow the motor machineguns through. The engineers have a pilot with them. And their cars will go out into the blue after Zero plus 4 hours.

12 cars are allotted to Gen Hobbs. 4 to Corps. 6 of the 5th divisional cars are to go to known centres of communications ~~xxxxxxx~~ to destroy telephone exchanges. The other 6 will go to points such as CappyDump, Chuignolles, which is a Corps Headquarters, Proyart, which is a divisional Hqrs. The armoured cars have an Australian flag to raise in Harbonnieres. The mark V tanks have a flag also.

The other 4 cars are for a special long distance reconnaissance for the G.O.C.

There is laid down a round road for motor traffic. ~~xx~~ special roads for horse waggons. 6 Sqns of light horse will act as traffic control. Mules must under imperative orders go by other roads. The railway to Corbie is fit for use. The first night's food for the 3rd and 4th Divisions may get to Corbie by rail. At Villers Bretonneux the rly has been reestablished as far as the cutting where the ~~xxx~~ Bde Hqrs is. The Canadians should be able to open it to Villers Bretonneux by the first night. This should bring the pack train and munitions up.

All heavy artillery, with flash spotting organisations etc should move forward before the enemy's guns arrive instead of creeping up under fire. The H.A. have an army troops coy specially allotted for this purpose - to make ready the routes etc for them to get up. This is the first time when the heavy artillery has ever gone forward like this.

Cavalry.

One brigade of cavalry is under the G.O.C's orders. This is the 5th Cavalry Bde of the 1st Cavalry divn. They arrive from westward at a point east of Marcelcave, and ~~patrols~~ follow Hobbs and go forward with the infantry. Their role is to judge of the situation in front. And if the situation is satisfactory and they judge that the cavalry can go through horsed, they are to go back to their brigade and go through. These patrols will be unmounted.

This is to avoid what happened in the Cambrai show where there was an opening and no cavalry to go through. If they find that no opportunity presents itself, there is no harm done.

General Currie is going to do the same with the cavalry allotted to him. He has a cavalry brigade allotted to him. It will be south of the rly. If they find an opening first, then our cavalry will go through it with them - if we find it they will all go through with us. Whichever brigade patrols first find an opening the whole cavalry division will go through it.

Air Service.

Each Corps has its own squadron for contact patrol. There are 24 other squadrons 8 of which are Camel scouts. These will go for the German aerodromes.

There will be 4 bombing sqns (night)

4 day bombing sqns.

2 c/attack sqns.

The rest will be low flying sqns to prevent the artillery getting away and to attack the infantry.

From 9.30 to midnight, and from 3.20 to 4.20 there will be the usual camouflage flying.

Of course the great anxiety is the left flank - especially the Chipilly Spur and Bend. I have made such an outcry on this point that Butler has been told that he must keep on the battle and go on attacking all day if necessary till he takes this. But through previous experience I am not counting on it. I have made arrangements to refuse my flank if necessary.

One sqn of aeroplanes will drop ammunition for the blue line m.g.s. We are trying one new experiment. At stated hours, abt

the time when we expect the infantry to be attacking various places the aeroplanes will drop phosphorous bombs at various points where he would be likely to have artillery observers- for example S. of Verisy, one at Zero plus 4 at Bayonvillers and Guillaucourt, and at plus 5 at S of Mericourt and at Carbonnieres.

The general also told us that before this attack he had to decide whether the attack should be made in order to get the enemys guns, or whether it should aim at getting the important junction of Chaulnes. He decided to go for the less extensive objective and get the enemys guns. The blue line was drawn with the object of doing this. Within that line were the great majority of the guns - practically all. The junction could be dealt with by artillery if we got so far as to get the guns. He had decided to deal with the junction with artillery only, and to make his objective the scooping in of the guns.

At the end of our interview I asked him what preparations had been made in case everything went well. It was perfectly certain, it seemed to me, that if everything went well we shd be asked to exploit this. What arrangements had been made for doing so. Were there any troops behind to put through?

Monash said that he had the first division in case of eventualities - they would be the troops immediately available for exploitation. But he understood that no exploitation was intended. He himself had told Lawrence that if he wanted to exploit the success it would be necessary to have all arrangements made and the troops ready there. And Lawrence had said to him "We intend to make this attack a limited one)- under no circumstances will the objectives be exceeded." I am writing this from memory, and a slight difference in the wording may make a big difference in the sense. But there is no doubt whatever about that being the sense as

Monash told the facts to me. The only doubt is as to whether Monash's statement of the facts was coloured or absolutely represented the spirit of his conversation with Lawrence. I give it as I remember it. x

Note. Last notes (below the ruled line) are evidently Monash's views expressed to me at my first interview with him before the battle (Aug 4 or 5) not on Aug 7 at the time of the interview in which he outlined the detailed plan as recorded on pp 1-5. The notes on pp 1-5 are my transcription of shorthand notes made at the time - (but considerably amplified by what I remembered). (E.W.B. 1/12/38.)

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

Corps Headquarters,

August 7, 1918.

To the Soldiers of the Australian Army Corps.-

For the first time in the history of this Corps all five Australian Divisions will tomorrow engage in the largest and most important battle operation ever undertaken by the Corps.-

They will be supported by an exceptionally powerful Artillery, and by Tanks and Aeroplanes on a scale never previously attempted.- The full resources of our sister Dominion, the Canadian Corps, will also operate on our right, while two British Divisions will guard our left flank.

The many successful offensives which the Brigades and Battalions of this Corps have so brilliantly executed during the past four months have been but the prelude to, and the preparation for, this greatest and culminating effort.-

Because of the completeness of our plans and dispositions, of the magnitude of the operations, of the number of troops employed, and of the depth to which we intend to overrun the enemy's positions, this battle will be one of the most memorable of the whole war; and there can be no doubt that, by capturing our objectives, we shall inflict blows upon the enemy which will make him stagger, and will bring the end appreciably nearer.-

I entertain no sort of doubt that every Australian soldier will worthily rise to so great an occasion, and that every man, imbued with the spirit of victory, will, in spite of every difficulty that may confront him, be animated by no other resolve than a grim determination to see through, to a clean finish, whatever his task may be.-

The work to be done tomorrow will perhaps make heavy demands upon the endurance and staying powers of many of you; but I am confident that, in spite of excitement, fatigue, and physical strain, every man will carry on to the utmost of his powers until his goal is won; for the sake of AUSTRALIA, the Empire, and our cause.

I earnestly wish every soldier of the Corps the best of good fortune and a glorious and decisive victory, the story of which will re-echo throughout the world, and will live forever in the history of our home land.-

John Monash.

Lieut.-General,
Commanding Australian Corps.

8TH AUGUST OFFENSIVE.

TIME - TABLE OF EVENTS.

Time	Event
a. m.	
3.20	Planes in air.
4.20	Zero. Barrage Opens.
4.59	Infantry clear of TAILLOUX WOOD.
5.27	Barrage reaches protector on North Flank.
5.28	III Corps reaches GREEN LINE.
5.43	Infantry enter WARFUSEE.
6.27	Infantry clear of LA MOTTE en SAMTERRE.
6.30	III Corps leave GREEN LINE.
6.31	3rd DIVISION all on GREEN LINE.
6.39	2nd DIVISION all on GREEN LINE.
6.43	Barrage reaches protective line on South Flank.
6.50	Contact Plane flies along First Objective Line.
7.20	Canadians reach GREEN LINE at our Boundary.
7.28	III Corps reaches BROWN LINE.
8.20	4th & 5th DIVISIONS cross GREEN LINE.
8.24	III Corps reaches RED LINE.
8.30	Heavy ARTILLERY lift off CERISY. Canadian Heavy ARTILLERY lift off WIENCOURT.
8.40	Heavy ARTILLERY lift off WEST end of BAYONVILLERS.
8.50	Heavy ARTILLERY lift off EAST end of BAYONVILLERS and MORCOURT.
9.50	Heavy ARTILLERY lift off EASTERN MORCOURT VALLEY.
10.20	Heavy ARTILLERY lift off HARBONNIERES.
10.50	Contact Patrol Planes fly over Second Objective Line.
11.20	Contact Patrol Planes fly along Third Objective Line. Ammunition-Dropping Planes drop their S.A.A.

*Saturday Herald
16/11/31*

WAR STORY RECALLED.

Capture of German Plans.

PART AUSTRALIANS PLAYED.

LONDON, Nov. 14.

Because he captured the German plans of the Hindenburg line of defences, the "Sunday Express" describes Lieutenant J. Rollings, who is now a sergeant of police, as "the man who ended the war." The Australians play a prominent part in his story, which is confirmed by the colonel of the battalion which made the raid.

The plans were captured 10 miles east of Amiens on August 8, 1918, after the Australians, at Villers Bretonneux, had made a breach in the line, enabling an armoured car unit, of which Rollings was a member, to race through to find the German corps' headquarters at an old farmhouse, from which the staff had fled in a panic. Rollings scooped up every document and dashed back. He never knew the part those papers played in ending the war until now.

Describing the action in which the Australians took part, he says: "Dawn! Then hell broke loose. The Australians went over like men possessed. In 15 minutes we received the signal, 'They're through.' Off we went. Looking back we could see the Australians dealing with the German rearguard."

PP. 168-70. Aust Siege Bde History

see tables of Arty + Ammunition figures of Aust Corps.
Aug/Sept 1918.

302 SECOND VILERS-BRETONNEUX

of wire. On the left in front of the Gort, the German
shoot to the bank of the left brigade and to the right
force put up hardly any resistance. Lieutenant Simpson,
commanding the left company, Lieutenant Vial, of the
northwestern platoon and Lieutenant West, one of the guides
from the Gort, were constantly on the look out for
the bank of the left brigade, with which they were to gain
touch; but except for a machine gun post of the left com-
pany, passed at the beginning of the second advance, they saw
nothing of it. Captain Gurney of the Gort knew that he
was in position. Lieutenant Gurney's platoon had
been to pass over a trench containing a wood, which was
the "map reference" of the locality, over a ditch. But when
once the Gort started, the Gort did not march towards the
Gort where the fighting was heaviest. Both battalions swung
slightly towards the Roman road, finding German bar-
bed wire out of the shell-holes in which they crossed
or surrounded, and paying attention to the blast of the
enemy were being shaken apart, by the first wild
charge. They were followed until a crossroad was passed,
and on the far side of it, south of the Roman road, appeared
the Gort and the canvas hangars of the old aerodrome.
There an officer of the Gort came along the front, shouting
that the objective had been passed. The men were excited,
marching a handful of German and British captives in some
houses near the Roman road, and searching for German
the hangars; but north of the main road they officers and
N.C.O.'s quickly regained control. Men of the front, rear,
and support companies of all three battalions were there.
Casualties had been slight—about 150 in all, it is said. The
enemy's artillery had ceased to trouble the Gort since they
broke into the German front. Except for light machine
machine-gun fire, mainly from the village behind them.

Sketch with

of wire. On the left, in front of the 60th, the Germans closer to the flank of the 14th Brigade and to the British posts put up hardly any resistance. Lieutenant Simpson,⁷⁶ commanding the left company, Lieutenant Veale,⁷⁷ of the northernmost platoon, and Lieutenant Watt, one of the guides from the 56th, were constantly on the look out for the flank of the 14th Brigade, with which they were to gain touch; but, except for a machine-gun post of the 14th Company, passed at the beginning of the second advance, they saw nothing of it. Captain Bursey of the 59th knew that he ~~was precisely~~ in position, Lieutenant Olver's⁷⁸ platoon happening to pass over a trench containing a board marked with the "map reference" of the locality, o.24.d.3.o. But, when once the rush started, the 60th bore too much towards the 59th, where the fighting was heavier. Both battalions swept obliquely towards the Roman road, pulling Germans here and there out of the shell-holes in which they crouched or surrendered, and bayoneting them. Most of the enemy were fleeing, shaken, apparently, by the first wild cheer. They were followed until a cross-road was passed, and on the far side of it, south of the Roman road, appeared the huts and big canvas hangars of the old aerodromes.⁷⁹

started exactly/

Here an officer of the 59th came along the front shouting that the objective had been passed. The men were excited, unearthing a handful of Germans and British captives in some houses near the Roman road, and searching for Germans in the hangars; but north of the main road their officers and N.C.O's quickly obtained control. Men of the front, reserve, and support companies of all three battalions were there. Casualties had been slight—barely 150 in all, it is said. The enemy's artillery had ceased to trouble the troops since they broke into the German front. Except for blind, distant machine-gun fire, mainly from the village behind them,

⁷⁶ Lieut. J. L. Simpson, 60th Bn. Clerk; of Ballarat, Vic.; b. Horsham, Vic., 22 Sept., 1892. Killed in action, 26 April, 1918.

⁷⁷ Lieut. P. J. Veale, 60th Bn. Battery manager; of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Sandhurst, Vic., 18 Jan., 1888.

⁷⁸ Lieut. H. Olver, 57th and 59th Bns. Grocer; of North Fitzroy, Vic.; b. Murtoa, Vic., 4 Nov., 1887.

⁷⁹ See Vol. XII, plate 465.

TELEPHONE NOS.
F 2597,
F 2598.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS
"AUSWARMUSE,"

COMMUNICATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED TO
"THE DIRECTOR."

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO.

"They gave their lives. For that public gift they received a praise which never ages and a tomb most glorious—not so much the tomb in which they lie, but that in which their fame survives, to be remembered for ever when occasion comes for word or deed"

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL,

POST OFFICE BOX 214 D,

318 POST OFFICE PLACE,

MELBOURNE.

February 18th, 1932.

Dear Mr. Bazley,

Capture of Defence plans of Hindenburg Line.

I am ~~enclosing~~ some cuttings from English and Australian papers relative to the capture on August 8th, 1918, by a lieutenant of the 17th (Armoured Car) Tank Battalion of the defence plans of the Hindenburg Line. The importance of the capture of these documents is perhaps greatly exaggerated but it has occurred to me that the account of the incident might be of interest to you in connection with Volume IV.

--
+ posting under separate cover

Reference is made in the cuttings to a souvenir history of the 17th (Armoured Car) Tank Battalion which provided the armoured cars attached to the Australian Corps on the 8th August, 1918. We are communicating with the C.O. of the battalion (Col. E.J. Carter) with a view to obtaining a copy of the history for the War Memorial library.

Yours sincerely,

Mr. A.W. Bazley,
c/o Official Historian,
Victoria Barracks,
PADDINGTON, N.S.W.

7305.

23 February 1932.

Dear Major Treloar,

Many thanks for the press cuttings about Lieutenant Rollings' exploit at Framerville. As they contain a few incidental details which may not be recorded elsewhere in our files, they will be useful when Dr. Bean comes to write the story of the August 8 offensive. As Dr. Bean has a copy of the "Daily Express" article with his own notes (I think Cusack gave it to us), I am today sending back the cuttings to you.

I hope that you will succeed in obtaining a copy of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion's history. This would be quite an important acquisition to the library records.

Yours sincerely,

Major J.L. Treloar, O.B.E.,
Australian War Memorial,
Box 214D, G.P.O.,
Melbourne.

THE MAN

NOW A POLICEMAN IN SOUTH WALES.

HIS OWN STORY OF THE RAID.

THE Man Who Ended The War—the forgotten subaltern who captured the Hindenburg Line defence plans and so enabled the allied armies to crash through and force an Armistice—has been found.

He is Lieutenant E. J. Rollings, M.C., of the 17th (Armoured Car) Tank Battalion, and now Sergt. E. J. Rollings, of the Neath police, South Wales.

For thirteen years he has patrolled the streets of Neath unaware of the great part he played in the world's history.

Yet had he not, on August 8, 1918, dashed in his armoured car into enemy territory nine miles in advance of our own front line and raided a German Corps headquarters the war might have lasted another two years.

The dramatic revelations in last week's "Sunday Express" that it was an unknown and unhonoured subaltern who, by capturing these German plans, had brought the war to an abrupt end set all Britain talking.

SCORES OF LETTERS.

Scores of young officers sent in letters in the belief that they were the men concerned, but a careful and exhaustive investigation has left little doubt that Sergeant Rollings made the vital raid and found the plans that gave almost yard-by-yard details of the Hindenburg Line.

He was the only man who did not make the claim personally. The information was sent by one of his colleagues Lieut. J. T. Yeoman, who was wounded in the battle.

A few days after the raid Colonel E. J. Carter, who was in command of the battalion, was personally congratulated by the King on the achievements of his men in the raid.

An account of this incident appears in a souvenir history of the battalion's work. It reads:—

"The King was motoring to Villers-Bretonneux, and seeing the armoured cars by the roadside, sent for an officer.

"Lieutenant Herd was the officer on duty . . . and he was able to give the King full details of the raid.

"The King congratulated the section on their achievement."

Later he saw Colonel Carter and had a long talk with him.

A "Sunday Express" representative yesterday took Sergeant Rollings to

see his old colonel, who is still in the Service. They shook hands on it. "There is no doubt about it," said the colonel, "he is your man."

The story of the raid is almost as dramatic as its consequences. The plans were actually captured at Framerville, ten miles east of Amiens, in the battle of August 8, 1918. Listen to Sergeant Rollings' own version:—

"The 17th (Armoured Car) Tank Battalion, in which I was a lieutenant, was a movable unit, and on August 7, 1918, we received sudden orders to attach ourselves at once to the Australian Corps at Villers-Bretonneux, a hundred miles away.

"RACE THROUGH" ORDER.

"We arrived there the same night, and our orders were short and to the point.

"We were to wait behind the line until the Australians had made a break in it, then race through, search for all German headquarters, raid them for documents, and shoot every German on sight.

"I received personal orders to concentrate on a German headquarters at Framerville, which was nine miles in advance of our front line.

"Before dawn the next morning we were all at our posts, waiting. I was in charge of two armoured cars.

"Dawn—and hell broke loose. The Australians went over like men possessed, and fifteen minutes later we received the signal—they were through!

"Off we went, leaving the Australians straining at the leash in the German front line, eager for more successes.

"The tanks towed us for two and a-half miles, and here we found the roads free from shell-holes, and left them behind.

GERMANS IN SIGHT.

"Framerville was now about seven and a-half miles away. In the distance we could see the German rearguard still retreating but fighting desperately to make a stand.

"I knew that if the break in the line was filled that would be the end of us, but I decided to make a bid for it, and we raced at top speed along the Amiens-St. Quentin road.

"After a while, however, we found we had to fight our way through the retreating Germans, but they were completely disorganised and we killed them in scores. My chief worry was our own shells, which were dropping dangerously near.

"By noon we had fought our way through to Framerville, with the German rearguard behind us being dealt with by the Australians.

"We found the German Corps headquarters in an old farmhouse. I remember there were three steps leading

to the door, because I mounted them slowly, revolver in hand.

"But the German staff had fled few minutes before, apparently, and so complete was their panic that they had not stopped to burn their papers.

"Some of the documents were torn up, but I packed every scrap into sandbags. I could not read German, and in any case I had no time to read any of the documents, so every little torn-up scrap went into the sandbags.

"When I came out I found my gunners in the car, holding up four German staff officers. We took all their papers and revolvers, but they were killed by a sudden burst of machine-gun fire.

"For three more hours we mopped up villages within a radius of twelve to fifteen miles, and when I got back I handed over the sandbags to my company commander, Major W. E. Boucher, M.C.

"They were sent on to General Headquarters for examination, and after that I heard nothing, except that I got a bar to my M.C.

"A few days later, on the 28th, I was shot in the head, and my active service came to an end.

"I never knew the part those papers played in ending the war until now.

"THIS IS A SURPRISE."

"In 1920 I went back to the Glamorgan County Police as a constable. Two years later I was transferred to Neath, and in 1926 was made a sergeant.

"But goodness this is a surprise!" Sergeant Rollings is married, with a daughter aged eleven and a son aged four.

The "Sunday Express" is glad to have made public this thirteen years' secret. Even now there is an official reluctance to confirm the facts, and the name of Lieutenant Rollings remains outside the official histories of the war.

London
Sunday Express

15/11/1931

19-6-36

55 Merton St
HN 8 Aug 1918. Albert Park
(10 Apr 1918) Victoria

C. E. W. Bean Esq
Official Historian

1. In reference to attached memo I read as that you require some information re-garding work done by our battery.

2. At Villers Bretonneux on 8/8/18 my section of the battery was in the line there & after firing the French Mortars from zero hour 4²⁰ until the stop over (having been trained in the use of Artillery) followed up the advance & took over (captured) 5.9" guns & turned them around & got them into action immediately, placing harassing fire on roads, railways, & other places at extreme range, as the open warfare progressed the whole battery was eventually equipped out with 5.9" guns with means of transport & attached to an Artillery Brigade 14th RGA. I have a few of the many orders issued at the time & forward same herewith hoping they may be of some use, on loan?

On 19 Aug.
V/Asst H/TM
13th Coy was attached
to 14th Bde RGA
being armed w/
5.9" Hows.
& 150^{lb} pom
Sec Asst
Corps H/A
Daily Tactical
Report
4-5 Sept
1918.
No 114.
Wk w/
Captured guns.

3. Prior to going into action at Villers Bretonneux we were left behind up north near Warneton & lost all our Mortars, our C.O. Captain Darling MC & BEM lost a leg & was evacuated, we also had a few men taken prisoners. Lieut Bond O/B Right Section took over command & with what was left of the battery he organised a post astride the Rue-Eglise

road as infantry until a relief came on the following day, during the early part of the evening we commandeered 3 Lewis guns from stragglers & I overhauled them in a barn with the light of candles, Bond obtained some boxes of Mills Bombs, & we prepared a strong post on the road, during the evening the enemy approached using flares & gas. Bond restrained us from shooting until the flares came close, when a few drums of ammunition were expended the enemy fell back, as flares did not appear again for some time & then a long way back, early next morning an enemy plane flew low along the road & turned along the trench off the road to take observation & I was fortunate in having the satisfaction of shooting him down at close range (having for years fired at lots of planes without any success) Bond was delighted with all this good work as he organised this post & done good work all night & day filling up the trench with stragglers left & right of our post, Bond asked some stragglers who they were & the reply came Hoyle's which proved to be KOYLI Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, Bond replied, well coil yourselves up in this trench, a captain Weiss of that regiment had a bad attack of nerves & was putting the wind up his men & Bond had to

III

hold him down in the trench when the flares started to fall close to us during the night, he would have it that we were surrounded. I am sure Bond could give some good information of all this, no one in authority ever knew of our episode there, we were eventually relieved & re-equipped with Mortars & sent in at Villiers Bretonneux as previously stated. I saw Bond about 2 years ago & he was then a farmer. I Bond Meliamo Victoria, hoping this is something you were asking for & let me have papers back.

yours truly
H. D. Newland

Bty was completed by ~~1st Coy~~
BCHA
IX Corps.
18 Apr 1918.

COPY.

H/N
Letter written
by Capt ET. Harnett
17 Nov

France,
5th Nov. 1918.

My dear Dad,

I have previously refrained from giving you an account of events leading up to my being wounded on 9th August at Framerville. The reason for this is that, knowing what is worth and what is not worth a decoration, I felt confident that my actions on 8th August would not pass unnoticed by those above. The reason for my confidence is that I had practical proof of my action in handing over to the battalion 3 guns of 5.9 calibre and 4 of 4.2, in addition to an officer and 46 men from the 5.9, and about 30 to 40 from the 4.2's and other small positions. The total captures by my company, and for which I held receipts, was 196 Germans. I have heard nothing after all this time; so all I did must pass over to the long list of unnoticed happenings which have occurred during this war.

I hopped off the tape at 4.20 a.m. on 8th August in what was the densest fog I have experienced. I had with me

C.S.M. Delhunty	My C.S.M.
Cpl. Poole	Gas NCO
Pte Rozin	
O'Brien	Runners.
Walsh	
L/Cpl. Foy and three other signallers and my batman, Pte. Irving. 10 men in all.	

We got going at the appointed time, but could not get in touch with either of our flanks. It was hard to keep direction, but by the aid of my compass and by observing the fire of our artillery I got a fair idea of my whereabouts. My men were in single file, C.S.M. Delhunty being immediately behind me. It will give you some idea of the density of the fog when I say that I could only see my C.S.M. and could not see the man just behind him.

After going about 1500 yards I ran into what had been our outposts line and found 2 men of the 18th Battalion in a dugout. These men came with me. In the next outpost to the south I met Lieut. Richardson and Sgts. Ford and O'Keefe. I yelled to them to come along with me, but they evidently did not catch what I said, for on enquiring a few minutes later if they were in rear I got the reply "No." The enemy's barrage here was very heavy, and were most fortunate in escaping casualties. Shell after shell burst almost on top of us, and yet we escaped.

I pushed forward into the Hun outpost line and took 3 prisoners. They were utterly demoralised and did not offer resistance. I moved to the south along the outpost and met a tank, which had broken down, and gave the tank officer the 2 men of the 18th Battalion as escort whilst he effected repairs.

On referring to my compass I found I was moving due south and knew I must eventually strike the main Warfusee road, which runs due E and West. I eventually reached and crossed the road, and pushed on with a tank which was moving due east. I got into a trench with two 19th Bn officers - Lt. Lillie and another - and collected about 20 prisoners. This trench was on south of road and 200 yards from 19th Bn. objective. The 19th Bn officers reckoned they were on their objective, but I assured them this was not so.

We were getting pretty hot machine gun fire here, first

from 2 m.guns on our immediate front, and secondly from a gun on our left flank situated on N side of road, and thirdly from a gun on our extreme right a fair distance off. I led a small party of about 12 men against the gun on our left, and by putting rapid fire into them from their right rear caused them to bolt, leaving their gun. We returned to our trench, and I noticed a tank on our front. I went forward and asked the tank commander to have a go at the 2 M.G's in front. He did so and as a result we took the 2 M.Guns and about 20 prisoners. About this time Lieut. Pettitt reported to me with 30 men, and Lieut. Willard with about 20. 4.2 and 5.9 shells were falling close to us here.

The mist was clearing and we could see there were no troops on our front. We decided that we would push on. Pettitt and ~~Willard~~ Willard and 50 men to mop up Warfusee (the job of A & D Companies) and I with my HQ to do the jobs of B & C Coys - that is, work round the south of the 2 villages Warfusee and Lamotte, and establish a line on the eastern end of Lamotte. I struck tank B21, and he went forward with me for only about 3/400 yards. I then pushed on with my HQ and about 6 odd men.

In the sunken road we took four 4.2 guns and a few prisoners. These were the guns which had been firing on us.

I saw two Lewis gun sections of 7th Brigade away to my right rear and gathered them in and led the little party forward. I noticed a party of over 100 Huns make a bolt for a bank at the top of a valley, and it looked as if things were going to go badly for us. I sent a 7th Bde officer, who joined me, out to my right flank to look after things. I got my left flank forward and into the valley, and with the L.G's and rifles enfiladed the Huns. They bolted in two large batches, for our fire was telling. Our fire played havoc with them as they bolted across the valley, and I feel sure that not more than 15 escaped.

On nearing the SE end of Lamotte I noticed a battery of 5.9 in action, and decided to take it. Whilst my men were engaging a machine gun at the SE corner of the village. CSM Delhanty and I rushed the first gun pit of the 5.9 and captured an officer and the crew working the gun. We got the second gun with a shell in the breech, also its crew. In all we captured three 5.9 and their crew of 1 officer and 46 men.

We took the Bn. objective at 6.50 a.m. - within a few minutes of schedule time. At about 6.40 a.m. I was joined by Lt. Harris and a few men of my company.

F.4151.
XXXXXXXXXX

2812

6 January, 1928.

Dear Sir,

I have to thank you for your courteous offer to lend me the maps taken from a German in front of Villers-Bretonneux in 1918. I shall not be reaching that period of my narrative for a considerable time, but I will make a note of your offer and, when the time comes, if the maps would be of assistance, I will ask you to lend them to me.

Yours truly,

Official Historian.

R. E. RYAN, Esq.,
133, Booth Street,
Annandale,
N. S. W.

133. Booth St
Amanda

Captain C. F. W. Bean. 10/10/1928
Through, Angus, and Hakerson, Sydney
Looking through my Bag of souvenirs
that I brought home with me from the
last great war, I came across two maps that
I took off a German officer in the 20th
Battalion ^{P.F.} in front of
Villers Bretonneuse in August 1918
I will lend them to you for writing up
the official history. If you will
give me your word they will be
returned to me. One map is a
Villers Bretonneuse showing British
and German trenches B.F. and M.G.
placements of both sides the other map
is a complete map of He. La. Somme

I am yours Faithfully

V. C. Bean. H.O.B.O.

the
of course, I understand they may be
wishes to you if so then so no harm
them

Moorabinda,
Brung South,
Horsham

Tel. Horsham 355A

Dr. Bean Canberra

Dear Sir

I came accross some old diaries which were very faint
and I have not at the time put down many dates and officers names.
I was told you were asking for material and I thought that some
of the enclosed may confirm and fill some gap that may exist in
what you have . It is a pleasure to read your books.

I am sincerely

680i

CPL.C.B.Gates

A coy 21st. battn A, I.F

Acknowledged

Beyond Villers Brettoneaux we joined the batallion horse lines and waited for the battalion which had not yet returned from the linewhere it had remained in occupation after Villers Sur Ancre.

Eventually we moved up again to a position just on the edge and slightly to the right of Villers Sur Ancre itself it was here that volunteers from A coy²¹ batn with the support of a box barrage raided an enemy outpost with the view to getting information prior to Hamel. Fortunately for the raiders the german machine gun~~s~~ jammed and the gunner was

shot down while trying to free it with one hand and shooting at us with his automatic with the other. All were killed that did not escape but information was obtained from the dead and their dugout. The party withdrew and the only person who was hit was private C B Gates who was evacuated next morning with a wound in the knee. At Hamel I acted as guide to the tape for A coy and after as runner to Lt Bennie who repeatedly got me to call up the right flank which was swinging back. We twice had to stop as we were right up with our own barrage otherwise a perfect stunt. Our objective reached A coy dug in or occupied existing trenches

while I was sent by Lt Bennie to ask a tank crew which had stopped on our front in no mans land to give help on our right which was held up temporarily by machine guns fire from the enemy. The tank officer possibly because I did not salute or because I had no written order ignored my request. Poor Hasey killed in this stunt. I also saw one of our chaps shot in mistake for a fritz he was charging ahead of the line in the half light and was I was told hopping in for souvenirs

we had just dealt with the outposts enemy and were making for his front line. I had great shooting while we were consolidating the light now being very good the enemy retiring in hundreds in the open. When we

first hit their front line I followed my O C along its~~x~~ parapet and got one poor devil at pointblank range it was dark in the trench but

~~I saw the bayonet, the other~~

II saw the bayonet .The others surrendered.

The next day I was given the machine gun(which was captured by the relieving 22 battn v c)to take to the rear and as the gun was awkward to carry in the trench Lt Bennie and myself risked a cut across the open and were immediately shelled by whiz bangs the gunner who no doubt could see us and that sprint to our old Mopoff front line must have given him the laugh of his life.A

A coy was in reserve in the old railway cutting near Villers Brett after Hamel and mostly spent our time doing fatigues to the front line on the night that the big gas attack was launched by the Germans we were detailed to dig support trenches in front of the village and near the old aerodrome.The gas shells seemed to be coming over in millions and as we only had picks and shovels and an attack seemed certain we were ordered back to stand to and this coy was fortunate seeing an attack did not develop that it had a gas proof dugout in which to spend the night. Poor old C coy billeted right in the village got it bad. Lt .Dick a new reinforcement officer was in charge at that time. of the fatigue party a coy.

Before August the 8th the 21st were in the line we were brought out the day of the attack given an overhaul and so much rations that we got suspicious. Hot cocoa and a final feed preceded stand to when we went up and on to the tape near the cutting on the railway. With about

Aug 8
twenty minutes to go to zero we were subjected to an intense shelling
while we were on the tape. This became so deadly that we were ordered
back into the old outpost trenches to save wastage as much as possible and also to be in a position for a possible attack . After this shelling by the enemy it was the sweetest music of my life when our own barrage opened .The guns were one roar and the small arms fire terrific. I was the right hand man of the Australian Corps that day my comrade across

Cappy

the cutting being a canadian .Truly this was a great day.

During the (peacefull penetration) that followed Lt Brett was in charge of my platoon Captain Sullivan in chargeA coy we were held up by a sniper in a tree on the high ground near the village of Freeze (pronounced so)Lt .Brett a signaller and myself went to the left while the remainder of the platoon worked to the right.The sniper was brought down. From this advantage point we now overlooked the village where the germans could be seen frantically trying to remove what was possibly Headquarters material.Ihad previously qualified for my marksmanship in England and this gave me some excellent shooting the removal being greatly speeded up and in return I was no doubt responsible for the salvoes of whizbangs that had apparently been directed on to our position It may be interesting to recall that the battn was recalled from the line here to rest at Cappy but through some error no i platoon did not get the order to retire and we remained in position for an extra day awaiting orders myself being finially sent back to look for the battn which I found as I neared Cappy and also a battn runner being sent to look for us. Before leaving this phase of the peacefull penetration behind I must recall that I was left by Captain Sullivan to guide the famous raider (I forget his name but an officer of the 23 or 24 battn) we raided but came up against a machine gun that could not be silenced and the stunt was called off.

At Mont S t Quentin we were in support to the 5 th brigade who went through us in the morning.We were taking a rest and a snack when orders came to fix bayonets and retake the summit.Here again our platoon was the extreme right at any rate no one was visible on that flank and almost without any artillery support we deployed our bayonets flashing in the hot sun.It was here also I noticed the photographer Hurley I think who snapped us as we advanced to the assault . The dead were

very thick around here. The resistance from both machine guns and artillery intense. Lt. Brett lost his 5th batman while we were crossing the main Peronne road the position I believe being hard to fill. Later, across this road the machine gun fire was very deadly and we were forced out from some shell holes in which we had temporarily taken cover. The platoon then occupied a small section of trench which however would not hold us all and Cpl. Star, another and myself laid in the table drain while the German 9.2s tore up the bitumen all round us. This shelling was particular hell. We still advanced and eventually formed a front line defensive system but still without any sign of anyone on our right and we placed a gun and swung back our own flank to be prepared for a flanking movement from the enemy. The dead and wounded were very thick in front and during the day these were brought in with the white flag. That day we were relieved Lt. Brett and myself being left behind to help consolidate the relief and when finally we got out I could not keep up with the Lt whose nickname was Chunda and whose impressions of Mont St Quentin inspired him to leave it with all possible speed. I must recall that Lt. Dick and Sergeant Smartt were killed by the one shell the morning the 5th brigade attacked.

After a short rest we were after the enemy again and I was recalled to a officers and n.c.o school while we were passing through Roisel. I rejoined the battn and were just going up again when the armistice was signed.

Deed for which Military Medal was
awarded to No 5342 Private G Hincks
26 Battalion

Prior to the attack East
of Vilers Bretonneux near Amiens on
August 8th 1918 this man although
wounded, took charge of a Lewis Gun
team whose leader had been killed,
and led them throughout the attack with
great gallantry and skill. During the
advance he encountered a machine gun
and going forward alone, engaged it
with his Lewis gun silencing it and
killing three of the crew.

During the following
two days this man continued to lead
the Lewis Gun team with the same
gallantry and skill. Whilst severely
wounded

Extracts from an account written up after the war
by 1001 Sgt J R Edwards, Pay Sergeant of 26 Bn
(formerly medical Sgt. of 27 Bn) from his own
notes. ~~of~~

When the Battalion went into the line on 7 Aug 1918
I returned to the O.M.'s quarters in La Motte, & from there heard
the terrific bombardment which next day preceded the
attack of John Monash's army We were soon
chasing the battalion up. It was wonderful how
the transport & stores kept up to the troops when the
big jumps to Peronne were taking place. One never
knew when the next move would occur, & often the
unit would suddenly go forward in the dark.

Near Chuignes we saw the enormous 15" gun
which used to shell Amiens. When in La Motte
I had heard the shells droning across the sky like
railway trains, watched the explosions in Amiens,
& distinctly heard the reports quite five miles
away.

Talk about prisoners - they used to come down
in batches of 500 or 600 at a time, & you could see the
Germans were nearly all fed up. The Prussian
officers, however, looked just as bumptious and
arrogant as ever, but those pleasant traits
did not deter the Diggers from going them the
"once over".

The Battalion at last stopped in front of
Harbonnières, & the transport were about 2 kilos
behind in front of Bayonvillers. We all took to the
ground on account of bombs The damned
Gottas seemed always in the sky & sleep was hard
to get.

While near Bayonwillers I witnessed a good example of troops digging in for a night's bivouac. A company of a battalion on its way to the line reached the field where I was dug in, at 7 p.m. They piled arms & had a snack, and then began to get below ground, which was fairly soft. Pairs of men with shovels excavated pits about 2'6" deep x 2'6" wide & 7' long. They placed dry grass in the bottom of the hole, & in many instances covered the top with galvanized iron or timber secured from the ruined village. All of these separate fossies held two diggers, & by 8 p.m. every man jack was in bed and completely out of sight. No one could possibly have learned their position without a very close inspection. The reason for getting below the ground level was to escape bomb splinters. Except for a direct hit, they were quite safe. - - - - -

On 17 Aug we went back to Bussy-les-Daours for a spell, & everyone enjoyed themselves on the banks of the Somme. I remember one pleasant afternoon attending the 27th aquatic sports - - - - -

From Daours we went back to the line in busses. This was the prelude to that great exploit of the 2nd Div. - - - - - Peronne & Mont St Quentin - - - - -

On our way towards Peronne the whole of the 7 Bde transport camped for a few nights at some crossroads between the Somme & the remains of a village named Dompierre. One night I went over to the 27th. During the evening some divisional signallers had found a lot of German flares & began to fire a few in order to see the pretty lights. This was an idiotic thing to do & of course opposed to all orders. Within ten minutes over came a couple of Gothas & bombed the Brigade camp.

Someone blew out our candle & down on the floor we went just in time to escape the fragments of shell, earth, & bomb which flew into the bivvy on the open side, from the first or second explosion. The other bombs fell a bit further away, but when we crept out we found that the horse lines were shambles, while one of the 27th runners, a kid named Tiny Marriott, had been killed.

A number of 27th fellows had been playing cards under a trench shelter. They were not an inch below ground. When the Gothas arrived, they nearly all took the prone position, quick and lively, but Tiny just stood outside & watched the show. A bomb fell close enough to riddle the trench shelter in a hundred places & dropped Tiny where he stood. He was a most lovable youngster, with a sunny smile for everyone, but reckless to a fault

4.

The transport of the 26th finally camped in a little wood at Feuillers The bombing was violent here

The brigade soon after came out for a decent spell at Cappy where we camped in huts right alongside the Somme, which is canalised at this point. The fellows had a real holiday here, & were engaged in all kinds of sport, fishing & swimming. The brigade held a refector, & on the flat above the banks there was a great athletic & race gathering, at which a real "tote" was run. This was a corps affair & highly successful.

On the evening of 27 Sept. we marched across the Somme to Doigt ^(via Peronne & the famous Rue de Kanga) The next night we moved along Mont St Quentin & bivvied "at Templars la Fosse or Templars la Garde Anyway we slept on chalk rocks. Next morning the unit proceeded to Hargicourt We had furious bombing attacks by the Hun while here, but it was wonderful how effective were the new tactics adopted in defence. No fire from the ground, but the searchlights would get the enemy plane in the beam, enabling our patrolling planes to locate the Gothas. The British plane would put a few bursts into the Hun & he invariably dropped his load at once, & either scooted for home or crashed. It was interesting to watch them turning & twisting to get out of the beam, because

they knew that while in the light they offered a splendid target to their unseen enemy.

When the boys came out in the afternoon of 5 Oct we camped for the night in some old trenches a few kilos from Harpicourt. Next morning... at 8 o'clock moved off towards Roisel... & entrained for Berteaucourt and Dames to enjoy a long spell. Berteaucourt will always be a happy memory, because here we heard of the signing of the armistice.

Everybody took it very calmly, as ~~we~~ all were "broke", & there were no junk things at all. We at once began to speculate as to when we would reach Aussie. I had one wild fleeting hope that I might get home before the New Year, but that hope quickly fled when I heard that Col. Chalmers thought it would take a year to get all the troops home. The next thing we heard was that the 2 Div. was going to (Boulogne & I listened to this story with mixed feelings. I wanted to see the Rhine, but felt that one square yard of Australia was worth more to me than all Europe. However, although we never reached Germany, we got well on the way during the next few weeks & finally settled down in... a suburb of Charleroi. We marched into the town with colours

flying band playing + were received by the Flemish & Walloon citizens in an enthusiastic manner. How well these people treated us!

I was billeted with M. Robillard — the accountant of a large iron works — + became one of the family at once. The kindness of Monsieur & Madame was overwhelming

— — — — —

In the infantry all ranks below, say, a brigade commander are simply automatons. Battalion commanders have perhaps a little latitude when struts are on, but the rest are simply puppets who dance when the straps are pulled. Speaking generally the individual is completely isolated within his battalion. He hardly knows what the next battalion is doing, but plods through existence in a self-contained community of about a thousand men. Off duty he seldom fraternizes with men of other units, though ready at all times to meet them in sporting contests. Of course, all this builds up esprit de corps & the doctrine of "my battalion, right or wrong." His spirit of devotion to the unit is really a

Marvellous thing, & permeates all ranks. Few men who have been on active service with a battalion fail to develop an intense regard for the unit. The honour of the battalion becomes a personal matter, & the sentiment persists until the old soldier "digs in" for the last time.

Service in the ranks is practically a period of arrested mental development. The occasions when a man is allowed to think for himself are few and far between. He is governed by rule & regulation every moment of his existence. This is probably quite necessary to ensure that the war machine will work, but it puts iron into the soul many a time and oft.

CAPTAIN LONGMORE'S MESSAGES TO 44TH BATTALION

8 August 1918.

6 a.m. The advance is continuing but in disconnected parties who have lost touch owing to the fog and smoke. All units are well mixed. I have at present party of about 100 advancing in Q18c. Some parties are ahead of me and some on left flank. No touch on right. No shellfire and no opposition. Nothing to stop 4th Div. coming through except possibility of losing themselves. The fog and smoke are awful.

7 a.m. Have reached my objective, Kate and Thin Wood, with a mixed crowd. Am reorganising and digging in. One of our guns firing between Kate and Thin Woods, firing very short (4 or 5 inch gun). Fritz plane flew over very low two minutes ago. In touch with 35th on right, and C & D on left. I will send ~~xxx~~ full particulars of line as soon as possible. Everything O.K. for 4th Div. to hop through.

8.20 a.m. 4th Div. and tanks passed through me at Green Line at 8.20 a.m. Everything now O.K. Casualties 1 killed 1 wounded 7 missing.

*Reveille
Aug 1935*

AUGUST 8 BATTLE Impressions of a 14th Bn. Soldier

Morcourt had been strongly held, and its easy capture was a surprise to us. We raked the town for stragglers, of whom 200 were found, and sent back to the rear Everywhere we saw evidence of the hurried exit of the divisional headquarters of the enemy. In a large canteen we helped ourselves to the best we could find there, including cognac



When we reached the top of a little rise we could see our fellows, a few hundred yards off, advancing in face of an increasing opposition of machine gun and rifle fire, and, further on, the Germans re-organising Then there was an air fight. It lasted only a few minutes. Our planes outnumbered those of the enemy, and chased them home. Just on our immediate front five planes came down in just those few minutes, two of ours and three Fritzes

The 16th Bn. was to come on, leap frog over us and carry on to the final objective. The 16th Bn. men came along in Whippet tanks. On being disgorged they stood about vomiting as the result of the stifling atmosphere and the rocking motion of the tanks. . . . For all of us it was a day of stunts and thrills and terrible fatigues, but it was a school picnic compared with some of the frightful ineffective nerve-destroying fights we had on the Somme in 1916-17.—
Extracts from an account of the August 8, 1918, fighting by the late Sgt. W. H. Boyes, D.C.M., M.M., 14th Platoon, "D" Coy., 14th Bn., A.I.F., who died on March 18, 1935.

decay and mutilation, and I would, after, struggling free from the earth, pick up a body by me to lift him out with me, and find him a decayed corpse. I pulled a head off - was covered with blood. The horror was indescribable. In the dim misty light of dawn I collected about 50 men and sent them off, mad with terror, on the right track for home. Then two brave fellows stayed behind and helped me with the only unburied wounded man we could find. The journey down with him was awful. He was delirious - I tied one of his legs to his pack with one of my puttees. On the way down I found another man and made him stay and help us. It was so terribly slow.

Start
8-point

$\frac{3}{4}$ - We got down to the first dressing station. There I met another of our men who was certain that his cobbler was lying wounded in that barrage of fire. I would have given my immortal soul to get out of it but I simply had to go back with him and a stretcher-bearer. We spent two hours in that devastated village searching for wounded - but all were dead. The sights I saw during that search, and the smell, can, I know, never be exceeded by anything else the war may show me.

I went up again the next night and stayed up there. We were shelled to hell ceaselessly. X went mad and disappeared. .

The experiences to which

The infantry ~~indeed~~ ^{were} at this stage ~~were~~ subjected ~~to such~~ ~~experiences as~~ ripped away in a few moments all those ~~protective~~ conventions behind which civilised men shelter their true souls even from the milder breezes of life, and left them facing the storm supported only by the naked framework of their character. The strain eventually became so great that what is rightly known as courage - the will to persist - would not suffice, since, however keen his will, the machinery of a man's self-control might become deranged. The same officer wrote:

8-point
Duck

I have had luck and kept my nerve so far. The awful difficulty is to keep it. The bravest of all often lose it - courage does not count here. It is all nerve - once that goes one becomes a gibbering maniac. The noise of our own guns, the enemy's shells, and the getting lost in the darkness. . . .

Only the men you would have trusted and believed in before proved equal to it. One or two of my friends stood splendidly, like granite rocks round which the seas stormed in vain. They were all junior officers; but many other fine men broke to pieces. Every one called it shell shock, but shell shock is very rare. What 90 per cent get is justifiable funk, due to the collapse of the helm - of self-control.

The shelling at Pozières did not merely probe character and nerve; it laid them stark naked as no other experience of the A.I.F. ever did. In a single tour of this battle, divisions were subjected to greater stress than in the whole Gallipoli campaign. The shell-fire was infinitely worse than that subsequently experienced in the Third Battle of Ypres, but with one mitigating circumstance: it was only the infantry and their associated front-line units who suffered severely. The bombard-

~~Confidential~~
Point Lonsdale

Victoria

5th June 1929

Dear Mr Bazley

I am in receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo in reference to Dean Dedmanide & Harvey & am obliged for your information.

In reference to Dedmanide ^{casually} my list from the department set out his death on I think 8th August 16. as I knew he had been recommended for a decoration for his services about that ^{time} I knew it was a mistake which I got rectified by inquiries. He died in September 1916 as a result of the Mangat farm operations. Harvey died P.W. (captured at Bullcourt) but I don't know his next of kin.

I can't close this letter without expressing my appreciation of your last Volume which disproves all that has been said about it — & more. Only one ^{re} ~~view~~ ^{view} satisfied me — the only one that I saw which grasped the spirit of the work — ~~was written~~ ⁱⁿ the Melbourne Herald written by the "Rousabout" who I understand is an ex-digger. Some of them were very poor & almost all betray that fatal Australian defect — lack of imagination. I sent other Brian the review of the Ballarat Courier which I thought might not have come under his notice. It was written by Cotton the Editor I was told. The interesting part to me was the list of Ballarat Soldiers mentioned in the Volume though some (e.g. Eric Brind) were missed out. I hope when the next Volume comes out some paper asks me to review it. Except the Sydney Bulletin of course I have not seen the N.S.W. Queensland &

other Australian papers, reviews but the Victorian ones were very poor & quite failed to do it justice.

You will pardon me for pointing out two mistakes (certainly not serious ones) which I noticed immediately as I knew the 14th Battalion story by heart. I am writing from memory as my chapter 19 (if both mistakes occur in the same ^{is in the printer's hands} ~~re-arrangement~~) ^{rearrangement}. In the German counter raid on the 14th of 3rd July the 14th casualties are set out as eleven. I think eleven was the number of the killed. The casualties (speaking again from memory) were just about forty. If you look up the 14th Battalion diary I think you will find my statement confirmed. The other is that the Boys who distinguished himself there was not Frank (F. H. Boys) but his brother Bill (W. H. Boys)

Frank Boyes was an original 14th man &
finally got a Commission. Bill Boyes won
two decorations in Eleven days (M.M. on
8.8.18 and the D.C.M. on 19.8.18 — the latter
at which he was badly wounded &
a very fine piece of work for which there
was some talk of recommending him for the
V.C. Bill Boyes left Australia in the 2nd
reinforcements of the 29th Battalion which
were in charge of my son & Lt. Towell.
Half of them joined the 14th under my
son the other half joined the 46th under Towell
who was not a fighting soldier & ^{subsequently} got several
non fighting jobs. I mention the above so
that when the next Edition of the 3rd Volume
is published it can be rectified.

at your leisure (for I am in
no hurry) you might let me have the Pozieres
correspondence that I forwarded you. I intend
to hand it all over (except one or two who
may want their manuscripts back) to Myr.

Ireland to be kept permanently.

^{Alan}
Mr. Murray who is doing the maps
for my history is (he told me) going to Sydney
this week. He expected to see you & Mr
Bean.

I have had a worrying time
recently as my sister-in-law (who is over
⁶⁵ really
60) has undergone a serious operation
& for a day or two I thought we would lose
her. My brother too is in a hospital at
Darlinghurst & he too is 65.

With best wishes to you & Mr Bean & I
hope you will be both long spared to carry
out the great work you are engaged in.
The mental effort involved must be tremendous.
My little job has been quite enough for me. I
could never have tackled your volumes.

Yours Sincerely
Newton Wauless

Lt-Col. J. Craven D.C.M.

C.O.

25/49 Battalion,
Kelvin Grove,
BRISBANE.

Hilderstone Street,
Kangaroo Point,
STH. BRISBANE.

12th. June 1933.

H.N.
8 Aug 1915
8 Aug 1918

Capt. Bean,
Official Historian,
Victoria Barracks,
SYDNEY.

Dear Sir/

As you are now busily engaged on the 1918 Volume of the Official History - there are a few incidents of the August 8th. 1918 advance which may or may not have come under your notice and as a participant and eye witness of that battle I put them before you for your consideration.

Rank at Time LT. J. CRAVEN, D.C.M., Signalling Officer 14th. Battalion
A.I.F.

1. I am definitely of the opinion that the Howitzer of large calibre, supposed to be British, which fired several shells when ^(we) were moving up the Cerisy-Gailey Rd, to leap-frog through the Green line, narrowly missing the C.O. Col. Crowther and self and afterwards wounding Dr. Trumble and killing several Ambulance men, was a German Gun from North of the Somme, in rear of our advance owing to failure of Troops to advance there.
2. When our 14th. Battalion with its left Flank on the Cerisy Road hopped over at 8.20 a.m. there was a heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire- and to my intense astonishment an A.S.C. Limber followed by others, drove up over the Road in full view of the enemy, and level with our advanced Infantry, the driver whistling, and a miracle of miracles he retired quickly without damage, this was at the time when the advance was momentarily held up and diggers were looking with one eye over the edge of shell holes. The Cerisy ridge opposite seemed thickly manned by enemy, like bees on a hive, who retired when the tanks approached.
3. After the occupation of the next ridge overlooking Morcourt we could see large parties of Germans escape along the banks of the Somme. Our B. Company (Capt. Cole) our left Company of the Battalion was experiencing shelling by a German Battery which could be plainly seen by me on the North side of the Somme. Then I saw a very valiant action, a Battery of Guns galloped up about 200 yds. in our rear, unlimbered and I watched the German Gunners align on to them and open fire, causing great damage, and the horses again galloped up limbered up and I again saw the Germans load and fire, causing further great damage, it was a wonderful act of gallantry on the horsemen's part whoever they were - eventually 4 M.G. Guns of the (4th. M.G. Coy. I think) silenced this enemy Battery.
4. It was on this ridge mentioned in para 3. that I think I got the first message back to Gen. Brand of the position between 9 and 10 a.m. I noticed 2 Brigade linemen running a line under the edge of the ridge across to the 15th. Battalion and I got a Telephone and tapped in said "General, we are now on the ridge in front of Morcourt." He apparently had no news of the advance for some time and said so, he was very annoyed, and rightly so, at my ambiguous message (in front of Morcourt) but he was very

pleased when I told him I referred to Battalion H.Q. and B.Coy. but that A.Coy (Capt. Wilson) was then advancing with a tank through Morcourt.

5. Bat. H.Q. immediately followed A.Coy into Morcourt I went into an enemy dugout and a disposition map on the wall was still smouldering I got many souvenirs including a Divisional Generals overcoat from which I cut the badges, (Ironcrosses etc. etc), and whilst down that dugout owing to my failure to put a sentry on top, further diggers arrived mopping up, threw 2 bombs down the dugout and advanced down with bayonets fixed, much to my alarm until recognised.
6. Owing to the failure of the British advance North of the Somme, the tanks after the capture of Morcourt and 183 prisoners ~~got~~ a very bad time from the German Batteries across the river, and some were waddling back on one tractor like lame ducks. The diggers were shaking their own hands to the men in the Tank as a sign of congratulation.
7. One of the humerous sights I saw was when one of my very small runners saw a crowd of about 50 prisoners coming out of Morcourt with about two diggers in charge of them he pointed a revolver at them and said "Hands Up" and up went fifty pairs of hands. Another one was after the Battalion had gone through Morcourt - heavy firing could be heard about 300 yds. on our right and on investigation it turned out to be our own men who had turned round a German Gun and were firing away a heap of German ammunition at full range, thinking it a great joke.
8. Great difficulty was experienced in keeping open communications after the capture of Morcourt but through the great efforts of my Signalling Sgt. (Sgt. Clark) who with linemen maintained these lines under very dangerous conditions - communication was kept up and Clark subsequently received the D.C.M.
9. *Immediately* ~~Soon~~ after the capture of Morcourt I made a reconnaissance and captured a wireless transmission and reception set of the Telefunken variety together with a log book the last entry of which was abruptly finished in the middle of a word. A few hours later the enemy destroyed this cellar with several well directed shots and I had to dig down to get further signalling gear.

I trust I have not wearied you with a few incidents which may be of interest and I congratulate you on your great efforts in a tremendous task. I may also mention that as an active member of the R.S.S.I.L.A. we watch very jealously any political interference with your splendid efforts. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE

Yours sincerely,

J. Brown

Re. GALLIPOLI

A little incident which I have not seen recorded anywhere was:-

After the advance on Sairi Bair August 6th. 1915. I had to take a message back to Gen. Monash and whilst he was accompanying me back to the 15th. Battalion ^{my old Bn.} we saw two men in a shelter hole, Monash poked them with his stick and said "what are you doing there men?" and to our surprise 2 Turks surrendered. So actually the General had personally captured 2 prisoners.

August 1, 1936

REV

August Memories

(By Colonel J. Craven, D.C.M., then Signalling Officer of the 14th Bn.)

August 1914—15—16—17—18—19.—What memories these hectic years bring forth as one sits in comfort round the winter fire, with grown-up children discussing their football or knitting. Dad with vacant stare is in contemplative mood—the kaleidoscope of past events fleeting through his brain.

August, 1914.—Moreton Bay, Brisbane—naval examination of all ships entering the port. Boarding in all weathers—day or night. We capture the German freighter *Signal* from Ocean Island with phosphates. No wireless—no knowledge of war—an irate skipper—and a complete capture, anchored under the guns of Lytton Fort.

August, 1915.—Gallipoli—promotion from corporal to sergeant. Bloody attacks on Hill 971; enormous casualties. Fed-up—lousy—and suffering with dysentery. I take a message to General Monash—he uses me as guide back to my unit (15th Battalion). We find two men skulking in a dug-out. As he pokes them with his stick, the General says: "What are you men doing there?"—and two Turks surrender—the first, I think, ever captured by a modern unarmed General. Still fed up I discuss with my cobbler from Cairns—why he joined up—stating that I shouldn't imagine it was patriotism. He replies, "No, Jack, I would just as soon be fighting the Pommies as anybody else!"

August, 1916.—Pozières—spirits down to zero. Now an officer with 14th Battalion. Jumping over dead bodies as we relieve the O.G.1 and O.G.2. Terrible barrage. I meet two linesmen mending a broken telephone wire—conversation: "Eh! Bill, do you think Fitzroy will beat Carlton next Saturday?" What men and what an honour to serve with them?

August, 1917.—Hospital, after Bullecourt wounds—convalescent. A different world—pretty nurses—warmth—theatres—complete recovery in the North of Scotland—green fields. Mud and murder forgotten.

August, 1918.—Villers-Bretonneux—we break the German lines—capture Morcourt. As this successful engagement is historic, I will now diverge from the abrupt, and will relate in extenso a few personal anecdotes.

When the 14th Battalion, with its left flank on the Cerisy road, hopped over at 8.20 a.m., there was heavy enemy machine-gun and rifle fire; and to my intense astonishment an A.S.C. lorry drove up the road in full view of the enemy, the driver whistling. A miracle of miracles—he retired quickly without damage. This occurred at the time when the advance was momentarily held up, and the "Diggers" were looking with one eye over the edge of shell-holes. The Cerisy ridge opposite seemed thickly manned by the enemy who retired when the tanks approached.

After the occupation of the next ridge, overlooking Morcourt, we could see large parties of Germans escaping along the banks of the Somme. "B" Company (Capt. Cole) was shelled by a German battery, which I could plainly see on the north side of the river. Then I saw one of the gamest acts of the war—a battery of guns galloped up about 200 yards in our rear and unlimbered. I watched the German gunners align on them and open fire, causing great damage. The horses again galloped up, limbered up, and the Germans loaded and fired, causing further great damage. It was a wonderful act of gallantry on the part of the drivers, whoever they were. Eventually four machine-guns of, I think, the 4th M.G. Coy. silenced the enemy battery.

It was, I think, from the ridge abovementioned that I got back to Brig.-General Brand the first message about the position—between 9.30 and 10 a.m. I noticed two brigade linesmen running a line under the edge of the ridge across to the 15th Battalion, so I got a telephone and tapped in. "General," I said, "we are now on the ridge in front of Morcourt." He apparently had

received no news of the advance for some time, and was very annoyed, and rightly so, at my ambiguous message ("in front of Morcourt"); but he was very pleased when I told him that I referred to battalion H.Q. and "B" Coy., and that "A" Coy. (Capt. Wilson) was then advancing with a tank through Morcourt.

Battalion H.Q. immediately following "A" Coy. into the village, I went into an enemy dugout and found a disposition map, still smouldering, on the wall. I got many souvenirs, including a divisional general's overcoat, from which I cut the badges, Iron Crosses, etc., etc. Owing to my failure to put a sentry at the top of the dugout, I suddenly received a shock. Diggers, mopping-up, arrived at the entrance, threw two bombs down the dugout and advanced with bayonets fixed, much to my alarm until I was recognised.

Owing to the failure of the British advance north of the Somme, the tanks, after the capture of Morcourt and 183 prisoners, had a very bad time from German batteries across the river, and some of them came waddling back on one tractor like lame ducks.

One of the most humorous incidents that I witnessed was when one of my runners, a very small chap, seeing a crowd of some fifty prisoners coming out of Morcourt with about two "Diggers" in charge of them, pointed a revolver at the Germans and said, "Hands up"—and up went fifty pairs of hands.

After the battalion had gone through the village, heavy firing was heard about 300 yards on our right. On investigation it was discovered that some of our own men had turned round a German gun and were firing away a heap of ammunition at full range, thinking it a great joke.

Great difficulty was experienced in keeping open communications after the capture of Morcourt. My signalling sergeant (Sgt. Charlie Clark), with some linesmen, however, maintained our lines under very dangerous conditions, and communication was thus kept up. Clark subsequently received the D.C.M.

Soon after the capture of Morcourt I made a reconnaissance and captured a wireless transmission and reception set of the Telefunken variety, together with a log book, the last entry in which had abruptly finished in the middle of a word. A few hours later the Germans destroyed this cellar with a few well-directed shots, and I had to dig down to get further signalling gear.

August, 1919.—Back again in Australia—a sadder and much wiser man. Married, and ahead, an almost greater battle—the economic. But with friendships, made during the war, which have grown and become more cemented during the past two decades.

administration being transferred further north to Stephansort in Astrolabe Bay. But the Company found by bitter experience - the lonely cemetery bears witness to it - that Stephansort was even more unhealthy than Finschhafen, and the capital was established at Friedrich Wilhelmshafen about twenty miles to the north. Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, now called by the native name of Madang, is the finest harbour on the German New Guinea coast. The town lies on the north shore of Shering Peninsula which, jutting out into Astrolabe Bay, forms with encircling islands a completely land-locked harbour of great beauty.

(By Lieut. F. E. Parsons, M.C.).

The mainland is the home of huge rivers born of the great mountains in the interior. First in magnitude and fame is the Sepik or Kaiserin Augusta River to rival which one must go to the Fly River in the west of Papua. The Sepik pours its prodigal waters into the sea north-east of Brecher Bay. It rises in a spur of the Victor Emanuel Range in the south-west near the Papuan boundary and not far from the meeting-point of the British, Dutch and German territories, and it flows easterly to the coast, draining wide valleys and rugged mountainous country, through hundreds of miles of a region where the rainfall is from 140 to 200 inches in the year. It hurries its eager waters along in a broad winding stream broken often into whirling eddies in the deep reaches where the river takes a sudden turn in its tortuous course, but it maintains almost the same rate of flow and an average depth of about six fathoms for about the last five hundred miles of its journey to the sea. The entrance to the river is about a mile wide with a deep channel,

essentials in a man's life. Mr. J. B. Cramsie, twice Chairman of the Imperial Meat Industries Board and recognised authority on livestock and allied industries, reveals all the significant qualifications of the old adage "Experience teaches" has an infinitely greater fundamental meaning than is generally accepted. Judging from the complete failures in different walks of life, the inability to be traced to lack of competence or experience on the part of the Captain in the most important job is to cloak his shortcomings. Right through his career the motto of Mr. Cramsie has been experience and then continuity of purpose in his ardent desire to acquire pertinent knowledge, can be found step by step from the time he managed a station to the time he became general manager of a meat company. In 1913-14 he made a tour of the world to study the marketing conditions of meat and the methods of production and handling of meat in U.S.A. and Europe. The pastoral activities in Australia from that trip, as on his return his services were at the disposal of that very important industry. The Royal Commission in 1915-16, Mr. Cramsie taking charge of them for a period of years. During that term he transformed a chaotic treatment plant into an organised enterprise. Mr. Cramsie took the big view of the meat industry, because having in mind the best methods and cost of production and treatment, and to discover how best to assist the further development of Australia's meat industry. Just a sample of unadorned patriotism—the kind this energetic and painstaking man is capable of and which is part of his nature. He spent two years in visiting New Zealand, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chili, Great Britain, Canada and United States. In view of the stupendous amount of information and data collected and assimilated during those two years of travel in different countries.

Shortly after his return he was asked by the Government of the day to again take

August 1918! and the 47th Battalion had for some time been non est! No not altogether that, for in some ways with all the horrors of the war, the 46th, 47th, and 48th Battalions found that the remnants of our crowd, drilled through the heavy casualties (March 28 and April 1918) brought numerical weakness to the 47th. There the gall won his V.C. Incidentally, I had been sent to a school of instruction and got back only in time to find that the billeting and meals were O.K. then went out to them come in. I looked at my ownatoon and felt that they were just grimly proud that they were in the 47th. Villers-Bret was the 47th's last stunt in the line. We were reduced to a mere handful of men. I had a very old aeroplane hangars in No-Man's Land; of a little light aeroplane in a spring garden.

How many ex-officers of the 47th remember the break-up of the 47th? What a night that was for us teetotalers! August 8, 1918, with the 45th. The break-up of the 47th was a very sad day. The barracks on the previous nights as they were assembled? Would his barrage crash before ours? We moved on to the great advance, which for a batman earning an M.M., for taking a dug-out occupied by himself. Next a battery of five-pipe line. August 8, I enlisted on that day 1915, and was for August 8, 1918, was worth living for.

"OMRAH" ASSOCIATION.

The 47th Battalion was re-united and the next function will be held on September 26 March 26 from other States are H. W. H. W. H.



Five Years in the A.I.F.

DIGGER'S NARRATIVE
By Charles Smith. 14th Battⁿ



THIS now brings us to June 14. The following night was fixed for a raid on the enemy's lines, by three separate parties. All were volunteers, and each party consisted of an officer and about five N.C.O.'s and 20 men. Lieut. "Darky" Thompson had charge of "B" Coy. party, the N.C.O.'s of which consisted of Sgt. "Dolly" Smith, Sgt. Fletcher, M.M., Cpl. Jones (Capt. Reg. Jones' brother), L/Cpl. "Titch" Foster, and myself.

Well before zero hour (11 p.m.) our little party crept out past the wire and lay concealed, as much as possible, not far from the sunken road. Presently our artillery opened fire, the shells whizzing close overhead. It was rather disconcerting to notice that some were dropping short, and near us. There was another unfortunate incident, when a German, evidently sensing danger, from his listening post just across the road, discharged a flare, which lighted up our immediate surroundings as clear as day. This was remarkable, because no flares had previously been observed from that quarter.

When we knew we had been observed by the enemy, Lieut. Thompson lost no time in taking us forward, so crossing the sunken road, we walked "at the trail" in extended order, towards the enemy lines. Some Germans were observed running from the listening posts back to their trenches, and these were fired upon by our men. Getting closer, the situation became more dangerous. Bombs were being hurled at us and artillery (probably our own) was bursting very close around us. After a few bursts of rapid fire we made a rush and found ourselves up against the enemy wire. We had passed the listening posts, and our artillery had accounted for several of the enemy—their bodies were lying about in grotesque positions.

To hack our way through the network of barbed wire was a physical impossibility, as we were without suitable tools, also were only allowed an hour in which to attack and return to our own lines, 800 yards away. Exactly how long we were at the wire I do not know, but we poured in a continual rapid fire, and hurled bombs. Each man was about a yard apart, and, as Lieut. Thompson had requested me, before the raid, to keep alongside of him, I obeyed the order. As we two, therefore, occupied the centre of the line, we were in as good a position to observe what was going on as was anybody. Hand bombs continued to burst around us, but with little effect, happily. Presently the signal (coloured lights) from the rear was given, and we slowly retired to our lines. In the sunken road was Lieut. Boland with a platoon of men, but they, fortunately, were not needed. We arrived back at 12.40 a.m., and were immediately relieved and marched back to dug-outs near Fouilloy.

On July 2 we left in small parties for supports, where American troops were attached to us. They were a fine body of men, and soon formed friendships with the Diggers. The following day, however, they were detached. On the 4th at 12.30 a.m. we left to take part in the stunt at Vaire Wood, which started at 3 a.m. Elaborate preparations had been made, and aeroplanes flying low overhead drowned the noise of tanks creeping up to the front line. The 14th Bn. objective was beyond the left of the wood, and this there was practically no difficulty in reaching. The tanks did wonderful work that day, and the aviators also made fresh fame for themselves by dropping ammunition from the 'planes in parachutes to the troops in supports. The 14th Bn. had but little opposition, as far as I could see, and the enemy trenches near the woods were entered easily.

Except for our own guns, the artillery was inactive, but it was regrettable that, in some cases, the shells were falling short, and several A.I.F. men, including an officer, were killed by shell. Barbed wire was being quickly put out, a tank being used specially for bringing up supplies. The men near me said that they had been subjected to a few surprise attacks from small parties of Germans from the wood ahead—Accroche Wood—and advised me to keep a sharp look-out. However, nothing of consequence happened during the hour of duty there, so we returned to supports. Here we remained all that day and the next, and about midnight of the 5th-6th were relieved and marched back to old dug-outs in reserve. At 6 p.m. we marched to dug-outs near Daours. We remained there for a few days, being employed mostly on fatigues.

At 7 a.m. on the 11th we left and marched via Daours to dug-outs near Querrieu. These were in the side of an embankment and were so far behind the line that we were never troubled with shell fire. The 14th were going to supply a divisional guard at Bussey, and I was detailed corporal of it, but, for some reason or other, the affair was cancelled the next day, after the guard had been selected and drilled. A welcome innovation at this place was leave to Abbeyville, per motor lorry. Each day a selected few from each company (in charge of a sergeant) were allowed to make the trip, being granted a day's leave for the purpose, and the lorry left in the early morning and returned late at night. On the 15th I made the trip, leaving at 8.30 a.m., arriving, via Amiens, at 1 p.m. We then disbanded and met again at 8.30, boarded the lorry and arrived at billets at 1 o'clock the next morning. The return journey, with all lights out, was not too pleasant, but it was the end of a perfect day. Abbeyville had been a target of the air raiders, and the beautiful cathedral was protected by sandbags.

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*David
Start*

On the 18th the Battalion adjutant was robbed of 32,000 francs, representing the Battalion pay, which had been temporarily left in his dugout. The wallet in which the money had been contained was afterwards found empty in a barn at Querrieu, but the thief was never discovered. The robbery had the effect of postponing the pay for a few days. Brigade sports were held at Querrieu on the 20th, the Battalion being well represented. Two days later there were more Brigade sports at Alonville, but these I did not attend. On the 24th we marched via Alonville to trenches where we went through gas, returning the same day. On the last day of the month we left at 6 a.m. and marched via Daours to a wood near Villers Bretonneux, where we remained till 9 p.m.; then, under cover of darkness, pushed on for the front line.

After much confusion we relieved the French, No. 5 platoon taking over International Post. Monument Wood was close by and the locality had been the scene of heavy fighting. Owing to having no interpreter, Lieut. Thompson had difficulty in persuading the French to leave the trench as they did not seem to understand that we were taking their place. The trenches were in a filthy state and it took some time to make them habitable. In front was a network of disused trenches and Lieut. Thompson and myself thoroughly explored them during the few nights we spent at this post. A metalled road ran parallel to our trench (immediately in front of it) and this we also explored, with the result that it was found literally covered with bodies—German, British, French, and a few Australian. Why the French had not buried them is a mystery, but it was characteristic of their neglect.

READY FOR AUGUST 8.

On the morning of August 2 I was warned to attend a court-martial at Rivers, a suburb of Amiens, to give evidence against a defaulter of the platoon. The 33 per cent. of the Battalion out of action were stationed there, about ten miles distant. I did the trip mostly by motor lorries, stopped the night and returned the next day. During my absence a shell had got a direct hit on the dugout occupied by Pte. Charlie Ekenburg—a fine soldier and member of the patrol near Vaire Wood, previously referred to. His body was so badly mutilated that it was found necessary to fill in the trench and dig another around it. This work was just nearing completion when I arrived, and we were just able to erect the wooden cross, which was sent up from Bn. H'qrs., before handing over the position. This took place at 2 a.m. on the 5th, when we marched via Hamelet to Vaire-sous-Corbie (6 miles), arriving about 5 a.m. We billeted in the town, and, on the 7th, with the aid of maps, had the operations for the following day fully explained to us.

Troops of another unit were to precede us and dig in a certain distance from the jumping-off trench. We were to push on past them as far as we could, taking our direction from a road which ran far out into the German lines. This road was to be the left flank of No. 5 platoon, and, as far as I can recollect also the left flank of the Battalion. At varying distances from the road, on the other side, wound the river Somme. Lieut. Thompson obtained the platoon roll from me that night and copied it in his notebook. He gave me a carbon copy, which I still possess, as it was the last writing he ever did. This is an exact copy. It will be noticed that it is dated August 8, but this was in preparation for the battle the following day.

No. 5 PLATOON. 8/8/18.

Lieut. H. W. Thompson. 1679 Cpl. Smith, C. Platoon Sgt.; 2913 Pte. J. Fitchett, Runner; No. 1 Lewis Gun. 6541 L/Cpl. Larkins, D. H.; 6508 Pte. Millard, L.; 6541 Pte. Humpries, A.; 1845 Pte. Curtis, H.; 172a Pte. Carr, A. O.; 2894 Pte. Lancaster, G. R. No. 2 Lewis Gun. 754a Pte. McDonnell, P. H.; 7000 Pte. Dunk, L. A.; 4293 Pte. Perkins, G.; 7258 Pte. Larsen, H. G.; 7021 Pte. Harvey, J. F.; 6618 Pte. Wisdom, S. G.; 7240 Pte. George, H. V.; 4786 Pte. Carton, T., Stretcher Bearers; 3814 Cpl. Howell, S. E.; 3818 L/Cpl. Howell, J.; 7089 Pte. Stevenson, G.; 7066 L/Cpl. Platt, C.; 7476 Pte. Cosier, T.; 4867 Pte. Paxton, R. A.; 7369 Pte. Brown, J. H. (TO BE CONTINUED)

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1679 Pte Charles SMITH

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Five Years in the A.I.F.

DIGGER'S NARRATIVE

By Charles Smith. 14th Batt.



CASUALTIES were light. Pte. Harvey was killed, in addition to Lieut. Thompson, and Ptes. Dunk and Larsen were wounded. On the morning of the ever-memorable 8th, we left at 2.30, jumping off later near Hamel. There was a heavy fog that morning, which was an advantage, if anything, but it cleared away as the hours passed. We were heavily laden that morning, for each man, in addition to his ordinary equipment, carried the following articles:—One extra full water-bottle, five empty sandbags, one pick or shovel, two Mills' bombs, and 100 extra rounds of ammunition. Platoon sergeants, though not required to carry a pick or shovel, carried, in addition to the other articles mentioned, two ground flares and one smoke bomb.

We were well supported by tanks, the fog, of course, aiding these till the morning was well advanced. The tanks silenced several machine-guns in the initial stages of the stunt, but nothing of importance happened till we passed over and beyond the troops digging in. Here the opposition stiffened, and we had frequently to take whatever cover we could. A few German bodies were lying about in pools of blood, but no living Germans were visible. To all appearances they were fast retreating, leaving only a rearguard to hinder our progress. A little shrapnel was bursting overhead, and Pte. Dunk, of No. 5 Platoon, was the first member of "B" Coy. to be wounded. I ran across to him, but it was a slight shrapnel wound in the leg, and he had no trouble in returning to the dressing station.

Still pushing on, and coming, at times, dangerously under machine-gun fire, we found ourselves, about 10 or 11 a.m., not far from Morcourt. Crossing the road, which we had followed up till now, Lieut. Thompson and I climbed the steep bank—the roads were here sunken—and found ourselves on a hill overlooking the Somme River. Between the river and ourselves, however, was a party of about two dozen Germans, distant about 450 or 500 yards.

Lieut. Thompson said to me, on catching sight of them: "We'll take them prisoners," and beckoned them to come across to us. They, however, hesitated, and pointed to their own lines, appearing undecided what to do. A minute later one or two put up their hands, and Lieut. Thompson said, "We'll bring them in," and took a step forward to do so. He immediately fell with a bullet through his temple, shattering his skull. His batman, Pte. Fitchett, was near him, and he took charge of the unfortunate officer's revolver. I could see at one glance that he was beyond aid, so concentrated my attention on his murderers.

The rest of the platoon, heavier laden than we, were now struggling up the embankment, and they took in the situation at a glance. Dave Larkin, with commendable promptitude, set up his Lewis gun on the shoulders of Pte. Jack Howell, and fired a few sharp bursts at the Huns. Presently Jack Howell fell with a bullet in his head, but, fortunately, was not killed. The second Lewis gun, by this time, was also in action, and with the remainder of the platoon, poured in rapid fire. This quickly scattered the Huns, and I have reason to believe that those who were not killed or wounded were shortly afterwards captured by the troops moving forward on the left.

Hardly had we disposed of this party when something else occurred to occupy our attention. A German battery, hidden behind the trees on the other bank of the river,

commenced firing point blank at us. We could distinctly see the guns and the gunners feeding them. They soon adjusted the range to a nicety, and presently the shells began to fall uncomfortably close. The whole company had by this time moved forward with us, and they occupied, for the most part, scattered shell holes in the vicinity. As nothing could be gained by remaining there, when excellent cover was available in the sunken road a few yards to the rear, the four platoons gradually fell back, our little party being the last to leave. In the sunken road we had, for the first time, a spell, and reorganised.

Lieut. Hyde, who had charge of No. 6 platoon, took a friendly interest in No. 5, and assumed temporary command. After a while we were marched in small parties through Morcourt, and took up a position a little beyond it—the enemy guns, I understand, having been silenced by our artillery in the meantime. In the new position we dug in, but I do not remember what troops there were in front, or how far distant. German airmen flew overhead, and the following day saw more of our observation balloons burnt and an aeroplane brought down in flames. The next day (10th) we left at 11.30 p.m., and marched via Builly and Saily Laurette, and dug in near the latter place in an embankment. This had been the scene of heavy fighting, and broken army limbers, etc., were lying about. After breakfast (August 11) the sun shone very hot, and I had a mild attack of sunstroke, and lay down in the shade till it passed off.

C.S.M. Tom Mew noticed me, and warmed a mess-tin full of rum, which he offered me to drink. Though unaware of it at the time, this was about the worst drink to be taken in such circumstances, for when the medical officer saw me a little later my temperature was 100.6, so he ordered immediate evacuation. I am still certain that a few days rest would have put me right, and was reluctant to again leave the unit, as it was, as usual, shorthanded. However, orders had to be obeyed, and, after handing in equipment to the A.M., I reported to the Fourth Field Ambulance in the village of Saily Laurette, the case having been diagnosed as a fever.

I was sent by motor ambulance to Fouilly (via Corbie) to the Tenth Field Ambulance, thence to the 55th Casualty Clearing Station at Daours, via Aubigny. Here I spent the night, and left next day by hospital train for Rouen. On arrival, I was motored to No. 5 General Hospital, a few miles out of the town. An hour or so later there was an enemy air raid on the town, and those who could leave their beds were ordered out and told to get underneath, although the hospital was under canvas! I spent a few days in the hospital, and considered myself fit, but the doctor still believed I had a fever, in spite of the fact that I told him it had merely been a touch of the sun, and had passed off. Much to my surprise, I was marked for England on the 17th. Rouen, by the way, is the city in which Joan of Arc was reputed to have been burnt at the stake, and it is said that Englishmen are not permitted to gaze at her statue in the local cathedral. Though I had passed through the city before, I did not have the opportunity of inspecting it.

The hospital train left on the 18th for L'Havre, where I boarded the Royal Mail Packet St. Patrick, and for the third time crossed the Channel to England, but this time headed for Southampton, arriving next day at 6 a.m. After lunch I disembarked with the rest, and left by hospital

nearer part of the road, an advance party of the 1/4th Hampshire with a New Zealand station ("I") moved in January to Qasr-i-Shirin. A second column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges⁵³ of the 14th Hussars (with "F" station), reached Qasr-i-Shirin on January 18th; and on the 20th the operators of "F" were sent with an advanced platoon of the Hampshire to the Pai Taq pass where, in summer kits, they camped close to the snow level.

⁵³Lieut.-Col. E.J. Bridges, M.C.; 14th Hussars.
B. 12 April 1882.

II. SERVICE IN DUNSTERFORCE AND MESOPOTAMIA, 1918-19

The plan adopted by the War Office as an alternative to any attempt to guard Persia with British troops - which might well have required an additional army - was to send a handful of British officers and N.C.O.'s of picked quality to organise and lead any elements of the Russian forces or of the civilian population in Trans-Caucasia that were ready to continue resistance to the Turks.

Not unnaturally, the War Office had no very clear understanding of the feeling then animating the Russian soldiery, particularly towards any stranger who urged them to continue a hateful and trying war which their government had formally ended. It was not from the Russian Army, however, that the War Office was sanguine of obtaining effective help, but rather from the Georgians, Armenians, and Assyrians - Christian inhabitants who had everything to fear from the entry, or re-entry, of the Turks into their countries which, for the Armenians at least, would mean wholesale massacre. The British mission, therefore, was to make its way to Tiflis, the capital of Georgia (where Colonel Pike was⁵⁴

⁵⁴Colonel G.D. Pike, M.C.; Gurkha Rifles. Officer of Indian Regular Army; b. 2 June 1880. Accidentally killed, at Vladikavkaz, 15 Aug. 1918.

attached to headquarters of the Caucasus Army), in order to organise a force to replace the main part of that army. Baratov⁵⁵

⁵⁵The French were organising the remnants of Russian forces north of the Caucasus.

train for Guildford, in Surrey, and was motored to Clandon Park Hospital. The hospital was really a beautiful country mansion, owned by Lady Onslow, who was Commandant. She had placed her mansion at the disposal of the military authorities. With a small staff, she occupied a wing of the mansion, and had a small lawn set apart for her use. The mansion, a three-storey stone building, stood in about twenty acres of ground. As I was in a room on the top floor, the view was magnificent.

I was now 27 miles from London, and about twelve from Epsom. Though fit as a fiddle, I had to spend all day in bed, and a lady doctor enquired about the "pains in my head." They even brought a temperature and pulse chart to hang at the head of my bed, but I for once had my own way, and was allowed up. It was not necessary to have a pass to leave hospital, but we had to be in for tea, unless permission had previously been obtained.

"BREAD AND BREAKFAST" HOSPITAL.

Naturally, I did not expect to be in hospital long. I remained a fortnight, and on September 2, I left with a small party of Tommies and Aussies. Leaving the Tommies at their hospital, our small party had an enjoyable eight-mile char-a-banc ride over Shooters Hill to Dartford—the "bread and breakfast" hospital. I was asked on arrival if I were fit to take furlough the next day, and answered "yes." Again the party for leave marched to the station headed by the band, which played "Auld Lang Syne" as the train departed. At A.I.F. Headquarters we drew leave pay. It then only remained for me to go to Epsom to spend the furlough. This time, though, I decided to visit a friend at Barrow-in-Furness and was made welcome by him. In the afternoon we took the electric tram (double deckers) to Furness Abbey, inspected the ruins, and also visited George Romney's early home. Romney was an English portrait painter (1734-1802), one of whose paintings was sold in 1919 for £54,600. The house is in a picturesque spot, and is in charge of a caretaker. It is full of interesting mementoes of its early occupant.

We had a look around Barrow the next morning, and, as my friend was to play cricket that afternoon at Willom (16 miles further north) I accompanied him. We went by train, and were then in Cumberland, the nearest County to Scotland. This was, by the way, the farthest north I ever got. Diggers there were evidently a curiosity, for the local newspaper reporter interviewed me at the match. I stayed only a few days at Barrow, and after taking leave of my friends, I caught the 4.45 p.m. train from Barrow (September 9) and, changing at Cranforth and Preston, arrived at Blackpool at 10.15 p.m. It was a wet and miserable night to arrive in a strange city, but a kindly policeman recommended me to a boarding-house and took me there.

FAMOUS BLACKPOOL.

The next day I visited the three fine piers and ascended by lift the famous tower, 550 feet high. Many other amusements were visited, including the Gigantic Wheel, the Hippodrome, Winter Garden Pavilion and other Theatres, and the Circus (the only permanent circus in a special building in England). Blackpool has, I think, more amusements than any other seaside resort in Britain—no less than five million pounds having been spent on them. It also has (or had, during my visit) the largest ballroom, unsupported by pillars, in the world. As my time was limited, I stayed there only four days. After two more days, spent boating on the Thames at Kingston, I reported to Headquarters in London, preparatory to being sent to camp. This procedure differed from last time, for then I reported direct to Warminster. However, I was fated not to return to camp that day, for Sir George Reid (the High Commissioner for Australia in London) had died, and a hundred Australian troops were required to attend his funeral at Putney Cemetery.

As these could not, of course, be spared from the staff, the only alternative was to use the men reporting back from leave. I accordingly was selected as one of the party, which was in charge of an officer. After having dinner at the War Chest Club opposite, our party marched to St. James' Park Tube Station, travelled to Earl's Court, and thence by the District Railway to East Putney, arriving 3.15 p.m. We then marched to the Cemetery and awaited the funeral, which arrived about four o'clock. There were not many civilians present, and the ceremony was of a semi-military character. Two sons of the deceased, both military officers in a British regiment, were the chief mourners, and "Billy" Hughes was present. As for ourselves, we simply stood to attention in two ranks, facing the grave, and, after the final obsequies, marched quietly away and then dismissed. The officer gave each of us an extension of leave till the next day, and informed us that, if we reported to Headquarters on the morrow, each would receive a further extension of 24 hours.

The next day I received the leave extension and visited the old city of St. Albans and inspected the historic cathedral. On this day, my cousin in France was killed, but I did not know of it till long afterwards. Reporting back to Headquarters (September 19), I marched with a party to St. James' Park, went by train to Paddington, and caught the 12.15 p.m. for Upwey Junction (via Acton, Westbury and Dorchester), arriving at 5.15 p.m. Leaving the troop train, we marched to No. 2 Command Sub-Depot at Littlemoor, one mile distant. Weymouth, the "English Naples," was only two stations farther on, and motors ran there frequently from the camp. As it was in bounds at the time, I went there for tea on the day of arrival.

(To be continued)

weakened force in north-west Persia would be supplemented by a separate Persian force, to be raised under the orders of General Marshall of the Mesopotamian force.

The choice of the picked leaders who were to compose the mission was left largely to Colonel Byron⁵⁶, who had fought in the Selection of the Mission South African War, and who decided to make the selection chiefly from the dominion forces. The project was kept a close secret - for months the mission was/as the "hush-hush" party". So it was that on the 3rd of January, 1918, the commander of the Australian Corps, General Birdwood, and the Canadian, New Zealand, and South African leaders received from the War Office a request to assist Colonel Byron, who was being sent to France to secure officer volunteers for a "a very important and difficult mission". "We well realize", said the letter to Birdwood, "how difficult it is for you to spare good officers, and especially the kind of officers we want, but from Colonel Byron's explanation you will realize what a big question is involved - nothing more or less than the defence of India and the security of our whole position in the East. If we can only stem the rot in the Caucasus and on the Persian frontier and interpose a barrier between the vast German-Turkish propaganda of their Pan-Turanian scheme, which threatens to inflame the whole of Central Asia including Afghanistan, our minds will be at rest as regards Mesopotamia and India, the latter of which is practically bled white of Indian troops."

Colonel Byron, who brought this letter himself, pointed out that, with the collapse of the Russian Caucasus Army, both sides of the Caspian Sea and the way across it, from Baku to Krasnevodsk, and thence to Central Asia, were open to the enemy. But it was believed that, with clean, daring, resourceful leadership, parts of the local forces could be reorganised sufficiently

⁵⁶ Brig.-Gen. Hon. J.J. Byron, C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded Q'land Artillery, 1895/99; member of Union Senate, South Africa, 1910/20, of House of Assmebly, 1921/35; served in German South-West African campaign, 1914/15, and subsequently in East African campaign; second-in-command, Dunsterforce, 1918/19. B. County Wexford, Ireland, 1865. Died, 17 Feb. 1935.

(LIVE IN SKETCH NO. 505)

Reveille

August 1, 1934

REVEIL

"I Dips Me Lid"

(August 8, 1918, 8.35 A.M.)

A summer morning on the Somme uplands. Wisps of mist slowly drift off Accroche Wood, but fog still veils the hollow where lies the river.

Khaki figures—a deep belt of them—move leisurely across the undulating, parklike landscape. Bayonets flash to right and left, down to the river, over to the poplars, on the road, and far beyond. Full twelve miles that steely glint can be seen.

Before go the tanks. One to each company, they cut the funniest capers, and add to the gaiety of the day. Miles behind lie the shell holes, the trenches, the mud. The green sward beneath their feet, the glorious sun above, nothing can stop Australia to-day.

"A" Coy. 45th Bn., has chalked a name—a derisive name—on its tank, "Ambling Annie." Half left, on the rise we presently surmount, there is a nest of Fritz machine guns.

The fine morning is being spoilt by their beastly clatter. The 45th finger their bombs resentfully. Suddenly "Ambling Annie" produces a new noise. In the middle of her hideous groans and shudders there is a sharp "BANG!"

"Hell!" say the 45th. "She's conked!"

But, no; a whisp of white smoke floats above "Annie," and among the bushes that cover Fritz a shell bursts—CRUMP!

The boys yell their approval; greatly bucked by her success "Annie" shoves her homely nose over towards her lawful prey. Those undaunted gunners, however, continue to perforate the still summer morning.

At that moment Jimmy Vincent, Intelligence Officer of the 45th, pops out of a Boche dug-out where he has been poking his inquisitive nose; spots "Ambling Annie," and feels the bullets whistling round him. He sings out, "Come on, Brownie," to his sergeant, and races off to beat the tank.

The line moves on, slowly, irresistibly. All eyes follow the two figures as they put "Annie" among the "also rans."

Racing up to the still firing guns, the two jump down among the Fritzes. Jimmy is up, and down again, hunting them like a fox-terrier. Bang! Bang! What time he's having with his revolver! A few more reports, and the guns are still. Five Fritzes survive and emerge with hands high.

The advancing wave envelops the spot, with the rest of the surrounding landscape. "Ambling Annie" hides her disappointment bravely and waddles back to her station before "A" Coy. Jimmy dishes out a packet of fags to the prisoners, claps two on the back at once, and dashes off to the next piece of devilment.—J. Leck Coolah (N.S.W.).

Taking advantage of the fact that the Germans in the blockhouses remained quiet - and probably slept - by day, the attacking party approached the first blockhouse and put in a barricade. But they ^{had} barely ~~begin~~ ^{began} ~~it~~ it when the Germans, tumbling out of their shelters, came at them, bombing furiously. The nearest part of the 48th, under Lieutenant Rafferty, ⁸⁰⁸³ joined Captain Allen in keeping up a constant supply of grenades to the fighters. The main difficulty was to avoid the fire of machine-guns not only in the blockhouse ahead, but in other positions close by and also among the trees to the east. These guns supported the German ~~post~~ post and prevented any attempt to surround it. Lieutenant Barton, ⁸¹⁸⁴ taking forward more bombers, was killed by their fire.

⁸³ ⁸⁰ Lieut. R.S. Rafferty, M.M.; 48th Bn. Cartage contractor; of Victoria Park and Bencubbin, W.Aust.; b. Paisley, Scotland, 17 Sept. 1895.

⁸⁴ ⁸¹ Lieut. R.A. Barton, 45th Bn. University student; of Sydney; b. Gladesville, N.S.W., 1895. Killed in action, 9 June 1917.

The enemy failed to seize the barricade, but the Australian advance had been only slight.

The night attack ^{by} ~~of~~ the 50th was to be made without an artillery barrage, and in strict silence, no shot being fired except by order of an officer. The battalion's waves were, however, detected as soon as they started. Flares rose from the German blockhouses in the valley. The enemy's barrage came down behind the South Australians, setting fire to an old German ammunition-store and so lighting up the ground. Machine-guns opened from the blockhouses ⁸²⁸⁵ on both flanks of the gap, and from

⁸⁵ ⁸² See Vol. XII, plate 342.

Deconinck and Delporte Farms farther down the valley. The 50th reached the ~~wire~~ wire, but found it to a large extent unbroken. Some men dropped into shell-holes, others fled back to their starting point. ~~Only~~ ^{entry point} On the ^{Extreme left of the attack part} left of Captain Churchill Smith's company made its way through an opening in the entanglement and,

(TAKE IN SKETCH No. ²⁶⁷ 282)

reaching the trench ^{close to where it was already held by the troops} on the flank of the sector ^{by their own sides} already held,



LIHONS

++

(By Joseph Lecky)

MEMORIES of the march to Saily-Laurette are dim in the minds of the 45th. They slept as they dragged their souvenir-laden carcasses along, drugged by three sleepless nights and long draughts at the cup of excitement.

In those three days, August 8 to 11, 1918, the A.I.F. and the C.E.F. had smashed through the stagnation of trench warfare; had delivered the first of the final blows that drove the Germans from France.

The boys clambered out of the shallow pits before Proport and walked through that hail of gas shells in a daze; too dog-gone tired even to curse.

In the darkness the new possy seemed to be a valley, ridged with flames and thunder. "Dig-in," came the order. "Dig-in, be sugared," grumbled the warriors, and slept before they hit the ground.

Presently the ominous drone of the Gothas pierced the angry barks from the flanking ridges. They flew low, and weren't particular to a kilo or two in their aim.

At the first C-R-U-M-P the sleepers awoke. "Put out that bloody light," stentorian voices shattered the darkness. C-R-A-S-H! the next one lit up hundreds of faces; the plane was caught in the stabbing rays of a dozen searchlights, and shrap. began to patter down from the Archies. Dig-in it was.

For 48 hours the battalion gave its moral support to the 13th Brigade, which was holding the line. It lay on its back, smoked, scratched, and wondered where the Hell it was going to plant its souvenirs. But the old L.G. was well-oiled, rifle clean and pouches bulged.

The only parades were bathing parades. White bodies gleamed against the green banks of the Somme. The old river has soothed the weary frames of warriors of all ages, but seldom has it entertained such a crowd of lithe, graceful giants as these Antipodeans. Nine out of ten scarred, gouged, punctured.

The heads couldn't see a useful battalion going to waste, so on Tuesday we moved due east again, and found ourselves at Harbonnieres. After a couple of days in dug-outs, each company marched into the town for hot baths and de-lousing. The route lay along some lines of Tommy artillery, and, as usual, the guns were drawing the crabs.

Passing a dug-out in these lines a dusty, dilapidated "A" Co. saw a Tommy polishing buttons on a tunic. Beside him stood, gleaming in the sunlight, a pair of expensive knee-boots of the kind worn by artillery officers.

The Diggers stared at the frippery. The ding-bat looked scornfully at the Diggers. "Hey! choom." called out Dusty Rhodes, limping past, badly in need of a new boot issue, "your boss'll draw the crabs." "Baint no crabs here, laad. Ah see a few sharks, though!"

Wh . . . i.z.z C-R-U-M-P! The dialogue ended suddenly. The Diggers scattered, the ding-bat disappeared in a cloud of dust. After the last clod thumped his roof, he emerged from the dug-out to survey the damage. The Diggers had disappeared. So had the boots.

After the hot showers, came a fresh issue of good Aussie woollens. The boys returned to the line in great nick. Dusty and Noisy Wilson were observed to toss

a coin. "What, startin' a school?" said the mob. "School, me foot," said Dusty, "we got a boot each here; we're tossin' for who gets the pair!"

On the 15th, one week after the great attack started, the battalion relieved the Third at Lihons. The position was an old French trench system, seven feet deep, deserted since 1916, and overgrown with brambles and weeds. Traversed and sapped, it had dug-outs 20 feet deep every few yards. For flies, lice and heat, it beat all records; the good effects of Harbonnieres vanished in the first hour.

Fritz was but 40 yards away; old saps ran between the lines, blocked by the posts of either side. So close were the two lines that the gunners had to take a holiday. "Thank Heaven!" said the mob, scarcely able to believe its luck. "Fritz'll come over and bomb ye in daylight," said the departing Third, maliciously. "Ker-icest," said Dusty, "the First Divvy have slipped!"

Appearances were deceptive. Far from "slipping," the First Divvy had just achieved a feat worthy of its great reputation. After the attack of August 8 had pierced his line and threatened to reach the Rhine itself, Fritz gathered all available reserves and flung them in. Against the spear-head of the attack he threw in his Household Guards, the very pick of his troops, with orders to hold Lihons, at all costs. The German elite met the First Division of the A.I.F. Our men had been in reserve on the 8th and 9th, and were fresh and inspired.

They drove through all resistance, smashed the mighty Household Guards, seized Lihons in his teeth, and held on against furious efforts to dislodge them. The enemy was beaten, but undaunted. He snarled and dashed against his conqueror, but in vain. The A.I.F. stood like a rock. From then on Fritz knew where he stood.

Into this dog-fight came the 45th, to the relief of the Third. "B" and "C" Coys. filed into the front line; "A" remained in support a few yards behind, with "D" in reserve, further back still.

The Lewis gunners ignored the old positions and dug fresh ones. Bombs and ammo. were piled on the firing step; sharp bushmen's eyes looked steadily on No Man's Land. Parties formed for shell-hole garrisons.

The supports explored the deepest dug-outs of their experience, scratched till the blood came, and swallowed flies with every breath. It only needed heat to put an edge on the plans hatching for stouthing the blasted Household Guards, and the weather was absolutely sweltering.

Dusty and Noisy went up with the first ration party. Thus it happened that one of the small groups that crept out to shell holes was not entirely composed of "C" Co. The altered L.G. possies and these little garrisons were the battalion's first counter to Fritz reported raids. Dusty's lot had rifles, grenades and Mills. Other shell holes held L.G. teams complete. This business of coming across and bombing the 4th Divvy was going to be nipped in the bud.

It wasn't like lying on the tapes of old. All the shells passed overhead and burst hundreds of yards away. Few flares went up and shots were infrequent. All the more need to watch. If only the sight could pierce the dark shadows of that sap! As the east lightened one of his machine guns opened, giving its position away. One to us. No reply from our chaps.

"S-S-S-T!" Dusty pressed the loot's arm, "Look at the sap!" In the dim mist of early dawn something stirred. Keen eyes soon discerned figures crawling along the edge of the sap, one, two, three, four. "Get a bead on 'em, you two, and wait for the word." Dusty and Noisy obeyed the whisper. "Can you lob a bomb in the sap,

the coast (about five miles north-west from Herbertshohe) there was an observation- and outpost-station of two white and six native soldiers. There was also a small post at Tobera, half-way between Toma and Bitapaka. Slight changes in the strength of the forces occupying the various positions were made from time to time.

The coast from St. George's Channel to Rabaul was continuously and closely observed. Thus the approach of the Australian Squadron on August 12th was promptly reported, and, in anticipation of a landing, the company stationed at

Herbertshohe had moved towards Kabakaul, the section at Papatava had been strengthened and pushed forward on the Toma road, and the guard at Toma had been reinforced. On that occasion, however, only two small parties landed, and returned to their ships without coming into contact with the troops. After the Australians had sailed away the former positions were reoccupied, and training was resumed. The native soldiers received regular instruction in musketry and manoeuvres, and the troops took part in field-service manoeuvres once a week.


January 1, 1938

Armistice Day at Sea

REVEILLE

Digger's Big Job

Distribution of Xmas Cheer



Like the m.v. Westralia, a sub-branch of the R.S.S.I.L.A., affiliated with the N.S.W. Branch, functioned on its last voyage from Canada to Sydney the Niagara war veterans gathered on deck to observe the two minutes silence on Armistice Day.

Mr. Pat Kinchington, M.M., on behalf of the City of Sydney sub-branch of the R.S.S.I.L.A., whose territory embraces even a number of the closer suburbs, undertook the distribution of Xmas cheer. The job was a job of great magnitude, as instanced by the fact that Pat walked at least 40 miles in a period of three weeks. His investigations, on application, showed that there is an army of what is known as "the regulars," always to the fore when there is any benefit to be had. He did his job so efficiently, and so conscientiously and sympathetically, that in all, 282 applications for Christmas cheer were received by the City of Sydney sub-branch to ensure substantial rations over the Christmas period.

Vale Reg

After a painful illness, extending over seven months, and borne with his customary fortitude, Capt. Reginald Arthur Neville Plant, V.D., (5th A.I.H.), passed away at rest on Xmas Eve at St. Martin's Memorial Hospital, Brisbane, at the age of 53 years.

The eldest son of the late Colonel C. F. Plant, V.D., and a very able and energetic soldier, known to his pals as Andy Regt. (A.), "Reggie" (as he was known), was one of three brothers to serve in the Great War. He enlisted in the 5th A.I.H. as a trooper in 1914, and gained his commission in Egypt, Gallipoli and Palestine, gained promotion to lieutenant and captain rapidly.

During the Battle of Romani he was dangerously wounded close to the heart. After convalescing in Alexandria, he returned to Westralia and when recovered returned to Palestine with 5th A.I.H. reinforcements. He was appointed A.D.C. to General Sir Granville Byrie with whom he returned to Australia.

One brother (a doctor) was killed in France and the other, Colonel E. C. F. Plant, is Director of Training at Army Headquarters, Melbourne. Both his sisters married military officers.

To know Reggie Plant was to love and respect him and he has left behind him many sorrowing pals both in this and other States; also in India, where before the war, he served for six months with the 10th Hussars, the regiment of which the Duke of Gloucester was an officer. He was also the only Queensland officer at the Coronation of the late King George V in London, and was A.D.C. to the Lieutenant Governor of Queensland when the Prince of Wales visited Australia in 1926.

"At the going down of the sun
And in the morning we will remember them."

—Major H. M. Maddock, 70 George St., Brisbane.

Imperial Reservists Association

In pointing out that the 1914 Imperial Reservists' Association of Australia, of which he is president, is flourishing, Mr. Issy Smith, V.C., writes from 54 Derby St., Moonee Ponds, Victoria, under date December 7:—

"All of our members were residing in Australia before the War, and rejoined the Colours in England. During the time we were in France we received the difference between Imperial and Australian pay by the Commonwealth Government, and still continue to do so. Therefore I think that these Imperial men should continue to get preference for employment just the same as the A.I.F. men.

Imperialists, who were in Australia before the war, and who are members of the 1914 Reservists Association, are invited by Mr. Smith to communicate with him or the secretary, Mr. F. Callow, 8 Belmont Av., East New, Vic.

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if they jump in, Bert?" "Sure." "Right. Watch me."

The crouching figures loomed larger, until the tall helmets and handles of their stick-bombs could be distinguished. Twenty yards off . . . Fifteen . . . ten . . . "SET!" The loot spoke with right arm behind his back, pin out and fuse two-fifth spent.

The rifles spat as the two bombs sailed through the air. They crashed a bare second after the bullets. In the flash two forms could be seen falling and two diving for the sap. As they jumped Bert's bomb burst beneath them, square in the sap.

As if at a signal, fire crashed from every shell hole, from every yard of trench, upon the enemy line. Bullets tore his parapet, Mills and rifle grenades burst in a long, spitting, screaming line in and on top of his positions. For one mad moment the quiet, shell-less sector became an inferno. Then it stopped as suddenly as it started.

* * *
"That'll larn him," said Dusty, as the tumult died down; and he eyed the two exposed corpses staring at the sky with glazing eyes. Big men, they were quite unlike the swarms of boys we had been capturing lately.

Silence fell upon the old battlefield. Daylight stole on, and there lay the familiar scene of brooding desolation. Fritz began to eat his breakfast. At about his third mouthful, crash! bang! down came bullet and bomb, from new angles altogether. No use sending up his S.O.S., for his guns daren't fire. For a minute he was unmercifully strafed, then silence. He must have spent a very uneasy day. About twenty times these mad moments fell upon him, and never from the same angle. Keen eyes never left his parapet, and to bat an eyelid there meant 60 seconds' Hell.

That night noiseless shapes crept from shell hole to shell hole across No Man's Land. Ghosts, they might have been, of the old 1916 slain, but actually they were sturdy Fourth Divvy Diggers patrolling. No Man's Land was empty of Household or any other Guards, so the boys threw a few bombs into his trench before returning.

All next day these tactics were repeated, while sharp eyes seemed to turn the very corners of his traverses. Two days of it were enough for Fritz. His bluff was called. No Man's Land became ours, and all Fritz wanted was to be let alone . . .

* * *
Halfway through the first day two bloodthirsty contestants were dragged from a shell hole by an irate sergeant. "You pair of skrimshankers! There's bloody millions of boxes to be humped, and you duckin' off like this . . ." "Have a heart, sarge." "Be sugared! Let 'C' Coy. do their own fightin'." And back they had to go into the lousy, fly-blown swelter of the old trenches.

* * *
On Sunday, word came of the relief, followed by a party of Yank officers. These trim, smooth-faced youngsters followed our casual, unshaven, monosyllabic veterans from point to point, wide-eyed, impressed, bewildered. "Bomb-dump," said the skipper, as he passed Dusty's crew overhauling the gun, "you'll want 'em all." "Gee!" said the Yank, "we'll sure hev to get you to heave a few for our guys to watch."

"Never thrown any bombs?" "Nope. Only hit Le Havre last week." "Cripes!" said Dusty, aside, "there's one more hit waitin' for you here." "Step up here," said the skipper, pulling himself up by Noisy's leg, "there's a good view."

The Yank swarmed up and peered across at Fritz. The brooding desolation of the dreary scene shadowed his keen young face. "The boys sure will get a thrill out of this," he said, as a bullet smacked alongside him. "Wal, if they cahpy the Diggers some, they'll sure make the Boche think."

"Bet you 10 frogs there's no relief to-night," whispered Noisy.

The Yanks faded into the evening, relieving the company officers of several pints of whisky. That was a start, anyhow. But the night dragged on without any further development, and all the next day was spent amid the flies and lice.

At dusk advance parties could be seen in the old C.T.'s. "Here they come," said Noisy, "get an earful of the Yankee twang." As the tin-lidded figures filed round the traverses their voices became audible.

"Bill, you old asterisk, call that 20 coils, there's not one entire." "What, sign for those periscopes in good order. Come off it, Blue. There's not a whole one there."

"What sort of a lousy hole d'ye call this? A man ought to have his somethin' throat bloody well out for joinin' this army."

"Keep off me foot, blast yer." "Yanks!" grinned Dusty, "I don't think!" Round the corner came the laden figures, almost hidden beneath their loads of picks, shovels, sandbags, and other routine gear. It didn't need the blue and white colour patches to tell us that these critical, suspicious, blaspheming newcomers were our hard-bitten cobbles of the 48th Battalion.

"Fork out that ten frogs," said Dusty Rhodes to his pal, as they humped the old gun down the C.T. and back into the shell fire.

NOISELESS

NOISELESS

NOISELESS

August 1, 1934.

REVE

Enemy on Run: August Fighting

(By Rupert Barrie, D.C.M., 48th Bn., A.I.F.)

"Company, quick march," and off we went—whither and why—we could only make wild guesses. We had been "drummed" that this was to be the biggest stunt ever attempted, and silence prevailed among us as vivid memories of other big stunts, such as Pozieres and Bullecourt, were still fresh in our minds. Visions of hand-to-hand fighting and slaughtering machine-gun fire were conjured up, but all the time we marched on, getting nearer and nearer.



Rupert Barrie

In fighting order, with bombs, picks, and shovels, we left Blangy Tronville in the early hours of the morning, trudging past a continual stream of traffic—artillery, A.S.C. waggons, ammunition columns, and other troops. Darkness added an eeriness to the scenery, and after a spell or two we were thankful to see dawn breaking. But this only ushered in a dense fog, and objects were rather hard to discern above a few yards.

We had been informed that we would have the "pleasure" of taking the last line of attack. "Pleasure" was right.

We arrived at the original "hop-off" line, from which the lads of the 46th Battalion, followed by the 45th, had moved off some time previously. The "show" was now on, and shells began to drop near enough to give us a nasty taste in the mouth, but a little too far away to do any damage. With the lifting of the fog, German prisoners numbering about a couple of hundred, passed into our lines, and these were the fore-runners of many other troops. As we advanced, the enemy fire levied casualties on our men. So far as the eye could see, there was a moving mass of men, waggons, horses, and guns (some of which would stop and fire, and then move on again), with tanks lumbering forward, and dozens of aeroplanes, often in combat, flitting about the sky. Exciting incidents occurred every minute.

The change from trench to open warfare was exhilarating to the Diggers, who fought like a lot of schoolboys on a mischievous rampage. Across sunken roads, up and down gullies, we continued on our way; on one occasion I well remember looking across a gully where several Germans, evidently caught on the hop, were dodging from one dug-out to another like disturbed ants. One of our chaps took a sitting-down shot at one Fritz at about 400 yards' range, but missed him. The other chaps of the company gave him dido for shooting at a defenceless man, and this Digger must have felt very small. This little incident proved how humane Diggers were in general.

Arriving at the tape which was the objective of the 46th Battalion, who had by now almost dug in, we moved on in the best of spirits, oblivious for the moment that we were getting nearer to our own part in the offensive. We passed by deserted enemy stores of all kinds, then, after a spell, through the 45th Battalion, who were digging in. Our objective was the ridge of a long sloping field of growing crops, about two miles distant. The "hop-off" line led into a sunken road, with the village of Proyart, about two miles to the right, in view of all. All at once an aeroplane crashed into a nearby sunken road, the pilot quickly scrambling out of the machine and seeking refuge at the side of the road. How he escaped death is a miracle, but then, many miracles happened during the war.

Led by Lieutenant Syme, who ordered a quick rush, "D" Coy. reached a copse honeycombed with deep dug-outs, into each of which we rolled a few bombs after failing to discover whether they were occupied. Machine-gun fire began to take its toll as we left the copse, but, following Captain Caldwell, we forged ahead. My cobber on the right, a chap named Mason, got his "issue" about a couple of feet from me, and my blood boiled when I saw him fall. Every man who went down in that fire

automatically spurred the survivors on to fresh efforts to reach the objective.

The advance was no walk-over as we had at first expected, and but for the fact that the enemy "dropped his bundle" as we neared the objective, I feel confident that not a single member of "D" Company of the 48th would have lived to tell the story. Much to our surprise, the Germans suddenly stood up with their hands raised high over their heads, and going hard, we were on them in quick time. But for the level-headedness of Capt. Caldwell, things might have been unpleasant for them, as feeling against them was running high during the advance. One Fritz officer had in his holster a revolver which I souvenired, despite his protests; a few days later Lieut.-Colonel Perry of the 45th Bn. bought it from me.

Packing off a mob of prisoners, we moved forward again towards our real objective—a trench two hundred yards over the rise, facing a gully. The gully was like a disturbed hornet's nest, with Germans running hither and thither, and, as I dropped into the trench, devastating machine-gun fire traversed the stretch of ground between it and the rise and played havoc with our boys, who dropped flat to dodge the fire. A tank which had caught fire became a death-trap for its occupants, for the Germans fired at the exit as the crew tumbled out.

Lieutenant King of the 12th Machine Gun Company was one of the gallant Australians who made the supreme sacrifice that day. Running along the trench, as a friendly gesture I dropped a bomb or two down a few of the dugouts, and very soon the trench was full of Germans. I pulled a few faces like a two-gun man and acted the same; fortunately for me, they were not hostile. Spotting Lieutenant Carr, I called out to him and in a very short time we were bagging many more souvenirs. Carr only lasted a few minutes with me, for he got a nasty crack on the shoulder and was in great pain. Captain Caldwell and several of the boys were now cleaning up stray Germans and making preparations to resist any counter-attack that might eventuate. However, none came.

I then started out for headquarters, which had been established in a sunken road near the hop-off line. Backwards and forwards on this and later trips, I came across stray Germans who, however, were a pretty mild lot of guys. Each time I noticed evidence of fresh casualties, particularly the wiping out of a posy of the 12th Machine Gun Company which had been in charge of "Darkie" Howard.

A few days later, when things had quietened down, we were relieved, and the ensuing rest was one that was amply earned.

extended southwards along it until stopped by fire from the nearest blockhouse on that side of the valley. ^{83⁸⁶} A few South Australians also held on at a small concrete shelter just short of the wire, but, on being seen by the Germans in the morning, they were shot out of it with the loss of half their number. From the south Captain Allen and Lieutenant McIntyre with the remaining fragment of the 45th, desperately weary, made another bombing attack after the nearest blockhouse had been bombarded by a Stokes mortar of the 12th Brigade. Again three German machine-guns, firing from positions away from the blockhouse, stopped the attack before it had gone a dozen yards.

The 13th Brigade was to have been relieved before dawn on June 10th by the 25th Division. But daylight arrived before the situation could be ascertained. Relief was then impossible; ~~in~~ ^{moreover} addition to which Generals Holmes and Glasgow were not content to hand over to the relieving brigade the task which for three nights had remained unfinished. General Holmes himself at dawn went up with General Robertson (12th Brigade), the brigade-major (Major Lee), Captain Allen, and a major of artillery to the 45th's barricade, and through a periscope viewed the nearest German blockhouse forty yards away. ^{He} Holmes decided to have the Blauwepoortbeek valley and its farms and defences, including the blockhouse, bombarded during the day, and to renew the attack immediately after dark. The 52nd Battalion, which was this day rested in the old British front line west of Messines, would help the 50th in a final attempt. The 45th would again endeavour to bomb down to meet them. It was to be relieved afterwards by the 48th, which also was resting; ^{84⁸⁷} and, if the ^{50th & 52th} ~~13th~~

86 ⁸³ With this party was Lieutenant E.H. Price (of Mitcham, S. Aust.), who had received in his cheek two pieces of ~~shrapnel~~ German shell. In spite of this painful wound, he carried on in the trench until Churchill Smith insisted on his going to the rear.

87 ⁸⁴ It had been relieved on the previous night by the 46th.

Brigade finished ^{their} its task, ^{they} it too might be relieved before dawn by the 25th Division, but only if this could be done without hurry.

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Melbourne Argus

13/8/32

BATTLE OF AMIENS.

GERMANY'S "BLACK DAY."

By MAJOR-GENERAL E. TIVEY.

"August 8 was the black day of the German Army in the history of the war. This was the worst day I had to go through." So wrote Ludendorff in his "Memoirs." Early on that day the British, mainly with Australian and Canadian divisions, and French, broke between the Somme and the Luce deep into the German front. A hole was driven on a width of nearly 12 miles right through the German defence, and it "blotted out at one blow the whole of the military resources which it contained." Black for Germany, August 8, 1918, was one of the greatest days in Australian records. It was the culmination of intense preparation in strictest secrecy, of conference, and careful planning worked out to the uttermost detail. The result of the Battle of Amiens is history.

The 8th Australian Infantry Brigade, of which I was in command, had been relieved by the 55th British Brigade early in the morning of August 1 after our successful attack on Morlancourt Ridge, and we moved to the Bois de Mai, Allonville. We had been continuously in the line since January 31, and we were looking for a rest. It did not come. I was summoned to divisional headquarters for a conference. Strictest secrecy was being maintained—even battalion commanders were kept in ignorance of the coming attack. Heads of the fighting formations, the tanks corps, the artillery, and the cavalry began to congregate, and when the staff captain issued an order that red flares for signalling to aeroplanes were to be dealt out, the usual rumours began to circulate. Many were the speculations as to where the fight would be—and when.

To the Front Line.

Our own balloons kept very careful watch over our corps back areas, and any unnecessary traffic by day was reported and immediately stopped. The moving of a division of infantry, with its attendant artillery, engineers, ambulance, and transport was enough to congest the very narrow and very bad roads leading to the front. The nearer we approached to the line the more congested became the traffic. The air was filled with the powerful hum of the tank engines and the squeal of the caterpillar gear. The tanks seemed to be everywhere in the darkness. Large and small fighting tanks, heavily laden store tanks—they varied in name from Man Eater to Dolly Varden. Throughout the short summer night the movement of all kinds of engines of war went on, the roads jammed with a heterogeneous collection of infantry on the march, horse-drawn waggons, artillery tanks, and heavy artillery drawn by caterpillars. With morning units began to straighten out and pull off into fields and woods. Any tanks which had to remain near the road were well camouflaged.

We established brigade headquarters in a dug-out 300 yards north of Villers-Bretonneux on the night of August 4, and next morning I held a conference of battalion commanders and commanding officers of artillery, engineers, cavalry, trench mortars, tanks, and others of the brigade group. We had a mass of instructions from divisional headquarters which I discussed with the various officers, and the brigade staff began work in earnest in preparation for the battle. Until August 7 the staff was working at high pressure. That afternoon an incident happened which might have been most serious. About 150 yards from brigade headquarters 18 store tanks loaded with munitions, &c., were parked in an orchard. A stray German shell hit one of the tanks. The place became an inferno; huge pieces of tank were blown into the air like matchwood, and all the brigade battle stores went up in smoke. Fortunately, the enemy did not realise what had occurred. All orders had been issued; the last of the conferences had been held. We waited for zero hour.

Zero Hour.

Aeroplanes of the F.E. type flew low over the front line to drown the noise of the tank engines. Zero hour was 4.20 a.m., and there was no preliminary bombardment. The quarter of an hour before zero was perfectly quiet. Suddenly the roar of a thousand guns rent the air as our barrage descended on the German lines. The noise was deafening—the shells must have produced a tornado of flying steel. In the plan of battle the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions were to advance at zero hour, and after they had taken the first objective (Green line), the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions were to pass through them and capture the final objectives (Red and Blue lines). The 15th Brigade on the right, and the 8th on the left, led the 5th Division, with the 14th Brigade in reserve. The first phase of the attack on the 8th Brigade front was carried out by the 5th Brigade. The battle-field was enveloped in fog and smoke, which enabled the 8th Brigade to follow in rear of the 5th without being subjected to the direct fire of the enemy artillery.

As soon as I received a message that the troops were on the move I closed our headquarters at Villers-Bretonneux and rode in rear of the infantry to Warfusee Abancourt, where I left the brigade major to establish a new headquarters. At 8.20 a.m., schedule time, the 8th Brigade passed through the troops of the 5th Brigade and carried on the battle. The brigade sector included the famous old Roman road from Amiens to St. Quentin, and when the fog lifted I saw a wonderful picture of war—a marvellous achievement of victory. On every side were the infantry and fighting tanks, advancing in perfect battle formation. Artillery, engineers, cavalry, and armoured cars pushed into the heart of the German position, while overhead aeroplanes fought; the scream of heavy artillery shells, the chatter of machine-guns, and the hum of tank engines all added to this amazing scene.

"We are Winning."

I spoke to many of our men during the advance. All were imbued with the spirit of victory. I noticed particularly the magnificent elan of the advancing infantry and the sparkling keenness of gunners and drivers of artillery. From the cheerful manner of these young Australians they might have been going to a picnic instead of being engaged in one of the most vital battles of the war. Even wounded men gave me a greeting and said, "We are winning." At 10.30 a.m. the red line was reached. Our men occupied and consolidated, and the blue line prepared for a counter-attack. I established brigade headquarters just behind the red line, and was trying to estimate our captures when an observation balloon officer came up to me, breathless with excitement, and asked whether he could put up his balloon, as it was his greatest chance in the war. I pointed out that we were seven miles in the German lines, and that the enemy was just in front.

Meanwhile the motor-lorries with the balloon had arrived, so I let the balloon officer put it up at his own risk. As soon as the balloon was up, and the two observers were busy taking notes, two of our aeroplanes came along and promptly shot their tracer bullets into the balloon fabric. The two observers jumped out with their parachutes, and the balloon burst into flames. I heard some of our men making wagers as to which observer would reach the ground first; the O.C. Balloon Section was with me on the verge of tears.

Looking to our left we could see that the Germans were miles in our rear, but we were determined to hold the ground that we had won. By nightfall the Australian Corps was consolidated in depth, and the front line troops were well dug in. On the following morning we received orders that the 8th Brigade was to advance the line to the east of Vauvillers, and that the 1st Australian Division was to come in on our right. Zero hour was 11 a.m. The 1st Division did not arrive in time, so the 8th Brigade had to advance with an exposed right flank. The 29th Battalion was on the right, and it suffered severely from machine-guns on the exposed flank. The 15th Brigade was pushed into the gap between the 8th Brigade and the Canadians, and the objectives were gained. Our brigade captures for the two days were 981 prisoners, 22 guns, including the 11.8 railway gun, 86 machine-guns, and a vast amount of war material.

The brigade was withdrawn from the line on August 10, and went back to the Aubigny line for a rest. All ranks were very tired but proud of their success.

— BATTLE OF AMIENS. —

Major Gen. E. Tivy

August 8th 1918.

The 8th Australian Infantry Brigade was relieved by the 55th British Brigade, on the early morning of August 1st, after our successful attack on Morlancourt Ridge, and moved to the Bois de Mai, Allonville. We had been continuously in the Line since January 31st, and were looking for a well earned rest. Doubts on the part of the Brigade Major began to arise when he had his leave cancelled, and I was summoned to Divisional Headquarters for a conference. As a result of long experience, the strictest secrecy was maintained, and even Battalion Commanders were kept in ignorance of the coming operation. Heads of the different fighting formations, such as Tank Corps, Artillery and Cavalry began to congregate, and when the Staff Captain issued an order that red flares, for the purpose of signalling to aeroplanes were to be dealt out, the usual rumours began to circulate, and there were many speculations as to where the fight would be, also the zero date. The task of moving the Brigade Group to the front was made rather difficult by reason of the fact that no movement of any kind was allowed by day, for fear of revealing our intentions to the enemy.

Our own balloons kept very careful watch over our Corps back areas, and any unnecessary traffic by day was reported and immediately stopped. The moving of a Division of Infantry with its attendant Artillery, Engineers, Ambulance and Transport, was quite enough to congest the very narrow and bad roads leading to the front, and much care had to be exercised in working out march tables. Tank Battalions and Heavy Artillery were not very considerate to infantry on the march, and it was generally advisable to give way to a section of Tanks when they came lumbering along. The nearer the approach to the line, the more congested the traffic became. The air was filled with the powerful hum of the Tank engines, and the squeal of the caterpillar gear.

The Tanks seemed to be everywhere in the semi-darkness. Big and little fighting tanks, and the heavily laden store tanks, the names of which varied from "Man Eater" to "Dolly Varden". Throughout the short summer night this movement of all kinds of engines of war went on, and the further one went forward towards the battle zone, the more unmanageable the traffic became. The narrow roads were jammed with a heterogeneous collection of infantry on the march, horse drawn waggons, artillery, tanks, and heavy artillery drawn by caterpillars. Riding along the road one felt rather afraid that the traffic would not clear

before daylight, and so allow the Germans to have a "field-day" with their long range artillery, but with the approach of morning different units began to straighten out, and pull off into fields and woods, and any tanks or guns that had to remain near the the road were well camouflaged, so that with the light of day they presented a very innocent appearance. The sight of all these preparations was very inspiring to the men, and the morale of all ranks at this time was particularly good.

We established Brigade Head Quarters in a dug-out 300 yards north of Villers Bretonneaux on the night of August 4th, and next morning I held a conference of Battalion Commanders, C.O's Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, Trench Mortars, Tanks, Signals, Ambulance and others of the Brigade Group. We had a mass of instructions from Divisional Head Quarters, which I discussed with the various officers, and the Brigade Staff began work in earnest in preparation for the battle. There was little time for rest, and the accommodation in the dug-out was very limited owing to the presence of signal personell, runners, liason officers and all manner of people who seem to collect around Brigade Head Quarters before an operation. The enemy shelling was desultory, but he managed to get two direct hits on our Head Quarters during the night, and as there was some gas we had to wear masks from time to time. When morning broke the Intelligence Officer and I set out to reconnoitre the Brigade "jumping off place" in the front line, and owing to the shell torn ground and muddy communication trenches, we had a trying time.

Until August 7th the Brigade Staff was working at high pressure, and numerous conference were held, as I had to be satisfied that every leader knew what he had to do. On the afternoon of the 7th an incident happened that might have had a very serious result. About 150 yards from Brigade Head Quarters 18 store tanks loaded with munitions etc, were parked in an orchard, and a stray German shell hit one of the tanks; the camouflage caught alight first, then the petrol, and soon the place became a perfect inferno. Terrific explosions, and huge pieces of tank were blown into the air like matchwood. All the Brigade battle stores went up in smoke, and we had to improvise motor and horse transport to take the place of the store tanks. Fortunately the Germans did not realize what had happened, but we spent an anxious night as everything depended on our attack taking the enemy by surprise. All orders had been issued; the last of the conferences had been held, and it was just a matter of waiting until zero hour. The Brigade began to move to its position of assembly at midnight, the journey was necessarily slow, the troops moving

in single file along winding communication trenches, until they arrived at the tape lines which had been laid by the engineers and members of the Brigade Staff. A few hours before zero we could hear the roar of the tank engines, as they manoeuvred their way to the vicinity of the front line. Low flying aeroplanes of the F.E. type were ordered to fly over the front line during this time, so as to drown the noise of the Tank engines. Zero hour for the attack was at 4.20 a.m. and there was no preliminary bombardment. The quarter of an hour before zero was perfectly quiet, only an occasional Very light from the German trenches. Suddenly the roar of a thousand guns rent the air as our barrage descended on the German lines. The noise was deafening and the number of shells must have produced a tornado of flying steel.

In the plan of battle the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions were to advance at zero hour and after they had taken the first objective (Greenline), the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions were to pass through them and capture the final objectives (Red and Blue lines). The 15th Brigade on the right and the 8th on the left, led the 5th Division, with the 14th Brigade in reserve. The first phase of the attack on the 8th Brigade front was carried out by the 5th Brigade. The Battlefield was enveloped in fog and smoke which enabled the 8th Brigade to follow in rear of the 5th, without being subjected to the direct fire of the enemy artillery. The 8th Brigade moved on a two battalion front, 31st Battalion on the right, 30th on the left; each battalion on a two Company front. ^{each} A Company disposed in lines of two platoons in file, with a screen of scouts in front. The 32nd Battalion was in support, 450 yards behind disposed in diamond formation, each Company disposed the same way. The 29th Battalion was in reserve in similar formation 450 yards in rear of ~~of~~ the 32nd.

As soon as I received a message from the Brigade Signal Officer that the troops were on the move, I closed our Headquarters at Villers Bretonneaux, and with the Brigade Major rode in rear of the Infantry to Warfusee Abancourt, where I left the Brigade Major to establish a new Head Quarters. The fog was so dense that keeping direction and maintaining control was extremely difficult, but in spite of this the Battalions arrived at the first objective in splendid order. At 8.20 a.m. scheduled time, the 8th Brigade passed through the troops of the 5th Brigade, and carried on the Battle. The Brigade sector included the famous old Roman road from Amiens to St. Quentin, and when the fog lifted, I had the privilege of seeing a most wonderful picture of war; a marvellous achievement of victory. On every side were the infantry and fighting tanks,

advancing in perfect battle formation. Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, Armoured Cars and transport pushing into the heart of the German position, while overhead aeroplanes were fighting, and the screaming of heavy artillery shells, the chatter of machine guns, and hum of tank engines all added to this amazing scene.

I spoke to many of our men during the advance, and all were imbued with the spirit of victory. I noticed particularly the magnificent élan of the advancing infantry, and the sparkling keenness of gunners and drivers of the artillery. From the cheerful manner of these young Australians, they might have been going to a picnic, instead of being engaged in one of the most vital battles of the war. Even wounded men gave me a cheery greeting, and said, "We are winning."

The 31st Battalion met with fierce opposition from a Battery of German Field Artillery, and five of our tanks were knocked out before the guns and crews were captured. Streams of German prisoners were coming in, and any opposition was quickly overcome, until the leading troops reached the Morcourt Valley, where the enemy were able to put up a more stubborn resistance. This valley was covered with trees and undergrowth, and the presence of hidden machine guns held up the advance, but with the assistance of the remaining tanks and the supporting field artillery, a company of the 30th Battalion, and a company of the 32nd, attacked the position with fixed bayonets, and captured 200 prisoners and a number of machine guns.

At 10.30 a.m. the Red Line was reached, and the exploiting parties who were being carried in Mark 5 Star Tanks were to pass through and take the final objective (Blue Line). I happened to be on the Red Line at this time, and seeing that the Star Tanks had not yet arrived, and were not in sight, I ordered the 30th and 31st Battalions to advance and capture the final objective. This was done before the Germans could organize any resistance, and our men occupied and consolidated the Blue Line, and prepared for a counter attack.

The left flank of the Australian Corps was exposed on the north bank of the Somme owing to the failure of the advance of the 3rd British Corps, and the enemy shelling from this direction during the afternoon was fairly heavy. The 1st British Cavalry Brigade passed through our sector, and very gallantly tried to exploit the success, but the German machine guns took a heavy toll of men and horses. They rounded up many prisoners, but could not advance against the machine gun positions. Just after the final objective was taken a messenger asked me if I would see the Tank officers, who were in the Morcourt valley. These

gallant boys paraded, asking for orders, as they were just about exhausted during after their strenuous efforts, both before and ~~after~~ the battle. Their faces and uniforms were black with grime, and in some cases spattered with blood. Some of the boys were almost hysterical and unfit for further duty. I warmly congratulated them and the tank crews on their splendid work, which saved the lives of so many of our men, and as some of the tanks were damaged, and most of them required overhauling, I sent them back for a rest. I established Brigade Head Quarters just behind the Red Line, and was trying to estimate the number of prisoners and amount of war material we had captured when an observation balloon officer came to me breathless with excitement, and asked me if he could put up his balloon, as it was his greatest chance in the war. I pointed out that we were seven miles in the German lines, and the enemy were just in front. However, his motor lorries with the balloon had arrived so I let him put it up at his own risk. As soon as the balloon was up and the two observers busy taking notes, two of our own aeroplanes came along, and promptly shot their tracer bullets into the balloon fabric, and the two observers jumped out with their parachutes. The balloon burst into flames, and I heard some of our men making wagers as to which observer would reach the ground first, and the O.C. Balloon Section was with me on the verge of tears.

Looking to our left we could see that the Germans were miles in our rear, but we were determined to hold the ground that we had won, and by night-fall the Australian Corps was consolidated in depth, and the front line troops were well dug in. On the following morning we received orders that the 8th Brigade was to advance the line to the east of Vauvillers, and that the first Australian Division was to come in on our right. Zero hour was 11 a.m. and the 1st Division did not arrive in time, so the 8th Brigade had to advance with an exposed right flank. The 29th Battalion was on the right and suffered severely from machine guns on the exposed flank. The 15th Brigade ^{was} pushed into the gap, between the 8th Brigade and the Canadians, and the objectives were gained. A company of the 29th under ^{Captain} Lieut. Clayton ^{Davis} very gallantly attacked and captured Vauvillers, taking 150 prisoners, and a number of machine guns. The 29th Battalion lost ^{five} four splendid young officers killed in this engagement, and the wounded included the C.O. Colonel J. McArthur, who was shot through the neck. Our captures for the two days were 981 prisoners, 22 guns including the 11.8 Railway gun, 86 machine guns, and a vast amount of war material.

The Brigade was withdrawn from the line on August 10th, and went back to the Aubigny Line for a rest. All ranks were very tired, but proud of their success.

~~_____~~

45 WESTBROOK STREET

EAST KEW.
9th October 1930.

H.W.
9/8/18.
Major J. MacArthur

To, Captain .C. E. W. BEAN.

Dear Sir.

SUBJECT. 29th BATTALION. A. I. F.

General, Tivey has requested me to write you in connection with the action of the 29th Bn in the capture of VAUVILLERS on the 9/8/18, he is a little concerned that there may be an error creep into the official history, as has occurred in the case of Sir, John, Monnish's book in which the 15th Brigade has been given the credit of this.

The facts are that the 29th Bn had gone through the village at least two hours prior to, the 58th Battalion having come up, (I had issued orders that the Coy on the right was to push right through and establish positions on the far side, and that no one was to remain in the village, when the 58th came up later they at the time did not know that the 29th had already gone through and sent back a report that they had captured it, having gone to the Post Office and amongst other things collected a bag with Iron Corsses, General Tivey heard that the 58th had made this claim, and having been advised over 2½ hours earlier that a Bn of the 8th Bde had already reported the matter, he at once got in touch with General Hobbs, & Elliot, and explained the position, General Tivey and myself received letters from General Elliot, forwarding congratulations and explaining that a mistake had been made.

It may be interesting to give a brief summary of what took place, (am not sure what the official report contained as unfortunately I had been one of the 12 Officers wounded in this action, these having been lost killed and wounded 12 in about 10, min)

At 7,30 a.m. on the morning of the 9th, I received a Telephone message to go to Bde for a conference, and reached there a little after 8 a.m. we waited some considerable time for one of the British Imperial Artillery Brigadiers to come along, but however he did not get along, it was a little after 9 a.m. when we commenced the conference, I was informed that my Bn would carry out the attack, and received permission to send a warning to my Coy Cmdrs to be prepared and meet me at 10 a.m. we were still waiting for the Artillery Officer, the Brig remarked on my concern, and gave me permission to write my Orders, which I did, these were dispatched by a Light Horse man, but I had a doubt about him delivering the goods, which proved correct as they did not reach the Coy Cmdrs till too late. I had to go back 3000 yds pick up my command move 1200 yds to our right front move through the 57th Bn, and to a position on the right of the 31st, There was also allotted 5 tanks, (which were knocked out. 3 prior to reaching the jump off, and the other 2 just in front of it. Zero hour was 11 a.m. and we did not get to our position in time the barrage as it was having been put down by one Brigade instead of two ~~XXXXXX~~ On moving up the 58th Bn were halted in groups on the left of Harbonniers, the C.O. asked me to give him some particulars of my orders as he was a bit uncertain of his position etc, he had to move to the right of the town and this took some time and was the cause of his delay in getting forward.

My Bn attacked with 3 Coys, and one in Reserve, we came under very heavy M.G. & Rifle Fire, also artillery, and suffered many casualties, but gained our objectives, and held same although our right flank was in the air for 2½ hours. Capt, Davis, D. S. O. was in command of "A" Coy who captured VAUVILLERS, was badly wounded, and although he fainted from loss of blood, he stuck to his post, and made a reconnaissance of the front and forwarded the position back through Bn to Bde, V. C's have been given for less than this Officer did, the 3 Attacking Coys lost all their officers except one each.

I understand that General Tivey is writing up this action.

There is also another action of the 29th that I am not

HN Beaumetz
23/3/17 (2)

B5 Maj. MacArthur 29
Ba.

I am not sure that they have received the credit that was due.

On the 20/3/17 the 29th & 30th Bns were attached to General Elliott, 15th Bde, and were ordered to relieve the Bns on the Advanced Guard, or Outpost, the 29th on the right ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxxx~~ of Bapaume, Road, and 30th on left. the former Bn relieved the 60th in the vicinity of Lebirquie, this Bn had been trying to get Beaumetz during the afternoon, but owing to the position of two nests of M.G.'s one on the right of the village and one on the left near the Bapaume Rd. they were unable to do so and on relieving them, there was some difficulty in locating the posts, however they were relieved between 3.25 & 4.20 a.m. ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~xxxx~~ At this time I was acting as 2nd I/C, and in view of the fact that Colonel Clerk of the 30th had been placed in command of the Out Post, Col, Purser, did not go forward, and I was sent forward with three Coys, 275 men, the C.O. remained with the Reserve Coy at Delsaux Farm 2½ miles in rear.

The 30th Bn took up a position on Morchie Rd, with an advanced L.G. post near the Junction in the vicinity of a Sugar Mill.

Just before daybreak on the morning of the 21st, I sent forward a Section towards Beaumetz, and they were able to get in, and reported same, I then sent forward a Platoon, but these were unable to enter owing to M.G. fire from the positions already described. I then ordered Capt Bennett of "B" Coy to move up a sunken road on the right of the Village and attack the guns there, this was successful, as the guns had to withdraw. "A" Coy under Capt Booth was then ordered to take the village which was done, by using a high mound which protected them from the guns on the Bapaume Rd. The German trenches were about 300 yds in front of the village.

The position now held was, "A" Coy in Beaumetz, "B" Coy in front of Velue Wood, "C" Coy on right at Bertincourt, with my H.Q. at Lebuquiere, The 30th Bn on the Morchies Rd, 1100 yds to the left rear. I think that the 29th can claim to having held the longest line, having 275 men on 5,800 yds with both flanks in the air, as the 30th although requested would not come forward, and the Imperial troops were back towards Le Transloy. we had no artillery forward of Bapaume. on the Night 21/22 we were relieved of the village of Bertincourt, by a detachment of Yeomanry and a Coy of the Devons. We assisted by two Engineer Officers who came along to see what ~~the~~ they could do, dug strong posts in front of Beaumetz.

On the morning of 23rd the enemy strongly attacked the village, moving down the Bapaume Rd, and on the Right and completely surrounded it, Capt, Booth with 56 men held it, and Lieut, Harrison, led a detachment of N.S.W. Light Horsemen that had joined up the Bn on the previous night, and proceeded to clear the village, he came through the village, on to the Lebuquiere side and about 40 of the enemy had collected on a small knoll, (the one that helped us to take the village) he charges at the head of his men, and the morning air bore out the yells, "You bloody bastards" repeated over and over, like a pent up flood, I saw this tall officer holding a rifle & bayonet dive it downward into three different ones, the dreadful yell and fierce attack drove the Germans from the knoll, who fell back on another large Coy coming from the Bapaume Rd, these in turn fell back, and the 30th Bn at the same time came forward a little and opened up with all their V.G. L.G.'s & rifles, at the same time Capt, Bennett, ~~and~~ of "B" Coy & Capt Dalton of "C" attacked from ~~the~~ the old friends ~~the~~ the sunken Rd on the right the enemy on this side were driven back and the whole attack was driven off, the 30th advanced along the Bapaume Rd, and found a few Germans in two or three houses near the road. The enemy captured their L.G. which was in the advanced post at the sugar mill, 1000 yds to our right rear, we had the pleasure of recapturing this again and handing it back for which I hold a receipt. We had secured all our ground by 5 a.m.

There were many of the enemy killed, prisoners and valuable maps captured, It was found that we had been attacked by 5 Coys of special storm troops, who were cavalry and had been training for 3 months prior to, they were well set up men, but had the wind up before they commenced the attack, not ~~saying~~ in love with the idea of attacking the Australians, we had this from prisoners.

The C.O. came forward with the Reserve Coy from Delsaux Farm 75 men and arrived at 7 a.m. but went back shortly afterwards. I then sent this Coy forward to secure the railway and sunken road, which gave a distinct advantage.

advantage.

(3)

I along with my orderly made a ⁷²⁰⁷¹⁷²¹⁷⁰ reconnaissance of the front line during the forenoon, and on reaching the village of Bertincourt could not find any of the Yeomanry or Devons, but eventually came across an Officer with a Patrol, who informed that they had received orders during the night to fall back towards Le Transloy, they had not advised me, so that I found both my flanks very much in the air. On the Bapaume Rd, between us and the 30th I could only place an officer with a L.G. & 8 men to protect me on this flank, and as will be seen there remained nothing on my right, it became necessary ~~for~~ to send a Platoon from Velue Wood to hold the village on the right.

Capt Boote was killed shortly after the situation was cleared up whilst reporting to me on the telephone, he was a gallant officer, as was also Lieut. Harrison who although wounded twice refused to go back till I could send him a relief.

All ranks behaved with the greatest courage, and in view of the long line held, it was impossible to obtain any rest for the three days and nights that we held this position, we had to suffer shelling from the enemy and could not reply, although a Major of Artillery came forward one evening, and promised to bring a gun up which he did and placed a few shells into the M.G. position on the Bapaume Rd. we thought a lot of that Gunner Major.

It will be seen ~~wakk~~ what a risk was taken in following up the Germans in 1917.

I believe that the Brigadier of the 15th sent up two Bns about 10 a.m. on the 23rd, but I did not see them, I am thankful to state that we did not require them.

The C.O. Outpost did not come forward to see how we were getting on, some of his Staff did after the fight was over.

I could relate many stories in connection with this action.

We were relieved on the night 23/24 the 57 Bn taking over Beaumetz, and next day another Bn took over the right portion of the line. The Germans again attacked the village and obtained a lodgment in the right corner, and held there for some time but were eventually driven out.

I have forwarded this owing to the statements that I have been made that my true reports as sent back had not been received and that another unit desired to claim that they had cleared the situation. The story that I have set out is the situation from the man on the spot. This is many years after, but as I have explained my late Brigadier, General Tivey has asked me to get in touch with you and as he expressed it I owe it to the fine fellows who formed the 29th Battalion, who am afraid have never said quite enough, and I know that you will blame me, for holding back information.

Trusting that you will give the above your consideration and if not ^{late} adjust anything that is not correct.

At certain periods our War Diary was not to clear, information not extended.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours sincerely.

John C. Frost
Ex. Commanding 29th Battalion.
Now by grace an Hon Major.

J. M. Frost

THE VICTORY OF AUGUST 8, 1918

++

(By P. F. Lucas, M.C., 32nd Battalion, A.I.F.)



Of all the battles fought in France by the A.I.F., it can be said, without fear of contradiction, that the one that stood out as the greatest and most spectacular was the action of August 8, 1918. Following but a few months after the great German success of March 21, it not only showed the world that the German Army was not the invincible machine that many people thought it to be, but opened the run of victories which ended in throwing the enemy from his well-nigh impregnable Hindenburg Line, and helped materially to place the final victory with the Allies.

From the time when the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions moved down to the Somme at the end of March and early April, 1918, a spirit of aggression pervaded the whole Australian corps. Apart from the brilliant successes of Villers-Bretonneux and Hamel, small stunts were being carried out the whole time; a raid here, a few hundred yards snatched away there, Monument Wood, Morlancourt Ridge, the Mound, and other little bits, all fell to the Diggers. Fritz was jumpy. Raids not only brought back prisoners, but inflicted casualties where they could least be spared.

My battalion moved up on August 5 from rest billets, or, rather, from wheat fields near Amiens, in which we had been camped. We had previously been billeted in a convent on the outskirts of the city, but, as the Boche persistently shelled the place with long-range guns, we had moved to a safer zone.

Although the abnormal amount of traffic on the roads at night had caused comment, it was not realised by us that a large-scale stunt was projected, until our C.O., Lieut.-Col. C. S. Davies, called the officers together on the morning of the 6th and gave us an outline of the plan. As my special job would be the guiding of the battalion during the advance, I was instructed to walk thirty yards ahead of the leading company, from which the others would take their direction. That afternoon a few of us went forward to the crest in front of Villers-Bretonneux and had a look at the country over which we were to advance, and while there I took a compass bearing on a cemetery on the outskirts of Warfusse-Abancourt. How useful this was afterwards to be, I little realised at the time.

On the 7th it rained. At another meeting with the C.O., final instructions and maps were issued, but, if I remember correctly "zero" hour (fixed for 4.20 a.m.) was not given out until late that night.

Sometime during the evening there was a great commotion around Villers-Bretonneux. It afterwards transpired that a lucky shell from Fritz had landed in the centre of the 28 supply tanks parked in an orchard on the north side of the town, with the result that one of them, which was loaded with petrol, immediately burst into flames. As soon as Fritz saw this, he made this point the objective for all his available guns, and, by the time he had finished, 5 tanks were destroyed. Prisoners taken next day stated that when the blaze was seen it was thought to be an ammunition dump on fire. No one on the enemy side, apparently, thought of tanks.

The 32nd Battalion moved forward to its jumping-off at 2 a.m., and then began the most nerve-trying time

of the whole stunt—the wait for zero hour. Everything possible had been done to ensure success, but one kept on thinking, "Is there anything forgotten?" Few of us who stood in that trench, noting the growing mist, will ever forget the suspense. Slowly the minutes passed. At last, twenty minutes past four.

The roar of the opening barrage was so great that when I shouted to my sergeant (A. I. Densley, afterwards lieutenant) who was standing next to me, he could not hear a word. The mist by this time was so thick that one could not see more than ten yards ahead. It was then I thanked myself for the compass bearing I had taken the day before, for I was thus able simply to walk ahead with the compass in my hand. Densley got three or four men from the company, and we linked up.

Crossing our front line, we literally fell into what had been the German front line, quite empty except for dead Germans. During the whole of our advance to Warfusee, we encountered only three live enemy; two offering fight were promptly killed, the third being sent back a prisoner. This reflected great credit upon the attacking battalion—I think it was the 19th, of the 5th Brigade—for the thoroughness in which they had "mopped up" under such foggy conditions.

I was beginning to feel a little doubtful of my position when I heard a voice out of the fog say, "Look out, you'll

Reveille Aug 1936
be walking into the wall of the b—y cemetery in a minute." The welcome advice came from a wounded Digger, who was sitting against the gatepost of the cemetery, and waiting for the fog to lift before he commenced his walk back to the aid-post.

As we drew near to Warfusee the mist began to clear, and in a very short while the sun broke through, and there developed a glorious summer morning. In a small gully we found the C.O., the adjutant (Lieut. F. Hardy), and the M.O. (Capt. E. W. B. Woods, now of Hay). In the fog they had stumbled upon the main Amiens road, and, following it, had arrived at Warfusee with the attacking battalion. It was just in front of this gully that we were to pass through the 5th Brigade on the so-called "green" line, and continue the advance.

While resting in the gully we witnessed one of the most exciting air scraps I ever saw. A German airman, flying very low, came over and turned his machine-gun on us. Although fully a thousand men were sheltering here, I did not hear of one being hit. Just as he turned to give us another burst, one of our 'planes suddenly attacked him. Round and round they flew just above our heads, so low, in fact, that we could see the German pilot's moustache. All the while they were pumping lead into each other, until finally the British 'plane appeared to be hit, and staggered away over the top of the ridge. By this time other British machines were making to join the dog-fight, so off Fritz flew towards his own lines.

The time (9 a.m.) had now arrived for us to move forward to the "red line," 5000 yards ahead. If this advance proved successful, we were to push forward another 1000-1500 yards, to the "blue" line.

Preceded by tanks, we crossed the main road, and met our first opposition from a German field gun shooting over open sights from the wooded corner of the Amiens-Bayonvillers road. Lewis gun and rifle fire eventually proved too hot for the crew, who nevertheless fought their gun bravely, so they limbered up and galloped off down the road, and, I think, got safely away. We could not help admiring their courage, and I, for one, hope they got safely through the war.

We were at this time still crossing a flat plain over which the German advance of the previous March had swept without much evidence of material damage. Apart from some posts strengthened with a certain amount of wire, there was no opposition in the way of a rapid advance. The machine-gun fire, when it became evident,

was quickly squashed out by the tanks, which simply ploughed the offending guns into the ground. About 600 yards beyond the Amiens road, we surrounded and captured a pill-box containing some twenty Germans, mostly boys of 17 or 18 years of age, under a big red-headed sergeant, who ran out with his hands up.

Sending these prisoners to the rear, we continued our advance to the Morcourt Valley, which lay right across our path. We had been warned to expect trouble here, and, as we moved forward, rifle and machine-gun fire broke out. Just then a tank came along. Pointing out the trouble to its commander, we lay down while it went forward to the edge of the valley, which was well wooded.

As soon as the tank reached this position, we moved forward and took the place with a rush. It was full of rest huts, and transport on the point of moving off. The German officer-in-charge was shot in the final rush, and 149 prisoners were taken. The advent of the tank apparently demoralised them, for there seemed to be no reason why the transport at least should not have escaped; but all the prisoners seemed quite happy in their situation, their only worry being to exchange their heavy helmets for the light, round cloth cap they wore out of the line. This they were allowed to do. I felt rather sorry for one chap who had his leave pass for home in his pocket. In the wood was also a canteen, well stocked with things a soldier covets, such as cigars and champagne.

We now moved forward to the "red" line, and, finding no opposition here, on to the "blue" line, which was reached at about 11.20 a.m. Since our start that morning we had made a total advance of 9000 yards. The 31st Battalion, on our right, had an equally successful advance, and to it fell the honour of capturing the great railway gun, which, after standing for some time in Sydney, is now in Canberra. It was reported at the time that a British 'plane had flown over and blown up the railway line on which the gun could have escaped.

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4

At that point began the long downward trend in the numbers offering for active service, the causes and results of which are ~~so intimately bound up with the political history of Australia during and after the war.~~ *so intimately bound up with the political history of Australia during and after the war.*
↳ In the meantime,

At the end of January 1916 the Prime Minister left Australia on a visit to England. The German submarine menace led to an amusing change of plans in his itinerary. Coming to Sydney to bid farewell to his friends and supporters, he took a cordial leave of a large party of admirers at the railway station and was supposed to be on the eve of departure to join the outgoing mail-steamer at Adelaide. But he went no farther than Strathfield, a suburban railway station, where he left the train, returned to Sydney, and boarded the Canadian steamer in the harbour. The Censorship prevented any further news of his journey from transpiring, until it was heard that he had been sworn of the Canadian Privy Council. The next stage was England, from which Australia heard abundantly of his speeches, his movements, and his influence. Too much, indeed, was heard for the equanimity of his party in Australia. It happened that in Great Britain during his visit there was growing dissatisfaction with the Asquith Government. It was felt that "wait and see" was not a war motto, and that the slow and heavy constitutional steps of old-time Liberalism were out of date when opposed to the seven-league-boots of German military autocracy. Before the end of the year Asquith had resigned and Lloyd George had succeeded. In the press and platform campaign of March-June 1916 W. M. Hughes found himself a personage of great importance in British public life. Apart from the attention which, in view of the military services of the Anzacs, the British people were now only too ready to bestow upon the leader of the people of Australia, they were disposed to listen with particular favour to a man who told them of his unsparing endeavours to root out the German trade penetration of Australia and to rouse his country to a policy of

1. Thru FAR. 19/278

Seen of 8 BTy capt on 18 Sept by Engl but not seen.
(marked A Coy 3rd AIF)

~~Height of sink.~~

Railway seen. Height of 52 I.R.

This is the description which will accompany the gun from Sydney
to Canberra —

GERMAN 28 C.M. (11 INCH) RAILWAY GUN.

It is printed on a
white board.

On the 8th August, 1918, in the course of successful offensive operation undertaken by the Australian Corps, the 31st Battalion (Victoria and Queensland), when advancing near Harbonnieres, saw a train steaming up and down a line some 800 yards away. The train consisted of a railway gun, coaches for the gun crew, and ammunition trucks. The gun fired a few rounds. Then an aeroplane flew up and bombed the train, causing a large explosion. A few minutes later the Battalion reached its final objective, two hundred yards or so short of the gun. Two or three hours later Lieut. George Burrows and Sappers L. J. Strahan and J. H. Palmer, 5th Australian Divisional Engineers, went out under heavy machine gun and rifle fire, raised steam on the engine, shunted clear the burning coaches, coupled up the gun and ammunition trucks, and brought them back within the Australian lines. The gun, which was used by the Germans to bombard Amiens, was subsequently exhibited in Paris and London.

The complete equipment weighs 185 tons, is 72 feet long, 8 feet 8 inches wide, and 13 feet 8 inches high. The gun weighs $44\frac{1}{2}$ tons and is 36 feet 9 inches long. The range is 26,000 yards and the shell weighs 660 lbs.

May 28th 1923

Dear Treloar,

how about this for the inscription:

"This gun, emplaced on rails at Wiencourt near Amiens, was one of those by which the Germans intended, during the year 1918, to destroy the railway centre in that city and thus partially ^{to} separate the British and French in the hope of driving one of them into early submission. The destruction of the city was, however, prevented by the advance of the Allied troops on the morning of August 8th, 1918, when five Australian, four Canadian, and several British divisions broke the German front before Amiens. This gun was captured early in the battle by the combined efforts of British aeroplanes, British and Canadian cavalry, and Australian infantry and engineers."

and on the other side (or front):

"In memory of those of our own soldiers and of their allies who saved the city of Amiens."

Yours sincerely,



Note from Lieut Butler
41 Bn

I am wandering

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(Also if Bean has his volume (the
last I think) about finished, it
should be interesting. I very nearly
wrote him of an incident on Aug
8th 1918 viz that Hun battery
on the N^o Banks of the the Somme
at "Cappy" (I think) they played
the devil & I saw them smother a
tank & disable a couple of Hows
just in front of us, they were stout
fellows those Huns & deserved a
mention as they sure did play
hell for a while.

Ellis's "Story of the Sea Aust Det" p. 335

"It was just near here (Framerville) that Lieut. G. Burrows of the 14 Coy, did some very fine work. On the same railway some hundred of yards beyond our foremost line, stood a huge railway gun on a truck, of which the 31st Bn had already taken possession. It had with ^{it} its engine and its ammunition tenders — indeed, the complete outfit — and Burrows thought it would be a fine thing to start up steam and bring the gun into our own lines.

This with the help of ~~two~~ two sappers of the 8th Coy he did"

(Before this Ellis speaks of the astonishing work of the cavalry out ahead of the infantry & of its capture of ~~the~~ a train load of prisoners near Framerville)

At p. 336 he publishes a photo of the captured gun with the caption —

"The large railway gun captured by 31 Bn, 8 Aug 1918"

danger. In the centre the Béthune coalfields also must be defended, since French industry largely depended on their output. On Haig's right, however, was a useless, shelterless area—the country devastated by the Germans in their withdrawal in 1917, and the old Somme battlefield—lying twenty-five miles deep behind the Fifth Army and the right of the Third. Here he could afford to retreat for many miles, and actually improve his tactical position by doing so. G.H.Q. considered the question of a voluntary withdrawal there, in order to forestall the blow. Such a manoeuvre might, indeed, have proved brilliantly successful in tactical results, but strong objections were urged and were held to be decisive, and it was resolved to defend the line then occupied.⁶³

In these circumstances Haig resolved not to withdraw his strength from the north and centre, but to accept the probability of being driven back in the south, and to maintain at all costs the central buttress at Arras, which he regarded as the backbone of his whole line, and on which that withdrawal would pivot. For a line upon which to fall back in the south, if necessary, he ordered the construction of rearward defences along the Somme south of Péronne and along the



⁶³ The proposal considered was apparently one for withdrawal behind the Somme. This would involve two chief difficulties. First, important roads and railway communications passed through Péronne, and a withdrawal there might have hampered the Third Army's right. Second, the old Somme battlefield would be immediately behind the Fifth Army. A deeper withdrawal behind the wilderness of the old Somme battlefield does not seem to have been seriously considered, although—from the merely tactical point of view—it might have proved the masterstroke for which the weary nations were waiting, and for which this was, perhaps, the only opportunity ever offered to a British commander on the Western Front. On the troops the moral effect of a brilliant manoeuvre by their leader would not necessarily have been depressing; the probable attitude of the French, however, would have been a most important consideration, since, by avoiding the main thrust, the British leader might have caused it to be directed against the French; he would also have given up land reoccupied by its French population, and have subjected Amiens to the risk of long-range bombardment.

1st Cav. Bde Report

B. Sqn. (5th D.G.) under Capt. Mitchell, swinging outwards & when he reached W.6.C. central saw 3 railway trains (one broad gauge & two light) at X1C central.

The two light trains steamed off towards Vauwillers but the broad gauge train was hit at that moment by a bomb from one of our aeroplanes and surrounded by men of this sqn. & Leut. Cockrill's patrol of the Queen's Bays - - - -

All the passengers were made prisoners . . .

Griffiths, at Horseferry-road, who, indeed at one time begged to be taken back to France with his former subordinate appointment. But Birdwood's proposal also had its drawbacks—it is certain that M'Cay would have been as difficult in the Horseferry-road command as at Salisbury Plain. In warning Senator Pearce that M'Cay would be unsuitable as G.O.C., A.I.F., if that post were vacated by himself, Birdwood quoted an opinion expressed by the High Commissioner for Australia in London that, whereas his office worked admirably in co-operation with Griffiths, if M'Cay were in charge, he himself could hardly hope to carry on.

However, M'Cay was given the post at Salisbury Plain; and, after Birdwood had impressed upon him the necessity of amicable co-operation, he filled the base dépôt command loyally and ably. When the losses at Third Ypres brought a crisis in the supply of reinforcements, he reorganised his reinforcement and convalescent units, reducing the former from 15 battalions to 10 and later to 5, and thus saving a number of the training staff. As, however, the staffs were partly formed from unfit troops, but principally from officers and N.C.O.'s sent over from their units in France for a needed rest, the reinforcement thus provided consisted partly of war-worn personnel.

Inevitably it was from officers and men returning after convalescence that the reinforcements now largely came. And some observers were inclined to suspect that at such times the mere knowledge that men were greatly needed in France could not help having its subconscious effect upon the minds of the medical boards, with the result of lowering the standard of fitness ordinarily insisted on. Among the men returned to France, many had been wounded again and again, and there were undeniably some whose nerves or strength were unfit for the strain that was being put upon them. There is a recorded case of one who had served since the beginning of the war, and whom the original medical officer of his battalion, chancing to meet him in France returning after many wounds, pronounced to be suffering from acute overstrain, eye-pupils dilated, and thoroughly unfit for front-line service. Another infantryman,⁸³ who had received his first wound shortly after

⁸³ Pte A. P. Scott (No. 1302; 5th & 57th Bns.). Prospector; of Williamstown, Vic.; b. Mirboo North, Vic., 1 Jan., 1889. Died 7 Aug., 1934.

31st report. Capt Wilson's Coy

An aeroplane had previously set the train on fire.

When the 8th Engps arrived a driver was obtained who brought the gun to the rear of our lines

5th Dragoon Ids History (p. 325)

"A" Squadron was shot at by m/guns from Harbouneres but went straight on, & reached the old Amiens defence line, & found it unoccupied. After crossing the trench line the squadron was fired on from a train on the railway running from Progart to the east of Harbouneres. The train was trying to steam away, but was hit by a bomb from an aeroplane & set on fire. Continuing its advance the squadron overran the train, & the men in the train ----- tried to get away towards Framerville but were all killed or captured ^{some} by this sqn + some by B. Sqn.

C Sqn. on right flank captured a light engine + some trucks and made some prisoners before reaching the old Amiens defence line

spearhead, the first of the series of clean, powerful strokes which constituted so important a part of the second phase of "Third Ypres." Never before had the A.I.F. fought with such effect. It delivered blow after blow with complete success. But, when Haig endeavoured to continue that brilliant series in the autumn rains and mud, desertion increased. It was difficult even for the company officers and N.C.O.'s to say how far the practice really went, but, during the dreadful period that followed the Battle of Broodseinde, 53 cases were reported by the 2nd Australian Division, which bore the chief strain,⁶² and the true number was probably larger. The offenders were men who, as Birdwood wrote to Pearce, when their battalion was ordered into the trenches "quietly slipped away at night back to the rear," where they lay up for a few days and then reported back, either to the battalion when it came out, or to its "nucleus" camp, or were arrested.

It was difficult to distinguish some of these cases from those of genuine "strays"; and, for conviction by court-martial, it was necessary to prove that the order to go into the line had actually been given to the accused man. There is no question that the action of a few worthless men constantly burdened the lives of many of their comrades, caused incessant trouble to N.C.O.'s and officers already weighted with battle duties, and disgraced their regiments and their nation. It was not the absence of these men from battle; but their example to the younger troops, that was harmful. Their absence was in some ways a definite advantage, but the unfairness of allowing criminals to avoid the dangers, into which better men had to be forced, made their discharge from the army an impossible penalty. They had to be caught and either hauled into the line or imprisoned. One result of this system was that the practice of suspending military sentences, largely adopted in the British forces and those of the other dominions, could not be so general in the A.I.F. The result was that, according to a graph circulated in March 1918, nearly 9 Australians per 1,000 were in field imprisonment as against 1 per 1,000 in the British force, and less than 2 in the Canadian,

⁶² See Vol. IV, p. 890.

Thrusts
blows

d) d
d

C d

/ effect

31st Bn During 31st Bn advance between Red ~~lines~~ ^{Blue} lines
Aug 8. Sqdn of the 5th Dragoon Gds. passed through in mass
preceded by scouts, but unfortunately ran into MG.
nest near Vauwillers + suffered severe casualties.

They retired a short distance + then set out again
+ were lost to sight in rear of Dramerwill.

They, operating with armoured cars, proceeded to
round up the enemy to a depth of about six
kilometres + collected between two + three hundred
prisoners,

On arriving at Blue line it was seen that there
was a train with heavy gun + crew on the line
in ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{the} near end of which was burning
as the result of a bomb being dropped
on it by one of our contact 'planes.

The crew (including the 2nd in command of the
gun) were captured by the 5th Dragoon
Gds.

The 28 c.m. ^{railway} gun is the most important capture

The battalion is extremely proud of itself inasmuch
as it has such an interesting trophy to its credit.

As ~~there~~ there seems to be some doubt as to the
claim of this battalion to its capture, it is only right to
say here that the aviator who dropped the bomb on
the train was instrumental in its capture as well as the
cavalry. The actual taking possession of the gun
was carried out by an officer of this battalion

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opponents' own flares, caught sight of a German machine-gun post behind "Hamp Farm." This ~~appeared a possible objective~~ for a raid, and the party was waiting to push round and reconnoitre it from the rear, when they heard a German patrol coming down the track on which they happened to be lying. Their first intention was to capture the patrol, but it would have been difficult to bring back the prisoners from that distance over several belts of wire. Accordingly, after waiting till the Germans, eight in number, were on them, they flung a couple of bombs and opened with their pistols, killing or wounding at least four. Flares immediately went up, and parties of Germans began to appear in several directions; but the Australians, being screened by the ground from the machine-gun at Hamp Farm, searched the injured Germans for documents, cut off the shoulder straps showing their regimental numbers, and then, recrossing the wire by rolling over it, came in with their information. "I see the 13th Brigade has too many officers!" was the comment of Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard, then of G.H.Q., who chanced to meet the commander of the 52nd Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Whitham) next day.

stet
seemed a possible goal for

NAIA

A ~~raid~~ ^{raid} ~~had been avoided~~
A raid, always hated, had been avoided.

It was claimed and believed by the Australian infantry and by their commanders that before the winter ended they had almost complete control of No-Man's Land, and it has been stated that the practice thus gained went far towards creating the confidence and proficiency which marked the conduct of these troops later in the year. Yet the reader who turns to the published histories of the German regiments then opposing them will be surprised to find that several of these make precisely the same statement with regard to their own patrols. The 153rd Infantry Regiment speaks of the period as a fairly quiet one marked by "patrol undertakings so well—and rightly—loved," through which, it is claimed, that regiment's fame spread "far beyond the boundaries of its division and corps." The 72nd Regiment states that the patrolling of both sides was keen, and that, whereas the 72nd took fifteen prisoners,

our opponents, in retaliatory attempts, secured nothing, and merely left machine-guns and prisoners in our hands.

The history is extremely frank of itself... as it has not an interesting chapter to be written... as there seems to have been doubt as to the claim of the British to its capture, it was right to say here that the German who dropped the bomb on the train was not mounted in its capture as well as the... the actual thing... was carried out by...



AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

VICTORIA BARRACKS,

PADDINGTON, N.S.W., 19.6.1934

Dear Dr. Beau

I am enclosing herewith a brief outline of the story of the difficulties experienced in bringing out the 11th unit railway gun Captured by the Australians at Harboursmead on 8th August 1918, to use as you think fit.

Speaking to Sir Charles Rosenthal some time ago I happened to tell him of some of the difficulties I set back. I experienced in bringing the trophy out & he suggested I should send a short article to "Reveille" as it would be of interest

to the typists. This I have done.

I thought you also might be interested hence the attached sheets; to use as you think fit, or otherwise.

I attach also some notes I made at the time from official records, handbooks &c. regarding this

fun & the 15th inch Charge's gun &c. though I presume you have

already
photostats.

Yours sincerely

G. Maubert

HISTORICAL NOTES AND WAR DIARY EXTRACTS HAVING REFERENCE TO THE

28 cm. GERMAN RAILWAY GUN.

On 3rd May 1918 towards evening a 24 cm. H.V. gun was located by the 15th F.S. Coy. at W 7 C 96 near Bayonvillers and Guillaucourt. In the G.O.C. R.A. Diary on 20th May an entry appeared "Shelling by H.V. guns is still considerable. Guns probably doing some of the shelling have been seen on the railway from V 11 to W 7 at various times. Their practice is to fire a few rounds, and to retire when engaged by our artillery".

On 30th a H.V. gun at W 8 a 66 was engaged with balloon observation. "One direct hit on the train was observed and two direct hits on the railway track".

On 4th June 1918 it was engaged by one of our forward 60 pr. batteries; each time it opened fire it was neutralized. When this occurred five times it moved off and did not reappear for two days, having fired on the 4th eight rounds in all. On 6th June our forward 60 prs. again "harassed with most successful results" this gun. It moved off on this occasion after firing three rounds only. Twice subsequently it opened up, and after firing five rounds and two rounds respectively it then moved away.

On the 9th in four attempts it fired eight rounds in all, each time being successfully neutralized.

On the 10th it was again neutralized, a small explosion being caused.

On the 16th an entry says that H.V. guns on railway mountings firing from V 12 and W 7 were successfully neutralized by forward 60 prs. (It is possible that there was only one gun in action, the reports having been furnished from divergent viewpoints.)

On the 17th at 5.15 a.m. it was engaged by 6" guns and withdrew after firing five rounds. At 8 a.m. the same date it again opened up, and was engaged by 6" guns and 60 prs. After firing only one round a direct hit was obtained on the gun, and another hit on the engine, and another on some ammunition. (It is more than probable that the hit observed on the gun was the engine or one of the trucks, as there is no sign of the gun having been hit at any time.) This area was then kept under fire. "At 12.15 p.m. a new engine came up rapidly and withdrew the gun. The engine was engaged without success by our batteries".

The damage done was evidently sufficient to keep the gun out of action for several days. It made its reappearance on 23rd in V 12. (It is pointed out that this is more or less the same area in which it has been operating all along. The gun has a range of 26,000 yards. Amiens is 23,000 to 24,000 yards distant).

On 23rd and 24th it was again neutralized by our fire. (About the same time, 28th, a special shoot, using aeroplane observation, was carried out on another gun, 38 cm (15") firing from Arcy Wood, near Chuignes. This gun was subsequently captured, having been blown up by the enemy some time before, either by a premature or by enemy design; the carriage and gun being completely damaged thereby. This is described in a special report. The distance of the 38 cm. gun from Amiens is about 34,000 to 35,000 yards, this gun having a range of 46,000 yards. Both the 15" gun and the 11" gun were thus within range of Amiens.

The shoot on the 38 cm. gun was carried out by a forward section of 6" guns, and after its completion these guns fired harassing rounds on the targets in the vicinity).

On 9th July 1918 the railway gun in W 5 a was neutralized by our artillery.

On 11th July again it was in action and neutralized, this time firing from V 12 d, W 5 a and W 7 d.

On the 13th firing from W 7 and W 8 on several occasions it was successfully neutralized each time, and again on the 16th. On the 19th a location at W 5 d 7365 was taken up by it and from which it shelled the vicinity of Allonville. It fired only four rounds, including two airburst rounds. We engaged it with 6" guns with balloon observation.

Capture of the 28 cm. gun.

On 8th August 1918 this gun was captured by the 31st Australian Battalion,

assisted by an officer - Lieut. G. Burrows, M.C., 14th Field Company Australian Engineers - with two sappers - L.J. Strahan and J.H. Palmer, 8th Field Company Australian Engineers.

The C.R.E. in 5th Australian Division War Diary, August 1918, states: "Lieut. G. Burrows, M.C., 14th Field Company Australian Engineers, with two sappers - L.J. Strahan and J.H. Palmer, 8th Field Company Australian Engineers - on reaching the final objective with one of the assaulting battalions of the Left Brigade, whom they were accompanying, saw a long range 11½" gun on railway mounting on a siding 400 yards beyond the front line. A locomotive with several ammunition wagons and coaches, which were on fire, was also on the siding. Without hesitation this party of Field Engineers went forward, and in spite of enemy machine gun and rifle fire, raised steam on the locomotive, shunted the burning coaches into another siding, coupled up with gun and ammunition wagons, and then brought these well back within our own lines".

The R.A.F. bombed the railway line, cutting it with a bomb, thus rendering the withdrawal of the gun to a place of safety from the enemy point of view impossible, and incidentally bringing it to a standstill.

Salvage of the gun and train:

"A party of one section of sappers was put on during the night of 8/9th to repair the broad gauge railway in W 5. This necessitated taking up the damaged sections of rails, and replacing them with rails taken up from between W 5 Central and the Blue Line. Rails that would not fit were successfully cut with one slab of guncotton placed vertically with the edge of the slab in close contact with the web of the rail, the slab being cut to fit. As the boiler of the locomotive attached to railway gun was practically empty, 300 gallons of water were taken up in a water cart from Bayonvillers during the night. Steam was raised early in the morning of the 9th, but when starting the locomotive on the upgrade the train ran back, with the result that the bogey of the guncarriage ran off the rails on one side. Work was then commenced jacking up the carriage, and eventually the gun carriage was replaced on the rails. Another 300 gallons of water were taken up to the locomotive in the Company water cart from Bayonvillers during the evening. Steam was again raised, and the gun and train moved back to W 3 d 28 during the night of 9/10th August.

Early in the morning of the 10th August, Lieut. Malcolm, R.E., arrived from Corps H.Q., with instructions to take over the gun and train. These were handed over and a receipt obtained from him."

(Extract from 8th Field Coy., Aust. Engineers' War Diary, August 1918).

Report by O.C. 8th Aust. Inf. Bde., enclosing report by O.C. 31st Australian Battalion re capture of 11.2" railway gun:

Report by O.C. 31st Battalion reads:-

H.Q. 8th Aust. Inf. Bde.

I have to report as follows in regard to the circumstances surrounding the capture of the German 28 cm. gun No. 602921:-

On reaching the first objective of the 5th Aust. Div. (Red Line) at 10 a.m. on 8th August last I saw a railway train steaming up and down a railway line running north and south through X1 Ref. Map Sheet 62 D S F 1/20,000. I was with my left front Company. On reaching a point about 800 yards from the line the train stopped, and I then saw a large gun fire from one of the trucks. After several shots had been fired, I noticed an aeroplane (apparently a Sopwith Camel) circling over the train, then moving slowly to the North, with the evident intention of attacking it. A few seconds later the plane dropped about four bombs close to the engine, which emitted a dense cloud of steam, and the train stopped. The plane then circled round the train again, and dropped a bomb on one of the rear trucks, causing a large explosion. By this time I was within about 600 yards of the train.

I then gave orders for the final objective (Blue Line) to be taken immediately. At this time I saw a mass of cavalry about a mile to my right rear approaching Harbounieres. My troops reached the final objective at 10.15 a.m., and some half hour later they had occupied the Blue Line the Cavalry passed through. By

then the train had been examined by many of my officers and men and souvenirs obtained therefrom.

As the train was within 100 yards of my front line it was in my possession and covered by fire at all times subsequent to the capture of the final objective. No tanks reached the final objective until at least one hour and a half after its capture by my battalion.

Steam was raised on the engine at 2 a.m. by engineers attached to me, and the train (less several passenger coaches and damaged trucks) was brought into our lines at about 3 p.m. The train was certainly brought to a standstill by the work of the aeroplane, but I claim on behalf of the 8th Australian Infantry Brigade the actual capture of the gun.

31st Inf. Battn.
G 484
20/9/18

(Sgd.) N.W. Freeman, Lt.-Col.
Comdg. 31st Bn. A.I.F.

5th Aust. Div.

H.Q. 5/Aust. Div. A.I.F. Q 101/951
22/9/18
8th A.I.Bde. No. G. 13/649
21/9/18

Ref. capture of German 28 cm. gun on 8 Aug. report by C.O. 31st Battalion is forwarded.

(Sgd.) C.H. Davies, Lt.-Col.
T/Comdg. 8th A.I.Bde.

At Paris:

The gun and mounting complete were despatched to Paris for exhibition purposes, and it was placed in the Champs de Mars, where it was viewed by thousands of Parisians and others. Many of them were under the impression that it was the gun that shelled Paris. At the time of its arrival there, it was marked, "Captured by the 31st Battalion, A.I.F." This was subsequently altered to, "Captured by the British IV Army", and this is till on the body of the undercarriage in huge white letters.

There is not the slightest doubt however that the actual capture was made by the 31st Australian Battalion and the Australian Engineer personnel attached thereto. An Australian detachment which was told off as a guard during its stay in Paris was warmly cheered by French soldiers and civilians.

The Prime Minister of Australia (The Hon. W.M. Hughes) subsequently asked the High Commissioner for Australia if steps could be taken to have the gun exhibited in London. The High Commissioner wrote to the Corps Commander, Australian Corps (Sir John Monash); who replied that he knew of no difficulties from that side and that he had no objections to its exhibition in London provided a definite assurance was given that the gun would ultimately arrive in Australia and not get overlooked in London.

It was suggested that the gun should be mounted in Trafalgar Square or near Australia House. (Owing to the huge weight of the gun and mounting and the absence of a railway line in the vicinity of these places this was found to be impracticable.)

The gun and mounting complete with four trucks for personnel and ammunition etc. were brought across to Richborough by train ferry from Dieppe. On the 5th October 1918 the War Office informed Major Treloar (O.C. War Records, A.I.F.) that the trophy was about to be sent to England for experimental purposes. Steps were immediately taken to ensure that such tests would not interfere with the gun as a trophy for subsequent removal to Australia, that is, that no more damage should be done to it than was absolutely necessary to carry out the tests, particularly of the recuperator system.

The gun has an abnormally short recoil for a weapon of its size and capabilities.

On the 7th October a request was made by the Commandant, A.I.F. Headquarters, London, for the trophy to be made available to Australian Headquarters for exhibition and eventual shipment to Australia, and that the trucks accompanying it be made available on arrival as they would not be required for experimental purposes.

In a subsequent letter to the War Office, 23/11/18, after the cessation of hostilities, the Commandant, A.I.F. Headquarters, strongly urged the War Office to use one of the other guns of the same type, which would be handed over under the armistice terms for this purpose, thus making this gun immediately available for Australian War Trophy purposes. This was also forcibly expressed by the Prime Minister in a letter to the War Trophies Committee.

Owing to the necessity of bringing guns, etc., requiring repair at Woolwich etc. over from France, traffic by the train ferry from France to Richborough was greatly congested at this time, and the trophy did not arrive in England until the 15th February 1919.

Richborough:

From the main broad gauge (4' 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ ") line at Calais the gun, mounted in its travelling position on its carriage, was moved directly on to the main ferry and run off on to a siding at Richborough.

Richborough was the famous "Hush" port used during the last 18 months of the war for transporting to and from England to France the more urgently required munitions of all sorts. The British Prime Minister is credited with the idea or at any rate with giving effect to the establishment of this Base. It was built almost entirely by the Royal Engineers, who dredged a huge area of swamp, diverted the course of the river, built 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles of wharves, and laid in sidings etc., about 25 miles of broad gauge lines, and in addition a jetty with special construction to obviate the effect of the rise and fall of tide, thus allowing loading and unloading at all times, day and night. About 20,000 men and women were employed at this Base, which before war broke out was quite unknown; in fact, even at the end of the war it was known only to a very small percentage of the population and was most carefully guarded by military and civil police.

It is thought that some of the enemy bombs dropped by enemy planes at Ramsgate, Margate, etc., were probably intended for Richborough, but owing to the thick mist which rises from the sea towards evening the location of the objective by the enemy planes was faulty.

At Richborough the trophy was in charge of a Sgt.-Major Artificer Marshall, of the A.O.C., Woolwich. He had been with the trophy almost since its capture, and he subsequently stripped all the small parts from the mounting before its removal to Woolwich. Owing to the fact that the top gauge of the trucks had an abnormally big overlap, thus making the passing of traffic on the opposite line dangerous, it was decided to leave the trucks at Richborough. The gun when mounted on its carriage is about 13 ft. 7 inches above the level of the rails. The loading gauge (height) of the tunnels on the South Eastern and Chatham Company's railway lines between Richborough and Woolwich is 13 ft. 1 inch only. The gun had therefore to be removed at Richborough from its mounting and transported separately on bogeys to Woolwich. It was taken into the Gun Inspection Room at Woolwich and measured up and carefully examined. It was found that the gun was too worn to carry out firing tests. (See also historical notes). The stores belonging to the gun and mounting were removed to Woolwich in British trucks.

Cost:

An estimate of the cost of removal of the gun and mounting to Australia was made out in conjunction with the brokers of the Commonwealth Shipping Line. A figure of £1,500 to £2,000 was arrived at. It was considered that this expenditure was rather excessive. However the handsome nature of the trophy, and the fact that it would be of considerable educational value in Australia, having been an object of great interest at Paris and also at Woolwich, where it was continually being viewed by military officers of all ranks, and it being the wish of many of the A.I.F. that it should be sent to Australia, the Minister of Defence (Senator the Hon. G.F. Pearce) decided on June 6th 1919 that as some of the vessels of the Commonwealth Line of steamers were leaving with partially full cargoes, and the cost would be after all merely one of bookkeeping between two Commonwealth Departments, the expense would be justified, and he gave orders for the transport of the trophy to Australia, without the trucks, which were of a bulky nature and presented many additional difficulties in the way of shipping and railway movement.

Many difficulties will be experienced before the gun is finally emplaced in Australia. Some of these are due to its size and weight, and others to gauge and other such limitations in Australia and England.

General Sir William Birdwood, G.O.C., A.I.F., wrote to Major-General Napier, Director of Artillery at the War Office, on the 16th June, asking if the War Office would have the gun, mounting and stores moved to Chatham, where it could be loaded on to an Australian freight ship, and also supply artificers to strip off small parts, in order to reduce the weight and stripping space as much as possible; also to supply 16 rounds of ammunition complete, rendered safe for transport beforehand, and for R.L. designs of the same. The intention is to distribute the ammunition in Australia between the School of Gunnery and the Australian War Museum and the several museums in the State capitals.

Chatham:

Owing to the depth of water at Woolwich, combined with sharp railway curves there, making loading at that port impossible, Chatham was decided on. The Secretary of State for the Admiralty was asked to permit the loading taking place at Chatham Dockyard, and on 28th June 1919 the Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty would give permission for the gun to be loaded at Chatham Dockyard, provided the trophy was delivered under the crane at Chatham Dockyards. This concluded generally the main arrangements at this end.

Unloading difficulties in Australia:

But one great difficulty had yet to be overcome, viz:- the offloading in Australia. The mounting being designed for 4 ft. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " gauge at once postulated the necessity of taking the gun off in a State in which the gauge railway was in use. The weight of the several parts involved further restricted the unloading port to such as had suitable cranes, combined with the 4 ft. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " gauge line alongside.

At Sydney the only crane which would take the weights of the individual lifts, viz: 80 tons, exists at Garden Island. The objection to Garden Island for this purpose is that after having been unloaded at Garden Island it would still be necessary to transport those weights to the mainland to put them successively on a broad gauge (4' 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ ") line. This would be a very delicate and expensive operation.

At Melbourne a crane taking weights up to 70 tons exists, but gauge trouble (5' 3") would render lifting off there useless. In addition only 17 ft. draught of water exists. At Adelaide 25 tons is the maximum that can be arranged, carried out by the shipping company concerned, no floating or land cranes being available. The disability of gauge exists again. Fremantle permits of 25 tons lifts also, under the same conditions of gauge. At Brisbane the greatest lift by land crane is 15 tons, but the gauge difficulty again crops up.

The only port where suitable facilities exist both as regards draught and lifting possibilities with 4' 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " gauge accompaniment, is at Newcastle. At this port the Broken Hill Proprietary Company have a wharf with suitable crane and draught facilities to take the weights involved.

Off-loading at Newcastle.

The General Manager (G.M. Delprat, Esq.) was fortunately in England on 26th June 1919 and a request from the Minister for Defence asking for this Company to do the work at Newcastle was acceded to, the Company placing its appliances at the disposal of the Minister for this purpose.

The original idea was to lift off the bogeys, then the undercarriage with central pivot in position, and then place the cradle and gun and breech hood in position, thus completing the whole exhibit, at the wharf at Newcastle.

The total height of the trophy thus mounted is 13 ft. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ " which will pass through the tunnels and other similar bridge structures between Sydney and Newcastle, but another difficulty appears that has not yet been finally overcome, viz: the possibility of the bridges, particularly the Hawkesbury Bridge, between Newcastle and Sydney, taking the axle loads if the trophy complete is moved to Sydney. The axle load with the whole gun and mounting complete is 18 tons; without the gun mounted it will present no difficulty - 11 tons.

AUSTRALIA'S GREATEST WAR TROPHY

It is probably not generally known that the finest trophy captured by any nation participating in the Great War is the 11 inch high velocity railway gun taken from the Germans by the Australians near Harbournieres on 8th August 1918. This magnificent weapon was greatly coveted as a war trophy by the French, who claimed it by reason of the fact that it was captured on French soil and for the further reason that it had done very material damage to Albert, Amiens, and other towns in the forward areas.

The Royal Air Force also put in a claim owing to the part played by British airmen in bombing the railway track on which it was running and the ammunition trucks attached, thus more or less immobilizing the gun and mounting.

British cavalry, though they passed through considerably after the Australian infantry, considered they had a right to it.

The R.E. thought they should be credited with the capture as some Engineers attached to the 31st Battalion A.I.F. had repaired the damaged railway track, had raised steam on the towing engine, and had drawn the gun and mounting out of enemy range to a position within our lines.

It was subsequently decided after much discussion that the 31st Battalion should be awarded the trophy, the C.O. (Lt.-Col. Neil Freeman) having conclusively proved that the gun while still firing had come under the machine gun and rifle fire of his unit and kept under fire after the Battalion had passed through.

Attempts were made by interested parties to bring back to Australia, in preference to the 11 inch gun, another gun, viz the 15 inch German weapon from Arcy Wood, near Chuignes. It was wisely decided however, that while the 11 inch weapon itself was smaller than the 15 inch gun, the railway gun with its mounting was in actual fact a larger trophy and was moreover a genuine capture, made while it was still firing during the Australian attack. The 15 inch gun on the other hand had been blown up by the Germans themselves two days prior to our attack and took no part in the battle itself. (This gun and mounting were formally presented to the people of Amiens by Gen. Sir Wm. Birdwood). The weapon and mounting had been rendered quite useless the breech end being completely shattered and strewn in all directions and the gun thrown out of its mounting, which was of the circular turn-table fixed type.

Furthermore, the broad-gauge railway line by means of which ammunition and supplies had been brought up to the gun had been pulled up for about three quarters of a mile.

To restore this line to permit the damaged gun only being moved to the

main line would have entailed much labour and expense; apart from material more urgently required elsewhere.

The railway gun on the other hand was capable of being moved by its own power and on its own mounting on the existing railway line to the coast.

Another factor influencing the decision was that about this time the Americans and other Nations were favouring the railway type of gun for coast defence; and it was considered that this weapon would be of interest to artillery students in Australia.

The British Army in France towards the end of the War had several 14 inch railway guns and also an 18 inch weapon on railway mounting.

After capture the trophy was removed to Paris and exhibited in the Champs de Mars where it attracted much attention.

It had been in the first instance inscribed "Captured by the 31st Battalion A.I.F." but this was altered to "Captured by the British 1Vth Army", which inscription it bore until its arrival in Australia.

In October 1918 it was moved to Calais and thence in February 1919 by train ferry across the Channel to Richborough the famous "Hush" port and base near Deal in England.

From Richborough it was subsequently moved to Woolwich for detailed examination and test by British naval and military experts and finally to Chatham Dockyard.

Owing to the top loading gauge being too great with the gun mounted on its carriage to pass under the tunnels of the S.E. and Chatham railway it was arranged for the gun to travel separately from the mounting to Woolwich. The Woolwich tests being completed arrangements were made to transport the prize to Australia by one of several vessels of the Commonwealth line. Amongst these were the Gilgai, Araluen, etc.

On several occasions after full preparations had been made to ship the gun, at the last moment arrangements were cancelled and it looked as though the trophy would never reach Australia.

The masters of several vessels made no secret of the fact that it was a risky job to stow such a bulky, awkward and weighty cargo in any ship likely to encounter rough seas.

Eventually, however, Capt. Waldron, a wellknown sea captain who in pre-war days had commanded the S.S. "Ferret" between Albany and Esperance, W.A. and at this time captain of S.S. "Dongarra" was approached. He readily assented and stated that he regarded the task as a great privilege.

Admiral Goodenough, son of a wellknown naval officer who took a prominent part in the survey of the Australian coast in the early days, was at this period Admiral Superintendent at Chatham.

He also entered most enthusiastically into the scheme and made all arrangements to load the trophy into the "Dongarra" at Chatham Dockyard, provided the Woolwich Arsenal authorities placed it under the big crane at The Basin. He had the Basin cleared of all shipping to facilitate the movement of the "Dongarra" and permit of loading being effected at flood tide.

A model in wood had been made of the undercarriage and of the hatch of the "Dongarra" to test whether this huge structure would dip correctly into the hatch; and in due course the whole of the parts of the actual trophy totalling 185 tons were safely loaded without mishap. In London two important factors had to be considered prior to finalizing arrangements; firstly the question of railway gauge at the port of disembarkation and secondly the availability of a suitable crane to take the huge weights from ship to rail.

It was obvious that the port of disembarkation must be in N.S.W.

The General Manager of the Broken Hill Proprietary (Mr. Delprat) happened to be in London at the time and offered to place all the Company's facilities and skilled personnel at Newcastle at our disposal.

Mr. Shellshear, Consulting Engineer of the N.S.W. Railways in London, gave valuable advice on the matter of axle loads on the Hawkesbury Bridge. The axle load of the whole trophy complete was 18 tons, which would have exceeded the safe load for the bridge.

With the gun removed the axle load was 11 tons only and it was therefore arranged for the gun to travel on two flat trucks as a separate unit. Just at this time however, information was received in London that the naval floating crane "Titan" was available in Sydney and was capable of handling weights up to 200 tons. This solved the problem and a cable was despatched to Cockatoo Dock, Sydney, asking for the bogeys, central pivot, undercarriage and gun to be unloaded from the "Dongarra" in Sydney direct on to the rails. This was done at Jones Bay, Darling Harbour, but as three (3) reserve guns of H.M.A.S. Australia had been loaded into the "Dongarra" on top of the German gun these were first unloaded by the "Titan" at Garden Island.

The N.S.W. railway workshops at Everleigh with the assistance of Lt. Pockett, A.A.O.C. assembled all fittings and parts.

The Premier (Mr. Holman) had been asked from London to have an existing railway track at Central Station extended to Eddy Avenue and to have a ramp

constructed for the trophy to rest on. This the Premier agreed to do and when the parts had been assembled at the Workshops the complete trophy was pushed down by an engine onto the ramp. Owing to the great weight the lines sank slightly immediately under the two bogeys and the gun and mounting were drawn back by engine to allow two plates to be inserted under the lines to strengthen them. When pushing the trophy back to its new strengthened bed the brakes failed to act and one bogey ran over the end of the ramp, portion of the undercarriage being in mid-air for some days. By the use of powerful jacks railway engineers skilfully replaced the trophy in its correct position.

Arrangements were made with the Australian General Electric Coy. to flood-light the trophy by night for some weeks prior to and during the visit of H.R.H. The Prince of Wales who inspected and greatly admired it. Thousands of people passing by day and night viewed the trophy until it was eventually moved to its present and final resting place at Canberra where it will remain as a magnificent monument to the 31st Battalion A.I.F., to the victory of the 8th August and to the work of the whole of the A.I.F.

The following facts in connection with the trophy may be of interest:--

Weight of gun (only) - 45 tons.
Length of gun (only) - 36 ft. 9 inches.
Greatest diameter - - 45.5 inches.
Diameter of bore (at muzzle) - 11.2 inches.
Maximum range - 26,000 yards.
Undercarriage - 80 tons.
Bogeys (2) - - each 15 tons.
Central pivot - 10 tons.
Total weight of gun, mounting, parts, fittings etc. - 185 tons.
Length of carriage - 72 ft. (overall).
Length of carriage - 55 ft. (stripped).
Width of carriage - 8 ft. 8 in.
Width of carriage (stripped) - 6 ft. 6 in.
Height of gun above rails - 13 ft. 8 in.
28 c.m. (11.2 inch) Naval Shell.
Shell complete - 665.8 lbs.

G. J. Mearns
A Col
Australian Staff Corps

GREATEST WAR TROPHY

31st Battalion's Capture in France



How the monster 11-inch railway gun, which was captured by the 31st Bn., A.I.F., at Harbonnieres on the opening day of the August, 1918, offensive, was transported to Australia—how all difficulties, some political, were overcome, including the designs of the French to retain it as a trophy of war for their people — is told in this article by Lieut.-Col. G. E. Manchester, of the Australian Staff Corps, who had charge of all the arrangements.

THE finest trophy captured by any nation participating in the Great War is the 11-inch high velocity railway gun taken from the Germans by the Australians near Harbonnieres on August 8, 1918. This magnificent weapon was greatly coveted as a war trophy by the French, who claimed it by reason of the fact that it was captured on French soil, and for the further reason that it had done very material damage to Albert, Amiens, and other towns in the forward areas.

The Royal Air Force also put in a claim, owing to the part played by British airmen in bombing the railway track on which it was operated and the ammunition trucks attached, thus more or less immobilising the gun and mounting. British cavalry, though they passed through considerably after the Australian infantry, considered they had a right to it. The R.E. thought they should be credited with the capture, as some engineers attached to the 31st Bn., A.I.F., had repaired the damaged railway track, had raised steam on the towing engine, and had drawn the gun and mounting out of enemy range to a position within our lines.

After much discussion the 31st Bn. was awarded the trophy, the C.O. (Lieut.-Colonel Neil Freeman) having conclusively proved that the gun, while still firing, had come under machine-gun and rifle fire of his unit and been kept under fire after the battalion had passed through.

Attempts were made by interested parties to bring back to Australia, in preference to the 11-inch gun, another gun, viz., the 15-inch German weapon from Arcy Wood, near Chuignes. It was wisely decided, however, that

while the 11-inch weapon itself was smaller than the 15-inch gun, the railway gun, with its mounting, was in actual fact a larger trophy, and was moreover a genuine capture, made while it was still firing during the Australian attack. The 15-inch gun, on the other hand, had been blown up by the Germans themselves two days prior to our attack, and in the end this gun and mounting were formally presented to the people of Amiens by General Sir Wm. Birdwood.

A factor influencing the decision to have the railway gun captured at Harbonnieres sent to Australia was that about this time nations, including America, were favouring the railway type of gun for coast defence, and it was considered that this weapon would be of interest to artillery students in Australia. The British Army in France towards the end of the war had several 14-inch railway guns, and also an 18-inch weapon on railway mounting.

After capture the trophy was removed to Paris and exhibited in the Champs de Mars, where it attracted much attention. It had been in the first instance inscribed, "Captured by the 31st Bn., A.I.F.," but this was altered to, "Captured by the British IV. Army," which inscription it bore until its arrival in Australia. In October, 1918, it was moved to Calais, and thence, in February, 1919, by train ferry across the Channel to Richborough, the famous "Hush" port and base near Deal in England. From Richborough it was subsequently moved to Woolwich for detailed examination and test by British naval and military experts, and finally to Chatham Dockyard.

Owing to the top loading gauge being too great with the gun mounted on its carriage to pass under the tunnels of the S.E. and Chatham railway it was arranged for the gun to travel separately from the mounting to Woolwich. The Woolwich tests being completed, arrangements were made to transport the prize to Australia. On several occasions, after full preparations had been made to ship the gun, at the last moment arrangements were cancelled, and it looked as though the trophy would never reach Australia. The masters of the Commonwealth Line vessels made no secret of the fact that it was a risky job to stow such a bulky, awkward, and weighty cargo in any ship likely to encounter rough seas. Eventually, however, Capt. Waldron, a well-known sea captain, who in pre-war days had commanded the s.s. *Ferret* between Albany and Esperance, W.A., and at this time was captain of s.s. *Dongarra*, was approached. He readily assented, stating that he regarded the task as a great privilege.

Admiral Goodenough, son of a well-known naval officer, who took a prominent part in the survey of the Australian coast in the early days, was at this period Admiral Superintendent at Chatham. He also entered enthusiastically into the scheme, and made all arrangements to load the trophy into the *Dongarra* at Chatham Dockyard, and had the Basin cleared of all shipping to facilitate the movement of the *Dongarra* and permit of loading being effected at flood tide.

A model in wood had been made of the undercarriage and of the hatch of the "Dongarra" to test whether this huge structure would dip correctly into the hatch; and in

of some of the ~~Black Line~~ ^{staffs and commanders} commanders, and a dangerous degree of inaccuracy in the barrage were responsible - the whole of the final objective between the Blauwepoortbeek valley and the Douve had by 9 p.m. been left open to the enemy.

(8-point)

German narratives imply that the whole of the line thus left empty was reoccupied by German troops, but this is almost certainly wrong. The counter-attacking German troops, whom the 47th had in part repulsed, belonged to the 1st Guard Reserve and 5th Bavarian R.I. Regiments, which had been coming up throughout the afternoon. The 18th Bavarian I.R. was relieved that night by the III/1st Guard Reserve Regiment, which held the line in the Blauwepoortbeek valley.

which took over the
Oostaverne

Hereafter

Space here →

As a result of the ~~same~~ ^{similar to those} causes that forced the retirement near Huns' Walk, the northern section of ^{the} II Anzac troops was

(thick black)

II Anzac, Northern front plunged into almost equal difficulties. Here the position had been strengthened since 5 p.m. After the capture of Van Hove Farm Captain Maxwell had asked the two unengaged tanks to move forward towards Joye Farm. While working down the Wambeek valley both became ditched, but, as they were

(TAKE IN SKETCH No. 251/262)

in a position to serve as forts opposing any attack up the valley, their crews stayed and manned them throughout the night. Fragments of the 33rd Brigade, which came up and asked their way, were directed by Maxwell to fill the gaps. While seeking for such troops on his left flank, he obtained touch with some on the Black Dotted Line of the IX Corps. Although these could not come forward, they ~~would~~ ^{were a} safeguard ^{to} the left. 14

14 ^{Maxwell} The intelligence officer of the 33rd Brigade had told him that there were troops back along the railway line in the Wambeek valley. The 6th Border afterwards obtained touch here with the 12th Royal Irish Rifles holding the 36th Division's Black Dotted Line. These were forbidden by their orders from reinforcing in the Oostaverne Line.

Since 5 p.m. the 13th Brigade's advanced line on the Wambeek had been troubled by the short-shooting of a heavy battery on its left and of eighteen-pounders on its right. Several messages had been sent asking for range to be lengthened,

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due course the whole of the parts of the actual trophy totalling 185 tons were safely loaded without mishap. In London two important factors had to be considered prior to finalising arrangements—firstly the question of railway gauge at the port of disembarkation, and secondly the availability of a suitable crane to take the huge weights from ship to rail.

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The N.S.W. Railway Workshops at Eveleigh, with the assistance of Lieut. Pockett, A.A.O.C., assembled all fittings and parts. The then Premier (Mr. Holman) had been asked from London to have an existing railway track at Central Station extended to Eddy Avenue, and to have a ramp constructed for the trophy to rest on. This he agreed to do, and when the parts had been assembled at the workshops the complete trophy was pushed down by an engine on to the ramp. Owing to the great weight the lines sank slightly immediately under the two bogeys, and the gun and mounting were drawn back by engine to allow two plates to be inserted under the lines to strengthen them. When pushing the trophy back to its new strengthened bed the brakes failed to act, and one bogey ran over the end of the ramp, portion of the undercarriage being in mid-air for some days. By the use of powerful jacks, railway engineers skilfully replaced the trophy in its correct position.

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The following facts in connection with the trophy may be of interest:—Weight of gun (only), 45 tons; length of gun (only), 36ft. 9in.; greatest diameter, 45.5in.; diameter of bore (at muzzle), 11.2in.; maximum range, 26,000 yards; undercarriage, 80 tons; bogeys (2), each 15 tons; central pivot, 10 tons; total weight of gun, mounting, parts, fittings, etc., 185 tons; length of carriage, 72ft. (overall); length of carriage, 55ft. (stripped); width of carriage, 8ft. 8in.; width of carriage (stripped), 6ft. 6in.; height of gun above rails, 13ft. 8in.; 28 c.m. (11.2in.) naval shell; shell complete, 665.8lb.

immediately brought back. Major Story, who had not wished the barrage to be shortened, asked his brigadier (McNicoll) first, that it should be lengthened to the afternoon's objective, and, later, that it should be still further lengthened so that the 37th might go back to the advanced line.

Thus, owing to the action of its own artillery - for which defects in the maps, over-eagerness of the infantry, over-anxiety

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The Battle of Amiens

WITH THE FIFTEENTH BRIGADE ON 8th AUGUST, 1918.

By J. J. McKenna.


Preparations for Battle.

News of a coming offensive reached us early in August, whilst we were resting in billets in the suburbs of Amiens. The first indications of the impending action were our visits to the Tank Training Camp at Vaux-en-Amiennois, where we carried out attack practice in conjunction with tanks. On the 2nd of August Brigadier-General Elliott held a conference of battalion commanders and officers commanding units attached to the brigade. He explained the operation, and ordered the equipment of the troops to go forward with the greatest despatch. He insisted upon the utmost secrecy being observed. Every effort had been made by the higher authorities to ensure that the attack would be a complete surprise to the enemy. In the Ypres sector open preparations for an offensive had been made, and it was hoped that the enemy, expecting attack in the north, would be unaware

proach of Zero hour, which had been fixed at 4.20 a.m. on the morrow.

Zero Hour Approaches.

Shortly after midnight of the 7th-8th August, the battalions left their shelters behind Villers-Bretonneux and moved silently to the lie positions allotted to them. The night was calm, and, except for the muffled noise made by steadily-moving men, there were no indications of the coming battle. Frequently lines of men in single file converged, moved parallel for a time, and then suddenly separated. The responses to our subdued queries told us that men of the Seventh Brigade were moving too. To the left the Eighth Brigade was preparing, and not far away on the right the Canadians were already in position. Soon on our left rose the well-known ruins of Villers-Bretonneux. Lest the enemy should suddenly open one of his frequent bombardments on the town, we had



Sketch showing the country over which the 15th Brigade operated on 8th August, 1918

of the threatened blow on the Somme. Severe punishment was promised to anyone responsible for warning the enemy by careless reconnaissance in the forward area or by unnecessary movement behind the lines. In the course of the next few days the brigade was joined by the majority of the 10th Reinforcements, just arrived in France. On the fifth of August the brigade commenced its forward movement from Amiens. The night was dark, and the main road to Villers-Bretonneux was crowded with traffic. It was nearly daylight when we reached our positions along the railway embankment west of Villers-Bretonneux and in the Bois l'Abbe. The sixth of August was spent in resting the men and explaining to them the details of the operation. The front line and forward positions were reconnoitred by intelligence staff and company commanders. Next day, bombs, ammunition, iron rations, extra water bottles, tools, and signal lights were issued. We spent the day resting, waiting for the ap-

kept well to the south. Others had chosen routes to the north. As we turned to the left, and crossed the railway, we entered the eastern suburbs of Bretonneux, and noted the complete destruction wrought by the enemy's guns. He had been vengefully firing on the place almost daily since the night in April when the counter-attack by our brigade threw him back from Bretonneux and saved Amiens. The memory of that victory put the men in greater heart for the work the next few hours were to bring them. Before we reached our lie positions, a fog arose, and added to the darkness of the night. The guides moved on unflinchingly, but Zero hour was approaching, and those behind were becoming anxious. It was with intense relief, therefore, that, on mounting a slight rise, we saw shining out of the darkness the number of our battalion. There was nothing supernatural about it. A candle burning inside a perforated petrol tin was all the magic that was used. We were destined to use the

device on many subsequent occasions, but never afterwards did we bless so heartily the brain that conceived the idea. In the lie positions, the 57th Battalion on the right and the 59th Battalion on the left, formed the front line of the brigade. They were supported respectively by the 60th and 58th Battalions. Our line extended from the Villers-Bretonneux-Chaulnes railway northwards for nearly two thousand yards, the right and left battalions joining hands just south of the well-known East-West road.

Distributed over the thousand yards in front of us lay the men of the Second Division, confidently awaiting the approach of Zero hour. No sooner did we reach our lie position than the enemy opened a brisk bombardment. There is no doubt that he had heard the tanks moving into position. Also, the shouting of the tank personnel could be heard for a considerable distance, and may possibly have reached the ears of his sentries. The barrage, though not violent, was heavy, and continued for an hour. It showed no signs of abating as Zero hour approached. What was even more disquieting was the fact that as Zero drew near we were still doubtful if all the troops were in position and ready. There was then sufficient light to permit the recognition of comrades, but the light enabled us to see only more clearly how dense was the fog. Twenty yards was the limit of vision. Away in front, enveloped in the fog, the companies should have been in position. Runners, intelligence staff, signallers, were out in the barrage, groping in the mist, searching. Now and again one of our guns would speak. We waited in suspense, continually looking at our watches.

The Battle Opens.

Punctually at twenty minutes past four our barrage opened with a roar. The bursting of enemy shells could scarcely be heard above the din. Gradually, the German guns ceased firing. The Second Division by this time was attacking, but we were not to move until Zero plus one hour.

We left our trenches at twenty minutes past five, and moved slowly forward. On the right, the companies of the 57th Battalion had the Villers-Bretonneux-Chaulnes railway line to guide them. Running parallel to the railway, and about five hundred yards north of it, was a well-defined track, which was a very useful aid in keeping direction. At the point where the track ceased to run parallel with the line a light railway took up the role of guide, and served the purpose until the first objective of the day was reached. By that time daylight had penetrated the fog, and it was possible to keep direction without difficulty. On the left the 59th Battalion was not so fortunate. The only well-defined landmark was the East-West road, which ran off at an angle from the line of advance. Direction was kept almost solely by the aid of compass bearings, which, with admirable foresight, the intelligence officer had notified to all platoon commanders. In some cases in both battalions small parties lost direction, but quickly regained it.

Upon all the maps used in the battle were drawn three colored lines—green, red, and blue—to indicate respectively the first, second, and third objectives. The green line, marking the first objective, cut the railway about five hundred yards east of Marcelcave, and ran

northwards around the eastern outskirts of Lamotte, a village on the main road from Bretonneux.

During the first phase of the attack—the advance to the “Green Line”—we merely followed in the wake of the 7th Brigade, which was one hour in advance of us, and to which had been allotted the taking of the first objective. For a time the enemy shell-fire was severe, and inflicted some casualties upon us, but its gradual dying away coincided with the advance of the 7th Brigade, the capture of the enemy field-pieces, and the withdrawal of the heavier guns. Around us we could see evidences of the fight that had occurred only an hour before. In front of the enemy trenches lay our dead. They were not many, and had evidently been killed by machine-gun fire. As we crossed the trenches we noted grimly that all the enemy gunners had not escaped unhurt. Some had fallen by their guns, but the equipment scattered in and behind the trenches told of others who took sudden dislike to steel as the bayonets came close. In the fields around us we saw pieces of white rag fluttering from the butts of rifles which had been reversed and thrust into the ground by the bayonet. This was the signal that indicated the presence of a wounded man, friend or foe, waiting for the stretcher-bearers that were to take him to the rear. As we passed, those not badly wounded raised themselves to see who we were. Many called to us, but there was work ahead; we could not wait, and they dropped back again.

By this time, 7 a.m., the fog had lifted to a considerable extent. On the other side of the railway line we could see the advanced troops of the Canadian Infantry mounting the slopes in artillery formation. We recognised Marcelcave and noted its shell-torn chimney. We could see one of our tanks moving through the town, and saw the enemy shells bursting among the buildings. Marcelcave was ours. At a quarter to eight we came in contact with the support line of the 7th Brigade, and learned of the complete success of their troops. The “Green Line” had been taken, they were hard at work consolidating the position, and everything was ready for our passage onwards. We were ahead of time, and took the opportunity to complete our reorganisation before advancing into the void. As it happened, the “Green Line” was drawn behind most of the 77 centimetre guns the enemy had on the sector, and these fell to our comrades of the 7th Brigade. Heavier guns were to fall to our brigade, and, unfortunately, some of our brigade were to fall to them.

At Zero plus four hours we were through the “Green Line,” and our turn had come.

Under Direct Artillery Fire.

Visibility was good; Bayonvillers was in sight, and we could see our barrage playing around it. Our planes were well on time with their smoke bombs. These they dropped on the town shortly after we crossed the “Green Line.” Several enemy planes appeared, flying very low. They passed over us, and flew well to our rear. They had evidently been sent out to discover on what scale the attack was being made. Close to the railway line the 57th Battalion found themselves almost upon a battery of 5.9 guns. The gunners fired over the sights, and many of us experienced for the first time the sensation of being under direct artillery fire. As the shells tore past, each

(Continued on Page 12.)

one of us imagined they were passing within a foot of him. They struck the hillside behind us, and caused several casualties in the battalion spread out in artillery formation. Lewis guns and rifles quickly engaged the battery, and it was finally silenced by a tank which had worked around to the rear. This, however, was too late to save another tank, which, attacking from the front, was destroyed by a direct hit at 100 yards range. On the left, the 59th Battalion had a similar experience. It was clear that we were then upon the enemy's second line of guns. In the centre, however, the fighting took shape as a series of contests between the enemy's isolated machine-gun posts and our companies supported by tanks. With such assistance, the infantry had no difficulty in clearing the way.

Helping the Canadians.

Thus far all had gone well. Just at this point, however, two, or perhaps three, of our guns began to shoot short, and, despite repeated complaints, continued to endanger our men for an hour. It was apparent, also, that things were not running smoothly for the Canadians on our right. Picuret Wood, well known to our artillery as a screen for enemy guns, ran at right angles to the line of the Canadian advance. It was strongly held by the enemy, who was endeavoring to cover the withdrawal of his guns through Wiencourt. The right company of the 57th Battalion and two platoons of the 60th Battalion took up positions along the railway line, and, by bringing flanking fire to bear upon the enemy, enabled the Cana-

dians to rush the wood and continue the advance. After passing Wiencourt, our right battalion came upon a large dump of engineering material, which had been set on fire in places and abandoned. The dump marked the point where the enemy's double railways terminated, and where started the single-line light railways which fed his front line. While the 57th Battalion was passing the captured dump the 59th Battalion was moving around the southern outskirts of Bayonvillers, the clearing of which was a duty allotted to the 58th Battalion, following in rear. This task proved an easy one. The battalion met with no resistance, and without interruption followed on after the 59th Battalion.

A Cavalry Charge.


It was at this time, about 9.30 a.m., that the cavalry came through. This fine body of men, riding through accompanied by field artillery, presented a magnificent spectacle. The sun shone out, and the weather was pleasantly warm. The fact that the cavalry had been ordered through told us that the enemy's resistance had been completely broken, and that our comrades on the flanks had also been successful. Unfortunately, one of our guns was still shooting short, and one of its shells, bursting close to a formed body of cavalry, emptied four or five saddles. Our stretcher-bearers hastened on and attended to the wounded men. Following the horsemen, we pressed on to the second objective of the day, the "Red Line," which ran from the railway in a north-easterly direction past the western borders of Harbonnieres. Ex-



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
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ALL BRITISH FIRM



Drawn for the V.P.I. Magazine by J. E. Higginbotham.

cept for the capture by the right battalion of 40 Germans in the small part of Guillaucourt north of the railway, the advance to the "Red Line" was completed without incident. Just as we reached this line the cavalry in front charged up the valley south of Harbonnieres, and rounded up about twenty prisoners. These were sent back under the escort of one trooper, and the horsemen, spreading over the country, rode out beyond the old Amiens defence line, but were finally driven in with loss by heavy machine-gun fire. They fell back behind the 57th Battalion, which by this time had reached its next objective, the "Blue Line," and was consolidating from the railway to the south-eastern edge of Harbonnieres.

On the left, the 59th Battalion had further to go to reach the "Blue Line," which on this sector swept out to encircle Harbonnieres. With the assistance of the 58th Battalion, the 59th Battalion had no difficulty in clearing the town of the enemy. The 58th Battalion then returned to the "Red Line," and consolidated there, whilst the 59th Battalion pressed on to its final objective. This, the "Blue Line," was taken, with the exception of a small portion on the right, which was commanded by enemy machine-guns just beyond it. These guns also caused considerable annoyance to the 57th Battalion.

Counter Attack.

By this time the troops were feeling the effects of the advance. No rations could be expected before night, and we sat down to deal sparingly with what little we had carried with us. We had finished, and had just settled down to rest, when the sentries called our attention to a white light descending rapidly from the sky well over the enemy's country. Fatigue was forgotten, and everyone was immediately galvanised into action, for the light we had seen was a signal from our aeroplanes to warn us of an impending counter-attack. The cavalry dismounted and went into the trenches alongside our men. Their machine-gun section took up a position from which our front could be swept with fire. The Brigade Exploiting Detachment, which was to have assisted in gaining the "Blue Line," but which, accompanied by tanks, had only just arrived, was distributed over our frontage. We waited impatiently, but no enemy appeared. An hour and a half elapsed, and it became evident that the counter-attack, if there was a counter-attack at all, had fizzled out. It is probable that the reported counter-attack was in reality a movement forward of enemy reserves intended

to bar further advance rather than to undertake measures to expel us from the positions we held. The retiring enemy artillery again came into action, and commenced to shell the vicinity of our front line and supports. The cavalry commander, fearing for the safety of his horses, which were in an exposed position, decided to withdraw. Our right line battalion was anxious to push out to the old Amiens line eight hundred yards in front. This line was very thinly held by the enemy, and afforded us a magnificent field of fire, an advantage not possessed by the position we occupied. The Canadians, however, declined to co-operate, and the left battalion was unable to advance without assistance from tanks, none of which could be made available.

"Germany's Black Day."

So stood things when darkness fell on the 8th August, 1918—a date which Ludendorff, when the event of the battle was known, declared to be "Germany's black day." It marks the commencement of those "sledge-hammer blows" that broke the German resistance in the West, forced the invader into full retreat, and finally threatened him with the complete disaster he averted only by suing for peace.

REFLECTIONS ON SOME RECENT READING.

(Continued from Page 7.)

more pleasant than Borrow could find in Spain. His humor is spontaneous. He does not try, like Mark Twain abroad, to make everything serve his wit, but we feel that on his way he has not missed anything worth a smile. As he is making his pilgrimage on foot, he has time to look around him, to draw illuminating little black and white sketches of scenery and striking bits of architecture, and to discuss with the reader abstruse questions more numerous and more diverse than even the "Sunetoi" of Canon Sheehan's "Intellectuals," debated in their Irish Club.

If I could go tramping where I willed, my first choice of route and guide-book would be "the Path to Rome." Crossing the Alps, though, I would closely hug the high-road. The adventurous spirit that moved Belloc to turn decisively from the beaten track and climb through the rugged passes to Italy fires in me only admiration for the feat, and no longing to rival it. Reaching the Italian country at the foot of the Alps, he found himself with eight francs and ten centimes to help him on his way to distant Milan, the nearest source of financial replenishment. That stage of the pilgrimage is an epic in endurance, cheerfulness, and struggle to keep his vow that he would not ride "on any wheeled thing." The effort did not deserve the defeat that awaited it at Gomo. "I went straight to the nearest railway station," he says, "and, putting down one franc eighty" (his total remaining wealth), "asked in French for a ticket to whatever station that sum would reach down the line. The ticket came out marked Milan, and I admitted the miracle and confessed the finger of Providence. There was no change." Riding on the rolling wheels, the pilgrim reflected sadly that he had broken the last and dearest of his vows, but the philosopher was soon laughing at the pilgrim.

D. A. GROSS

Chemist

387 Swanston Street :: Melbourne
F 5567

Big Concessions to All Postal Employees
and Institute Members

The Kleptomaniac

(By Courtesy of "Adam and Eve.")

BY GEORGE A. CORBETT.

Post Office, Glen Iris.

Cecil Brocklehurst, a smartly dressed man of middle age, sat with his attractive and somewhat younger wife in the waiting room of Dr. Stewart Nelson, the eminent Australian brain specialist. With the exception of an old gentleman who had just been ushered into the waiting room, they were alone.

"Really, Cecil," the lady was saying in a voice peeved with annoyance, "I don't know why you have forced me to come here. I feel terribly nervous."

"Now then, my dear, we don't want to go over all that again," implored her husband. "Goodness knows, I've had a hard enough job to get you to come here. Please be patient a little longer."

Their voices, which had a decided English accent, must have been clearly audible to the other man in the room, but he appeared to be too engrossed in his morning paper to notice the mild argument.

"I suppose you are right," she sighed resignedly, "but I hate doctors."

The entrance of a nurse interrupted any further conversation.

"Dr. Nelson will see you now," she announced.

Brocklehurst jumped to his feet quickly. "Wait here a few moments Dorothea, and I will explain your case to the doctor. It will save you unnecessary strain."

"I am at a loss how to begin," said the visitor, as he shook hands with the specialist. "It's about my wife I wish to consult you. It is rather difficult to explain, but I know the secret is safe with a medical man." He hesitated. "I feel loath to confess even to you."

"That is all right, my dear sir," the doctor assured him. "You can confide safely in me."

"Well, Dr. Nelson, to put it plainly, Mrs. Brocklehurst is a victim of kleptomania. Although I buy her everything she needs, she will persist in stealing trivial articles wherever she goes. Why, only yesterday I had the greatest difficulty in preventing the management of a big store from having her arrested for shoplifting."

"It must be very trying for you," the specialist agreed. "It is certainly a rather difficult case, but I am sure I can cure her."

"If you could, doctor, no fee would be too high," the other man replied fervently. "For the life of me I cannot see how you are going to do it."

"Hypnotism," answered the doctor mysteriously.

"But you can't hypnotise her now, doctor. She is too highly strung. I had to almost drag her this far. I have it! Why not dine at the hotel with us this evening? We could have a night at the theatre, and on our return she would be at her ease. You could then use your treatment without her suspecting anything."

The specialist looked at his diary. "That will suit me," he said, "but I would like to see your wife for a few moments now."

The visitor got up from his chair. "I will fetch her in. But wait." He paused in his stride.

"Wouldn't this be a good opportunity to observe her peculiarity. When she comes in I will engage you in conversation while she takes a look around the room. Have you your note case handy?"

The specialist produced a bulging wallet and laid it on the table.

The other man took the money and placed it on the mantelpiece.

"She would recognise mine at once," he explained.

"Of course," agreed the specialist smilingly. He was anxious to see the actions of a kleptomaniac.

The visitor made his way towards the waiting room.

"Dorothea!" he called.

"Yes, Cecil," a very timid voice answered.

"Come on in, my dear. I assure you that Dr. Nelson is the nicest doctor you have ever met."

The brain specialist saw a neatly dressed young woman appear in the doorway and at once set out to put her at ease.

"Your husband has been telling me about your nerve complaint," he said. "I want to tell you that it is nothing serious. A little treatment and you will be quite normal again."

"Oh, doctor, you have made me so happy!" she exclaimed in a much brighter voice. "I was so worried, you know."

"Now, Dorothea," interrupted her husband, "I want to have a little chat with Dr. Nelson. You can take a look around the surgery while we are talking."

He winked at the specialist, who returned the signal. While they conversed in low tones the two men secretly watched every movement of the young woman.

At first she wandered aimlessly around the big room, stopping to look in turn at the X-ray and the sterilising cabinet. A tray full of silver-plated instruments seemed to fascinate her. Glancing back suddenly she saw the two men talking earnestly.

Quick as a flash a pair of scissors and a stethoscope disappeared into her big bag; a lancet and some valuable knives were the next to go.

"It's hopeless doctor!" groaned the anxious husband. "She's got it too badly."

"Not at all, not at all," the other assured him. "I'll stake my reputation that she can be cured. Ssh!" The doctor gave a warning sound.

The kleptomaniac was stuffing the wallet of notes into her already bulging bag.

"Then we can expect you for dinner to-night," Mr. Brocklehurst called out, jumping to his feet.

Turning to his wife, "Have you finished your tour of inspection, Dorothea, dear?" he questioned.

"Yes, Cecil. I think it is just wonderful. I would love to be a doctor!"

She looked at the men with a countenance that was innocence itself.

"Well, we must get back to lunch now," said the visitor. "Do not forget our dinner engagement to-night, doctor. Lenlie's at seven-thirty."

"Very well. I'll be there," replied the specialist. "And goodbye, Mrs. Brocklehurst. We will soon have you well again."

"Goodbye, doctor."

(Continued on Page 15.)

Eggleston
Campbell Town
Tasmania

15th March 1935

Capt C. E. W. Bean
Canberra
Dear Capt Bean.

I have just been reading your last volume of the A. I. F. in France - & I suppose you are well on the way with the next volume.

We have all been struck with the very fair ^{you write} way with reference to the exploits of our own men and those of the English and other troops, when it was earned you give the A. I. F. its due credit - and as I think that you have always been anxious to give the A. I. F. any thing that is earned or any individual a mention for anything worth while I am

writing to bring before your notice (you are probably conversant with it all the same) one thing, & that is that on the 8th of August, Australian guns got further through the German lines than any artillery had ever penetrated to date, in one day, in a major operation. I mean, penetrated & came into action.

On this day Lt J J (Joe) Punch of the 53rd Batty A.C.F. had charge of a section of this Batty, which was detailed to go forward with the 15th Brigade artillery. He got his guns into action several times somewhere between Harbourside & the Railway dividing the Canadian front from our own in the operation. I have no map now, but remember the positions were approximately there. He had casualties & one of the guns knocked out and horses ditto - but eventually salvaged both guns, after doing good work against machine guns.

3

The fact escaped us at the time but on talking things over afterwards the claim was made that Punch had the record of having got his guns farthest forward in the action. That, at least, was true in the British Army to that date.

So far as my recollection goes I think that is correct. I was the senior Battalion Captain in the 14th A.F.A. Bde at that time. My Battalion was the 14th How. but from Hamel onwards I used to be detailed to act as Bfc for any Battalion that happened to have its O/c out of action or on leave & on this occasion had been detailed to take the 53rd as its O/c. Major Beavis was on leave in London. Knowing Punch, who had been in the 5th L.H. with me as an N.C.O in Egypt. I had every confidence in detailing him to take the forward position. I got the rest of the Bty into action early in the day west of Guildcourt but was unable to do much good through

84

lack of knowledge of where exactly the front
line was, but Punch, well forward, had
a good time, we were not allowed to
take the main batteries further forward at
that juncture, but I went further
forward myself, keeping in touch with my
guns, and saw most of what went
on to the rear of the front. As my
memory is right, the junction of the
Aust. Canadian front was about the apex
of the advance that day, and that
advance was the greatest made in our
day on the Western Front, (excluding the
German voluntary retirement in 1917)
There was a Canadian position in
action to the R. of the railway but not
so far forward as Punch. I do not
recall any guns further forward
to the left. The only one possible was
a section of the 13th A.F.A. Bde. which
would still be Australian guns.
The British Cavalry had entered
some R.H.A. with them but I do
not think they were even much forward

of the Guilacourt ridge. (R.A.A. I mean)
The Cavalry I know were forward of
Horboumieres - and I never saw any of
the R.H.A. guns in action that day.

Peech's performance got him an M.C.
(he later got a bar) - He was a splendid
type. He is now selling insurance in
Sydney or in the Union Assurance Co
He is Sec. of the 5th Div. Artillery League in
Sydney and his address 444 Ashley St
Chatswood -

May I take this opportunity of
voicing what every digger of any
age and rank thinks of that is our
great appreciation of the work you
are doing. We find your books of
absorbing interest and are eagerly
waiting for the next volume - We
learn of what happened next door
to us for the first time perhaps - and
you make clear what was often a
puzzle to us. Your references to
men who were killed but did well
over there are greatly treasured by their
people

I have had all the U. I. F. History to you
and have lent the volumes round to the
members of our R. I. S. I. P. A. here - They are
still reading them and there is a waiting
list for even the first Vol! There are men from
a lot of different units here amongst us, and
I have never heard one word of adverse
criticism - or any contradiction of the operations
as you describe them - but all wonder
at the exact way you have got the facts.
The diggers follow out your accounts
as they remember they followed the advances
themselves. & supplement them with accounts
of their own parts in these actions. It
is very interesting talking to a man
who says he was at Modjeat from or
Herbair. or Pozuine. after ^{his} reading
your book. and I follow out your
descriptions & maps with the greatest
interest. especially the actions I was in
myself.

Yours faithfully

Norman A. Neilson

Late Capt. 11th Hottel
to 2nd. A. I. F.

Doct's Record.
S. Bar. 6 opp 1st D all 2nd moving E.

Intercepted 9

Marcomt Area:

In map sq. S.E. of Chippell our own
line pushed back over Somme. Enemy attacking
on Hill 85 near point 159/2 with
strong patrols out in advance. SS 802/247

Pressure wood penetrated. We are holding
out SE wood. Sgt Wendel 1 Bn 120.

Parts our own inf. still on W. edge. our
main line of resistance is now on SE of
wood.

From pressure wood: Sent at once fresh
reserves 3/479. Pass also thro 53rd
Brig by ground line.

3/479 almost knocked out by tank attack
cannot wait longer.

P. T. O.

108
43 RD

13 DW

13 IR 55 IR
15 IR

41 DW - 18 IR 152 IR
148 IR

109 DW · 2 Jcw R
26 RIR
376 RIR

1117 DW · 11 Jcw R
157 IR
22 RIR

Sydney Sun. 30 Decr 1919

"ARRANT NONSENSE"

MONASH ANSWERS CRITIC

Taking Chipilly Spur

Aussies and Their Score

MELBOURNE, Tuesday.

In the course of a reply to the criticism of extracts from his book (referred to in a cable on page 1), Lieutenant-General Monash said to-day that the question at issue affected not the 10th London Regiment, but the whole of the 3rd British Army Corps, which consisted on the occasion in question—August 8, 1918—of three divisions, each of nine battalions. On the face of it it was unreasonable to suppose that a captain of a battalion, even though he was adjutant of his battalion, was likely to know the true facts of a big battle.

Captain Martin took exception to his statement that the 3rd British Army Corps failed to capture Chipilly Spur, and he (Captain Martin) claimed that a company of his battalion did actually capture it. The Chipilly Spur was at least two miles long, and a mile and a half wide, and it was therefore arrant nonsense to claim that such a position could have been captured by so infinitesimal a force.

BRAVERY NOT QUESTIONED

He was not going to join issue with Captain Martin on the bravery of the London Territorials. He agreed that they were very brave wherever they fought, either under his command or in his neighborhood; but it was an undoubted fact, on which there was a volume of evidence, that on August 8, 1918, the 3rd British Army Corps totally failed to reach its objectives and to capture the Chipilly Spur.

It might be true that small bodies of the 3rd Corps, and in particular the 10th London Regiment, did enter the village of Chipilly and set foot on the spur, but even if that were so they failed to hold it. If they had captured and held it, how could Captain Martin explain that, for the whole of that day and during the two following days the entire position was in occupation by the enemy, and that at least 22 field guns of the enemy remained in full action against the left flank of the Australians?

"THE ONLY BLEMISH"

General Monash remarked that the truth of the matter was as stated in his book that the failure to capture Chipilly Spur was the only blemish on a great day's operations, which, on every other part of a twelve-mile front, were brilliantly successful.

Owing to that failure the left flank of the Fourth Australian Division was seriously exposed, and at the conclusion of the day's fighting it had to be sent back along the south bank of the Somme to prevent the Australian Corps from being outflanked from the north.

"Then," said General Monash, "I conferred on the matter with Lord Rawlinson, the commander of the Fourth Army, and as a result he entirely took that part of the army front objective out of the hands of the Third Corps and placed it in my hands, adding to my then existing resources the 131st American Regiment. With this regiment and the 13th Australian Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier-General Herring I launched a series of operations to attack the spur from the south towards the north instead of from the west towards the east. After three whole days of very difficult fighting it was finally captured and held by them, and not by any unit of the Third Corps."

DIGGERS AND SPORTSMANSHIP

General Monash added that it was not the first time that the issue raised by Captain Martin had been argued. When the result of the engagement was originally made known the British newspapers placarded the capture of Chipilly Spur as a brilliant victory by the Third British Army Corps.

This compelled him at the time to make very serious representations to the British High Command to the effect that the Australian soldier made war in a sportsmanlike spirit, but like a good sportsman he liked to see his score on the scoring board.

If, however, the British High Command was not prepared to give the Australian soldier due credit for what he did, and if it permitted other troops to claim the credit for what was really an Australian victory, then he said that he would not be prepared to guarantee the continued readiness of the Australian Corps to put forth its best efforts. This representation to headquarters had an immediate and satisfactory result with regard to future communiques.

THE YEAR



Etinehem and Corbie-Bray Road

August 10—11
1918 Operations

(By Captain R. Tambling, M.C., 49th Battalion).

The attack which opened on August 8, 1918 was vigorously pushed forward by the Canadians and Australians, on the right and centre, respectively, and met everywhere with grand success. On the left, however—where a local attack had been delivered by the enemy on the 6th, thus keeping each side on the *qui vive*—the progress made by the British along the Corbie-Bray road was not nearly rapid enough. As this considerably hampered the movements of the Australian Corps attacking south of the Somme, it became necessary, on August 9, to make an extra effort immediately north of the river. Chipilly had been taken by Londoners and regained by the enemy, and the position of the troops on the left of our corps gave room for anxiety.

An American regiment was therefore put in to reinforce the English division, and, in a dashing assault in the afternoon, helped matters along considerably. Many a tale of heroism and "go" in this attack came to the Australians waiting on the other side of the stream. From the hills about Hamel, where investigation of details of the July attack filled in resting time, the 13th Australian Brigade watched the Yanks "go over." Rumour said that they had only just arrived in the area, and consequently had no opportunity for reconnaissance, but it was essential for "the left" to go ahead to help "us." So, as the barrage crept over the hill near Saily Laurette, and the little bands of troops following it were lost to view, conjecture ran high as to the objective of the attack and to its likely success.


How well the Americans fought, and the difficulties they encountered, gave rumour plenty of food that night and next day; and as our battalions moved forward by easy stages—but with the hurried warning of each move that the developing situation demanded—guesses as to our probable action, and as to when we would be needed, secured for the "tacticians" of each platoon an attentive hearing, and a greater respect than they had enjoyed since the days of Villers-Bretonneux, when their anticipations of the wily German's intentions had already marked them as men of higher intellect. How agreeable it is, in

the strain attending uncertain times, to listen to the rumour kings and the propounding of their theories. Any attempt to gainsay them leads to the garnishing of their already elaborate plans, and so the hours pass like the days of leave, till a call to "get all your gear ready" heralds the fulfilment, at least, in part, of one of the "plans."

The English and Yanks had fought through Malard Wood and along the plateau between Saily Laurette and Bray to the great Bois de Tailles, and, as parties of Germans were able to find shelter in this wood and the steep banks and gullies and gulches of the countryside, the attacking units had lost their battle organisation. Although the eastern edge of the bois was reached, an accurate description of the position could not be obtained even on the evening of the 10th. Days afterwards, parties of Germans were mopped up in the wood; and days afterwards, too—days after a further advance, in fact—small bands of determined Americans were found dug-in, sticking it, having been foodless for hours, even days, but enduring for the sake of their new name and the story they were making. Hurried into the battle by the III. British Corps, they had been disorganised and somewhat dazed by this new and somewhat unfortunate experience. An American medical officer, accompanied by a single orderly, with a haversack of bandages sufficient for about a section's casualties, absolutely lost, found his way on the morning of the 11th to the aid-post of the 49th Australian Battalion. His intention, he said, was to establish an aid-post, somewhere, anywhere, just where someone might find him. And two days later, one of their colonels, referring to the terrible casualties of his regiment, was agreeably surprised when told about "a couple of hundred of your fellows dug in along one gully, and plenty more kicking around the wood."

But to the return to the morning of August 10. "The left" had been pushed on a little, and Chipilly was again in our hands, patrols of the 1st Australian Brigade having successfully mopped-up the village late on the 9th. These New South Welshmen had come down from Flanders to take part in the offensive, and were at present supporting our 4th Division. The 13th Brigade (4th Division)—which had previously held the entire frontage from which the Canadian Corps attacked on the 8th—thereupon took over the work of the 1st Brigade; the 50th Battalion, pushing through the village, occupied the southern slopes of the Chipilly spur without opposition, linking up with the 131st American regiment, holding the top of the ridge. The remainder of the 13th Brigade was, on the afternoon of August 10, disposed in Cerisy-Gailly and further down the Somme, in support, guarding the river.

After preparations had been made for the defence of the captured position, the chief interest centred in souvenirs, which were to be had galore. A search of the German area-commandant's quarters at Cerisy led to the sending back of cases of flares and new gas-helmets,



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"FOR SERVICES RENDERED"

Mr. Frank C. Baker, the author of this story, was an artilleryman in the A.I.F., and is now a scenario writer at Hollywood, where his brother "Snowy" Baker, has achieved fame as a polo player. When Mr. Charles E. Chauvel, the Australian film producer-director, and nephew of General Sir Harry Chauvel, arrived in Sydney from Hollywood on July 12 he brought with him a story entitled "For Services Rendered," written by Mr. Frank C. Baker, for production into a large scale motion picture in Australia. "For Services Rendered" is a drama of the World War, based upon the exploits of the Australian Lighthorsemen in the desert campaign between Jerusalem and Damascus. Says Mr. Baker: "Some of the major motion picture companies here have been interested in making it into a production over this side but I preferred to sell the rights to Chauvel, as I feel sure that it will be handled with more care by him. Anyhow; it is a purely Australian story, and I feel that if it is to be produced at all, such production should be by an Australian company with the employment of Diggers to as large an extent as would be possible."



(Major Gordon Magee), led a company of the 4th Battalion up the rugged slopes of Anzac at the Landing. Captain Gerald Groves, A.D.C. to a former Governor of Victoria was, until recently, a valued research expert at the studios.

It is not at all surprising to find so many ex-service men in the picture business here when one realises that there are some 230,000 British-born residents in the State of California, 65,000 of them being in and around Hollywood alone. There are almost three million people born within the British Empire now living in the United States, of which a hefty proportion saw service with the British Army in the "brawl" of 1914-18.

Most of the rank and file of the British service men who work as "extras" in pictures are members of the Hollywood Post of the Canadian Legion, which is one of the strongest and most alive British Legion Posts in the U.S. A studio in need of British service men for a film production has only to 'phone this organisation and a full company of well-drilled veterans will be at the studio ready to work within an hour.

Of course, the British Army is not the only one represented in this Town of Movies. There are organisations of ex-officers and men of the Imperial Russian Army, the French Army, as well as the German, Austrian, and Italian Armies; also smaller groups of almost every national fighting force on the face of the globe. And there seems little doubt that every professional soldier of fortune turns up in Hollywood sooner or later to join the ranks of the World's Highest Paid Army.

The Australian Force's six-bob a day turned many a stiff-backed Guardsman a pale green with envy, but such a scale of wages would be spurned with withering contempt by the rear rank privates of Hollywood's Army, whose pay ranges from 30/- to £2 a day when they shoulder a rifle; and should they have the luck to be called on by the director to do a "bit"—a bit means speaking a line, no matter how small, for recording before the camera—their pay is raised to £5 for the day's work. Five quid for just saying, "What-oh, Digger!" Not bad, eh?

But, remember that Hollywood is not always engaged in making army pictures. So, between wars the movie warriors have to content themselves with finding jobs as Irish townfolk, London pedestrians, habitues of water-side dives, or unshaven beachcombers in other-type pictures.

One Of Us

(By S. G. C. in the Canadian Legionary)

Have you ever marched the French roads when you're
absolutely beat,
And the poplar trees seem endless in their rows;
When you think you will go crazy watching other fellows'
feet,
And your boots are worn and letting through your toes?
Have you stood waist deep in water day and night until
you freeze,
With just bully beef and biscuit for your fill;
And your kilt all torn to ribbons from the waistband to
the knees,
While your chum lies in the water cold and still?
Have you ever lain in No Man's Land for hours at a time,
Machine gun bullets whistling o'er your head;
Or crawled into the shell holes that are thick with frost
and grime,
When it pays you to be careful — or you're dead?
Have you ever had the courage to climb across the bags,
When the ground in front is being raked with shell;
With the high explosive screaming, tearing everything
to rags,
And the Lewis guns are purring just like hell?
When the fellows keep on dropping by the dozen every-
where,
And you get that awful feeling "I must run;"
But you still continue walking just as though you did not
care,
For your Regiment demands it from each one.
If you've done these things, old fellow, simply knowing
they were right,
Just performing all your duties without fuss;
Then we'll take your hand in our hand with a grip that's
firm and tight,
For you've won your spurs — and are counted
ONE OF US.

Technical advisers on these military pictures—the fellows who are responsible for the accuracy of technical details of the production, but whose knowledge is generally overruled by the director—draw down a salary of from £15 to £60 a week on the job.

* * *

The morning's work was finished, and the "Tommies" began to stream past us on their way to the studio cafe for lunch. The colonel watched them intently as they hurried by us. One of the boys stopped near him to light a cigarette, which gave my guest an opportunity of examining his rifle and equipment closely.

As the actor moved away, the colonel turned to me with a puzzled expression. "That fellow was wearing the genuine British regulation equipment, and a regulation Government-marked Lee Enfield. Why, I thought they used all fake stuff in these pictures. I'd like to know how they get hold of our army stores over here?"

"Right-o, colonel," I answered. "First of all, let us get some lunch, and then I'll show you the place that supplies all the military stores for these film wars—Hollywood's Q.M. store de-luxe. But now let's eat."

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together with many German rifles. Medical officers eagerly sought among the captured aid-posts for drugs and medicines scarce among our supplies, but which the German chemists had been able to manufacture in good quantities. The dead in Cerisy-Gailly were buried. Captured machine-guns were cleaned and set up as additional defences, and also mounted for use against aircraft. Our men, well aware of the use to which they would be able to put the captured guns, gathered in interested groups around these trophies. The Lewis gunners posted themselves as instructors, and eager little gatherings kept themselves usefully occupied for hours.

The Tank Corps had had the misfortune to lose a few of their monsters on the downward slopes towards Chipilly, and the reason for this was to be found among the hedges on the opposite side of the river, about the road leading from Chipilly to Etinehem. Here a battery of 77's, good to look at now that the guns were captured and silent, lay facing the destroyed tanks; and the men of the Tank Corps received praise and approbation from the lips of our men.

Liaison reports about midday on the 10th having showed that still greater progress *must* be made just north of the river, it was arranged that the 13th Brigade should attack and clear the Etinehem spur at 10 p.m., at which hour, too, the 10th Brigade (3rd Division) would advance south of the Somme. The 10th Brigade, whose attack was of necessity hurriedly conceived, met with considerable opposition, and did not secure its objective until the morning of the 12th.

To the troops of the 13th Brigade, waiting about Chipilly and Cerisy, extra ammunition and bombs and a good meal had set everything in order in the early evening of August 10th. The whole brigade moved to the northern bank of the Somme, undiscovered by Fritz's "sausage" balloons, which, in the time our aeroplanes allowed them up, had their work cut out to note the vast movements everywhere on our side of the line. The battalions, each a long worm of platoons, threaded their way to Chipilly, and, hugging the steep sides of the re-entrants to the north of it, pressed forward to the assembly points in the Bois de Tailles, or, rather, in that southern part of it known as Gressaire Wood. As they passed our own howitzer batteries in action, cheery chaff with the gunners kept their bright spirits buoyant. Ration parties of Americans, patrols of Londoners, and one little batch of mopped-up prisoners were passed en route, and "good luck" from everywhere helped the way along.

All three battalions of the brigade took part in the operation: The 49th (Queensland) was to drive for about a mile along the Corbie-Bray road, close to the outskirts of Bray, facing north towards the main strength of the enemy on the Morlancourt heights, and east towards Bray on its right; the 50th (South Australia) would work along the Etinehem spur towards the river, while a company of the 51st (West Australia) secured the exits of Etinehem, and mopped-up the village at dawn next day.

Except that the 50th Battalion did not get so far this night as was intended, thus giving the German a chance to dig in along the southern parts of the spur, the objectives of the brigade were duly reached. The attack was made without a covering barrage, the artillery merely engaging in some harassing fire and counter-battery work. Four tanks, however, assisted on the left. The Germans

(Continued on Page 45)

Von Luckner (From Page 19)

prison-commandant's launch, in which they reached Red Mercury Island and there lay in wait, until after a couple of days two small schooners sailed by. One of these they boarded and seized, and sailed in it to the Kermadecs to obtain food; but there they were overtaken and brought back by the cable-ship *Iris*, which during the war carried arms. For the remainder of the war, von Luckner was interned in Australia.



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War Pension Talks

(By the Pensions Officer of the N.S.W. Branch of the R.S.S.I.L.A. as a broadcast address from station 2BL)

In N.S.W. there are three principal schemes providing special educational and training facilities for the children of ex-soldiers:

- (1) The Soldiers' Children Education Scheme, administered by the Soldiers' Children Education Board, N.S.W., under the Repatriation Act.
- (2) The Sir Samuel McCaughey Bequest, administered by the Trustees of the A.I.F. Canteens Fund Trust, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne.
- (3) War Bursaries, administered by the Bursary Endowment Board, Department of Education, Bridge Street, Sydney.

Under the Repatriation Soldiers' Children Education Scheme an eligible child means:—

- (a) A son or daughter (including an ex-nuptial child) of a deceased Australian soldier;
- (b) A son or daughter (including an ex-nuptial child) of a totally and permanently incapacitated soldier, born to the soldier not later than 1/10/1931;
- (c) A step-son, step-daughter, adopted son or adopted daughter of a deceased or totally and permanently incapacitated soldier, provided that the child was dependent upon the soldier prior to 1/7/1931.

"Deceased soldier" means a person whose death has been accepted as due to war service, or who died from any cause whatsoever, and who was so seriously disabled that immediately prior to his death he was pensioned under Section 39A of the Repatriation Act.

"Totally and Permanently Incapacitated Soldier" means a soldier who has been accepted by the Repatriation Commission as incapacitated for life as a result of war service, to such an extent as to preclude him from earning other than a negligible percentage of a living wage, or who has been classed as totally and permanently incapacitated by an Assessment Appeal Tribunal, which decides that its decision shall be binding for at least three years.

"Australian Soldier" is defined as a member of the Australian Naval and Military Forces appointed or enlisted for service overseas, or a member of any of the like Forces of the British Empire, provided that in the latter case the soldier was permanently domiciled in Australia at the time of his enlistment.

The minimum age at which a child may be granted financial assistance under this scheme is thirteen years. The assistance usually takes the form of an education maintenance allowance.

In addition, the Education Board may, in special cases, grant assistance for fees, text books and fares.

The education allowance is not in the nature of war pension, and payment is contingent on the child undergoing a course of training selected and approved by the Education Board, and to the child making satisfactory progress.

In actual fact, the allowance is paid so as to assist the Board in preventing the child of a deceased or totally and permanently incapacitated soldier from entering a "blind alley" or an unskilled occupation.

Throughout the Commonwealth, over 16,000 children have already been admitted to the benefits of the Soldiers' Children Education Scheme. Of this number, nearly 10,000 have satisfactorily completed training for professions and skilled occupations.

Application and all correspondence relative to assistance under the provisions of the Education Scheme should be addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Department of Repatriation, Box 3994, V.V., G.P.O., Sydney.

Those eligible under the terms of the Sir Samuel McCaughey Bequest are the children of members of the Australian Naval and Military Forces, who actually served abroad during the Great War, and

- (1) who died directly or indirectly as a result of War Service; and
- (2) who have been certified as totally and permanently incapacitated under the Repatriation Act.

With regard to par. 1, the trustees in some instances admit children to the benefits of the bequest, who are not



LEFT LEG LOSSES

War's Toll

Many more left legs were lost during the great war than right legs. In a check up on these statistics from the Canadian Dept. of Pensions, as far as Australia is concerned, it is found that on the books of the Repatriation Dept., there are approximately 2070 Diggers of whom 693 suffered amputation of the left leg above the knee, and 409 of the left leg below the knee; while 631 suffered amputation of the right leg above the knee, and 338 of the right leg below the knee.

The cause of more left legs than rights being lost, one opinion ventures, is that the left leg is forward when the soldier fires his rifle.

Of the 1800 artificial eyes worn by Canadian war pensioners, the same authority states, replacement is made every three or four months. Color, too, has to be changed, as eyes change color as a person grows older.

Wounds from bayonets must have been rare, for out of the many thousands of war disabilities, investigated by the N.S.W. pensions officer of the League, in furtherance of pension claims, he has not yet come across a soldier who had suffered a bayonet wound.

entitled to receive assistance under the Soldiers' Children Education Scheme, in consequence of the death of the father not having been accepted as due to war service, and of the children not coming within the provisions of the Section 39A of the Repatriation Act. The trustees, however, will not consider these applications until the widow or guardian of the child has exercised her rights of appeal under the Act.

The assistance granted by the trustees of the bequest in the majority of cases takes the form of supplementary grants for text books, fares, etc., to many of the children receiving maintenance allowance under the Repatriation Education Scheme. Where a child is being granted benefits by the bequest, but is not eligible for assistance under the Repatriation Education Scheme, the assistance granted by the trustees includes a maintenance allowance which is usually paid according to the scale applicable to beneficiaries under the departmental scheme.

Application forms for assistance from the funds of the Sir Samuel McCaughey Bequest may be obtained from the office of the Trustees at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, or from the Deputy Commissioner, Department of Repatriation, Sydney. (The Education Board, N.S.W., acts as the advisory body to the Trustees of the Bequest, in so far as applicants residing in this State are concerned.)

The Bursary Endowment Board of the Department of Education, awards bursaries to the children of deceased soldiers where the death has been accepted as attributable to war service, when such children are between the ages of eleven and thirteen years. They also grant similar bursaries to the children of seriously disabled soldiers. No definite ruling appears to have been made by the Bursary Endowment Board as to the definition of a "seriously disabled soldier," but each case is considered on its merits.

In addition, the Bursary Endowment Board will not grant a Bursary to a child whose parents' income is in excess of that laid down in the Bursary Endowment Act of New South Wales.

Application forms for these bursaries may be obtained from the Chairman of the Bursary Endowment Board, Department of Education, Bridge Street, Sydney, or the Deputy Commissioner, Department of Repatriation, Box 3994, VV, G.P.O., Sydney.

(Sub-branches or individuals who desire information "over the air" on any problem or Repatriation, are invited to send in their questions to the pensions officer, R.S.L. Headquarters, Anzac Memorial, Sydney, and the answers will be given by the pensions officer in one of his radio talks.)

Etinehem—Corbie Fight *(From Page 27)*

were completely taken aback, for an attack by tanks at night was not the usual procedure, and how far it was to go, they could not divine. So their artillery was silent, the German S.O.S. going unanswered. Perhaps the gunners were getting ready for a dash for home!

The tanks, which came along the Corbie-Bray road, met the infantry at the point of assembly, and the co-operation between the two was arranged in a five-minute conference in a nearby dug-out. On the left of the attack the Queenslanders, shaking out from their long "worm," deployed to open formation, with the Corbie-Bray road as a guide on their left. One company moved ahead as a screen. The extreme left was protected by the tanks, which went out one after another, their left-side guns popping-off; as they ambled along at the end of their "promenade," they turned about, and on the homeward track gave their right-side guns a chance to inflict some damage.

The Germans hardly used their machine-guns, except in the sunken Etinehem-Bray road, about halfway to the objective, and even here they soon either scuttled or surrendered. The main difficulty of the attackers was to know when they had gone far enough. The manoeuvre, however, was simple enough, each company going forward to its position in the point or side of the thrust. The outskirts of Bray soon appeared before the advanced company, and consolidation of the captured position was begun.

On the right of the 49th's front was a deep ravine, of which there are many about the banks of the Somme in these parts. A small party of Germans sheltering here made a small but gallant attack on the Australian line near the head of this ravine, but was forced to retire, less a machine-gun, an officer (wounded), and two others.

One episode during the advance is worthy of special mention. A German machine-gun post located the advancing sections, but a ground scout, who had become separated from his companions, got on to it unnoticed by the crew. Throwing in a bomb, he followed up with the bayonet. One Boche was killed and another six surrendered to him. On the line coming up he left with these prisoners for the rear, but on the way got lost with them. On his ordering them to show him the right direction, one German led the wrong way, and was shot for his pains. The lad, turning about, brought the rest in safely. The Military Medal came his way later.

Another incident which occurred will serve to illustrate the fear of Australians that was held by many Germans, and also their idea of our honour and methods. During consolidation, three Germans, mere lads, were taken from the shelter of drainage pits alongside the road. It was arranged that they should be escorted back by a runner, as soon as our position had been determined. They seemed content enough until one of them, on being interrogated some time later, discovered that they were in the hands of Australians. He called to the others, and at once all three began "kamerad-ing" for mercy, much to the amusement of their escort. One of these same Fritzes, on being kept waiting at battalion headquarters, asked whether he was to be killed or not!

On August 11, our new positions, which were very exposed, were heavily shelled. During the morning our machine-guns, pushed well forward, inflicted some damage on an enemy force moving against the 3rd Division on the other side of the river, after which our positions came in for some extra shelling. In the afternoon and evening another force, estimated at two battalions, came in artillery formation down the hills round Bray, evidently for a counter-attack, which, however, did not develop, the artillery-fire directed against it evidently being successful. From a vantage point at the head of the ravine, the Lewis gunners of the 49th Battalion made good shooting against

enemy messengers and carriers passing its mouth. One gun here, working in conjunction with another belonging to the 50th Battalion, accounted for no less than 17 Germans during the day.

During the heavy bombardment of our lines a German post was established on the Corbie-Bray road, at which a party of our walking wounded was later captured. An attempt at their rescue resulted in our losing several men killed and wounded, but the enemy post was dislodged.

Throughout August 11 the Germans did not play the game. From points of advantage they fired with machine-guns upon our stretcher-bearers, allowing no movement whatever for the succour of the wounded. The advanced company of the 49th had its four bearers shot; these were replaced by volunteers, all of whom were likewise hit during the day.

To meet the threat of the Germans who had dug in at the southern end of the Etinehem spur, the 51st Battalion, in brigade reserve in Gressaire Wood, sent forward a second company to link the company about Etinehem with the right of the 50th Battalion. At the same time a company of Americans was moved from the wood into closer support of our advanced positions.

The pocket of the river was finally cleared by continuing the operation at 1 a.m. on August 13, when the remaining two companies of the 51st, being all that was left in brigade reserve, captured (at a cost of only five wounded) 1 officer and 170 others, as well as 16 machine-guns and trench mortars. Throughout this period the American regiment was still handy in the wood, but what with fighting and gas-shelling, it had undergone a trying experience during the past few days, and, as a result, its inexperienced troops were not in the best of condition. However, when the pocket of the river was cleared the brigade front was greatly shortened, and both the 50th and 51st Battalions came back into brigade reserve.

This operation was carried out under the G.O.C. of the 4th Division, Major-General E. G. Sinclair-MacLagan. On the evening of August 12, however, the Americans and the 13th Australian Brigade were formed into an independent "Liaison Force," under Brigadier-General E. A. Wisdom.

On the night of August 11 and on succeeding nights, the roads behind the German lines resounded with the clatter of transport and caterpillars. For as far as the eye could see the countryside was ablaze. All that the enemy could save, was saved, for he knew that Bray was doomed to fall almost at once. The platoon "Tacticians" immediately set to work on new plans for preventing his evacuation of the place.



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++

(By Capt. Tom Kelsey, M.C., D.C.M.)

(Commenced in April Issue)



The alarm had now been given, and it was no use trying to surprise the Turks, so we dug in where we were and waited until dawn. Then we discovered that Captain Tommy Hewett, suspecting that we had lost direction, had done a bit on his own. He had somehow collected about 250 men of the Punjabis, Ghurkas and Rangers, and captured part of the Turkish line near the Twin Pimples. We breathed freely once more, and went across, a platoon at a time, to occupy and consolidate the line which Hewett had captured.

We were relieved that night—April 16—and marched across to the left of the Turkish position, where we dug in, in depth, on a frontage of less than a hundred yards. We were on the extreme right of the line, on the river, with the 27th Punjabis on our immediate left, and the remainder of the attacking force beyond the Punjabis. This time General Egerton insisted on having an artillery barrage, although the troops didn't want it. However, at dawn on the 17th, the gunners laid a barrage on the Turkish front line.

Our orders were to wait until the barrage lifted, but we began to move forward beforehand. Now, there were no orders given when the forward move started; the whole line seemed to get the idea at the same instant, and we all raced for the Turkish line, right into our own barrage. Of the Rangers, Lieut. Beckett, at the head of 64 bombers, led the attack. He was to bomb his way along to his right, where the river curved. However, Beckett was hit on the parapet, right in the shoulder. As I jumped over him into the trench I heard him yell, "Give the beggars hell, Kelsey!"

I dropped into the trench beside Durrant. He was on his back, a piece of shell through his foot, cursing everything and everybody impartially. I got a crowd moving to the right, behind the bombers, with C.S.M. Whelan in charge, and Hewett yelled, "Let's get forward, Kelsey!" I climbed out beside him, with Lieut. Lett, of my company ("A") on my left, and we raced for the next line, with a crowd of Rangers behind us, reloading as we ran.

Then the barrage lifted to the next line, and we went right into it. The second line, which appeared to be the main Beit Aressa position, was constructed from a deep irrigation channel leading from the river. There was a trench, a six-foot high loop-holed bank behind it, with a deep ditch (the irrigation channel) behind the bank. Actually, it was a position with two tiers of

trenches.

Hewett, Lett and I reached the trench, took it in our stride, and scrambled up the bank, and jumped—right into the Turkish transport animals, which had apparently just brought up the rations. I saw a Turk who looked about ten feet high, with a poised bayonet at the end of a rifle. Somehow or other, I twisted in the air, landed on my elbows and knees as the bayonet came forward, jerked up the muzzle of my revolver, and pulled the trigger.

Then I fired under the bodies of the mules. I could hear Lett cursing and shouting on my left, and Hewett was busy on my right. I climbed to my feet and grabbed a pony. Hewett grabbed it at the same time. "My pony," I gasped. "You be damned!" said Hewett, "I've just plugged the owner! We'll share him!" Then the troops surged over, and Hewett grabbed the leading man. "Take this pony back and hand him over to the transport officer. He's mine!" It was all over in a few seconds, and we raced forward again, partly to keep the Turk on the move, but mainly to get clear of our own barrage.

When the barrage died down we threw out outposts and consolidated our captured positions, feeling rather pleased with ourselves. The whole affair was over by 7 a.m., and we had time to remember little things we had noticed during the "hurroosh." The native troops behaved remarkably well that morning, and seemed to actually enjoy it. I remember seeing a very tall corporal of the Punjabis walking slowly through our own barrage, holding a red casualty screen above his head at arm's length, trying to let the gunners know where we were. Half-a-dozen of his comrades formed a compact little group round him, ready to defend him from the Turk.

The transport animals we had bumped into were still loaded with rations, which our own troops collared. The pony which Hewett had sent back was still with the battalion when I joined the Dunsterforce, nearly two years later. It was a beautiful little animal, with a remarkable turn of speed. Hewett christened it "Billy the Buddoo," and afterwards won several races on it.

When we had sorted ourselves out and sent back the prisoners, we took things easy for a couple of hours. The bombing sergeant reported to me in the advanced position with 21 bombers. He said he thought I was the best man to report to, and, anyway, he had to report to somebody. Then my skipper (Captain Beard) sent two platoons to the advanced position, and recalled my platoon to the nullah. The bombers trailed along with me, but I sent them to the adjutant. Battalion headquarters were in the nullah, and the bombers might be useful as orderlies.

The Turk didn't let us get away with it. He counter-attacked, and drove in our outposts. But the main position was too strong for a frontal attack to be successful, and although the Turk launched several, they were beaten off with severe loss. Unfortunately, our left flank was absolutely in the air, and the Turk eventually occupied the nullah on the extreme left of our line, and worked down. The battalion on the extreme left, finding its flank turned, dropped back to the next line, the original Turkish front trench, and hung on there. Each battalion

CHARLES KINSELA

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MONASH'S GENIUS.

+ + +

General Herring's Tribute

+ + +

Etinehem Spur Capture

+ + +

General Herring

I read with interest in the August number of "Reveille" Captain Tambling's account of the Etinehem and Corbie-Bray Road operations. In my opinion, this minor operation was one of the sidelights on the great military genius of General Monash and of his great thoroughness and attention to detail.

As Captain Tambling relates, the situation on August 10 was that although great progress had been made on the south side of the Somme, the advance on the north side had been more or less held up. Consequently the Australian Corps, which was attacking on the south side could not safely advance much further until their left flank was secure.

Quick to act, General Monash decided that Etinehem Spur must be taken without delay. Ascertaining that the 13th Brigade was available, and knowing the delay that must occur if his orders had to go through the usual corps and divisional routine, he immediately got in touch with the 4th Divisional Commander and asked that the 13th Brigade be made available for a special operation, and advised him that he would see the brigade commander at divisional headquarters at 11 a.m. and give him his instructions verbally.

On arrival at divisional headquarters (I was commanding the 13th Brigade at the time) I found General Monash already there and studying a map. Explaining the situation to me, he said, "I want you to move your brigade across the Somme and take the Spur. When can you do it?" I explained that by the time I had received my orders and got my troops ready to move it would be too late to do it that night, but that I could do it the following night.

"That is no good, Herring," he replied. "It must be done to-night for two reasons. First, I cannot continue my advance until my left flank is secure; and, second, the Germans holding the Spur have already been attacked twice, and are sure to be in a more or less disorganised state; but give them twenty-four hours to consolidate and it might not be possible for you to take the Spur. I can, however, save you a lot of time, as I will personally see that you C.O.'s, etc., are not only advised to be at your H.Q. at 1 p.m., but also to have their troops ready to move by 4 p.m." I, of course, saw the force of his argument, and agreed to attack that night.

He then gave the necessary instructions to be telephoned, and said, "Now, tell me how you propose to attack." I briefly outlined my ideas, and he agreed as to the general principles, and then told me he would place at least four tanks at my disposal, and advised me as to how he thought they should be used. He then advised me as to how to make the best use of my artillery, and we also discussed the various phases of the infantry attack. He closed the conference by saying, "The best of luck, Herring. Get back to your H.Q. as quickly as you can; and I am sure by this time to-morrow you will find you are in possession of Etinehem Spur."

On arrival at my H.Q. I found my C.O.'s, the artillery, and tank commanders, etc., waiting for me. I explained the situation to them, and gave out my various orders, and by 4 p.m. the 13th Brigade had started on their move across the Somme. Shortly after daylight next morning,

I was able to ring up division headquarters and report that I had captured my objective and was consolidating.

General Monash must have devoted at least three to four hours of his time to this minor operation, but as a result his left flank was strongly held, and the next day his corps continued their victorious push through the German line.

* * *

I hope you will find the foregoing of sufficient interest to publish in "Reveille." I am having a very extended holiday over in this part of the world, but hope to be back in Sydney early next year.

SYDNEY C. E. HERRING, Brig.-General, London, Oct. 3

Reveille
Nov 1937

2nd Divisional Artillery (Plate p. 173), 10, 14, 16, 65, 66, 78, 97n, 123, 190, 245, 252, 303, 325, 653, 803n, 856n, 901n; reorganisation of, in Egypt, 37-8; detachments attached to British batteries for experience of French conditions, Mar., 92; supports 7 Bde's raid, 6 June, 247; 4 Div. Arty. relieves, June-July, 299, 300; at Pozieres: bombards O.G. Lines, 26-28 July, 619-20, programme of opening bombardment, 29 July, 624-5, plans, prior to 4-5 Aug. attack, 650-3, programme, 4-5 Aug., 671-2, total casualties, 25 July-7 Aug., 724n. 3rd Divisional Artillery, 38. 4th Divisional Artillery, 295n, 296, 297n, 303, 334, 335, 336, 337n, 343, 354, 449, 878; relieves 2 Div. Arty., June-July, 299, 300. 5th Divisional Artillery, 296, 335, 336, 337n, 343, 354, 881, 901n; composition of, 28 May, 295n. 1st A.F.A. Brigade, 581, 582n, 625n, 754. 2nd A.F.A. Brigade, 518n, 519, 582, 625n. 3rd A.F.A. Brigade, 625n, 734n. 4th A.F.A. Brigade, 734n, 754. 5th A.F.A. Brigade, 69, 625n, 734n, 794n. 6th A.F.A. Brigade, 197, 625n, 713, 734n, 773. 12th A.F.A. Brigade, 713; formation of, 295-6. 21st A.F.A. Brigade, 625n. 22nd A.F.A. Brigade, 78n, 734n, 754. 36th Heavy Artillery Group, 6, 18n, 116, 180, 455, 461n, (plate) 496; composition, 491n; bombards Pozieres, 19-22 July, 491. 1st Battery, 492n. 5th Battery, 139, 141. 6th Battery, advanced gun of, fires point-blank into Pozieres 23 July, 497. 7th Battery, casualties from aeroplane bombs, 21 Aug., 731n. 8th Battery, 547n. 10th Battery, 143, 200n. 21st Battery, 91n. 22nd Battery, 91n. 24th Battery, 91n. 25th Battery, 91n. 105th Battery, 197. 114th Battery, 363. 1st Aust. Siege Battery, 491n, 492n, 493n, 494n, 495n, 496n, 497n, 498n, 499n, 500n, 501n, 502n, 503n, 504n, 505n, 506n, 507n, 508n, 509n, 510n, 511n, 512n, 513n, 514n, 515n, 516n, 517n, 518n, 519n, 520n, 521n, 522n, 523n, 524n, 525n, 526n, 527n, 528n, 529n, 530n, 531n, 532n, 533n, 534n, 535n, 536n, 537n, 538n, 539n, 540n, 541n, 542n, 543n, 544n, 545n, 546n, 547n, 548n, 549n, 550n, 551n, 552n, 553n, 554n, 555n, 556n, 557n, 558n, 559n, 560n, 561n, 562n, 563n, 564n, 565n, 566n, 567n, 568n, 569n, 570n, 571n, 572n, 573n, 574n, 575n, 576n, 577n, 578n, 579n, 580n, 581n, 582n, 583n, 584n, 585n, 586n, 587n, 588n, 589n, 590n, 591n, 592n, 593n, 594n, 595n, 596n, 597n, 598n, 599n, 600n. 2nd Aust. Siege Battery, 491n, 492n, 493n, 494n, 495n, 496n, 497n, 498n, 499n, 500n, 501n, 502n, 503n, 504n, 505n, 506n, 507n, 508n, 509n, 510n, 511n, 512n, 513n, 514n, 515n, 516n, 517n, 518n, 519n, 520n, 521n, 522n, 523n, 524n, 525n, 526n, 527n, 528n, 529n, 530n, 531n, 532n, 533n, 534n, 535n, 536n, 537n, 538n, 539n, 540n, 541n, 542n, 543n, 544n, 545n, 546n, 547n, 548n, 549n, 550n, 551n, 552n, 553n, 554n, 555n, 556n, 557n, 558n, 559n, 560n, 561n, 562n, 563n, 564n, 565n, 566n, 567n, 568n, 569n, 570n, 571n, 572n, 573n, 574n, 575n, 576n, 577n, 578n, 579n, 580n, 581n, 582n, 583n, 584n, 585n, 586n, 587n, 588n, 589n, 590n, 591n, 592n, 593n, 594n, 595n, 596n, 597n, 598n, 599n, 600n. 54th Siege Battery, 116n, 491n, 622n, 652n, 811n; becomes 1st Aust. Siege Bty, 491n. 55th Siege Battery, 491n, 558n, 581n, 622n, 652n, 811n; casualties, Mar., 116n; in Battle of Amiens, 465n; becomes 2 Aust. Siege Bty, 491n. See also

File with H.N.

COPY.

of note given by Capt. Berrell, 2/10¹² London, to C.O. M.S. Kraye, 1st Bn., on completion of patrol work by which (to a great extent) Chipilly was captured, 9 Aug. 1918.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY AND RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING
N.C.O's AND MEN OF THE 1ST AUST. INF. BATT. FOR
THEIR CONSPICUOUS BRAVERY TODAY AND THEIR
MAGNIFICENT WORK WITH ME TODAY.

(sgd) J.H. BERRELL

9/8/18
9.15 p.m.

CAPT. O/C D COY.
2/10 LONDON

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September 1, 1933

REVEILLE

Chipilly Stunt: Brave Diggers

THIS is the story of how a handful of brave men, led by two sergeants, in the usual spirit of Digger adventure, were responsible for bringing off a successful stunt, and of playing an important part in the capture of Chipilly Spur. There have been several controversies as to whether the position was taken by 2/10th Londoners or by Australians, but it is not my desire to wake up that argument, for, in my opinion, all troops did their share during the war, in spite of some reverses. The story that I am concerned with is based on facts given to me by one of the patrol engaged in the adventure, and also on my own personal knowledge.



C.Q.M.S. Jack Hayes, D.C.M.

On August 8th, 1918, our 1st Inf. Bde. was a reserve brigade to the 4th Australian Division. Dawn found our battalion lying out in fields awaiting the "zero" hour, and one remembers how, when a given number of big shells passed overhead towards the enemy lines, our field batteries blazed out, and the big attack commenced. After what seemed a considerable time we received orders to advance in artillery formation, and went a few miles before coming up with the field-guns. This circumstance, combined with the large number of prisoners passing to the rear, gave us great heart, for it showed that the advance must have been surprisingly rapid, and that all was well ahead.

Before dawn on August 9 we found ourselves on the right bank of the Somme at Cerisy Gailly, "C" Company occupying a sunken road. At this time the position of the front was—the Canadian Corps on the right, Australian Corps (with the 4th Division flank resting on the south bank of the Somme) in the centre, the III. British on the left.

The Dominion troops had pushed well ahead into the enemy territory, but the British, owing to hot opposition the day before, were not so far forward.

On the morning of the 9th the 1st Bn. took over from part of the 15th. The latest verbal information to hand was that British troops were in occupation of Chipilly, but this was doubted when one of our fine and valued officers, Lt. R. O. Samuels was killed by machine-gun fire whilst reconnoitring. A patrol consisting of C.Q.M.S. Hayes, Sgt. Andrews, and Ptes. Fuller, Kane, Turpin, and Stephens thereupon set out across the bridge and marshes to the main road which ran through the village. On arrival at the road the patrol found a company of the 2nd London Regt.

waiting to advance. Hayes spoke to its O.C., saying that he would patrol the village for him.

The party had gone some distance when it was joined by two platoons of "D" Coy., 2nd London Regt., under Capt. Birrell. Immediately this occurred, heavy machine-gun fire from a concealed post was brought to bear upon them, the Londoners suffering some casualties. The Australian patrol now split up, Pte. Kane going back to bring up a Lewis gun team to a nearby chalk-pit, whilst Sgt. Andrews and Pte. Fuller continued up the road, and then struck across country to a position on rising ground, where they could not see any of the enemy from a distance of 100 yards. At the same time Ptes. Stephens and Turpin went through Chipilly and returned to starting point, without observing any hostile movement. The whole patrol then rejoined the Tommies, who at the moment were bombarded with smoke shells from our own guns, causing the whole lot to retire.

Hayes, Andrews and Fuller then proceeded along the road for some distance and, on striking out in a northerly direction between two roads, observed a small enemy post. Andrews thereupon brought fire to bear on the post, whilst Hayes worked up the left side of the road towards it. When he thought he was opposite it, Hayes stood up to demand the surrender of the occupants, when he suddenly discovered that he was right on top of another small post containing 3 men, one of whom fired point blank at him. Fortunately the shot missed, and Hayes immediately returned the fire and killed the German. Andrews, seeing his friend in difficulties, turned his fire on to the second post and the remaining Germans surrendered. On taking the prisoners back to the Lewis gun post in the chalk pit, they were joined by Pte. Kane.

The four Australians then returned to the post from which the prisoners were taken. Further on, about 30 yards away from the road, they observed a strong enemy machine-gun post, and after a pow-wow they gamely decided to attack it. While Hayes and Fuller covered it, Andrews and Kane from the left flank, rushed straight into the post, where they found a deep dug-out around which were placed 7 machine-guns. A bomb through the entrance resulted in cries of "Kamerad," and the Australians, standing at the ready disarmed the garrison (1 officer and 30 other ranks) as they filed out, and handed them over to a company of the 2nd Londons which had now come up.

Jerry Fuller and Kane, still thirsting for fight, pushed ahead and, "off their own bat" captured another 9 prisoners and 2 machine-guns. Sgt. Andrews mounted one of the captured weapons and, opening fire, caused some casualties among a party of Germans retiring on a post further back.

By this time American troops, who now came into the picture, had advanced from Bois Gressarde and, not knowing that the patrol was forward of them, commenced to fire at it. The Australians stood up and signalled them to advance, but were not apparently understood, and so had to seek cover. The London Regt. advanced again, and Andrews brought the captured gun into action against the enemy post. The whole of the plateau was now captured. The Americans, who had no idea that anyone except the enemy were ahead of them, were very surprised to find C.Q.M.S. Hayes and his party.

Whilst assisting in the mopping-up a further 28 prisoners were taken by the Australian party, bringing its total captures close to 100, with 9 machine-guns.

C.Q.M.S. Hayes and Sgt. Andrews each received the D.C.M., and Ptes. Fuller and Kane the M.M., all most worthily earned. Strange to relate, whilst the Bn. was engaged near Chuignolles on August 23, Hayes, Fuller and Kane all collected "Blighties." Hayes is now hon. sec. of the Anzac Club, Marrickville; Fuller is hon. sec. of the Arncliffe sub-branch, R.S.S.I.L.A.—"Sammy."

NO RECORD

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CARMODY, Private MICHAEL THOMAS (No. 2479; 4th Battalion)
Killed in action, 12/8/18.

✓ "Mother" Mrs. Anne Agnes Carmody.
Address : - William Street, Raymond Terrace.

CARMODY, Driver WILLIAM (No. 3719; 3rd Battalion)
Died of wounds, 26/4/18.

✓ "Widow" Mrs. Ethel May Carmody.
Address : - 91 Metropolitan Road, Enmore.

CARNEY, Private MATTHEW (No. 4994; 26th Battalion)
Killed in action, 3/10/18.

No Record.

CARNEY, Gunner PETER (No. 1846; 11th A.F.A. Brigade)
Killed in action, 24/7/17.

No Record.

CARNEY, Private WILLIAM (No. 1638; 56th Battalion)
Killed in action, 28/9/17.

No Record.

CARPENTER, Private FREDERICK JOHN ---- (No. 2586; 3rd Battalion)
Killed in action, 22-27/7/16.

No record.

CARR, Private FRANCIS SYDNEY (No. 1602; 18th Battalion)
Died of wounds, 8/8/15.

✓ "Mother" Mrs. Bridget Agnes Carr.
Address : - 98 Hudson Street, Hurstville.

CARR, Private HAROLD (No. 3252; 5th Machine Gun Battalion)
Killed in action, 20/7/16.

+ "Widowed mother" Mrs. Sarah Jane Carr.
Deceased 12.8.1928.

No other record of any dependants.

CARR, Private HERBERT (No. 2122; 1st Battalion)
Killed in action, 31/12/16.

No record.

CARR, Lieutenant HENRY GEORGE, Aust. Flying Corps.
Accidentally killed, 11/5/18.

No record.

CARR, Private JOHN CHARLES (No. 4163; 9th Battalion)
Killed in action, 7/5/17.

No record.

+ CARRICK, Private JOHN (No. 2832; 1st Pioneer Battalion)
Died of wounds, 23/10/17.) Mother & father decd.
"Sister" Miss Christina Bell Carrick, No record of address since
July 1920, when address was then 49 Harrow Rd., Stanmore. N.S.W

Rosieres
Aug 9 or 10.

Sir

Probably
Lt. H. F. Morrison MC
5 Bn.
Died of wounds 10/8/18

Jaysdale
19th April 1935

Probably
Lt. H. C. Morrison
5 Bn.

You do not state the particulars of information you require, but I am writing you an incident which I think is unique in Military affairs & War-fare that is. a Ballot in trench. to see, who should have the distinction of wearing a M. M. which was granted our Platoon (No 11) or rather what was left of it. for a stunt done without orders. by our Platoon Officer (who was killed in stunt) to give support to another Ball^{on} who were "Leap Fropping us" & going forward. We had entrained at Compiere to join in the Big Push. Back. Villiers Bret sector & were being pushed on to catch up "Jerry" who by this time was getting back. and made contact with him on the left of Barbomiers (I think) on the afternoon of the 2nd day. under particularly heavy machine gun fire with heavy loss our C.O. Leut Morris being killed (his brother Cpt Morris "Bombers" being sent same evening. to take his place. but somehow or other got into enemy lines & was taken prisoner.) We took our objective. Aug. in but after dark we advanced a little taking a few prisoners who walked in to us. At dawn we knew that another Ball^{on} (22 I think) was going over us & forward, but were a little surprised when our Platoon Officer ^(name forgotten as he was attached to 5 Bn) a decent young fellow. sang out "Hollow. One Lads. of course" over we went in short rushes. I forgot to state that we were on the extreme left flank of our Ball^{on} "in air" without any support or connections on left. A Big English Tank which had been put out of action (I have a little to say about this tank later) was also on our left also high redges with a sunken ^{road} on front & left which must have been strongly fortified by machine guns. which were giving us hell our officer fell in the second rush. but we still went forward. till we came to a sunken road and found the Ball^{on} on our right held up by machine gun fire and we calling forward Grenadiers to bomb out machine gun posts. I look around & saw our Sargent (Piper) & about seven more of us. I had a talk with the Sargent regarding our position in the event of the other Ball^{on} going forward. as we had no officer & were not attached to the other Ball^{on}

for rations. He replied that he had better try to rejoin our company & find out particulars. We were ordered to get back one a time to our Company which we did with one casualty & were told we had no right to have gone forward. That evening four of us with a stretcher were detail-ed to find our Officers body & Report with it at Ball's H.Q. it lay precisely in No Man's Land and as we went to find it we took it into our heads to have a look over the Trench and we found that it had been occupied by "Jerry" and a big heap of ^{empty} cartridges showed where some of the Hot stuff had come from. I happened to look into a Trench close by and saw the late occupants of the Trench laid out side by side. Officer & 3 men & was trying to think out what had happened them. When Schrapnell started to burst over-head which showed us we were under observation so we departed at the "cut" picking up our stretcher we had to drop it twice & take cover. but eventually got in under cover of darkness & Reported. Two or three days later our Sergeant came in from H.Q. with a statement that a M.M. had be awarded our Platoon and as there was no Officer or any one to recommend any particular person. the only thing which we could do. was to ballot among ourselves (7) who should be the possessor. which we did on strips of torn paper resulting in favour of Sergt. Piper. who was unfortunately killed in the next Hop. over at St. Martin's Wood. opp Goyart.

386. Sgt. G.T. Piper DCM
 5 Br.
 Killed in action 23/8/18

Decoration ballotted for was
 clearly DCM & not M.M.

Old No 11 Platoon
 From Pte T.W. BRATT
 5 Br
 Daysdale
 via ~~Corowa~~
 NSW

COPY.

Cpl B. Stuckey

7 Bn

Killed in action

9/8/18

France - 17th August.

Dear Mr. Stuckey,

I write these few lines to try and express my sincere sympathy, but I feel right at the outset that words are useless, but I think you will understand that having lived and fought with your son for so long we feel his death very much indeed and also in a small measure can understand and feel for you.

About the operation itself and the results I can say nothing, but very early in the fight a sniper's bullet grazed your son's shoulder and killed the man behind him. I was his platoon officer and told him to go back and report to the waggon lines but like the good soldier and fighter he was he asked me to allow ~~him~~ him to remain with the boys.

I am sorry to say that I allowed him to do so, as every man was required about half an hour after reaching the final objective I saw him again fighting like all true Australians do. The next time I saw him he had been shot right through the heart.

He was not in the least disfigured and had not suffered at all. Those who saw him fall saw that he never uttered a sound so death must have been instantaneous.

We lifted him under cover and the following day had him carried down to a military cemetery where he was buried by one of our padres.

Before I close let me once more assure you of the feeling of deep sympathy which we extend to you.

I am,
Yours in sympathy

(signed) Jas McKee Lieut.

7th Bn.A.I.F.

... ..

Cpt G H Barnes 11 bn

Killed V/Bret 10/8/1918

was a brother of

Capt C A Barnes of the same

bn who was killed

at the Landing

Another brother Lieut J V Barnes 51 bn

was invalided at the beginning

of March 1918 (gas).

Proyart 11[?] Aug 1918.

Gellibrand. (9.1.35) Proyart.

Monash rang up Gellibrand & said he wanted the 3rd Divn to ~~do an~~ attack. Which brigade would be available at once. Gellibrand said the 10th. Monash replied "Oh, good! (He trusted MacNichol chiefly of his 25 bdrs) I want you to come along & discuss the matter - and ~~will~~ do you mind bringing along MacNichol?" Gelly did mind bringing McN. because it practically ruled ^{out} his own ^{power to} influence the final plan. But of course he could not say so, & took McN.

Monash said to them: "The German is in a condition of great confusion & we have only to hit him without warning & roll him up" ~~he is not in a condition to offer resistance etc~~
He expected no difficulty. He gave instructions as to P plans. McN. went to his H.Q. & drew up his orders. Gellibrand asked him to ~~come~~ ^{come along} & show him the orders etc ~~in confer with him~~, but McN. said that he was detained by conference w his officers, & actually his orders did not reach Gelly until the fighting was practically over.

The first news G. had of the battle was an appealing message for respite when the attack had failed. He then could only tell McN to hold fast as much ground as he could wh. of course, was only what McN. shd have been doing without any advice from ~~the~~ H.Q.

10th Brigade Hunt, 10th Aug 1918 Near Proyart

Sgt. Gornall 37th

We reached a position in the neighbourhood of Leon, Rena & Susan Woods on the afternoon of Aug 8th. We bivouaced in a sunken road nearby leading from Morcourt to (I presume) Harbouiniers. Here we remained all the 9th & part of the 10th. About 7 pm on the evening of the 10th Col G Knox Knight called a conference of the officers which took place in the open in full view of the battalion & in the hearing of many.

As a result all were warned to be ready to move at a moment's notice with extra ammunition ^{& 48 hours rations}. It was also learnt that a pack train would accompany us.

We started away shortly after 8 pm in column of route making a bee line for the Warpsie - Vermand Road. We were in full view of the 3 enemy observation balloons with a gorgeous sunset in the west behind us. The ground like all the Sautere country

Consisted of rolling plateaux similar to Salisbury
plain. We could not fail to be observed & it was
a subject of general comment.

Reaching the road we kept in open
country on its left hand side but not in
the shadow of the trees. It was noticed that
38, 39 & 40 battalions trailed on behind
us, making a very long & very visible column.

After marching for some $\frac{3}{4}$ of an hour
we reached a steep declivity where we
were engaged with 3 Tanks. There was a
well kept ~~well kept~~ German cemetery on the right of the
road. We continued our way with the
tanks leading with the intention of reaching
a cross road just beyond La Hêche by 10 pm.
It was distinctly understood (& I wish to emphasize
this) that we should encounter no opposition
as far as this cross road, hence column of route.

At this point we were to assume open order.

We crossed the old 1916 line soon
after 9 pm it now being dark & saw ahead
on our left a large abandoned timber
dump. After passing this, one tank

took up a position on the left flank as a sort of flank guard & a platoon under Lieut. R. J. Smith was detached for the same purpose.

All this time the tanks were making great noise, the ~~last~~ writer marching at the tail of the 2nd Tank & at the front of the 37th Battalion.

On reaching the houses of La Héche on the right of the road there came a sudden burst of highly concentrated machine gun fire & which was directed on the furthest corner of these buildings making the road practically impassable. The writer escaped by keeping in the lee of the tank. Those following immediately, having no cover, caught the full blast & many casualties ensued at this point. But many got by the march was resumed.

Almost immediately the leading tank ran on a road mine & was disabled completely blocking the road.

The battalion was now in considerably confusion those behind pressing on & those before wanting to get back & no one was in control. Simultaneously the enemy lighted many ground flares on the road & used all sorts of fireworks which came right over & illuminated the whole scene like day. Fortunately the enemy fire was frightfully erratic & high but casualties were occurring with unpleasant frequency.

Many men got into a shallow ditch on the right of the road, full of barbed wire, but for some inexplicable reason not exploded by H.G. fire. Others, the writer included, sought such shelter as the numerous trees afforded, & he identified no fewer than 10 M.G. guns concentrated on the stretch of road from La Héche to the leading tank - less than 100 yards.

Meanwhile the enemy attacked the

rear of the column (40th Batt) with low flying planes & did much damage & causing the whole column to become very badly bunched.

About this time N. Col. Knox Knight made his way, unaccompanied, from the neighbourhood of the rear of his battn along the centre of the road, now entirely clear of troops except such as were casualties, & by a miracle was uninjured. He reached the block in the road & was endeavouring to straighten out the mess when he was struck by what the writer believed to be an anti-tank rifle bullet which took off the back of his head.

All this time the noise & confusion were perfectly appalling & it seemed that no one could ever escape.

However, there came a lull in the firing & many men, acting entirely on their own initiative, struck across the

fields towards Framerville & made an
improvised defensive flank.

Here we remained some 2 hours until
orders arrived from Brigade to withdraw.

This we did along the road in artillery
formation quite unmolested in any way.

We took up a position in the old 1916
line & remained there all the next day,
being heavily shelled with gas & H.E.

The whole show had been a most
complete fiasco, & many valuable lives lost.

It is interesting to note this. Just before

starting out an officer asked Col Knox Knight
(in the writer's hearing) what he thought about it. He looked more


grave than usual & said words to this
effect "It is either a ^{Victoria Cross} ~~the~~ or a wooden cross
for me". The writer never again heard him

Speak.

Lieut. N. G. MacNicol was Bath's Scout Officer

At this time & as such was far ahead with
 O.C. Tanks. The writer believes he received
 a slight wound & was evacuated from the Battalion.

The writer knew MacNicol very well especially
 in the early days when they were tent-mates
 together.



A German prisoner, 2 days later, ^{said} that they
had had ~~only~~ ^{heavily} 2 hours in which to prepare
a reception for us at this point. They received
the information from their balloons which
saw us start out & gave warning.

This is very feasible, because the defence
was quite obviously carefully planned, & the fire
registered on the last house at La Hiche. Also the
road mine which disabled the tank is sound
evidence of this. I heard the explosion & saw
its effect immediately it occurred.

A Night Attack with the Tanks

"There will be a train-load of V.C.'s waiting for us when we get back—if it's a success. But we won't want them if we get through with our lives."

WITHIN a few hours after he had spoken these words, Lieut.-Col. E. Knox-Knight, the C.O. of the 37th Bn., A.I.F., was dead. An area officer of Malvern (Vic.) before the war, he was original 2/Command of the 37th, and was promoted C.O. in mid-1917.

Col. Knox-Knight was killed in action near Proyart, August 10, 1918, when his battalion co-operated with the tanks in their "first and last" night attack. The whole operation ended disastrously, and according to Capt. D. E. Hickey, of the Tank Corps, whose article from "The Royal Tank Corps Journal," follows, the 37th Bn., out of a strength of 1000, came out with only 100 survivors.

The Hundred Days' Battle, culminating in the Armistice of November 11, 1918, commenced on August 8, when the great success of the tanks was intoxicating. They then almost seemed to be regarded by responsible staff officers as super-terrific monsters, which had such a devastating effect on the enemy morale that they could not meet with failure. The lesson had not yet been learned that after their initial attack, the element of surprise, essential to a tank action, had been lost. Among the 430 tanks in action on that day were: "H24," "H25," and "H32," under my command. These machines were similar in appearance to those in action at Cambrai, but were of an improved type, and had a crew of an officer and five men. They had a maximum speed of seven or eight miles an hour, and the steering was easily manipulated and under the sole control of the driver.

Two days later, August 10, at 3.30 p.m., I received orders for a remarkable attack that night by my tanks, co-operating with the 10th Australian Infantry Brigade, on the Amiens-St. Quentin road, about 17 miles in front of Amiens. The operation had been so hurriedly arranged that no written orders were available. My section was to head the 37th Battalion of Australian Infantry, under cover of darkness, against Proyart, with the object of adjusting an inter-corps boundary. A second battalion of Australian infantry, accompanied by another section of tanks, was to move up in reserve. Zero hour was fixed for 9.30 p.m., and the "starting-point," where the tanks had to pick up the infantry, was a place marked on the map "Hospital."

Instead of making a frontal attack on Proyart, the plan was to penetrate the enemy line about one mile further south, where it crossed the Amiens-St. Quentin road. This was believed to be at La Flaque. After proceeding along the highway for three-quarters of a mile the column was to turn north at a prescribed cross-roads, and by an encircling movement attack Proyart from the rear. The tanks would advance in spear-head formation, one on the road and one about fifty yards on either side of it, the infantry following on the road. As soon as the whole column had turned north, fast armoured-cars, with headlights full on were to dash along the Amiens-St. Quentin road. The idea was to delude the enemy into thinking the attack was in that direction and so put him off the tanks and infantry which had turned northwards.

We who were about to take part in this novel operation realised its risks, for tanks had never before been used



Lieut.-Col. Knox-Knight.

by night in this way. Besides, a great deal had to be left to chance, for, owing to shortage of time, none of the normal work in the way of preparation and precaution had been done. None of us had the least idea what the ground was like; and to the disadvantage of restricted vision from inside a tank was now to be added the possibility of complete darkness inside and out. With a tank on either side of the road, there was the risk that in an engagement the tank gunners would be unable in the dark to distinguish our troops from the enemy, and would fire into the men marching on the road. The tanks and infantry would have to keep in very close touch to avoid this danger. There was every possibility that the tanks moving in the dark over unknown ground at the sides of the road would be ditched. It was certain that the enemy would now be

prepared to meet tanks with artillery, anti-tank rifles and armour-piercing bullets, especially at a place where his line crossed the main road.

At the time the orders were received, my tanks were carefully camouflaged in a hedge in the derelict village of Bayonvillers, a distance of about two and a half miles from the Hospital. On the way up, as we trekked across the fields, we saw an enemy plane up aloft on our left above the road. We took cover by some trees, and wondered if the tanks had been spotted, as it was broad daylight. At eight o'clock, having reached the rendezvous, I reported to the commanding officer of the 37th Battalion, as previously arranged, and was told that zero hour had been altered to ten o'clock, and, therefore, I was not to bring my tanks into position at the head of the infantry until a quarter-past nine.

At the appointed hour the tanks, "H24," "H25," "H32," in that order, moved forward in the twilight at the head of the infantry, who followed in single file. We had about one-and-a-half miles to go before we reached La Flaque. On seeing the actual ground which the tanks would have to negotiate on either side of the road, it was obvious that they simply could not do it, for it was covered with dumps and old earthworks. After consultation with the infantry colonel it was agreed that all three tanks should keep to the road. The infantry reconnaissance officer was appointed by the colonel to be responsible for direction, especially for the exact point where the whole column was to turn north after piercing the enemy line. The colonel instructed me to accompany him, so that I should be at hand if he wished to give any particular orders for the tanks.

As I walked with him, ten to twenty yards behind the tanks, he said to me, "There will be a trainload of V.C.'s waiting for us when we get back, if it's a success. But," he added, "we won't want them—if we get through with our lives." We adjusted our pace so as to reach La Flaque about ten o'clock, when it would be sufficiently dark to proceed.

When we got to La Flaque darkness had fallen. We were all keyed up, expecting opposition at this point. But, to our surprise, we met with none. The colonel and I wondered if the enemy had withdrawn his line to a

(Continued next page)

The Spirit of Comradeship

(By R. D. Hadfield, Secretary of the R.S.S.I.L.A. (N.S.W. Branch), and Editor of "Reveille")

FIFTEEN crowded and momentous years have neither obscured the significance of Armistice Day nor lessened the sincerity of its observance. On the eleventh day of this month the commemoration will be honoured as widely as in the years immediately succeeding the War, and far more wisely. Its simple ceremonial will express no mere deference to a waning tradition, but an emotion that remains entirely genuine, and a gratitude that has lost nothing of its strength.

"Each November must find diminished numbers of those remembering the War as a chapter of experience, and a larger proportion knowing it only as a chapter of history," said the "London Times" recently. "The latter need to learn what the former can never forget, and the opportunity of realising both the price of War and the nobility with which it was paid will never be wanting so long as the observances on Armistice Day continue.

"These lessons are steadily bearing fruit. There will be speeches to show that the insane folly of War as a means of settling International differences is understood at this moment more clearly than at any previous time in the world's history. For many reasons statesmen must needs find the business of transmuting International convictions into International action a task of colossal difficulty.

"The old clash of interests and the old distrust persist. Some leaders favour armament to preserve peace; others favour disarmament to promote it. The "War to end War" was, for a time, a phrase instinct with hope. At this later stage is it a vanished illusion?"

This Armistice Day the hope will be revived. It may still meet with checks and disappointments. Yet, as we salute the heroic dead at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day we must feel sanguine that eventually the ultimate aim will be achieved. Whether by us or by our successors, there will yet be honoured men whose self-sacrifice means not merely victory in the war, but victory, in the end, over war itself.

In part the thoughts suggested by the recurring of Armistice Day remain unaltered. Year by year its hush can be for us no lifeless silence, but one in which we hear the pulse of things eternal. Year by year we pay homage to the dead, with hearts full of sacred and tender memories. Year by year, also, we shall help, as they would desire, their comrades to survive. The wearing of our poppy will denote a privilege eagerly claimed, rather than a duty regularly performed.

By this time most of the men who fought have left their youth behind them, so that, even if they escaped partial disablement, it is increasingly difficult for them to find work in this period of widespread unemployment.

These facts make it the more imperative that the admirable Fund which is linked with the names of a devoted labour of those associated with the Soldiers' Poppy Day Appeal—the United Returned Soldiers' Fund—should receive our fullest support. To honour those who fought and fell, to help those who served and survived, are duties common of every Armistice Day.

But it is true that each of these anniversaries takes a special colour from the circumstances of its own moment, and can give to us accordingly its individual message. To-day perhaps there is no lesson which we may more usefully learn from Armistice Day, and adopt in practice, than the value of comradeship. From the days when the "Old Contemptibles" crossed the Channel and the first Diggers marched to the waiting troopships until the "Cease Fire" sounded on November 11, 1918, the spirit of comradeship was unshaken. Every page of the War's History, whether it describes service at sea, on land, or in air, is glorified by that spirit. It animated not our fighting men alone, but all who served with them.

Nothing was more significant, for example, than the close co-operation of the Army Chaplains of various denomina-

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tions. The spirit of comradeship worked wonders in those days. Differences of class, of creed, of politics were seldom allowed to hinder the full accord of common effort to meet a common danger. Old feuds were forgotten. It would be too much, of course, to say that there was no reappearance of division before the War was over. Yet, in the early days sufficient was achieved to show of what wonders the spirit of comradeship is capable. At the front it exercised its marvellous power to the end.

This month we may well reflect how vastly we—our country—should gain by a revival of that spirit of comradeship in something like its old intensity. It is true that the dangers which menace us to-day are, in major part, different in character from those which confronted us in the war.

Then the struggle was begun with a common belief that, however severe, it would at least be short. In recent years we have had, unexpectedly, to face many new crises. And again mistakes have recurred in some minds of imagining that one strong effort would see us through our difficulties. Again disappointments have imposed a severe strain. Plainly, an emotional reaction of goodwill is necessary, and our need is of a comradeship of persistence that will work, and wait, and work again.

Such was the temper magnificently shown by those we commemorate again this year. And the right way of doing them honour is to imitate what was best in their example. What that example suggests is less a series of formal agreements to end our internal difficulties than ending temper, to which such agreement will be the natural and inevitable sequel. It is the spirit which shows no recrimination. It seeks peace, not eschews it. It is the spirit which sets us to understand and co-operate with people whose interests and points of view may be far remote from our own.

It has nothing in common with mere sentimentalism. It springs from and is sustained through other external circumstances by an act of the human will reinforced by divine power. For, if this is the spirit which was revealed in the War, no less is it the spirit of essential Christianity. Seldom has its appeal been more needed than to-day. And never should it come to us with more force than on this anniversary.

If, in the solemn pause of the morning silence, the citizens of this Australia and Empire should pledge themselves, by the memory of those who fell, to live in the spirit of comradeship, then surely could the true purpose of Armistice Day be more worthily fulfilled.

Greets Comrades: 1st Div. G.O.C.

Lieut.-General Sir H. B. Walker, who commanded the 1st Australian Division during the greater part of the war, sent greetings to all old A.I.F. comrades in a letter written to "Reveille" from his home at Palace Lodge, Crediton, Devon (Eng.), under date September 5.

It was with keen regret, General Walker said, that other calls of duty caused him to sever his connection with the A.I.F. From France, he went to the Italian front, and afterwards to India, where the work was particularly strenuous. He was now beginning to feel his old self again.

It was with pleasure that he read "Reveille" each month, for it kept him in touch with the past, and in it he saw names which "once used to be daily on my lips." He was deeply honoured, the general added, at the kind appreciation of him expressed by Lieut.-Col. Herrod, in an article in the July issue of "Reveille."

point further back, or if the tanks had been observed moving up in the daylight and he was laying a trap for us. The night sky in front looked peaceful and calm. If the enemy were holding a line at this point it seemed impossible that he should be unaware of our presence, for the clatter of the tanks on the hard road rent the stillness of the night. About a quarter of a mile beyond La Flaque we heard, above the noise of the tanks, the roar of a plane overhead. Suddenly there was a downward whizz, a blinding flash, and then a terrific explosion. The unditching-beam of the rear tank—about ten yards away—flew up into the air and crashed back. As luck would have it, this was exactly the spot where the enemy was holding his line and had a strong point in a large dump at the side of the road. Other bombs fell.

The noise of the bombing-plane had up to this moment drowned the clatter of the tanks; but now the enemy was alarmed. He at once put up flares which made the night as bright as day. In the ghastly light we could see the poplars and the hedges along the road. Then hell was let loose! A withering machine-gun fire was opened on the tanks. The infantry following close behind, being swept by it, took cover in the ditch on the south side of the road. The tanks replied with their six-pounder and machine-guns; but without effect, for no targets could be seen. The peculiar thing was that there was not even a flash to aim at. In short rushes the infantry continued to advance. The enemy had now got his artillery to bear on us, and shells began to explode in the road and on either side of it. The noise was terrific. Machine-gun bullets cracked all round, like a thousand whips. A war correspondent, who was in a position to have a full view, described how one of the tanks was lit up like a blacksmith's fire by the quantity of bullets striking it.

After about half-an-hour there was a short lull, except for desultory firing. The tanks had halted. The colonel was on the road taking stock of the situation, and I was hurriedly approaching the rear tank when the tank commander of "H25" hastened to me with a terrific wound in his right fore-arm. He was weak from loss of blood and had been obliged to hand his tank over to the corporal. It was obvious he could not carry on, and I sent him back to have his wound dressed. He reported that the enemy were using anti-tank rifles and armour-piercing bullets. He told me it was impossible to locate the enemy machine-guns from inside the tank, and on two occasions when he had got outside to keep in touch with the infantry he could see nothing. I immediately returned to the colonel to tell him that I had lost an officer, and gave him the information I had received.

The tanks started to move again. Immediately there was a hurricane of machine-gun fire, and we again took cover. The night was pitch-black, except for occasional flares. The infantry, advancing in short rushes along the side of the road, were being mown down like grass, and lay where they fell.

At this moment a runner reported that the tanks were returning. "They haven't got orders to turn, have they?" the colonel asked me in amazement. I was equally staggered, and replied, "Certainly not! I'll go at once and tell them to keep straight on." "Yes, you must," he answered, and, standing erect, urged the infantry on. I made a dive forward, with my runner, in a hailstorm of bullets. I heard a choking gasp, and saw the colonel fall heavily to the ground, two feet away from me. As we ran the few yards to the tanks my runner's pack stopped a bullet. Miraculously, he was not injured. He found the bullet later in his pack.

I manoeuvred the tanks forward, running from the front of one to the front of another. I found it no easy job, because they were so close together. Then, when trying to stop one from backing into another, I was caught in

"O.C. APES."

Perhaps the most curious military appointment in the British Empire is that of "O.C. Apes," at Gibraltar. Officially he is the "Keeper of the Apes." A couple of centuries ago the Spanish had a saying that when the apes died out at Gibraltar the British would go. The position of "O.C. Apes" was created to make sure that the monkeys would not die out. This unique post has always been held by a military officer—usually a gunner officer quartered at Tracy's Farm, which is situated on the Upper Rock, where the animals, the last wild apes in Europe, normally live.



O.C. Apes receives no extra pay or allowance for this appointment, and he has his ordinary military duties to perform, but he is definitely held responsible for the safe custody, health and happiness of the animals. Special shelters have been built for the apes and the officer in charge has a staff of one man, who keeps the sheds tidy and sanitary, and places the "rations" which these animals, being on "the strength" of the garrison, are allowed. The Government's annual allowance is £36.

between the two, and had to climb up the back of one of them to avoid being crushed.

I discovered that the officer in charge of tank "H24" had been killed during the first few minutes of the engagement while walking outside his tank to keep in touch with the infantry. The tank was perforated on all sides by armour-piercing bullets, and all the crew, except two, were wounded. The tank was now in charge of the second driver, a gunner, who had manoeuvred it for position to engage enemy machine-guns from what appeared to be a strong point. It was this manoeuvre which the infantry mistook and led them to report that the tank was returning. For his share in the night's work this gunner was awarded the D.C.M. and promoted sergeant. Tank "H25," whose officer and driver had been severely wounded, had only half its crew uninjured, and was in charge of a corporal. The officer and crew of "H32" were all badly shaken and wounded by splinters; one man, in addition, being gassed by fumes from the exhaust. The second two tanks had not been able to see the infantry following, and had turned to get in touch with them.

My runner and I had got the tanks going forward again when I heard a shout, and, turning, found the adjutant of the infantry four or five yards away. He told me that the colonel had been killed, and that the infantry had suffered such severe casualties that they were retiring in extended order. I said the tanks were going forward to continue the attack. He declared that the infantry were so disorganised that it would be impossible for them to follow.

The thought had crossed my mind, "What would the rest of the operation be like, since just at the start all my tank crews were wounded and depleted?" Now, without infantry support, I decided it would be useless for the tanks to advance further, and I gave the order to retire. Again, turning them was no easy job. I felt rather like a wild animal tamer with huge beasts to control. In the dark the tank crews could not easily understand my directions, nor hear my voice above the noise. Every time the tanks moved the enemy machine-guns simply went mad, and there was a terrific fusillade of bullets.

The tanks had moved back about 150 yards when I found a revolver being brandished in my face. Replying to the challenge, I found I was being mistaken for one of the enemy by an Australian officer at the head of the second battalion of infantry, which had apparently come up. So great was the noise of the firing, together with the clatter of my own tanks on the road, that I had not heard the approach of the reserve tanks and infantry, nor could I see them in the dark. My tanks halted while I explained to him what had happened, and, as we were

(Continued on page 31)

Edits Daily: Digger's Rise

(By C. G. Pura in "The Sun Junior")

An exciting and a varied career, punctuated by visionary glimpses into the many spheres of journalism, and added by a novel war experience, has been the good fortune of Mr. Frank H. Ashton, Assistant-Editor of "The Sun," Sydney.

Born at South Yarra (Vic.), he received his elementary education there, but at the age of 12 his family moved to Sydney, and here at school he early gained distinction in studies. After four years at St. John's Church of England School he received top



Frank H. Ashton.

marks in a scholarship for North Sydney Church of England Grammar, but an age handicap put him second on the list, and he decided to embark into journalism as his future career.

Becoming a member of the staff of the "Town and Country Journal," he was assigned to special writing, and later to touring throughout the State, taking photographs and reporting on shows, completed the set curriculum.

After several years he tired of this roving life, and a successful application to "The News" found him once again in the journalistic grind, this time his jobs being mostly police work. Early in 1915 he was offered a position by Mr. D. W. McCay, then the news editor of "The Sun."

The war, however, having intervened, he enlisted in the 1st Divn. of the Field Artillery. Through the long years of warfare he spent a great part of the time as a runner, receiving no serious casualties, except slight attacks of trench fever and gas.

After the Armistice he returned to Sydney and rejoined "The Sun." One year later he was sent to London to join the "Sun" cable staff. There he met an English lassie, married and remained in England for three years. Wanderlust again overtook him, and he returned to Sydney again, to be assigned to special writing.

Cable editorship, sub-editor, chief sub. and news editor followed in rapid succession, and now Mr. Frank Ashton wistfully retrospects, and remembers the time when "I was a lad doing produce sales, water court, coroner's court, and Stock Exchange." And all this, headed, "had to be done in one day."

"My hobbies," he said, with a Mondayitis look, "are work, motoring and golf . . . in that order."

Mr. Frank Ashton has, from the first rung of the ladder of hardship, worked his way to the top. . . . To aspiring journalists, it is an incentive to succeed.

"Pompey's Mob": 7th Bn. History

(By Ex-Private in 1st Bde.)

To the lengthy and always slowly growing list of unit histories is now added that of the 7th Battalion (A.I.F.), which, in 1914, was Lt.-Col. H. E. (Pompey) Elliott's mob.

Cold comparison is of no value when contemplating these unique unit records. Each unit, indubitably, acquired a personality all its own. Each took, apparently, in its moulding, the impress of the outstanding characteristic of the commander who had most to do with its original training. So the Seventh, impressed with a personality of dour courage, expresses unconsciously in its record how faithfully it kept true to its motto: "*Cede nullis!*"

The eye is drawn irresistibly to each outstanding event, each scintillating flash of sharp incident which, as is usual in all records of war, occur suddenly in the midst of a vast deal of formal routine.

Thus the reader discovers the dour heroism of Lt. N. J. Greig, who, defending a crater near German Officers' Trench on Gallipoli, stood his ground alone until death—acting swifter than the merciful Turkish commander, Zeki Bey, who in admiration would have saved his life—struck down; an incident that surely is not described with the detail it deserves. Also he appreciates the Lone Pine epic, where in a defensive action (much more graphically described) four 7th Battalion men earned well-won Victoria Crosses in a single day!

And again under the ghastly "sturmfür" shelling at Pozieres, and under the heart-cracking strain of the Somme winter, this record unconsciously reflects the 7th Battalion's tradition of "no surrender." "Pompey" had left long since to take promotion to a General's rank, but the 7th, treading a now too-familiar path, fought through a common round of rough assaults and march and counter-march until April, 1918, when, in the face of the German break-through at Armentieres, again it reaped honours suitably in keeping with its distinctive traditions by being the first to man the La Motte defence line; and from that moment, the record states with quiet grimness, "the line moved only one way—back towards Germany."

So victory comes at last, but the intensive honesty and fidelity of the Seventh shows forth yet again on August 9 in that very hour of final triumph. With quiet yet justifiable pride the story is told of how the Battalion, without artillery support, struggling to maintain a critical flank when plans went awry, fought doggedly onward over a wide, exposed plain against stout frontal resistance and torrid enfilade fire to wrest at the last, their allotted portion of the "Red Line" from a worsted foe. *Cede nullis!*

Thus this History is a good record, clearly told. I would have said dourly if it were not for its happy and nicely judged flashes of humour. It touches happily too on a matter which, I think, has often been overlooked in earlier regimental records, that matter of the casual life of the Digger on service, in billet and bivouac, and his ceaseless—if private—warfare upon quartermasters, orderly corporals, and all other fair game of a like ilk. And had I known once as I know now that the 7th had some of its earliest beginnings in Footscray and Carlton, I, an ex-private in the 1st Brigade, might not have lost a "pogue" to them in a certain two-up school near Ypres. But, then, on the other hand, I believe that had I known it, I would have appreciated their support in the line a lot more!

Congratulations to those who are responsible for this, their very fine record.





WHITE HORSE

Scotch

WHISKY

SCREW CAP BOTTLES. NO CORKSCREW REQUIRED.

Tanks Night Attack —(from page 3)

deciding what to do, the tank company commander appeared from the rear, having evidently come up with the reserves.

We now held a conference. The tank C.C. said "We'll do whatever you want. I can order the tanks forward, but look at the state of the crews!" I wondered whether the reserves would be pushed through at once to carry on with the good work. Not so, however! The commanding officer of the reserve battalion decided he would await orders from the brigade commander. The tank company commander volunteered to go back and explain the position to the brigadier. I was ordered in the meantime to keep my tanks where they were, motionless and silent, so as not to draw the enemy fire, until I received fresh instructions.

After what seemed an interminable time, during which we were, of course, behind the enemy lines, a runner came with the message that the tanks were to remain silent, so that the infantry could retire in safety. We were to stay put until we received word from the infantry that they had withdrawn. We remained out in front for another hour-and-a-half, covering the retirement of the infantry. Then a runner reported "All clear!" A hail of bullets sped the departing tanks as, at 3.45 a.m. they took leave of the enemy, after spending five-and-a-half hours in his company. I travelled back inside one of the tanks. Rumbling along the main road, we passed the headquarters of the 10th Australian Infantry Brigade, in a dugout close by. We were stopped there and a message was delivered that the Infantry General wished to speak to "O.C. Tanks."

I was taken to him, and he spoke in a very serious tone. There were other staff officers present. The General wished me to make a statement of exactly what had happened. It was a formal interview. He told me that the reconnaissance officer at the head of the 37th Battalion, on his way to the casualty clearing station, having been wounded in the foot, and had been brought to him to give an account of the operation. He added that he was a man noted for his veracity. I related the whole story, omitting nothing, and explaining how the noise of the tanks had drawn the fire of the enemy, not only on themselves, but also on the infantry, who were keeping in close touch. Regretfully, I agreed that the presence of tanks in the dark had been a hindrance instead of a help to the infantry.

The General thanked me for my statement, and said it coincided in every detail with what the reconnaissance officer had said. He could see now that it had been a great mistake to use the tanks at all in the operation. With great sorrow he told me that in it he had lost a very fine battalion commander, and of a magnificent battalion of one thousand men who had gone into action only one hundred had come through.

*"Come thro' the jaws of Death,
Back from the mouth of Hell,
All that was left of them,
Left of (ten) hundred."*

NOTE.—Commenting on the foregoing, Captain Hickey's runner, who was promoted sergeant from the ranks and awarded the D.C.M. for his work in the attack, becoming a company-sergeant-major shortly after, wrote to him recently: ". . . . As I read the narrative everything came back to my mind as though it were a recent happening. Every detail you record is only too true, and I marvel that after all these years you have been able to give such a vivid description. I was not previously aware that you had been challenged at the point of the revolver on that delightful evening. A similar experience came my way. When we went forward to turn the tanks back into action, I happened to be standing in front of the leading tank, when along comes an Australian officer brandishing his revolver and threatening me with my life if the tanks so much as moved. I explained who I was, but it made no difference; he said, 'I put you in charge, and if these tanks move you will be shot.' His point was that we were drawing the enemy fire. I often wonder if he ever returned to cover, as no sooner had he left me than it started to rain bullets all round, turning one side of the tank in front of which I was standing into a glorified pepper box."

MASCOT.

In Mascot, the biggest social attraction of the year is the Armistice Ball, organised by the local sub-branch of the R.S.S.I.L.A. This year it took place on August 29, being the only date available to the Governor-General and Lady Isaacs. There were 400 present.

Some 600 people thronged the roadway to welcome their Excellencies. The Vice-Regal party was received by the Senior Patron of the sub-branch and Mayor of Mascot (Ald. Cyril Dransfield, a Digger), and the president (Mr. Fred Emerson).

Eighteen debutantes were presented, and their dance, to use the words of their Excellencies, was one of the sweetest, if not the nicest, they have ever witnessed. The Mayoress (Mrs. Dransfield) was the Matron of Honour. Lady Isaacs, Mrs. Dransfield, and Mrs. Emerson were presented with beautiful bouquets—the gifts of another patron of the sub-branch (Ald. Anderson, of Botany).

The net proceeds of the ball were divided between the benevolent fund of the sub-branch and Furlough House. To Mr. Secretary Philpott's wonderful organising all the success was due. The Ladies' Auxiliary arranged the decorations.

The sub-branch desires to thank the contractors to the Council (Messrs. Allman Bros.), and the architect (Mr. R. S. Hamilton, a Digger) for their assistance in making the Coronation Hall so presentable.

CHULLORA.

The Chullora (Electric Car Repair Shop) Sub-Branch held its first annual smoke concert on September 8. The success of the function was due to an energetic committee, assisted by the "Royal Scots Entertainers," including Mr. W. Mackay (leader), Messrs. Doug Graham, B. Dick, J. Friels, A. Moody, T. Lightbody, Paul Gibbs, and Jack Silver-sides.

The President (Mr. W. Wilkinson), who was M.C., stressed upon all present to become members of the R.S.L. One of the leading organisers, Mr. Fred Amy, who was the first to get the "smoko" on the way, was unfortunate in meeting with an accident (breaking four toes), just prior to the function. This prevented his being present.—

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Celebrities of the A.I.F. (From page 7)

leave, with the dry comment that he "wanted to see the show through." This is typical of Lillie's determination in all things.

He is now married and living in Melbourne with his wife and family of two, and, as in 1914, is still the same modest, fearless, likeable boy, known affectionately to all his old comrades as "Ger."

For a further estimate of Lillie's character and his soldierly qualities, one may now turn to the following, which was written for this article by a brother-officer:—

"I knew Cyril Lillie from the earliest days of Broadmeadows Camp. He had been a keen militia officer in pre-war days and carried his enthusiasm into the moulding of the A.I.F. Though a very junior 2nd/lieut., he never lacked confidence or moral courage on that account. Stocky, freckled, and red-haired, he was variously known to his comrades and his men as 'the pink kid,' 'ginger,' and later more affectionately 'ginner.'

"His rather high-pitched, raucous voice could be heard high over the rumbling and shuffling of a battalion parade. He never had any pretensions to academic distinction, even in his adopted profession of soldiering, but from the very beginning he knew his work and could apply his knowledge practically. His knowledge of military history may not have been profound, but his instinctive ability to size up and deal with a military situation stood him in good stead on all occasions without the help of either Napoleon or Stonewall Jackson.

"Though never unpopular, he was sometimes spoken of with something approaching amused levity by members of his company who failed to recognise his real qualities. This amusement turned to respect long before it was forced into admiration by his behaviour in action. In the officers' mess he bore himself with dignity and a confidence born of lack of fear and lack of false reverence for anything or anybody who did not deserve reverence for his own sake. Shrewd commonsense and an inborn discretion prevented him from making the mistakes so common in more sensitive and imaginative people.

"One of the occasions on which the higher qualities of philosophy and tolerance became evident was when, in Egypt in February, 1915, he was superseded on the seniority list of officers of the 5th Battalion by two subalterns junior to himself. No reason was ever given for his supersession, and, although their subsequent records were good enough, nothing that happened later justified Lillie's being passed over. Never by word or action did Lillie betray any sense of annoyance or resentment. He was loyal to the backbone, and he was capable of being loyal to a newly-advanced junior.

ALWAYS IN FRONT LINE.

"It was not until his regiment went into action at the landing at Anzac, however, that Lillie came into his own. He was always in the front line, and, with all due deference to senior officers, nearly always directing it. He never lost his head. He was not imaginative enough or hysterical enough to throw his life or his men's lives away in leading forlorn hopes. On the other hand, he was devoid of fear and he retained in the fiercest fighting the same commonsense and discretion which stood him in good stead in the officers' mess.

"He saw what had to be done and did it or had it done. Neither fear of the onrushing enemy, nor fear of the criticism of some "brass-hat" behind, affected his judgment in the least. In all those critical situations, he kept his head both in the spiritual and in the physical sense. After the first two or three days' fighting at Gallipoli, all the men of the 5th Battalion would have followed the 'Pink Kid' wherever he would lead.

"On coming out of the line on the Wednesday night, four days after the Landing, the writer had a few hours' much-needed sleep, and woke up to a beautiful April dawn and a sound of trudging feet. It was a digging party, led by Lillie, going back into the line to dig communication trenches, and all that day messages from him of sound advice and reasonable requests were received at battalion headquarters during the progress of the work. From that time on he was consistently with his company, first as a platoon commander, later as second-in-command, and in the end, commander.

"He fought with the 5th Battalion in nearly all its major engagements, never failing in the smallest degree in all the difficult situations he was called upon to face. On one occasion, at Pozieres, for many hours he held the line with a handful of men against an enemy counter-attack, keeping the Germans back by skilful bombing tactics, while the whole line was in danger of being driven back partly because his senior officers did not realise what a stout defence he was putting up. The task of the battalion and brigade staffs was not, as they supposed, to save a desperate situation by furnishing him with reinforcements, but merely supplying him with sufficient bombs to hold his vital piece of front line, which, while he was there, was never really in danger.

"It might be asked, why did Lillie, who sailed in 1914 as a 2nd/lieut., return to Australia after the Armistice with only a captaincy and one

Won D.C.M.: First-Bayonet Man

This is a war-time picture of 2101, Sgt. E. C. (Joe) Wegner, 3rd Bn. (A.I.F.), who entered the fray early on the Peninsula, and carried on with the business until November, 1916, when he was wounded at Flers, on the Somme and won the Distinguished Conduct Medal in circumstances which are set out in the *London Gazette* (January, 1917):



Joe Wegner.

"For conspicuous gallantry in action. He acted as first-bayonet man and himself killed eight of the enemy. He was wounded at the beginning, but hung on till next day, when he was evacuated."

Wegner, who went back to the line and carried on until the Armistice, was one of the gamest and was always prominent as first-bayonet man in raids. He is now farming at Busselton (W.A.).

MASONIC CLUB AND ARMISTICE.

The recently formed N.S.W. Masonic Club Sub-branch, which already has a financial membership of 50, plus associates galore, is making special arrangements for Armistice Day, including a luncheon. Subsequently members will march to the Cenotaph where a wreath will be laid.

A MACCABEAN NIGHT.

The Jewish Returned Soldiers' Association will hold a special function at the Maccabean Hall, Darlinghurst, on Armistice night, to which all Diggers, irrespective of sect, are cordially invited. Tickets (2/6) will be available at the door.

decoration—the Distinguished Service Order? On the face of it, the honours and promotion achieved by him pale into insignificance compared with those of hundreds, nay, even thousands, of officers of less outstanding qualities. The reasons for these apparent anomalies are first, that Lillie's battalion, the 5th, was unique in the slowness of promotion of its officers. One of the earliest battalions formed, and one certainly containing some of the finest personnel, both officers and men, including the famous 'F' Company formed from the great public schools of Victoria, it so happened that its early casualties among officers included a greater number of wounded than killed, and many of these lived to re-join the battalion and fight on.

"Secondly, the original and later officers of the 5th Battalion included many experienced men with pre-war militia experience. In fact, many of its original N.C.O.'s and even privates had had considerable experience as officers in the militia before the war, and it thus happened that a number of the 5th Battalion's officers were seconded early for staff duty on brigade and divisional headquarters, and these seconded officers tended to hold up battalion promotion. In the 5th we never had the extraordinary circumstance, as occurred in the 7th, of a man who landed at Gallipoli as a corporal, rising as early as 1916 to be major and acting-colonel of his regiment.

"Then again, the 5th did not, at Gallipoli, take part in the devastating actions of the original attacks on Lone Pine and German Officers' Trench, although they were early engaged in the holding operations at Lone Pine. Lastly, Lillie's qualities themselves, although fraught with dauntless courage, dogged determination, and an absence of the sense of fear, either of enemy action or of other fearful consequences, were never essentially spectacular. He was devoid of the faculty of self-advertisement. He never sent back to headquarters carefully-worded messages indicating how remarkable his achievements of the moment were. He never 'kowtow'd' to brass-hats for the purposes of self-advancement. He treated all men alike, giving real deference where he felt that deference was due, and in this judgment I believe he was nearly always right.

"It is recorded that on more than one occasion when a general visited and criticised Lillie's dispositions in the front line, Lillie, in a matter-of-fact sort of way, returned the compliment by explaining to his commander just how his dispositions on a larger scale would be improved from the point of view of the men who were bearing the brunt of it in the line. Never offensive, but always straight to the point, and sometimes a little dogmatic, these criticisms, although they helped to win the war, might possibly have not helped Lillie to amass a collection of 'honours easy.' Suffice to say that those who knew him at the front are satisfied that he belongs to the great army of heroes—the super-men—who won the war, and who, in winning it, so guarded the interests of the men they commanded, that the life of no comrade was sacrificed unnecessarily.

"Great is the good fortune of Australia that some men of Lillie's type lived to come home, and great should be the honour accorded to him and them now and while they live."

Tanks in Night Stunt

(By Major S. H. Heseltine, who was Adjutant of the 37th Bn., A.I.F., when that battalion and tanks co-operated in a night march into enemy territory at Proyart in August, 1918.)

THE article in November *Reveille* (reproduced from *The Royal Tank Corps Journal*), by Captain D. E. Hickey, of the Tanks Corps, entitled "A Night Attack With the Tanks," is in the main correct. There are, however, certain matters of which he apparently was not aware and these may be of interest.

During the attack on August 8, 1918, the 37th Bn. was in reserve, and consequently took no active part in that battle, but was moved up, in rear of the fight, and on the evening of that eventful day bivouacked in a steep gully at Morcourt, near the Somme, where it remained till August 10.

On the morning of the 10th the commanding officer (Lieut.-Colonel Knox-Knight) was sent for by brigade headquarters, and returned about 2 p.m. I was his adjutant, and when he came back he told me to make arrangements for the battalion to move that evening. Each man was to carry two days' rations in addition to his usual "iron rations," as well as extra ammunition, grenades, "Verey" lights, rockets, etc. While I was arranging this he saw the battalion scout officer and the company commanders and explained the task the battalion had to carry out.



It was, I think, about 5 p.m. when the battalion moved off, and while we were marching the commanding officer explained the scheme to me as he had not had an opportunity of doing so before.

He said that the 10th Infantry Brigade, with some tanks attached, was to march out that night along the Amiens-St. Quentin road, the 37th Bn. leading, and at a certain point behind the German front line we were to wheel to the left. That at the same time another force on our left was to move in a similar way, but to wheel to its right, so that the two forces would meet head-on, and when they did so everybody was to halt and dig in on the ground they were on and to face both ways. The idea of the operation was to surround an area of ground held by the Germans. Other troops were then to advance from our original front line and drive the Germans who were in the area enclosed by us into our arms.

It will therefore be seen that the operation was not an "attack," but a night march straight into enemy territory. As stated by Captain Hickey, the 10th Bde. crossed the front line at La Flaque after dark. The exact time I do not remember. The 37th Bn. was leading, with three tanks in front and three behind.

The battalion marched in column of fours, the men loaded up with all the extra rations, grenades, ammunition, etc., and guided by the scout officer (Lieut. McNicol), who, with the commander of "A" Company, was the only man beside the commanding officer who knew the route we were to follow.

Lieut.-Colonel Knox-Knight, Captain Hickey, and the battalion signallers marched in the middle of the column. We, in the centre of the battalion, had not marched far past La Flaque when a terrific hail of bullets, apparently from machine-guns, struck the column, but particularly the tanks. In addition to the machine-gun fire there was a considerable amount of anti-tank gun fire. Fortunately there was a deep ditch along the side of the road, into which the troops moved as soon as the fire opened, and along which they continued to move.

(Continued next column)

THE LAST POST

The sad, sweet notes fall on the quiet air,
Pale-faced and tense the rigid Diggers stand;
Gone is the splendor, and the glory grand
Fades out in that grim carnage over there.
Around the earth it floats from coast to coast,
Retelling to lone hearts that ache with pain,
The farewell notes with meaning all too plain,
The sad, Last Post.

Life ends for all; but some before their time
Lie down and finish with the things on earth;
Hushed is their laughter, stilled their mirth—
War's useless slaughter and its awful crime.
When peace is ours then hate we war the most,
And stand in protest with people in the mass,
Regardless of our name, our sect, or class,
And hear the last, Last Post.

Approaches close, the time of peace draws near,
The little Child then born in Bethlehem,
Crowned in the Inn by love's rich diadem,
Goodwill to man doth to the earth appear.
Children of God, how can we make this boast,
And hate and fight and one another kill,
And like a shambles this fair world to fill?
The bugle peals the last, Last Post.

—R. Herbert Millington, Narrandera, N.S.W.

After moving along the ditch in single file for a while the column halted. Lieut.-Colonel Knox-Knight sent messages along for the march to resume. After one or two efforts to move on there was a complete stop, and a message came back that the tanks had turned back. Lieut.-Colonel Knox-Knight sent me up to find out what the trouble was, and to try and get the troops moving forward again.

As I got near the head of the column I saw the tanks exactly as described by Captain Hickey. Each tank looked like a huge firework, caused by the sparks from the machine-gun bullets which were striking them. I found one tank halted, partially turned round, and another moving back towards our starting point. I tried to get the tanks to go on, but as all the crew were inside I could not communicate with them. I then tried to get our men to move on, but then discovered that the scout officer and the leading company commander had both been seriously wounded, and that there was no one else who knew the route.

I then went back to tell the commanding officer, but when I arrived at the place I had left him I found that he had just been killed. I then found the next senior officer in the battalion and told him he was in command.

As there was now no one left in the battalion who knew the route, he decided it was useless to go on. The troops were not disorganised, but would have gone on if there had been anyone who knew which way to go. Under the orders of the acting commanding officer the troops were moved out into the country on the right of the road, where they lay down and waited for orders. A message was sent back to the brigade commander, and after some time an order was received to withdraw.

The casualties in this affair were not nearly as heavy as stated by Captain Hickey. According to my diary they amounted to about 80. The strength of the battalion at that time would be nearer 600 than 1000. There were, however, I believe, a number of casualties in the next battalion of the column. The fact that the fire was apparently directly aimed at the tanks and that the troops were able to get into the ditch at the side of the road saved many casualties.

Beg Pardons

Through a typographical slip, a West Australian newspaper once called an old soldier "a bottle-scarred veteran." In its subsequent apology, the paper described him as "a battle-scarred veteran." Which is on par with the following correction which appeared in another paper: "In our last issue we stated that John Doe was a defective in the police force. Of course that was a typographical error. John Doe is really a detective in the police force."

RETURNED ARMY SISTERS.

In the annual report of the N.S.W. Returned Army Sisters sub-branch of the R.S.L., reference is made to a proposal for the establishment of a rest home for returned sisters at Furlough House. The project had been put to a referendum, and was adopted, the result being communicated to the authorities of Furlough House, who, however, had not yet taken further action.

Membership of the sub-branch is 273. During the past year the sub-branch contributed £10/10/- to the R.S.L. employment drive, £1/1/- to Furlough House, £1/1/- to the R.S.L. Anzac Day fund, £3/3/- to the Last Post Fund, £5/5/- to the Xmas Cheer fund of the Australian Legion, and £25 for the relief of distress among returned sisters.

Office-bearers: President, Miss S. H. Durham; vice-presidents, Mrs. Kamishansky, Misses F. L. Lowe and N. Younger-Wood; committee, Mesdames Longden, Haddon, Matthews, Misses McKenzie, Gilchrist, Henson, Larkin and Harford; hon. secretary and treasurer, Miss E. M. Coleman.

KOGARAH.

In his annual report, the president of the Kogarah sub-branch of the R.S.L. (Mr. F. M. Gordon) referred to the "Digger spirit," which beat just as strong as ever, manifesting itself in divers form throughout the year—in direct monetary assistance to pals, in securing work for the unemployed, in adding cheer to convivial evenings (like a ray of sunshine in a very drab world), and in regular attendance at meetings. Mr. Gordon has been re-elected president of the sub-branch, together with Mr. J. H. Burt as vice-president, Mr. F. E. Baker as hon. secretary, and Mr. B. E. Newlands as hon. treasurer.

MAROURBRA-KENSINGTON.

The president of the Maroubra-Kensington Sub-branch of the R.S.L. (Mr. H. L. Hind) in his annual report, in referring to the big advance in membership achieved by the N.S.W. branch during the past year, stresses that Maroubra-Kensington contributed substantially—its financial membership having increased from 151 at December 31, 1932, to 197 at the end of 1933. It was now the third largest sub-branch in N.S.W. As the result of the initiative taken by Maroubra-Kensington, a council of sub-branches has been formed in the Eastern Suburbs. Mr. Hind was elected foundation president. The sub-branch is represented by two delegates on the Randwick Beautification Committee, which has made excellent progress in beautifying Anzac Parade. During the year regular visits were paid to patients in the Military Hospitals, and comforts distributed to them. Noble assistance had been given by the Women's Auxiliary in the alleviation of distress. Two raffles were conducted during the year, and the net proceeds from the first were £38/8/-, which was allocated to distress; and the second, £35, which went to the Children's Christmas Tree. In conclusion, Mr. Hind says:—

"My past year of office was very pleasant and enjoyable, and it is my fervent wish that I shall be spared for many years to take an active part in the affairs of the sub-branch and to watch its continued growth in membership, usefulness, and prestige."

In all Maroubra-Kensington, the secretary (Mr. E. C. Child) reports, dealt with over 150 applications for Xmas Cheer from ex-servicemen or their families. Each was handed an open order for food or clothing valued from 5/- to 10/-, and among them were distributed 110 fowls and a similar number of puddings, of which number, 10 was donated by the Australian Legion. The total amount expended was approximately £57/10/-. By far the greater percentage of applications were received from non-members of the League and comprised mostly unemployed residing in the various camps throughout La Perouse, Long Bay and Yarra Bay.

The committee consisting principally of Messrs. Claude Wilson, W. H. Russell, W. Iliffe, and W. Squires worked incessantly throughout each night of the last week prior to Xmas, and to them the success of the effort is very largely due.

Canada's War History

Having spent many careful years in assembling, indexing, and cataloguing countless tons of documents, the Historical Section of the Department of National Defence has now settled down to the serious duty of writing Canada's official history of the war.

Fifteen years is a long time to wait, especially when practically every other British country has already made considerable progress with official histories. However, careful and painstaking preparation was always a Canadian characteristic.

The compilation of the record is in the hands of Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, D.S.O., who was on the artillery staff of the 3rd Canadian Division and who is Director of the Historical Section. Colonel Duguid has considerable experience as a soldier, and possesses many scholarly attainments to befit him as a writer and a historian. Whether all the volumes of what will be a monumental work are to be written by the Director, or, as in other countries, the various phases and features will be distributed among other Canadian literary men has not yet been decided.—"Canadian Legionary."

GLADESVILLE.

Mr. G. Kidd, secretary of the Gladesville Sub-branch, reports that visits are made periodically by its members to the returned soldier patients in Gladesville Asylum, and smokes and fruits distributed. Many cases of distress had also been assisted by the sub-branch during the year.

ORANGE AUXILIARY.

Membership of the Orange Women's Auxiliary of the R.S.L. increased during the year, from 58 to 85. A total amount of £124 was raised. A donation of £23/10/- was made towards the furnishings of the Base Hospital. A large amount of sewing had been done by the members, and 129 made-up garments were distributed in addition to clothes which had been supplied by supporters. Twenty-four distressed families had been helped. The president of the Auxiliary is Mrs. Alma R. C. Aird.

MOONLIGHT HARBOUR CRUISE.

The executive of the Sydney Harbour Trust Sub-branch has undertaken an ambitious scheme to assist Furlough House, Narrabeen. What could be more delightful, it asks, than a harbour cruise on the night of March 1 with good companions, good music, a splendid concert programme, and a full moon? A steamer of the Manly Ferry Company will leave No. 3 Ferry Wharf, Circular Quay, at 8 p.m. on March 1 on a moonlight cruise, and is scheduled to return at 11 p.m. Tickets (1/6 each) from the secretary of your own sub-branch, or from Mr. W. W. Miles, hon. secretary, Sydney Harbour Trust Sub-branch, c/o Sydney Harbour Trust, Circular Quay. (Phone No. B.W. 2852.) Refreshments at reasonable cost.

CHRISTMAS TREE AND FETE.

Over 200 children and as many adults responded to the invitation by the P.M.G.'s Dept. Sub-branch for the Christmas Tree and Fete held at the G.P.O., Sydney, on December 23. It was a joyous gathering, reflecting great credit on the hard working committee and other willing helpers. The decoration of the Postal Cafeteria under the supervision of Madame Cavalier was a revelation. As each tiny guest entered the fairy-land atmosphere they were presented with jazz-caps, blow-outs, trumpets, tin-whistles and other novelties.

Mr. J. W. Kitto, Deputy Director, Posts and Telegraphs, officially opened proceedings, referring to the comradeship and goodwill existing among the postal staff, and complimenting the sub-branch officials on being the first organisation to hold a Christmas Tree in the G.P.O.

A Punch and Judy entertainment followed, and Jim Hilder, of Willoughby, had the kiddies roaring with delight. The ladies were entertained to afternoon tea, whilst the kiddies filled "the open spaces" with sandwiches, cakes, fruit, soft-drinks and milk, issued out with a lavish hand. Items on the programme included a dance by Joyce Musgrave, a recitation by Marie Gould, and piano items by Mrs. Fisher. Community singing held sway until the arrival of Santa Claus (Victor Thorsen).

The thanks of the sub-branch are given to the undermentioned: Dairy Farmers, Fresh Food and Ice Coy., J. W. Kitto, Peak-Frean, Arnotts, A. Hordern, G. McKenzie, McIlraths, Madame Cavalier, Miss Walker, Wrigleys, Peters, Farmer's, David Jones, Coles, Andrews, Woolworths, and McDowells; and the Postal Cafeteria staff, assisted by Sister Drewitt (returned nurse), assistant to the postal medico. The hard-working committee comprised the secretary (Len Wootton), the president (Bob Swain), Nick Gurd, Vic. Thorsen, Dud Kennedy, E. Thompson, Jock Gaynor, Jack Park, C. Lane, C. Walton, P. McCauley, Peter Lithgow, Jock Fernley, — Kingsley, — Bull, and — Palmer (2).—W. Ireland.

May 1934

THE FIRST—AND LAST— NIGHT ATTACK WITH TANKS

The Editor, *Royal Tank Corps Journal*.

Dear Sir,

Thank you very much for sending on to me the cutting from *Reveille*, February, 1934, with the article "Tanks in Night Stunt," by Major H. S. Heseltine. You ask me if I have any comments to make on it.

First of all, let me say how pleased I am to hear that the Adjutant of the 37th Battalion, A.I.F., is alive. His voice on the night of August 10th-11th, 1918, still rings in my ears.

The account tallies in most respects with that of my own experience. But, perhaps, the following remarks may help to throw further light on the tragedy.

In the great advance of August 8th, 1918, my three tanks operated as a free-lance section along the boundary of the 14th and 13th Battalions, A.I.F., between the Somme and the Amiens-St. Quentin road, as far as the Red Line, and took an active part in the battle, I myself being slightly wounded by a fragment of a shell from an enemy gun across the Somme, firing at a tank on, or near, the Red Line ridge.

About 3.30 on the afternoon of August 10th, with my Company commander and another section commander, I went to what I thought was a Divisional H.Q., the Colonel of the 37th Battalion, A.I.F., being present, and there I received orders for the operation that night. The whole thing had been very hurriedly prepared and the orders were verbal. I believed them to be as stated in my article: "The First—and Last—Night Attack with Tanks."

It was only afterwards that I heard of the successful operation north of the Somme. In point of fact, there was a very important difference between the operation north and the operation south of the river. The attack north of the Somme followed a comparatively unimportant road, while the attack on the south was along a *route nationale*—the Amiens-St. Quentin road—a principal highroad of France. It should have been obvious that the defence of such an important *route* would be exceptionally strong.

As regards the statement in Major Heseltine's account that "the two forces would meet head-on," this is the first I have heard of it, as, also, that "other troops were then to advance from our original front line and drive the Germans who were in the area enclosed by us into our arms." This last fact was evidently not known to Capt. W. J. Denny, M.C., M.P., when he wrote the article, "Australians in the German Defeat," that appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* of Tuesday, April 1st, 1919.

I'm afraid I must disagree with Major Heseltine that the operation was not an "attack." According to the *Universal Dictionary of the English Language* (1932), an "attack" is defined as "an offensive operation by organised armed force upon another; opposite of defence." "A night march straight into enemy territory"—the German front line—would be deliberate suicide, if it were not an attack. *The Tank Corps*, by Clough Williams-Ellis, M.C., refers to the operation as "a rather

remarkable night attack," and *The Tank Corps Book of Honour* as "an attack after dark."

With reference to the statement that three tanks were behind the 37th Battalion, this is true is so far as they were heading the reserve battalion. Further, the 37th Battalion may have marched in column of fours as far as the "Hospital," but it did not do so after that point.

It is difficult to remember exactly the position of the Colonel and myself at the moment the first bomb fell. We were certainly more or less on a level with the tanks. It may have been that we were between the second and third tanks, but slightly to one side. When discussing my article with the officer who was in command of "H 25"—Second-Lieutenant H. W. Humphreys (I had not seen him since the attack fifteen years before), he told me he was certain it was his tank (the second one in the order of advance) on which the bomb had fallen.

It seems that Major Heseltine and I went forward more or less at the same time. The leading tank never actually turned round. When Stittle, my runner, went forward, the men in the tank were anxiously awaiting instructions and asked what was happening. They were, in fact, waiting, expecting to go forward. The reason that the second and third tanks were coming back was that they had specific instructions that they must keep in close touch with the infantry, and they had turned to find them. It was no good the tanks going on if the infantry were not following. The reason, no doubt, why the infantry were not following was that they were being mown down.

Humphreys has told me that on two occasions when he had got outside to keep in touch with the infantry he could see neither them nor the enemy machine-guns. When he climbed out on to the road bullets were flying so thickly that he dived into the ditch for cover, landing on a German, who, luckily, was dead.

Actually at the moment when "each tank looked like a huge firework" (to use the words of Major Heseltine), I was turning the second and third, having sent Stittle on to the first, and I was caught between the rear of one and the front of the other and had to scramble up the back of one of them, wondering how it was I was still alive and was it worth the struggle!

Both Humphreys and Stittle had independently the experience of being told at the point of a revolver by an Australian officer: "If you value your life, the tanks will not move," or words to that effect. As stated in the "Note" to my article, Stittle was actually told: "I put you in charge and if these tanks move you will be shot." The point was, as Stittle explains in the "Note," that when a tank moved it drew the enemy's fire.

I believe that the Colonel was killed outright when he fell at the moment I left him; he would, therefore, have been dead some little while before Major Heseltine returned.

I was up forward with the tanks when Major Heseltine was discussing the situation with the next senior officer who then took command. I knew nothing of the order

for the troops to move out to the side of the road. When the tanks were preparing to advance again, I heard the Adjutant shout to me. According to my record, made next day, he :

"told me that the infantry were retiring in extended order. I informed him that the tanks were going forward to continue the attack; but, the infantry now being disorganised, he said it would be impossible for them to follow, and so I ordered the tanks to retire."

I must state quite definitely that it was not said to me that there was no one left who knew the route, and that the troops "would have gone on if there had been anyone who knew which way to go." I knew the way. At any rate, I thought I did, and was, in fact, going on, in spite of the fact that I had only one officer left.

I am still at a loss to know why the reserves (infantry and tanks) were not sent through.

My statement as regards the casualties of the 37th Battalion is merely a repetition of what I was told by the General in an unforgettable interview.

In a letter home, written on the 13th August, I said : "The infantry suffered terribly. The Colonel of the battalion was killed." Two days later I wrote : "He was killed in the thick of the fight as he stood erect, urging his troops forward against the enemy."

I have taken considerable trouble to try and verify the extent of the casualties. Captain I. C. A. Glanville, M.C., a section commander of the same Company as myself, met in hospital an Australian officer who had been badly wounded in this action. He said that he had been in several stiff fights, but none of them had been so terrible as that night attack with tanks.

To return to Captain Denny's article, previously referred to, it is stated there :—

"Heavy casualties having been suffered by units of the 10th Infantry Brigade, it was decided that this brigade, as it was unable to carry out that operation as ordered, should co-operate with the 9th Infantry Brigade by taking up a position round the eastern outskirts of Proyart. The 9th Brigade was to complete the capture of Proyart."

The italics are mine, to emphasise the "heavy casualties" suffered by the 10th Infantry Brigade in the night attack. My own section suffered heavily, only four or five being left uninjured.

I had many happy associations with the Australians, for I was liaison officer between tanks and Australians in the line at Villers-Bretonneux in May, 1918, and shared their quarters. This was just after the first tank *v.* tank battle on the Cachy Ridge, and I was in command of the two emergency tanks in Aquenne Wood, ready to go forward to break up any attack with tanks attempted by the enemy.

I am, yours faithfully,
D. E. HICKEY.

P.S.—The tank commander of "H 25" (Second-Lieut. H. W. Humphreys), and my runner (then Private, later Company-Sergeant-Major, E. W. Stittle, D.C.M.) have read the foregoing, and their remarks are as follows :—

" 17th March, 1934.

" Captain D. E. Hickey.

" Very pleased to have your letter, with enclosures, which were re-directed on to me here. I have been very interested this evening in going through your further comments on our show and going through all the emotions and fears of that night.

" I haven't much to add.

" I consider your description as an 'attack' was quite correct. We expected the Germans to be disorganised after the two previous days, but we certainly expected resistance. Had there been no enemy there, it would not have been an attack.

" With regard to the enveloping movement, I understood that our object was to go north from the main road for a distance of about half-a-mile, to remain there until the morning and await orders. We only assumed, or at least I did, that the Australians were going to make a frontal attack, and the hope was expressed that the Germans, finding themselves nearly surrounded, would surrender.

" Nobody was delegated before the action to take the place of Lieut. McNicol in the event of him becoming a casualty. As a matter of fact, I did not know he was injured until I picked him out on the hospital ship two days later.

" I saw both Lieut. McNicol and Second-Lieut. S. S. Jefferies (commanding 'H 24') taking cover on the carrier at the back of the leading tank when the Germans first opened fire. I merely presume they walked in order to keep in touch with the infantry.

" I must say I felt very sheepish handing over my tank to the corporal, but I am afraid I was not much good as I collapsed at the 1st Field Dressing Station in a cellar and my nerves were in a bad state.

" Just before I was wounded, my driver (Gunner G. Williams) was hit in the chest by a fragment of bullet and rushed to back of tank while in motion. We hit a tree, and then the engine stalled. Frantic efforts to start engine! Lights by my shoulder accidentally turned on, drawing more fire!—H. W. HUMPHREYS, Westcliff-on-Sea, Essex."

" 18th March, 1934.

" Captain D. E. Hickey.

" Thank you for your letter of the 15th inst., also for the enclosures.

" I have carefully read both Major Heseltine's article and your comments thereon.

" Your comments are absolutely correct, and no alteration whatsoever is necessary.

" If the operation of the evening of August 10th was to be just 'a night march into enemy territory,' what on earth did they need the tanks for? Surely the better course would have been to 'march' in quietly and without us! If our little stunt was a 'march,' then the word has taken on a new significance.

" I, of course, can only write from my angle of the rank and file, but we, I know, started out on that memorable afternoon anticipating a scrap.

" Also, I understood at the time that casualties were heavy.—E. W. STITTLE, York."



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Book Review**Rolling Into Action**

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MEMOIRS OF A TANK CORPS
SECTION COMMANDER

++

By Captain D. E. Hickey

(Reviewed by N. G. McNicol, 37th Bn., A.I.F.)



N. G. McNicol

The author of "Rolling into Action," Captain D. E. Hickey, transferred from the Suffolk Regiment in Dec., 1916, to the Tank Corps (then called the Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps) and served in it until demobilisation. The book is an account of his personal experiences rather than a history of tank warfare in general.

The type of tank issued to Hickey's section, when it moved to France in August, 1917, was known as Mark IV., and reputed to cost £8,000. They were very unwieldy, each weighing about 30 tons and having a maximum speed of three or four miles an hour. Each required a crew of one officer and seven men. The starting handle required four men to turn it.

Tanks were of two types — "male" and "female," the former armed with two six-pounder guns, the latter with machine-guns.

Early in October, 1917, Hickey's tanks were ordered into the Salient to take part in the tremendous third Battle of Ypres, which had been raging since July 31. It was intended to employ them in the final assault on Passchendaele Ridge. In earlier actions here, in the vicinity of Clapham Junction, about a dozen of the monsters had been knocked out by direct hits as they endeavoured to cross the slimy marshlands. Captain Hickey's impression after his first reconnaissance of this area was:

"If the Tank Corps was to be scrapped, putting it to work under impossible conditions, such as these, was a certain way of doing it."

As the weather conditions became worse, the idea of employing the tanks in battle seemed to have been abandoned, but two of them were used for hauling guns and supply sledges, and even for pulling out guns half-buried in the mud—surely a descent from the sublime.

After seventeen days of useless and dangerous floundering round in the mud of Ypres, two tanks were detailed to take part in an attack against Polderhoek Chateau at daybreak on October 24. After making a reconnaissance, the section commander reported that it was doubtful if his tanks could manage to negotiate the road leading forward, so badly smashed was it; therefore Captain Hickey was detailed with 2 officers and 30 men, armed with ten shovels, ten picks and two axes, to repair the road for about a mile, from Hooge Dump to Clapham Junction.

To read now, 20 years after that such instructions could seriously have been given in that dreadful hell-hole, is almost past comprehension. Needless to say, the road was not repaired, and the tank share in the enterprise was finally cancelled. "Rolling into Action" drives yet another nail in the coffin of dead reputations lost in the badly conceived and shockingly executed Battle of Passchendaele.

THE TANKS GET THEIR CHANCE

It is a more cheerful story that is told regarding the secretly launched Battle of Cambrai on November 19. The author shows very clearly how valuable the tank was, when the ground was hard and surprise tactics were developed. It is now a matter of history that the tanks at Cambrai astounded not only the enemy, but also the British leaders. Insufficiency of reserve troops resulted in the enemy counter-attack regaining a considerable

portion of the area that had been won in the opening stages. Hickey's comment is:

"G.H.Q. could not have had much faith in tanks before the battle, the success of which must have exceeded their wildest dreams. Otherwise how could one explain that there were no fresh troops to relieve the Highlanders at Fontaine on November 21? They were physically exhausted men who had to withstand the fierce German attack of the following morning."

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE

During the great offensive of March, 1918, the tanks took part in the rear-guard action from Bertincourt, east of Bapaume, across the old Somme battlefield, until they helped to fill a gap in the line near Colincamps on the 26th. It was in this locality that there spread that day a rumour of a break-through by German tanks. This rumour was a matter of some concern to Australian troops rapidly approaching from Doullens. Captain Hickey accounts for this rumour by explaining that it was due to the first appearance in the war area of the new British light tanks, known as "whippets." This agrees with the conclusion reached by Dr. Bean in Vol. V. of the Official History of Australia in the War (pp. 267 and 268).

The reinforcing Australians and New Zealanders encountered astonishing scenes of confusion that day, as they approached the battle zone. It appeared for a time that the British Army was in a state of disintegration. Fortunately this was not the case.

FIGHTING WITH THE AUSTRALIANS

Space does not permit to deal adequately with the many exciting episodes described in the volume under review, but mention must be made of Captain Hickey's association with the Australians. He took part in the battle of 8th August wherein 430 tanks were engaged, and he acclaims it as a tank victory, after which he says:

"Tanks now almost seemed to be regarded by responsible staffs as super-terrific monsters which had such a devastating effect on enemy morale that they could not meet with failure."

PROYART ATTACK

The author himself does not appear to have suffered from any such delusion, and his description of the night advance along the east-west road near Proyart on Aug. 10, 1918, leaves no room for doubt that he regarded this enterprise as stupid.

In this night attack Hickey's section (three tanks) was ordered to accompany the 37th Battalion at the head of the 10th Australian Brigade in an encircling movement from La Flaque down the road for three-quarters of a mile and thence northward to the Somme. The plan was hastily arranged on the afternoon of the 10th, no written instructions being issued either to the tanks or the infantry.

This was the first occasion on which tanks were engaged in a night attack. In the afternoon, as they marched to the main road and thence towards the point of departure, both tanks and infantry came under observation from enemy balloons. Zero hour was 10 p.m., the moment that darkness set in. Final dispositions placed one tank at the head of the advancing column, the two others farther back in the ranks of the 37th. Captain Hickey, on foot, accompanied Lieut.-Colonel Knox-Knight, C.O. of the 37th about the centre of the battalion.

The writer of this review, being scout officer of the 37th, had the doubtful privilege of leading the way down the road in company with 2nd/Lieut. Jeffries, in charge of No. 1 tank, and three of the battalion scouts, Ptes. Tyres, Cahill, and Ambrose. This party had to ensure that direction was maintained—hence its position in front.

Hickey gives a very vivid and accurate account of that extraordinary night. He describes how the main road was deluged with machine-gun fire, and hammered by artillery-fire and aeroplane bombs, the while floating lights turned darkness into day. Various observers have agreed that the withering machine-gun fire opened on

(Continued on Page 44)

a new raider was in the Atlantic. On March 30 the *Cambronne* arrived at Rio, and next day the British ambassador there cabled the news to England along with a description of the raider, which by this time had a start of nine days on its dash for the Pacific. From the crews of the captured ships it was learned that the Germans had always kept charts of Cape Horn; three of the seven British warships on the west coast of South America were therefore ordered south to intercept von Luckner. He managed, however, to slip past them and, after coasting to Peru, turned westward towards the equator, passing 400 miles south of the Galapagos. Reaching the equator on June 8, about 1200 miles west of the South American coast, he scouted along it. He was not very successful, for he only captured three American schooners in more than five weeks, and after this the ship's doctor told him that the crew were showing signs of scurvy. The *Seeadler* was therefore turned southwards, and on July 28 anchored off Mopelia, a deserted island in the Society group. The crew spent several days ashore among the coconut trees; but on August 2 a sudden squall put the ship on the reef, and it was only after surmounting great difficulties that von Luckner and his crew were able to salvage their stores, firearms, wireless apparatus, and two boats. On the 21st von Luckner with five officers and seamen went off in a launch, loaded with hand-grenades, rifles, revolvers, and a machine gun, in the hope of catching a copra vessel unawares and of returning with it to Mopelia and starting afresh. The venture was not successful. They first made their way to an island in the Cook group; after telling the resident official that they were Dutch Americans, they persuaded him to give them fresh fruit and provisions. They next cast anchor at Aituaki, and took what stores they needed, von Luckner leaving an acknowledgment signed "Max

Pemberton." Sailing westwards they anchored off Wakaya, in the Fiji group, on September 21, utterly exhausted. They were discovered by a half-caste trader, who informed the authorities; Sub-Inspector Hills, with half-a-dozen Fijian police, at once left Levuka for Wakaya in a cutter, but could not make way against the strong head-wind, and had to return. Meanwhile there had arrived at Levuka the A.U.S.N. Company's *Amra* (535 tons); Hills requisitioned her and went back to Wakaya, where he saw the launch making for the opening in the reef. Leaving the *Amra* off the opening, Hills lowered a boat, pulled alongside the launch, and with an empty revolver forced its crew to surrender by the threat that otherwise his ship's guns would blow them out of the water. It was not till the prisoners were safely under guard aboard the *Amra* that they discovered she had no guns at all. The *Seeadler's* log and charts and von Luckner's diary were captured, as well as the machine-gun and the other weapons.

After the first excitement in Levuka had died down, the *Amra* was manned with forty local militia — two machine-gun sections — and sent off to Mopelia to deal with the rest of the *Seeadler's* crew. But these had meanwhile, on September 5, captured (with their other motor-launch) the French schooner *Lutece*, left their prisoners on the island, and set off for the South American coast. Calling in at Easter Island, they were picked up by a Chilean cruiser which took them to Chile. Here they were interned.

As for von Luckner's party they were at first put into Suva gaol, and then transferred to New Zealand. At Motuhihi, where they were confined along with a number of Germans from Samoa, von Luckner persuaded a selected group to escape under his leadership. By careful planning they succeeded in getting hold of the

(Continued on Page 27)

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ON SALE AT ALL DRAPERS

Rolling Into Action (From Page 20)

the tanks from right, left, and front, lit up those monsters like a blacksmith's fire as the hail of bullets struck them. This was particularly true of the leading tank. In that locality the guiding patrol could not live out in front; consequently it sought shelter behind the lumbering tank. Captain Hickey's account errs slightly here in reporting that this party was seen "riding on top" of it. The present writer shivers at the idea of doing anything so foolhardy as that.

Within half-an-hour the guides were all out of action, Lieut. Jeffries and Pte. Tyres being killed, the remaining three severely wounded. The leading tank had by this time been perforated by armor-piercing bullets and all but two of its crew were casualties.


Tanks Nos. 2 and 3 were in no better situation, and obviously the terrific fire had shattered and disorganised the 37th Battalion. Whenever the fire was hottest, the survivors naturally sought cover in the wayside ditches, so presently the tank crews got the impression that they were not being accompanied by infantry at all. They therefore halted and presently began to turn back. On becoming aware of this, Captain Hickey, exposing himself to great danger, succeeded in checking the retirement. It was at this stage that Colonel Knox-Knight was killed within a few yards of Hickey, who appears to be convinced that his crews were justified in believing that they were unaccompanied by the infantry. He gives an account of how his runner, Pte. Stittle, was challenged by an Australian officer as he went forward with instructions to the leading tank. Stittle says that this officer threatened to shoot him if the tank moved, and made him personally responsible for seeing that no movement occurred for fear that fresh bursts of fire would descend upon the infantry.

There is some misconception here. The reviewer, lying wounded in the ditch in line with the leading tank had instructed its crew to halt but to keep its guns going. His two wounded companions were then ordered to withdraw. As they did so, they informed Lieut. C. J. Ashmead, commanding No. 1 Platoon of the 37th Battalion, of his plight. Ashmead dashed up just at the moment when the leading tank began to turn as if to withdraw, and he was told to "stop that tank." He probably did this after the manner suggested by Captain Hickey, but his purpose was not to ensure silence so much as to make certain that the tank would be on the spot when the advance recommenced, or to play its part in resisting any counter-attack.

Though it was obvious that losses must have been heavy, the advance had not been countermanded. It was not known, for instance, that the 37th's colonel had been killed. Its scout officer had, on his own initiative, ordered the leading tank to stop so that it would not get too far ahead of the main column and, just as he gave these instructions, he had been struck down along with his whole party.

As a matter of fact, the advance proceeded no further

Anzac Day at Kavieng



The war veterans of Kavieng in the Anzac Day march — Lieut. H. J. Murray, D.C.M., 2nd Bn., A.I.F., extreme left of front rank. Major McAdam in command.

The sun rose fiercely over Kavieng on Anzac Day. The recreation ground looked a picture with its booths and streams of bunting. The commemoration services commenced at 8 a.m. with a Mass, celebrated by Rev. Father Lakaff. At 10 a.m. the whole population gathered at the flagstaff. The march of war veterans was conducted by the District Officer (Major T. L. McAdam). An impressive service was conducted by Rev. B. Chenoweth.

Then all repaired to the sports ground, where the R.S.S.I.L.A. had arranged a big sports programme. An innovation this year on the programme was "The Kavieng All-Aged Stakes, 4 fur." Those who looked for the horses (all plantation bred) to run off the course were disappointed, as all finished well. The race went to the best rider. The only event won by a Digger was the R.S.S. Handicap. The tote was a huge success.

The finale of a big day was the Anzac Ball at the Kavieng Club when a generous prize list was distributed. Prizes were given for the best couple, best fancy dress (ladies and gent), most original and best sustained character. Supper was supplied by the management of the Club, when toasts were drunk to H.M. the King, and Fallen Comrades. At 4 a.m. when this scribe retired the songs were still straining the rafters of the Club.

And so all Diggers are a year older!—Alf. N. Lussick, hon. sec.

that night. A line was established by the 38th Battalion and then the tanks and the shattered 37th withdrew. The attack—which, as Captain Hickey anticipated, "had very little chance of success, because it was at every stage against common sense and was fraught with great danger"—was over. He and his men had played their part gallantly. He himself afterwards admitted that the tanks on this occasion had not helped the infantry, but had drawn trouble upon them. But actually they drew worse trouble upon themselves. The fact of the matter was that higher commanders had not on that occasion used tanks intelligently.

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PENSION WIN FOR EX-IMPERIAL

Mr. N. Humble, ex-Imperial soldier, of Weston Street, Weston, N.S.W., whose pension claim had been persevered with by the R.S.S.I.L.A. for two years, has now had the satisfaction of securing a pension of 12/- a week from the British Ministry of Pensions. "Without the assistance of the R.S.S.I.L.A. I would not have got this recognition," says Mr. Humble, who adds that he will always do everything in his power to further the cause of the League.

With the 4th at the Pine (From Page 37)

session of his revolver (he appeared to have no spare ammunition), and we buried his body in the sandbag barricade. There was no sign of any of his party.

While we were thus engaged numbers of the enemy had taken advantage of the absence of firing to crawl towards the barricade, but they were discovered in time, and driven off by fire.

The trench at this point was about 9ft. deep, but had no fire-steps on the side facing the Jolly. Setting the others to cut fire-steps, I proceeded along the front line to establish touch with the rest of the battalion, and on passing the entrance of a sap that the Turks had dug towards our old lines, I heard sounds coming from the depths of it. In case some wounded were there, I stood at the mouth of the tunnel and beckoned to the inmates to come out. But there was no response, other than a call which sounded like "Testim, Testim." This, of course, meant nothing to me, but, more convinced than ever that some wounded were sheltering in the sap, I put down my revolver. Imagine my surprise when there emerged, not wounded, but seven unwounded Turks, including an officer or N.C.O. Disarming them after hurriedly regaining possession of my revolver, I ordered them to precede me towards where I anticipated the battalion H.Q. would be located. We had not gone far before the whole pack stampeded back on me; guessing that they had run into some of our fellows, I called out, and went ahead of them, and met Sergt. Crawford. The prisoners were handed over to Colonel Macnaghten, to whom I made a request for assistance at the barricade, but, as the battalion was heavily engaged with the enemy in the depression that Dr. Bean calls "The Cup," no men could, at the time, be spared to return there with me.

In the communication trench the Turks were becoming bolder and apparently preparing to attack us, so I gave my party orders to run from one fire-step to another, and open fire rapidly, so as to engage them from as many points as possible. This move quietened the Turks for the time being. About this time the adjutant of the battalion, Lieut. Massie, visited us, and, after complimenting us on gaining the position, said that he would endeavour to obtain a machine-gun, which would be needed to repulse any counter-attack, and also some reinforcements.

Towards dark, word was received that a gun was coming, but the message was incorrect, as only a gunner arrived, without a gun. The enemy was now quieter, but I ordered a strict watch to be kept, and myself proceeded up the support trench, some distance along which I met Corporal Stone, who, unaware that we had gained the end of the trench, had barricaded it at the point where he was holding. Asking him to connect up with us and with the rest of the battalion, I returned to the forward barricade, to be met by a call from one of the men who had recently joined us, that there was movement out in front. On climbing up, it was discovered that a Turk was within a few yards of our position, but after firing a shot, no further movement was seen.

Towards dawn bombs were thrown into the trench. One of them landed close to where I was sitting, and I made a dash for the cover of a fire-step, but was too late. Wounded in several places in the right arm, I was obliged to seek medical aid, and so my part in the battle came to an end.



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Dear Mr Parker,

It is with the deepest regret that I am writing to you, as Officer Commanding No. 16 Platoon, of the 19th Battalion, concerning the great loss we have all sustained in the death of your son No. 6206. Pte, R.J.H.Parker. He fell on the field of battle during our attack of the 11th August, just as we had reached our objective.

I was not actually with him at the time of his death, as owing to the dense fog, the Platoon was considerably scattered, but men who were with him in the advance speak very highly of his conduct on that occasion, and of his bravery in attacking German Machine Gun posts which were holding up our advance.. It was in attacking one of these posts that he was killed.

I have known your son for a considerable time, first as an Instructor on the Lewis Gun, before we came into the line, and afterwards in the line as a No.1. Gunner. I have had him under observation all the time, and have had him marked as my best Lewis Gunner and one of my very best all round men, in fact, he has helped me with advice on many occasions, and has been my right hand man, he was most energetic, cool in time of danger, cheerful at all times, most efficient in his work, and beloved by all with whom he came in contact.

He was also very highly esteemed by the Officers of the Company, and his death means a great loss to the whole Battalion.

I cannot write any more, except to express to you, on the behalf of my Platoon and myself, our deepest sympathy with you in your bereavement. The great consolation is that he died the most noble death that a man can die for his King and Country.

"Then how can man die better
Than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his fathers
And the temple of his gods".

I feel that this is a very poorly put together tribute to the loss of one of the best of men, but we feel that loss very much more deeply in our hearts than it is possible to express on paper.

Yours sincerely,
J.G.Vickers, 2nd Lieut.,
O.C. No.16 Platoon,
D.Coy., 19th Battalion,
A.I.F.

Mrs. ~~John~~ of Lawson's Creek,
has received a communication from
Lieutenant M. C. Toogood, M.M.,
with reference to the death of her
son Sergeant Ernie Paine. Lieut.
Toogood writes:—"As your son's
platoon officer during the recent
heavy fighting I wish to convey the
deepest sympathy and sincere regret
of my brother officers and all his
comrades for his irreplaceable loss.
We all thought of him as a brother,
and he was 'Ernie' to us all. I was
alongside of Ernie in his last fight—
the battle of Raine Court. Fight!
He fought like a tiger, using his
revolver right and left. He was
always in the front, leading his men
and setting a splendid example by
his conspicuous bravery. When we
reached our objective, just out of the
village, and were consolidating our
positions by digging in, in the
open a Hun sniper lurking in some
distant trees shot Ernie clean
through the forehead. His death, I
am thankful to say, was instantan-
eous. Lieutenants Moss and Gard-
ner were similarly killed by the same
sniper, and are all buried alongside
each other, crosses marking their
graves. Previous to the last fight
of Ernie's I had the honor and
pleasure of highly recommending
him for conspicuous bravery, daring
in immediate action and magnificent
example in the taking of an enemy
strong point in broad light with
six men. Owing to his death this
award will not be granted, V.C.'s
being the only posthumous awards.
Your son had been marked for the
past few weeks as the next N.C.O. to
be granted a commission for his tact
and judgement, which speaks for
itself. His personal belongings will
reach you in due course."

This letter was written by
Lieut. Toogood M.M.

of D Company 20 Bde.

Sgt E E Paine
20 Bde

Killed in action
11/8/18

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*This letter was
written by Lieut
Toogood*

*Sgt EE Paine
20 Jan Killed 11/9*

Extract from a letter written by Sgt. Brittain, 42nd Battalion,
concerning the death of Sgt. C.H. Goode of the same unit.
(Sgt. Goode was reported killed in action, 12/8/1918)

"Cyril was in charge of a section of men pushing forward in a daylight advance. He had not got over the top of one ridge when the enemy started to resist. Cyril, seeing this, crawled out to an edge in front of his men and started picking the Germans off one by one with deadly accuracy. The Germans at this period made a rush from either side, and the men hung on till night when they went out to find him, but could see nothing of him."

Leant King. 12 M Coy. 8 Aug 1918. O.N.

XIV
P297

Coolitah

River view Terrace.

Indoor copy. Brisbane

Nov. 2nd 1939.

C. E. W. Beau Esq.

Dear Sir - In answer to your letter addressed to my father, Mr. King, (wh has been deceased for some time) in connection with my late brother, Lieut Claude Napier King.

I will do my best to give you any information that you ask for -

Born, Charters Towers - Feb. 14th 1891 - died Aug 8th in the Victoria advances near Proyas. (Somme) being shot in the head & dying instantly. He was buried near the village of Proyas - some 15 miles East of Arras - The following being a description of the end of his career.

He was in command of the crew of a tank which was directly hit & set on fire. Lieut King, jumped out, carrying a machine gun & Cooly placed it in position, & mowed down the majority of a party of 50 Germans, who were rushing at the tank.

When the Germans were within a doz yards of the tank, Lieut King, was struck in the head by a bullet & killed - a private instantly seized

2/

the gun & swept down the remains of the
 aircraft - (This was first dated London)
 as it appeared in the English papers before
 the Australian news came out - & this
 was also written & told me by the Commanding
 Officer, Captain Allan F. Taylor - 12th Australian
 Machine Gun Coy, which letter was dated
 2/9/18 - A day after the battle.

My brother said he liked fighting with the
 American, they got on well with the "Boys", said
 they were very keen, & very daring - & good
 fighters too & very funny.

Before my brother enlisted, for many
 years, he was serving with the water, sewerage
 board (Bristol). & then for 3 yrs.
 was serving in the Pacific Islands (Tonga)
 under the Tongan Government, & from there
 returned to Bristol & joined the Army -

For some time prior to going to
 Tonga, my brother was with "Light Horse
 - Cavalry", in the Inkhiserne Coy. which
 I believe was disbanded at the time of the last
 war - My brother enlisted from the
 suburb of New Farm, Bristol -

3/

We have heard from various sources that
my brother had gained a decoration,
but we have never officially been notified
of such — but we have received a
registered Memorial Scroll bearing the
Late King ~~Edward~~ George's Coat of Arms —

Hoping this will help you in
what you ask — & that I have
given you the information you
require —

Believe me

Yours faithfully
Dorothy Puffish (Alice King)

my brother was the ^{3rd} son of the
Late Dr. W. ^{John} Wake King: M.R.C.S. Eng.
and Bailiff — W.R.

✓