

## CHAPTER XX

### CHETWODE'S PLAN

THE second Gaza struggle served to define sharply the Turkish line, which now extended from the sea west of Gaza across thirty miles of country to Beersheba. Over the sand-dunes and in front of the town the enemy trenches were continuous and deep, and were covered by a heavy system of barbed-wire entanglements. From Gaza towards Beersheba the Turks depended upon a chain of formidable earthworks situated in dominating positions. The first of these was the Tank group; then the Atawineh group, the Baha or Sausage Ridge works, and the Abu Hareira-Arab et Teiaha trench system; while the works around Beersheba secured the extreme flank. Between Gaza and Hareira these groups were from 1,000 to 2,000 yards apart, but from Hareira to Beersheba there was a break of about four and a half miles. Some of the gaps were too wide to permit of neighbouring groups covering one another with rifle and machine-gun fire; but a clever distribution of artillery enabled the same guns to arrest an advance against any two or three of them, with the exception of Beersheba.

Throughout the campaign the enemy was very sparing in his use of barbed-wire, probably owing to shortage of supplies or the already heavy strain upon his transport. Nevertheless, in leaving the south-eastern flank of his line without continuous entrenchments and wire, he was justified by the existence of two strong and favourable natural features. His redoubts, or groups of redoubts, from Tank to Hareira, occupied positions of exceptional strength. They stood high on the ridge, and the fighting on April 19th had proved them safe against a frontal attack. Moreover, as the line extended towards Beersheba, they were protected by the traditional friend of the defenders of Palestine—the absence of water on the attacking side. The British could only assail the Turkish flank after they had first developed sufficient water there to maintain troops engaged in the attack.

Summing up, the enemy was practically unassailable in the sand-dunes west of Gaza, and in the cactus in front of the town. The high ground around Ali Muntar commanded every

foot of country for another mile to the east. The Tank, Atawineh, and Hareira groups of earthwork overlooked a naked, low-lying triangle contained between Tel el Jemmi and Gamli on the Ghuzze and Ifteis on the Wady Imleih, and across this triangle the British must advance in any attempt to break the enemy centre; it was also open to cross-fire from Sausage Ridge on the south-east. From Hareira to Beer-sheba his line was not so strong, and his flank was open. But there, as he believed, he was made quite safe by the difficulties of water-supply on the British side.

Sir Philip Chetwode had succeeded to the command of Eastern Force soon after the second battle of Gaza, and on him fell the task of selecting and perfecting the British line. So decisive had been the change of fortune that, as we have seen, the main concern of the British High Command was now to make itself secure against enemy aggression on a bold scale. Digging and wiring commenced on the night following April 19th, and was continued without a pause for some weeks. Battalions and regiments were sorely reduced both in numbers and in spirits, but the change in the command of the advanced army had a cheering effect upon all the men. The rank and file were not perhaps aware of the cause of the double failure, nor clear as to who was to blame; but soldiers who are well-fed and treated with consideration, as were the men on this front, are always eager to seize upon anything which gives them a light heart and a bright outlook. Already they had, in the instinctive fashion of large bodies of men, formed a strong liking for Chetwode. The sourness which prevailed in the camps immediately after April 19th vanished with the changes in the High Command.

The British line ran continuously from the sea eastwards to Sheikh Abbas at a distance of from 400 yards to 3,800 yards from the Turks. Over that sector the defences were strong in entrenchment and deeply protected by wire entanglements. Everywhere the observation was good, and Chetwode desired nothing more than that the Turks should advance against him on that sector. From Sheikh Abbas the line bent back in a series of strong posts to the Wady Ghuzze at Tel el Jemmi, and followed the water-course south-east to Gamli. Lack of water at that date prevented the extension of the line in

conformity with the Turkish defences towards Beersheba; at Gamli, therefore, Chetwode's front turned almost at right angles southwards as far as El Ghabi. Its total length was about twenty-four miles, but only from the coast to Sheikh Abbas was there continuous touch with the enemy. That sector was held by the infantry alone; on the right flank the infantry occupied the posts, while the mounted brigades engaged in reconnaissance and patrol over a wide No-Man's Land between the infantry and the enemy. Broadly speaking, the Turks held the country on the flank as far south as the Wady Imleih, and the British the country as far north as the Ghuzze.

Chetwode's immediate concern was defence, but he was a leader incapable of prolonged inactivity. Moreover the British Government now, for the first time in the campaign, made it clear that it was whole-hearted in the prosecution of the invasion of Palestine. Chetwode therefore attacked with impressive energy a double task. He must restore the depressed morale of his reduced divisions and improve by hard training their marching capacity and fighting efficiency; and he must evolve a scheme for breaking through the stout opposition in front of him. The prospect might have dismayed the spirit of a less resolute and tactful commander. His troops, and especially his infantry, were neither in the humour nor in the physical condition to respond to a call for enormously increased and sustained labour, in the excessive heat of the rapidly developing summer, and on a shadeless area notorious for high winds and dust-storms, which prevailed for days and nights at a stretch. In May Sir Philip wrote, "At present we have battalions of not more than a dozen officers and 300 to 400 hundred men; we have mounted regiments at a strength of not more than two-thirds of establishment; every division is still deficient of howitzers; one division has no organised artillery." Nevertheless he did not hesitate to impose from week to week fresh burdens upon all ranks in his command.

Himself a mighty worker, he set an example which was followed not only by his small Eastern Force staff, but by every officer and by the humblest privates and troopers in his battalions and regiments. He rode or walked his long line from the sea to El Ghabi; like Birdwood at Anzac, his

dominating but kindly personality was familiar to every officer and man on the front. Doubling back, he encouraged and stimulated the great force of British engineers and Egyptian labourers, who were working night and day to carry the railroad and water-supply from the coast to the thirsty inland district towards the flank. For the first time since the British army had crossed the Canal, the soldiers felt the influence of a strong and guiding personality; if they were driven harder than ever before, they knew that they were being driven by a man who did not spare himself, and who was concerned not only with the winning of battles, but with the welfare and advantage of his men. Chetwode was a hard taskmaster, but he was recognised as the affectionate guardian of his army.

Prolonged seasons of work, in the trenches or in the saddle, were followed by brief rests in pleasant camps on the coast; afterwards came a spell of vigorous training before the men returned to make contact with the enemy. Schools for officers and non-commissioned officers were increased and improved. The cavalry schools for officers, while they advanced the already high efficiency of the Australians and New Zealanders, had another much desired result. They brought into close personal touch the leaders of the light horse and the yeomanry, and went far to dissipate the bad feeling which had prevailed since the unfortunate affair at Romani. The yeomanry were now, under their regular cavalry officers, making rapid headway in their campaigning quality; and the light horseman, natural fighter as he was, and hitherto a little arrogant in his bearing towards these slower-witted and less adaptable but great-hearted young British farmers, was quick to appreciate the change. In the campaign across Sinai and on to Gaza the Australian had affected a laughing superiority over the yeoman. From now on he respected him as a worthy comrade and a formidable but friendly rival in arms; and the spirit of cordial competition which existed between them was good in its effect upon both.

From April almost to the end of October the part played by the mounted troops, if almost bloodless, was still extremely arduous. In June the arrival of the 8th Mounted (Yeomanry) Brigade gave the British command ten brigades of horse, and

it was decided to form a complete yeomanry division made up of the 6th, 8th, and 22nd Yeomanry Brigades. This brought the mounted strength on the front to three complete divisions of three brigades each. Anzac Mounted Division was made up of the 1st and 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade; Australian Mounted Division (the name having been changed from "Imperial" at the request of the Australian Government) of the 3rd and 4th Australian Light Horse Brigades and the 5th Yeomanry Brigade; the third was the new Yeomanry Division. The Notts Battery and the "A" and "B" Batteries of the Honourable Artillery Company remained with Australian Mounted Division, while the Berks, Hants, and Leicesters were given to the Yeomanry Division, and the Essex to the 7th Yeomanry Brigade, which became corps troops. There could be no higher tribute to the work of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Brigade in the early stages of the campaign, and to the quality of Chauvel's leadership, than is furnished by this decision to increase the mounted troops.

The mounted work was divided so as to give each division in turn a month's work over the wide No-Man's Land on the flank, a month's rest on the beach at Belah, and a month's hard training at Abasan. As there was little or no hard fighting—and, after May, no serious anxiety about a Turkish attack—this programme would in a country of normal living have imposed but little hardship upon the mounted brigades. But most of the Australians agree that, with the exception of the 1918 summer in Jordan Valley, this was the most distressing period of the long advance. Water was scarce, the heat oppressive, and the dust perpetual and suffocating. Thirty thousand troops, most of them mounted, moved constantly over a limited area of light clay soil for many rainless months. The dread khamsin added to their trials. The men rode and lived and slept in a fog of dust, which seldom lifted. Even on still clear nights the dust raised by a moving brigade was at times so thick that officers could see neither the stars nor their compasses. The monotonous diet and the absence of vegetables brought about a severe epidemic of septic sores. Few men, from the commanders down, escaped this evil, and

at times the majority of the men in a regiment would be swathed in bandages. Sore hands and faces might seem in war-time a trifling disability, but they had a lowering and irritating effect upon the men.

There was concern also as to the condition of the horses. As Chetwode devoted more and more consideration to the heavy task ahead, and evolved his famous plan which was to shatter the Turkish opposition and win the whole of Palestine, it became clear that the mounted divisions must, if possible, be in prime condition when the time came for the renewal of the offensive. The men could be depended upon; but, unless their horses were strong and fit, the striking power of the army would speedily vanish. The advanced division had its headquarters about Gamli, from which base the three brigades engaged in thirty-six-hour patrols against the enemy. Regiments would leave their camp at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, march through the night, arrive at an advanced position at about 3.30 on the following morning, remain there engaged in various activities until the late afternoon, and return to camp in the early hours of the next day. But the Gamli camp was three miles from water; when horses were watered twice daily, this imposed upon them twelve miles of travelling, and the men were kept always on the move. After the month in the forward area, the animals returned to Belah jaded and low in condition.

In May Chetwode wrote his admirable *Notes on the Palestine Campaign*, in which, after a masterful appreciation of the rival possibilities between Gaza and Beersheba, he laid down in detail the plan which Allenby employed more than five months later for the overthrow of the enemy and the capture of Jerusalem. Chetwode by this despatch establishes his right to rank as one of the soundest and most imaginative Allied leaders engaged in the whole war. It is a classic of constructive thinking and clear expression. It provided Allenby not only with a scheme drawn up by a great strategist and tactician, but—supported as it was by the rehabilitation of a dispirited army, and the brilliant handling and provision of engineering necessities—one relatively easy of execution. When Allenby proceeded from Cairo to Palestine early in July, he possessed both a plan stamped by genius on which to

work, and a force stronger, and man for man incomparably more efficient, than it had ever been Murray's fortune to command.

Chetwode in his notes surveyed first the broad strategic features of the campaign. He pointed out that, while the Turks, "helped by the Russian inertia in the Caucasus and the summer check to active operations in Mesopotamia," had definitely resolved to stand between Gaza and Beersheba, they were not likely to take the offensive. The most they could hope from an attack in force would be to push the British back as far as the eastern edge of the Sinai desert, and even in that they might not prove successful.

Considering next the strength of the enemy as a defensive force, Chetwode, after paying tribute to the capacity of the Turks "to exist on vastly less than would be necessary for a European army," believed they could maintain between sixty and seventy battalions on the Palestine front. That would make them equal in numbers to the British force, although with a something weaker support in artillery. The prospect, therefore, of overthrowing the enemy by a plain frontal attack was not one which appealed to the British leader. Furthermore, even if the Turk could be jolted from his present line by a direct assault, he would still be far from broken. "Every mile he goes back," wrote Sir Philip, "helps his supply and decreases his water difficulties," while north of Ramleh his water troubles would be over. Moreover, "even if the enemy could be forced north of Ramleh, he would probably fight better on the Jaffa-Jerusalem line, which is believed to be one of great strength, and on which he has put in a considerable amount of work. The loss of that line would mean to him the world-wide moral effect of the capture of Jerusalem, and would probably force him immediately to abandon the Hejaz enterprise, as it is the first line from which we can threaten his communications in that theatre."

But Chetwode saw clearly that it was doubtful whether by a frontal attack the enemy could be compelled to retire even to the Jaffa line. The British army was still tied down firmly to railhead. "We can on present scale," wrote the British leader, "by practically immobilising the remainder of the force, place one division and two mounted divisions, or two

divisions and one mounted division, at a distance of twenty to twenty-five miles beyond railhead. This will not put us in a position to put our cavalry on parallel lines after a tactical success, and keep a retreating army really on the move. We shall constantly be obliged to come to a full stop, giving him time to re-organise." Up to that time, the normal rate of progress of the British railway across Sinai and southern Palestine had scarcely exceeded an average of one kilometre a day. Supplies from the coast were at best uncertain, owing to the submarine danger and the great difficulty of landing stores upon open beaches. Therefore, assuming that the Turk could by some means or other be driven off his present line, Chetwode, with characteristic energy, addressed himself to the speeding up of the railway and other transport services. "Careful preliminary arrangements," he said, "suitable and elastic organisation of transport, the collection of railway material at railhead, the training of plate-laying gangs provided by the troops, the utilisation of the earthwork of the enemy's railways for our own railway, luck as regards the weather, and the fullest use of sea-transport, should enable us to give the enemy less breathing-time than at present appears possible on paper. We must not, however, entertain any hope, whatever preparations we may make, of being able to pursue at a speed approaching that which the river enabled the army in Mesopotamia to attain. It would be fatal, in my opinion, to make half-a-bite at the cherry, and to attempt an offensive with forces which might permit us to attack and occupy the enemy's present line, but which would be insufficient to inflict on him a really severe blow and to follow up that blow with fresh troops pressing closely on his heels. Nothing less than seven divisions at full strength and our three cavalry divisions will be sufficient for this purpose, and they will be none too many. Divisions of such poor rifle strength as the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th, and with no drafts to keep them up, will disappear in three weeks' fighting."

Chetwode expressed himself strongly against any attack upon the enemy's "strong modern fortress" at Gaza. He was equally opposed to an attack in the centre across the naked Gamli-Jemmi-Ifteis triangle. Not only was the enemy strongly placed on these right and centre sectors, but a British



success there might prove only local; for the enemy had prepared a reserve line from Hareira to Deir Sineid, and would therefore still stand across the British advance up the Philistine plain and towards Jerusalem. To attack him in the centre on the Tank-Atawineh-Baha sector across the low country of the triangle would be, in Chetwode's opinion, "to attack him in circumstances of every disadvantage. We should have to contend with lack of artillery observation, all the worst of the ground, and great difficulties in respect to water and supply," and there would be no flank on which the mounted troops could operate effectively.

The enemy right and centre, therefore, offered no chance for an assault which could have far-reaching results, and Chetwode turned his attention to the Beersheba flank. From the Gamli-Jemmi-Ifteis triangle the country rises towards Beersheba in a series of bold undulations; this area, although broken by many wadys, is suitable for the movement of all arms. But there the obstacle was lack of water on the British side. The only useful supplies were at Esani, Beersheba, Sheria, and Hareira, and all these places, except Esani, were securely occupied by the enemy. Still, water or no water, the enemy's left flank was his only vulnerable point; and Chetwode's thoughts turned to his engineers. The engineers had made possible the crossing of the Sinai desert; they must make possible the break into Palestine.

Therefore he unfolded his plan of attack. "By suitable arrangements," he wrote, "and the rapid carrying forward of the railway from Gamli or Shellal towards Ifteis when the moment comes, we can place a force in position on the high ground between Irgeig and Taweil el Habari, which should at once cause the evacuation of Beersheba, or, if not, would place us in a most favourable position to attack that place while holding off any enemy coming to its assistance from the direction of Hareira. Once established on the high ground between Beersheba and Hareira, and with Beersheba in our possession, we can attack north and north-westwards, always from higher ground, always with observation, with water at Beersheba, with water at Esani, with water at Shellal, Fara, and Gamli, with rail-borne water east of Shellal, and with the only prospect, which no alternative course affords, of finding a flank on



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE VIADUCT ON THE ASLUJ RAILWAY.

*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 4, p. 105*  
*And in Museum Collection No. B2305*



TURKISH CAVALRY IN DISMOUNTED ACTION. (IN THE DISTANCE ON THE LEFT CAN BE SEEN THE  
DUST RAISED BY LIGHT HORSE OR BRITISH CAVALRY ADVANCING AGAINST THEM.)

*From a German photograph, lent by Tpt. F. P. Yeatman, 24th I. H. Regt.*

which we can use our great preponderance in mounted troops; not an ideal flank, for east of Towal Abu Jerwal the country becomes mountainous and rocky, but still a flank which should afford us great opportunities, with water at Tel en Nejile, fourteen miles to the north, and the possibility of cutting the enemy's railway behind him; with water at Sheria and Hareira, a little salt, but good enough for animals, and with a strong pivot on our left flank from Abbas to the sea, on which to swing our right forward towards Nejile, and to force the enemy by manœuvre to abandon Gaza. We must also remember that any fight here must be a fight for water as well as for the enemy's position, and that if we merely take his position we shall be tied down to another tedious advance, with the necessity of providing water mile by mile until we can attack his next position in rear. If, however, we can attack him in such fashion as to compel him to withdraw his full line beyond the Wady Hesi, we shall find water on the line Tel en Nejile-Wady Hesi at once.

"The enemy has put all his best work, all his wire, into this Gaza front as far as Atawineh. His works on the Hareira-Teiaha position are certainly formidable, but there he has not the depth that he has elsewhere, nor the wire; nor have we elsewhere the observation that we should obtain in attacking his left flank.

"The chief factor in success on this flank must be rapidity of action. We must give the enemy every reason to believe until the last moment that we contemplate renewing our efforts against his right. Subsidiary operations against portions of his Gaza front will, I think, be necessary, and it will further be for consideration whether it would not be well at the same time to advance our line in the centre from Abbas to Magam, both in order to encourage the idea that our main attack will come against his right, and in order to establish our centre close enough to the Atawineh group of works to force him to retain considerable forces in that quarter while we make our main effort against his left. In the meantime every preparation would be made to push forward the railway, and if necessary a pipe-line, from Shellal towards Ifteis, so that, after placing our striking force on the high ground between Irgeig and Taweil el Habari, we may be able to undertake the main

operation with the least possible delay and before the enemy is enabled to improve the position on his left flank to any great degree.

"On paper and by the map the chief objections to this line of action appear to be the separation of our forces, and the weakening of our centre, with the consequent danger of a counter-stroke in that quarter. A very short acquaintance with the actual terrain would, however, I think convince any one who had studied it on the ground that a counter-stroke by the enemy between our strong works at Sheikh Abbas and our forces about Bir Saba (Beersheba) launched into the open flat country in the centre would be a most risky operation. Indeed one might hope that the enemy would undertake it, and find himself between the jaws of the pincers."

These notes were written in May. "At the moment," added the writer, "our efforts are concentrated on lessening the extent of front which we hold from Abbas to the sea by concentrating our defence in very strong localities, so that if it should become necessary we may be able to hold that flank with a minimum number of troops. Water and railway preparations are well advanced, based on employing three divisions and mounted troops for the main operations against the enemy's left flank holding our 'fortress' line from Abbas to the sea with not more than two divisions, and retaining the sixth and seventh for pinning operations against the enemy's left flank."

In conclusion, Chetwode struck a peremptory decisive note, such as had unfortunately always been lacking in the despatches of Murray. "There is," he said, "one essential. Divisions must be divisions and mounted divisions mounted divisions. The notes are based on a minimum requirement, in the existing situation, of seven divisions and three mounted divisions (each of three brigades). But they are based on these formations being up to strength, fully armed and equipped, and provided—one of the most important matters of all—with first reinforcements, actually in the country, which should amount to 20 per cent. of infantry if possible, and should not in any case or at any time fall below 10 per cent. Unless we have a sufficient and a regular income, it is impossible to make any reasonable plans involving expenditure."


In other words, there was the scheme; but it could be successful only if the War Office supplied the troops, the munitions, and the engineering supplies essential to put it into operation. Chetwode would take no responsibility for ambitious military enterprises with the raw Territorial divisions—uncertain of reinforcements, ill-supplied with artillery, and liable at any moment to be withdrawn to France—which had been the precarious portion of Murray, Lawrence, and Dobell. If the British Government wanted Palestine and Jerusalem, they must in future regard this campaign as one of primary importance, and treat it as they treated the British Army in France.

Late in May the engineers of Desert Column carried out an interesting and highly successful series of demolitions on the Turkish railway south of Asluj. The use of this line was discontinued after the British marched to the Ghuzze, but so long as it remained intact it was a menace to Chetwode's right flank. Moreover, the enemy was known to be very short of steel rails; already he had torn up the old railway from Jaffa to Ramleh for use on the new military lines, and it was anticipated that he might remove for the same purpose the rails on the line from Asluj south to Auja.

The absence of water on the route between Shellal and Asluj, the uncertainty of the water-supply at Asluj and Auja, and the presence of a considerable enemy force at Beer-sheba, made it necessary that the raid on the railway should be a complete surprise to the enemy and rapidly accomplished. Two columns were arranged. One, made up of the engineering field squadrons of the Anzac and Imperial Mounted Divisions, and escorted by the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, was to cover the twenty-six miles between Shellal and Asluj in a single march so as to arrive on the ground at 4 o'clock in the morning of May 23rd; while the other, the Field Troop of the Camel Brigade, was to march simultaneously from Rafa to Auja. This party was to be protected by the Camel Brigade, with a squadron of horse from the Imperial Mounted Division as escort. All the demolition work was to be completed by 10 o'clock in the morning of the 23rd, when the two bodies were to return immediately to their bases. While the work was in progress, the Imperial Mounted Division was to demon-

strate against the enemy south of Beersheba; two brigades of the Anzac Mounted Division were to occupy the country between the demolition parties and the Imperial Mounted Division; at the same time the infantry was to show activity against the Gaza end of the Turkish lines.

The preparations, which were capably directed by Brigadier-General R. E. M. Russell,<sup>1</sup> of the Royal Engineers, were remarkably thorough. The engineering squadrons, which were strengthened by men selected from the mounted troops, rehearsed in detail the work ahead of them, and careful and accurate estimates were made of the time the demolition would occupy. As usual in these adaptable mounted formations, much ingenuity was shown in improvisation. All the explosives, amounting to several tons, were packed in kerosene-tins, and clips for attaching the charges to the rails were made from the steel bands in which hay for the horses was brought up to the front. Between Asluj and Auja were several substantial masonry bridges and viaducts; these were to be destroyed if time permitted, but the first concern of the engineers was to be the breaking of the steel rails, as it was believed that these could not be replaced by the enemy.



Marching from Shellal at 2.30 in the afternoon of May 22nd, Cox's brigade was joined at Fara by these two squadrons of engineers and one section of the Leicester Battery. Soon after midnight the 6th Regiment was thrown round the village of Khalasa to prevent the Arabs from carrying information to the enemy. The locality of operations was reached in the early morning, although the extremely

<sup>1</sup> Brig.-Gen. R. E. M. Russell, C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., R.E. Officer of British Regular Army; of Milford House, Limerick, Ireland, b. Limerick, 2 Sept., 1879.

rough unknown country had somewhat delayed the march, and the first demolition charge was not fired until nearly 8 o'clock. But so perfect had been the training of the men engaged, and so expeditious was their work, that at 9.58 the last charge was fired by the Imperial Division Squadron under Captain Ford-Young,<sup>2</sup> and twenty minutes later the Anzac Squadron<sup>3</sup> under Major Alexander<sup>4</sup> had completed its share of the task. Meanwhile the Camel Brigade was advancing from Rafa on Auja further to the south. At this time the camels were low in condition owing to excessive work, and the railway was not reached until some hours after the appointed time. With the line destroyed to the north, however, General Smith's engineers were in no danger from molestation, and early in the afternoon the whole undertaking was completed, and the troops were on the march back to Rafa and Shellal.

The enemy, except for light patrols, made no appearance. But although the operation was not hindered by fighting, the raid was an admirable demonstration of careful organisation and brilliant execution. Numbering in all only four officers and less than 100 men, the three demolition parties destroyed every steel rail over thirteen miles of track, as well as a quantity of Decauville line. In addition, they blew up and entirely wrecked one bridge of eighteen arches, one of twelve arches, one of six arches, one of five arches, one of three arches, and one of two arches—also a viaduct over the Wady Theigat el Amirin, and several arched culverts; a number of railway points and switches, station buildings, and telegraph poles, and a good deal of other enemy property were also demolished

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<sup>2</sup> Maj. A. Ford-Young, D S O.; R E. B. South London, 28 Jan., 1883.

<sup>3</sup> These were, respectively, the 2nd and 1st Fld Sqns, Aust Engineers.

<sup>4</sup> Lieut.-Col. J. H. Alexander, D S O., M C.; R E. (ex. S. African Engr. Corps), b. Kimberley, S. Af., 6 June, 1885.