

AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.

Diaries and Notebooks

Item number: 3DRL606/267/1

Title: Folder, 1914 - 1915

Comprises extracts of telegrams ships, logs and other naval records from the Committee of Imperial Defence relating to the SYDNEY - EMDEN engagement and the Dardanelles, 1915.



AWM38-3DRL606/267/1

EXTRACTS FROM NAVAL RECORDS. No. 267.

1ST SET. DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918

THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every reader and writer who may use them.

These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so—but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.

These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.

16 Sept., 1946.

C. E. W. BEAN.

Australian War Records Section. London.

Extracts from Records of Committee for Imperial Defence.
Introductory cables, etc. prior to despatch of first batch
of transports from Australia.

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TELEGRAM.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies to the
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia.

(Sent 7.30 p.m. 6th August, 1914).

"His Majesty's Government gratefully accept offer of your
Ministers to send to this Country force of 20,000 men and
would be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible."

S e c r e t -

"If at the same time your Ministers desire and feel them-
selves able to seize German Wireless Stations at New Guinea, Yap
in Marshall Islands of Pleasant Island, we should feel this was
a great and urgent Imperial service. You will realise, however,
that any territory now occupied must, at conclusion of war, be
at the disposal of Imperial Government for purposes of an ulti-
mate settlement. Other Dominions are acting on the same under-
standing in similar way and in particular suggestion to New
Zealand is being made with regard to Samoa."

(Signed) Harcourt.

CABLEGRAM.

20/8/14.

sent 1.20 p.m.
Recd. 6.50 a.m.

From Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration, Melbourne,
To Admiralty.

2. "It is proposed that number of transports for the Australian
Imperial Expeditionary Force number one upwards, prefix Letter A.
Is this in order?"

From Admiralty to Navy Office, Melbourne. Date 20/8/14 sent (?)

"Your telegram No. 2 no objection if local signal experts
concur."

TRANSPORTS FROM AUSTRALIA.

Geelong)
Pera) P. & O. Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.

Ascanius - Ocean S. S. CO. (A. Holt & Co.)

Cevic)
Medic) White Star.

Euripides-Geo. Thompson & Co. Ltd. (Aberdeen Line).

Hymettus -British India Steam Navigation CO.

Argyllshire - Turnbull, Martin, & Co.

Shropshire - Federal Steam Navigation Co.

Karroo }
Saldanha } -- Ellerman & Bucknall S. S. Co. Ltd.
Katuna }

Orvieto }
Omrah } -- Orient Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.

Star of England -- Commonwealth and Dominion Line.

War Office to Minister of Defence, New Zealand. 1/9/14.

"785 Cipher. The Expeditionary Force should assemble at Wellington by September 20th by which date an escort is expected to be ready to convoy the transports to Port Adelaide where the Australian Contingent will join them. From Port Adelaide all ships will proceed via Fremantle, Colombo, and the Red Sea. The red ensign should be flown by all the transports!"

Corrected List of Transports conveying Aust. Exped. Force.

		<u>Speed</u>		<u>Speed</u>	
A1	Hymettus	11½	A15	Star of England	13½
A2	Geelong	12	A16	Star of Victoria	13½
A3	Orvieto	15	A17	Port Lincoln	12
A4	Pera	11	A18	Wiltshire	14
A5	Omrah	15	A19	Afric	13
A6	Macquordale	12½	A20	Hororata	14
A7	Medic	13	A21	Marere	12½
A8	Argyllshire	14	A22	Rangatira	14
A9	Shropshire	14	A23	Suffolk	12
A10	Karroo	12	A24	Benalla	14
A11	Ascanius	13	A25	Anglo Egyptian	12
A12	Saldanha	11	A26	Armadale	11
A13	Katuna	11	A27	Southern	10½
A14	Euripides	15	A28	Miltiades	13

Ports of embarkation - Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Hobart, Adelaide, and Fremantle.

To Commander-in-Chief, China,
Singapore.

8/9/14.
12.5 a.m.

"166. If the two German armoured cruisers are not accounted for by the end of the month, you must escort with MINOTAUR and HAMPSHIRE to Colombo the Australian Contingent which leaves Fremantle on 3rd October for Colombo. You should arrange to meet the 22 transports on their lines of advance near Cocos. SYDNEY and MELBOURNE will convoy all the way from Fremantle to Colombo."

R.A. Comm. Aust. Squad. Britannia, Thurs. Island. 9.9.14
3.58 p.m.

"9/9. MELBOURNE due Nauru 9/9. SYDNEY joined me 9/9 off Rossel Island. May proceed to occupy Simpsonhafen. Operation to be expected to be completed 12/9. Will detach Sydney then to Sydney. Melbourne from Nauru must come Simpsonhafen to coal and will then be sent to Sydney also and should arrive in time to escort troops."

Extract from Message from Admiral Sir H. B. Jackson
to 1st Lord of Admiralty.

"The first expedition consists of 10 transports from New Zealand conveying mounted Brigade, Infantry Brigade, Battery and details, 8,276 men and 3,838 horses, joining (at Port Adelaide) the Australian Contingent of 22 transports conveying 1 Infantry Division, 1 Light Horse Brigade, and Army Troops (about 20,000 men and 6,000 horses) and Army Reservists from both colonies.

"If ready there are also 10 transports bringing Army details for Base and Line of Communications, viz. Transport Units (Motor and Horse) Ammunition Parks, Hospital and Pay Units. If not ready these will be left over for later convoy.

"Escort to Aden is Australia, Sydney, Melbourne, covered in addition by China Squadron from Colombo, the details of this covering movement are now under consideration."

Copy of cable from Navy Office, Melbourne. 14/9/14.
sent 2 p.m.
To Admiralty. Recd. 7.21 A.M.

"39. Arrangements have been made for Australian Expeditionary Force in 27 Transports convoy to assemble at King George's Sound by 5th October."

Copy of message from Intelligence Officer, Colombo. 14.9.14
Sent -- 1.30 a.m.
To Admiralty. Recd.-- 10. 26 P.M.

"23. German EMDEN with 4 prizes sighted by Italian steamer position 18.0 N 86.16 E time not reported, estimated 8 a.m. 13th September. I am causing enquiry to be made. I have delayed shipping at present in Bay of Bengal including Colombo Singapore trade routes.

"I am endeavouring to inform DUPLEIX and HAMPSHIRE. On this message is a note by the Director of Operations Division Admiralty RearAdmiral A. C. Leveson. 'This shows that Emden anyhow did not go to Straits of Magellan.'"

CABLEGRAM.

The Governor of New Zealand to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies.

(Received 3.35 p.m., 13th September, 1914).

"After consulting the Senior Naval Officer my Prime Minister desires that you will inform Admiralty that expedition will leave New Zealand Sept. 25th proceeding direct to Fremantle arriving there Oct. 7th. Senior Naval Officer with "PSYCHE" and "PHILOMEL" will escort expedition to longitude 145 E having sent "PYRAMUS" on to coal at Melbourne and "PYRAMUS" will escort expedition from Longitude mentioned to Fremantle. Please telegraph whether Admiralty concur as soon as possible."

(Signed) Liverpool.

CABLEGRAM.

The Governor of New Zealand to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Received 10.35 a.m.
15th September, 1914.

Private and Confidential.

"The Cabinet has expressed considerable uneasiness with regard to the fact that the escort for the expedition between New Zealand and the point of junction with Australian Squadron will consist of P Class ships. The information at my disposal states that near Albany the Australian Squadron joins the expedition and that there is practically no danger.

"The Cabinet have been referred to your telegram of Sept. 11th but their doubts as to the safety of the expedition have not been entirely allayed."

(Signed) Liverpool.

To the above the following reply was sent:-

Under Secretary of State
Colonial Office.

Secret and immediate.

"Sir,

In reply to your letter of 1the 15th instant No. 35197, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs that if the naval situation in New Zealand waters at any time is such as render the escort arranged for an expedition inadequate, steps would be taken to strengthen it - even at the cost of considerable delay in the date of its departure.

At the date of the telegram referred to by the Governor of New Zealand - 11th Sept. 1914 - there was no reason to consider the escort in any way inadequate, but their Lordships take this opportunity of asking that the New Zealand Cabinet may be informed that the safety of these military convoys is a matter which receives most careful consideration and is constantly borne in mind.

(Sgd.) W. F. Nicholson

for Secretary. 16. 9. 1914.

Following cablegram from Governor of New Zealand at 1 a.m.
on the 16th of September.

"I have received the following from the Officer administering the Government of Samoa. Please inform the Admiralty (begins) The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau appeared at daybreak on September 14th off Apia, and left about noon steaming north-west. No shots were fired (ends)."

(Sgd). Liverpool.

CABLEGRAM.sent 16. 9. 14
12.40 p.m.

From Admiralty

to C. in C. China, R.A.C. "Australia", Navy Board, Melbourne.

"Situation changed by appearance of "SCHARNHORST" and "GNEISNAU" at Samoa on 14th Sept. and "EMDEN" in Bay of Bengal. "AUSTRALIA" and "MONTCALM" to cover "ENCOUNTER" and Expeditionary Force from attack and then search for the 2 cruisers. "MELBOURNE" to be used at R.A.'s discretion. "SYDNEY" to return for convoy of Australian troops to Aden. "HAMPSHIRE" and "YARMOUTH" to sink "EMDEN". "MINOTAUR" to arrive at Fremantle by Oct. 4th for Australian convoy. One Japanese cruiser to accompany "MINOTAUR" acknowledge."

CABLEGRAM.From R.A.C., Australian Squadron, via Thursday Island 16. 9. 14

to Admiralty.

sent 2.29 a.m.
Recd. 5.28 p.m.

"77 "MELBOURNE" examined Kawieng Harbour, New Ireland this morning "GEIER" (German) left there seven days ago."

0030

"One Japanese warship "IBUKI" was loaned to assist in convoying Australian Imperial Force.

"At 6.52 p.m. on 17/9/14, a message from the C. in C., China reported that "Minotaur" was sailing same evening from Singapore and "Ibuki" on following morning (18/9/14) with the object of meeting the "Emden" should she visit vicinity of Sumatra or Cocos Island.

"Ibuki" referred to above was described by British Admiralty as a "powerful Japanese Battleship, though in the quarterly return she showed as a cruiser carrying 4-12," 8-8", 14-4.7", sea-going speed 18.4."

A message handed in at 12.20 p.m. and received at 7.15 a.m. (19/9/14) by the Admiralty from C. in C., China, reported that the "Emden" was sighted off Rangoon at 6.30 p.m. 18th September.

A message sent 10.5 p.m., received 4.56 p.m. (24/9/14) at Admiralty from Navy Office, Melbourne, advised that C. in C., China, telegraphed "Minotaur" and "Ibuki" were due at Fremantle about 1st October having Admiralty Orders to join convoy at Wellington.

Part of New Zealand convoy left Auckland 24/9/14, remainder due to leave Wellington on morning 25th September.

Three Australian transports left Brisbane 24/9/14 for King George's Sound.

Sydney transports' embarkation commenced.

On 27/9/14 a message was received by the Admiralty from Navy Office, Melbourne, timed 12.8 p.m., received 5.36 a.m. advising "Melbourne" left Sydney 9 p.m. 26th September to cover transports now proceeding to Port Phillip Bay from Brisbane."

Owing to grave anxiety expressed by the New Zealand Government sailing of New Zealand troopships were postponed until escort could arrive to convoy them across to Australian waters.

At 10 p.m. on 30/9/14 the Governor of Papeete reported that "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" arrived at Papeete 22nd Sept. with two colliers. They sank gunboat "Zelee and destroyed half the town by shell fire and left the same morning.

On 5/10/14 a message sent 1.10 p.m. received 8.46 a.m. from Navy Office, Melbourne, to Admiralty, advised that Roebourne and Broome on the night of 4th Oct. heard a Telefunken Station send a message to "Emden" using her confidential call sign. Repeated six times message in transposed A.B.C. code and undecipherable.

A message sent 5.11 p.m. 5/10/14 from Navy Office, Melbourne, said that Suva had intercepted a message in secret German mercantile transposed code at 8.15 p.m. 14th Oct. which translated read - that Scharnhorst was on the way between Marquesas Island and Easter Island. Present position (somewhat mutilated) Long. 130 W. Wellington confirms above and received call sign as Scharnhorst to Dresden.

On morning of 10th Oct. Roebourne, Broome, and Geraldton, again heard Telefunken Station sending message to Emden but no reply from Emden was received.

Consequent to Japanese warship "Nisshin" loaned with "Ibuki" for convoying, having sustained slight damage by grounding off Sandakan and requiring 10 days to be made seaworthy and 35 to completely repair, the Japanese Admiralty when approached offered either "Yahagi" or "Hirato" but as time was too short to enable them to join the convoy at Albany the offer was accepted and ship selected was asked to be sent to meet convoy near Cocos Islands.

Two further telegrams were intercepted by Geraldton and Roebourne between midnight and 1 a.m. 14th Oct. Both were in A.B.C. but could not be decoded.

Minotaur, Psyche, Philomel, and Ibuki, and following 10 transports left Wellington for Hobart 16/10/14:-

Athenic, Hawkesbay, Eimerick, Maunganui, Orari,
Quenwa, Ruapehu, Star of India, Tahiti, Waimana.

grand total 381 Officers, 8,193 O.Rs, 3818 horses. Each Unit's camp equipment shipped with it.

Departure witnessed by Governor, Lord Liverpool, Lady Liverpool, Cabinet Ministers and large and enthusiastic crowd.

Above Force and that at Samoa contained $\frac{1}{48}$ of white male population New Zealand and $\frac{1}{18}$ white male population between ages 20-40.

The New Zealand Force arrived at Hobart 21st Oct. and left for Albany 22nd instant.

Both Governor of New Zealand and Governor General of Australia were advised that dates of departure, routes and convoy of Forces should not be published until they received advice from Colonial Office.

"Minotaur", "Philomel", "Pyramus", and "Ibuki", and New Zealand Expeditionary Force arrived King George's Sound 28/10/14.

Naval Board of Administration advised on 1/11/14 that "Minotaur", "Melbourne", "Sydney", with 36 transports sailed same day for Colombo.

Sailings of transports from Australian Ports were as follows (For organisation of convoy see page 24): -

From Sydney -

October, 17th, 1914	·Miltiades
" 18th, 1914	·Argyllshire) ·Afric) ·Suffolk)
October, 20th, 1914	·Clan MacCorquordale) ·Star of Victoria) ·Euripides)

From Melbourne -

October, 17th, 1914	·Hymettus
" 18th, 1914	·Pera) ·Southern)
October, 19th, 1914	·Anglo Egyptian) ·Benalla) ·Marere-) ·Hororata) ·Wiltshire) ·Omrah)
October, 20th, 1914	·Armadale) ·Rangatira) ·Star of England) ·Karoo) ·Shropshire)
October, 21st, 1914	·Orvieto) ·Miltiades)

From Adelaide -

October, 20th, 1914	·Ascanius) ·Medic)
October, 21st, 1914	·Saldanha
October, 22nd, 1914	·Port Lincoln) ·Hymettus)

From Hobart -

October, 20th, 1914	·Katuna) ·Geelong)
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From Fremantle -

November 2nd, 1914	·Ascanius) ·Medic)
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From Melbourne -

1st November.

6.25 a.m. "Minotaur" and Sydney sailed
 6.45 a.m. 1st Australian Division sailed
 7.15 a.m. 2nd Australian Division sailed
 7.55 a.m. 3rd Australian Division sailed
 8.20 a.m. New Zealand Division sailed
 8.53 a.m. All transports clear of Sound
 8.55 a.m. Weighed anchor and proceeded

Note:- Divisions as above are the three sections into which convoy was divided.

3rd November.

6.p.m. Pioneer parted company and proceeded to Fremantle on account of heavy weather.

8/11/14 "Minotaur" having been so instructed, handed convoy over to "Melbourne" and proceeded to Mauritius.

On 9/11/14 Naval Board of Administration, Melbourne, advised that a cable had just been received from Cocos stating that a Warship with three funnels was at Cocos landing men in boats - time - 7 a.m.

This resulted in the C. in C., China Squadron knowing that the Australian convoy would be passing within 100 miles of Cocos or Keeling Island on 9/11/14, ordering "Hampshire" and "Empress of Russia" to proceed at high speed to cover them into Colombo in case the "Emden" detected the presence of the convoy and attacked.

The following is a report from Cocos Island by cable:-

"Emden landed 43 men Cocos Island 9th November. Cocos Island sending wireless call for help. "Sydney" appeared on horizon. "Emden" to sea. "Emden" started firing shots at first excellently but afterwards fell off losing two funnels taking fire at stern and ran ashore North Cocos Island. "Sydney" scarcely touched. Three killed, 15 wounded. Party landed from "Emden" escaped in schooner. "Sydney" has been to North Cocos Island to help wounded there. Cocos Island instruments and Wireless installation smashed."

Extracts from Log of H.M.A.S. "Melbourne".

November 9th - Monday. From Albany to Colombo.

6.30 a.m. Cocos Island report hostile cruiser, off Refuge Harbour, by W/T.

7 a.m. "Sydney" proceeded to Cocos. "Melbourne" and "Ibuki" proceeded as requisite to protect S.W. side of convoy.

9.30 a.m. "Sydney" reported by W/T that hostile cruiser in sight.

10.15 a.m. Secured. Prepared ship for battle.

November 9th - Monday. (Continued).

11.15 a.m. "Sydney" reported by W/T. that hostile ship "Emden" had been brought to action and had grounded to avoid sinking.

11.30 a.m. Proceeded N 32 W 16 knots.

Latitude and Longitude at this time.

<u>Latitude.</u>		<u>Longitude.</u>
D.R. 10-44		D.R. 96-54
	(s)	(E)
Obs. 10-53		Chro. 96-51

True bearing and distance.

Pt. de Gatte N 44 W - 1420 M.

Wind - E S E. Force 4 (mph⁰)

Extracts from report of Capt. M. Silver, H.M.A.S. "Melbourne", dated 14th Nov. 1914, Colombo, and addressed Secretary of Admiralty.

8th (Sunday) - I received a signal from Captain Kiddle of "Minotaur" that he was ordered on other service and required me to visit him in the morning. At 6 a.m. I proceeded on board "Minotaur" with my Intelligence Officer (Chaplain Tulloh) and received such intelligence as was necessary to supplement the orders I had already received or intercepted. "Minotaur" then parted company.

Speed of convoy was 10 knots. Disposition of Escort - "Melbourne" ahead, "Ibuki" on starboard beam, "Sydney" on port beam.

I had regarded the vicinity of Cocos Island to be dangerous, and Captain Kiddle had told me he was expecting "Emden" to make an attempt on the cable and W/T. Station.

Since our departure from Australian Coast the escort had not used W/T. on power.

W/T. with buzzer circuit was permitted to the escort and leaders of Divisions of Convoy.

On the night of the 8th November, the convoy was darkened, and W/T. buzzer forbidden after dark (the night range being considerable).

Shortly before 7 a.m. on the 9th a W/T. signal was intercepted from Cocos to "Minotaur" - "Strange cruiser off entrance" and was followed later by W/T. signal of distress and Telefunken jamming.

The convoy was then 55 miles to the northward of Cocos. I decided that it was in the interest of the safety of convoy to get into touch with this cruiser, which could only be "Emden" or "Konigsburg."

I thereupon directed "Sydney" to raise steam for full speed and proceed to Cocos. I also directed "Sydney" by W/T. to rejoin convoy with despatch in case the cruiser had, in the meanwhile, departed.

About 10 a.m. "Sydney" reported enemy in sight and subsequently that he was steering north.

"Melbourne" and "Ibuki" raised steam and were placed on the south flank of the convoy - my Ally was very anxious to proceed to "Sydney's" assistance.

Then came a message "Am briskly engaging enemy" and half an hour later "Sydney" reported that "Emden" had run ashore to avoid sinking."

N O T E:- Report of "Sydney" on above action is at present untraceable, but it will be available at a later date, when extracts will be made. Unfortunately also, the log of H.M.A.S. "Sydney" is in Australia, tho' that of "Melbourne" is available, extracts from which are shown in previous pages. (See page 12).

N O T E:- Ref. Japanese ship "Ibouki". All inward cables from C. in C., China Squadron spell name as "Ibuki" but Capt. Silver's despatch has it "Ibouki". Vice Admiral Leveson states correct name is "Ibuki."

From Report of an Officer of "Emden".

"We sighted Cocos Island 6 p.m. 9/11/14 and the lookouts reported the harbour free of enemy warships.

The landing party left at 7 a.m. and consisted of 3 officers 5 N.C.Os. and 45 men with a machine gun and 1200 rounds 47 rifles and 60 rounds per rifle. Only on our landing did the inhabitants learn that we were Germans and they were not too pleased. The Wireless Station now sent out calls for help which our people spoiled by jamming.

In a short time we heard the roar of shells and saw the Wireless Installation fall to the ground.

(8,700)
(8,000)

About 9 O'clock the lookout reported "Smoke on the horizon" and at first mistaken for our collier "Burisk", she was later recognised as a warship. She steamed with tremendous speed and we had to leave our landing party to its fate. At 87,000 metres the Commander gave the order to open fire. Our shooting was good, but after a time the enemy opened fire tho' his range was faulty. Salvo followed salvo but our guns could not effect much damage owing to the great distance. At about the 12th round our enemy had got his range and smashed our wireless installation with his first hit, killing all its personnel. The enemy kept the fight at 80,000 metres and by her heavier guns and superior speed turned the fight which way she wanted. Right at the commencement our range finder was short away.

We now lost our first funnel, foretopmast, and other two funnels and the ammunition chambers having been hit, were flooded to prevent explosion. We answered the fire of the enemy already feebler. The ship was on fire in several places. Blood was flowing in streams on the deck and terribly mutilated corpses were laying about.

We only fired now and again and soon these few men were dead also, only the Artillery Officer and a few unskilled chaps were still firing. These also were soon out of action.

The Commander decided to run the ship ashore and ten minutes later the proud "Emden" had finished her last work. We had already learnt that our adversary was the "Sydney" and she now took leave. The battle had lasted from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. and at about four in the afternoon the "Sydney" reappeared and then they fired on a defenceless ship. We knew the reason very soon. On our one and only mast which was already very shaky was our War flag. A sailor tried to climb the shaky mast and the "Sydney" ceased firing at once and sent a boat along with the order that we would be taken off in the morning. Towards midday

she/

she appeared and carried out very cleverly and carefully the job of transshipping us.

Casualties.

Killed - 3)
Wounded - 13) on "Sydney"

Killed.

Officers - 7)
Men - 108) "Emden"

Wounded.

Officers - 3)
Men - 53)

From Log H.M.S. "Hampshire".

"Nov. 12th 8 p.m.

Communicated with "Melbourne". Altered course to N. 45° true."

After arrival of "Hampshire", she took charge of convoy as "Sydney and "Melbourne" were required for service in the Atlantic where fast cruisers were urgently needed.

The "Melbourne" sailed noon 15/11/14 for Malta, having arrived at Colombo and secured to buoy at noon 14/11/14.

At 6.15 a.m. 15th "Hampshire", with convoy arrived at Colombo and secured to buoys. Commenced coaling 1100 tons.

Extracts "Hampshire's" log.

10 a.m. - 15/11/14.

"Sydney" and "Empress of Russia" arrived.

Noon - 15/11/14.

"Ibuki" arrived.

17th - 11.45 a.m.

Cast off buoys. Proceeded as requisite for leaving harbour.

17th - 2 p.m. Convoys course N 78 W. Speed 10 knots.

25th - 8.15 a.m. Arrived Aden.

25th - 9 p.m. Finished coaling - 650 tons.

26th - 6.10 a.m. Proceeded to take station ahead of convoy.

December 1st.

11 a.m. Anchored Suez Bay.

2.45 p.m. Entered Channel - Pilot in charge.

9 p.m. Stopped off Ismalia - changed Pilots.

9.10 p.m. Proceeded.

December 2nd.

2 a.m. Arrived Port Said.
 3 p.m. German prisoners of war from S.S. "Orvieto" and "Maunganui" joined ship.

NOTE- These prisoners of war were captured in the "Sydney"- "Emden" action.

Cairo cabled 1/12/14 "All Australian and New Zealand convoys have arrived," and G.O.C., Egypt, under date 15/12/14 advised the War Office "We have completed disembarkation of the Australian and New Zealand Contingents at Alexandria."

Thursday - 3/12/14 - "Hampshire" sailed 6.40 a.m. for Malta under Admiralty instructions en route to Gibraltar.

"SYDNEY'S" REPORT OF "EMDEN" FIGHT.

Despatch from Captain Glossop to Secretary, Admty.

H.M.A.S. "Sydney" at Colombo. - 15th November, 1914.

"I have the honour to report that whilst on escort duty with the Convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H.M.A.S. "Melbourne" at 6.20 a.m. on Monday, 9th November, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the entrance.

I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7 a.m. and proceeded thither. I worked up to 20 knots and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be H.I.C.M.S. "Emden" coming towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot.

I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very rapid and accurate to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately.

First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Kelling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action.

2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action, I had not fired, and as she was making off fast, I pursued and overtook her at 12.10 firing a gun across her bows and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat and found her to be S.S. "Buresk", a captured British collier with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English Steward, 1 Norwegian Cook, and a German prize crew of 3 officers, 1 Warrant Officer and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking, the kingston knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so I took all on board, fired 4 shells into her and returned to the "Emden" passing men swimming in the water for whom I left 2 boats I was towing from "Buresk".

3. On arriving again off "Emden" she still had her colours up at the mainmast head. I enquired by signal Internal Code "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse "What signal" to signal books". I then made in Morse "Do you surrender" and subsequently "Have you received my signal" to neither of which did I get an answer. The German Officers on board gave me to understand that the Captain would never surrender, and therefore, tho' very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m. ceasing at 4.35 p.m. as she showed white flag and hauled down her ensign by sending a man aloft.

4. I then left the "Emden" and returned and picked up the "Buresk's" two boats, rescuing 2 sailors (5 p.m.) who had been in the water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to "Emden" manned by her own prize crew from "Buresk" and 1 officer and stating I would return to their assistance next morning.

This I had to do as I was desirous to find out the condition of cables and wireless station at Direction Island.

On the passage over I was again delayed by rescuing another sailor (6.30 p.m.) and by the time I was again ready and approaching Direction Island it was too late for the night.

5. I lay on and off all night and communicated with Direction Island at 8 a.m. 10th November to find that the "Emden" party consisting of 3 officers and 40 men, 1 launch and two cutters had siezed and provisioned a 70 tons schooner (the "Ayasha") having 4 maxims with 2 belts to each. They left the previous night at six o'clock. The wireless station was entirely destroyed, 1 cable cut, 1 damaged, and 1 intact. I borrowed a Doctor and 2 Assistants, and proceeded as fast as possible to "Emden" assistance.

6. I sent an officer on board to see the Captain and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of accommodation, etc., on this ship and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his officers and men and all wounded, then as for such time as they remained in "Sydney" they would cause no interference with ship or fittings and would be amenable to the ship's discipline. I therefore set to work at once to tranship them - a most difficult operation, the ship being on the weather side of Island and the sea alongside very heavy. The conditions in the "Emden" were indescribable. I received the last from her at 5 p.m. then had to go round to the lee-side to pick up 20 more men who had managed to get ashore from the ship.

7. Darkness came on before this could be accomplished and the ship again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5 a.m. on 11th November, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring wounded round to embarking point. A German officer, a doctor, died ashore the previous day. The ship in the meantime ran over to Direction Island, to return their Doctor and assistants, send cables, and was back again at 10 a.m., embarked the remainder of wounded and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m., Wed., 11th November.

8. Total casualties in "Sydney" - killed 3, severely wounded (since dead) 1, severely wounded 4, wounded 4, slightly wounded 4.

9. The damage to "Sydney's" hull and fittings was surprisingly small; in all about 10 hits seem to have been made. The engine and boiler rooms and funnels escaped entirely.

(Here paras. 10 to 12 inc. have been deleted from this report published in a supplement to the London Gazette of 29th Dec., 1914, and these will only be available when the original report is found.)

(Missing paras. deal with the effect of gun fire of both "Sydney" and "Emden").

ORGANIZATION OF CONVOY.

Extract from "Convoy Naval Orders" issued by A. Gordon Smith, Captain in charge of Convoy.

C. N. O. 9

The convoy will be organised as follows :

1st Division.

Distinguishing Signals	Transport No.	Fleet No.	Name	Tonnage	Speed
(Flag of G. O. C.)					
AVB.	A3	1	Orvieto	12130	15
AVC.	A27	2	Southern	4769	10½
AVD.	A4	3	Pera	7635	11
AVE.	A26	4	Armadale	6153	11
AVF.	A12	5	Saldanha	4594	11
AVG.	A13	6	Katuna	4641	11
AVH.	A1	7	Kymettus	4606	11½
AVI.	A23	8	Suffolk	7573	12
AVJ	A25	9	Anglo-Egyptian	7379	12

2nd Division.

			(Division Leader)		
AWB.	A18	10	Wiltshire	10390	14
AWC.	A7	11	Medic	12032	13
AWD.	A11	12	Ascanius	10048	13
AWE.	A15	13	Star of England	9150	13½
AWF.	A2	14	Geelong	2951	12
AWG.	A17	15	Port Lincoln	7243	12
AWH.	A10	16	Karoo	6127	12
AWI.	A21	17	Marere	6443	12½
AWJ.	A6	18	Clan MacCorquodale	5058	12½

			(Division Leader)		
AXB.	A14	19	Euripides	14947	15
AXC.	A8	20	Argyllshire	10392	14
AXD.	A9	21	Shropshire	11911	14
AXE.	A19	22	Afric.	11999	13
AXF.	A24	23	Benalla	11118	14
AXG.	A22	24	Rangatira	10118	14
AXH.	A16	25	Star of Victoria	9152	13½
AXI.	A20	26	Hororata	9491	14
AXJ.	A5	27	Omrah	8130	15
AXK.	A28	28	Miltiades	7814	13

C. N. O. 10.

(Extracts)

General procedure of Convoy:

1. The convoy will proceed at sea in three divisions. The first division in the centre, the second division to port, and the third division to starboard of the first division.
2. Divisions include as far as possible ships of equal speed, first Division the slowest and the 3rd Division the fastest vessels.
3. Leaders of divisions will be abeam of the "Orvieto" and one mile distant unless otherwise ordered.

From C. N. O. 46

The "Orviato" will be considered the "Guide of the Fleet". That is, she will maintain a steady course and speed with which other ships are to conform.

C. N. O. 40

New Zealand Transports.

1st Division.

No.	Ship	Speed.	Tonnage	Master or Naval Tpt. Ofcr.
3	Maunganui	16	7527	Com. Ward, R.N.
6.	Orari	13	7207	Lt. Jenkins, R.N.R.
8	Star of India	11	6800	Lt. Varian, R.N.R.
7	Limerick	13	6827	Lt. Williams, R.N.R.
4	Tahiti	17	7585	Lt. Com. Denniston, R.N.

2nd Division.

10	Arawa	12	9372	Com. Newton, R.N.
11	Athenic	12	12234	Lt. Porter, R.N.R.
9	Hawkes Bay	12	6800	Lt. Tonge, R.N.R.
5	Ruapehu	13	7885	Lt. Cooper, R.N.R.
12	Waimana	14	10389	Lt. Glenny, R.N.

The New Zealand Convoy of ten ships will follow astern of the Australian Convoy.

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(Details of other convoys are not yet available here at Committee of Impl. Defence as they are only abreast of work to end of 1914 and other telegrams and docketts are in a state of chaos - absolutely unsorted.)

(Logs of transports have no information of value owing to the fact that all Masters were instructed that logs must not contain anything likely to be of value to the enemy in the event of their falling into his hands.)

EXTRACTS FROM ADMIRALTY RECORDS AT COMMITTEE ^{FOR} OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

NAVAL CO-OPERATION WITH A.I.F. DARDANELLES.

EXTRACTS FROM NAVAL RECORDS.

Vol. I

3

Extracts from Admiralty Records at Committee of Imperial Defence.

Naval Co-operation with A.I.F. Dardanelles.

Extracts from Naval Records.

Owing to the fact that Turkish vessels of war were officered and partly manned by Germans, it was decided that if any such vessels issued from the Dardanelles in company with either "Goeben" or "Breslau" that they would be attacked.

Later too it was considered by the Admiralty that if Turkish vessels of war issued without the convoy of "Goeben" or "Breslau" they would be ordered to return, so long as there were German officers and men on board.

At 6.p.m. September, 26th 1914, a Turkish destroyer was stopped outside the Dardanelles and ordered to return, whereupon the Commandant Constantinople immediately ~~closed~~ ^{closed} the straits.

The Grand Vizier indicated later that if the Allied fleet, which had been lying off the entrance to the Dardanelles, were moved a little further from the entrance towards Lemnos, the straits would be reopened.

The fleet mentioned above was commanded by Vice Adml. Sackville H. Carden who was transferred from Adml. Supt. Malta Dock Yards on 20.9.14 to command of Squadron in Eastern Mediterranean succeeding Rear Adml. Ernest C.T. Troubridge C.B: C.M.G: M.V.O:

Vice Adml. Carden arrived at the Dardanelles 22nd September, 1914, and hoisted his flag on the "Indefatigable."

The other ships under his command were "Indomitable", "Warrior", "Defence", "Dublin", "Gloucester", "Blenheim", eleven destroyers, three submarines, One destroyer at Syra.

On 26.9.14 French Battleships "Suffern" and "Verite," arrived and reported to V/A. Carden.

On September 27th, the British Vice Consul Dardanelles reported following guns landed and sent to White cliffs near Dardanelles.

1	4 gun Battery	12 centimetre	Howitzers. (old pattern).
1	6 gun "	10.5 "	filed quick firing ^{How's} _{field} Lous.

On October 1st the British Vice Consul Dardanelles reported "An additional 16 Guns, 12 apparently howitzers, were landed at the Dardanelles on 30.9.14."

"Liman von Sanders Pasha and Staff have arrived at the Dardanelles to inspect."

On October 3rd Sir L. Mallet. ^{British} ~~But~~ Ambassador Constantinople advised that information from a usually reliable source led to inference that Dardanelles were now mined. Reason to suppose that mines were laid by Germans and their position unknown to Turks.

On October 17th Sir L. Mallet reported that since the end of September the following have reached Constantinople:- 6,900 cases of Mauser Ammunition; 540 cases Mauser rifles; thirteen trucks of War material exact contents unknown; and about 800,000 pounds in bar gold.

On October 14th according to Sir L. Mallet 4 more 12 centim howitzers were landed at Dardanelles and six (6) more of this or smaller calibre at Namazi. These guns came from Adrianople defences.

On October 29th a wireless message from the "Indefatigable" was received at Malta stating that a powerful new searchlight had been mounted on the cliffs about one mile to the North of Cape Helles.

On 29.10.14 the British Consul at Odessa reported that 2 or 3 torpedo boats had raided that part before dawn on 29th. Sank Russian Gunboat "DONETZ" in harbour. Part of crew Killed and Wounded. Russian Steamships "Vitiaz", Liacaref" and "Whanpav" damaged. French ship "Portugal" damaged; two of crew Killed, two Wounded. Town shelled; sugar factory damaged and some loss of life. Govr. states raiding vessels were Turkish.

Consequent to above and other Bombardments of unfortified Russian towns, an ultimatum was handed Turkey, expiring on 12 hours from 8.15.p.m. 30.10.14. The Ambassador left Constantinople on 31.10.14.

On 1.11.14 the Chief of Staff, Admlty. Adml. F.C.D. Sturdie drafted a plan which was approved by 1st Lord - Winston Churchill - for a bombardment of the forts at the Dardanelles.

Orders read, when sent to Adml. Carden, as follows:-

"Without risking the ships a demonstration is to be made by bombardment on the earliest suitable day, by your armoured ships and the two French Battleships against the forts at the Entrance of the Dardanelles at a range of 14,000 to 12,000 yards. The ships should keep under way, approaching as soon after daylight as possible, a retirement should be made before the fire from the forts becomes effective. The ships guns should outrange the older guns mounted in the forts. Latest information about shore guns herewith."

(Here follows particulars of position of guns).

Admiral Limpus Malta in acknowledging a copy of above telegram says on 2.11.14 "My knowledge of Turks leads me to think result would be reported widespread in Constantinople Allied fleets have attacked and have been repulsed with serious loss. Naturally, have no knowledge of plan, but it seems to me that first thing to free passage of straits is a land attack on forts on Asia side. Forces based on Adramyti Penedos Island and Lemnos would be needed."

A message giving the results of the bombardment was received on 3.11.14 from "Indefatigable."

"Demonstration bombardment carried out daylight Nov. 3rd. "Indefatigable." "Indomitable" fired 46 rounds 12 inch between them at Helles Fort. "Suffren" 13 rounds 12", "Verite" 30 rounds 8" at Fort KumKalesi. Forts replied. Some projectiles fell in the neighbourhood of the Squadron but only one alongside. No ships were hit. Material damage impossible to estimate but large explosion with dense volumes of black smoke occurred at Helles Fort, where it is considered that the magazine was hit, doing considerable damage, at Fort Seddul Bahr No. 3.

Range 13,000 yards."

It was reported by American "Steamer Indiana" which came out of entrance to Dardanelles on 4.11.14, that Helles and Seddul Bahr forts were in ruins.

On 5.11.14 the light cruiser watching the straits reported vessels coming down the Dardanelles and the submarines closed the entrance ready to attack. The Vessels turned out to be two Gunboats and two Torpedo Boats and B11. (Lt. Norman D. Holbrook) penetrated about 2 miles up the Dardanelles to attack them, but was observed when 2,000 yards away, when the Gunboats at once returned up the Dardanelles at full speed.

A further report from "Indefatigable" on 6.11.14 reported on Bombardment as follows:- "After first six rounds all salvoes from Battle Cruisers fell in or close to forts. Explosion in Seddul Bahr appeared to be very severe. This in conjunction with reports from "Indiana", makes it possible that all, or nearly all, guns in that fort are disabled. But the two new guns North of No. 1. are still intact. French ships fired short at first but improved and for latter half of run apparently made very good practice. Steamer "Indiana" came out close to Cape Helles side and was unable, therefore, to examine fort French ship had fired at. Activity observed at Helles yesterday and today. Two gunboats, two torpedo boats and a merchant vessel came down. They retired when our patrol began closing."

On 9.11.14 the "Indefatigable" was asked to report if it was seen how the enemy could be injured without undue risk or expenditure of ammunition.

The reply received on 12.11.14 said - "At present without using full charge with B.L. guns 12" there is not much that can be done. But I am endeavouring to locate guns near to Besika Bay which could be dealt with by reduced charges or smaller guns, and then Orkanich Forts enfiladed from a position near to East of Rabbit Island. Also it may be possible to attack number one and the new guns Cape Helles from a position to the North West. Observations with this view being made. The service of a seaplane would be valuable. Smyrna offers opportunity for operations in destroying guns West of Sanjak and then Sanjak Fort itself. This might be undertaken by French ships but sweeping would be necessary and the ships would be 100 miles from Dardanelles Patrol."

But to this 1st Lord telegraphed "You must keep a concentrated force off the Dardanelles to prevent egress of enemy. Subject to this make your proposals for injuring them."

During November changes to the fleet lying off the Dardanelles occurred as follows:-

On October 31st V/A of "Indefatigable" asked for 4 French Torpedo Boats burning coal and another 3 submarines.

On 1st November "Harpy" (destroyer) was sent by the "Indefatigable" to Salonika to arrange for passage of H.M. "Ambassador" at Constantinople, to Piraeus in French ship "Flandre", and "Gloucester" left for Aden, having been ordered there by Admlty.

The collier Hindustan in which anti-aircraft guns had been mounted, being used as submarine parent ship the Master was given a Commission as Lieut. R.N.R. and ship renamed Hindukoosh. Dated 5.11.14

On 7.11.14 Fanfare, sabrefache and ~~Pape~~^{Safe} joined fleet.

On 8.11.14 Beagle sailed for Malta.

On 11.11.14 French submarine "Faraday" and "Le Varrier" arrived.

On 15.11.14 French Battleship "Gaulois" arrived.

On 16.11.14 "Indefatigable" reported that the flag of Adml. Guepratte had been hoisted on "Gaulois".

On 17.11.14 "Suffren" sailed for Toulon and "Bulldog" for Malta.

On 18.11.14 "Beagle", "Pincher", "Rattlesnake" sailed for Malta and with "Bulldog" constitute first 4 Destroyers made available for North Sea under Admlty. instructions.

The vessels in Company of "Indefatigable" on 19.11.14 were thus "Indomitable", "Gaulois", "Verite", "Dublin", "Blenheim", "Wolverine", "Grampus", "Scorpion", "Renard", "Harpy", "Grasshopper", "Fanfare", "Sabretache", "Sape", "Hindukush", Three British, two French submarines.

On 19.11.14 Submarine "B9" sailed for Malta with collier "Amecus" to make good defects. *defects*

On 21.11.14 following arrived. "Savage", "Raccoon", "Basilisk", and French submarine "Circe" and The Indomitable sailed for Malta for refitting.

On 23.11.14 French Naval attache telegraphed Marine Bordeaux as follows:- "Admiralty (i.e. British) proposes to leave "Indefatigable" "Dublin" and three British submarines to watch the Dardanelles and ask you to replace "Indomitable" by two old Battleships for instance those used for convoying transports. Admiralty is extremely anxious to withdraw the destroyers from the Dardanelles in order to use them in the North Sea, if you can replace them."

On 23.11.14 "Indefatigable" reported "Foxhound" and "Mosquito" as being in her company but no details given of date of joining.

On 25.11.14 "Foxhound" and "Savage" sailed for Malta.

On 26.11.14 "Saint Louis" and "Charlemagne" both French arrived.

On 27.11.14. "Pirgnard", "Cognes" and "Trident" all French arrived.

On 30.11.14 "Grasshopper" sailed for Malta.

Under date 5.12.14 "Indefatigable" advised "Basilisk" "Mosquito", "Grampus", "Grasshopper" going to Malta require docking and small important defects made good, such as line up shafts - time required 4 days each. Should work be done.

C-in-C states he cannot send me any more destroyers but perhaps "FOUORE" as depot ship; one is absolutely necessary. When destroyer "Sape" returns from Malta the total will be 6 of old type weak gun power and his boilers; they will be quite inadequate to maintain an efficient watch on Dardanelles and also to take certain precautions, especially during Winter and with only one light cruiser which cannot always be in support. Turkish destroyers could drive them off. Enemy can easily observe the reduction of our force. Also there is the question of Submarine menace (information that construction of submarines at Constantinople had been proceeding, was being reported from many sources) I consider 6 destroyers absolutely necessary in addition to 6 French destroyers and that "Blenheim" should be retained, as "Foudre" is so inferior."

On 6.12.14 "Basilisk" left the squadron for Malta.

On 7.12.14 Submarine "B9" rejoined Squadron from Malta.

On 10.12.14 "Grasshopper" rejoined Squadron.

On 13.12.14 the following message was received from "Indefatigable". "Submarine B11 - Lt. N.D. Holbrook - which had been fitted by "Blenheim" with special guards to bow tube and other projections dived this afternoon under 5 rows of mines laid completely across the Dardanelles and torpedoed "Messudiyeh" which was moored with head and stern in Sarisiglar Bay for defence of mine fields. She

opened fire with at least 8 guns. Submarine B11. not hit. When last seen ship was settling by stern. B11. then returned dived again under mine field. She was chased by a torpedo boat and was submerged for nine hours. The strong adverse current greatly increased danger of Service. B11 selected as being in most efficient condition of battery. French submarines unsuitable as no guard to their twin screws."

As a result the Commander Lt. N. D. Holbrook was awarded the V. C. his 2nd in Command Lt. Sidney Winn the D. S. O. "Every member of the B11" telegraphed First Lord - Winston Churchill - " will receive the D. S. O. or D. S. M. according to rank. The Captain is singled out for the V. C. because the whole conduct of the boat lay in his hands alone and success depended on his judgment."

On 14.12.14 "Scorpion" left for Malta and "Courtelas" (French) arrived.

On 17.12.14 "Basilisk" rejoined squadron.

On 18.12.14 the "Indefatigable" forwarded the following W/T message "Suggest possible feasibility of attack by an E Class submarine or late type French Submarine boat as far as Constantinople if fitted with efficient guard vertically and horizontally in order to pass under the mine fields which consist of five rows across straits abreast of KEPHEZ covering one and a half miles in depth and one row just below the narrows, Chanak."

Consequently Marine Paris, i.e. French Admlty. were advised what the Adml. "Indefatigable" suggested, and as British Admlty. were unable to withdraw any large submarines from the North Sea, they proposed that the French should undertake the operation.

On 20.12.14 "Indefatigable" reported "arrived at Dardanelles" "Amiral Charner" for exclusive service at Smyrna patrol, and "Bivert." "Verite" departed for Malta." "Foudre" arrived for exclusive service at Dedeagatch patrolling.

On 21.12.14 "Indefatigable" advised by W/T as follows:- "Two additional searchlights placed in Dardanelles at HOZI HISARLIK and between KEPHEZ POINT AND AREN KIOI.

On 23.12.14 a gig from "FANFARE" while proceeding to examine suspicious boat close inshore in EIOUKERI BAY, was fired on by Turkish soldier. In gigs crew 1 man Killed, 2 wounded, one dangerously.

On 24.12.14 "HUSSAR" left Syra for Malta to embark Sir H. MacMahon and convey him to Alexandria.

On 25.12.14 "Indefatigable" in acknowledging receipt of telegram advising possibility of attack by Turkish Gunboats stated "in view of operations being carried out on coast of Syria, submit if exchange of destroyers river for G class is carried out, the Turkish Flotilla with two gunboats Flotilla leaders "will have a superiority of gun fire over whole allied flotilla would have also Practical superiority in speed 4 destroyers 28 knots, 4 distroyers, 25 knots against River dual nationality which is accentuated in co-operation with smaller craft. The bases of our position lies a close blockade by our destroyers and submarine boats which would endanger weaker units. Enemy passes gunfire against day attack by Turkish flotilla thus preventing subsequent operations of Turkish torpedo boats against Capital ships and depot ships and possible use of Smyrna as torpedo base. This accentuates necessity of retaining present powerful destroyers and better still to substitute river class for French T. B. D's, latter need constant repairs; this will also ensure co-operation and render depot ship immune from attack. It is impossible to dispense with "Blenheim" and keep destroyers and submarine boats efficient 700 miles from dockyard."

On 26.12.14 "Wolverine" left for Malta.

Numerical Superiority. I consider it imperative to have numerical superiority of

On 26.12.14 it was learned from a message intercepted from Athens and emanating from a good source that the Turks, fearing the forcing of the Dardanelles were arranging for early transport of heavy artillery from Adrianople to San Stephane and Kadikioi.

On 27.12.14 the British Ambassador at Athens (Sir F. Elliott) reported that the Greek Govt. learned from Dedeagatch and from Constantinople that all heavy guns had been removed from Adrianople and were being mounted in Chatalja lines and at San Stephane and Kadikioi.

Movements of Guns and Troops December 14th.

On 29.12.14 the following telegram was received from the British Ambassador, Athens, "Greek Government have received following from Constantinople dated 24th December. Four howitzers and eight field guns with gunners and five Battalions Infantry were moved from Adrianople December 22nd and 23rd. Heavy guns are being sent from Kadikeni to Gallipoli. Fifteen trucks have been sent to Kadikeui and forty to Adrianople to fetch guns for defence of Constantinople.

First Regt. of XI Divn. has arrived at Paderma where two other Regts are expected.

On December 20th 4 Howitzers were taken from Adrianople to Paderma and thence by rail to an unknown destination. Whole of V Corps seems to have left for Posanti (?) probably eventually for Syria."

"12th Division is being brought back from BLEIKESSE to Paderma for defence of Dardanelles."

Forcing the Dardanelles.

On 3.1.15 First Lord - Winsten Churchill - telegraphed Adml. Carden as follows "Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone a practical operation.

It is assumed older Battleship fitted with mine bumpers would be used preceded by colliers or other merchant craft as bumpers and sweepers.

Importance of results would justify severe loss. Let me know your views."

On 5.1.15 Adml. Carden replied as follows:- "I do not consider Dardanelles can be rushed.

They might be forced by extended operations with large number of ships."

Note on forcing the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus by the Allied fleets, in order to destroy the Turks - German Squadron and threaten Constantinople without military co-operation.

This note was written by Adml. Sir H. B. Jackson who was Principal adviser to the Chief of Staff (Adml. Sturdie) and practically acted as a second C of S. He succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord in 1915.

"1. The strength of the enemy fleet that has to be encountered consists of 1 Battle cruiser, 2 Battleships, 3 Light cruisers, 2 Torpedo Gun Boats, 9 T.B.D. , 9 Torpedo Boats, 6 Minelayers, and some Gunboats.

Each of the squadrons conveying ^{new} on Constantinople should be capable of engaging these at an advantage, after passing the shore batteries. The Russian Black Sea Squadron is hardly equal to this task, even if it met them before passing the Batteries of the Bosphorus. It would, therefore, preferably wait for the Allied French and British Squadrons, preventing the escape of the enemy into the Black Sea, should they attempt this.

Consequently the French and British squadrons must arrive at Constantinople in sufficient force to engage the enemy squadron, and also dominate the situation at Constantinople. The least that can do this would be 1 Battle Cruiser, a Battle Squadron (8), with cruisers and torpedo craft in proportion.

2. Assuming the enemy squadron destroyed and the batteries rushed, they would be open to the fire of field artillery and infantry, and to torpedo attack at night, with no store ships with communication, and no retreat without reengaging the shore batteries, unless these had been destroyed when forcing the passage.

Though they might dominate the city and inflict enormous damage, their position would not be an enviable one unless there were a large military force to occupy the town.

3. Strategically, such a diversion would only be carried out when the object to be gained was commensurate with the loss the Fleet would sustain in forcing the passage.

The actual capture of Constantinople would be worth a considerable loss, but its bombardment alone would not greatly affect the distant military operations, and even if it surrendered, it could not be occupied and held without troops and would probably result in indiscriminate massacres.

2. Scheme for rushing the passage.

4. The attack should be as much in the nature of a surprise attack as possible, but before this is attempted, it is most desirable the guns mounted in the defences at the entrance be entirely demolished, in order to lessen the losses to the attacking squadron. This would necessitate a much more determined attack on these forts than was carried out in November last, and the landing of demolition parties with gun cotton or thermit to actually destroy the guns. The 20 heavy guns mounted in the 7 forts at the entrance are old and short range guns, and most could probably be put out of action by long range fire before closing the Forts and subjecting them to a searching fire at moderate range. Some losses, however, must be expected.

5. When these outer forts are entirely silenced, armoured ships could enter the straits subject only to fire from Field Artillery, and the damage from mines and torpedo attacks. A line of retreat from the narrows would be open to them, and this is a point of great importance for future operations, as ships injured and not under control before reaching the narrows, would drift in the strong S.W. current to the Mediterranean without being subject to heavy hostile fire, and the destruction of these outer forts would be a gain of about 10 miles ⁱⁿ and the 35 miles of dangerous water to be passed through.

Their destruction would also simplify the operation of the blockade of the straits, in reducing the area to be watched, and is an operation well worth serious consideration.

6. Assuming the outer defences have been permanently silenced, the waters of the straits as far up towards the narrows as possible, should be swept for mines. There are occasionally foggy nights in winter, and one of these should be selected for the passage of the straits. The squadron should be preceded by Mine Sweepers as long as they remain afloat, and the attack should be as much a surprise as possible.

The distance under heavy fire in the narrows will be about 12 miles - say 1 hour's steaming against the current. The passage may be divided into three phases: the approach; the close engagement; and the retirement up the straits; during the latter, intermittent fire from batteries more isolated than they are at the

narrows, will have to be met.

7. (a) The approach. During the approach to the narrows the following guns, according to our Intelligence reports, could be brought to bear on the Fleet.

5	14"
3	11"
12	9.45"
2	8.24"
<u>13</u>	6"

Total. 35.
=====

Presuming that fire is opened at 6,000 yards, and that the average rate of fire is 1 round per minute per gun of 8.24", and above and 3 rounds per minute from the 6" guns, and that the speed over the ground is 12 knots, 330 heavy projectiles and 585 6" shell could be fired at the Fleet, which would have to be in formation of single line, or nearly so, preventing the rear ships from taking much part in the engagement.

If only 10% of these were hits, ie above 90, it is evident that several ships must sustain severe injuries from gun fire alone besides the possibility of loss from mines.

The mine sweepers would probably be all sunk, the two leading ships out of action and some others severely damaged.

(b) The passage of the "Narrows" would probably take 10 minutes, and the forts are passed at a range of about 1000 yards, so that a larger percentage of hits should be scored per gun - say 20% , but for 10 instead of 15 minutes.

The actual number of guns is also greater.

The guns bearing are:-

6	14"
1	11"
5	9.45"
9	9.2"
1	8.24"
6	8" hows.
11	6" guns
2	6" hows.
<u>Total. 41.</u>	

=====

On this basis the hits would be 130 in number if the fire could be maintained, but the secondary armament of the leading ships should with luck greatly reduce the volume of fire that would be directed on the rear vessels. Probably 3 more ships would be hors de combat, and allmore or less damaged.

(c) In the retirement up the straits, at ever increasing range for say 25 minutes _

2	10.24"
5.	9.2"
12	6 "

could be brought to bear in succession, and would increase the injuries to the fleet, especially to the rear ships, they would probably account for another vessel.

(8) From the above rough estimate, the risk to a battle squadron rushing the straits under favorable circumstances can be

approximated. I have put it at 6 ships

approximated. I have put it at 6 ships out of the 8, hors de combat, and the other two severely damaged. On the other hand, much damage would have been inflicted on the forts; and a second squadron following closely on the heels of the first, and in the same channel, might get through with much less damage. Light Cruisers and other unarmoured craft, must be expected to suffer more heavily, and would follow the two squadrons at their highest speed.

(9) It may be deduced that it would be unwise to attempt the operation with less than 2 complete battle squadrons, and 2 cruiser squadrons to give any chance of meeting the enemy squadron at an advantage, and dominating the city of Constantinople; and it is open to consideration whether the attempt should not preferably be preceded by long range bombardment of the forts in the "narrows" as at the Entrance so as to reduce the volume of fire in the approach.

(10) A methodical bombardment would entail the expenditure of a large amount of ammunition and wear of heavy guns, and also some losses, but it would enable the attacking squadron to replenish before making the passage and to start fair from the "Narrows", and expend much less ammunition during the last rush, and then be in a better position to engage the enemy naval forces. It may be reasonably expected their forces would endeavour to meet our squadron as it emerged from the Straits into the Sea of Marmara before we had time to reform in that Sea and recover from the effects of the fire of the batteries.

To arrive off Constantinople with depleted magazines and ships almost out of action from gun fire, and with shore batteries still intact both in front and rear, would be a fatal error and tend to annul the effect of the appearance of the squadron, as soon as its real state was known.."

(Sgd). H. B. Jackson. Adml.

Under the date 3.9.14 a criticism of a purely naval operation, as outlined above, was written by Genl. C.E. Callwell, Director of Military Operations at the War Office. In it, apparently lies the germ of the idea which led to the Gallipoli Campaign.

"It ought to be clearly understood that an attack upon the Gallipoli Peninsula from the sea side (outside the straits) is likely to prove an extremely difficult operation of War. The subject has often been considered before by the General Staff and it was examined in- to by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1906; it was then decided that such an operation could not be regarded as feasible with the British troops that might, at short notice, have been collected for the purpose, at that time. Since then the garrison has been greatly augmented and as a consequence of threats on the part of Greeks and Bulgarians during the first Balkan War, and of the attack made upon the Lines of Bulair, the protection of the rear of the various batteries and works dominating the Straits, was taken in hand.

It is understood that what was then done renders them secure against anything in the nature of a surprise attack.

The Garrison of the Peninsula now normally consists of an Army Corps which may be taken at 27,000 men with 136 guns. But under existing conditions this garrison will almost certainly have been strengthened considerably, and it would be unsafe to assume that the attacking side would only have the above number to deal with. In any case, it would not seem justifiable to undertake an operation of this kind with an army of less than 60,000 men against the Ottoman Forces likely to be encountered. These 60,000 might, however, cross the sea in two echelons, admitting of the transports returning to Greece after disembarking the first echelon. The

expeditionary force could dispense almost entirely, if not entirely, with cavalry, and its mobile artillery might well be composed mainly of Mountain Batteries. It ought, however, to be accompanied by a strong contingent of siege pieces especially howitzers for attacking the batteries and forts bearing on the straits, which are the real objective; but unfortunately, the Greeks don't seem to have any howitzers and very few siege guns. It has to be remembered that there is nothing to prevent the Turks bringing strong reinforcements to the Gallipoli Peninsula from Constantinople, Panderma and elsewhere across the sea of Marmora, until such time as it becomes impracticable for them to disembark such troops within the Peninsula. There is a division - Say 6,000 men - normally stationed on the Asiatic side of the Straits which could get across at the very start if there were a few steamers and launches available at Canak. Moreover a report just to hand says that there is now an Army Corps assembled on the Asiatic side. As a rough outline of the plan of attack, it is suggested that in the first instance 30,000 men should be landed, should gain as much ground as possible, and, should prepare landing stages, while the transports return for the other 30,000 and the siege ordnance. The first 30,000 would have to be prepared to hold their own for about a week, allowing for the time taken on the voyage and in getting the transports loaded up afresh at the port of embarkation. But the actual details would, of course, have to be worked out by the General appointed to Command the Expeditionary Force. It is not unlikely that the Greek War Office and Admiralty are in possession of later information as to the conditions of the land defences of the Gallipoli Peninsula than we are."

(Sgd). C.E. Callwell,
D.M.O.

TURKISH PREPARATIONS.

On January 5th 1915, the British Ambassador at Athens sent the following message to Adml. Carden.

"Russian Naval Attache furnishes following information believed to be trustworthy.

Germans have laid about 70 mines at Entrance to Dardanelles of which mine exploded while being laid. They gave out that forts at entrance were entirely destroyed by bombardment, in order that Allied squadrons may be induced to enter new minefields. They have quantities of floating mines ready for use as required.

New forts have been erected at Kada Tepe. At Perenovassi and Chanaovassi in a valley behind a crescent shaped hill-ock there are respectively 1,000 and 2,000 troops. On the south side of the Dardanelles behind white cliffs there are six 6" guns. Further south near Arenkisi are German Artillerymen for these guns and also field guns.

There are torpedo ^{hibes} at Nanazieh, Chanak, Kalessi, Kephes Point, Suandere, Kum Kale, and Sedil Bahr.

All above places are marked on Admlty. chart.

On 8.1.15 V/A Lewis Bayley V/A Cmdy. Channel Fleet No. 34 forwarded to the Admlty, a plan of attack on the Dardanelles and Constantinople, to be undertaken by his Squadron. The squadrons duties should be, he suggested (a) To destroy the Turkish fleet (b) to prevent transportation of troops from Europe to Asia and vice versa.

(c) to clear the Dardanelles of Mines (d) to assist Russia to transport troops across the Black Sea. He also pointed out that the feeling in his squadron was that they were merely being used as bait to entice the enemy out, when a more powerful squadron would attack them and confidently asserted that some active operations as he described given them would entirely remove any despondent feeling and give them that self confidence with they are otherwise likely to lose "But which, at present, is sufficient, to carry them to victory."

MOVEMENTS OF SHIPS UNDER ADML. CARDEN.

9.1.15 "Indefatigable" sent wireless message advising SUFFREN, SAPHIR, PIOCHE joined squadron (French).

On 11.1.15 V/A Carden sent following telegram about the naval operations to be commenced at the Dardanelles.

"Possibility of operations.

- (a) Total reduction of defences at the entrance.
- (b) Clear defences inside of straits upto and including Cepheg Point Battery No. 8.
- (c) Reduction of defences at the Narrows Chanak.
- (d) Clear passage through minefield advancing through Narrows reducing forts above Narrows and final advance to Marmara.

Term defences includes permanent, semi permanent and field works also guns or howitzers whose positions are not yet known.

Whilst A and B are being carried out a Battleship Force would be employed in demonstration and bombardment of Bulair line and coast and reduction of Battery near Gaba Tepe. Force required 12 Battleships of which four fitted with mine bumpers. Three Battle cruisers. Two should be available on entering Marmara. Three light cruisers. One flotilla leader, sixteen destroyers, one depot repairing ship, six submarines, four seaplanes and the "Foudre". Twelve mine-sweepers, one Hospital ship, six colliers at Tenedos Island, two supply and ammunition ships, The above force allows for casualties.

Details of action.

Frequent reconnaissance by seaplanes indispensable.

(a). Indirect bombardment of forts. Reduction completed by direct bombardment at decisive range. Torpedo tubes at the entrance and a gun commanding minefield destroyed; minefield cleared.

(b). Battleships preceded by mine sweepers enter straits working way up till position reached from which battery No. 8. can be silenced.

(c) Severe Bombardment of forts by battle cruisers from Gaba Tepe spotted from Battleships, reduction completed by direct fire at decisive range.

(d) Battleships preceded by sweepers making way up towards Narrows. Forts 22 23 24 first bombarded from Gaba Tepe, spotting for 22 by seaplanes, then direct fire. Sweep minefields in Narrows, the fort at Nagara reduced by direct fire, battle force proceeds to Marmara preceded by mine sweepers.

Expenditure on ammunition for C would be large but if supplies sufficient, result should be successful. Difficulty as to B greatly increased of "Goeben" assisting defence from Nagara. It would, unless submarine attacks, successful, necessitate employment of battle cruisers from Gaba Tepe or direct.

Time required for operations depends greatly on morale of enemy under bombardment, garrison ^{largely} ~~layely~~.

"Stiffened by Germans, also on the weather conditions. Gales now frequent. Might do it all in a month about. Expenditure of ammunition would be large. Approximate estimate of quantity required being prepared.

Disposition of Squadron on completion of operations.

Marmara 2 battle cruisers, 4 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 1 flotilla leader, 12 TB destroyers, 3 submarines, 1 supply and ammunition ship, 4 mine sweepers, collier,

Remainder of force keeping straits open and covering mine sweepers completing clearly minefield."

On this report, V/Z Sir H.B. Jackson, wrote a memorandum on 15.1.15, concurring with the plans generally as drawn up by V/A Carden and pointing out that it differed from his own merely in small detail.

In estimating the amount of ammunition required, he took the November 14th bombardment as a comparison, and found an average of 10 rounds per gun would probably be required at extreme range.

From this he deducts a total of 3,000 shells would be used on the primary armaments and 3,000 on the secondary armaments.

He also pointed out that during the previous bombardment shells from the forts fell along our Battle cruisers at a range of 12,300 yards and therefore considered that in the early stages it imprudent to close to less than 13,000 yards.

He sums up that in his estimation the operation should not be attempted unless we are prepared to expend the 6,000 rounds referred to above, besides the loss of some vessels.

He suggest "A" should be approved at once for the value of its experience and it should be carried out under favorable light conditions and continued, with spotting ships, until all guns at the entrance are permanently silenced.

On 12.1.15 the COUTELAS (French destroyer) left V/A Carden's squadron for Malta.

On 12/1/15 the first Lord wired V/A Carden asking if he meant by Battle Cruisers, Dreadnaughts" with modern guns, but high speed not essential. Also asking him to consider the effect of using "Queen Elizabeth" 15 guns for A. B. & C, their power, accuracy and range far exceeding any other weapons.

On same day - 12.1.15 Indefatigable reported that H.M.S. "COLNE" and "JED" joined the squadron.

On 13.1.15 V/A Carden replied to First Lords query as above, that high speed was considered necessary for meeting the "Goeben" in Marmora, that the "Queen Elizabeth" was very desirable and should certainly shorten operations. He estimated there were a total of 330 mines in various parts of Dardanelles, in eight lines.

On 15.1.15 the First Lord telegraphed V/A Carden as follows:- "Your scheme was laid by the First Sea Lord and myself, before the War Cabinet Council yesterday, and was approved in principle. We see no difficulty in providing the force you require including the "Queen Elizabeth" by the 15th Feby.

We entirely agree with your plan of methodical

piecemeal reduction of forts as the Germans did at Antwerp. We propose to entrust this operation to you. Adml. de Robeck will be your second in command. The sooner we can begin the better. You will shortly receive the official instructions of the Board. Continue to perfect your plans."

On 15.1.15 V/Z Carden sent the following message "First Lord. Secret and personal. Submit two howitzers or Naval Guns adopted high angle fire of from 4 to 6 inches calibre be fitted in each of three old type battleships for use inside the straits against concealed guns. A total of 6 howitzers."

MOVEMENTS OF VESSELS.

16.1.15 reported that Submarine CIRCLE (French) left for Malta in tow of supply ship No. 13.
GRAMPUS rejoined squadron.

17.1.15 MOSQUITO sailed for Malta to refit.
HUSSAR, WELLAND, CHELMER, KENNET joined squadron.

Indefatigable reported that on 15.1.15 a light Gun concealed near Gheijikle fired on destroyer patrol south east of Tenedos.

On 16.1.15 DUBLIN shelled position result uncertain.
No casualties or damage to allies' ships.

LOSS OF FRENCH SUBMARINE "SAPHIR."

On 15.1.15 French Submarine SAPHIR proceeded up Dardanelles. By German Press telegram she appears to have struck mine and sunk, some of crew saved. It was the first morning that submarine had been on patrol and commander was evidently too keen to emulate the feats of the British Boat. All submarines had been given orders not to enter Dardanelles without permission unless enemy was sighted.

REQUEST FOR FRENCH MINE SWEEPERS.

On 19.1.15 the French Naval attache, telegraphed MARINE Paris, asking if they would assist British Admiralty with some two dozen French sweeps, if crews would be sufficiently trained in about 3 weeks time when operation for which they are requested, should take place.

APPOINTMENT OF ADML. de ROBECK AS 2nd IN COMMAND.

On 22.1.15 Rear Adml. de Robeck was telegraphed as follows:- Your services will be required temporarily in the Mediterranean during some operations which will shortly take place. You will act as second in command to Vice Adml. Carden.

Transfer your present command to Senior Captain and transfer your flag to "Vengeance" at Gibraltar when she arrives there about 31st Jany. "Vengeance" will convey you to Malta when your flag can be shifted to such other ship as Adml. Carden may direct. Acknowledge."

On 24.1.15 "Indefatigable" was advised as follows:- "When "Inflexible" arrives transfer your flag to her and send "Indefatigable" to refit. If you require to be at Malta to make preparations, you must wait until relieved by de Robeck who will have temporary rank of Vice Adml. It is imperative that British retain command of Dardanelles and continually retain a battle cruiser and a Vice Adml."

On same day a request was made by "Indefatigable" for two gas buoys flash or occulting with different intervals ready charged with gas, as when Turkish searchlights at entrance to Dardanelles were destroyed, there would be nothing to keep vessels clear of shoals to North of Rabbit Island.

MOVEMENTS OF VESSELS.

24.1.15 "Inflexible" arrived Medit. detached Squadron "Hussar" left for Malta.

EQUIPPING VESSELS FOR OPERATION.

On 25.1.15 First Lord telegraphed V/A Carden repeating the necessity for a V/A and a cruiser being continually at Dardanelles. He also advised that he expected V/A "to formulate all requests for minesweepers, mine bumpers and all special appliances in the greatest possible detail, Malta must execute them if possible but we will supplement her resources from England. This is a great opportunity and you must concentrate absolutely upon it. Sir H.B. Jackson, who examined for the Board, all Naval questions connected with the East, is in general agreement with your plans. You should telegraph fully for everything you want that cannot be supplied locally. Every effort is being made to accelerate the departure of "Queen Elizabeth". Official orders will reach you in due course."

MOVEMENTS OF FLAGSHIP AND ADML.

26.1.15 from V/A "Indefatigable." "Have shifted flag to Inflexible. "Indefatigable" leaving for Malta. Due there daylight 27th."

MINE SWEEPERS.

26.1.15 Following from "Inflexible." "Request I may be informed what officers will be sent out in charge of mine sweepers and that the senior may arrive at Malta as soon as possible. In addition to those carried by minesweepers 100 Dan buoys and 50 Munro buoys are required, fitted with moorings suitable for buoying channel between the Sea and Nagara Point to be sent out in supply ship. Can we use Mudros Bay. It would be a great advantage, specially for small craft.

COMMANDERS OF MINESWEEPERS.

On 27.1.15 following Message was sent to V/A "Inflexible" Officers in charge of minesweepers will be:-

Commander	Mellor	R.N.
Lieut.	Pitts	R.N.R.
"	Whitehouse	R.N.R.
Boatswain	Lee	R.N.

Dan & Munro Buoys will be sent.

Reply about Mudros later.

EQUIPMENT OF SEAPLANES.

On 28/1/15 By W/T from "Inflexible" Request seaplanes bring out full supply of appliances for dropping messages and indicating position of guns. Also moderate supply of Bombs.

MOVEMENTS.

28.1.15 "Ribble" joined squadron.

Admlty ordered "Indefatigable" will be permanently relieved by "Inflexible" and should proceed to England on completion of refit."

29.1.15 Following message was sent "Inflexible."

"The following ships will be sent to Mediterranean.
"Queen Elizabeth" from England.
Triumph from Egypt.
Swiftsure " "
Cornwallis " Bay of Biscay.
Irrestible " England.
Ocean " Egypt.
Albion On passage to Medtn.
Canopies do
Vengeance do
Majestic from England.
Prince George do
Doris " Egypt.
Amethyst On passage.
Sapphire do
Ark Royal Seaplane carrier.
Wear from Gibraltar
2 B Class Submarines from Gibraltar
Submarine A.E.2.
21 Mine sweeping Trawlers
Nimrod Yacht in charge of Trawlers.

SUBMARINES.

29.1.15 By W/T from "Inflexible" "Request that submarine A.E.2 may be sent to Dardanelles due to loss of SAPHIR B10. and CIRCLE being away for long refit my submarines now reduced to 4 - 2 French, 2 British, - of these B11. now has defects to Hydroplanes which make diving uncertain. Needs six days refit in dock at once. I am now asking C in C for one in place of B11 but I believe he is short. Anyhow presence of A.E.2. may open up opportunity of attacking in the Marmora."

1.2.15 By W/T from "Inflexible." " B11. left for Malta Submarine boats here now reduced to 3. One on patrol at a time. C in C informs me he cannot spare any."

HOSPITAL SHIP.

2.2.15 Admlty. to "Inflexible." "The Hospital ship "Soudan" will be sent to Mediterranean. Sailing about 7th inst.

DELAY TO OPERATIONS.

3.2.15 From "Inflexible" by W/T. "Weather conditions at present render operations certainly in the first phases impracticable. All January with the exception of three days, it blew from S.W. now heavy N.E. gale with snow and rain, expect more favorable weather towards the end of February.

MOVEMENTS.

5.2.15 From "Inflexible" by W/T. "Hussar" "Mosquito." "Usk" and Submarine AE2 arrived."

OPERATION.

6.2.15. First Lord sent following message to Adml. Supt. Malta. "Pass following to "Inflexible for Adml. Carden. (begins) Secret and personal from First Lord. I am proposing to send out Commodore Keyes as your C. O. S.

Will this be agreeable to you . Telegraph reply.

Secondly. I wish you to keep me closely informed of the daily progress of these operations. Do not hesitate to send full reports by telegraph and let me know all your difficulties.

Thirdly. Are you getting all you want, and is everything progressing satisfactorily. I attach great importance to fire being opened punctually on the 15th by which time "Queen Elizabeth" should have arrived."

7.2.15 Following by W/T from "Inflexible."
"First Lord. Secret and personal from V/A Carden. Your 33, fully concur with appointment of Commodore Keyes. Should like Commander Escombe attached to my staff.

Messenger just arrived from C in C, indicates French battleships are taking part. It is necessary that they should have their own ~~gold~~ goldiers and fresh water supply, they are unable to ~~donderrse~~ condense sufficient..
condense

I have been getting from Malta weekly in our colliers, 600 tons of water for them. They are slow coaling. Fourteen French minesweepers are also coming. Request information which of our ships are being fitted with mine bumpers."

PROGRESS OF PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATIONS.

7.2.15. Following by W/T from "Inflexible."
For First Lord. Everything progressing well to make beginning on Feby. 15th."

TEMPORARY CHANGE IN COMMAND OF SQUADRON.

7.2.15. By W/T from "Inflexible." "Turned over to V/A de Robeck and left for Malta in "Racoon" which will have short refit.

V/A de Robeck shifted flag to "Inflexible."

"Vengeance" will relieve "Blenheim" at Tenedos Island. Captain D. remains in charge of Flotilla. "Blenheim" will dock, make good important defects Malta, can be back by the time she is required."

7.2.15 At the request of C in C Egypt. "MINERVA" was substituted for "DORIS".

FRENCH PREPARATIONS.

- 7.2.15 Marine Paris advised Admiralty thro' F.N.A.
- (1) Two minesweepers left Bizerta yesterday to Malta.
 - (2) One is leaving Toulton today.
 - (3) Ten will leave Toulton tomorrow and one will leave Bizerta on the 10th.
All have the Ronarch sweep and draw less than 10 ft. of water.
 - (4) A transport is at present loading ammunition for the ships that will take part in the operations. She will probably leave in three days time. Another transport will start loading on the 9th.

MOVEMENTS.

9.2.15 "Vengeance" left Squadron for Tenedos.

ANTICIPATED DELAY TO OPERATIONS.

9.2.15 From V/A Carden. "First Lord of the Admiralty .

Secret and personal.

We shall not be prepared to begin before 19th as minesweepers cannot be made ready sooner. For moral effect, to make real progress, and reduce expenditure of ammunition it is essential that operations should be continuous. The presence of mine sweepers is necessary for this. Seaplanes will be available by same date but not before."

MOVEMENTS.

10.2.15. By W/T from "Inflexible."
"Cornwallis" arrived. Have left in "Inflexible" for Tenedos.

10.2.15. To First Lord from V/A Carden.
Secret and personal.
"I have arranged that "Queen Elizabeth" now carrying out gunnery practice at Gibraltar, shall pick me up at a rendezvous South of Malta on 15th Feby. I shall arrive Tenedos A.M. 17th and commence operations 19th."

10.2.15 From Admlty. to V/A Carden. "Commander Douglas a surveyor of great experience is being sent out to assist in any surveying work required. He will be of assistance to you in calculating the positions of uncharted objects, which it is desired to place accurately on the charts and also in calculations and observations required for indirect fire."

PROPOSED OPERATIONS.

12.2.15. C.O.S. sent following to V/A Carden.
"Re proposed bombardment of Dardanelles. From N.I.D. 838 it appears some of the ports with heavy guns are open to long range bombardment from dead water in which ships could anchor with little danger from return fire and carry out deliberate bombardment on flank or rear of forts. Every advantage should be taken of this point in arranging plan of attack. Before commencing it should be ascertained if any additional defences fixed or moveable have been prepared by enemy, using aircraft and any other means at your disposal."

MOVEMENTS.

13.2.15 By W/T from "Inflexible."
"Cornwallis" has left for Tenedos relieving "Vengeance". "Inflexible" in harbour. "Charlomagne" has relieved "Dublin" until tomorrow. "Trident" sailed for Malta 2.0 p.m."

Ⓢ French Battleship. Ⓢ French destroyer.

15.2.15 From V/A "Inflexible."
"Owing to late arrival of "Queen Elizabeth," I propose to leave in "Albion" and Commence operations with ships available retaining "Inflexible" until arrival of "Queen Elizabeth".

15.2.15. By W/T from "Vengeance" "Triumph"
"Vengeance" arrived. V/A 2nd in command shifted flag to "Vengeance."

CO OPERATION OF ARMY IN PROPOSED NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Under date 13.2.15 Sir H.B. Jackson, adviser to C.O.S. in some "Notes on attack of Dardanelles Forts" places the following opinion on record:- "The provision of the necessary Military Forces to enable the fruits of this heavy naval undertaking to be gathered, must never be lost sight of; the transports carrying them should be in readiness to enter the straits as soon as it is seen the Forts at the Narrows will be silenced.

To complete their destruction, strong military landing parties with strong covering forces, will be necessary. It is considered, however, that the full advantage of the undertaking would only be obtained by the occupation of the Peninsula by a Military Force, acting in conjunction with the Naval operations; as the pressure of a strong field army of the enemy on the peninsula, would not only greatly harass the operations, but would render the passage of the straits impracticable by any but powerfully armed vessels - even tho all the permanent defences had been silenced.

The Naval Bombardment is not recommended as a sound military operation, unless a strong military force is ready to assist in the operation, or, at least, follow it up immediately the Forts are silenced."

PERMISSION TO USE LEMNOS AS BASE.

16.2.15. Admlty to Adml. Carden begins. "Secret. Greek Govt have agreed to use of Lemnos Island as a base for Allied fleets and are arranging to withdraw their ships and men from Mudros Bay with exception of a few men left in charge of Stores.

The Batteries will be left all standing and Mr. Venezelos requests that they may be looked after by the British.

Communicate with Sir F. Elliott Athens and arrange the earliest possible date on which to take over Lemnos Island from the Greeks. The Marine Brigade should be landed there on that date and the place taken over.

You should be careful to meet the wishes of the Greek Authorities in every way possible and treat them with due consideration.

R/A Wemyss will be sent out as Governor and S.N.O. at the Base and Brigadier Genl. Trotman will command the troops.

You should telegraph if any additional officers are required for administrative duties and should communicate with the High Commissioner Cyprus and obtain loan of an official from him to be attached to the Staff of R/A Wemyss in an advisory capacity.

Proper arrangements should be made for the administration and policing of the island. " Ends.

16.2.15 Following from First Lord to Adml. Carden. begins. Personal and secret. Sir John French has expressed a wish that Capt. Frederick Guest M.P. on of his aide-de-camps should be present unofficially to witness the operations. I shall be glad if you will attach him to your staff. I trust nothing will prevent fire being opened on 19th. The political situation in the Balkans and in Turkey will be immediately influenced by the beginning of this attack. I hope you will report fully." Ends.

MOVEMENTS.

16.2.15 Ham from Malta. "Albion" for Dardanelles with V/a Carden.

MOVEMENTS.

17.2.15. "Raccoon" joined squadron.

17.2.15. V/a Cmdg. Eastn. Meditn. Squadron by W/T begins. "In view of serious reduction in speed of "Queen Elizabeth", I consider it essential that "Inflexible" should remain until "Goeben" has been dealt with, as reliable information indicates that her efficiency is unimpaired except for the loss of one 6 inch gun and a small reduction of speed." ends.

CABLES CUT.

18.2.15. Intelligence officer Malta advised that

Tenedos - Scis and Tenedos - Lemnos cables both cut apparently close to Tendos. Cable ship being sent from Piraeus as soon as possible.

On 18.2.15 V/A Carden asked that Mr. Palmer late Consul at Dardanelles should be sent to him for attachment to his staff.

The attack on the forts as outlined in the Memorandum submitted by Adml. Sturdie and referred by 1st Lord to War Cabinet Committee, was commended on 19.2.15. Following is Adml. Carden's report on same, and his covering letter to the Secretary, The Admiralty dated 17.3.15.

ADML. CARDEN'S REPORT ON OPERATIONS.

Covering letter.

H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth"
17.3.15.

Sir,

I have the honor to submit for the consideration of their Lordships the narrative of events during the operations of the Allied British and French Squadrons against the defences of the Dardanelles from 19th Feb. to 16th March. 1915, also the reports from the flag officers and commanding officers of the various ships which took part, together with the following remarks.

There was a marked difference in the tactics of the enemy manning the forts at the entrance when attacked on this occasion to that which they followed on 3rd Nov. 1914; on that day when a short bombardment was carried out by "Indefatigable" "Indomitable" "Suffren" and "Verite" by a run past in close order, range 13,000 yards they replied to our fire almost at once and maintained it from forts Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6 till our Squadron completed their run. The only projectiles however which fell close were those from the 9.4" guns in Forts Nos. 1 and 4. Good practice was made by the Allied Squadron on Forts Nos. 3 and 6, in the former of which there was a large magazine explosion. Information was received later that the casualties to personnel were high amongst the enemy, some accounts putting it at 600.

That it was considerable, is, I think, shewn by the fact that on 19 Feby, when the present operations began and a deliberate bombardment by our ships took place, no Turkish fort attempted to reply until late in the afternoon when the old battleships were sent close in. They apparently kept their men in shelters until the desired moment.

Bad weather prevented a renewal until 25th Feb. and then there was this difference. Fort No. 1. opened fire on "Agamemnon" at 10,000 yards as soon as that ship was in position and hit her several times. This fort maintained its fire with great perseverance against "Queen Elizabeth", "Agamemnon", and "Gaulois" until the former ship by hitting with two consecutive 15" projectiles dismounted one gun and put the other out of action, and effectually silenced the fort; the surviving personnel quickly made their way down to the neighbouring village.

On the same day the accurate fire of "Irrestible" on Fort No. 4. prevented its two 9.4" guns taking any part in the proceedings. When the ships closed in, Forts Nos. 3 and 6 fired a few ineffective rounds. Although a heavy and prolonged fire at short range was poured into these forts, 70% of the heavy guns were found to be in a serviceable condition when the demolition parties landed.

(letter contd).

The destruction of the guns in Fort No. 3 by "Irrestible" and in Nos. 4 and 6 "Vengeance" was most smartly and effectively carried out on 26th Feb. and 1 March by demolition parties from those ships which were ably supported by their detachments of Royal Marines.

In this service the following officers are specially and strongly recommended.

Major G.M. Heriot D.S.O. R.M.L.I. "Vengeance"
(afterwards mentioned).
Lieut. Commr. (T) E.G. Robinson "Vengeance" (V.C.)
Lieut. (T) F.H. Sandford. "Irrestible" (D.S.O.)

(In brackets is indicated awards granted later).

The two latter officers are further very strongly recommended for their conduct in the sweeping operations.

I was present in "Inflexible" close off Kum Kale on 4th March and witnessed the landing operations which were under the immediate direction of Rear Admral de Robeck and Brig. Genl. Trotman, both of whom were on board "Irrestible" in the entrance of the straits. I consider the operations were correctly conducted and that everything possible under the circumstances was done.

The skilful manner in which "Wolverine" (Commr. O.J. Prentice) and "Scorpion" (Lieut. Commr A.B. Cunningham) ran close inshore after dark and sent whalers ashore to bring off the remaining officers and men, is highly commended.

I desire specially to endorse the recommendations of the Rear Adml. and Brig. Genl on the conduct of Lieut Col. G.E. Matthews. R.M.L.I. and also Major H.E. Bewes. R.M.L.I.

The recovery of the maxim guns by volunteers from "Agememnon" was a smart and plucky piece of work.

The sweeping operations by night between 12 and 15th March were conducted with great gallantry under heavy fire and although not completely successful, I consider the officers and men are deserving of great praise for their efforts.

It is regretted that a complete list of those who volunteered for this dangerous duty was lost in "Ocean" but a further list is being prepared and will be sumitted as soon as possible. The attempt made on the night 13-14th March was most determined and I desire to bring particularly to the notice of Their Lordships the following names.

Commr.	W. Mellor	In charge of minesweepers.	(D.S.O.)	
Lt. Commr.	J.B. Waterlow	"Blenheim"	(do)	
"	"	J.R. Middleton	"Albion"	(do)
"	"	E.G. Robinson	"Vengeance"	(V.C.)
"	"	G.B. Palmes	D.S.O. "Egmont"	(mentioned)
Lieut	F.H. Sandford	"Irrestible"	(D.S.O.)	
"	B.T. Cox	R.W.R. "Prince George"	(do)	
Actg. Bosum	R.G. Young	"Cornwallis"	(mentioned)	
Midshipman	J.C.W. Price	"Ocean"	(D.S.O.)	

Captain of Trawler 318.

The six officers first mentioned carried out these duties on several nights and I desire to submit that they maybe awarded the highest decoration suitable for their rank and seniority, and that Commr. Mellor and Lt. Commr. Waterlow be

promoted now.

(letter contd).

In connection with the operation of the night 13 - 14th March, I desire to bring to Thier Lordships notice, the name of Commr. G.J. Todd "Amethyst".

"Amethyst" was hit several times by large projectiles and had her steering gear and engine room telegraphs put out of action. Arrangements were quickly made to man the hand steering wheel and improvise engine room communications. Both during and after the action Commr. Todd was very ably assisted by Lt. James C.J. Soutter Senior Lieut of "Amethyst" who was indefatigable in his efforts.

The service rendered by the Destroyer Flotilla during all this period have fully maintained the high traditions of that Branch of the Service, their boldness in action and untiring devotion and duty are worthy of the highest praise.

I beg to call special attention to the excellent work done by the French Squadron on every occasion that they have been called upon, and also to the cordial good feeling which prevails in the allied fleet, due so much to the personality of that dashing and courteous officer Contre Admiral E.P.A. Guepratte.

I consider it a special duty to call attention to the excellent work done by Malta Dock yard, under Under Vice Adml. A.H. Limpus C.B. in supplying every need of the large force off the Dardanelles in addition to the main French Fleet. Commanding officers speak most highly of the great assistance rendered to them on all occasions at Malta, and the rapidity with which the work is done, and which shows that the principle, that the Dock Yard exists for the benefit of ships, is fully understood and acted upon.

The conduct and ability of Commanding Officers has been of a high order.

The behavior of officers and men on all occasions has been most admirable, and in every way as would be expected.

In closing the report on this stage, I wish to bring to the notice of their Lordships the splendid work done by Rear Adml J.M. de Robeck, and the great assistance I have received from him, together with the valuable services of Commodore R.J.B. Keyes C.B. M.V.O.. Flag Commdr Hon A.R.M. Ramsay and Capt. W.W. Godfrey R.M.L.I. Flag Staff.

(Sgd). L.H. Carden. Vice Adml.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

BOMBARDMENT OF DEFENCES OF DARDANELLES.
COMMENCED 19.2.15.

"The attack on the defences of the Dardanelles commenced on 19th Feb. 1915.

Air Reconnaissance on 17th and 18th and a.m. 19th confirmed information in our possession, with regard to Forts Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6 except that an additional gun was shown in Eastn. bastion of Fort No. 6.

Seaplanes also reported that some Minor Earth - works and trenches appeared and have been extensively prepared for the defence of possible landing places.

The attack was commenced as laid down in Phase 1, part 1, memo. No. 49. "Orders for the forcing of the Dardanelles by the Allied Squadron" a copy of which is attached (See Page).

The following ships took part in the operation of 19th Feb, being detailed for the various duties as follows:-

Duty of ship	A.	"Suffren"	Flag of Contre Adml. Guepratte
"	B.	"Bouvet"	
"	C.	"Triumph"	
"	D.	"Cornwallis"	
"	E.	"Inflexible."	
"	F.	"Albion"	

The "Gaulois" acted as the second cruiser supporting ship "A" while "Amethyst" supported ship "F".

Seven British mine sweepers were employed with ship "F"

The "Vengeance" (Flag of Rear Adml. de Robeck) was ordered to take station as convenient to observe the fire of her division.

4.30. p.m. "Queen Elizabeth" arrived with "Agamemnon" the latter taking part at the end of the day.

a.m.	
9.51	"Cornwallis" fired first shot on Fort No. 4.
10.00	"Triumph" opened fire on Fort No. 1.
10.32	"Suffren" opened fire on Fort No. 6.
10.38	ships were ordered to anchor with a view to improving the practice.
11.00	The "Vengeance" and "Cornwallis" were ordered to exchange positions: "Cornwallis" owing to a defective Capstan, being unable to anchor in deep water.
11.25	"Cornwallis" was ordered to spot for "Triumph" and for "Inflexible" if required.
11.45	"Inflexible" opened on Fort No. 1. which was hard to distinguish, but practice appeared good.
p.m.	
0.14	"Vengeance" opened fire on Fort No. 4. Practice was very good - her third shot appeared to hit close to Northern embrasure.
0.30	"Triumph" was ordered to cease fire as she was unable to hit fort No. 1. "Suffren" at this time was making excellent practice against Fort No. 6, firing by indirect laying with "Bouvet" spotting.
0.52	Triumph was ordered to open fire with light guns on men showing signs of activity in a field work two miles north of Cape Tekeh.
0.55.	A seaplane was ordered up to spot for "Vengeance" but owing to Wireless trouble in seaplane, no results were obtained.
1.00	"Inflexible" opened fire on Fort No. 3. making good practice.
1.56.	The signal was made to prepare for Phase 1. part 2. it being considered that the effect produced by the bombardment at long range was great enough to allow of ships approaching nearer to the forts.
2.12	"Suffren" and "Triumph" (ships A. & C.) were ordered to commence their operations of Phase 1. part 2. The "Triumph" being ordered to engage the position of the new battery of Cape Tekeh only.

- p.m.
- 3.53 Plan as laid down in part 2. was modified and "Cornwallis" ordered to close Fort No.1 on present line of bearing and open fire when certain of position.
- 4.00 "Bouvet" was ordered to carry out duties of ship "B" in part 2.
- 4.10 There being still no reply from the forts, "Vengeance" and "Cornwallis" were ordered to close and destroy forts Forts Nos. 3 and 6 were heavily bombarded by "Vengeance" engaged fort No.4. with her secondary armament while "Cornwallis" did the same to fort No.1.
- 4.40 "Suffren" who was in position laid down for ship "A" in phase 1 part 2 was directed to close the forts. At the same time "Cease fire" "examine forts" was signalled at "Vengeance."
- 4.45 Fort No.1 opened fire on "Vengeance" and "Cornwallis" and shortly after Fort No.4. also opened fire. "Vengeance" and "Cornwallis" assisted by "Bouvet" engaged and silenced Fort No.1. Fort No.4. being left unfired at, both inshore ships were unaware that she had opened fire.
- 5.00 "Inflexible" opened fire on Fort No.4. with the immediate effect of causing her fire to suffer in accuracy.
- 5.08. "Gaulois" also opened fire on this fort. "Agamemnon" was ordered to support "Vengeance".
- 5.09 The "General recall" was made - "Vengeance" requested permission to continue the action; this was not approved as the light looking towards the land, was becoming bad, while ships shewed up well against western sky.
- 5.30 "Cease firing" was ordered and the squadron withdrew.
- 7.00 "Albion" reported "No mines or guns encountered. Area has been swept."

The result of the days action shewed apparently that the effect of long range bombardment by direct fire on modern earthwork forts is slight; Forts Nos.1 and 4 appeared to be hit, on many occasions, by 12 common shell well placed, but when the ships closed in, all four guns in these forts opened fire.

FROM 20th to 24th FEBRUARY.

From 20th to 24th February inclusive, the weather was too rough to continue operations and no reconnaissance by seaplane was possible.

On 25th Feb. the weather being favourable, operations were resumed in accordance with the plan laid down in operation order No.1. with the exception that no seaplane took part - the sea being too rough for them to rise off the water.

The following ships took part:-

"Inflexible," "Vengeance", "Agamemnon", "Queen Elizabeth", "Albion", "Cornwallis", "Irresistible", "Triumph", "Suffren", "Gaulois", "Bouvet." "Charlemagne" and "Dublin" with eight destroyers and two submarines.

Ships were in position to commence the long range Bombardment by 10.00 a.m. - the destroyers forming a screen to seaward of the battleships.

- a.m.
- 10.07 "Agamemnon" reported range obtained of fort No.1.
- 10.14 "Queen, Elizabeth" opened fire on Fort No.3.
- 10.16 Fort No.1 opened fire on "Agamemnon" range 10,000 yards.
- 10.18 "Gaulois" opened fire on fort No.6.
- 10.22 "Agamemnon" opened fire on Fort No.1.
- 10.27 "Irresistible" opened fire on Fort No.4.

- a. m.
- 19.33 Fort No.1 appeared to be getting the range of the "Agamemnon" who was ordered to weigh and proceed further out - "Queen Elizabeth" being ordered to fire on Fort No.1.
Between 10.34 and 10.43 "Agamemnon" was hit seven (7) times, but as the shells did not detonate, directly "Agamemnon" had good weight on fort No.1. lost the range.
- 10.44 Fort No.1 opened on accurate fire on "Gaulois" who immediately replied to it with a heavy fire from all her guns, this probably accounted for the fact that she was able to weigh and proceed further out, without the fort scoring a single hit.
- 10.45 "Queen Elizabeth" opened fire on Fort No.1. and "Dubin" was observed firing at a gun near Yeni Shehr.
- 10.55 "Irresistible" reported she obtained range of Fort No.4. She was ordered to continue slow firing. She opened a deliberate, accurate fire on the fort which kept it silent practically all day.
- 11.30. "Gaulois" was making excellent practice on Fort No.6.
- 11.47 Fort No.1 was still firing at "Agamemnon" and "Gaulois" but shots were going short - its extreme range appeared to be about 1,000 yards.
- 2.11.000 Noon. "Queen Elizabeth" whose shooting had been extremely accurate, appeared to drop a shell right into Fort No.1 and at 0.02.p.m. she reported eastern gun dismantled.

- p. m.
- 0.15 "Irresistible" reported she thought her tenth round had damaged northern gun of Fort No.4. "Vengeance" and "Cornwallis" were ordered to prepare for Run and which was commenced at 12.45 p.m. with all covering ships firing deliberately on their allotted forts.
- 0.50 "Vengeance" and "Cornwallis" opened fire concentrating chiefly on forts 1 and 4. Forts 3 and 6 both opened fire but their practice was poor and few rounds were fired. Forts 1 and 4 did not fire during the run.
- by 1.22 "Vengeance" and "Cornwallis" had completed run 1, and all ships checked fire.
- 1.50 Rear Adml "Vengeance" reported "No.1. battery west gun pointing in the air, right gun not visible, battery not manned. No.3. fired at "Vengeance" - apparently uses Black powder - three guns are visible on south west face. No.4. both guns laid horizontal, battery not manned, one round was fired from western gun."
- 2.05 Centre Adml. "SUFFREN" was directed to commence Run 2, given following directions:-
"Battery No.1 out of action, battery No.4. not manned, concentrate your fire on No.3, 4, and 6 especially.4."

Run 2 was carried but most deliberately. "Suffren" being about 3000 yards ahead of "Charlemagne" - both ships made excellent practice - the only round fired at them was one from fort No.6.

The run was completed at 3.00 p.m. Covering ships fired very few rounds during this run, it was evident that forts were silenced.

- 3.05 Mine Sweepers were ordered to close the entrance and carry out sweeping operations laid down. "Albion" and "Triumph" were ordered to prepare to close forts to 2,000 yards of Southern and Northern shore respectively, keeping way on and carrying out destruction of guns still intact. Rear Adml. in "Vengeance" being directed to follow them to direct operations.

While "Albion" and "Triumph" were attempting to destroy the guns of forts 1 and 6 at close range, fort No. 4. apparently fired one round from her northern most gun - the fort was immediately engaged by "Albion" and "Irresistible" - forts 1 and 6 also appeared to fire one round each - these were the last rounds fired at the ships.

Concealed guns of apparently 6" calibre fired from positions one mile north east of Cape Tekeh and from behind Northern end of Yeni Shehr village - these guns did no damage though "Gaulois" was struck three times on the armour.

"Albion" when off Kum Kale reported two explosions probably light ground mines, these occurred about 100 yards ahead of the ships, and did no damage.

By 4.00 p.m. the forts were reduced and the mine sweepers were ordered to enter and commence sweeping. "Vengeance", "Albion" and "Triumph" with six destroyers covered these operations.

The remainder of the fleet returning to Tenedos - during the night of 25th - 26th, mine sweepers swept the entrance; they found no mines. The enemy were reported as burning the villages at entrance.

On 26th Feby 1915 "Albion," "Triumph" and "Majestic" entered straits between 8.00 a.m. and 9.00 a.m. and shelled forts 3 and 6 from inside entrance, also firing station below De Totts battery.

"Albion" preceded by sweepers proceeded to a position 12,000 yards from fort No. 8 from which position fire was opened on that fort. "Majestic" supported "Albion" these two ships being under fire from field guns and howitzers from Asiatic shore, ships remained under weigh, enemy scored one hit on "Majestic".

"Jed and "Chalmer" reconnoitred northern and southern shores during forenoon as far up as the true white cliffs - Saundere, both ships being engaged with the enemy's light batteries - they sunk some large range buoys - and located several batteries.

"Vengeance", from outside straits was engaged bombarding position on Asiatic shore near Achilles Tomb.

At 2.30 p.m. the enemy apparently having abandoned Kum Kale and Seddul Bahr, the opportunity was seized to land demolition parties on both sides - from "Vengeance" at Kum Kale and "Irresistible" at Seddul Bahr.

Parties being covered by the guns of "Vengeance", "Irresistible", "Cornwallis", "Dublin", and "Raccoon", forts 3, 4 and 6 were entered and demolitions carried out and the two new 4" guns concealed near Achilles Tomb were destroyed, but owing to cateness of the landing it was impossible to verify results. Both parties encountered slight opposition, the enemy being in some force in Seddul Bahr preventing fort 1 being entered.

On night of 26 - 27 mine sweepers entered straits to continue sweeping in Lower Area - being covered by "Colne" "Jed" and "Kennet" who engaged enemy's Batteries and sank more range buoys.

Seaplanes carried out reconnaissance inside straits in order to locate batteries etc - amongst other details they reported, battery 8 now contains eight guns. Many positions for guns have been prepared on both shores.

27th Feb. 1915:-

Weather broke, north easterly gale, much rain with low visibility - operations inside the strait much impeded, small progress made.

28th Feb. 1915:-

Heavy north easterly gale - operations confined to watching the straits.

1st March 1915:-

Gale having moderated, operations inside straits were resumed.

The following battleships entered straits to engage howitzers and field Batteries - "Vengeance", "Ocean", "Albion", "Triumph", "Irresistible", and "Majestic".

Fort 8 and Battery at White Cliffs were engaged by "Albion" and "Triumph", "Ocean" and "Majestic" meanwhile engaging guns near Aren Kioi village and on European shore. These proved extremely hard to locate and when seen, great difficulty was experienced in obtaining points of aim - the guns being well concealed.

The action was discontinued at 5.00 p.m. - "Ocean", "Albion" and "Triumph" were each hit on several occasions by projectiles of 6" calibre and below without suffering any serious damage.

Demolition parties from "Irresistible" landed at Seddul Bahr and completed destruction of fort 6.

The party was attacked during the operations the fire from covering ships and destroyers in Morto Bay, however, was sufficient to disperse the enemy.

During the night of 1st - 2nd March, mine sweepers entered and swept to within 3,000 yards of Kephez Point. They were covered by destroyers when abreast of Sundere River, batteries opened fire, and sweepers retired, destroyers covering withdrawal. No vessels were hit.

2nd March.

"Canopus", "Swiftsure" and "Cornwallis" entered the straits, and engaged Forts Nos. 8 & 7, also field guns.

Garrison of fort No. 8 were forced to withdraw, but material damage to fort could not be determined.

Howitzers and concealed field guns opened a heavy fire, which could not be silenced. All ships were hit on several occasions, suffering some material damage.

On observation mine exploded ineffectively ahead of "Canopus".

On the 1st - 2nd March the French Squadron reconnoitred the gulf of Xeros, bombarding the Forts and earthworks of the Bulair lines and the Bridge over Kavak. French minesweepers swept along the coast. They discovered no mines.

The landing places in the Gulf of Xeros were also reported on.

Destroyers and minesweepers continued the attack on the Kephez mine field, but made no progress in the face of heavy fire.

3rd March.

Weather in the morning unfavorable - foggy. In the afternoon "Albion", "Prince George", "Triumph" continued the attack on Forts 7 & 8, and field Batteries. These latter were not so active as on former

March 3rd (Contd).

days. Sweeping operations continued at night covered by destroyers - slight progress was made.

Seaplanes carried out useful reconnaissance without however being able to locate batteries firing at the ships.

4th March:-

It being uncertain whether Forts Nos. 1 and 4 were absolutely destroyed, demolition parties were ordered to land and complete the destruction, being covered by a landing party of the Royal Marine Brigade one company of 250 men each side.

This landing had been postponed for several days on account of the weather.

Seaplanes reconnoitred the vicinity of Forts, and villages near them in the morning and reported no movements of Troops.

At 10. a.m. parties landed at Seddul Bahr and Kum Kale. Both parties met with opposition at Seddul Bahr. No progress could be made and the party withdrew at 3.00 p.m.

At Kum Kale an attempt was made to reach Fort No. 4., but without success, the enemy being in some force in well concealed trenches. Great difficulty was experienced in withdrawing the advanced party, the enemy gaining possession of a cemetery near MENDERE Bridge, commanding the ground over which the party had to fall back, and which could not be shelled by the ships as our troops were between the cemetery and the ships.

Seaplanes attempted to locate the enemy's trenches without success, descending to 2,000 feet in their efforts to distinguish the positions - one seaplane was hit 28 times and another 8 times.

It was not until the destroyers were sent close in to shell the trenches that the retirement could be carried out.

After sunset "Scorpion" and "Wolverine" ran in and landed parties under fire to search the Beach from Kum Kale to the cliffs below Fort No. 4. The former brought off two officers and five men who had been unable to reach the boats.

5th March:-

The attack on the Forts at the Narrows commenced by indirect bombardment by "Queen Elizabeth" as laid down in operation order No. 2. copy of which is attached; a report of this firing is also attached.

Three seaplanes were sent up to spot for fall of shot. One met with an accident and the second was forced to return on account of her pilot being wounded by a rifle bullet, in consequence they were not of assistance in the firing.

"Queen Elizabeth" was under fire from field guns, being struck on many occasions without, however, suffering any great material damage.

6th March:-

Indirect attack by "Queen Elizabeth" continued of which a report is attached.

"Vengeance" inside the straits spotted for "Queen Elizabeth", "Albion", "Majestic", "Prince George", and "Suffren" engaged Forts Nos. 7, 8, and 13, with what result could not be discovered.

At night "Amethyst" with destroyers and mine-sweepers in company proceeded inside Dardanelles to attack the Kephez minefield. Some progress was made, but, as on former occasions, gunfire drove the minesweepers out of the mined area.

Between the 3rd and 6th March "Sapphire" was engaged in the neighbourhood of Mitylene in destroying telegraph stations etc.

7th March :-

French squadron consisting of "Suffren" "Gaulois" "Charlemagne" and "Bouvet" entered the straits and engaged Forts Nos. 7 & 8.

Later "Agamemnon" and "Lord Nelson" attacked the forts at the Narrows by direct fire from range between 14,000 and 12,000 yards. After a severe engagement during which both ships were hit by heavy projectiles, forts 13 and 19 were silenced. During this attack the French Battleships kept down the fire from howitzers and field guns.

"Dublin" and "Bulair" ^{at Bulair} was engaged with a shore battery.

During the night of 7th 8th March, destroyers attacked the searchlights at Kephez, but without result, the lights being extinguished temporarily but invariably reappearing.

8th March:-

"Queen Elizabeth" entered the straits to continue the attack on the Narrows by direct fire.

Conditions became unfavourable for spotting and little was accomplished.

Weather was too misty for seaplanes to do any spotting. Attack on minefields was continued at night with mine-sweepers, and picket boats.

Batteries opened fire.

9th March :-

"Prince George", and "Irresistible" entered the straits and made a thorough search for boats etc and shelled look out stations. The weather was misty throughout the day.

At night picket boats covered by destroyers attacked the Kephez minefield with explosive creeps.

10th March:-

"Irresistible", "Dublin", and "Ark Royal" off Bulair. The former bombarded the enemys' positions when guns had been located. The seaplanes were unable to fly owing to the rough weather.

"Ocean" and "Albion" bombarded light gun battery in Morto Bay, also villages and positions near entrance.

After night fall 7 sweepers attended by picket boats fitted with explosive creeps, supported by Destroyers, "Amethyst" and "Canopus" entered the straits. The latter opened fire on the Batteries and searchlights protecting the minefield off Kephez Point, but was unable to extinguish the lights. The vessels were subjected to a heavy fire from guns of a below 6" calibre.

Sweepers and picket boats succeeded in getting above the mine field with the object of sweeping down with the current.

10th March (contd).

Picket boats destroyed several cables, but only one pair of sweepers got out their sweeps and little was effected.

Two trawlers were hit by 6" projectiles.
Trawler No. 339. was sunk by a mine.

11th March :-

Seaplanes carried out reconnaissance for the ships operating off Bulair.

Ships inside the straits engaged in watching both shores.

Operations against the narrows delayed by failure to clear the mine field.

Attack on the mine field at night failed, owing to the sweepers refusing to face the heavy fire opened by batteries on them and the covering destroyers.

12th March :-

Daylight operations at a standstill. Weather misty. French minesweepers attacked the mine field at night with no success, being driven off by heavy fire.

Aerial reconnaissance reported a line of mines near the surface extending from Taundere Bay in an E.S.E. direction. These were examined by a sweeper and picket boats which attacked the line with creeps and explosive sweeps. The line subsequently turned out to be an obstruction consisting of empty observation mines moored by chain cables and connected by ~~awere~~ hawser. The latter apparently had a hemp netting suspended from it. It was evidently an anti-submarine obstruction.

13th March :-

A determined attack on the minefield was made on the night of 13th March. Volunteer Officers and men being in each trawler.

The plan of attack was similar to that on the 10th, it being very essential for the sweepers to get above the mine field before getting out their sweeps as they can make no progress against the current.

"Amethyst" and destroyers covered the operations which commenced with a bombardment of lights and batteries by "Cornwallis"

The defence of the minefield was well organised and sweepers and picket boats had to pass through an area lit by 6 powerful search lights, under fire from Fort No. 13 and Batteries Nos. 7 and 8, besides numerous light guns estimated at 20 to 30 on either shore.

The passage was accomplished, but on reaching the turning point only one pair of trawlers was able to get out the sweep owing to damage to winches and gear, and loss of personnel.

Picket boats did excellent service in blowing up cables with explosive sweeps.

"Amethyst" drew the fire of the batteries at a ^{cr}critical period, and suffered severely."

14th 15th 16th March.

Minesweepers engaged in clearing up area inside the straits in which ships would have to manoeuvre in their combined attacks against the forts at the narrows and the minefields at Kephez.

Finis of report.

From the printed "Orders for the forcing of the Dardanelles by the allied squadron" issued on 14th Feby 1915 by V/A S.H. Carden from H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth" the following information is extracted.

"Operations will be considered under seven main phases.

- Phase (1) Reduction of defences at entrance of straits in Bashika Bay and on the North Coast of Gallipoli.
- " (2) Sweeping minefield at entrance and reducing defences up to (but not including) the forts at the narrows.
- " (3) Reduction of forts at the narrows.
- " (4) Sweeping of principal minefield.
- " (5) Silencing forts above the narrows.
- " (6) Passage of fleet through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora.
- " (7) Operations in Sea of Marmora and establishing efficient patrol in Dardanelles.

Phase 1. consists of two parts.

Part 1. Longrange bombardment.

" 2. Bombardment at closer range overwhflming of forts at close range and sweeping a channel towards entrance of straits.

PART 1.

Ships and tasks.

Ship "A" "Suffren"

"Ship" A will bombard Fort No. 6.....range from 9.900 to 9.000 yards. Ship is not to go west of the line Kum Kale bearing N.E.

When ship E reports. Fort No.1. silenced, ship A can approach nearer and bombard Fort No. 6 direct, but Kum Kale should not be opened from beyond bearing N. 60°.E.

Ship "B" "Bouvet."

Ship B will act as spotting ship for ship A from a position N. 65° W of Kum Kale 13,000 yards.

Ship "C" "Triumph".

Ship C will bombard Fort No.1 from a position steaming between bearings N 29° W and N 11° W 8,000 yards from Fort.

If battery No.50 opens fire she is to silence it first.

Ship "D." "Cornwallis" (Relieved by "Vengeance")

Ship D will bombard fort No. 4 steaming between bearings S 68° W and S 85° W 11,000 yards from the fort ship D will use direct fire and own spotting.

Ship "E" "Inflexible."

Ship E will spot for ship C from a position between bearings S 68° W and W 13,000 yards from Seddul Bahf.

From this same position she will bombard fort No. 3.

Ship "F" "Albion"

Ship F assisted by Cruiser ("Amethyst") will destroy any defences in the neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe and cover the operations of the minesweepers.

Second Cruiser "Gaulois"

The second cruiser will patrol off Bashika Bay to prevent any field guns etc. interfering with Ship "A".

Minesweepers. (7 in Number)

Minesweepers under the orders of ship F will sweep from one mile North to three miles South of Gaba Tepe clearing an area for ships bombarding over Gallipoli Peninsula.

. PART 2.

The various steps in Part 2 will be carried out by order of the Senior Officer.

It is necessary to reduce the forts on the Asiatic shore before attacking those on the European shore.

Asiatic Shore.

Ship "A"

Ship A, when ordered, will shape course N 20° W from southern end of Yeni Kioi village to open Fort No 6 at a range of 7,000 yards, opening fire with her secondary armament. She must not pass north of the line S 84° W from Fort No. 4. till she has silenced Fort No. 6 by repeated short runs at decreasing ranges.

Fort No. 6 being silenced, ship A will open direct fire on Fort No. 4 at 5,000 yards.

Supporting Ships.

Ships D and E will remain in their original positions ready to open fire without orders, should the forts commence firing.

Ship D to fire on Fort No. 4.
" E to fire on Forts Nos. 1 and 3.

Ship C from her original position will stand by to assist ship E if ordered.

European Shore.

Ship C

Forts Nos. 4 and 6 being silenced, ship C when ordered, will alter course to southward so as to open Battery No. 50 at

a range of 5,000 yards opening fire with her secondary armament.

This run to be repeated at decreasing ranges to ensure complete destruction of the Battery, after which ship C is to resume her original position.

Throughout this operation ship C is not to cross a line drawn West from Cape Helles.

Ship "B"

Ship B when Battery No. 50 is silenced will be ordered to close Fort No. 3 along a line Seddul Bahr bearing S 78° she will make repeated runs in a southerly direction at gradually decreasing ranges, opening fire with secondary armament.

Throughout this operation Ship B is not to go south of a line Fort No. 1 bearing N. 50° E.

When Fort No. 3 is silenced Ship B will operate in similar manner against Fort No. 1.

Two ships will then be ordered to complete destruction of forts at close range.

Supporting Ships.

Ships A D & E will take up positions from which they can open direct long range fire upon Forts 6, 4 & 3, respectively, without interfering with other ships.

Mine Sweepers.

Mine Sweepers will, when ordered, sweep a passage one mile wide in towards the entrance to the straits, this passage to commence 1,500 yards from the line seddul Bahr - Kum Kale.

A ship will be detailed to place two buoys to mark the starting line for this sweep, in positions

Latitude	40°	1°	N.	Long	25°	9½°	E.
and	40°	2°	N.	"	"	"	"

by One trawler will be detailed, S.O trawlers to grapple for the old Tenedos - Chanak telegraph cable, she will precede the sweepers, under-running the cable with a view to damaging electric cables of observation mines, telephones etc. placed across the straits; the trawler must be prepared to slip and buoy the cable at any moment.

Torpedo Tubes.

Two destroyers detailed by Captain (D) will search for and destroy the two fixed Torpedo tubes at Seddul Bahr and Kum Kale.

Phases 2 to 7 indicated by general plan of operations, include clearing straits; Bombarding forts at the narrows; sweeping a passage through mine field along Asiatic shore; sweeping passage through narrows when guns commanding it are silenced; Passage of straits; operations in Sea of Marmora.

Extracts from Telegrams sent during period covered by Bombardment, viz. 19.2.15 - 17.3.15.

Purchase of Tugs and lighters.

Purchase of tugs and lighters (contd).

20.2.15 V/A Carden was advised that a Mr. GRECH acting on behalf of Admlty had been sent to Piraeus to purchase tugs and lighters and suitable vessels for landing Troops. All vessels when purchased would be sent direct to Port Mudros.

Transporting Australian Troops from Egypt.

20.2.15 V/A Carden was sent a copy of a cablegram which had been sent to Robinson, Finance, Cairo, (beginning) Urgent. Transports are required to be ready at Alexandria by 27th inst. for conveyance of Australian etc. troops as reqd. by G.O.C. in Egypt with whom you should communicate at once.

Adml. Supt. Malta has been directed to return Saturnia to Alexandria at once and Ionian also if latter has left Port Said. These ships should be emptied and got ready also MALDA and Nizam due Suez 24th inst. Suffolk should also be used. Braimar Castle and Cawdor Castle will be sent on from Lemnos if available; any other suitable ships should be used requisitioning if necessary.

For the voyage contemplated 50% more troops than normal accommodation may be carried in transports.

Telegraph at earliest possible date total numbers you can embark under these arrangements and the names of ships used. The greater the number for whom you can arrange conveyance locally, the less will be the Tonnage which must be sent from England for main move (ends).

Transports.

20.2.15 V/A Carden was sent the following message (begins) Communicate with Morgan British Consul Dedeagatch through the Prime Minister at Athens, as to obtaining tugs, boats, lighters, brows or ramps for disembarking from same and any other facilities needed for landing of 10,000 Infty. at earliest moment possible should such a step be found necessary. The troops will be sent in transports from Alexandria. Further communication will be made as to this. (ends).

Telegram from War Office to G.O.C. Egypt.

"The mechanical transport ~~from~~ the Expedition from Egypt will not be sent from England. Allowing for the amount obtainable locally, wire what additional ~~at~~ transport, if any, should be sent from England. We will send two months complete supplies of food and forage including hospital supplies and disinfectants, together with two months' flour, two months' frozen meat and one month's fuel wood. The transports will take ten days' voyage forage rations and seven days' landing rations.

We will also send Hdqrs of Administrative services and Departments and Hdqrs of a Base." (ends).

Movements of Ships.

21.2.15 Arrived off Dardanelles 19th Feb. "Albion", "Amethyst" "Ark Royal" submarine B6, 7 mine-sweepers, "Queen Elizabeth", "Agamemnon" "Irresistible", 20th "Blenheim", Sub B8; 21st "Sapphire", Sub B11. Hosptl Ship Soudan.

Mystery Ships.

21.2.15 V/A Carden was advised "Two ships numbers 11 and 14 of Special Service Squadron have sailed to join you at Tenedos, proceeding direct and should arrive about 5th March. They are under the orders of Commd. W.B. Forbes sailing in No.14. No.14 closely resembles "Tiger" and No.11. "Indomitable". They have each one 3 pounder gun and No.14 has W/T. They are manned by Merchant Service Captains and crews but have each a naval officer and some naval ratings on board. On the passage

they are ordered to show themselves at various points so as to be reported as battle cruisers proceeding outwards. They carry coal for 10,000 miles. On arrival make any use of them you think fit, such as screening "Queen Elizabeth" from submarines and deceiving enemy as to ships present by showing themselves in the distance. Care to be taken that their true character does not become known. (ends).

23.2.15 V/A Carden had following despatched to him. "Captain DEEDES Staff Officer is being sent to Lemnos shortly. He has served for years in Turkish Gendarmerie and knows language and country thoroughly, and is well acquainted with opponents of Young Turk party. War Office thinks his knowledge might prove of use to you. He will be on staff of Genl. Birdwood."

23.2.15.5 Strength of French troops for Dardanelles.

French Admlty advised Brit. Admlty. Total of French troops for Dardanelles was one complete Divn. viz. 18,000 men and 5,000 horses.

Military Force for Dardanelles and their operations.

24.2.15 Firts Lord to Adml. Carden. Secret and Personal. The operation on which you are engaged consists in forcing the Dardanelles without Military assistance, as generally described in your telegram No. 19 of 11th Jan. and in your instruction from the Admlty. It is not proposed at this stage to use military force, other than parties of Marines landed to destroy particular guns or Torpedo tubes. On the other hand, if your operation is successful, we consider it necessary that ample military force should be available to reap the fruits. The following military forces are therefore being moved or held ready to move to withing striking distance :-

Royal Naval Division	8,500
2 Australian Divisions	30,000
A French Division	18,000

It is also possible that the 29th Regular Divn of 18,000 will be sent from England. You will receive full details of these movements; but they do not affect your immediate operations. It has been arranged that 10,000 troops should be held ready, part in Egypt, part in Lemnos, for unexpected contingencies, should your operations proceed more rapidly than had been estimated. But it is not intended that they should be employed in present circumstances to assist the naval operations, which are independent and self-contained.

General Birdwood who will command the Army is leaving tonight in the "Swiftsure" to join you. You should discuss the whole position with him and if you are of opinion that the army can help your operations, you may make recommendations. An official telegram is also being sent you on this subject.

First objective of Naval attack outlined.

24.2.15 Admlty to V/A Carden Telegram (begins). Referring to telegrams exchanged between you and Genl. Birdwood as to the employment of Military Forces in Dardanelles Operations, the War Office consider the occupation of the southern end of the peninsula to the line Saundere - Chana Ovasi is not an obligatory operation for ensuring success of first main object, which is to destroy the permanent batteries. Though troops should always be held in readiness to assist in Minor operations on both sides of the straits in order to destroy masked batteries and engage enemy forces covering them, our main army can remain in camp at Lemnos till the passage of the straits is in our hands when holding Bulair Lines may be necessary to stop all supplies reaching the peninsula.

You should discuss the whole position with Genl. Birdwood on his arrival before deciding any major operation beyond covering range of ships guns, and report conclusion arrived at (ends).

25.2.15 Following by W/T from V/A Carden (begins).
If only 10,000 men are sent I propose at first to base them on Mudros and make occasional feints in Xeros without actually landing troops. If it becomes necessary to prevent serious interference with fleet by concealed guns, force could be landed at Seddul Bahr to occupy the Peninsula up to the line Saundere River - Chanaotasi, being supported on both flanks by ships. A landing at Seddul-Bahr and maintenance after landing being so dependant on weather. I do not intend to take this step unless essential. I have informed G.O.C. Egypt that force should be sent to Fort Mudros as soon as possible in order to be instantly available should be entirely independent of fleet for all supplies.

Have also informed him that troops will have to live in transports at Mudros, landing only for exercise. If the Royal Marine Brigade is to be employed in conjunction with Hospital Force, I submit they may be in addition and that Portsmouth and Deal Battalions be sent out with one Field Ambulance, one company supply and transports to complete the Brigade.

Movements Ships. 25.2.15.

Following by W/T from "Inflexible":- "Dartmouth" "Majestic" arrived. B9. sailed for Malta in tow of Collier "Amicus."

25.2.15 Admlty to V/A Carden:- "Askold" will join your flag shortly to represent Russian Navy in combined allied fleet before the Dardanelles. Her principal use will be for wireless comm. with the Black Sea fleet. Should her installation not be sufficiently powerful, her operations can be transferred to a ship with the necessary power.

Movements Australian Troops. 26.2.15

From Lieut. Genl. Sir J. Maxwell, to Earl Kitchener.
"The troops leave Cairo on Saturday night and I hope that the embarkation will be finished by Monday, when the convoy should leave. The following ships are all victualled for one month:-

"Malda", "Nizam", "Devonha", "Ionian" and "Suffolk". The following are the details of the troops.

Headqrs. 3rd Aust. Bde. under Col. MacLagan.

9th 10th and 12th Bns.
One Brigade Section Div Sig Co.
One G.A.A. Section F.A. Bde Ammn. Col.
One Field Coy Royal Engrs.
One Field Ambulance.
Two Sections Field Bakery.
One Sqd. Field Butchery.
One clearing Hosptl.
4th Coy. Divl. Train.

Total 167 officers; 474 men; 647 Horses. Seven days landing rations and two months reserve supplies for men and horses."

4.3.15 From Admlty to V/A Carden. Secret and Personal
The following matters require your attention with a view to action when the time comes.

Should you succeed in entering the Sea of Marmora, your first task is to destroy the Turco German Fleet wherever it is.

As soon as this is achieved you should send vessels to cut, by fire or landing parties, according to circumstances, the Scutari - Ismid Railway line and the railway and road from Constantinople to Kuckuk Chekmeje.

Our policy is to cut off on the European shore as much of the Turkish Army as possible and to force them to capitulate later

You are next to attack the Forts of the Bosphorus on which operation a memorandum prepared by Sir H. Jackson is being telegraphed to you in Sections. This is to be taken as a guide and not as a rule. When you see yourself within four days of entering the sea of Marmora, you are to make Askold telegraph to the Russian fleet at Sebastopol to come to Blockade the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus and to attack with long range fire the outer forts.

You are to duplicate this telegram to us. We want the Russians to block the exit and to increase the moral effect by opening fire simultaneously with your attack.

We are not counting on them at this stage for any decisive operation. When the above military necessities have been fully provided for you should deal with Constantinople.

The number of ships at your disposal will probably enable Constantinople to be summoned as soon as the Turco German fleet has been destroyed, without prejudice to the other warlike movements against railways and the Bosphorus just described. We wish to obtain the peaceful surrender of the City and if you think it advisable and likely to prevent massacre or futile resistance, you may at any time after you have entered the Sea of Marmora communicate with the American Ambassador, or other Neutral or Turkish Authorities accessible to you, assuring them that prompt obedience and the orderly surrender of the city will save all private property from injury and that the most respect will be shown to all religious buildings, especially Mosques and objects venerated by Moslems. You will also concert with Genl. Birdwood the necessary movements of troops.

You will report fully and regularly your views and intentions, using your chief of Staff for this purpose when you are too pressed.

It is of the utmost importance that we should be kept informed.

Antecedent to the above, it is of course presumed that by the fire of ships in Saros Gulf you will as far as possible prevent all movements of troops guns and convoys across the Bulair Isthmus.

This appears to be of importance in the present phase."

From Lt. Genl. Sir J. Maxwell to Earl Kitchener.

4.3.15

The following telegram has been received from Birdwood.
"3rd March. Your No. 3299 received. The proposal I made in my telegram dated 2nd March seems to be generally in accordance with your views, and to cover most of the points mentioned in your telegram, I anticipate that, if required to land, by the Navy, we shall not be able, in taking concealed guns or howitzers, to restrict movements to minor operations, as any guns are sure to be in strong positions and would be covered by strongly entrenched infantry who in some places would be doubtless able to command coast fort guns which might have been required by the Navy. With the exception perhaps of two mounted Brigades, I shall probably be taking with me in the first instance, my whole corps; there will not at first be much scope for mounted Brigades, and one of these lately arrived from Aust. is but little trained. I will certainly try to dominate the Eastern side from the Gallipoli peninsula as I am particularly anxious to avoid, if possible, placing any troops on the Asiatic side, for not only do I fully realize the danger if placing there a more or less isolated force, but I know from personal observation that the country is big and difficult, and even a whole division would soon lose itself. You can therefore rely on my avoiding it if possible.

(contd).

You will have seen that arrangements have been made already in the direction you have indicated, regarding threats on Bulair Lines. Also before receiving your telegram, I had issued orders in practically identical terms regarding embarkation and disembarkation practice at Mudros Bay. It is probable that only the advanced Brigade would be able to take much advantage of this.

If I get in touch with local information later on, I will telegraph an appreciation, but, as I said in a former telegram, at present this is not feasible, and it is impossible to say what troops may be in the vicinity of Constantinople, when the Dardanelles have been forced. I cannot help thinking that when the fleet arrives before Constantinople, and threatens the bombardment of the city, opposition will collapse. At present I have no information to guide me in advising as to operations after the Gallipoli Peninsula has been taken, and I have as yet, no maps of the country. A man lifting Kite or a captive balloon would be of great use to the navy. It would not only give great assistance in the spotting of long range fire, but I would also be able to detect by its means, the concealed batteries which are already troubling the navy. I therefore strongly recommend the immediate despatch of one of the other."

Intended use of troops in Egypt with regard to
Gallipoli Peninsula. 4.3.15

From Earl Kitchener to Lt. Genl Sir J. Maxwell.
Please transmit the following to Genl. Birdwood:-

From the Admeral's estimate, I understand that by 20th March he will probably have accomplished the forcing of the Dardanelles. It will therefore be possible by 18th March to concentrate at Lemnos the whole of your Australasian contingent and in addition one Division of French troops and 10,000 of the Naval Brigade, a total of approx. 65,000 men. If, however, anything should occur to upset this calculation, I will let you know.

We do not intend to issue orders for any more troops than the Brigade now there and the naval Division, to start for Lemnos until 12th March as it is evidently objectionable to keep troops in trans-
peris at Lemnos longer than is necessary.

The date mentioned will give us time to judge the progress that has been made in clearing the passage and to obtain another and clearer estimate from the Admeral of the time when he will have passed the straits. Unless the navy are convinced that they cannot silence the guns in the straits without military co operation on a large scale in which case further orders will be issued, there is no intention of using the troops enumerated above to take the Gallipoli peninsula. In such a case even more troops might be required to force the Turkish positions, and you might have to wait for further reinforcements from here. The numbers and composition of the additional forces will be communicated to you after a decision has been taken, probably on 10th March. In the meantime only small bodies of troops will be required for subsidiary operations while the Fleet are successfully silencing the forts, and, when needed by the Admeral, these should be supplied by you from the Brigade now at Lemnos. If about 18th March it appears that the forts have been successfully silenced by the fleet, and the latter is about to proceed to Constantinople, it should be followed at close interval by the transports conveying the whole force for operations either at or near Constantinople or on the mainland on the European side in whichever place these may be found advisable

The abovementioned reinforcements from England would, of course, follow and join the forces later. The situation which will be created in European Turkey by the passage of the Dardanelles by the fleet is almost impossible to foretell. It will most probably only be necessary to leave a force sufficient to hold the Bulair lines, as it is anticipated that the Turks will abandon the Gallipoli Peninsula. Therefore, the concentration of troops at the entrance to the Dardanelles, is not so much for operations on the Gallipoli peninsula as for operations subsequently to be undertaken in the neighbourhood of Constantinople after sinking the Turkish Navy on

arrival at/

arrival at Constantinople the first duty of the fleet will be to open up the Bosphorus for the entrance of the Russian Fleet, which will be accompanied by a Corps of Russian Troops probably numbering 40,000 men and the operations on land will take place in co operation with these forces."

(note underlined is my own and not part of original message). (Sgd). S.F.

General Birdwood's criticism of forcing Dardanelles.

5.3.15

From Lieut Genl. Sir J. Maxwell to Earl Kitchener.

Birdwood sends the following in continuation of his message transmitted to you under my No. 683 of 4th March:-
"With reference to the last para. of your telegram No. 3261, I am very doubtful if the navy can force the passage unassisted. In any event the forcing of the passage must take a considerable time, the forts that have been taken up to the present have been visible and very easy, as the ships could stand off and shoot from anywhere, but inside the straits, the ships are bothered by unknown fire. The weather at present is very bad, only one out of several days being fine, and the operations are much delayed in consequence. Before troops can be landed it is absolutely essential that the weather should be settled as the landing sites are small and indifferent and a small force only cannot be landed owing to the risk of being out off by the weather, I think Adml. Carden would have liked to see the troops landed at Bulair Lines, but I am averse to doing this for the following reasons:-

1. I should be in no way enabled to carry out my role of assisting the navy if necessary.
2. Owing to the conformation of the coast it would be necessary to land on the northern side of the lines, and these have been constructed expressly to meet a force from this direction.
3. If the navy and my troops advance together from the South we can fully help each other while if the troops work from the North to the South, and the Navy South to North, from opposite ends of the peninsula, no co-operation is possible.
4. My rear would always be open to attack from any forces coming down from Thrace.

The coast of Besika Bay has also been entrenched and fully organized for defence. Moreover the crossing of Mendere River and the adjoining Marshes would be a very difficult operation while the right flank of an army advancing from there would be much exposed.

I therefore think the best line of action to be a cautious advance from Helles Point."

Movements of Troops. 5.3.15.

The R/A Mudros advised Admlty that five Military Transports viz. "Frizam", "Suffolk", "Devanha", "Ionia" and "Malda", with 5,000 troops had arrived from Egypt.

From Lieut. Genl. Sir J. Maxwell to Earl Kitchener.

6.3.15.

Following from Genl Birdwood:-

I have just returned to Cairo for a few days to make the necessary arrangements with Maxwell with regard to my corps, and shall shortly proceed again to Lemnos. I have already informed you that I consider the Admirals forecast is ~~to~~ sanguine and though we may have a better

estimate by/

estimate by March 12th, I doubt his ability to force the passage unaided. I have in the meantime, placed the Brigade at Lemnos at the disposal of the Admiral for minor operations. I have no intention of wishing to rush blindly into Gallipoli Peninsula and quite realise that my movements must entirely depend on the progress made by the navy. On this point I note I shall receive further orders, but if my anticipation is fulfilled and military co-operation is needed, I should propose to make my first and definite objective the line Kiled Bahr - Gabatepe when this is attained the Fleet would be enabled to get through to the Sea of Marmora. The Bulair lines would then be reduced en route by bombardment from both sides, and for the time being my ^{sole} ~~sole~~ would have been accomplished. Once the fleet is through the Dardanelles, I agree that the Turks might evacuate the peninsula, and that my transports should therefore follow the fleets if such a course should be safe. I fear, however, that the transports would be liable to loss from guns, with which the Navy might not have been able to deal elsewhere than in the forts."

Water Supply. 6.3.15.

Admeral Mudros advised Admlty as follows:-

"Water supply Port Mudros quite insufficient for large numbers of troops. Distilling ship is absolutely necessary."

Purchase of Tugs and Lighters for landing troops.
6.3.15.

Adml. Mudros advsd. Admlty that Grech wired that he had bought 4 tugs and a salvage vessel at Marseilles. As time presses however, he (Adml Mudros) had engaged a British subject named David Chalmers to purchase between 40 and 50 lighters capacity 100 - 120 men each and Piraeus and to engage men for handling same. Two steam hoppers, most suitable, had been purchased and delivered at Port Mudros.

Water Supply. 7.3.15.

Admlty wired Robinson. Finance Egypt as follows:-

"There is great difficulty in obtaining fresh water at Lemnos and no distilling ships are available. Transports must be supplied with as much fresh water as they can stow and troops should be cautioned to exercise strictest economy of water."

Admlty also wired R/A Mudros re same subject. on 7.3.15 as follows:- "There is no distilling ship. Transports have been warned to stow as much water as possible before leaving and to practice strict economy. On Feb. 24th Malta was ordered to put improvised distilling plant in a steamer, and until it arrives, men of war in harbour should distil and distribute water. You should if necessary charter vessels to bring water from Piraeus or Salonika by communicating with British Minister or Admiral Kerr.

Our reports state there was plenty of water in Lemnos island after 3 months drought and Royal Engineers should consider bringing an additional supply to Mudros."

French force for Dardanelles. 7.3.15.

Marine Paris advised French Embassy, for War Office London, of following:- "The French Expedty Force at present assembled at Bizerta will leave that port in two convoys with G.O.O. consisting of five or six ships which will need replenishing after the voyage leaves on 10th for Lemnos, when it will be replenished from our own resources; the second convoy consisting of the remaining ships, leaves on 13th and will rendezvous with Expedty force at the mouth of the Dardanelles where they will be completed ready for landing on 18th March."

Water supply. 8.3.15.

Marine Paris advised F.N.A. as under:-

"We are making all arrangements in our power to remedy the lack of drinking water. I suggest that you find out if it would be possible to charter in England tank vessels engaged in the transport of Molasses between England and the West Indies and which after being cleaned might transport drinking water."

Transport of Sir Ian Hamilton to Mudros.
12.3.15.

Special train arrived at Marscilles Sunday 14th March containing Genl. Sir Ian Hamilton with 13 Staff Officers and 14 servants and Military Clerks. Baggage one freight car full of personal effects and mess stores. "Phaeton" was ordered to meet party and convey them to Mudros at 2/5th Horse Power.

As more Aéroplanes were urgently required at Dardanelles, Admlty also advised Cmdr. "Phaeton" that as many as possible airoplanes and seaplanes with their personnel were to be taken back with Genl Hamilton.

Water Supply. 13.3.15.

Admlty to Adml. Supt. Malta (begins). "S.S."Sunik" a molasses tanker which has been used for water at Scapa Flow is being sent out. She holds 6,000 tons. The French are sending two 200 ton steam tanks from Biserta and are fitting an old transport to distil with main condensers. Sunik will be told to fill at Biserta" (ends).

Strengthening of Dardanelles Fleet. 13.3.15.

F.N.A. to Marine Paris (begins).

"Battleships "Queen" and "Implacable", under the command of Rear Admeral Thursby are being detached from Channel Fleet and sent at once to reinforce Dardanelles Flëet." (ends).

Ships appropriated for 29th Division.

Alaunia	City of Edinburgh	Manitou
Ausonia	Canada	Campanello
Haverford	Dongola	Aragon
Merican	Marquette	Calédonia
Andania	Knight of the Garter	Southland
Kingstoman	Verdala	Harmatris
Tintoretto	Melville	Arcadian.

Totals officers 1294. Men 20,390 Horses 7082.
Sailed 16th. 3.15.

Position of Base for Dardanelles troops 15.3.15.

From Lieut Genl. Sir J. Maxwell to Earl Kitchenor (Begins)....Both Birdwood and I would like definite instructions in view of the fact that troops and supplies are being sent direct from England to Lemnos without calling here. Is the base to be formed at Lemnos or Alexandria. My latest information from Lemnos is that only horses can be landed, the troops remaining on transports. I have heard nothing from Admeral Carden and I hear from the French Military Mission that Genl. D. Amade has left Biserta for Lemnos, with his force." (ends.)

Accident in Boiler Room "Dartmouth" 15.3.15.

"Queen Elizabeth" to Admlty (begins). "C" Boiler Room of "Dartmouth" wrecked by boiler explosion. Ship will require to go into Dock yard to make good defects. Cause of explosion not known yet, but not due to enemy gun fire. Regret to report 11 men Killed. "Dartmouths" speed reduced to 15 knots. Request "Chatham" may relieve her. Am retaining "Dartmouth" until relieved. Submit two cruisers of Talbot Class would be of great assistance here.

French troops movements. 16.3.15.

Adml. Mudros to Admlty (begins). First division of French Army consisting of 8,500 troops arrived this evening and remain afloat. There is sufficient water supply for troops now at Lemnos provided they are kept afloat."

Criticism of Mudros as base by V/A Carden. 16.3.15

V/A Carden Tenedos to Admlty (begins). First Lord of Admlty. Secret and Personal. Fourth concentration of Birdwoods force Lemnos would create congestion there is no room for transports in Mudros. Landing stages are being built Port Mudros but some time is needed before these can be finished sufficiently to cope with so large forces and necessary stores. The difficulty of water supply is great, wells are being sunk but water would have to be landed also for the use of the troops.

The re embarkation of the force into transports prior to active operations would be a lengthy operation. If troops were landed at Lemnos under these circumstances it is considered that it would take 3 times as long for them to reach area of active operations as would be the case if they were completely held in readiness in Egypt where embarkation facilities exist. If the remaining troops from Egypt are sent here it will be necessary for them to live in their transports at some other port than Mudros. Suggest that no definite decision be taken until General Hamilton has been consulted. He arrives in the forenoon of 18th" (ends).

The health of V/A Carden. 16.3.18.

Rear Adml. Wemyss Tenedos. to Admlty. (begins) "V/A Carden is suffering from Atonic dyspepsia and will require at least three or four weeks complete rest. He has been placed on the sick list." (ends).

On same date - 16.3.15 - V/A Carden advised that owing to his being placed on sick list he was handing over to Adml de Robeck who was well in Touch with all arrangements, present and future, and had been of great assistance in their preparations, and in whom Adml. Carden had fullest confidence of his judgment and determination.

Change of Command. 16.3.15.

Adml. Wemyss Mudros to Admlty (begins). "Urgent. In view of Adml. Cardens illness, Adml. de Robeck continues to carry out operations as arranged. I have returned to Mudros to be ready to turn over command of Base if necessary.

Strongly recommend Captn. Boyle, who has arrived here with a letter from Minister at Athens, should remain at Mudros in charge of base temporarily, if I proceed to Tenedos.

I am quite prepared to act under orders of de Robeck if you should think it desirable to promote him. De Robeck and I are in perfect accord and can loyally co operate whichever way you decide. Suggest Captn. Sadler be made Commodore. I am arranging to meet Genl Hamilton on his arrival and confer with him and Genl D'Amade" (ends).

On 17.3.15. First Lord advised both R/A de Robeck and R/Adml. Weymss that while Adml. Carden was on the sick list Rear/Adml. de Robeck would be directed to assume command of the Fleet with acting rank of Vice Adml. and that Adml. Weymss would act under his orders in command of the base or on any service required.

Report of Adml. de Robeck on operations of 18/3/15.

Addressed to Secy of the Admlty.

With regard to the general results of this attack, although the principal forts remained silent for considerable intervals, only a portion of their armaments can be considered disabled. The tactics employed by the enemy when the bombardment by the fleet becomes heavy, are to desert their guns and retire to bomb proof shelters. When they consider a favorable opportunity offers they remain at the guns and open fire again.

But taking into consideration the accuracy of fire of the ships and the number of explosions which occurred in the forts, both material and personnel must have suffered considerably. Throughout the greater part of the day, the fleet appeared to have a marked advantage as regards gunfire, so much so that the minesweepers were called in at 2.p.m. Soon after they were inside, it was, however, evident from the amount of fire from howitzers and field guns that they would not be able to proceed into the minefield at Kephez Point, and beyond sweeping in the area, where Bouvet sank the sweepers effected nothing.

Up to the time Bouvet was mined, everything had proceeded satisfactorily, the ships receiving little damage by the enemys gunfire, although the annoyance from concealed batteries was very great, it was evident that some of these batteries were directing their fire on the control positions of the Ships. In this way "Inflexible" lost two very fine officers who were in her fore control viz. Commander Rudolf H.C. Vener and Lieut Arthur W. Blaker.

During the period the second division Battleships "Ocean" "Irresistible" "Albion" and "Vengeance" were bombarding, the situation again looked satisfactory.

"Inflexible" reported shortly after 4.p.m. that she had struck a mine and she was ordered out of the Dardanelles. I submit that it reflects great credit on Capt. Phillimore and his ships company that "Inflexible" was able to reach shoal water off Tenedos.

Herewith Fuller report of operations carried out on 17th - 18th March, 1915.

"The attempts to clear the minefield at Kephez Point during the dark hours having failed, it became necessary to carry this out by daylight.

The plan of operations was fully explained to Captains of Ships on the 16th and issued to them on 17th March.

Sweeping operations against the Kephez minefield were suspended during the nights of 15/16 - 16/17 - 17/18 March, trawlers during this time being employed in thoroughly sweeping the area in which the ships would have to manoeuvre.

It was considered impracticable for ships to be at anchor inside the Dardanelles, owing to the heavy howitzer fire which can be brought to bear on them, subject to the necessity of occasionally moving, so as to throw off the enemys fire, ships remained stationary on

the 18th /

the 18th, in order that the gun fire of the fleet might be as accurate as possible.

The morning of the 18th was fine though it was at first doubtful whether the direction of the wind - which was from the south - would allow the operations to take place under favourable conditions for spotting, there was also a slight haze over the land, this however cleared and the wind having fallen, the signal was made at 8.26 a.m., that operations would be proceeded with, commencing at 10.30. a.m.

At 8.15 a.m. the commander of the British mine-sweepers reported area between 8,000 and 10,000 yards range was traversed by sweepers on the night of 17th and 18th without result.

Senior Officer of French minesweepers at 8.45. a.m. reported that they had swept as far as White Cliffs "eleven cutters showed signs of working - no mines have been caught in the sweeps."

- 8.50. a.m. Signal was made to French Admiral that Vice Adml did not wish him to approach nearer than 500 yards to the position of the reported mines situated S.E. of Saundere Bay.
- 9.7. a.m. It was reported that "Mosquito" had sunk 3 electric mines, none of which exploded, these were evidently empty mine cases which were used to form a boom defence below Saundere Bay, and which had been broken up by our explosive creeps.
- 9.10. a.m. Destroyers fitted with light sweep, were ordered to sweep in ahead of the fleet.
- 10.30. a.m. Ships reported "Ready for action and Line "A" proceeded in the following order:-

<i>George</i> "Prince Consort" (on Port Beam)	"Agamemnon" "Lord Nelson" "Queen Elizabeth" "Inflexible"	"Triumph" (on Starboard Beam)
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Destroyers with sweeps proceeded line "A" into the Dardanelles. Each Battleship had one picket boat in attendance on her to deal with floating mines and Wear was also in attendance on "Queen Elizabeth".

"Dartmouth" was ordered to patrol the North Coast of Gallipoli to fire on any batteries she could locate and which were firing on the fleet inside the straits.

"Dublin" demonstrated against Bashika Bay and watched Yeni Shehr.

- 11.0. a.m. Ships were engaging field guns and howitzers firing from the Asiatic shore.
- 11.15. a.m. Four steamers were observed in the middle of the stream off Chanak, these made off up the straits about 15 mines later.
- 11.25. a.m. "Queen Elizabeth" opened fire on Fort No. 19. "Agamemnon" "Lord Nelson" and "Inflexible" opening fire shortly afterwards in the order named. All Line "A" were firing by 11.36. a.m.
- 11.40. a.m. "Triumph" was firing at Fort No. 8. at a range of 10,400 yards.

Line "A" was now being subjected to a heavy fire from
howitzers and/

howitzers and field guns. One battery of the former, using 4 guns of about 6" calibre, which fell together, was particularly annoying. The forts also opened fire but the range, about 14,400 yards, was evidently too great for them and they fired only a few shots, none of which took effect.

11.50. a.m. A big explosion was seen in Fort No. 20 on which "Queen Elizabeth" was now firing, "Agamemnon" and "Lord Nelson" were apparently making good practice against Forts Nos. 13 and 17.

About this time the fire from the heavy howitzers was less intense, but there were still a large number of smaller guns firing on ships of Line A, all of whom were struck several times at this period.

0.6. p.m. "Suffren" "Bouvet" "Gaulois" "Charlemagne" (who formed the first line "B") were ordered to pass through Line "A" and engage the Forts at closer range.

The wind at this time was blowing almost straight from the ships to Chanak, making spotting difficult from aloft.

"Suffren" led the French squadron through Line "A" well ahead of Bouvet and by 0.32. p.m. she came under fire from, and engaged, the forts. Fort No. 13 was firing 4 guns and Forts Nos. 19, 7a, 9, and 8 all opened fire and possibly 16 as well.

The action now became general, both line A and B engaging the forts and at the same time, the lighter batteries.

Fort No. 7a. was very persistent, and seemed hard to hit.

0.47. p.m. "Aramemnon" was being made the target for most of the lighter guns, she turned 32 pts and the batteries lost the range.

"Inflexible" was also under heavy fire, and a picket boat alongside her was sunk.

0.52. p.m. Some large projectiles were falling into the water about 500 yards short of the line B.

Forts Nos. 13, 19, 7a, and 8, were all firing their practice was good, chiefly directed against line "B". "Prince George" and "Triumph".

0.56. p.m. "Inflexible" fore bridge observed to be on fire blazing fiercely.

About this time a heavy explosion occurred in Fort No. 13.

1.15. p.m. Line "B" under a heavy fire - "Suffren" apparently hit several times. Fort No. 8 had now ceased firing.

1.25. p.m. There was a slight lull in the firing, "Lord Nelson" however being straddled by a 6" battery.

"Gaulois" and "Charlemagne" were making good practice on Forts Nos. 13 and 16.

"Inflexible" quitted line to extinguish fire and clear control top, which had been wrecked by a shell and all personnel therein disabled.

- 1.38. p.m. Seaplane reported "Fort No. 16 firing, 19 hit, 17 hit, but firing, new battery at Kephez Point not manned, battery south of Saunders River firing.
- 1.43. p.m. There was little firing - Minesweepers were ordered to close. The French squadron were ordered out of the straits, also "Prince George" and "Triumph" the ships relieving them being up, just inside the straits.
- 1.54. p.m. "Suffren" leading line "B" out of straits, with Bouvet immediately astern. A large explosion occurred on the starboard side of the latter, abaft the after bridge, accompanied by dense masses of reddish black smoke.
2. "Bouvet" capsized to starboard and sank within two minutes of first explosion.

From the "Queen Elizabeth" it appeared that the explosion was not due to a mine, but possibly to a large projectile, it was also occurred, as she was previously observed to be on fire aft, and she sank so rapidly there appears little doubt that her magazine blew up, but whether it was exploded by a mine, gun fire, or an internal fire, is not clear.

British boats were quickly on the scene, but the whole episode occupied so short a time, that few of the crew could have reached the upper deck only 66 survivors were picked up. "Suffren" stood by till all survivors were picked up, the remainder of her line proceeding out of harbour. The enemy fired a few shells at the boats picking up survivors without however obtaining any hits.

- 2.15 p.m. "Queen Elizabeth" and "Lord Nelson" were practically the only ships firing, the forts being silent. About this time the enemy again opened fire with their 6" howitzer battery.
- 2.31. p.m. Seaplane over forts at 1.p.m. reported troops at Kephez Point. Forts Nos. 13, 16, 17 and 19 all manned and firing; Saundere also firing.
- 2.32. p.m. New line "B" passed through line "A" to engage forts at closer range. This line consisted of "Vengeance" "Irresistible", "Albion" and "Ocean", with "Swiftsure" and "Majestic" in support.
- 2.52. p.m. Line "B" were engaged with forts of which only No. 19 was firing at all rapidly.
- 3.7. p.m. Large explosion behind Fort No. 13, from the volume of smoke it appeared that an oil tank had been set on fire.
- 3.14. p.m. A heavy explosion was observed alongside "Irresistible", evidently a big shell.
- All forts were now firing rapidly but inaccurately. Forts No. 19 apparently concentrating on "Irresistible"; "Queen Elizabeth" in consequence opened salvo firing on it.
- 3.32. p.m. "Irresistible" was observed to have a slight list.
- 4.11. p.m. "Inflexible" reported "struck a mine," she proceeded out of straits.
- 4.14. p.m. "Irresistible" apparently unable to move, and with a noticeable list "Wear" was ordered to close her and ascertain what was the matter, signalling communication having broken down.

ø considered that a magazine explosion had

4.14.p.m.
(Contd). "Irresistible" was ordered to proceed out of straits if able to do so, and "Ocean" to prepare to take "Irresistible" in tow.

"Wear" was seen to go alongside "Irresistible" and subsequently returned to "Queen Elizabeth" at 4.50.p.m. with 28 officers and 582 crew of "Irresistible" on board her.

It was then ascertained for the first time that "Irresistible" had struck a mine, both engine rooms being immediately flooded.

As the ship was helpless her commanding officer decided to remove a portion of the crew, retaining the executive officers and 10 volunteers to work wires etc. should it be found possible to take her in tow.

The operation of removing the crew was carried out in a perfectly orderly manner, the ship being under fire the whole time from Forts Nos. 7 & 8 and batteries near Aren Kioi.

4.50.p.m. When it was learnt that "Irresistible" had also struck a mine, orders were given for line "B" to withdraw.

5.10.p.m. "Wear" having disembarked crew of "Irresistible" was ordered to close "Ocean" and "Irresistible" and direct the former to withdraw if she was unable to take the latter in tow.

5.50.p.m. Survivors on board "Irresistible" were removed to "Ocean", the Captains of both ships being of opinion that it was impracticable, to take "Irresistible" in tow, she being bows on to the Asiatic shore, listing badly, at right angles to the course for going out and there appearing to be insufficient room to manoeuvre between her and the shore.

It was therefore determined to leave her till dark, when an attempt to tow her would be made with destroyers and minesweepers, arrangements being meanwhile taken to torpedo and sink her in deep water, should there be any chance of her grounding, this was always a possibility, as she was in the dead water off White Cliffs, with a light breeze blowing up the straits.

"Irresistible" having been abandoned, it was decided in view of the unexpected mine menace, to abandon the mine sweeping of the Kephez minefield, it being inadvisable to leave heavy ships inside the straits to cover the minesweepers.

6.5.p.m. "Ocean", while withdrawing, struck a mine and took a quick list to starboard of about 15 degrees.

At the same time a shell, striking the starboard side, jammed the helm nearly hard aport. The list becoming gradually greater, her Commanding Officer determined to disembark the crew, this was done in the Destroyers "Colne", "Jed", and "Chelmer" under a heavy cross fire from Forts Nos. 7 and 8 and batteries at Aren Kioi. "Chelmer" was twice struck while alongside "Ocean".

Destroyers "Wear" "Raccoon" "Mosquito" and "Kennet" also stood by "Ocean".

When all were reported clear of the ship, the Captn. embarked in "Jed" and lay off till dark; he then returned to her to make absolutely certain no one was left on board and that nothing could be done to save her.

His opinion being that nothing could be done, the ship was finally abandoned in the centre of the straits at about 7.30.p.m.

6.5.p.m. The Captains of "Ocean" and "Irresistible" after reporting to
(contd). the Vice Admiral Commanding, returned to the Dardanelles to
join the destroyers, which, with six minesweepers, had been
ordered to enter the straits after dark to endeavour to tow
"Irresistible" into the current and prevent "Ocean" drifting
out of it.

No trace of either ship could be found, this was confirmed by
"Jed" at 11.p.m. after an exhaustive search, "Canopus" at day-
light also reconnoitred, and found no trace of either. There is
no doubt both ships sank in deep water.

The squadron anchored at Tenedos for the night, "Canopus" and
"Cornwallis" being on patrol with destroyers at the entrance
of the straits.

The damaged ships were dealt with as follows:-

"Inflexible" anchored north of Tenedos.
"Gaulois" grounded on North of Drepano Island.
Damage due to gunfire.

On the morning of the 19th instant, Contre Admrl.
Guepratte informed me that the "Suffren" was leaking forward,
it had been necessary to flood the fore magazine, on account
of fire and a heavy shell had started a leak.

"Inflexible" "Suffren" and "Gaulois" will therefore
require to go to Malta for repairs."

(Sgd). J. M. de Robeck.
Vict. Adml.

Adml's report of proceedings 19th March - 24th April 1915.

"After the indecisive attack on the defences of the
narrows on 18th March, it was imperative to reorganise the
sweeping flotilla our losses in ships on that day being entirely
due to the presence of mines, and not to the enemys gun fire.
Certain ships were also in need of temporary repairs for minor
damages inflicted by the guns of the forts at the narrows.

A patrol consisting of two battleships with attendant
destroyers was kept constantly off the entrance of the Dardanelles
entering the straits only for some specific object, and then
always preceded by minesweepers.

The reorganisation of the minesweeping flotilla proved
a lengthy operation, as new crews had in the majority of cases
to be provided for trawlers - the crews who had brought the boats
out from England, being unwilling to continue sweeping operations
which of necessity had to be carried out under fire which was
sometimes very heavy. Volunteers from the fleet manned those
boats in which the original crews refused to stay. Bad weather
seriously delayed the practice of the new crews.

Diary of events 19th March to 24th April inclusive.

19th March. A patrol of two battleships with attendant destroyers
was established at entrance to Dardanelles.
Remainder of fleet anchored north of Tenedos.
Temporary repairs being carried out on "Inflexible", "Suffren",
"Gaulois" and Chelmer".

Reorganisation/

Reorganisation of trawlers crews commenced using crews of late "Océan" and "Irresistible" and volunteers from fleet.

Experiments being carried out in fitting destroyers with Sweeps in order to possess sweeping ^{craft} capable of working against current of Dardanelles.

Rising Sea prevented our reconnaissance of straits by seaplanes.

20th March. "Agamemnon" "Lord Nelson" despatched to patrol in Gulf of Xeros.

"Gaulois" re floated after repairs had been executed by divers from "Albion" and "Triumph."

After dark "Grampers" carried out experimental firing at Kephez searchlights, using smoked glasses.

Progress on "Inflexible" satisfactory, salvage vessel commenced pumping out.

State of weather again prevented aerial reconnaissance of straits.

21st March. Southerly gale, no operations possible.

Arrangements concluded to move troops to Egypt 5,000 Australians only remaining in Lemnos.

In afternoon gale suddenly veered to northward, necessitating the moving of fleet to south side of Tenedos. "Inflexible" made the passage without accident.

"Queen Elizabeth" sailed for Mudros.

"Agamemnon" and "Lord Nelson" ordered to Mudros. "Dublin" to Xeros on patrol.

French contre-admiral requested to take command of this patrol with his ships and askold.

Enemy displayed no activity in neighbourhood of Bulair.

22nd March. Meeting between Vice Adml & Genl Sir Ian Hamilton to discuss future operations.

North easterly gale, operations suspended.

Reported by American S.S. "Maine" that a Turkish Torpedo Boat manned by Germans entered Smyrna 19th March.

A British destroyer was dispatched to watch the Gulf and "Dublin" recalled from Xeros preparatory to carrying out air reconnaissance of the part.

Gale interfering with sweeping-destroyers practicing under lee of Tenedos.

23rd March.

Major Temple R.M.A. appointed Military Governor and chief censor Tenedos, and arrangements made to land Royal Marine guard selected from detachments from late "Ocean" and "Irresistible" for safe custody of airdrome and patrol of island.

Strong North-easterly wind continues, no sweeping operations possible and rough sea preventing the landing of aeroplanes at Tenedos.

Sailing of "Dublin" and Seaplane carrier "Rabenfels" for Smyrna postponed.

- 24th March. Gale continuing. Destroyers and trawlers continuing sweeping at entrance of straits.
- Landing of Aeroplanes still delayed.
- "Dublin" and "Rabenfels" proceeded to Smyrna. Enemy fired on sweepers at entrance to straits from both shores.
- Some floating mines seen and sunk.
- 25th March. "Suffren" and "Gaulois" sailed for Malta. Contre Admiral transferring his flag to Charlemagne.
- Sweeping vessels engaged at entrance of straits; a few shots fired at them.
- North easterly gale still continuing.
- "Agamemnon" and "Lord Nelson" patrolling in Xeros Gulf under Contre-Amiral Commander Douglas engaged in making close reconnaissance of west of Gallipoli.
- Enemy using moveable searchlights on Asiatic shore.
- 25th March. Enemy aeroplane observed late in the evening.
- Rough sea at Smyrna preventing seaplane reconnecting port.
- 26th March. Weather improving.
- French seaplane after flight of 90 miles, reported on torpedo boat inside harbour.
- "Sapphire" sent to Myrna to take command of patrol. British seaplane reconnoctred straits and saw no signs of sunken ships, reported one gun of Fort No. 19 destroyed.
- One enemy Biplane sighted over Gallipoli.
- Squadron in Xeros Gulf shelled enemys position at Bulair without eliciting a reply from his guns and no movements of troops seen.
- 27th March. Seaplane made useful reconnaissance of Dardanelles. Observed new Batteries and ships at Nagara. reported salvage operations of Sapher appear to have been discontinued.
- Battleship on patrol shelled Krithia village without drawing enemy's fire, his troops had been reported in neighbourhood of village.
- Minesweepers operating inside straits at night were fired on without however suffering any damage.
- Destroyers covered minesweepers.
- 28th March. Battleships on patrol fired a few shells into Krithia also engaged concealed guns. "Majestic" being assisted in spotting by an aeroplane with good results.
- Destroyers were fired on at night from Seddul Bahr. Several floating mines were sunk.
- 29th March. Enemy aeroplane attacked "Ark Royal" in forenoon, dropping two large bombs; both missed, though one fell within ten yards of the ship.
- British aeroplanes all landed at Tenedos. Anti aircraft guns mounted in aerodrome.

- 29th March Battleships on patrol again practised firing on concealed guns (Contd). with aerial spotting.
- H.M.S. "Minerva" visited Dediagatch and was well received by authorities.
- 30th March. Reconnaissance of coast of Gallipoli by Condr. Douglas completed, instructions issued to all ships to make sketches whenever possible of likely landing places from Camp Helles to Bulair.
- Minesweepers operating inside straits covered by patrol battleships who replied to enemys fire.
- Work on nets to place across Dardanelles to catch floating mines progressing, party working on them in old castle Tenedos.
- 31st March. Battleships on patrol covered operations of minesweepers and engaged enemys batteries.
- High wind seriously delayed reconnaissance by aircraft. Small squadron being sent to Adramyti Gulf, ostensibly to cover a close reconnaissance of the beach there, with a view to misleading enemy as to our probable position of disembarkation.
- Enemy aeroplane sighted in evening.
- 1st April Battleships and destroyers on patrol engaged enemys concealed guns and covered minesweepers, enemy fired a few shots only.
- Signals observed being made from Cape Heles lighthouse.
- 2nd April. Minesweepers working inside Straits under fire from field guns - No casualties to them or covering ships. Enemys aeroplane attack "Albion", dropping two bombs without hitting. British aircraft engaged in reconnaissance flights and attacked enemys positions with bombs.
- 3rd April Minesweepers engaged inside straits, trawler No. 34. struck by shrapnel in engine room, 3 of crew wounded, one subsequently dying.
- Cape Helles lighthouse was demolished by "Prince of Wales."
- Battleships on patrol practising indirect fire with aeroplane spotting.
- 4th April. "Ark Royal" at Smyrna; seaplane reported three torpedo boats in harbour. Smyrna patrol re-inforced by one destroyer, now consists of Dartmouth and two destroyers - ordered to reconnoitre Chesme with a view to destruction of W/T Station there.
- Dartmouth shelled guns at Tres Tepe.
- Seaplane attacked torpedo boats in Smyrna twice without success.
- Battleships on patrol made several hits on concealed guns, aeroplane spotting
- Useful reconnaissance carried out by aircraft.
- Enemy opened considerable fire on sweepers inside straits.
- Trawler No. 92 received a hit in the funnel. "Colne" was holed on water line abreast foremost funnel "Londons" A.I. 6 inch gun burst while firing lyddite shell, guns crew complained of shock, the. no injury to personnel.

5th April. Strong northerly gale, operations suspended, sailing of "Inflexible" for Malta postponed.

6th April Gale in morning, moderated sufficiently in afternoon to permit of Aerial reconnaissance.

"Inflexible" conveyed by "Canopus" and "Talbot" left for Malta.

No movements of enemy's troops at Bulair.

7th April Battleships on patrol engaged with batteries inside straits - aeroplane spotting. At night they opened fire at Kum Kale and Saddul Bahr villages, setting them on fire, enemy reported as billeting in these at night.

Minesweeping inside straits discontinued, it being considered results did not justify risks to ships from enemy fire. During the night destroyer patrol was engaged with Batteries on European shore.

8th April From 31st March to 8th April the "Henry IV." was patrolling in Gulf of Xoros with other ships but nothing of importance occurred, they fired a few shells at certain Turkish works and Sketches were made of all possible landing places.

Battleships on patrol engaged enemy's guns and destroyer patrol was fired on.

"Swiftsure" and "Majestic" under command of Rear/Adml. Stuart Nicholson. M.V.O. carried out reconnaissance of landing facilities at Enos, using picket boats, a small body of enemy opened fire, but were dispersed by ships guns with some loss.

We suffered no casualties.

Enemy's main magazine at Faifur Kem was shelled by "Lord Nelson", result uncertain as sea was too rough to admit of seaplanes spotting.

9th April Battleships on patrol engaged with enemys batteries Aeroplane spotting.

10th April Battleships on patrol succeeded in hitting three enemy's guns - aeroplanes spotting.

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10th April.

Battleships on patrol succeeded in hitting three enemy guns, aeroplanes spotting. "MINERVA" at Smyrna relieved "DARTMOUTH". Seaplane carried by "MINERVA" was unable to reconnoitre harbout owing to rough sea. Destroyers fired on from both shores.

11th April.

"AGMEMNON" carried out reconnaissance of various places on north coast of Gulf of Xeros and fired on several enemy positions. Air reconnaissance reported no movements of troops in southern part of Gallipoli Peninsula. Submarine officers inspected Dardanelles from a destroyer and subsequently from an aeroplane. Enemy showed some activity inside Straits, firing on all ships that entered, without, however, scoring any hits.

12th April.

"MINERVA'S" seaplane reconnoitred Smyrna and reported three torpedo boats still in the harbour. "QUEEN ELIZABETH" carried out steam trials during which General HAMILTON and a number of Army Officers inspected landing places on coast of Gallipoli and at Bashika Bay. Troops in Mudros constantly practising landing on beach by day and night.

13th April.

Destroyers actively engaged inside Straits. "TRIUMPH" at night fired on searchlights without being able to hit them. Flying impossible owing to weather conditions. Staff of A. & N.Z. Army Corps inspected position of their landing. "AGMEMNON" proceeded to Dedeagatch to embark Colonel NAPIER and Mr. FITZMAURICE; her reception was most friendly. Captains of ships were informed confidentially of the positions their ships would occupy to cover the landing of the Army in order that they might inspect the area they were to fire on, prior to disembarkation. Agent supplied by the Army despatched to Kos to enquire into alleged landing of arms and oil at Budrum. Details for a raid on that place being discussed.

14th April.

Balloon kite tested in strong wind at Mudros with good results. Ships on patrol engaged enemy's batteries on night of 14th/15th; picket boats from "TRIUMPH" and "MAJESTIC" with volunteer crews attacked Kephez mine field with explosive creeps with a view to clearing passage Straits for submarines. "SCORPION" covered picket boats which picked up one cable and fired explosive creep, returning without suffering any casualties although one boat heavily fired on. Military Governor Tenedos organising gangs of Greeks ^{for service} as beach parties after Army is landed.

15th April.

"TRIUMPH" entered Straits in afternoon and carried out some experimental firing against trenches and wire entanglements with military officers on board. During practice she was struck four times sustaining slight material damage and two men were wounded. "CANOPUS" at Skyros Island ordered to organise force for raid on Budrum using one battalion Royal Naval Division. "TALBOT" reconnoitring in Gulf of Xeros sketching landing places. Further trials with kite balloon at Mudros with satisfactory results. Ship "MANICA" however not very suitable and some alterations in her being carried out.

16th April.

"LORD NELSON" assisted by seaplane spotting again bombarded Taifur Keui evidently hitting one magazine as a large explosion was observed. Transport "MANITOU" en route for Mudros was attacked east of Skyro Island by Turkish torpedo boat "DEMIR HISSAR". Troops were given 8 minutes in which to abandon ship; three torpedoes were then fired, all of which missed. Troops getting into boats overcrowded them and two upset; many also jumped

jumped overboard. Fiftyone men were drowned including some ship's officers. Torpedo boat subsequently chased by "KENNET" and "JED". On being cut off by "WEAR" in Khios Channel, ran herself aground in Kalamuti Bay. Crew were arrested by local authorities and interned. "DARTMOUTH" and destroyers sent to convoy remainder of transports through dangerous area. This necessitating abandonment of sweeping operations by destroyers. Seaplanes attacked store depots and ships in port at Gallipoli and observed several gun emplacements. Aeroplanes attacked troops near Maidos. Additional destroyer sent to Smyrna patrol.

17th April.

Morning of 17th. Submarine E15 attempted passage of Dardanelles with the object of operating in Sea of Marmora and cutting communication by sea with Gallipoli Peninsula. Arrangements made for aeroplane to follow the passage and drop bombs to create diversion. Aeroplane returned 10 a.m. reported submarine aground south of Kephiz light with enemy torpedo boat alongside. Submarine B6 was sent up to torpedo the wreck; she fired one torpedo, being under fire herself, the torpedo did not hit, but a tug alongside E15 was observed to sink by H.M.S. "VENGEANCE". Torpedo from B6 was subsequently recovered. On night of 17th/18th "SCORPION" and "GRAMPUS" attacked the wreck, the former getting within 1000 yards of supposed position. However by clever manipulation of searchlights enemy hid submarine and destroyers were forced to retire under heavy fire. Seaplane reconnoitring Smyrna reported only two torpedo boats in the harbour.

18th April.

Enemy's aeroplane attacked Tenedos aerodrome unsuccessfully. Submarine B11 reconnoitred wreck of E15 at dawn but fog prevented wreck being seen. In afternoon "TRIUMPH" and "MAJESTIC" attacked wreck with aeroplane spotting, no hits obtained. Aeroplane with bombs prevented enemy approaching E15. At night picket boats from "TRIUMPH" and "MAJESTIC" manned by volunteer crews successfully attacked and torpedoed E15 rendering her useless for service with the enemy. "MINERVA" reported wireless station stated to be at Chesme is actually at Latyato and not within range of the sea.

19th April.

Submarine B6 reconnoitred wreck of E15 and reported her heeled over on starboard side, conning tower probably resting on bottom. B6 narrowly missed being wrecked near E15, she was caught by the strong current and carried onshore, but by skilful handling managed to get off though fire was opened on her. Her conning tower was exposed for $3\frac{1}{2}$ minutes. At a meeting of all the principal officers it was decided to commence operations on Friday 23rd April. Agent returned from Budrum; reported no oil or rifles landed there, his information being quite conclusive. Raid on Budrum in consequence postponed by order of Admiralty. "BACCHANTE" and "TALBOT" assisted by balloon kite and aeroplane spotting attacked encampments at dawn and subsequently field guns in neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe. Spotting from balloon kite very well reported on. Battleships on patrol harassing enemy on both shores.

20th April.

Preparations for landing on 23rd being completed. Ships ready to leave for preliminary rendezvous.

21st April.

Strong N.E. wind. Commencement of operations postponed for twenty-four hours. Yacht "TRIAD" armed with two 12 pounders sent to relieve "MINERVA" on Smyrna patrol. Bomb attack on Maidos, headquarters of Turkish Army, ordered for first favourable day.

- 22nd April. No improvement in weather conditions; commencement again postponed twentyfour hours. Weather improved in afternoon and air attack on Maidos took place - from subsequent Turkish sources, damage inflicted appears to have been considerable.
- 23rd April. Weather steadily improved. Transports, tugs and lighters, etc., leaving Port Mudros for their preliminary rendezvous.
- 24th April. Weather after showing signs of again breaking steadily improved; all squadrons assembled at their preliminary rendezvous. AE2 attempted passage of Dardanelles but was forced to return owing to slight temporary defect.

ATTACK ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION -

March 18th,
1 9 1 5.

Admiralty to C.-in-C. Mediterranean.

"On arrival of S.S."ABDA" with aeroplanes, you should consider an air attack by seaplanes on the railway bridge crossing Maritza River near Kuleli Station. If machines fly in line of bridge and drop 100 lb. bombs considerable damage might be done. Before making attack, Sir Ian HAMILTON should be consulted with regard to details."

EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED - MARCH 18th, 1915.

By W/T from V/A de ROBECK.

" "MINERVA" proceeded to Malta with sick and wounded in order to clear ships before operations. V/A CARDEN took passage to comply with medical opinion and secure complete rest at Malta for short period."

LOCATION OF BASE - 18/3/1915.

From General Sir Ian HAMILTON to Earl KITCHENER :

"I have seen D'AMADE, PARIS (G.O.C. Naval Div.), MacLAGAN and Admiral WEMYSS. There are at present at Lemnos a Naval Division, a French Division and an Australian Brigade. Owing to want of facilities for disembarkation and more especially for re-embarkation, this force, supposing animals are disembarked, would be at least one fortnight nearer any point of destination if transferred to Egypt or Egyptian ports than if it remains at Lemnos. The animals must be disembarked very soon, as some are dying already. I will telegraph fully tomorrow after I have seen General BIRDWOOD. Meanwhile my idea would be to send the Naval Division to Alexandria, the French Division to Port Said, and to leave the Australian Brigade here at Lemnos to meet any sudden call for infantry which the Admiral might make. The closeness of Lemnos to the Dardanelles as implying the rapid transport of troops is illusory. The Naval Division transports have been loaded under peace conditions and must be completely discharged and reloaded. General D'AMADE is in full agreement as regards the French Division not remaining here. Broadly, only 5000 Australian Infantry need remain here at Lemnos to meet a sudden call, and the base for the whole force should be removed from Lemnos to Alexandria."

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S APPRECIATION OF SITUATION - 19/3/1915.

General Sir Ian HAMILTON to Earl KITCHENER.

"Yesterday we steamed close along the whole western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Here and there

there landing places were of course observed, but with the exception of Cape Helles they were all commanded by elaborate networks of trenches. So near were we that we could see quite clearly the barbed wire defences covering the trenches. Afterwards we entered the Straits but before we had gone a mile we were shelled by field guns, and we were then signalled to stand by H.M.S. "INFLEXIBLE" on her way back to Tenedos. I have not yet received any report on the naval action but from what I actually saw of the extraordinarily gallant attempt made yesterday, — I am being most reluctantly driven towards the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less likely to be forced by battleships than at one time seemed probable, and that if the Army is to participate, its operations will not assume the subsidiary form anticipated. The Army's share will not be a case of landing parties for the destruction of forts, etc., but rather a case of deliberate and progressive military operation carried out in force in order to make good the passage of the Navy."

V/A Eastern Mediterranean to Admiralty - 20/3/1915.

"Conditions of "INFLEXIBLE" 9 p.m. 19th - Salvage vessel started pumping and water is being lowered. Progress satisfactory.

Plan for reorganising minesweeping progressing. Eight "Beagle" class being fitted as minesweepers. Six "River" class and four torpedo boats as mine seekers with light sweeps and a flotilla of picket boats with explosive creeps. Fifty British minesweepers manned entirely by volunteers and twelve French sweepers will be available. The whole area in which ships will manoeuvre in order to dominate forts at the Narrows and the batteries protecting the Kephiz minefields, will be thoroughly swept again; no more night sweeping will be carried out.

Tunny(?)nets and indicator nets will be laid across Straits night before attack is renewed. It is hoped to be in a position to commence operations in three or four days, but delay is inevitable as new crews and destroyers will need some preliminary practice. No ship will enter Dardanelles unless everything is ready for a sustained attack. In the meantime feints at landing in various places will be made in order to draw off some of the enemy's field guns."

REPLACEMENT OF "BOUVET".

French Admiralty advised on 19/3/1915 that "HENRI QUATRE" had been given orders to proceed to the Dardanelles.

FITTING OUT SMOKE SCREENS - 21/3/1915.

Admiralty to Admiral Supt. Malta.

Begins "Decided to fit at Malta as ~~xxxxxxx~~ smoke screen ships four large and sixteen smaller vessels stop Each of former to be capable of holding four hundred tons of combustible material, each of latter ten to fifteen tons stop Vessels need not be steamers as they can be towed stop Total material required is twelve hundred tons coal, three hundred tons shavings, brushwood, etc., one hundred tons offal wood, two thousand four hundred barrels tar stop Vessels and material to be collected on station as far as possible stop Method of loading and supplementary particulars will be telegraphed shortly. Telegraph promptly what can be provided on station and quantities of materials if any which must be sent from England stop Daily telegram reporting progress will be subsequently required stop Matter is urgent and important and every effort is to be made to get vessels ready earliest possible date" Ends.

CENSORSHIP - 21/3/1915.

Admiralty wired V/A de ROBECK advising him that a number of War Correspondents including Ward PRICE and STEVENS appeared to have established themselves at Tenedos. It was desirable that an effective censorship should be immediately established and correspondents definitely recognised and regulated. It was also proposed to send out three correspondents and a photographer, representative of the whole press and they could be accommodated on board if convenient. On their arrival all unauthorised correspondents should leave the military zone. Suggested that the V/A did not occupy himself too much with these matters but delegate them to some competent Staff Officer, who in case of difficulty could apply to the Admiralty.

AEROPLANES - 23/3/1915.

V/A at Mudros reported arrival of Commander SAMSON and 11 aeroplanes at Mudros and his departure for Tenedos. All equipment arrived except wireless which is in another ship.
following

POSSIBLE DATE OF OPERATIONS AND THEIR COURSE - 23/3/1915.

A/S Malta to Admiralty.

Begins "Following from "QUEEN ELIZABETH":- At meeting today with Generals HAMILTON and BIRDWOOD, the former told me Army will not be in a position to undertake any military operations before 14th April. In order to maintain our communication when the Fleet penetrates into the Sea of Marmora it is necessary to destroy all guns of positions guarding the Straits. These are numerous and only small percentage can be rendered useless by gunfire. The landing of demolishing party on 26th February evidently surprised enemy. From our experience on 4th March it seems in future destruction of guns will have to be carried out in face of strenuous and well prepared opposition. I do not think it a practicable operation to land a force adequate to undertake this service inside Dardanelles. General HAMILTON concurs in this opinion. If the guns are not destroyed any success of Fleet may be nullified by the Straits closing up after the ships have passed through and as loss of material will probably be heavy ships may not be available to keep Dardanelles open. The mine menace will continue until the Sea of Marmora is reached, being much greater than was anticipated. It must be carefully and thoroughly dealt with both as regards mines and from floating mines. This will take time to accomplish but our arrangements will be ready by the time Army can act. It appears better to prepare a decisive effort about the middle of April than risk a great deal for what may possibly be only a partial solution" Ends.

NAVAL OFFICERS TO COMMAND TRANSPORTS - 23/3/1915.

Admiral Mudros to Admiralty.

Begins " Experience teaches that Masters of transports cannot be depended on to anchor their ships accurately or punctually and as accuracy and punctuality are essential contributions to success of forth-coming combined operations I urgently request that Naval Officers may be appointed to command each group of three transports and that if possible one signal rating should be allocated to each transport. Retired officers preferred, late navigators would suit. If this request is granted propose requisite number should be sent immediately to Port Said, Alexandria and Mudros" Ends.

LOSS OF TORPEDO BOAT. - 23/3/1915.

R/A Wemyss Mudros to Admiralty.

Begins " Regret to report that Torpedo Boat 064 was wrecked during northerly gale on east side of Lemnos Island on the night of 21st March. Vessel is a total wreck. Crew saved." Ends.

EARL KITCHENER CONSIDERS DELAY TOO GREAT. - 23/3/1915.

Earl KITCHENER to General Sir Ian HAMILTON.

Begins "I hear that 14th April is considered by you as about the date for commencement of military operations if the Dardanelles have not been forced by the Fleet before that date. I think you had better know at once that I regard any such postponement as far too long. I should like to know how soon you could act on shore." Ends.

NECESSITY OF LIGHTERS FOR LANDING FORCES - 23/3/1915.

General Sir Ian HAMILTON to Earl KITCHENER.

Begins "It is the first step of landing under fire which is the most anxious as well as the most important in this operation. If the Admiralty could improvise and send out urgently 20 or 30 large lighters the difficulty and duration would be reduced by at least one half. These lighters should each be capable of carrying 400 to 500 men or 30 to 40 horses and should be protected with bullet proof armour." Ends.

REALIZATION THAT LARGE MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY. - 23/3/1915.

General Sir Ian HAMILTON to Earl KITCHENER.

Begins "Referring to my telegram of 21st March I have now conferred with Admiral and we are equally convinced that to enable the Fleet effectively to force the passage of the Dardanelles the co-operation of the whole military force will be necessary. The strength of the enemy on the Gallipoli Peninsula is estimated at about 40,000 with a reserve of 30,000 somewhere west of Rodosto. The unsettled weather prevailing in March introduces a dangerous incalculable factor into the operation of landing a large force in the face of certain opposition but the weather next month should be more settled and I am sanguine of the success then of a single straightforward scheme based on your broad principles. I have already worked out the main features of my scheme and I can communicate them if you think it safe to do so. Practically the whole of my force will be required to effect what I have planned and on the thoroughness with which I can make the preliminary arrangements of which the proper allocation of troops etc., to transports is not the least important, the success of my plans will largely depend. This is one of the principal reasons why I attach importance to the thorough organisation of the expedition at a convenient base like Alexandria. The Turks will be kept busy meanwhile by Admiral." Ends.

General Sir Ian HAMILTON to Earl KITCHENER - 24/3/1915.

Begins "I have not yet named any date as I considered that this mainly depended on the arrival of the XXIXth Division. In any case it would be futile to fix a definite date seeing that during the week I have been at Lemnos there has been only one day in which the re-embarkation of men ashore has been possible owing to the stormy weather. Taking the XXIXth Division as the ruling factor the advance party reaches Malta on 30th March and the other ships leave England 5 days later. As the troops were embarked for convenience and not for military operations ~~at~~ all will have to be rearranged, but the XXIXth requires less re-arranging than the others and the delay to the last detachment need not exceed two days at Malta. I shall recast my plans accordingly, if larger considerations cause you to modify your original instructions. On the local military situation, however, your forecast was perfectly sound.

BIRDWOOD'S force is weak in artillery; the Naval Division has none that is mobile; while the enemy has a large number of field

field guns and howitzers in concealed positions which cannot be dealt with by fire from ships. The guns of the XXIXth Division are, therefore, very desirable. I hope in any case to complete BIRDWOOD'S New Zealand ~~Brigade~~ Division by a brigade of Ghurkas who would be admirably suited to the terrain, in place of the Mounted Brigade, which for the present would be left in Egypt. I am starting for Alexandria. The Admiral, whose confidence in the Navy seems to have been raised even higher by recent events, and who is a thruster if ever there was one, is in agreement with this telegram." Ends.

DECISION OF de ROBECK THAT TIME IS RIPE FOR COMBINED ATTACK. 27/3/15.

V/A de ROBECK to Admiralty.

Begins "First Lord. Secret. I do not consider check on 18th was decisive and am still of opinion that a portion of Fleet would succeed in entering Sea of Marmora. Nothing has occurred since 21st to alter my intention to press enemy hard until I am in a position to deliver a decisive attack. On 21st I was prepared to go forward irrespective of the Army as I fully realised that this matter must be carried through to successful issue regardless of cost and also because in view of the military opinion expressed in your 70 and which if persisted in would in no wise assist the Navy in their task, I did not anticipate the possibility of military cooperation in the forcing of the ~~Balkan~~ Straits though I have always been of opinion that decisive result would be best obtained by a combined operation rather than by either a Naval or Military force acting alone. On 22nd having conferred with General and heard his proposals, I learned that the cooperation of the Army and Navy was considered by him a sound operation of war and that he was fully prepared to work with the Navy in the forcing of the Dardanelles but that he could not act before 14th April. The plan discussed with General HAMILTON and now in the course of preparation pending ~~xxx~~ your approval of my 265 will effect in my opinion decisive and overwhelming results. The original approved plan for forcing the Dardanelles by ships was drawn up on the assumption that gunfire alone was capable of destroying the forts. This assumption has been conclusively proved to be wrong when applied to the attacking of open forts by high velocity guns. For instance, Fort 8 has been frequently bombarded at distant and close ranges; the damage caused is probably one gun disabled. Shells which hit either expended their destructive power uselessly on the parapet or destroyed some unimportant building in the background of the fort. To obtain direct hits on each gun has been found impracticable even at ranges of 700 to 800 yards as was attempted in the case of Forts 3 and 6. One gun in Fort 4 was found loaded and fit for service on 26th February although the fort had been heavily bombarded for two days at long range and at short range. The utmost that can be expected of ships is to dominate the forts to such an extent that gun crews cannot fight the guns; any more permanent disablement could only be carried out with an excessive expenditure of ammunition at point blank range. The report of operations carried out against Tsing Tau recently strengthens this opinion. Conclusions drawn from the attack on the Cupola forts at Antwerp by heavy howitzers are quite misleading when applied to the case described above. To engage Forts 7 and 8 at close range entails ships coming under fire of forts at the Narrows; these have therefore to be silenced with consequence heavy expenditure of ammunition which cannot be spared. Further wear of the old guns is causing me some anxiety. On the 18th there were several premature bursts of ~~shell~~ ^{common} and guns were out of action from time to time. It would be the worst policy to carry out bombardment which could not be brought to a decisive result. To destroy forts therefore, it is necessary to land demolishing parties. To cover these parties at the Narrows is a task General HAMILTON is not prepared to undertake and I fully concur in his views. To carry the demolition out by surprise is impracticable. The mine menace being even greater than ~~xxx~~ anticipated, the number of torpedo tubes

tubes by all reports having been added to, combined with the fact that they cannot be destroyed, materially increases the difficulties of clearing passage for the Fleet which has to be carried out while the forts are kept silenced by gunfire. The result of Naval action alone might in my opinion be a brilliant success or quite indecisive. Success depends largely on the effect that the appearance of the Fleet off Constantinople would produce on the Turkish army, which appears to control the situation in Turkey at present and which is itself dominated by the Germans; but if the Turkish army is undismayed by the advent of the Fleet into the Sea of Marmora and the Straits are closed behind it, the length of time which which ships can operate and maintain themselves in that Sea depends almost entirely on the number of colliers and ammunition ships which can accompany the Fleet. And as the passage will be contested the percentage of large unprotected ships which can be expected to get through is small. The passage of supply ships for the Fleet through the Dardanelles with the forts still intact is a problem to which I can see no practical solution. In such a case it would be vital for the Army to occupy the Peninsula, which would open the Straits as guns on Asiatic side can be dominated from the European shore sufficiently to permit ships to pass through. The landing of an army of the size contemplated in the face of ~~xxxxxx~~ strenuous opposition is in my opinion an operation requiring the assistance of all Naval forces available. A landing at Bulair would not necessarily cause Turks to abandon Peninsula and ~~xxxxxxxx~~ there could be no two opinions that a Fleet intact outside the Dardanelles can do this better than the remains of a Fleet inside with little ammunition. With Gallipoli Peninsula held by our Army and Squadron through Dardanelles our success would be assured. The delay possibly of a fortnight will allow cooperation which would really prove a factor that will reduce length of time necessary to complete the campaign in Sea of Marmora and occupy Constantinople." Ends.

On 27/3/1915.

1st Lord advised A/S Malta to inform Admiral CARDEN that Admiralty sympathised with his desire to resume command of operations at earliest possible moment, but that it was a matter which must be governed by medical advice. He should therefore return to England for survey.

ACTION BY NAVY IN EVENT OF ARMY BEING CHECKED. - 27/3/1915.

1st Lord to V/A de ROBECK. "Personal and Secret. With regard ~~to~~ previous telegrams what will the Fleet do if the Army is checked? Suppose for instance that the Army is brought to a standstill against the Kilid Bahr plateau, do you intend to push through separately leaving only sufficient ships to support the Army or do you consider that your decisive attack can only be delivered if the Army has already succeeded. Secondly my desire is to sustain you in all action necessary for your success and therefore it is important I should know exactly what you have in mind. Do not be vexed by these inquiries. The only thing is to win."

30/3/1915.

From "QUEEN ELIZABETH" R/A NICHOLSON transferred flag to "SWIFTSURE" March 30th and has taken command ~~of~~ 3rd Division East Mediterranean Squadron.

RECONNAISSANCE OF LANDING PLACES. 30/3/1915.

Mudros to Admiralty.

Begins "Commander DOUGLAS in "MOSQUITO" under cover of battleship completed close reconnaissance of landing places between Bulair and Cape Helles." Ends.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR LANDING TROOPS. 4/4/1915.

On 1st Lord asking V/A de ROBECK to telegraph particulars of his arrangements for landing of the Army the following was forwarded. "V/A Eastern Mediterranean Mudros to Admiralty. Begins "Covering force will be landed in pulling boats from transports and ships, towed in towards landing places; transports not approaching until footing has been gained. Details of covering force which cannot be landed in first trip will approach landing places in destroyers and minesweeping vessels, etc.

General HAMILTON has not informed me yet whether the covering force will land at night and attempt a surprise or by day and obtain maximum assistance from gun fire of Fleet; our preparations cover both contingencies. Main body will be landed chiefly in lighters - 44 of these are available, all horse boats from Egypt being brought in transports. To tow these there are 18 tugs together with picket boats of Fleet and some trawlers. Picket boats have all had thorough overhaul since the 18th and ship's boats have been fitted with crows. Floating pier head has been constructed. Once pier has been built French minesweeping vessels will be able to land men themselves direct. Everything is being done to ensure a rapid landing which will continue day and night.

Personnel : All tugs, lighters and transport's boats are being provided with service ratings. The first two crews from "OCEAN" and "IRRESISTIBLE" have been taken, remainder will be found by battleships. Supply of officers is chief difficulty. Beach and transport parties are being detailed and all arrangements that can be undertaken before the return of General Hamilton are being pushed on. Captain MITCHELL has gone with General HAMILTON to Egypt to complete certain details with which he has been occupied for several weeks. Progress to date has, I consider, been good and directly General HAMILTON returns the final orders will be given. Rear Admiral WEMYSS who is in general charge of the landing has made arrangements for a regular service of supply ships to run between Mudros and the Army. With regard to progress of minesweeping operations 17 British trawlers, all available, have had service or volunteer crews placed in them. Naval officers are in command of each. 8 "Beagle" class destroyers have been fitted with 9 foot kites and 2½ inches sweeps, to be used as fast sweeping boats. 6 "River" class have been fitted with light sweeps for use as mine seekers. Picket boats are prepared with explosive creeps. Net parties organised. All are practised daily and sweep inside Dardanelles to keep clear area in which ships will manoeuvre primarily." Ends.

PLAN OF LANDING. 11/4/1915.

V/A de ROBECK to Admiralty.

Begins "Most Secret. General HAMILTON arrived morning of 10th and communicated his plan of operations confidentially to me; which is as follows : A main landing at Cape Helles and Morto Bay with the Krithia Ridge as the objective, covering force from which advance will be made against the Kilid Bahr Plateau. Simultaneously a feint will be made near Gaba Tepe which will probably develop into landing and a seizure of a covering position on foot of hill to Sari Bair whence enemy can be prevented from reinforcing the Kilid Bahr Plateau from the north - at the same time there will be demonstrations in North Xeros and a heavy bombardment of Bulair lines so as to keep the enemy busy everywhere and attempt to mystify him as to real point of attack. I am completing arrangements for meeting his requirements and this will fully occupy the whole resources of the Fleet. Directly the Army is established the combined attack on the defences of the Narrows will take place, Navy and Army advancing side by side.

I will inform you fully of the details of Naval cooperation when complete. Navy will be ready to act when the Army is assembled. The date of the actual commencement must then be governed entirely by the weather." Ends.

MOVEMENTS OF SHIPS.

Arrivals at Mudros, 11/4/1915 :-

"RACCOON", "BULLDOG", "PINCHER", "RATTLESNAKE", "SCOURGE",
"NEWMARKET", "FOLKESTONE", "CLACTON".

CARE OF "QUEEN ELIZABETH". 12/4/1915.

Admiralty to V/A de ROBECK.

Begins "We are sure you realise "QUEEN ELIZABETH" is of an entirely different value from all other ships in your command and that you will take every possible precaution to safeguard her from serious injury. She should not attempt herself to pass the Narrows although no doubt you may require her for the long range bombardment of the forts." W.S.C." Ends.

MOVEMENTS OF SHIPS. 12/4/1915.

Arrivals Mudros :-

"BEAGLE", "FOXHOUND".

Arrivals Mudros, 13/4/1915 :-

"MINNETONKA", "ARMADALE", "CASTLE" (?) "ITRIA", "INDIAN", "ANDANIA",
and "KARROO".

DELAY IN PREPARATIONS FOR LANDING. 14/4/1915.

In replying to a query from Earl Kitchener as to cause of delay, General HAMILTON said: "Broadly speaking, the delay is chiefly due to the fact that everyone and everything connected with the Mercantile Marine seems to work a little in arrears. It is discovered at the ~~exact~~ moment of starting that the water tanks are empty which causes 12 hours delay, or there is some similar miscalculation. Cumulatively this mounts up to days. More specifically, several days were lost by the late arrival of two ships of the 29th Division and the necessity of revictualling the Australian transports. All will be assembled (D.V.) by 18th April except the French, who are rather at sea on the water. They will only be beginning to arrive but I mean to start without them and let them chip in as they come up. They will see that they are not being left out as they appear in orders and D'AMADE understands that he is being regarded as Napoleon's old guard and kept a little in reserve. The weather is still unsettled and renders the operation quite impossible at present." Ends.

SUBMARINES ACTIONS IN STRAITS. 14/4/1915.

V/A Mudros to Admiralty.

Begins "Commanding officers of E class submarines have reconnoitred Dardanelles in destroyer and aeroplane. They will undertake the passage of the Straits singly at intervals of 24 hours with a view to operating off Gallipoli town and cutting enemy's sea communication. The selected moment for their passage through Dardanelles will be 2 or 3 days before the combined operations commence." Ends.

MOVEMENTS OF SHIPS. 14/4/1915.

Arrivals Mudros :

"ARAGON", "MERCIAN", "GLOUCESTER CASTLE", "KATUNA", "CAWDOR CASTLE",
"SOMALI", "OLIVE", "BARON BALFOUR", "BIEN HOA" (French).

Arrivals Mudros 14th :

"VENGEANCE", 4 French Torpedo Boats, "RESCUE", "LYNN".

SUGGESTED RUSSIAN DEMONSTRATION: 15/4/1915.

From General Sir Ian HAMILTON to Earl KITCHENER.

Begins "It is reported today that since 8th April the 2nd Army Corps, Nizam, has been moved to Constantinople from the Caucasus. If this report is correct, unless its attention is occupied elsewhere this Corps will be available to reinforce the Gallipoli Peninsula. Would it be possible to stir up the Russians to make a push in the Caucasus? At any rate I hope that the two Siberian Divisions which are destined for Constantinople may soon do something, if it is only to embark in their ships, although I gather that the Russian Admiral on account of the "GOEBEN" is averse from letting them sail." Ends.

On 15/4/1915 General HAMILTON also telegraphed that the first aerial photos had that day been taken and it was hoped that their information about Achi Baba, Kilid Bahr and all possible landing places would be considerably amplified. He also stated that several pier lighters had been lost while being towed from Egypt during rough weather; a fact the more serious as they were carrying the reserve water which was to be landed on the first day of disembarkation. Reported also that the spirit of the troops was excellent and as an example quotes the reply of an Australian Colonel who looking grave at the sketch of barbed wire, when asked what he thought of the problem replied, "What is worrying me is how I shall feed and water the prisoners!"

TRANSPORTS MOVEMENTS. 16/4/1915.

Transport arrivals 14th, Mudros :-

"ARRANMORE", "INKONKA", "SEANG BEE", "HAVERFORD", "DONGOLA", "ITONUS".

Arrivals Mudros 15th :

Fleet Sweeper "REINDEER".

HOSPITAL SHIP - 17/4/1915.

V/A Mudros to Admiralty.

Begins "Submit a 2nd Hospital Ship to be sent for squadron as "SOUDAN" alone will not be sufficient." Ends.

DEFENCES OF PENINSULA. 18/4/1915.

General Sir Ian HAMILTON to Earl KITCHENER.

Begins "Herewith general outline of defences on southern half of Gallipoli Peninsula, as disclosed by latest aeroplane reconnaissance.

- (1) A line of trenches and entanglements facing seawards and stretching from Kaba Tepe to the end of the cliffs 4 miles north of Tekke Burnu.
- (2) An inner line from Kalmaz Dagh through N.W. of Kilid Bahr Plateau across by Maghram through big redoubt and batteries round the north of Eveden thence round 591 Achi Baba and back along the crest of the line to 344 on the Straits.
- (3) Complete system of trenches and entanglements supported by guns in concealed positions covering landing places at southern extremity of Peninsula, the most important of which are those 1 inch N.W. of encampment in Morte Bay, 1 mile N. of De TOTT'S Battery, 600 yards N. of Point 138 and 300 yards S.E. of the same Point and on each side of the road leading S.W. from Krithia $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from "K" of Krithia. 129 gun emplacements were seen, but owing to their being roofed it is not possible to say whether there were guns in them, but it is probable that many of them are alternative.

On the whole Peninsula there are 100 mobile guns and howitzers." Ends.

FORTS REFERRED TO IN PREVIOUS VOLUME ONLY BY NUMBER HEREWITH IDENTIFIED :

Fort 1	Cape Helles. Fener Tabia.
" 1A	Gaba Tepe.
" 1B	Cape Tekeh Earthworks.
" 2	Cape Helles. Field Gun Battery.
" 3	Seddul Bahr.
" 3A	Field Battery. " " "
" 4	Orkhanieh Tabia. " " "
" 5	Orkhanieh. " " "
" 6	Kum Kalessi Tabia.
" 7	Field Battery.
" 7A	Suandere Battery.
" 7B	Field Battery.
" 8	Mount Dardanus.
" 8A	Kephez Point Battery.
" 8B	Battery S. of Kephez Bay.
" 8C	White Cliffs Battery.
" 9	Tekeh (Yildiz Tabia.)
" 10	Field Battery.
" 11	Konja Suyu Tabia.
" 12	Field Battery.
" 13	Rumili Medjidieh Tabia.
" 13A	Fountain Battery. ? <i>Mountain</i>
" 14	Field Battery.
" 15	" "
" 16	Hamidieh II Tabia (Toprak).
" 17	Fort Namazieh .
" 18	Bilas Baba Tabia (Kusghun).
" 19	Hamidieh I Tabia.
" 20	Hamidieh III (or Sultanieh, or Chimenlek).
" 21	Derma Bernu Battery.
" 22	Derma Bernu Tabia.
" 23	Medjidieh Avan Tabia.
" 24	Anadola Medjidieh.
" 25	Cham Burnu Tabia.
" 26	Cham Kalessi.
" 27	Keosch Kalessi.
" 28	Maitos Tabia (Kilia L ^O doss).
" 29	Mal Tepeh Tabia.
" 30	Nagara Kalessi.
" 31	Nagara Baba Tabia.
" 32	Saria Tabia (Kilia Poyzaz).
" 33	Bokali Kalessi.
" 34	Ak Tabia. (<i>Chakal</i>).
" 35	Agh Bashi Tabia (Yanik).
" 36	Field Battery.

DATE OF COMMENCING OPERATIONS - 19/4/1915.

V/A Eastern Mediterranean to Admiralty.

Begins "A meeting of all principal officers today, 19th, decided that operations will commence on Friday 23rd April weather permitting. Remainder of transports ordered to leave Egypt at once. Request following be sent to Admiral Ebergardt :- Expect to commence operations morning 23rd April. Request you will coordinate your actions accordingly." Ends.

HOWITZERS FOR USE ON LAND - 19/4/1915.

Admiralty to V/A Eastern Mediterranean.

Begins "G.O.C. states you have placed at his disposal five 6" howitzers for use on land and he requires 5 officers 124 rank and file to work them. Admiralty approve personnel being supplied temporarily to meet this emergency from Marine Detachments from "INFLEXIBLE", "OCEAN", "IRRESISTIBLE"; R.M.A. being used as far as available until military

military details can be sent out by War Office." Ends.

LOSS OF E15. 20/4/1915.

V/A Eastern Mediterranean to Admiralty.

Begins " The apparent determination of the enemy to salvage submarine E15 (wrecked on the morning of 16th near Kephez Point while attempting passage of Straits) caused me considerable concern. An aeroplane reported a tug alongside apparently pumping and from her position and various reports she appears to be intact and possibly serviceable. "TRIUMPH" and "MAJESTIC" failed to hit her yesterday afternoon, 18th. During the night picket boat of "TRIUMPH" - Lieut.-Commander Eric ROBINSON and Midshipman John WOOLLEY of "VENGEANCE" - the former in command of expedition and Lieut. Arthur Brooke WEBB, R.N.R., and picket boat of "MAJESTIC" - Lieut. Claude GODWIN - equipped with 14" torpedoes manned by volunteer crews attacked Submarine E15 which was within a few hundred yards of Fort No.8 and commanded by a number of smaller guns at short range. Four torpedoes were fired of which one from picket boat of "MAJESTIC" struck E15. The boats were subjected to a ^{very} heavy fire estimated by "TRIUMPH" at over 200 rounds. "MAJESTIC" picket boat was holed and abandoned in a sinking condition, crew being saved by "TRIUMPH" picket boat. The only casualty was one man who died of wounds before arrival ship. I selected Lieut.-Commander ROBINSON for the command of this dangerous enterprise because he had displayed conspicuous gallantry on 26th February and proved himself during many attacks on the mine field an officer of great determination. His action on 26th February which I personally witnessed was worth the highest ~~honours~~ honours. I submit he may be, if you consider it advisable, promoted to Commander. This morning B6 reconnoitred the wreck and reported E15 heeled over on starboard side conning tower probably resting on bottom. I am satisfied she cannot be made use of or got off by the enemy. "VENGEANCE" reports seeing a tug capsize and sink near to E15 yesterday while B6 was attacking but Commanding Officer B6 has since reported no explosion at all occurred when he fired. Cause of loss of tug unknown. In today's reconnaissance B6 was caught in strong currents and swept inshore within 100 yards of E15 and narrowly escaped destruction by gun fire. Lieut.-Commander C.G. BRODIE who was passenger in aeroplane yesterday and in B6 today speaks very highly of Lieut. MacARTHUR'S coolness and skill in handling and the admirable behaviour of crew under very trying and dangerous conditions. B6 was undamaged. B11 also reported current abnormally strong. I do not anticipate despatch of E14 until it slacks. Lieut. PALMER, R.N.V.R., late Consul at Chanak volunteered for service in E15 in order to assist with his local knowledge. He has shared fate of crew which is uncertain. I much regret losing his services." Ends.

On 22/4/1915 Sir Ian HAMILTON telegraphed War Office that attack which had been arranged for 24th, had to be delayed 24 hours owing to bad weather.

On 23/4/1915 Earl KITCHENER sent his best wishes for success of Fleet, General D'AMADE and French troops and General Sir Ian HAMILTON and his troops.

MOVEMENTS OF SHIPS - 23/4/1915.

Arrivals 22nd Mudros :- Hospital Ship "GASCON", 6 trawlers with 4 lighters.

On 23/4/1915 V/A Eastern Mediterranean reported to Admiralty "Weather improved sufficiently for transports, tugs and lighters to leave Mudros for their preliminary rendezvous. Attack commences before dawn 25th. Submarine A.E.2 attempts passage of Dardanelles at dawn 24th."

Arrivals Mudros 23rd. Tug "BLACKCOCK", "DANUBE", "REVENGER", each with 2 lighters.
