


**AWM38**  
**Official History,**  
**1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,**  
**Official Historian.**

Diaries and Notebooks

**Item number:** 3DRL606/185/1

**Title:** Notebook, 1915 - 1918

Includes references to the 7th, 48th and 52nd Battalions, the 12th Infantry Brigade, Sgt S R McDougall's VC, Dernancourt and the Turkish guns at Gallipoli.



AWM38-3DRL606/185/1

*Original*

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3 DRL 606 ITEM 185 [1]

**DIARY NO. 185.**

**DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN  
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914 - 1918**

**T**HE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every reader and writer who may use them.

These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so — but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.

These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.

**16 Sept., 1946.**

**C. E. W. BEAN.**

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

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
*Be...*  
52 Bn.  
48 Bn  
47 Bn  
**DERNAN COURT**  
185

Treloar - Morralls files  
some enlargements?

82

Brian  
52 Bn.  
48 Bn  
47 Bn  
DERNANCOUR  
185

Chinnery




ANCIENNE ANCRE

ANCRE

Hammel Wood

Village Bréil



ANCIENNE ANCRE

ANCIENNE ANCRE



ANCIENNE ANCRE

ANCIENNE ANCRE



Amiens Caltrid

E 6 W. Not ancre to Amiens from hill NW of Newville.


side 1  
in who  
1 two.

82

Parts marked by line at side  
are from Lt Tulin - Rest mostly from  
Col Witham who is much more careful of two.

52nd Bn - Dernancourt.

The rly embankt starts W. of  
Buire at abt 30 B 6.6. The S side  
of rd is also banked here as  
far as abt 19 C 9.2 where the  
rly embkt ends - & there is therefore  
a depression between the rd &  
rly - the rly embkt here is  
pretty steep.



From D to E the road is also embanked  
on its S. side & there is a big  
depression between the Rd embankt  
& the rly embank. Between A & B

3

\* Under N Boase, M.C. who  
 was in/c of the left Pln of B Coy  
 wh included in its left the arch.  
 This post was abt E 20 B 6.4. It  
 was dug in out of rd & cd fire  
 pretty well to 1 Church at Drennet.  
 The nearest house had been smashed by shell or bomb.

the railway embankment? gradually  
 gets steeper, after the level Xing  
 at A; but the N bank is  
 a good deal deeper  
 than the S. bank.

Our outpost line was  
 dug into the rly bank for  
 shelter for living positions;  
 but the position was defended  
 by simply getting up on top  
 of 1 embankment & lying flat  
 there, shooting over the nearer  
 rail.

Under the arch at B  
 we had a sniping post w  
 a Lewis gun dug in about  
 50 or 60 yds down 1 road  
 on 1 right, \* sniping into 1  
 village. The companies of 52  
 ran

A near Buire, Decentral,  
 (in trench w 37 Bn)  
 B Coy on left up to & including rly

bridge & A Coy in support  
near HQ at 18 C 2.0 near  
the nine trees.

The policy of the C.6. (Col  
Witham) was to have the  
rly line held sufficiently to  
prevent 1 German getting  
it by any except a strong  
attack. The Pioneers were  
tunnelling it for m.g. positions  
but these had not been finished.  
When finished, the <sup>rly</sup> line could be  
held by these & pickets sufficient  
to prevent enemy massing;  
the support line would then have  
been 1 main line of resistance  
in any heavy attack, & 1  
coys would have been kept in  
garrison there. The support line  
consisted of a number of  
lengths of trenches - platoon posts,  
some 300 yds up 1 slope of 1 hill.

82  
They were connected ~~with~~ with  
the rly & Buire Village on  
their right by a trench dug  
N & S by the 3rd Pioneers  
of whom 3 Coys were the g  
garrison Buire N of the Ancre.  
The 37 Bn Hqs were in Buire  
(Col. Knox Knight).

Witham - in order to  
deny the ~~space~~ dead ground  
behind rly to enemy -  
decided to place 1 garrison  
in the picket line on rly;  
& to give instrs that if they  
were forced back they were  
to fall back on 1 support  
line as the main line of  
resistance. This was taking  
a risk; & he spent 1 night  
of Apr 3/4 in going personally  
along rly to the coys



telling them each personally exactly what the policy was - fight on / rly line; & if you have to fall back - fall back & make your definite last resistance in / support trenches.

He saw Col. Knox Knight in Buire & had a yarn w him. Then he visited A & D Coy. At D Coy he was talking to Capt Williams - It was just midnight - when there came a ring from Bde to say th the enemy was expected to attack in the morning. Witham wondered a moment whether he ought to go back to his Hqrs directly but decided to go on & see Fraser, the ex-Staff Captain of 4<sup>th</sup> Bde who was in/c of B Coy on his left in touch w 47 Bn at the rly

"It leaves me perfectly calm -  
I hope they come!"

Witham lit his pipe on a cigarette  
behind one of the tents of the C.C.S  
& began a welcome smoke!

Julian was with him.

10  
Bridge. He stood talking to Fraser  
for a time <sup>until 2 am,</sup> - explaining to him  
what his Coy was to do if  
driven back. Fraser was quite  
sure there <sup>it was not in his mind as a possibility -</sup> would be no going back  
but Witham told him it <sup>was</sup> <sup>2</sup>  
seriously meant - if he went  
back he was to occupy the  
reserve support position of  
B Coy (by the C.C.S). There was  
an intermediate advanced  
post near the cemetery  
(L - civilian cemetery & military  
Cem. next to it).

Witham went back  
past the NE corner of the  
C.C.S in order to satisfy  
himself that the troops of  
the reserve coy (wh he had  
ordered up there at midnight)  
were there (under Capt Kennedy).  
And at 3 ~~am~~ am. arrived

back at Bn H.Q. He let Fitzgerald go to sleep while he sat up & waited & at 7 a.m. our guns opened. They had been firing a few minutes when German guns began. It was impossible to tell for a noise of our guns exactly when German guns did open. There was nothing for a

C.O. to do then but wait - & he had on along whole line left to rtr it was a great comfort to him; in this trying interval ~~without~~ of next two hours without shaved & read paper.

In meantime, according to Lt Julien, Bn. Int. Ofcs, a patrol under Lt Denne worked down to about [20] 5.5 or 4.5, where a short sunken rd runs from 1 village to 1 anchor. They saw there abt 30 Germans

in / Sanken Rd. I then took  
this info back to his Coy Comd,  
who sent it on to Batt. Q.

On strength of this (accdy to  
Julian) arty was asked for &  
a few shots were fired.

Capt Williams, centre (D) Coy,  
sent out a further patrol, of  
4 men under a sergt; they  
went out by daylight,  
& they report that they located abt  
200 Germans in 20 B, where  
there is some dead ground  
hidden from arty nearby  
but observable from further  
west. They each got through  
5 rounds rapid firing into  
1 German but 1 German  
wd not reply. They sent  
back word to the T.Ms  
near the Cemetery (L) &

these fired 10 rounds into /  
direction indicated.

It was abt 6.20 when  
this second patrol went out  
- by daylight; the news was  
telegraphed thro to 1 arty, but  
of course by then it was too  
late to make any difference.  
The patrol reports probably  
reached <sup>further warned</sup> ~~affected~~ the  
companies in 1 front line;  
but Bn Hqs was not much  
influenced by this - its  
preparations had been made.

The support Coy from B Hqs  
had been moved to 1 rear  
of the C.C.S at midnight;

[One Coy of 51 Bn was at disposal  
of Witham & was afterwards moved  
to prolong Kennedy's left to  
the 12 Bde but never got into

Certainly said  
to D 181

82

14

the position intended - i.e. the Coy. Commdr did not realise what was expected of him, but stayed on / reverse slope of hill in D8D.

Our barrage, sd Julien, started at 7 am. & 1 German barrage abt / same time. Julien rang the Bde & said: "They're off!"

The barrage was on / front posts & supports but as far as 52 Bn was concerned a lot of it missed them. The fire from T. Ms beside Dernancourt was very heavy & they were very big T. Ms - but the weight of it seemed to finish at / bridge. The L.G. post was placed underneath / bridge firing thro / arch at / farms in Dernancourt street until it was blown

up by a T.M. bomb. <sup>15</sup> Then <sup>another</sup>  
gun took up position on 1 top  
of 1 rly arch (under Gt.  
Whit comb.?).

At 8.45 am. Julian (who  
was in the Bn observatory post)  
sent a note to the Colonel  
saying the rifle & mg fire had  
commenced. It began on  
the right. He thinks it  
was against a body of  
Germans seen at this  
moment in Ville where  
troops were assembling or  
else a dummy attack was  
in progress. The men  
were firing at 700 to 800 yds.  
No enemy was as yet seen  
attacking 1 rly.

Bn HQ in Observatory Post cont  
See 1 front line at this time

82  
owing to 1 mist & shell smoke. 16  
But by 9.30 the mist had lifted  
in 1 valley & it was fairly  
clear.


By 9.15 the barrage  
was completely lifted onto the  
rear areas - it had been on  
1 support 2, but missed them;  
it was very heavy on 1 old  
huts & tents of C.C.S.

[This C.C.S. was ~~not much~~ dangerous to  
visit by day. But at night  
it was like a "White City" -  
the <sup>candles</sup> lights of souvenir hunters  
everywhere. One Offr Witham  
met coming back from  
there with a quilt under  
each arm, & a tennis  
racquet. The quilts were  
thrust into the bottom of  
a muddy "pozzy" &  
improved the sleeping. A



waggon was sent down there after dark for the stores of blankets etc. This night, as Kennedys Coy, who usually carried, was in 1 support line, Witham had 1 ration sent up in carts to behind the C.C.S. The Germans did not fire much on 1 rly line or 1 C.C.S. at night but of course they were unsafe by day (tho' our men did not find 1 sniping on 1 rly so deadly as the Tommies).]

The barrage pretty well flattened the C.C.S.



Q<sup>v</sup> [There were bomb proofs around the C.C.S. made in order to shelter patients there during German aeroplane raids. Witham had known these were there & counted on them - they were round the edge of it.]

At 9.35 there was a lull in the front except exactly in front of Dernancourt where our m.g. fire was very heavy.

We had 2 m.g.s. near the level crossing in 19d. Central on the S. side of rly in a little bit of a cutting. These guns were in 1 front line, Vickers guns, & they did great execution. The Germans tried to get out of village at the

Entrance near 1 arch in 20 B,  
 or else to dig in & make a  
 flank there (at S), (just S.E. of the  
 O in 20) These 2 guns knocked  
 these Germans about heavily.

The two trench mortars, also,  
 near the cemetery (near an old  
 tank wh we stuck at N — there  
 was also a light whippet tank  
 stuck at M) fired 270 rounds  
 into Dernancet. & around it  
 (where their observer could see  
 targets) The Lewis gun? in  
 front? of the Embankt. was  
 firing at Germans coming  
 up thro the broken down  
 houses on 1 N. of the village,  
 sometimes in fours. The  
 Germans tried to get into 1  
 road wh runs 60 yds S.  
 of 1 rly & parallel to it  
 (tho appearing closer on 1 map)

but the m.g. fire prevented them. There was a German m.g., possibly 2, on top of church wh was giving good covering fire & causing a lot of casualties to our men lying on top of rly. ~~The~~ <sup>our</sup> arty fire on Dernancet was not heavy; & at one time dropped on 1 embankment to such an extent th 1 troops in the centre pln (of B Coy) had to move E & shelter under 1 rly arch for some minutes.

These shells came from NW.

According to Julien the Germans first appeared gathering in Ville at 8.45 when rifle firing was first heard.


Then at 9.15, at 1 time of general attack, a party wh had crossed 1 stream of Ancre by 1 bridge near 1

White mill or pumping sta in 21  
 E26A also started up, probably  
 making for 1 level Xing. They  
 had bn sheltering behind some old  
 huts of British pumping sta.  
 during 1 night. At same  
 time they seem to have come out  
 of Dernancourt & all round  
 1 foot to 1 left. This w<sup>s</sup> 1 real  
 assault, at 9.15.

Some time before 10, some  
 men of the 47 Bn, which had  
 bn along 1 rly out left of  
 the 52nd, reached Frasers Coy.  
 He sent Sergt Dalton w<sup>th</sup> them  
 to try & find their 47 Bn people.  
 Dalton (who did splendid work during  
 1 day) took them 200 yds along  
 1 rly E O 1 bridge but found  
 no one. [possibly 200 yds is an  
 over estimate, but it is Dalton's].  
 The fire there w<sup>s</sup> so heavy th<sup>t  
 Dalton took them no further -</sup>

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 they came back & fought w/ 52nd.

About 10 a.m. the 52nd left on 1 rly, near was enfiladed by a m.g. from the left near the level crossing above Derranacourt; & Capt. Fraser saw men coming in artillery formation across towards / prisoners of war compound (P) abt E 15 C. 2. 8.



He gave orders for B Coy to get back into 1 prepared line in rear of cemetery & running through the old C.C.S.

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 About 10.15 Julin, who had been sent down to this point (? <sup>possibly</sup> on a message <sup>rec'd 9.30</sup> from Fraser that T.M. fire was awful & for God's sake to get arty out of it?) met about half of B Coy retiring towards the C.C.S. half way between the rly Arch & the C.C.S. Julin wanted them to go back to the rly, & got them to halt & lie down where they were. But he then found that he could see Germans, advancing & easily recognisable by their <sup>full</sup> packs, 50 or 60 of them, over his left shoulder apparently on the hill in 14 D. They were

bending low & getting under some embankment in 14c to escape from fire coming from 14B or 14 central. The guns in the Quarry were not firing but from 14c 5.4 a german m.g. got into the party & hit a fair number. The m.g. was able to enfilade support 2, when they got into them, (& so it must have been pretty well up the hill).

Julian went back to the right support Coy - (C. Coy) to get a platoon - to add to the remains of B Coy. [Part of B Coy with Capt Fraser had fallen back up the road up the hill but very few survived. Part had also retired on its left along]

? right



by Embankment.]

Capt Kennedy gave him  
St Rogers & his pln.

By the time the Germans had  
a heavy concentrated fire  
round the edge of C.C.S.  
(where the bomb proofs were)  
& sneaked up there thro'  
the archway, & the Sunken  
Road into the trench, & established  
themselves in the French  
Cemetery - one wig. seemed  
to be there. - Julien then  
went back to get a Coy  
of 5th Bu to fill in the  
gap on the top of the  
valley.

The only movement they  
could see on their left was  
German & all the firing  
was German until they  
got back some way when

82  
 the Vickers - (Julian sd "in the Quarry" but it seemed a guess & he was not at all sure of it when Witham sd it was scarcely possible) started.

Julian was inclined to think it must have been these guns in the Quarry which kept the German off the Quarry & road up to it & drove him E of the Spur. The Germans were not coming W or NW because there was a big open flat there & the Vickers guns from NW covered it.

This was the position at about 1.30 when Julian returned to HQs. It was at this time that a field gun was brought up by the Germans & fired

from somewhere near 1  
 P.O.W. compound at Capt.  
 Kennedy. <sup>Julian</sup> ~~They~~ Saytt  
 horses brought it thro 1  
 archway, & men handled  
 it up 1 hill. There also  
 seems to have been a  
 German wif. in the cemetery;  
 a second German field gun  
 possibly firing from E of  
 Deruancourt straight  
 along 1 rly; & one or  
 two guns firing from  
 among 1 trees on the  
 river flats. They cd have  
 bn brought up over night.

The mist had bn too thick to  
 see more than 600 yds before  
 9 am. but from then on it  
 lifted quick. The later part o  
 1 day was 1 drizzly.

The Support Coy from H Qrs had  
 be moved from H Qrs to the CCs  
 (rear of it) at midnight.

The Coy of the 51st was <sup>ordered to</sup> moved  
 up so as to top 1 hill &  
 bring fire to bear from a position  
 prolonging Kennedy's left to the  
 12th Bde. This the O.C. of the  
 Coy reported he had done - he  
 sd he was in touch w 1. 46th  
 Bn & had 50 men in a  
 good fire position at head of  
 valley (or something to that effect)  
 & so with am felt that this  
 gap was secure. As a matter  
 of fact this Coy was not on 1  
 forward edge of 1 hill but on 1 rear  
 slope [+ 1 gap left was  
 very dangerous indeed  
 I shd say (C.W.B.)

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
29

At abt 4 there came from Bde  
a statement that there wd be a  
C-attack, & that the 12th Bde were  
going to cooperate on 1 left &  
that 1 line wd also be reestablished  
by the 13th Bde. — or ~~some~~ words  
to that effect. This was marked  
to "52nd Bn" & to a number of  
other units; but there was  
nothing in it to show who was  
to organise 1 C-attack. Witham  
did not know if he were  
meant to do so, — he was  
not put in a position to  
~~command~~<sup>ask</sup> and help from the  
12th Bde. However presently  
came news that the 49th were  
in position <sup>on 1 left.</sup> And presently also  
Col Draxton arrived a 13th Bde  
order saying that 1 attack was  
to be organised by the C.O. & 9th

Bn.

In / meantime, just <sup>before</sup> ~~after~~ / ~~not~~ ~~as~~ ~~to~~ / impending c. attack arrived, there came news from Capt Kennedy th 2 Bns of Germans had been seen reinforcing into the Quarry (i.e. abt 4 pm.) This was followed by details making it clear th 1 German was making a second push.

At 4.30 the German appeared N of the E. end of the C.C.S. Kennedy had previously placed No 9 Pln under Lt Wilson on / rly, & No 11 Pln (under Lt Rogers) E of the C.C.S. The German now made Wilsons Pln, <sup>(after W.)</sup> ~~th~~ had been very



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 severely wd. (thro 1 wrist?) at  
 12.30 & had held on still)  
 to fall back along 1 rly.  
 Wilson came back to Bn H.Q.  
 & reported exactly where his  
 men were & then pitched down  
 collapsed - (He was an old  
 Anzac Scout of the 12<sup>th</sup> Bn)

The enemy, following along  
 1 rly line, forced enfiladed  
 Rogers (No 11) Pln & forced it  
 to fall back on Kennedy.

Stubbing (Capt of the 1st Coy) reported  
 at 4.45 that he was falling back  
 on the Pioneer Trenches. Williams

was falling back  
 joining up to  
 Kennedy.

The German was seen <sup>by Kennedy</sup> bringing  
 up a heavy T.M. to somewhere  
 abt the Quarry, & also

82  
 a field gun. He <sup>also</sup> began to appear  
 to Kennedys N. up 1 hill,  
 & was lining the edge of slope  
 just in front of Kennedy, firing.  
 The fire was so hot that Kennedy  
 could not move his unit -  
 the only thing was to work their  
 fire to 1 greatest effect. The  
 left of them were told to fire at  
 1 German on left & the  
 11th Pln (Rogers) on right to fire  
 at 1 Enemy in front. The  
 Enemy was certainly some of  
 him in the C.C.S. It looked  
 as if K's. left flank were  
 being deliberately turned.

At this time <sup>(4.55)</sup> Witham sent  
 up a second Coy of 57th Bn  
 to Kennedy as instrus to Lt  
 Owen, its O.C., to place his right



upon the upper (N) end of Pioneer trench & then advance to join up w Kennedy (?ourt). Owen's Coy reached Pioneer 2y but there found Stubbins (who had fallen back) advancing again to the rly as things were not so bad at his part of field. Owens Coy, instead of going to Kennedy, seems to have forgotten all its instrs. & joined in w 1 one piece of movement wh it saw - & went w Stubbins to rly Embankt.

Poor Kennedy saw his looped for reinf'ts moving across his rear to a positn where they were not in 1 least required.

By 4.55 pm Kennedy was very hard pressed - the

\* The Coys on Kennedys right, down on 1 rly were firing with their backs to 1 rly at 1 German up 1 hill near Kennedy & were getting good shooting.


82  
Coy of 57 Bn wh ought to have bu on his left being still over 1 hill & he having no touch w anyone on his left - no one except Germans in sight & they <sup>edging</sup> ~~creeping~~ round him - & he pinned down by fire.\*

At 5.30 he saw heads moving over 1 top of 1 hill to his left front. He was not sure they were not Germans but they turned out to be 49 Bn.

It was 1 C-attack. From that moment 1 situation eased at once. The 49 came down towards the C.C.S. Their progress was slow, but 1 line did come gradually down. Between 6.30 & 7 the Germans finally fled, covered by m.g. fire from the rly.

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Owens Coy was now brought up from its wrong position by 1 rly & was joined to the 49 Bn by the C.C.S. - its line running forward of the C.C.S to 1 rly.



C Coy 5758 Bn (of 79 rifles) was put in to reinforce 49 Bn.

[Lade continued to direct operations tho his wrist was smashed in 1 mg. at 1 cemetery - he had 1 rt plu & 1 left Coy.

The Centre & right Coys kept the C.O. supplied w splendid & accurate information;

"Stand to", when every man has to be called & stand to his post, had of late been from 4.30 to 6.30 am. There

Had to have some slackness in getting men out & waking them - & with me had to insist on this being done punctiliously. It is the only way of being sure to waken 1 man - so as to be in time for a possible rush.

### 12 Bde. Confidential.

The 47 Bn is abt 400 to 450 strong & Norman, when I told him that Imlay sd they came out 43 strong, shook his head & sd it was a heavy exaggeration. He says that Keane's <sup>evidence</sup> story is far more worthy of being taken literally than Imlay's. Gelly found out very soon that Imlay was a "bluff", & that there was a lot of eyewash in the accounts of the

47 Bn.

Both Gelly & Norman say  
 that work of the 47 Bn is slapdash,  
 & not careful. For example,  
 when lent a Coy of 45 Bn to  
 support 1 British at Dernancet,  
 Imlay had them marched  
 into their trenches in artillery  
 formation over 1 top.

Leane dribbles his reliefs  
 into his 2, a few at a time.

Gelly gave direct instructions  
 that (as he put it) 1 first consider-  
 -ation must be "to take care of  
 old Billjim" - i.e. to try & keep  
 their men alive thro' 1 bombt  
 (if ever one came). Leane only  
 lost 120 men, the 47<sup>th</sup> far more.  
 (The Birdwood says its casualties

? strength

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were heavily overstated & he believes <sup>40</sup>  
they are now 700. I daresay  
Berdie equally understates them -  
he generally is too optimistic).  
[Jelly had settled within a  
very short time that he must  
look for a new C.O. for the  
47 Bn. But now it will  
be broken up].

The 46 Bn lost abt 30  
men by jumping up & going  
out at the Germans when the  
Germans raided or attacked 1  
day before. The 46 Bn would  
be denied - wasn't content  
to stay in 1 trench but got  
out & charged - That is 1  
spirit Jelly gets into his  
battalions in a wonderfully  
short time.

Gellibrand was instructed by the Divn to re-establish 1 line. He knew it was impossible. He rang up Leane who was senior officer of 48<sup>th</sup> & 47<sup>th</sup>. Leane told him it was impossible to push down to the rly. "Yes I know it is," sd Gelly. They decided on pushing for the X road (Sunkers) thro 3 & 8. The Pono did not get so far as this - the Germans were holding it & still are. They were believed to have reached it at one point near the X roads, but this is doubtful.

(On first arriving at Henencourt <sup>on March 27</sup> the <sup>advanced</sup> 121<sup>st</sup> Bde extended over exactly 1 same ground over wh they had fought in field days in 1917)

Barton & Castle, 2 ofrs of 52<sup>nd</sup>, who were both in a splendid bit of patrol work in the Ypres Battle ground were hit in this fight. At Ypres they were picking 1 ground for a raid. They went under 1 German wire & found a post of 3 men; 5 others reinforced at the moment - one an oftr. They lay low & then bombed & shot 6 & 2 ran away. Off 1 oftr they got an order for relief - & they got identification apparently from all of them.

In the Dernancet fight, Barton was hit in 1 knee. He & Castle were in the same C.C.S. & Barton died.

48th Bn. Ap. 5/1918.

These notes are additional to Bn Diary. The Coys were, as in plan opposite. 2 Platoons of C Coy, wh. we in support, were sent to D Coy early in fight.

6.55 - w. hour of Bombt. most of shells went over 1 Embankment but were very heavy on 1 rear areas. Our reply was good.

The attack came first in 15c. The news of it came by runner from the 47 Bn. Leane in 48 Bn has a platoon of Bn scouts, not authorised, & wh he has been told twice to disband. He keeps them now nominally as Coy. scouts but 1 moment he gets into 1 front line they report to him. He sent them out to various O.P. of his, & all day long got reports from them.

At 6 am. 50 Germans had come out apt our left post (of B Coy).

At 9 am. 1 germ started to attack across 1 rly in E3D, they tried to come along 1 rly & drive in the left post but rifle fire from L.Gs. in 1 Embankment wrecked them. Some came apt the post by Amiens Rd at 3D78. The attack here failed completely & was held well until 10 am.


Word then came thro' that enemy had broken thro on 1 right. Capt Anderson, O.C. A Coy ind. took over 140 yds of front held by the 47 Bn so as to allow 47 Bn to concentrate on its right.

~~where Gally told them to dig in.~~  
on 11/3/18 Extended over some 20 yards as  
had practice over in field.

~~Diary~~ ~~2 Bn entering at Amiens~~

~~12/4/18 in Vanguard.~~

~~13/4/18 in Vanguard.~~



2 ppls C to D Coy  
Early in fight 10 am.

6.55 am. Bombt. ~ 500

W. 1 2 1 1 1 1 1  
L 0 15 C x 1 1 1 1

47 Bn.

6 am. 50 2 1 - 1

apt 1 1  
9 am. 2 1 L 1 1  
E 3 D x 1 - 1 1 1  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 am.

33078

Anderson O.C. A Coy  
2.7 1 1 1 47 1 1 (so as to allow 47)







49  
2<sup>nd</sup> attack of March 28.

On March 28 Germans attacked at 5am. with little shelling but much trench mortar. The enemy came with full packs, British field boots, some Australian Comfort fund socks w letters from women in <sup>Apr.</sup> still in the socks, Brit. cigarettes etc. They came on in pretty close formation not expecting much opposition. Their orders (a prisoner sd) were to keep moving forward - other troops wd follow in rear. [they had no idea that all Australians were finished]

9 attacks were made by enemy trying to get through belts Dernancourt & Albert - 9 efforts to form up. In 1st attack they got thro near level Xing E of ~~Dern~~ in 15 central & moved up towards 1 high ground NW - the orders being to push

The narrative of Ap. 5<sup>th</sup> continued.


The 48<sup>th</sup> Bn ~~was~~ relieved (after a rest) on 1 night of April 3/4. ~~On~~ the day of Ap 4 the activity of trench mortars made Leane think 1 Germ. was registering. L was anxious abt his left because 1 German held 1 rly there, & with the hedges & 1 deep ravine there, he cd get in behind 1 rly line & assemble unseen. Therefore Leane strengthened his left.

on wherever they penetrated & the other troops wd follow thro 1 gap. (These were 1 invariable orders to Germ. in this advance). Lt Mitchell 15 men of

These men were apptd those already dealt w by 47<sup>th</sup> Bn and Sgt McDougall.

48<sup>th</sup> Bn C. attacked W. up hill from abt 9 central on rly Bank & theykameraded without trouble. All were captured (abt 30 or 9 an offr.). These men who got thro didnt fire at our backs - it was misty & they probly cant see supports.

The L.G.s sent down the p? carefully down along the banks when sent to reinforce - Only 2 L.G.s were sent all day.



52 Abt 1 am / Gerns were seen (by patrols) on / road parallel to / rly. The register along / rly had made L think th they were going to attack next day. Also, informatn arrived during / night from / French.

The German was putting T.M. on to Capt Cumming, B. Coy, on / Amiens Rd during / whole bombt; but the T.M. barray on / front line did not begin till 8 am. The bombt. continued w / heavies on / back area.

H Qrs of 48 Bn (47 Bn next door) was in an open trench just near / Amiens Rd at / junction w / Millencourt Rd.

The Germans had a moving barrage of field guns working backward & forwds all / time. (Keane clearly thinks it was not as heavy as Pozieres & Col. Smiley says th at Pozieres & after Messines in June & July they had heavier barrays - but this was very heavy). The time of actual attack was 9.25. Keane had observers out & at 10.30 they reported th the 13th Bde was falling back. The 45th Bn was then sent from D.12 to the rt flank. At 10.45 Capt Smiley of / support coy (48 Bn)

92

53 Abt 1 am. To / on road. Leave (E / ) x / German was /

Capt Cumming B Coy 'Amiens' 1 / 8 am. /

H Qrs / Amiens 1 / 6 s /


To / 9.25 / 10.30 13th Bde /

At 10.45 Capt Smiley / Quarry in E 14.

Sent back information that Germans were firing on him from 1 quarry in ~~14~~ E 14. ~~then~~

54 When the left Pln retired they could not attract attention of British on 1 left before doing so. A

Serjt (?) volunteered to go across - & tho he fell several times the English brought him in to their post & got <sup>some</sup> message, because they signalled up our pln at once asking what it was going to do.



[The 48 Bn is now nominally S.A., but abt 1/2 the men are W.A. The 5th Coy & 7th Coy were W.A. & reinforcements have been recd. Since this battle from WA as well as S.A. They have got them from reinforcements for 3rd, 10th, 27th & other Bns since this battle - i.e. our available reinforcements are being quietly used.

The 48 Bn lost no guns exc. 3 blown up early in 1 action (The 47 Bn lost a fair number).

At 4.45 pm the 49 Bn moved forward on rt. The advance took place at 5.15 w/ assist. of arty. The 48 Bn was already on the front ready to be held <sup>48</sup> + With the 49 Bn the remains of 47, all 45, & one Coy of 46 were told to cooperate. Leane spoke to Gelly, saying that it was impossible to go back to 1 valley. The Germans had the sunken Rd thro 8 cent to 14A. & 1 c-attack was to push them off this. We had had strong points there & 1 intention was to

13 Coy incident - info sent to English on left. ( ) 3 etc > Bouzinet

48 v P v - exc. 3 S 1 v  
 4.45 49 v  
 48 ) v  
 47 v , 45  
 46 v r. v s 49 v 1 x  
 L v, Gelly 2 c 5  
 8 e, 14 a  
 off 6 x 1 S/Ps  
 100 x 6 P 1  
 f 1 u X 2 } L v  
 p. 2  
 at 2 e }

56 push / germ. back from these. We got to abt 100yds this side of road & possibly reached road itself just where rd thro 13B & 14C crosses it, & we dug in there opposite 1 German, not far from point wh it was desired to reach. This attack, ~~actually~~ <sup>nominally</sup> in waves, actually went forward in one line or through.

The British on 1 left, N. of 1 Amiens Rd, who were always well behind our flank, had fallen back to conform w our new line at 2 Central. [They originally had the Quarry near the Millencourt Albert Rd, but 1 German at some time obtained this & were in Quarry when we <sup>on later day sent</sup> out a post to E 2 D.]

The German losses were much heavier this day than on the 28 March. 2 Prisoners taken in E 8 sel to 4 Divs took part in this fight - Naval Divn, 9 Divn, 50 Divn & 60 Divn <sup>(if I am remembered)</sup> - they belonged to 50 Divn.

The ravine on 1 left is very deep just S. of the Albert Rd. On the other side there is a sheer drop down to it of 50 or 60 ft. The road thro 8 & 13 is much of it sunken.

57  
 ~ ~ 2 1/2 ✓ ~ ~ 6 L 6"  
 28 x 2 2e L ~ E 8 P 4 L  
 L 6 ~ x Naval 6 96 50 6 60  
 (V 1 > 50) x  
 . 1 . 1 . 0 7 L 3 2'  
 50 > 60 x  
 . 1 7 . 8 - 130 1 1 7

Sunken  
 The 2 2e C 1 ✓  
 D L at 10.5 am. 7 9 C U  
 66 x (✓) 2 1 L 6 > 0  
 U or V 6 x (✓) Potts a  
 W. 3p L 2 1 ✓ x

[Germans had the Quarry on the Douzinc? Rd after this when our post was <sup>moved to</sup> E 2 D.]

The 2 Plns of C Coy wh were sent to Day at 10.5 am got there w no casualties. They were dribbled up taking advantage of ground, in small parties. They were under Lt Potts, a W.A. offr (son of a parson) <sup>there</sup>.

[N.B. McDougall & Lawrence serpts of 47 Bn noticed 4 German method of dribbling men forward was slow but much less wasteful than "ours".]

[A lot of this narrative is inaccurate].  
 47 Bn. led the 48 Bn part of way down. After marching about the Hebuterne district in search of Germans (they were one of many who reconnoitred Hebuterne & found no ferms) they marched all night & reached Sentis abt 7 am. where they marched into 1st sign of ferms - a few shells of a morning Straf - probly not aimed at them. Betw. Millencet & Heuencet abt 11 am they broke into arty formation. (They had done exactly 1 same in their last field day in 1 same place). The ferms cd see them here, & there was a fair artillery fire, coming over 1 high ground they saw a crowd of men on Edgehill (E 13 & 14). They thought these were probly ferms but they were Tommies. They were mostly Scots. They set 1 German on them - but a word or two "not to be - fools" & the Scots came back w 1 Australian.  
 The CO. left the Bn in E 7 central (48 was not there yet) & walked down Albert Rd. It was quite empty. As he went down 1 slope towards Albert a mfg. started on him from 1 direction or rly. He turned back, placed posts at 2, 8, & 14 & then ~~went~~ got orders to place Bn on line thro 2 & 8 N. vs of Albert Rd. (just over 1 crest looking towards Albert). abt 5 pm 48 Bn came

up and took over 1 line N of the Amiens Rd. 47 Bn was posted on 1 ridge in 8 & 14 E.  
 It was at this time an English Off. came up & sd they were to relieve his men at dark. He sd he left Dernancet, owing to 1 German entering it, at 11 am. Sentis & Heuencet  
 There was no fight so far as we know. At Sentis it had been told us that 1 German were already in Dernancourt. This officer had left his lunch on 1 table. (his settles the time.)  
 Diagrams and notes:  
 Sentis 11 am  
 Heuencet 11 am  
 Edgehill 13.24  
 C.O. 2 1 2 1  
 Sentis 11 6 1 Heuencet.  
 6 7 7 mfg. 1  
 9 2 5 x 1  
 2 8 4 6 7 1  
 1 2 8 P (1. 2 4)  
 47 1 1 8 & 14  
 6 1 2 x 1 2. guides  
 (1 P. 1 Dernancet 1 2 1  
 1 1 11 am 1 1 Sentis




These troops belonged to the 9th British Divn. 2<sup>nd</sup> 6<sup>th</sup> K.O.S.Bs, 9<sup>th</sup> Seaforth, 8<sup>th</sup> Black Watch, 4<sup>th</sup> D.L.I., 6<sup>th</sup> & 12<sup>th</sup> Royal Scot, 19<sup>th</sup> North<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers & some South African Scottish 8 Bns altogether. We relieved them <sup>some way</sup> on our side of rly line & our line brought 1 line up to 1 rly line. [This is not altogether accurate some of Tommas were certainly at 1 rly] The British were not on 1 rly line.

The line of 47 Bn this night was fixed from 15 to 20 central. The 48 Bn was on its N. The 106<sup>th</sup> Bde was on the right but were not in a stable condition.

Next night Capt Stabell of the North<sup>th</sup> Fusils. came along & sd it we had taken too much line. Their left shd be on 1 level Xing E. of the Village. This was 1 night of March 28.

On 1 mng. of April March 28 1 German attacked. Their bombt was w 5.9 & Whizzbang & they put up a smoke screen (McDougal says all this is wrong). The smoke of smoke bombs was so high th our S.O.S. cd not be seen. But a German plane, flying low, fired a green signal flare over this smoke & this curiously eno' brought down our S.O.S.



Apr 28. 20 L ... 5.9. Whizzbang ... SOS ... 28.

The Germans knocked out the Vickers gun at the Crossing in 15 D 3-2. & then moved across <sup>1 rly line</sup> & spread out both ways (This is not what M.D. says). These storm troops had slept 1 night before at Vivier Mill - they were the leaders of their battalions attack.

Among 1 men of 1 line was Sgt. S.R. McDougall (a Tasmanian youngster) who was in 1 ditch by 1 level Xing w 1 men. He rushed out of ditch when he saw 1 German coming through. He charged them w 1 bayonet - he was not more than 15 yds away. All these Germans had their packs on. McD. stuck abt 6 of these w 1 bayonet. Then he took one of their light m.g.s & turned it on 1 second wave coming over 1 level Xing. This put these men in disorder. When he had exhausted all 1 amm'n. he went after the front wave & got a Lewis gun wh they had taken from 1 British (McD. told me th a British L.G. was taken by our men on 1 rly line a little way to his left!) during 1 advance. He fired all 1 amm'n of this into 1 front wave. It was soon exhausted. By th time the L.G. Offr & Scout Offr. came up from 1 right & joined in. A German officer was abt to shoot the L.G. Offr when McD. got him w his bayonet. [The whole of this story is completely inaccurate - the facts are in the report of my talk with McDougall 15/4/18]

Another man w a L.G. had now joined 1 party. McD. got onto 1 German w this (scorched his hands) & onto some more Germans who came across 1 ~~cutting~~ Xing & chased 1 German up 1 hill with their hands up.

82


(w 1. Vic. → line '6 →  
x (1 or 1 Vivier Mill  
y x (✓ 2 2 x (✓ 1 1  
✓ L x  
~ . → " 1 ) Sgt  
McDougall S.R., → } 8 → x  
1 1 6. } ( , ) . 2 - ) x  
1 1 ( 5 ) ( 1 0 0 1 5 2 1 } 6  
2 1 1 1 x , 2 1 6 5 2 x  
6 1 L ✓ 1 ) 1 1 1 1 1 1  
1 1 2nd cl - ) . 1 1 1 1  
6 1 6 → 1 1 1 1 1 1  
~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
L.G. 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
y > ~ 1 1 1 1 1 1  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 L.G. 1  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
L.G. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
0 1 1  
~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Mac. 7 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Then he left them & bothered no more  
abt them. He went back to the King & kept  
on shooting at anything he cd see, firing  
from his hip.

We took 39(?) prisoners & 3 offrs  
killing 2 (? of these) offrs (& capturing one) The  
germs left 30 or 40 dead inside / lines. These  
men were coming down from / direction  
of Albert.

The germs made some little attacks  
dur / day - nothing to speak of - three or  
4 times.

In / first two days, by promise-  
-ous shelling on front & supports, 47  
Bn lost 170 men. The N. Fusiliers  
attacked from the west aqst Dern-  
-an court & were cut up by m.g.  
fire



on / level ground  
where the X is.

It was sd at this  
time to Dernanct was  
unoccupied. Imlay was to cooperate w them,  
but, seeing th they lost 51 men at once,  
he did nothing.


The Bon refilled & replenished w blankets  
bully beef, 50 or 60 rifles, petrol tins etc from the  
abandoned British camp behind Edgell.

On the night of 28/29 March some horsemen  
turned up at dark. Their offr sd they were an "arty  
patrol" (British) who had not sent up because they heard  
th / infantry had evacuated. He belonged to / G  
group. They were to find out where / line was.

82

6. r ( ) ...  
100 ...  
1 - ) ...  
✓ L 39 ... - 3 ...  
- 2 ...  
of . P x 6 ...  
~ 2 x  
... 2 ...  
3 ) 4 ...

4026 / promiscious ...  
... 47 Bn P 170 ...  
... N.F. L 7 ...  
Dernanct ...  
... x o x  
} P | c ...



(P 51 ...  
... bully } 50 } 60 ...  
... Tommy ...  
... 28 ...  
... x . 6  
...  
... x , ...

66 On 1 afternoon of March 27 a tremendous lot of aeroplanes were up. They started to fire on our men & managed to kill 2 of 47 Bn & wd another (+ 1 same with 48 Bn). They made our men lie down very close. We learnt later that someone had told the R.F.C. that everything forward of Laviesville was German.

On 1 night of April 2, 47 Bn relieved 45 Bn again & took from the rly arch to above 15 Centl. The 46 Bn was then on 1 left. On 1 morning of April 3 the Germans attacked on a 300 yds front just along the centre of 1 Bn. There was a bit of bomb first; the SOS went up; our arty came down. We battered (Germans) back w Stokes mortars, ligs & rifles. Not one of them got on to our rly line. They ran Northward to 1 boundary between 46 & 47 Bns & got onto 1 rly line there. The right Coy of 46 Bn battered them & so did 1 left Coy of 47 Bn. There were 80 dead in front of 1 left Coy of 47 Bn - 47 Bn got one prisoner, & 46 Bn one.

These sd that one Bn had made 1 attack. His attack was made abt 8.15 & was over by 9. They had come by the sunken Rd W of Vivier Mill down to 1 rd on 1 other side of rly, where there was a platform & stone dump wh hid them. They had 250 yds to come after crossing the

52

67  
 47 : 2 : 47 : 48 :  
 ( 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 :  
 2 : 47 :  
 2 : 48 :  
 ( 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 :  
 1 : 1 : R.F.C. :  
 Laviesville ) 2 x

2 Apr. 47 vs 45 - 7  
 15 e x 46 ) 6 x  
 3V 2 L : 300 : 1 :  
 SOS : 1 : 1 : 1 :  
 ( Stokes : 2 : 2 :  
 47 vs 46 : ( 7 : 1 : 5 :  
 ) x 46 : 1 : 1 :  
 47 : ( x ) : 80 : 1 :  
 left : 47 Bn : 7 : 1 : 46 :  
 ( 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 :  
 ( 1 : 8.15 - ) : 7 : 9 :  
 ( 1 - 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 ) : 9 :



70 the X Rd at 21 A. 9. 9. An offr  
 volunteered to go out & disperse these. He  
 sd he cd fighten them w a Lewis gun.  
 This w Lt Taylor. He went out & saw  
 these germs. He reckoned there w only  
 50. He fired at them 2 magazines  
 from his L.G. & he says he did not  
 see one man get away unhit [of  
 course this is an estimate of no value].  
 He w abt 100 yds away.

Presently they heard transport  
 moving along the Albert Vivier Mill  
 road & the Morlancourt Rd & we got  
 the arty onto these.

The ground mist became heavier  
 you cdnt see anybody on / ground. The  
 lamp signal w still being maintained.  
 Im lay determined to send a chain  
 of scouts down from the Bn O.P. abt  
 14 A 2.9 to 1 front line. (They were to  
 be sent but the arrangement w not completed)

Our arty opened on / germs at  
 5 a.m. & continued till 7 a.m. & our  
 men sd it w a most perfect  
 barrage. At 7 punctually / german  
 barrage came down, not on

71  
 L.G. (Lieut Taylor)  
 50 x 2  
 L.G. 100  
 Albert  
 Morlancourt  
 14 A 2.9  
 15 a.m.  
 17

1 front line but on the supports right back past Bn H Qs to Millencourt.

It was abt the 3rd best barrage in 1 Bn's experience - H.E., sensitive fuse, Shrapnel, gas. Telephone wires were cut. At abt 8.30 the Support Coy reported that they had very few men left. C. Coy on 1 night under Lt Goodsell had 108 men when they started.

But by this time he had lost all his officers - Douglas, Hinds & Marson, & was badly wd in 1 back himself, & had only 24 men left. The trenches were half full of water for it ~~was~~ had <sup>been</sup> a rainy night.

Reinfts were sent down from a Coy of 45 Bn wh was in Pioneer Trench. Capt Simmons of 1st Support Coy (who was in w his men) only had 50 men left out of 124 - & one officer, Lt Smith, had bn wd.

At this time the front line stated that they were being heavily shelled. This was abt 9 am. The message came by wire from the front line from both Coys. The linesmen had repaired 1 line (many signallers were hit, Inlay sd.) The lamp was also

J u v d p , v o a b  
 1 2 3 4 H C b - r r x  
 ) n . 2nd v 4 r r x  
 H E e g b 2 - x a v  
 ✓ - x 1 n 8.30 . v i  
 v { 1 7 } e - r x C i  
 " 1 v r Goodsell 1 108  
 11 r Douglas, Hinds, Marson  
 { 24 }  
 - 2 ✓ v 7 0 1 1 r  
 - 4 7 x r 2 ✓ e 1 9 .  
 { 45 } 1 ) v Pioneer 4 r  
 Capt Simmons v r v i  
 4 1 50 - r (out of 124).  
 ✓ v Lt Smith J m x  
 { } . v p p i { } ✓ v v

D / (east of) (west of) Young B

Heard A

Rose Cooksey Wcoq

Ward Taylor Lt Reid I.O. (Supt Brown Scout Supt Ws W him)

Working. The previous night 2 more L.Gs had bn sent down to 1 left Coy. This gave

a total of 13 L.Gs in 1 front line; 4 Vickers guns were in 1 quarry in 14B.

The Stokes mortar <sup>was</sup> in 1 valley

in 15c & in addition there was a party of 25 pioneers (4th Pion. Bn) under Lt Pennefather who were driving tunnels - none of 1 tunnels in 1 Embankt were yet ready.

There was a small reserve at Batterys - 3 L.Gunners, runners, signallers, & a couple of batmen.

At 9.40 an S.O.S. went up N. of the Amiens - Albert Rd where the Essex were on 48 Bns left - & the left Coy 48 Bn were also attacked.

[The main front of the 48 Bn was not attacked at all, Imlay thinks.]

It was thought th this was probly 1 real attack.

Handwritten notes on page 75, including a vertical line and various symbols and numbers: 6) u 9 pm. 6 - n 10, 1. 2 P 7, 1. P x, 2 79. Lyp J e J, 6 n u 3 P 13 Lyp, 4 6 - 1 C 1 u 14 B, 15c, 25-40, Pennefather, 3 L e, etc.

At 10.20

at 9.40 an S.O.S. was sent up N. of Amiens

Albert Rd & Essex? 48 Bn

48 Bn

5 (6) L x



at 10.20 the camp could be seen. The chain of scouts was not ready; but 1 wire had been repaired just in time for them to say: "Fritz is attacking heavily". The lines were repaired twice during the bombt. & twice during 1 fight.

At 11.15 ~~the~~ runner sent to Support Coy came back & said "Fritz is in the Support trenches." The Germans at this time were in C Coys trench. Goodsell was badly wd & had only 24 men. He was supported by a pln of 45 Bn under Lt. Perry - sent up w 24 men of whom only 15 arrived & Perry was k by a shell on arrival.

Fritz was expelled by C & D Coys in the Support trenches - they attacking from 1 road (this is very vague & unreliable) & was thrown down the hill. At this time I observed a long stream of men coming over the hill in 24 B & 13C (Edgehill). I saw

1 10.20  
 . . . .  
 \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /  
 L \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /  
 1 bombt - 2cc 1 w }

at 11.15  
 - L - P  
 Germans  
 ) r m - 1 y 24 r x  
 ) r m - e - 45 u r  
 Perry w 24 r - m y  
 15 ? - Perry was k by  
 a shell on arrival .

Coys  
 C & D i - r L u . 1?  
 - J h . r x d u v  
 . . . .

It ~~these~~ were the 52nd Bn, "wh  
 "explained how 1 sermo got up  
 "into the supports". [A fair num-  
 ber of 52nd Bn <sup>left Coy.</sup> certainly did  
 retreat up road in this directn  
 at abt 10.30 But the break was almost  
 certainly thro right of 47 Bn].

"I sent Lt Robinson, L.G. off to  
 take command of C Coy. No word has  
 been heard of him. A runner  
 came back & sd he saw 3 or 4  
 men taken prisoners near the  
 Quarry in the Sunken Rd."

Imlay then went down to  
 see to the gap of 800 yds between 47  
 & 52. 47 was then with its rt (in  
 the supports) on the X Rd on grid 13-14  
 central & (in front line) on the Bridge  
 on l rly line (impossible). The visibilit  
 was clearer. Lt Smith, asst. adjutant,  
 was ordered to gather up spare men  
 at Bn H Qrs. & come to the  
 right of Pioneer Trench (i.e. a trench  
 thro E7, not the 3rd Pioneer Trench near 52 Bn)

24 B v 13 c x, ' ) 8  
 ✓ 52nd v 1 - 8  
 72 7 \ 7 . 8 )  
 2 "  
 v e Lt Robinson L.G. v  
 L v C v x v  
 ) v x v  
 - P ) 3 7 4 v L v  
 C. C v v 1 x  
 C O 6 v 1 v ) v 800  
 v v 47 v 52 x  
 47 v ) 6 v 6 1  
 " x v 13-14 v v  
 > " v 6 v x v 40  
 v x Lt Smith v v )  
 v v spare v 1 H Q

880 to fill the gap. Imray told C.O.  
52nd Bn that his line was intact.

A few minutes after 12 noon a lamp  
message was recd from 1 front line  
[probably from left or from a position in rear of  
front] saying that line was intact to their  
right boundary (the rly arch). Then  
a runner from Capt Young reported  
the state of affairs on his Sector  
(left front). This gave the C.O. to  
understand that Germans had  
got over thro the 52 Bn & cut  
the supports of 47 Bn in 1 flank.

The Stokes mortar on 1 left  
was blown out & the crew joined in  
w 1 infantry under Lt Kenyon &  
Lt Bone who fought as riflemen.  
The Pioneers also joined in.

At 1 pm they saw the Germans  
all round 1 country on their  
right rear. They decided to fall  
back along 1 rly line & form a  
flank. They had to be subject to very

20

Handwritten notes on page 881, including a vertical line and various symbols and numbers:

1 - 7 1 2 4  
5 7 x C O 520  
o p 7 4 x 6 7 4  
12 7 7 7 2  
7 0 p 2 6 p 7 4  
1 1 7 (12. 7) 6  
2 7 7 7 7 7 0  
2 7 x 6 7 7 C O 7  
9 7 1 7 7 7 52nd 7  
1 7 7 7 47 7 7  
C 7 x  
Stokes 7 7 7 7  
S 1 7 7 7 7 7  
7 Lt Kenyon & Lt Bone 7 7  
7 7 7 7 7 7  
1 7 pm ( ) 7 7 7 7  
7 7 7 x ( 7 7 7 7 7

8? fierce attacks but had settled them all.  
 No 4 platoon post in the right Coy  
 reckoned th they had over 400 dead  
 in front of their post. They had one  
 loader to every four rifles - some  
 of 1 rifles they got from 1 German  
 dead. The value of rapid firing  
 practice came in here.

At Capt Young's Coy HQs they  
 got an anti aircraft Lewis gun & a  
 number of sparemen of Coy HQs; & Heard  
 (rt) & Young (left Coy) reckoned they  
 must have had 40 w. gs - their own  
 & German, - at one time. The Germans  
 came out in solid formation - bunches,  
 not waves or lines - the rear lines  
 clambering over 1 front line of dead?

They brought up 2 field guns wh  
 fired (probly really from right rear of  
 Dernancourt) at 250 yds from  
 Albert Rd just NE of junction E of  
 village. Young picked off 1 gunners  
 w a rifle from Coy HQs in 1 rly embankment.

5 P - Y. C. x (1)  
 8. 7 y L. 1 PC x No 4  
 2 b - 1 y - (1)  
 400 i. u o ' ) b x (1  
 1 7 . 4 2 o ' / (7  
 2. 2 1 . x . 5 ' 1 . 2 -  
 u y \*  
 1 Young u o y (7  
 - air - L. y spare men.  
 Heard - u - (00  
 1 40 wgs. 2. 2 1 2 h x  
 2 - 1 u o y u  
 u u y p . / p  
 u y . o p . i .  
 ( 7 1 2 4 - 1 5  
 1 250 y . 2 1 8 NE > 6  
 E > y x Young i . u .  
 o y y . o y y u s w x


84 The boys say Young did wonderful work, knocked out m.g.s. w rifle grenades sniped m. gunners etc. [If this account were not so inaccurate these details wd be of more value]

There seemed to be no attack north of 15 B Central. It seemed to be from 15 B Central to 19 D Central. More Germans cd be seen on / road thro 26, 27 & 22 ready to come through.

When 47 started to withdraw the Coys withdrew gradually up the Spur towards 14 Central, falling back on / supports, bringing back / rt flank of 48 Bn w them. Lt Reid & Serjt Brown went out & covered the movement w a small party. Capt Heard had Lt Rose w him (from Rt) but had lost Cooksley k. & Alcoa (wd. early); Young had only Taylor w him - Ward having bn sent to 48 Bn. By 3pm they got on to / high ground in D Central & at 3A. The 48 Bn joined them & made a line on / top of / slope. The left post of 48 Bn had bn attacked by this time. Also, instead of 46 Bn

92


85



Coming up to fill 1 gap, 49 appeared <sup>on</sup> ~~out~~ the horizon coming S. from 1 direction of Lavieville towards Buire. Inlay sent out & got them to join on to 1 right of 47 wh hadbn reinf. by 2 plns of 45 Bn under Capt Holman & Capt. Davies. The total strength of 47 Bn "as far as cdbc estimated," exclusive of runners & signallers (who were now withdrawn as 49 Bn had come in) amounted to 500 & 750 r.

Orders were to C-attack in conjunction w/ forward movement of 49 Bn & regain 1 Support line, 48 Bn conforming to 1 movement by forming a line to the rear E 2 Centl. 8 Centl. connecting w/ 1 left of 47 Bn in E 8 D & 45 E & 49 E.

At 5.15 the barrage opened & they went forward along 1 whole line. It was a splendid sight. When they got over the ridge there was



88 a devilish fire upon them - a tremendous tattoo of mgs. They got over / crest of ridge & charged. The Germans broke before them but their ranks were so depleted that it was decided to dig in 150 yds short of support trenches (i.e. they got into / sunken rd in parts & took prisoners but can stay there). The strength of 47 Bn then was 4 officers & 43 men. Lt Marson was killed in this advance. (? had he been hit before?)

Capt Semmons, who had been badly shaken by a shell, was the only officer of Coy left. He took charge (sent after a rest at Bn H.Q.) of the line when it had dug in. The 49 Bn connected with 52nd Bn in 19 A.

47 Bn captured 2 prisoners & 2 mgs in this advance but one of guns had to be left as 1 man who had it was too tired to bring it in (probably in Sunken Rd). At 10.30 pm 46 Bn came up & took over / forward line; 47 moved

89  
 79. 1 7 ) . b ' . )  
 \ ( x . 2 mgs ) ' mgs.  
 ( 79. 1 7 ) . b ' . )  
 2 4 ( . ) mgs )  
 \ c } b . L ~ 150 2  
 > > 2 4 x 9 ' 47 ✓  
 6 ) 46 - 43 - ; Lt  
 Marson ) - 6 x  
 Capt Semmons ✓ 2 1 5  
 ) . 7 6 ~ D Coy x 1 L 4  
 > P o 1 1 L ~ x 49 ✓  
 - 1 5 52 ✓ ~ 19 A.  
 47 ✓ ~ 2 2 e ' 2  
 mgs 6 6 x ✓ 6 - 1 1  
 P o . 2 ) . 4 . ~ 1 ~  
 1 10-30 46 ✓ ~ 1  
 L ) . 2 P . ✓ ~ L  
 - 2 4 ' Bn Hqs.

Actually  
 Marson  
 had the cap B  
 some time  
 before.

back to Pioneer Trench & Bn Hqs  
abt 15 Hrs & 300 or. were lost by  
47 Bn in this fight, & 21 Hrs & 504  
or. during whole period in line  
before Dernancourt.

A & B coys cdnt bring  
their wounded out, nor cd  
part of C Coy. so these were  
left & captured.

Serjt M'Dougall, so Imlay  
says, in this fight was working  
a h. gun in an advanced positn.  
The gun was pierced by a bullet, so  
he crawled 300 yds to get another  
gun & took it back to same  
positn. (Serjt M'D gave no  
hint of this when I spoke to  
him altho I tried to test /  
statement.)

Cpl. Shang who did so well at  
Messines is now an observer w  
1 Bn & was w D Coy. He asked to be  
allowed to stay w them & was there during fight.

21 Hrs. 504 or P ee (or)

. P x (w 15 or 300 or P' ap. 5).

A & B C ~ ~ ~

- V' C ~ ~ ~

as McDougall ~ ~ ~ 7. Lg.

1) ~ ~ ~

300 or ~ ~ ~

1 ~ ~ ~

Cpl. Shang, ~ ~ ~

2 ~ ~ ~

P. E x



Capt Young sd th our arty did not, so far as he cd see, get very much onto / crowded transport on the Albert - Vivier - Dernancq. Road. But he did see one of our 6 in shells get into a house wh was full of Germans at about 10 A 9 $\frac{1}{2}$  3. The Germans came out of it like ants round an anthill stirred by your boot - Germans had bn getting back there out o 1 way of our fire. (Young is a hard wry wizened little Queensland pastoralist - & his version wd be literally exact.)

The teams of guns etc were at first mistaken by them for cavalry.

along to a point on the  
Promontory.

Burgess told Hobbs at once  
— any time that I in gun fire  
tell me & I'll silence him.

~~Hobbs~~ They asked if he knew  
where I gun was.

"No, but I know his  
O.P." sd Burgess — "It's at  
Saba Tepe".

So close was the watch  
kept by the gunner on another  
on the Peninsula.

side, but it sometimes fell on  
 1 gun & the gun learnt not to  
 fire sometime (probly) in May.  
 At first <sup>three</sup> the observers in 1 Naval  
 O.P. asked the Pacchaute to  
 silence this gun & she came in  
 but ran her nose on 1 mud.  
 So 1 arrangement was made  
 w Rawson. (see Playfair's  
 sketch 3 pages back).

There was also an 8 in gun  
 firing a lead coated shell. This  
 was never located, Burgess  
 thinks. But on 1 day of armistice,  
 when Burgess was reconnoitring,  
 abt 11 am. this gun fired a  
 shell. It was an accident - Burgess  
 watched the horsemen halfway  
 down 1 beach. One of them  
 presently turned & galloped straight  
 for Gaba Tepe. When he thought  
 he was out of sight there he ducked


on 1 sight & fired straight at  
 Playfair Siddall & Clowes O.P. (wh  
 became very hot after a time).  
 There was always a sign th this  
 gun was going to fire — a man  
 used to appear round 1 edge of  
 this little bit of a promontory  
 on 1 beach. No doubt they were  
 manhandling 1 gun & his shoulder  
 and body appeared in showing 1  
 gun round 1 corner. Rawson  
 & 1 Mtn Bty had a gun on  
 the top shooting in th direction. It  
 was kept laid on this point  
 & an Indian was left <sup>(his eyes fixed to)</sup> with a telescope  
 watching it all day long. Whenever  
 1 Indian saw th man appear  
 he yelled to 1 Sabadar Major —  
 or whatever his name was — & 1  
 Sabadar Major rushed into 1  
 gun pit & fired 1 gun. The  
 shell often fell wide on either

97  
 several guns. Gaba Tepe was only  
 2850 yds from Burgess Bty.  
 There were a couple of hows  
 there — 4.2 — wh occasionally  
 appeared, especially in 1 earlier  
 days, when in 1 evg they used to  
 fire along 1 beach. They fired  
 over the promontory from some  
 positn. Burgess got a destroyer  
 to go round behind & look & it  
 crept so close th you could see  
 1 tip of its funnels & its mast  
 from Anzac. But all 1 destroyers  
 reported was th it could see  
 2 green mounds.

Towards 1 end it got so hot for  
 these guns th they didnt fire  
 at all or very little.

Then in early days there  
 was a gun wh used to fire from  
 1 front of Gaba Tepe from some  
 fold (as marked out previous  
 page). It enfiladed our line

\* Playfair Sid all Clowes



Some who used to fire from  
→ / 3 / 1 / 9 Gaba Tepe till May

we asked to  
fire at it but went afraid. Backhauke } 2  
 got a gun on site  
 Rawson }  
 who had a much to do. Whenever this (Gaba T) gun was going to fire  
 a man appeared. As soon as that man appeared the Indian who had his eye on a  
 telescope shouted & the gunner pulled the string.

Olive Grove was 4450. It was a section of 4-25.

Left Section (also of 2/425) 5800 we used only against the fleet.


There was another 2 4-25 also.

Then there were 2 old 6 in hows one of which fired shrap & the other H.E. (common shell)

Burgess thought both were same gun till a shell we found having 3 fewer grooves than those others.

96 Gen Burgess theory is that at Olive Grove the centre section was finally dug back into the hill. It was originally in open, but dug in backwards

into the hill so H.M. 6 in hows tho' many 100 fired at him & never destroyed him. You could see his flash



& 18 pdr shrap wd silence him.

[Above is Gen. Burgess' sketch of his idea of the way in which the Olive Grove guns (centre section) were dug in.]

Burgess (who was the Gunner who was expert in the Olive Grove) tells me that there were 6 guns there, all 4-2 guns, of which 4 used to fire on Arzac & 2 on ships & tugs. The left section (on ships & tugs) was 5800 yds from Burgess' battery (Toppo & (Stuffy Parkers) "Brighton Bty").

At Gaba Tepe there were also

Diary No. 185. Map found loose in diary.  
Dec. Ad. 17.3.70.

IF NOT DELIVERED WITHIN 7 DAYS RETURN TO  
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL  
P.O. BOX 345  
CANNBERRA CITY, A.C.T., 2601

82

Burgess' Photos.

94

Ordinance by L ✓

1. 2. 1. by \*

Evans on Rawsons ✓ v ✓

Camouflaged gun on at } v } olive ✓ x

Beach ✓ v b  
Evans on his look out to R ✓

Pybus ✓

Pybus at 3. 9Bz.

Gun at recoil

Trench ✓ ✓ ✓

L ✓ ✓ ✓

Sphinx ✓ ✓ ✓

Pier.  
Capt 20

Gun in ✓ x

Two led coated 8 in dust.

Malays ✓ (✓ Joppo ✓ ws)

Heavy shoot of S. Teps. by ships in June.

Kerosene tin of Browns Dip.

Captured

The 2y barber

OP looking onto Chessbd.

4 Bty ✓

The armoury ✓ ✓

✓ 1 ✓ ✓

Beach cliffs near ✓ ✓

Views on Stamps in L ✓ x

them



SCALE 1:40,000

620 570





Joe Briggs  
Younger



Jack Lovell  
(Sunlayer)

Waine or  
+

BAC  
Reinf.

now Sept  
3884

now at 4DA

The famous photo taken  
by Maj. Evans of 9 Bty.  
in action at Anzac.

This gun was shooting at  
the "Pipsqueak" (75- away  
below the wine glass &  
olive grove which always used  
to fire when the guns fired  
on olive grove. The gun  
was always kept upon  
it & when firing at Olive Grove  
they used to keep snuff withing this

Saba (was 2850)  
The Tuna Burgess Bty.

gun. The one time they were  
asked by Ryrie to devote  
the gun to ~~something~~ else. The

(This was not 1 above shoot  
shown in 1 photo.) "Pipsqueak" got into it  
& k 1 good man & wd  
another (woods & Macgregor)

They were firing at Olive  
grove at the time & Ryrie  
rang up to get them onto some  
men who were making two gun  
emplacements. Burgess knew of these  
& was waiting for 1 gun to go in, to  
finish the guns w H.E. which he now  
had. But Ryrie sd - well if you  
dont shoot on targets when we point  
them out we wont point them." So he turned this gun on.

Burgess Photos  
2 Ryrie  
14 Evans  
2 large

them out we wont point them." So he turned this gun on.

