


**AWM38**  
**Official History,**  
**1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,**  
**Official Historian.**

Diaries and Notebooks

**Item number:** 3DRL606/160/1

**Title:** Notebook, June 1917  
Includes references to the 47th and 48th  
Battalions and Messines.



AWM38-3DRL606/160/1

Original

DIARY NO. 160

AWM38

30RL 606 ITEM 160 [1]

DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN  
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914 - 1918

THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every reader and writer who may use them.

These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.

These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.

16 Sept., 1946.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

ACCESS STATUS

C. E. W. BEAN.

1

L+8MB  
47 Bm  
160

40

1

48th Bn.

47 Bn

169

See McKeon  
Williams.

Bn Op. order 139.



48 Bn was near Wellington  
Camp. (ANTRIM LINES)

Left at 8.40 am. moved  
up to midland support South.  
During night men had to  
be warned. Stories for  
gas shells wh were falling  
around the guns.

and midland Supp abt  
9.30.

Remained there for day.  
watching fight. At 9pm.  
CO. ordered to send up 2  
coys to support 45 & 47 Bns.  
one to each Bn.

Mayersbeth with C. Coy.  
went to 47 Bn.

At Stubback with A Coy  
to 45 Bn.

A Coy moved off at abt

9.20 to report to 45 Bn HQ  
~~into~~ just behind Black  
 line in unbearable 2.

At 11.30 Col Leane recd  
 a wire from Bde to send  
 up rest of Bn to support  
 the 2 Bns in making a  
 a. attack on the green line.

~~to~~ B + D Coys moved  
 forward (B Capt Ammins, D.  
 2/Lt Allen) + reported to 47 Bn  
 H.Q. in Ulcer Sep.


A Coy reported to 45 Bn.  
 + they said w<sup>o</sup> their wish to  
 be shd be a secondary  
 support line in rear of  
 black line. No tools were  
 available so this idea  
 was abandoned. This was 12.15 -  
 12.30 am. The men were

lying up under bank abt  
 U 3 B 2.9. Then Stubbs  
 went back for further  
 orders & while there  
 at 2.30 heard that they were  
 to make an attack on  
 the green line at 3am.  
 [The idea had to be  
 wait till dawn to defend  
 black line]

At 2.40 the order was  
 received by Stubbs. He  
 put Coy into position for  
 attack by 2.55 am. up  
 to this time no support was  
 to hand from 45 Bn & the  
 other Coy of 48 Bn was not  
 to hand. At that time the  
 other Bns had not their  
 men at hand or organised

probably because of their  
own art having put down  
a barrage behind them.]

As A Coy was  
unsupported at 2:55 Lt  
Stubback reported back to  
C.O. 45 Bn stating that it  
was impossible to attack  
as he had only 1 man  
per 10 yards & the men  
had no knowledge of  
ground - it not having been  
reconnaitred. Lt. Herring  
agreed & ordered them  
to withdraw to a sap  
dug by the 4 Div Pioneers  
at 11:30 A.M. The Coy was  
taken there after dawn.  
At this time Allen arrived  
with D Coy - & was shaking



them out on the tape  
at the Red dotted line.  
B Stubback brought him  
back to the same sap. X

It was after 4 am.  
when they were in position  
here.


<sup>O.T.</sup>  
The troops in black line  
further north sent over to  
find out what troops  
were retiring (these were  
N.Z. 2nd Auckland's in  
Black line NE of Messines).  
Stubback went over &  
explained & on way back  
saw B Coy - men moving  
out past trees just S. of  
Huns walk (nearing the  
tape on black dotted line).



Stubback got permission  
 to see Col. Inlay - thinking  
 they were going over unsupported.  
 He found Col. Inlay who  
 told him they were going out  
 to dig in. He thought that  
 A Coy had better move  
 along side of B Coy & dig  
 in. Stubback reported ~~that~~  
 to Herring & he was going to  
 do this - & a message at  
 this moment and from  
 Capt Cumming that Owl  
 2 was not held <sup>there</sup>. Stubback  
 told Allen & both asked for  
 permission to go up personally.  
 They found Cumming in  
 front of Oxygen 2.

Bremner told Cumming that C Coy. of  
48 Bn would be on his left. That 47 Bn  
would be on C Coy's left. And the 3rd  
Div (44th) on his right. 37 with  
two

In the meantime B Coy  
& D Coy, under Maj. Breaddy,  
had orders at 11.50 to  
report to Col. Inlay, 47 Bn.  
Capt Cumming. B. arrived there  
with B Coy & 1/2 of D Coy - the  
rest of D Coy becoming disconnected.  
They reached 49 Bn H.Q. at  
abt 2.30 am. Col Inlay  
explained the disposition  
& Lt Bremner (Inf. Offr.) gave  
Cumming a realistic acct.  
of all the German m. go. up there  
& approximate positions. Orders  
from Col. Inlay were to get forward  
as far as possible towards Green  
Line 1, if impossible to go on,  
to take up a position & dig in;  
sending back map coordinates.



40 While discussing w Col. Inlay - a note arrived by runner from Bde, (At 2.50) at zero hour wd be at 3 am. These instructions were then given. Inlay sd he wd arrange another barrage then, wd go forward again.

Cummings went thro' the blackline & there found Capt Majersbeth & C Coy & D Bn. he was then on B Coy's right. They went thro' the black line - it was full of troops - by 3.45 am. They went forward in extended formation - the men hopping out of blackline & lining up as marked. Things were quiet - an occasional whizzbang & odd m.g.s & many snipers fired at them.

The line was 150 yds in front of the tape - an old German defence line, covered in by camouflage - bits of wood etc. It was v. shallow, may have been one of our original British 2<sup>d</sup> on Messines 1. It was disconnected in many places. They just chanced onto it. While consolidating it they sent active patrols forward.

1 patrol under Lt (C.W. Stoerker)  
 (Sergeant <sup>Michael Patrick</sup> O'Brien - 1 to the wall.)  
 They were under heavy inf. & sniper fire, but found out the 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>d</sup> were not occupied.  
 (This fire tho they did not know it probably came from the blockhouse)

behind the hedge at about ~~the~~ <sup>O34D</sup>  
5.6.

On this report Cumming  
ordered 1 pln to occupy  
Oxygen 2y. They got down  
a depression & along a row of  
willow trees & got into Oxygen  
2y still under heavy fire.  
Then the same patrol went  
forward & reconnoitered Owl 2y  
(the same 3). They reported it  
apparently unoccupied but  
heavy inf. fire coming from  
the rear amongst the trees.


Cumming ordered another  
pln to go thro the pln already  
in Oxygen, & occupy Owl 2y.  
They went across extended,  
thro the wire. When they

Mayerbeth  
1 pln C Coy.



There was a l.g. of 47 Pn  
with team in Owl support all  
thro, wh did not retire &  
wh was found by 48 when  
they reached it next day.

Got to the wire they were  
under very fire from the  
left flank enfilading 1 wire  
but somehow they got  
thro it. They had abt 4  
casualties in getting across.  
Cumming folded up at once  
w rest of B Coy. (The Coys  
were 2 plus strong.) C Coy was  
then brought up to right in Owl 2.  
Mayerbeth Capt Williams of 47 Pn  
with abt 80 men had  
reported to Capt Cumming  
in jumping off position where  
old ~~tro~~ camouflaged 2 was.  
Capt Williams then  
followed up into Oxygen  
2 where he acted as support  
& to guard the flanks.



The Lieut Stoerkel & his patrol went forward again to locate the femur, as it looked like a trap, things were so quiet & diff. to understand. They went to reconnoitre Owl Support & further. From Owl Support he sent back a report. 1 Pln of C & 1 of B were sent forward at once to occupy Owl Support wh they did & were fired on heavily but with no loss. Stoerkel went out in front of Owl Support & was here wounded. Plt Wall & Sgt O'Brien brought him in - he was seen being assisted in by one man on each side. He was not fired on



by Germans. as he came  
in.

It was at this time Lt  
Lieut Stubback came along  
from Huns walk - in  
broken formation under  
an erratic m.p. fire  
but no one being hit.  
It looked like a German trap.


Stubback moved down  
Z<sub>1</sub> to past the circular  
strong point at elbow of  
Z<sub>1</sub>. The blockhouse was  
not held but a little  
further down a heavy  
sniping occurred & heads  
of Germans were seen above  
the Z<sub>1</sub> in grey tin helmets.  
We put in a block at  
where marked. Stubback



organised a bombing party to go down the 2, & submit a situation report to Col Herring & proposed operational order for bomb attack. Col. Herring ordered bombing attack not to be undertaken till night fall when he wd send Capt. Allen up to see about it.

Sgt Allen of D Coy came in at the same time as Stubback. They held up to the block, & posted L. Gs.

They consolidated Owl 2. In Owl Support both flanks were in the air - the 2 was not continuous. (There was some camouflage screen behind Owl 2, hiding probably a gun).



Whittle selected these  
positions first + then took  
the men out.

A patrol under Serpt.  
Whittle went forward to  
reconnoitre owl 2 on  
left of Cummings + select  
positions for outposts.

3 posts were pushed  
out by day under  
a good deal of fire -  
taken out one by one by  
Whittle + posted on  
a line near owl support  
from 34 D. 3.4 to  
34 D 2.7 in an  
old trench. These  
posts began digging to try +  
make a continuous line.

Apparently the Germans  
had hidden m.g.s. + posts  
out beyond + men cd not  
go further without being sniped.

Whittle did not crawl like a scout - he simply went out & looked around, constantly fired at. The men took their food out with them. Serpts Whittle & Symes afterwards took out water to them when going out to see how work we going on. While they were out on outpost they heard a wd man calling further out. They came back for a stretcher, went out (at the time heavy <sup>general</sup> fire w.g. & sniper) wd going on - & brought the man in - he was 47 or 45 Bn. who had bn wd in the original attack. He was near the blockhouse.

June 8. 4pm. The  
 Germans held the Blauwe-  
 -poortbeek valley & houses  
 & further W. than the Owl 2.

Abt 5.30pm. 45 Bn  
 under Capt Allen came  
 in with 30-50 men &  
 took position on left of  
 48<sup>th</sup>. They pushed down  
 2/3 further till they struck  
 opposite & put in a  
 further block, getting towards  
 3/4 central.

This night a bombt began  
 around on the left, abt 8 pm.  
 & extended to the left of 48 Bn  
 abt 8.30 or 9pm. Abt this  
 time a considerable no. of  
 Germans were not moving

from the Strong Pt at 34 Central  
 along the road hedge SE,  
 ducking across onto road  
 parallel w/ Support 2  
 - & our Ls did some very  
 good shooting. It looked as if  
 they were getting onto this  
 road for an attack - going by  
 2s & 3s & 5s. Our outposts  
 reported a lot of activity in the  
 wood SW. of Gapaard Farm.  
 The German at 011 9.30  
 to 9.45 seemed to make  
 a feeble C. attack. We put  
 up an S.O.S. - got an immediate  
 splendid barrage - Vickers guns  
 opened indirect fire & no  
 Germans were seen to get thro  
 it.

✓ 1. Lf. ca. 1600 yds  
 ~ 91 3 Dis. knocking  
 2 - 20.

Out of hedge came 2 Germans carrying something. They put on them. They ducked in behind hedge & reappeared w white flag. They stopped firing. Then out dashed 2 German opportunists with white flag & no stretcher - they took no chances this time & bowled over a couple.

A German was seen - they were sure of it - in a hollow tree. Put barrage of <sup>rifle</sup> grenades on it.

At this time you wd hear, "Let the bastards get over, Bill" - The men were dying for a fight in the midst of their uproar.

Arty kept up till abt 1 am. Troops stood to & kept sharp lookout till daylight & then consolidated again.

On afternoon of June 9 - a patrol (Off. of 47 Bn Lt Bird, 3 or 4 of 47 Bn. Sert. B.M.P. O'Brien & 3 or 4 of his choice men - went out to reconnoitre near blockhouse by fork of Underdale Ry. They went along & saw a German - they decided to capture him. They then saw abt 20 Germans in the Ry. (Undulating Support). They fired all their revolvers, & when Germans

began to throw bombs they  
retired. Some of 3 Div.  
Seeing them retiring put  
up S.O.S. German put one  
up also. S.O.S. when put  
up further along line N.  
& both artys came down - chiefly  
ours. This wd be abt 7pm.  
June 9.

June 9. One of Stubbacks posts engaged  
a machine gun w rifle grenades  
this day. Men used to run across  
to these posts & back (as I saw  
them). We had our men sniping  
over towards the woods N. of  
the Blaawepoortbeek.

45 Bn sent a bombing ply  
this afternoon down Owl 2  
where they met opposite &  
temporarily stopped. As soon as  
they stopped up came the Germans  
from the str. pto bombing for all  
they knew. 45 threw bombs back  
& battle ensued, bombs being  
supplied for 48 Bn.

At about 1/2 hr later word was passed from 45 that the attack had been repulsed w slight casualties. While attack was on Lt Rafferty (48 Bn) did great work assisting Capt Allen in getting stores to 1 attack & encouraging the men. The Germans went back to their Str. pt & 45 held their block.

At 8.30 p.m. Adjt of 65 Bn brought an operational order to Allen ordering him to capture Strongy pts & 2 of Road by 10 p.m. night of June 9. At same time 13 Bde were to advance line of posts to the road in front of Despaigne Farm. 13 Bde were then to send patrol forward to connect w

At least part of this evidently refers to night of 10/11 June  
C. G. B.



Allen & him arrange Zero  
time & 13 Bde wd silently  
push posts forward & occupy  
Odd 2. The 13 Bde  
patrol struck opposite &  
the 45 Bn was only one who  
got thro to 45 Bn.

45 Bn were unable  
to get to road to night -  
they weren't in a position to  
make a heavy attack.

June 10 m.f. as you were.

48 Bn held this morning  
at 3 am. (They had an idea  
they were likely to come in  
again to night but weren't  
sure). They went to  
Subsidiary line. The 46 Bn

relieved & took over  
part of ~~central~~ front between  
45 Bn & 47 Bn.

48 Bn was having a  
sleep in. Subsided line this  
day.

That night at 10.30  
45 Bn attacked w abt 50  
men under Lt —

They got on - had a no of  
casualties - off to k. &  
driven back to their  
original stop.

At ~~10.30~~ 11 pm 48 Bn  
moved off & took over  
line thro' a fair amt of shell  
fire - abt 2 am. The  
46 Bn moved it & took  
47 Bn area; 47 came out.  
48 came up & with 3 Coy

to road in O 34 central as bde on left reported  
that ferns had retired. <sup>second</sup>

34 He found str. pt where #77 was  
unoccupied - fresh blocks gone.  
He then pushed on & patrolled all  
Owl support & Owl 2y to the Rd  
S of stream being sniped at all  
the time. He came back to the  
block where his Coy was.  
supplied Coy with digging tools &  
extended them down to the road  
& set to work to consolidate.  
The other 48 Bn Coy in Owl 2y  
gave him all available men to  
help consolidate. At this time  
Lt Stubbart went to see how things  
were going, 1/2 Coy being at rest, other  
1/2 carrying. He brought resting 1/2 Coy up  
& assisted consolidation. By 4pm  
whole line had been consolidated &  
food fire 2y organized. As soon  
as this was done posts were pushed  
out on extreme left to Owl Support,  
& in centre to just in front of  
Central Blockhouse. O'Brien was to  
just abt this time in front of this  
blockhouse.

Abt 6pm. report came thro'  
Lt cavalry had Joe (two) on the  
left (forward) →

at 9.15 reported in block with 15 Bde.

took over to 45th block -  
keeping A Coy in support in  
Oxygen 2y. Dnd. after  
taking over Capt. Mayerdet  
in 9 of left Coy went to  
personally reconnoitre the  
position below the block,  
as there was a strange enemy inactivity.  
He got into the blockhouse,  
(first beyond block) where  
77 gun was. There were  
only dead ferns in it -  
appth it had been used  
as a dressing str. He  
found the line was unoccupied.  
He got touch with the 52nd Bn.  
Then ~~was~~ by 2 L gunners,  
& taking a couple of runners  
& he went on to patrol  
ground betw Owl 2y &  
Support - an order having been  
sent by CO. abt 6am. to patrol  
towards Gapsard Farm →

O'Brien & another asked Cummins if he would like a drink. He set his mind. They went down a bit of a sap & down a gutter they had cut into a shell hole. There they had a couple of blankets, & McCannagh, & a bottle of rum & water with they had on salvaging. They were ~~going~~ every now & then ~~they~~ "Well - we'll go off & look for another one." They salvaged a couple & wd fire 400 or 500 rds to make sure they were in order.

The 12 TM Stokes gun under 2/13 Coward came up first to Oxygen 2, then out 2 firing onto the strip in the hedge & the strip where the gun was (2 duds were found under the 77 gun).

Vickers guns were also covering left flank firing down valley

At 4.15 pm. 4 dismounted  
L.H. & one off'r reached Owl  
2y (Cummins) & got no further.

The cavalry went up  
the Douse valley - & 10 off'r  
& 20 men w/ Hotchkiss gun  
were near Potteries with  
16 Bn all night.

But those who went  
along Huns walk could  
get on - it was too hot.

(Cavalry) & 48 Bn was ordered  
to send a strong fighting patrol  
to keep touch. These patrols  
pushed out from near the <sup>1st</sup> 77 gun  
under Lt Pavy & 2/10 Mitchell.  
They went thro Owl Support till  
they came under inf. fire  
from Japaard Tr.

By this time remainder of  
Lt Stubbs Coy had come up  
& taken over Owl ~~Support~~ Trench.  
Vigorous patrols were sent out from  
all parts of line chiefly to  
ascertain whether 1 posts could be  
pushed into Owl Support tonight  
The wood in wh the blockhouse was  
was bristly w/ mines & snipers  
& 1 posts could not be further  
advanced. (Early next morn these cleared)  
At 3 am. The 48 Bn was

Relieved by 14 & 15 Bns.

After getting back to Black  
Line, Mays belt was k by  
a shell abt 9 am. June 12.

---

Col. J. J. J. J.  
Four J. J. J.

40

40

47 Bn Camped

on Newe Eglise Rd.

abt 1/2 mile from 48 Bn

got gas shelled 1st night

- 5.9 shells - after a big 12 in  
gun on rails.

Started at 7.20 followed

X route by shrine,

Plum Duff Rd, Wellington 2-

Bn HQ corner of Waikato Ave

& Winter 2.

Bn ~~went~~ went straight  
over extended from Hanbury


Support 2 & formed on green

in 6 between Ulua Beak

& Ulua 2 - 47 on rt

45 on left. They had previously  
reconnitered this at 4 am.

& put out bn's coloured flags.



Each plu broke into 4 sections in single file & went forward in this artillery formation.

There was a bit of shelling on our front line but they didn't stay there.

Orig. starting off time was 1.10. If they left at 11.30 they reckoned on moving almost at once with barrage from ~~black~~<sup>red dotted</sup> line.

As far as they know they were not seen - there was a fair amount of shelling wh may have been meant for tanks <sup>once deployed</sup>

The Bowdies exactly same formation & frontage as it wd use on the attack.

The ground was pitted but the formation made movement easy &



was well kept. They moved thro the NZs on the black line. Lieut. Scott (who had reconnoitered up in 1 morning, in/c of Bn forward Command Post) led them up.

NZs had estab posts (supposed to be 300 yds but actually) abt 100 yds in front of black line.

47. Bn got into position on this line of posts behind our barney - & at this time news was read by Bn H.Q. of the new zero hour. It had bn sent before but the 2 runners have not bn seen since & were presumably killed.

The Bn waited there & got as much cover as it cd in shell holes. The Japans saw it & they were fairly heavily shelled. Capt Davy, Lt Dixon & Lt Campbell were killed by shells.

<sup>(Baqda)</sup>  
 (Tasman)  
 Exeter Singl.

<sup>(Clair)</sup>  
 (Grist)

<sup>(Cousins)</sup>  
 (Sgt.)  
 (Tasman)  
 Hobart

Left of one Coy was on the Zareeba & left of other on unbearable 2.


They were in touch w 45 Bn all way, & in touch w 37 Bn on night.

At 3.10 the barrage lifted & went at rate of 100 yds in 3 minutes. It was absolutely perfect & good.



B Coy (Capt. Miller) was to  
 attack & take Unbearable  
 & form a lodgement  
 in Owl ~~by~~ trench astride  
 Huns walk, right on  
 junction with Uncanny 2.  
 Left Coy. C. Coy under  
 Capt Williams had to  
 move as arrow opposite  
 & get into Owl 2.  
 Oxygen 2 was left to  
 45 Bn. The two rear  
 coys were to come thro  
 & occupy similar position  
 in Owl Support.

They met with very  
 heavy fire from the bushes  
 & hedges in Uncanny  
 Angle (abt Uncanny 2)

Antilla <sup>nephew</sup> 

This held them up until  
they cd locate it & Lieut.  
Goode <sup>N.S.W.</sup> was mortally wounded  
by a m.f.

Capt Miller O.C. B Coy  
said he wd fix them. He  
went out to reconnoitre  
position & locate these guns  
- He was killed. By this  
time B Coy had few left.  
They were just past the  
strip in unbearable  $\gamma$  to  
(Gundah <sup>to ungunny</sup>)  
right of Oxygen  $\gamma$ . He  
got abt 200 yds into the bushes  
& was shot.

Williams was held up  
by m.f. from the salient  
of Oxygen  $\gamma$ .

C Coy went over Oxygen  
 $\gamma$  - they got the m.f. & some

prisoners there.

B Coy were wandering  
bright & into part of  
Owl 2, but lost direction  
& touch with C Coy. It  
was here that Lieut. Bird  
in Septime Barn shot first  
2 germs who came out —  
after that they all kameraded.  
& abt 40 came out — B.  
standing w revolver at the  
Entrance & kicking them on  
to his men. They made  
these germs consolidate  
Owl 2, & Septime Barn  
is beyond the 2 (the little  
white cement place below  
it & uncanny 2 became  
known to many as  
Septime Barn)

Williams got into Owl -  
but B Coy got into  
Uncanny angle.

Salmon of A Coy got  
into owl 2, & got a lot of  
inj. fire there from  
Germans on 1 left - wh  
stopped him for 1 time from  
getting to the Owl Support.  
He tried to counteract  
this by section fire (covering  
fire by sections). D Coy  
~~supp~~ behind B got as  
far as Owl 2, connected  
with C. So owl was  
occupied.

The question was  
where was D B Coy to go  
to not having seen B Coy

Salmon pushed forward  
on left - 45 Bn -  
in a sort of half left  
form so as to keep touch.  
As got abt  $\frac{1}{2}$  way,  
while patrols of D Coy  
got into Owl support  
on his right.

By this time ferns  
were missing near  
Sapard with idea of  
C. attack. So Salmon  
got back into Owl Coy  
& prepared to push this  
C. attack back.

At this time arty barrage  
came down - no SOS  
called for here but on the  
left - The arty were appt  
acting on information

Capt Williams told Capt. Cumming later that he could do nothing as the men had this retreat. He could not manage them - they were very shaken & scattered.

[Of course Col. Imbry's acct. does not take this into full consideration.]

from 13 Bde.

This arty barrage came back onto Owl trench where we were. It had been on targets. It then came down onto <sup>in front</sup> SOS line abt 200 yds in front of Green line.

It was then recalled & came down onto Owl 2x

The lufy reported back to the barrage was on them.

At abt 6 pm. they came out & dug a line from Oxypfen trench to Huns walk, an excellent little trench - exc. some of B. Coy. The left & right were unknown.



X Son of district  
 Capt for rly, Roma.  
 Norman Frederick B.



This wood is  
 not on our  
 maps.

Germs call this  
 A la Belle Promenade  
 Cabaret.  
 From Germs. map 1/5000.

C.O. sent adit. Lt Bremner  
 out to see situation. He  
 found the 3 Coys & started  
 to look for B. He wandered  
 on & found them out  
 near Uncanny. In  
 front of it - He put them  
 out to the others. All B Co  
 offrs had gone - one  
 Lt Mendoza - was lying  
 wd in Septime Barn. X  
 Bremner put them on the  
 track, went back for  
 Mendoza under mg.  
 fire, & carried Mendoza  
 home. He was attacked by  
 5 Germs. with rifles. He  
 killed 4 w/ revolver &  
 wd the 5<sup>th</sup> & brought  
 him in prisoner to give

information -

That saved the situation - put the 4 Coys together & put them into position to make an assault.

At midnight they were reinforced by a Coy of 40 Bn under Mayserschets. The 24th arrived a runner giving zero at 3.0. There was no time, but they started abt 40 mins after the barrage to dig approach as close as possible, sneak up & dig in. ~~some~~

They got well up & when spotted were abt 200 yds off Owl 2. They lay

low & attempted the stalking movement, fighting patrols causing a diversion on the flanks. By 7 am. ~~they~~ were in Owl 2, which the Germans had reoccupied - Some prisoners were taken there (194 Co were taken by 47 Bn)

In Owl they started to consolidate & began some tactics towards Owl Support. Got in there at 8.30 & found a L.G. team there where the 34D grid line cuts the 2. That gave 47 Bn its objective - the first Bn on it. Both right & left were uncertain.

The German was busy as was  
 from Huns walk, sniping.  
 They consolidated this line, sent  
 out fighting patrols towards  
 Huns walk the chief idea  
 being to get left not linked  
 up. All day they had no  
 connection. As the left had  
 not come up 47 Bn took  
 over 600 yds of owl support  
 until Col. S was flank Bn  
 did not come up, estab.  
 posts across left from  
 Owl Support to Owl 2.

The 44 Bn had relieved  
 37 Bn & they came into  
 uncanny 2 & connected  
 there on June 8 or 9 -  
 Sunday  
 at C. O. saw them there by  
 midday when he was there.

The 44 Bn finally connected up  
uncanny support at 47 Bns  
request. This gave a complete  
line - Uncanny Support,  
Owl Support; Owl.

The 1st C. attack was  
first night towards Tapanui  
In.

Two snaker attacks came  
from direction of Steigast  
(one in air - one in row)  
news came in air. Lt Jerms  
were massing at Warneton.

We got 4 Vickers guns (2  
extra being now sent) on flanks  
& front, 21 L.S. & all men  
had been trained in rapid  
firing - They were ready for  
anything. C.O sent message  
to Lt to the Jerms had no

C. Attack <sup>at</sup>  
 (chief expectator  
 of everybody)

hope in life of getting thro.  
 Presently they began to  
 appear along the rd behind  
 Lapoard & Steigmoor,  
 towards Deconick Farm.  
 They got everything out  
 then. Pigeons were due  
 to go so 2 were sent  
 with message & 2 others  
 were being kept in case  
 Germans appeared. Abt  
 $\frac{1}{2}$  hour or so later another  
 pair were sent to say  
 that 1 German was appearing  
 & to be ready to put  
 SOS down when flare was  
 sent up.

abt  $\frac{1}{2}$  hr later the  
 Germans started. A flare

This is like playing  
 as a trigger to show  
 yourself at a moment  
 like this

went up from 1 front  
 line & at some instant  
 down came the barrage.  
 The attack withered  
 up. The Germans retired  
 northwards into Blaawepoort  
 valley.

On June 9<sup>th</sup> a number were  
 seen around Steynpost Jan.  
 & arty were induced to  
 put fire hows onto it.  
 They shot beautifully & the  
 country was full of running  
 Germans.

Fighting patrols were  
 then sent all around towards  
 Steynpost. German maps here  
 prevented much movement.

At <sup>U</sup> 4B2-3 is a house (known  
 in 47 Bn as Hun House) &

found by Imley on German  
 maps in the shelter he was in  
 to be a regimental H.Q.  
 He sent a patrol there under  
 Lieut McKeon - & found  
 on way to it a dead  
 German Major von Fötte.  
 He had a bag of papers &  
 maps & proved to be the  
 Adj. of the XIX Army Corps.  
 These were sent to Dwin -  
 They saw movement at  
 the House & were being  
 sniped from trees further.  
 They lay down till dark,  
 went down uncanny,  
 undulating (not occupied)  
 up sap leading to SE  
 of the House. When  
 they got near the wire



of undulating support  
they surprised a pocket  
of 20/30 Germans. The  
Germans put up their S.O.S.  
signal, wh is same as ours.  
Result was that both barracks  
came down. The Germans  
ran & our men had to  
stay there & eventually returned  
to the Bn lines near (E of)  
undulating 2, & got back to  
their own 2 after being out  
6 hours.

Then house was an old  
farm house with a  
concrete shelter alongside  
of it.

The mules used to go  
up to Owl 2 (the Bn).

Q.M. got these mules up) to  
 Owl 2, with rations. The  
 pack mule train had to get  
 stones up. Bn H.Q. consisted  
 of C.O. Adj. 2 runners &  
 3 signallers. They had 35  
 casualties at H.Q. in  
 one day. It was a  
 concrete depot, very  
 exposed & well marked.  
 It started by being on ground  
 level & finished by being  
 a white house. The  
 first H.Q. was a little  
 off concrete signal str  
 into wh the Germans  
 put m.g. bullets from  
 direction of Bethlehem  
 Farm. They found this

by accident when first  
going up. A shower of  
shrap. fell on H Co. Some  
got behind trees. Others nipped  
into shell hole & found the  
Sigs. Sta there. Herring  
at P. at first was an open  
y afterwards a heavy  
grenade store of wood.

The former end of  
the (47) 2nd H Co (where beam was)  
was hit by <sup>alt 40</sup> 3 shells & finally  
broken by 3 in same place.  
8 men were killed there  
(2 Ambce <sup>men</sup> & wd men) in this.  
It was clearly a deliberate  
German target. It had been  
a Bn H Co of the Eugen  
Battalion. (10th Bn was on  
his rd & Barmen in his rear)

(? the shell we land  
of in winter wh  
wd kill at  
1000 yds).

The night of 9/10 46 Bn came  
in & took over  $\frac{1}{3}$  of <sup>Bde</sup> sector.

48 Bn was relieved.

June 10. German aeroplanes  
came over flying low. Heavy  
shelling all day. many  
casualties.

This night 10/11 at dawn.  
47 Bn was relieved & moved into  
old British front line wh  
was pretty warm. Some were  
k. here. The German was  
using a shell as an instantaneous  
fuse and wh was at the same time  
a gas shell.

HML'S 47 Bn had 4 Tanks -  
Lucifer, Our Emma, Rumblebelly  
& 2005. 2005 stuck  
below messines after the fight.

An Australian named  
 Lay (from G.L.H.R.) ran  
 Lucifer; 3 Scotsmen —  
 Williamson, Agnew (Rumblebelly)  
 & Brockwell (2005).  
 our Emma

They got up. Rumblebelly  
 got down. Huns walk to our  
 2 x Lucifer & our Emma  
 went to Oxygen.

2005 followed Rumblebelly  
 but he became lost in the  
 trees by Mearnsy & got  
 lost to view — & when next  
 seen was coming back.

Our men had an  
 idea that Tanks wd rout  
 the Germans out, & if they  
 got near them they wd  
 catch & bayonet them.

47 Bn had 10 offrs k & 809 wd.

Capt Davy k. at jump off waiting  
to start  
Capt. Miller k in wood on patrol.  
Lt Goode } just after starting under  
Lt Dixon } our barrage  
Sgt Walker --- missing but  
(Brisb.) body found.  
near Owl 23

Lt Scott. av. fine offr. going across  
Ipawick Q. to 45 k when first they  
got in to see what matter  
was. He was <sup>in</sup> of the  
forward Bn Command Post.  
(post on blackline).

Temp.  
Capt Salmon k by shell in Owl  
Trench 3rd day.

Lt Campbell. k 1st day near Owl 24  
setting into it.

McKeon hit but remained on duty.  
Williams

Reumblebelly caught fire  
on Humer walk. An offr.  
got out with his Pyrene  
Extinguisher & sat on top  
& Extinguished it - our men  
standing looking on in wonder  
at his gallantry ~~and~~ not  
thinking of their being under  
1 same m.p.

All these 4 tanks  
came back, just seeing  
the troops into the trenches.  
The only complaint tanks  
had was that men got into  
their way.

One half caste Chinaman  
from Casius acted as  
runner Signaller Scout  
L. Sumner (after 1000 self  
initiation in Signalling). He

P. Shang

found a signal camp in the cement cottage at Huns walk, set up the camp on top of it exposed to everything, worked it from there by daylight & dark (by daylight running messages).

He went out on patrol after Snipers & got thro' without a scratch.

Every time he came to Bu HQ he carried some information, disc, or paybook. Every time he went back he carried water or ammo. & sniped in the intervals.  
The Co. roused on him with his tongue in his

check "You don't appear  
to be doing much" he said.

"Oh well - I'm a bit  
new to this" he said "This  
is only my second stunt."

What were you in.

OT Bullecourt -  
Oh is that all.  
He was in the 2nd line  
at Bullecourt.

[Recommendations in  
this Bn were left largely  
to the men - informally  
asked. 2 ofrs were recommended  
by the N.C.O.s.]

47 Bn got 1 gun 77. between  
Zareeba & White Spot Cottage.  
The 47 Bn sent a team to get  
it out (transport horses) But  
some ~~of~~ N.Z. gunners were



47 Bn Casualties:

Offrs.	8	10	
<del>Pls.</del>			82
OT	65	292	K

Losses 2.

Total 459.  
 Went in 783. incl. carrying  
 pties, details  
 at dump etc.

Fighting units abt 680. abt 220  
 came out.

then using it. It was in  
 a lean to at the rear of  
 a concrete emplacement.  
 (Prob. anti-tank - Nabe-kang  
 battery). Capt'd by 15 Pln Day  
 47 Bn.

For carrying pties.  
 see Bn Report.

Carrying Yukon packs.

Previously 3 men cd carry 2 boxes.  
 With a Yukon pack the weakest  
 man cd carry 1 Box -

Imley carried 3. Strongmen  
 cd carry 2 + run with 1.

5 were carrying. a shell  
 got them + k. abt 12. At  
 the start going up from the  
 forming up place in Co.