THE EMPIRE PLAN: DOCTRINES AND DECISIONS

To understand how the Empire Air Training Scheme began we must recall the inconclusive discussions in London in 1936 when the possibility of achieving a coordinated Empire-wide air training plan was reviewed. It happened that Australia was represented indirectly at this conference by Air Commodore Goble who was then serving on exchange duty with the R.A.F. as Deputy Director of Air Operations. The proposals considered at this conference were rejected eventually by the 1937 Imperial Conference. The British Air Council, in October 1938, revived the idea of establishing flying training schools overseas, but the only result was the establishment of one school in Kenya.

The establishment of an Empire training plan had been under discussion in London again during the first three weeks of September and on 22nd September the Australian High Commissioner in London, Mr Bruce, adopted the typically direct method of telephoning the Under-Secretary for Air, Captain Balfour,1 and outlining four primary points. The first was that pilot training should be approached from the standpoint of pooling the resources of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The second was that the elementary training for each of the Dominions should take place in their own territories and, so far as possible, with equipment, including aircraft, produced by each Dominion. Thirdly, pilots from Australia and New Zealand, when they had completed their elementary training, should go to Canada for further training for which, he hoped, Canadian-built aircraft would be used, though probably Britain would have to supplement the supply. (Canada was then not so far advanced as Australia in the production of aircraft.) Finally, when their training had been completed, pilots would join squadrons of their own Dominion in Britain.

The next step towards a coordinated plan was the dispatch on 26th September of the cablegram, mentioned earlier, to the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Governments, seeking their approval of a plan to form an Empire air force. It pointed out that Britain was vulnerable to air attack, lacked space for training schools, and needed more men than she could provide from her own resources; with the objective set at 50,000 aircrew members a year, it was estimated that Britain, from a population of 46,000,000, could provide only four-ninths of this total, leaving five-ninths to be found among the 19,000,000 people of European race in the three Dominions to whom the appeal was made. The cablegram tentatively suggested that these Dominions between them should establish 50 training schools. Elementary schools should be established in each Dominion according to its capacity, but advanced

1 Rt Hon Lord Balfour of Inchrye, MC. (1914-18: 60 Rifles; RFC and RAF.) Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air 1938-44. B. 1 Nov 1897.
schools should be concentrated chiefly in Canada which was closest to
Britain and the war zone, could produce military aircraft and was near
the aircraft factories of the United States. At the same time it was hoped
that each Dominion would expand its aircraft production to the utmost.
It was recognised that each Dominion would have first call on the men
trained in the proposed schools. Finally the three Dominions were invited
to send missions to a conference in Canada to discuss details.

The Australian War Cabinet, which held its first meeting two days after
this cablegram had been sent, considered the proposals on 5th October,
agreed to them in principle, and, as mentioned, decided to send to Canada
an air mission led by the Minister for Civil Aviation (Mr Fairbairn).
With him would be Wing Commander George Jones (Assistant Chief of
the Air Staff), Mr Kellway\(^3\) (financial adviser), and Mr Elford\(^4\) (sec-
retary). New Zealand also appointed a mission and on 13th October the
two delegations sailed for Canada in company.

After the War Cabinet meeting the British proposals were examined
by the Air Board which considered that about 1,000 elementary training
aircraft would be needed to train the number of pilots proposed in the
British plan and almost as many additional aircraft to train other aircrew.
There were then in Australia only 224 elementary trainers, of which
164 were in civil use; probably about 160 of the 224 were in good enough
condition to be used for instruction. These would suffice only to continue
training on the present scale (including additional men needed for the
expeditionary force of six squadrons then still a commitment) and provide
from 500 to 600 pilots a year with elementary training for the Empire
scheme. With its present equipment the Australian force could not increase
the number of observers, gunners and wireless operators then in training.
The number of instructors needed would far exceed the experienced men
available, but these might at length be provided by using men returning
to rest after operations. The project required deep examination and “in
view of its magnitude must be regarded as a long-range one”.

Outlining the basic plan in the House of Representatives on 14th
November, Mr Menzies said it was designed to train “such large numbers
of air pilots, observers and gunners as to make our ultimate personnel
superiority to Germany in the air not only substantial but overwhelming”.
This aim was somewhat ambitious, since the combined population of the
British Commonwealth and France did not overwhelmingly exceed that
of Germany, but the statement served to illustrate the extent of the
Government’s support for the plan. The Prime Minister declared further
that, subject to completing her own air defences, Australia should con-
centrate her resources and energies on the Empire Air Training Scheme.
“These decisions were and are, I believe, not only sensible but inevitable,”

\(^3\) C. V. Kellway. (1st AIF: Lt 37 Bn.) Finance Member Air Board 1940-41; Dep Dir-Gen Aust
War Supplies Procurement in USA 1942-45. Aust Consul-General in New York 1945-49; Aust
Min to Rome 1949-54, to Brazil 1954-57. B. Melbourne, 2 Jul 1892.

in aircraft accident 13 Aug 1940.
he said, adding that Australia would need every experienced flyer and
every competent instructor who could be found; and must build or acquire
hundreds of training aircraft and import other aircraft of various types for
advanced training. This would add greatly to Australia's security in the
air. In terms of men it would tend almost to make Australia a first-class
air power. The Government, correctly interpreting, it believed, the wishes
of the Australian people, would, as far as possible, preserve the Australian
character and identity of any air force which went abroad. In the early
stages Australia could not hope to provide anything more than a trifling
fraction of the number of senior officers who would be required for the
“air armada” which would come from the E.A.T.S., but, as time went on
that position would correct itself.5

Mr Curtin, for the Labour Opposition, contended that the Common-
wealth would have had more time to carry out the organisation the
Prime Minister had outlined had the Labour party's policy been accepted
instead of “being derided”, and had efforts been made to place the air
force on a sounder basis. In the meantime he was opposed to an expedi-
tionary force leaving Australia for overseas service. If the efforts that were
being made to restore peace failed, Australia's dangers would be in-
creased and, while confronted by this uncertainty, Australia's manpower
and more particularly the members of the air force who were trained
or about to be trained should not be depleted.

Despite the assurance of the Prime Minister that the Government would
“as far as possible preserve the Australian character and identity of any
air force that went abroad” it was quite clear that the Empire plan
cut across the policy pursued by the Dominions of maintaining fighting
forces which were independent of those of the United Kingdom, though
their doctrines, training and equipment were similar to those of the parent
nation—indeed, were largely provided by them. Thus had been estab-
lished the Australian and Canadian Navies, virtually self-contained, though
in war largely committed to the control of the Admiralty in London. Thus,
in the war of 1914-18 the armies of each Dominion—and in Australia's
case the Flying Corps—had gained in individuality and national pride
as the years passed. In 1918 a proposal for an amalgamation of the
British navies had been rejected; a proposal for an amalgamation of the
armies—for example that all reinforcements should go into a common
pool—would not then have been entertained by the Dominions. Yet in
1939 the Australian Ministers and air force leaders agreed promptly to
a plan whereby Australia's main effort in the war in the air was likely
to be made by men contributed to a unified Empire force. What forces
produced such ready agreement?

Perhaps the main factors were the sense of extreme urgency attached
to the need for swift action to counter German air power and the manner
in which the British Government took the initiative with a definite proposal.
Each of the three Dominions was anxious to help, and each looked to

Britain for advice in defence matters and seldom rejected it. The fact that the R.A.A.F. was a relatively young Service probably made the Australian Government less concerned to preserve its identity than they would have been if similar proposals had been made affecting their army or navy. And there was the hard fact that the United Kingdom considered that it could not produce enough aircrew to fly the aircraft that its factories could produce and its potential ground staff could maintain. Thus, even if each Dominion made its main air force contribution in the form of its own squadrons, wings and groups, Britain would still need to draw on the Dominions for aircrew. This, as we have seen, she had been doing in some degree in peace—already in 1939 there were as many Australian aircrew in the R.A.F. as in the R.A.A.F.

Records of the initial executive action that put the whole Empire air plan into motion show very clearly how decisive was Mr Bruce’s contribution. It was characteristic of Mr Bruce that he should have a very clear conviction and that he should take prompt action to revitalise the plan that had been dormant since 1936. An Australian by birth and schooling, he had been at an English university and, in the earlier war, had served in an English regiment. Although for six years he had been Prime Minister of Australia, by 1939 he had spent more than half his adult life in England. To him the vision of a united British Commonwealth air force was likely to be stronger than to most Australian leaders. Other influences may well have been his nearness to the European scene where the upsurge of German air power was a dominating military theme.

When the conference opened at Ottawa early in November Lord Riverdale, the leader of the British mission, said that it was proposed that the United Kingdom should provide about 22,000 of the 50,000 aircrew required each year, Canada about 13,000, Australia about 11,000 and New Zealand about 3,300.

The three Dominions were to be asked, between them, to recruit 1,200 pilots, 630 observers and 1,080 gunners each four weeks, a total of 2,910. Canada should provide 1,396 (including some trainees to be sent from the United Kingdom), Australia 1,164 and New Zealand 350. It was proposed that a first draft of 40 Australian pilots should arrive in Canada by 14th October 1940, and thereafter an increasing quota should arrive at intervals of four weeks: 200 by 21st June 1941, 320 by 3rd January 1942, and 400 by 23rd May 1942, air gunners and observers being provided in proportionate quotas.

For pilot training it was proposed to establish 25 initial training schools in the Dominions—with 12 elementary training schools in Canada, 10 in Australia and three in New Zealand. All the corresponding 25 advanced training schools would be in Canada. With an intake of 1,200 for elementary flying training schools and an estimated output of 850 from service

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A typical scene at a R.A.A.F. Empire Air Training Scheme school for navigators. Trainees are being instructed how to correct a compass for error.

Two Avro Ansons from No. 2 S.F.T.S., Wagga, N.S.W., which collided and became interlocked in flight, were successfully landed in a paddock near Brocklesby, N.S.W., by trainee pilot L.A.C. L. G. Fuller on 29th September 1940. Fuller was pilot of the top aircraft and, using the aileron and flap controls of this aircraft, was able to make a gliding landing of both with one engine still functioning on the lower aircraft. In England Fuller served with No. 37 Squadron, R.A.F., and was awarded the D.F.M. for an operation over Palermo, Italy, in September 1942 and soon afterwards was commissioned. Later he was returned to Australia and made an instructor at No. 1 O.T.U. at Sale, Victoria. He was killed near 1 O.T.U. while riding a bicycle on 18th March 1944.
From a small beginning in 1940 the W.A.A.A.F. increased until by the end of the war it numbered 594 officers and 16,299 airwomen occupying 71 musters. Seen above are airwomen performing the duties of instrument repairer, electrician and meteorological assistant.
schools, the estimated wastage was 16 2/3 per cent and 15 per cent respectively.

For observers initial training would be provided in each of the Dominions and subsequent training in Canada at 15 observer schools, 15 bombing and gunnery schools and three air navigation schools. The monthly intakes and outputs were to be 630, 525, and 510 respectively, with a wastage allowance of 16 2/3 per cent at observer schools and 3 per cent at bombing and gunnery schools. Wireless schools were also to be formed in Canada for air gunner trainees from all Dominions and from Britain. The intakes at these schools would be 1,080 every four weeks (on courses of 16 weeks' duration) which would be reduced by wastage to 900 for entry into the bombing and gunnery schools where a further wastage of 3 1/3 per cent was expected.

Aircraft selected as standard for training were: elementary—Tiger Moths or Fleets; service—Harvards or Ansons; observer and air navigation—Ansons; air armament and bombing and gunnery—Fairey Battles.

Canada was to supply Moth airframes so far as possible, receiving engines from Britain. Harvards were to be obtained from the United States if the Neutrality Act was repealed; otherwise these were to be manufactured in Canada. Britain would provide the Anson airframes (minus the wings which would be made in Canada) and engines, in addition to all the components for the Fairey Battles. A statement on the aircraft manufacturing potential of the Commonwealth was sought. It was estimated that Australia would need 540 Moth airframes and 720 engines with an annual provision for wastage of 90 airframes and 72 engines. Australia was, of course, also making Wirraways (Harvards).

Lord Riverdale told Mr Fairbairn that the whole plan was based on the formation and reinforcement of 100 squadrons. If this proposal was completed, Australia and New Zealand, with shares of 40 per cent and 12 per cent respectively, would have formed and reinforced 52 squadrons, the cost being approximately £86,000,000. But maintenance in the field would commit Britain to an annual expenditure of £156,000,000. Britain at that time was spending 51 per cent of its national income on government and defence and would have to find £300,000,000 annually for the maintenance costs of the Empire air plan alone.

The quotas for the Dominions, as outlined in Lord Riverdale's analysis, did not seem to Mr Fairbairn to be equitable—the 48:40:12 per cent ratio for Canada, Australia and New Zealand was not in keeping with the Dominions' population ratio which was 57, 35 and 8. Canada's share had been reduced perhaps because of the large French-Canadian population; in 1914-18 Canada, though her population exceeded Australia's, had maintained a smaller army in the field. In a cablegram to the Australian Prime Minister, Fairbairn directed attention to the unequal quota-basis.

The syllabus of an air observer school included dead-reckoning navigation, signalling (morse and visual), reconnaissance etc; the air navigation school gave the trained observer (who had survived the air observer and bombing-and-gunnery courses) 4 weeks' instruction on astro-navigation.
and to the inclusion of the costs of the elementary training in Canada in the total divisible cost. This last, Fairbairn claimed, should be omitted as Australia and New Zealand would bear similar liabilities.

Fairbairn proposed to the conference that Australia and New Zealand should undertake a considerable proportion of their own service training, on condition that Britain allotted a proportion of her instructional staff for that purpose. This would reduce Australian and New Zealand difficulties in meeting dollar exchange and would also provide strategic advantages by building up air forces for their own defence. The British mission favoured this proposal, and tentatively it was suggested that 50 per cent of Australia's quota in advanced training under the original proposal should be trained at home while the other 50 per cent, after partial training at home, would go to Canada. Under this amended plan Britain would make available to Australia a very substantial contribution in service training aircraft.

On 10th November Menzies advised Fairbairn that all the elementary trainers and Wirraways for advanced single-engined aircraft training, could be made in Australia and still leave a surplus which would be available to New Zealand or the other Dominions. A new Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation trainer was also undergoing trials satisfactorily, and a proportion of the Anson wings required could be made locally.

Menzies supported Fairbairn's contention that the original proposals for sharing the costs were not equitable and held that it would have an adverse effect on local defence. Australia was making a large contribution to the Empire's naval defence and, apart from the Empire air plan, her defence expenditure when related to her population was greater than that of Canada. If the Commonwealth conducted a large proportion of its own service flying training, the costs of overseas training would be reduced and Menzies suggested that the proportion of service training in Australia should be greater even than the proposed 50 per cent.

Canada, too, claimed that she could not bear the cost of the share allotted to her and asked that Britain should bear the cost of freight charges, cost of making Anson wings in Canada, and of Harvard aircraft bought in the United States, in addition to any costs exceeding a contribution of $300,000,000. Fairbairn's reaction to this was to claim that, if Canada's requests were met, Dominion equality could be achieved only by similar concessions to Australia and New Zealand. Australia had no wish to add to Britain's burdens but could not be expected to share in the plan if the cost was shared unequally among the Dominions.

Lord Riverdale then announced that Britain would pay the freight charges for Canada and buy the Harvards Canada required. A comparable concession would be made to Australia. The next step was acceptance by Canada of a revised division of the costs of training in Canada on the basis of 72½, 22½ and 5 per cent for Canada, Australia and New Zealand respectively.
In the negotiations that followed it was agreed that Britain would bear the whole cost of the transport of trained men to Europe and of their maintenance in the field; a cost estimated at £300,000,000 sterling. In addition, the payment of pensions and gratuities at R.A.F. rates and the making up of any deficiencies in the Dominions’ quotas of trainees were to be Britain’s responsibilities.

Fairbairn, in a further message to the Prime Minister on 18th November, reiterated the point that Canada’s proportionately high percentage of the estimated total cost of the plan was due to the retention of Canadian elementary training costs in the divisible total. But it seemed obvious to him that Canada would not concede anything further and that to press Australia’s case would result only in the acceptance of even greater liability by the already overburdened United Kingdom. The estimated cost of the entire plan to Australia—calculated to 31st March 1943—was $97,200,000. It provided for 5,920 pilots, 3,270 observers and 5,616 air gunners—a total of 14,806 trainees.

Fairbairn and Menzies discussed the whole problem by radio telephone on 21st November. To the conference Fairbairn was still contending that Australia’s “ability” should be limited to a population ratio which would be approximately nine-tenths of the original proposal, and seeking a proportion of advanced training in Australia greater than the proposed 50 per cent. He did not advocate complete service training in Australia, advantageous though he considered that to be, because it would have an adverse psychological effect on the whole Canadian plan. He proposed that Australia should establish nine service training schools instead of ten —thus observing the population quota level. Seven of these schools should be in Australia and the other two in Canada.

Another important point raised at this stage by Fairbairn and agreed to by the British Government representatives was that Dominion squadrons in the R.A.F. should be “labelled” to indicate their Dominion origin.

Menzies, on 22nd November, authorised Fairbairn to proceed to an agreement on the basis he had outlined, but expressed the opinion that the Australian quota for Canadian training should not exceed 8,000 in the three-year period. Nine elementary flying schools, seven service flying schools, and the required schools for other aircrew, would be formed in Australia if agreement was reached on the basis suggested.

This program was put to the conference in Ottawa, Fairbairn intimating that if it was not acceptable Australia would attempt the whole of her training within Australia on a population basis. The proposals were accepted, Canada finally capitulating on the issue of the cost of her own

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8 While this suggests that Canada was driving a very hard bargain at the expense of Britain, as indeed she was on this particular issue, the full picture of her contribution to the Empire’s war effort is very different. That contribution was in fact more than generous. Never once did she refuse, or even question, British requests for financial support. In the course of the war she made very substantial interest-free dollar loans to Britain, financial aid which culminated in a free gift of 1,000 million dollars. Cf W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 227 and 357.

9 The original plan provided for five RAAF service flying training schools in Australia and five in Canada.
initial and elementary flying training, the whole of which she undertook to bear. Canada wished to have a separate agreement with the United Kingdom before any four-party agreement was made, and on 27th November Lord Riverdale and Mr Fairbairn initialled the four-party agreement, and it was signed by Bruce for Australia in London on 5th January.

This agreement provided for the training of what it termed Australian "pilots and aircraft crews" both in Australia and in Canada for service with the Royal Air Force. It became operative immediately. Australia would set up "as speedily as possible" an organisation which, when fully developed, would be capable of accepting every four weeks, 336 pilot trainees into elementary schools, 280 pilot trainees into advanced flying schools, 184 observer trainees and 320 wireless operator-air gunner trainees—a total of 1,120. From this organisation Australia would provide for the Canadian organisation: 80 pilot trainees for advanced flying schools (two); 42 observer trainees (for one school) and 72 wireless operator-air gunner trainees (for one school)—194 trainees every four weeks. Initial and elementary training of pilots and initial training of observers and wireless operator-air gunners would be completed in Australia. To help with the training plan in Australia the British Government undertook to lend officers and airmen in such numbers as would be agreed on, their pay and allowances to be paid by the Australian Government. Aircrew members who had been completely trained in Australia would be placed at the disposal of the British Government which would undertake that they would be identified as Australians either by organising Australian units or formations or in some other way as agreed between the two Governments. Britain accepted liability for the pay, allowances and benefits of all trained Australian airmen from the date of embarkation for service with the R.A.F. This liability was to be limited to R.A.F. rates and conditions, any supplementary payments to bring pay and allowances up to Australian rates would be borne by Australia.2

The first elementary flying training school was to open on 6th May 1940. Additional elementary schools were to be added at intervals of eight weeks for the first five schools and thereafter the interval was to be 20 weeks. On 10th May the first air observer and air gunner schools would open. In all Australia would have initial training schools for all aircrew and nine elementary and seven service flying training schools, four air observer, four wireless operator-air gunner, four bombing and gunnery schools and one navigation school.

Australia's estimated needs in aircraft for the E.A.T.S. program, as calculated to 1st March 1942, were: 591 Anson airframes (1,576 engines), 336 Fairey Battle airframes (448 engines), 315 Wirraways or Harvards (420 engines) and 486 Moths (648 engines). Britain agreed to provide up to 50 per cent of the initial equipment and immediate reserve

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2 Comparative rates were: trainee pilot (LAC)—RAF 7s 6d stg a day, RAAF 10s 6d Aust; graduate pilot (P-O) 14s 6d stg a day, RAAF 17s 6d Aust.
in engines for the elementary training schools' aircraft (Moths); all the Fairey Battle aircraft complete needed for bombing, gunnery and armament training (56 per cent to be target-towing aircraft); all Ansons for service flying, observer and navigation training, the first 150 complete and thereafter without wings, which would be made in Australia. Further, while Australia undertook to endeavour to make all Wirraway or similar-type aircraft, including engines and spare parts, which would be required for single-engined aircraft training, Britain agreed to pay Australia the value of the first 233 of these airframes and the first 291 engines, together with spare parts. Should Australia be unable to make all the airframes and engines of this type that were needed, Britain would supply Harvard airframes, Wasp engines and spare parts.

On 17th December, after seven weeks of negotiation, the four-party agreement was signed; the seals of four nations of the British Commonwealth were set upon a document that was unique in military history. The only other fully self-governing Dominion, South Africa, was making independent air training plans with Britain; plans more adapted to her difficult political circumstances.

This four-party agreement, which was to expire on 31st March 1943 unless an earlier date was set by common agreement among the parties, included Article XV in which Britain undertook that Canadian, Australian and New Zealand aircrews passing through the E.A.T.S. would serve in Canadian, Australian or New Zealand squadrons respectively, within the R.A.F.

The organisation to be established in Canada was to be able, every four weeks, to receive 520 trainees at elementary flying schools, 544 at service flying schools, 340 at observer and 580 at wireless operator-air gunner schools.

Australia was committed, on a proportionate basis, to provide two-sixteenths (68) of the pilot trainees needed for these service flying schools, and one-tenth each of the observer trainees (34) and wireless operator-air gunner trainees (58). New Zealand's commitments were one-sixteenth, one-tenth and one-tenth respectively, while Canada was responsible for all trainees for all elementary flying schools in the organisation and the remaining proportions for all other schools, subject to a reduction by not more than 10 per cent for trainees provided by Britain including, if desired, trainees from Newfoundland.

It was estimated that by the time the agreement expired the total output of Australian aircrew from the Canadian finishing schools would have been 1,836 pilots, 850 observers, and 1,450 wireless operator-air gunners; a total of 4,136.

To man this training organisation when the plan was in full operation Canada required 2,686 officers, 30,366 airmen, 4,929 civilians and 1,037 works maintenance employees.

The Canadian Government was to be responsible for operations within Canadian boundaries. The R.C.A.F. also held executive command over
the administration and operations of the plan, general supervision of which would be exercised by a supervisory board consisting of the Canadian Minister for National Defence (chairman), the Canadian Ministers for Finance and Transport, the Deputy Minister for Air, the Canadian Chief of the Air Staff, and representatives of all signatories to the agreement. All signatories were to appoint liaison officers to assist the board with criticism and suggestions, offered through the Canadian Chief of the Air Staff. Australia's representative on the supervisory board was the newly-appointed Australian High Commissioner to Canada, Major-General Sir William Glasgow, a distinguished Australian with a fine military record. His appointment dated from 10th January 1940 and the Australian Counsellor to the British Embassy at Washington, Mr Keith Officer, was appointed to act for him until he reached Ottawa.

The Australian and New Zealand decisions to reserve a large proportion of their training for their home organisations had affected the earlier financial proposals. The consequent reduction in training costs to $607,000,000 reduced Britain's contribution from $218,000,000 to $185,000,000. This was offset by Britain's contributions in kind to the Australian portion of the plan. After deducting Britain's contribution and the cost of Canadian initial and elementary flying training, the divisible cost of the Canadian training program stood at $354,000,000, making the three Dominions' financial quotas for advanced training:

- **Canada**: $285,466,000 (80.64 per cent)
- **Australia**: 39,931,000 (11.28 per cent)
- **New Zealand**: 28,603,000 (8.08 per cent)

Thus the vast and complex cooperative plan was developed to the point of operation. It was a remarkable achievement of united action after allowances had been made, contentions measured, and disagreements overcome, all of them understandable when the magnitude of responsibility for merging four distinct national wartime economies is considered. The delay in completing and signing the plan was due in part to lack of any definite terms of reference when the conference began. It became apparent, too, that in Britain there had been some failure to appreciate the develop-
ment of Dominion authority and capacity. Within the British Air Ministry the plan was regarded as too vast for Canadian officers to undertake and it was considered that a senior R.A.F. officer with his own staff would be required to take control; but Lord Riverdale had quickly found that the Canadian Government would agree to the plan only if the R.C.A.F. administered the whole organisation in Canada and retained executive command over it.