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Reports of Proceedings, HMA Ships and Establishments

AWM78 Class 380 - Task Force 74 [HMAS AUSTRALIA and others]

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Includes operation orders for operations in New Guinea and Solomons areas

RCDIG1073435

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TASK FORCE 74.
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OPERATIONS. N. GUINEA. SOLOMONS AREAS.
(R. A. CRUTCHLEY)

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ANNEX TO TF 74
OF PROCEEDINGS

LETTERS

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Declassification Authority—Defence Records
This record has been reviewed and has been declassified by the Department of Defence (Navy) with effect from: 17 DEC 90.
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Reviewer: LCDR R. L. Smith (RANEM)
Signature: R L Smith Date: 14 MAR 91

Subject: TASK FORCE 74. (OPERATIONS ORDERS) 1-43
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OPERATIONS. N. GUINEA. SOLOMONS AREAS.

R. A. CRUTCHLEY.

500 9-45 Stuart Taylor Ref. 3536

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
RCDIG1073435

MOST SECRET

Enclosure to T.F.74 DIARY OF PROCEEDINGS COVERING PERIOD 1ST - 31ST OCTOBER 1943.

MOST SECRET.
A.F.1060/19.

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
16 October, 1943.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER NO. 4-43.
(Short Title: CTF 74 Oporder four dash forty three)

TASK ORGANISATION.

Task Force 74	-	Rear Admiral CRUTCHLEY.
Task Group 74.1	-	AUSTRALIA (CTF 74)
Task Group 74.2	-	WARRAMUNGA (CTG 74.2 Commander DECHAINEUX) KELM BAGLEY

INFORMATION.

Allied Forces have recently ousted the enemy from SALAMUA LAE and FINSCHHAFEN and now hold the eastern coastline of PAPUA and NEW GUINEA as far north as FINSCHHAFEN.

2. Re-supply and reinforcement of Allied elements in these newly captured areas is currently proceeding by overwater movement.

This operation is being conducted by C.T.F.76 who has DESRON 5 under his operational control to support the movement of shipping and to provide defence of advanced positions. DESRON 5 is normally based at BUNA.

3. Reconnaissance of RABAUL has shown the presence there of two Japanese heavy cruisers (probably HAGURO and MYOKO).

4. INTELLIGENCE suggests possibility of enemy landing attempt being made in vicinity FINSCHHAFEN about dusk 16th October and that landing will be accompanied by air strike and surface bombardment.

Comdesron 5 with PERKINS, FLUSSER, SMITH, REID, MAHAN and MUGFORD, departed Cape WARD HUNT at sundown 15th October and will be off FINSCHHAFEN late afternoon and night of 16th October co-operating with P.T. boats in the destruction of any enemy forces attempting a landing.

DRAYTON and LAMSON departed MILNE BAY 1630L 15th October to join COMDESRON 5.

5. DIRECTIVES.

C.T.F. 74 has received the following directives from Commander 7th Fleet.

(i) C.T.F.74 will remain under direct control of Commander 7th Fleet.

(ii) Task Force 74 base at MILNE BAY on two hours notice and be prepared to operate against Japanese cruisers in event any heavy surface raids from RABAUL.

(iii) C.T.F.74...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

(iii) CTF 74 co-ordinate combat activities with CTF 76 forward echelon.

(iv) Task Force 74 will not proceed north of MILNE BAY unless ordered by Commander 7th Fleet or unless a heavy cruiser attack develops MOROBE - KIRIWINA - WOODLARK.

6. The exact nature of the tasks which may be set this force cannot be forecast.

Enemy naval undertakings with surface vessels in the NEW GUINEA theatre are likely to consist of

(a) Support of a major landing attempt

(b) Attack upon our sea communications to our advanced positions.

(c) Bombardment of our bases or positions in advanced areas.

Owing to the strength of Allied Air Forces in the NEW GUINEA AREA, these enemy naval undertakings are likely to be carried out at night and by cruisers and/or destroyers.

7. My intentions in the event of this force engaging on an offensive mission are as follows:

C.T.F. 74 INTENTIONS.

8. CONDITION. NIGHT SURFACE ACTION AGAINST ENEMY FORCE-S (. .ALL TO CONTAIN ONLY CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS.)

(a) TASK FORCE 74 - DISPOSITION.

(i) Opposition by enemy submarines and aircraft is likely to be met in SOLOMON SEA.
Before contact is made with enemy surface forces, Task Force 74 will therefore form with destroyers providing A/S or A.A. screen.
This is a CRUISING and APPROACH DISPOSITION.

(ii) On making radar contact with enemy forces, Task Force 74 will be ordered by keyed signal on common task force frequency, (3265 Kc/s), to form SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITION ZEBRA which is hereby established with the following details:-

HELM and BAGLEY formed as a division 500 yards between ships and stationed 5000 yards 000 relative to AUSTRALIA.

WARRAMUNGA (who has no TBS, no SG radar and inferior blind fire arrangements) shall prolong the line astern of AUSTRALIA.

This is a BATTLE DISPOSITION.

(iii) It is NOT intended that the battle disposition described above shall be treated as a rigid formation.

Until released, I shall expect HELM and BAGLEY to maintain roughly their assigned station and WARRAMUNGA, whilst remaining abaft the beam of AUSTRALIA, to favour whichever side of AUSTRALIA's wake seems best to suit the situation which is developing.

(iv) When ~~joined~~ formed...../

(iv) When formed in battle disposition it will be my endeavour to make all course changes by ship turn movement (ships turning together).

(v) In most night actions fought by Japanese light surface forces, they have used their torpedo armament with great skill and often with considerable effect. It will therefore be my general policy that AUSTRALIA shall fight at the limiting range of enemy effective torpedo fire, until the enemy torpedo attack has been launched. Accordingly AUSTRALIA will engage in blind fire when the enemy has been closed to about 12000 yards. I then intend that AUSTRALIA shall close the enemy until the range is about 10000 yards, at which range a radical turn away or reversal of course probably will be made to avoid possible enemy torpedo zones. AUSTRALIA's gun action will then be continued at range in excess of 10000 yards.

(vi) AUSTRALIA opening fire will automatically release HELM and BAGLEY who will close to favourable range for fighting their gun and torpedo armament. ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK ON A SUITABLE TARGET MUST IMMEDIATELY BE SEIZED AND THE ATTACK PRESSED HOME.

(vii) WARRAMUNGA may be given specific orders after contact is made but I expect to leave the movements of WARRAMUNGA entirely to the initiative of her Commanding Officer who will accept any favourable opportunity for engaging in offensive action either individually or in supporting AUSTRALIA.

(viii) It is a reliable rule that if the enemy is within starshell range, and unless certain you can spot the fall of shot without illumination, always use starshell when opening fire with other guns.

(ix) Whenever battle disposition (Special Cruising Disposition Zebra) is formed, all ships will switch on IFF.

(x) All ships must be ready to identify themselves instantly by

(a) Three letter reply on white light
and (b) by switching on VF identification if under fire from friendly forces.

(xi) DO NOT USE SEARCHLIGHT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. If it is ESSENTIAL to use a searchlight, expose the beam INTERMITTENTLY and do not overlook the danger of silhouetting own ships.

(xii) ANY SHIP FORCED TO FALL OUT OF THE FORMATION due to damage should do so if possible on the disengaged side and

(a) follow the course of the action at her best speed if she can be of any potential use for mopping up enemy damaged ships

or

(b) retire towards a friendly base if unable to take any further part at all. In this case make radio signal advising interested authorities of condition, position and intention.

9. CONDITION...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

9. CONDITION.- ACTION AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINE.

The object of the operation upon which the Task Force is engaged will probably be quite definite and it will NOT be the destruction of enemy SUBMARINES.

It is my intention therefore that attack or counter attack on enemy submarine whether it has been detected by sight sound or radar shall be continued ONLY till the submarine is no longer a menace to the force and that the attacking destroyer shall then rejoin WITH ALL DESPATCH.

10. CONDITION - ACTION AGAINST ENEMY AIRCRAFT.

(a) If ordered to take up anti-aircraft disposition, destroyers shall form on the 1400 yard circle as follows:

HELM (or BAGLEY) - 060 relative.
WARRAMUNGA - 180 relative.
BAGLEY (or HELM) - 300 relative.

(b) At night destroyers must be prepared to lay smoke if ordered.

11. CONDITION - DAY SURFACE ACTION.

(i) In the event of Task Force 74 becoming engaged in day surface action with enemy forces, the handling and fighting of the force will depend on many factors, e.g. visibility, composition of the enemy, etc.

(ii) The following broad principles shall apply:-

(a) WARRAMUNGA, HELM and BAGLEY, shall remain concentrated in the VAN and shall be led by Commander DECHAINEUX in WARRAMUNGA.

(b) AUSTRALIA will endeavour to fight at mean range about 11000 yards.

(c) If the enemy has a force of destroyers, the primary function of Task Force 74 destroyers will be to engage enemy destroyers and particularly to break up enemy destroyer torpedo attacks launched at AUSTRALIA.

(d) In normal visibility NO attempt should be made (unless favourable opportunity offers) by Task Force 74 destroyers to deliver a torpedo attack on the enemy cruiser-s until they are effectively engaged by AUSTRALIA.

12. RETIREMENT.

The direction of GENERAL RETIREMENT (when ordered) will be promulgated.

If the direction of retirement has not been promulgated, ships will retire towards nearest base or supporting force (naval or air).

If Task Force 74 has been broken up and ships or groups are retiring independently, they shall advise by radio message their composition, position and intentions.

13. FIGHTER...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

13. FIGHTER DIRECTOR TEAM.

Commanding Officer No. 9 Operations Group has been requested to provide fighter director team to embark at MILNE BAY in event of Task Force 74 proceeding on operation to Northward.

If such a team (or a controller) can be provided, it is intended that BAGLEY shall be fighter directing ship.

14. TOWING.

All ships of this force must be prepared to tow or to be taken in tow.

15. COMMUNICATIONS.

(i) USF 70 and PacFleet supplement thereto is effective.

(ii) Radio Frequency Plan 4 will be used. Frequencies are as follows:-

	Primary.	Alternative.
Common Task Force and Warning Net	3265 Kc/s	3005 Kc/s.

(iii) All ships guard BELLS, TBS and Warning Net.

In addition AUSTRALIA will guard 425 Kc/s (as requisite), Task Force Commanders Frequency (4205 Kc/s) and Task Force 76 destroyer circuit 4610 Kc/s (day) 2510 (night).

(iv) PT boats (Task Group 70.1) frequency is 3120 Kc/s (night) and 4475 Kc/s (day).

(v) Voice and Key Call Signs - USF 70A Appendix I, Table 4, as follows:

Task Force 74	KEWPIE (CL)
C.T.F. 74	CASEY (AQ)
DESTROYERS	WHIPCORD (QD)
S.O. DESTROYERS	SNUFFY (LA) *
BAGLEY	BONNIE (BC)
HELM	BRIAN (DV)
WARRAMUNGA	CHEERFUL (EF) *

* WARRAMUNGA has NO TBS fitted. The above call signs will be used on TBS and Warning Net ONLY.

(vi) VOICE CODE (PAC -3A)

Secondary meanings. Use column (3).

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16. PAC - 10 and C.O.P.

PAC - 10 shall be effective except as hereunder:-

(i) PAC 10, Articles 2500 - 2520 inclusive, are replaced by C.O.P. Section H.

(ii) PAC - 10, Article 3458, will NOT be effective.

(iii) PAC - 10 Article 4414, paragraphs (d) and (e) will NOT be effective.

The following portions of C.O.P. are effective and shall supplement PAC - 10.

Section A - Articles 4, 11, 12 (c)(vi), 15.

Section F

Section H

Section M, Articles 3, 4.

17. This OPORDER is effective upon receipt.

V. CRUTCHLEY.

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

DISTRIBUTION.

"AUSTRALIA"	(4)
"WARRAMUNGA"	(2)
"HELM"	(2)
"BAGLEY"	(2)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

MOST SECRET

ENCLOSURE No. VIII To TF 74 DIARY OF PROCEEDINGS.

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship,
4th November 1943.

A.F. 1060/22

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 5 - 43.

(Short Title: CTF 74 Oporder 5 dash 43)

TASK ORGANISATION:

Task Force 74	Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY.
Task Group 74.1 (Cruiser Group)	"AUSTRALIA" (CTF 74) "SHROPSHIRE".
Task Group 74.2 (Destroyer Group)	"RALPH TALBOT" (Captain Walker, COMDESRON 4) "HELM" "WARRAMUNGA" "ARUNTA".

Destroyer Group will assume following Divisional Organisation:-

Desdiv ABLE	"RALPH TALBOT" (COMDESRON 4) "HELM"
Desdiv BAKER	"WARRAMUNGA" (Commander Dechaineux) "ARUNTA".

INFORMATION:

1. SOPAC FORCES have landed at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY (west coast of BOUGAINVILLE Island) and on MONO ISLAND (Treasury Group). These positions are being consolidated in preparation for further offensive action.

2. SOWESPAC FORCES now hold the eastern coastline of PAPUA and NEW GUINEA as far north as the SONG RIVER (north of FINSCHAFEN).

3. Re-supply and reinforcement of allied elements in newly captured areas is proceeding.

4. The exact nature of operations being currently undertaken in SOPAC AREA is not known.
The disposition of SOPAC FORCES is not known.

5. In SOWESPAC AREA, defence and overwater supply and reinforcement of advanced positions is being assisted by the following 7th Fleet forces:-

Task Group 70.1	PT Boats.
Task Group 73.1	Naval (search) aircraft based SAMARAI and JENKINS BAY.
Task Force 76	Amphibious Force (Comprising Destroyer Squadron 5 plus "MUGFORD" and "BAGLEY", APD's, LST, LCT, LCI Flotillas etc.). Desron 5 ("SHAW", "DRAYTON", "FLUSSER", "LAMSON", "MAHAN", "PERKINS", "SMITH", "CONYNGHAM", "REID") plus "MUGFORD" and "BAGLEY" constitute Task Group 76.6 (Based on BUNA).

6...../

6. TASK FORCE 72 (Submarines) is supporting allied operations by maintaining an offensive reconnaissance patrol in the area north of 1° North, across the most probable tracks of enemy advance south from TRUK.

7. (a) TASK FORCE 74 has been directed to proceed to MILNE BAY at best speed.

(b) After arrival, force is to complete logistic requirements with all despatch and prepare for sea.

(c) C in C SOWESPACFOR (General MACARTHUR) has advised COMSOPAC (Vice-Admiral HALSEY, Commander 3rd Fleet) that TASK FORCE 74 will be available, if required, to support operations in SOPAC AREA.

8. ALLIED AIR FORCES - SOLOMON SEA AREA:

(a) The strength and disposition of Allied Air Forces in SOPAC Area is not known.

(b) (i) In NEW GUINEA AREA, considerable allied fighter and bomber strength is judged to be available.

(ii) RAAF Fighters operate from airfields on WOODLARK, KIRIWINA and GOODENOUGH ISLANDS, and there is a Fighter Sector Headquarters on each island.
These RAAF Squadrons are under the immediate operational control of 9th Operational Group, with Headquarters at GOODENOUGH.
No fighter squadrons are at present based on the airfields at MILNE BAY which is now only a sub-sector headquarters.

(iii) U.S. Fighter and Bomber Squadrons (5th Air Force) operate from airfields in PAPUA and NEW GUINEA. U.S. FIFTH AIR FORCE Advanced Echelon (Short Title ADVON FIVE), has Command Headquarters at PORT MORESBY.

(c) It is expected that an Air Force Fighter Director Team will embark in "SHROPSHIRE" (Fighter Direction Ship for Task Force 74).

9. TASK FORCE 74 WILL:-

(a) Upon arrival MILNE BAY, complete logistic requirements with despatch and prepare for sea.

(b) Prepare to operate in SOLOMON SEA area as directed.

10. The exact nature of the tasks which may be set this force cannot be forecast.
Enemy naval undertakings with surface vessels in SOLOMON SEA Area are likely to consist of:

(a) Support of a major landing attempt, either an initial landing or a reinforcement operation.

(b) Attack upon our sea communications to our advanced positions or upon our naval vessels protecting our advanced positions.

(c) Bombardment of our bases or advanced positions in advanced areas.

Owing to the strength of Allied Air Forces in NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS these enemy naval undertakings are likely to be carried out at night and by forces composed of cruisers and/or destroyers. However it is estimated that the enemy will react very strongly against the allied landings on BOUGAINVILLE and MONO Islands since the security of the former is vital to his position in RABAUL. Under these circumstances I estimate the enemy will be prepared to take considerable risks in the offensive use of his Fleet.

11...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

11. Whilst it is impossible to advise in advance, my intentions when this or that opportunity or emergency presents, my intentions should certain conditions apply can be imported.

12. CTF 74 INTENTIONS - TF 74 ENGAGED ON AN OFFENSIVE MISSION:

(A) Condition - Action Against Enemy Submarine

The object of any operation upon which this Task Force engages will probably be quite definite and it will NOT be the destruction of enemy SUBMARINES.
It is my intention therefore, that attack or counter attack on enemy submarine, whether it has been detected by sight, sound or radar, shall be continued ONLY till the submarine is no longer a menace to the Force and that the attacking destroyer shall then rejoin WITH ALL DESPATCH.

(B) Condition - Action Against Enemy Aircraft

(i) By Day

Task Force 74 Cruising Disposition VICTOR (refer PAC-10) has been designed to provide a suitable cruising disposition which may be ordered when air attack by day is likely.

(ii) By Night

Delivery of air attacks at night is being undertaken more and more frequently by the enemy.
It has been the experience of SOPAC forces that best avoiding action at night is:-

(a) radical manoeuvring of the force
(b) use of smoke
(c) withholding of gunfire.

If ordered to take up NIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DISPOSITION, CRUISERS will form in column in loose order (1200 yards apart) DESTROYERS will form on cruisers as follows: at 2000 yards

"RALPH TALBOT" (or "HELM") - 045 relative) from leading
"HELM" (or "RALPH TALBOT") - 315 relative) cruiser.

"WARRAMUNGA" (or "ARUNTA") - 135 relative) from rear
"ARUNTA" (or "WARRAMUNGA") - 225 relative) cruiser.

If subjected to attack, force will be manoeuvred by ship - turn alterations.
All ships be prepared to lay smoke.

(C) Condition - Night Surface Action Against Enemy Forces (likely to contain only cruisers and destroyers).

(i) Opposition by enemy submarines and aircraft is likely to be met in SOLOMON SEA. Before contact is made with enemy surface forces, Task Force 74 will, therefore, form with cruisers in column and with destroyers providing normal A/S screen or special night anti-aircraft disposition (vide paragraph 12 (B) (ii)).
This is a CRUISING or APPROACH DISPOSITION.

(ii) On making contact with enemy surface force, Task Force 74 will be ordered (probably by keyed signal on Warning Net frequency 3265 kc/s), to form SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITION X-RAY

which is ...../

which is hereby established with the following details:-

CRUISERS - In column 1200 yards between ships

DESTROYERS - Formed in two divisions.
Division ABLE stationed 5000 yards 000 relative to Flagship.
Division BAKER stationed 3000 yards 180 relative to Flagship.

OR special CRUISING DISPOSITION ZEBRA which is hereby established with the following details:-

CRUISERS - In column 1200 yards between ships.

DESTROYERS - Formed as one division, stationed 5000 yards 000 relative to Flagship.

Cruising Dispositions X-RAY and ZEBRA are BATTLE DISPOSITIONS.

(iii) It is NOT intended that the battle dispositions described above shall be treated as rigid formations.

Until released, I shall expect the Commander-s of Destroyer Division-s to keep their division-s concentrated and roughly in assigned station-s.

I leave it to the initiative of Commander-s to assume the divisional formation-s which best suit-s the tactical situation which is developing and so as to be ready to move off immediately on being released.

Commanding Officer, "SHROPSHIRE", will be expected to adjust his bearing from the Flagship as necessary to fight his ship most effectively.

(iv) When formed in Battle Disposition it will be my endeavour to make all course changes by ship turn movement (all ships turning together).

(v) In most night actions fought by Japanese surface forces, they have used their torpedo armament with great skill and often with considerable effect. It will, therefore, be my general policy that CRUISERS shall fight at about the limiting range of enemy effective torpedo fire, until the enemy torpedo attack has been launched. Accordingly cruisers will engage in blind fire when the enemy has been closed to about 12,000 yards. I then intend that cruisers shall close the enemy until the range is about 10,000 yards, at which range a radical turn away or reversal of course probably will be made to avoid possible enemy torpedo zones. CRUISERS will then continue the gun action at range in excess of 10,000 yards until it is deemed prudent to close to more effective range.

(vi) CRUISERS opening fire will automatically release DESTROYERS who will be led by their divisional commander-s to favourable range for fighting their gun and torpedo armament.

AT ANY TIME, HOWEVER, ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK ON A SUITABLE TARGET MUST IMMEDIATELY BE SEIZED AND THE ATTACK PRESSED HOME.

(vii) It is a reliable rule that if the enemy is within starshell range, and unless certain of being able to spot fall of shot without illumination, always use starshell when opening fire with other guns.

(viii) DO NOT USE SEARCHLIGHT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. If it is ESSENTIAL to use a searchlight, expose the beam INTERMITTENTLY and do not overlook the danger of silhouetting own ship.

(ix)..... /

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(ix) Whenever battle disposition (Special Cruising Disposition X-RAY or ZEBRA) is formed, all ships will turn on I.F.F. if not already switched on.

(x) All ships must be ready to identify themselves instantly by -

(a) three letter reply on white light
and(b) by switching on VF identification if under fire from friendly forces.

(D) Condition - Day Surface Action

(i) In the event of Task Force 74 becoming engaged in day surface action with enemy forces, the handling and fighting of the force will depend on many factors, e.g. our object, composition of enemy force etc.

(ii) The following broad principles shall apply:-

(a) Initial disposition will probably be Special Cruising Disposition ZEBRA (para.12 (C) (ii)).
(b) CRUISERS will normally remain concentrated.
(c) With CRUIS ERS CONCENTRATED it will be my aim to deploy and fight them at mean range 12,000 - 14,000 yards (against cruiser targets).
(d) If the enemy has a force of DESTROYERS, the primary function of Task Force 74 destroyers is to break up enemy torpedo attacks launched at OUR CRUISERS.
(e) In normal visibility, NO attempt should be made (unless favourable opportunity offers) by Task Force 74 destroyers to deliver a torpedo attack on the enemy until opposing cruisers are heavily engaged. When delivered, the attack should be pressed home.

13. ANY SHIP FORCED TO FALL OUT OF THE FORMATION during day or night surface action, should do so if possible on the disengaged side and -

(a) follow the course of the action at her best speed if she can be of any potential use in mopping up enemy damaged ships, towing our own damaged ships etc.

or

(b) retire towards a friendly base if unable to take any further useful part. In this case, make radio signal advising interested authorities of position, condition and intention.

14. RETIREMENT:-

The direction of GENERAL RETIREMENT (when ordered) will be promulgated.
If the direction of retirement has not been promulgated, ships will retire towards nearest friendly base or supporting force (naval or air).
If Task Force 74 has been broken up and ships or groups are retiring independently, they shall advise by radio message their composition, position and intention.

15. FIGHTER DIRECTION TEAM:-

It is expected that an Air Force fighter director team will embark in "SHROPSHIRE" (fighter director ship for Task Force 74).
"RALPH TALBOT" will be stand-by fighter director ship.

16...../

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16. TOWING:-

All ships this force be prepared to tow or to be taken in tow.

17. (a) COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with ANNEX TWO.

(b) Use Zone LOVE Time.

18. This Operation Order is effective upon receipt.

ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE
ANNEX II - COMMUNICATIONS.

V. Crutchley

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74

Distribution:-

"AUSTRALIA" (4)
"SHROPSHIRE" (4)
COMDESRON 4 (1)
"RALPH TALBOT" (2)
"HELM" (2)
"WARRAMUNGA" (2)
"ARUNTA" (2).

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

MOST SECRET

A.F.1060/22/1

ANNEX NO.1 TO C.T.F.74 OPERATION ORDER 5-43.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

JAPANESE NAVAL DISPOSITION

1. AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONAL USE (As at 5th November):-

(1) Rabaul - Kaviong Area:

6 CA : ATAGO, TAKAO, MAYA, TONE, TIKUMA, CHOKAI and possibly MOGAMI, SUZUYA.
(Damaged at RABAUL in raid of 3/11 are HAGURO, MYOKO - one listing with large hole in side).

3 CL : SENDAI plus NAKA and/or IZUZU from convoys (see below).

28 DD: About 20 destroyers and about 8 destroyers from convoy escorts (see below).

(11) Truk Area:

6 or 7 BB : MUSASHI, YAMATO, NAGATO, MUTSU, KONGO, HARUNA and possibly FUSO.

3 CV : ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, ZUIHO.
(THe fact that TONE, TIKUMA and possibly MOGAMI, SUZUYA, which are all attached to carrier force, have advanced to the KAVIENG area may be of significance as to the future movements of the carriers).

3 CA : Possibly MOGAMI, SUZUYA (it is just possible one or both of these is damaged), KUMANO due TRUK 8/11.

5 CL : AGANO, OYODO, NOSHIRO, NAGARA, TAMA; also KISO (possibly damaged) and YUBARI (probably damaged and in JAPAN).
For NAKA, ISUZU see below.

28 DD: About 20 destroyers and some 8 or 10 which might be withdrawn from escort duties.

2. JAPANESE SHIPPING AND REINFORCEMENTS IN KAVIENG - RABAUL AREA:-

The enemy has since 20th October been hurrying supplies and reinforcements to various points in NEW BRITAIN, making considerable use of DD's and also SS for this purpose. Places recently occupied or reinforced are VITU ISLAND (north of NEW BRITAIN), REIN BAY and CAPE HOSKINS (north coast of NEW BRITAIN), GASMATA, VAHSEL HARBOUR and JACQUINOT BAY (south coast NEW BRITAIN). Behind these movements are shipping at RABAUL and convoy movements. Shipping at RABAUL has of late been considerable, averaging about 120,000 tons. Two important convoys are now (4/11) en route:-

(i) KIYOSUMI MARU and GOKOKU MARU (XCL's), one or both of NAKA, ISUZU and destroyers - left TRUK 1/11 - arrived KAVIENG 3/11 - departing KAVIENG morning 4/11 for RABAUL.

(11) HIE MARU (XCL), NICHIE MARU (AO), KAMIKAZE MARU (AP) and 3 destroyers - left TRUK 3/11 probably en route KAVIENG.

NOTE: CL's NAKA and ISUZU and escorting DD have been added to list of vessels available either TRUK or KAVIENG area.

3. Japanese Submarines ..../

3. JAPANESE SUBMARINES:-

Four to seven submarines are usually seen in RABAUL HARBOUR. Submarines, northbound and southbound, pass CAPE ORFORD almost daily (probably mostly on supply runs). Two or three submarines may be expected in the western SOLOMONS SEA. Two submarines were seen between ST.GEORGE'S CHANNEL and BOUGAINVILLE on 2/11.

On the whole Japanese submarines were fairly widely dispersed (from FIJI and the NEW HEBRIDES to WAKE and PEARL HARBOUR) in the latter half of October and a rapid reconcentration in the SOLOMONS SEA does not appear likely.

4. RESERVES:-

Only meagre reserves are available in JAPAN - 3 or 4 BB, 3 Second Line CV, 2 - 4 CL. One CA and 1-2 CL are repairing.

Forces in the KURILES and EAST INDIES are already very slender.

Distribution:-

"AUSTRALIA"	(4)
"SHROPSHIRE"	(4)
"WARRAMUNGA"	(2)
"ARUNTA"	(2)
"RALPH TALBOT"	(2)
"HELM"	(2)
COMDESRON 4	(1)

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MOST SECRET

A.F.1060/22/2.

ANNEX NO. 2 TO C.T.F.74 OPERATION ORDER 5-43.

COMMUNICATIONS.

1. USF 70(A) and PACSUPP are effective.

2. PAC-10, Appendix 8, is effective except as follows:-

Article 2, Para.1(a)(b) } CSP 1270 series may also be used.

2. CSP 1270 series may also be used.

Article 3. Voice card authenticators and voice card coded call signs will NOT be used.

Authenticators from authentication word of the day are to be used with S.E. code reports.

Article 10. - See paragraph 5(a)(v).

3. CALL SIGNS.

All call signs used for communication within the Task Force are to be from T.F.74 COMPLAN 5-43.

4. STANDARD RADIO WATCHKEEPING.

(a) The following Radio watchkeeping scheme will be adopted 2 hours before leaving Milne Bay.

ALL SHIPS

Bells	-	Continuously.
TBS	-	Continuously.
Warming Net	-	1800L - 0600L, in low visibility and as in para.5(a)(iii).

GUARDS:

"AUSTRALIA"	-	NPM Fox Task Force Commanders A.O.I.C.
"SHROPSHIRE"	-	Port Wave for all ships in accordance with A.C.D.653(43) table 2(1).

(b) When enemy surface forces are known to be within 100 miles of T.F.74, ships are to set additional watch:-

All Ships	-	Warning Net continuously.
Cruisers Comdesron 4	-	Port wave continuously.

(c) According to the tactical situation, further watch may be ordered on:-

Fighter Director Frequencies (to be promulgated by signal).

Comdesron 5 Destroyer Circuit:

4610 kc/s	:	2100Z - 0900Z.
2510	:	0900Z - 2100Z.

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5. REPORTING RADAR CONTACTS OF AIRCRAFT:

(a) (i) "SHROPSHIRE" is designated Radar Reporting Ship.

(ii) Warning Net will be used as Radar Reporting Wave.

(iii) All ships are to set watch on Warning Net as soon as a raid is reported within 30 miles.

(iv) The order to break W/T silence for Radar reporting will be passed by O.T.C. on T.B.S.

(v) Reference to AIRCRAFT under C SOPUS and D SOPUS are in abeyance in T.F.74. Amend PAC-10 Appendix 8 article 10 paragraph (a) accordingly.

(vi) Code for radar reports follows:-

(b) CSP 1846, Chapter X in force modified as follows:-

(i) BUS flag will not be used.

(ii) After first reports (by visual) ALL reports are to be made by D.S.L. - see paragraph (C). This will be in addition to radio reports on Radar Reporting Wave once radio silence has been broken vide para.(a)(iv).

(iii) Reference CSP 1846, Chapter X, article 64(a). By night, or in low visibility, use TBS for the first report (paragraph (a)(iv) applies) if unidentified aircraft are detected approaching the Task Force within 30 miles.

(c) PROCEDURE FOR RADAR REPORTS OF AIRCRAFT BY D.S.L.

(i) After first reports (by visual) all reports are to be made by D.S.L.

(ii) Reports are to be made in accordance with CSP 1846, Chapter X : without any call, made twice through, separated by IMI and terminated by prosign AR.

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ENCLOSURE No. VIII To TF 74 DIARY OF PROCEEDINGS.

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA".
Flagship.
14th November 1943.

MOST SECRET
A.F. 1060/23.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER NO. 5A-43
(Short Title: CTF 74 Oporder five A dash forty-three)

TASK ORGANISATION:

Task Force 74	Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY
Task Group 74.1 (Cruiser Group)	"AUSTRALIA" (CTF 74) "SHROPSHIRE"
Task Group 74.2 (Destroyer Group)	"RALPH TALBOT" (Captain Walker, COMDESRON 4) "HELM" "WARRAMUNGA" "ARUNTA".

Destroyer Group will assume following Divisional Organisation:-

Desdiv ABLE	"RALPH TALBOT" (Comdesron 4) "HELM"
Desdiv BAKER	"WARRAMUNGA" (Commander DECHAINEUX) "ARUNTA".

INFORMATION:

1. SOPAC FORCES have landed at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY (west coast of BOUGAINVILLE Island) and on MONO ISIAND (Treasury Group). These positions are being consolidated in preparation for further offensive action.
An air field is under construction at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY.

2. Re-supply and reinforcement of allied elements in newly captured areas is proceeding by overwater movement. Transport movements in this connection are ordered by CTF 31 (COMAMPHIBFOR SOPAC) and are promulgated by despatch. Next movement (fifth echelon to TOROKINA) is described in CTF 31 message timed 120124 (FOX 776). Naval cover for these transport movements is arranged by Commander 3rd Fleet and usually consists of a cruiser and destroyer task group. At present available are Task Force 39 (Admiral MERRILL) with "MONTPELIER", "COLUMBIA", "CLEVELAND" effective, CRUDIV 9 (Admiral AINSWORTH) with "NASHVILLE" and "ST. LOUIS" effective and TASK FORCE 74.

3. In the advanced area, US PT boats are operating from EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, TREASURY and VELLA LAVELLA.

4. Forward of GUADALCANAL, SOPAC fighter planes are operating from BARAKOMA (Vella Lavella), ONDONGO (Hathorn Strait), MUNDA, SEGI and RUSSELLS. Strong formations of US Navy dive and torpedo bombers are based at MUNDA.

5. TASK FORCE 74 WILL -

(a) base at PORT PURVIS

(b) operate as directed by Commander 3rd Fleet (COMSOPAC).

6. Enemy naval undertakings with surface forces in SOLOMONS AREA are likely to consist of:-

(a) Support of a major landing attempt, either an initial landing or a reinforcement operation

(b) Attack upon our sea communications to our advanced positions or attack upon our naval vessels protecting our advanced positions or covering our sea communications to them.

(c) ...../

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(c) Bombardment of our bases or advanced positions.

Owing to the strength of Allied Air Forces in the SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA areas, these enemy naval undertakings are likely to be carried out at night by force-s composed of cruisers and/or destroyers.
However, it is estimated that the enemy will always react very strongly against allied seizure of areas under his control and I believe that he will attach great importance to the maintenance of his control over BOUGAINVILLE since it bears such close relation to the security of his major base at RABAUL.
Already the enemy has sent almost his entire heavy cruiser strength to RABAUL to be used in opposition to allied naval forces wherever they may be met in the advanced area, but the US carrier air strikes of 5th November and 11th November have successfully forced these cruisers out of the area, at any rate temporarily, with losses and damage.

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7.
~~H~~. Whilst it is impossible to advise in advance, my intentions when this or that opportunity or emergency presents, my intentions should certain conditions apply can be imported.

8. ~~H~~. CTF 74 INTENTIONS - TF 74 ENGAGED ON AN OFFENSIVE MISSION:

(A) Condition - Action Against Enemy Submarine

The object of any operation upon which this Task Force engages will probably be quite definite and it will NOT be the destruction of enemy SUBMARINES.
It is my intention therefore, that attack or counter attack on enemy submarine, whether it has been detected by sight, sound or radar, shall be continued ONLY till the submarine is no longer a menace to the Force and that the attacking destroyer shall then rejoin WITH ALL DESPATCH.

(B) Condition - Action Against Enemy Aircraft

(i) By Day

Task Force 74 Cruising Disposition VICTOR (refer PAC-10) has been designed to provide a suitable cruising disposition which may be ordered when air attack by day is likely.

(ii) By Night

Delivery of air attacks at night is being undertaken more and more frequently by the enemy.
It has been the experience of SOPAC forces that best avoiding action at night is:-

(a) radical manoeuvring of the force
(b) use of smoke
(c) withholding of gunfire.

If ordered to take up NIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DISPOSITION, CRUISERS will form in column in loose order (1200 yards apart) DESTROYERS will form on cruisers as follows:-

"RALPH TALBOT" (or "HELM") - 045 relative) from leading
"HELM" (or "RALPH TALBOT") - 315 relative) cruiser.

"WARRAMUNGA" (or "ARUNTA") - 135 relative) from rear
"ARUNTA" (or "WARRAMUNGA") - 225 relative) cruiser.

If subjected to attack, force will be manoeuvred by ship - turn alterations.
All ships be prepared to lay smoke.

(C) Condition - Night Surface Action Against Enemy Forces (likely to contain only cruisers and destroyers).

(i) Opposition by enemy submarines and aircraft is likely to be met in SOLOMON SEA. Before contact is made with enemy surface forces, Task Force 74 will, therefore, form with cruisers in column and with destroyers providing normal A/S screen or special night anti-aircraft disposition (vide paragraph ~~8~~ (B) (ii)).
This is a CRUISING or APPROACH DISPOSITION.

(ii) On making contact with enemy surface force, Task Force 74 will be ordered ~~(probably by keyed signal on Warning Net frequency 3265 kc/s)~~, to form SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITION X-RAY

which is ...../

which is hereby established with the following details:-

CRUISERS - In column 1200 yards between ships

DESTROYERS - Formed in two divisions.
Division ABLE stationed 5000 yards 000 relative to Flagship.
Division BAKER stationed 3000 yards 180 relative to Flagship.

OR special CRUISING DISPOSITION ZEBRA which is hereby established with the following details:-

CRUISERS - In column 1200 yards between ships.

DESTROYERS - Formed as one division, stationed 5000 yards 000 relative to Flagship.

Cruising Dispositions X-RAY and ZEBRA are BATTLE DISPOSITIONS.

(iii) It is NOT intended that the battle dispositions described above shall be treated as rigid formations.

Until released, I shall expect the Commander-s of Destroyer Division-s to keep their division-s concentrated and roughly in assigned station-s.

I leave it to the initiative of Commander-s to assume the divisional formation-s which best suit-s the tactical situation which is developing and so as to be ready to move off immediately on being released.

Commanding Officer, "SHROPSHIRE", will be expected to adjust his bearing from the Flagship as necessary to fight his ship most effectively.

(iv) When formed in Battle Disposition it will be my endeavour to make all course changes by ship turn movement (all ships turning together).

(v) In most night actions fought by Japanese surface forces, they have used their torpedo armament with great skill and often with considerable effect. It will, therefore be my general policy that CRUISERS shall fight at about the limiting range of enemy effective torpedo fire, until the enemy torpedo attack has been launched. Accordingly cruisers will engage in blind fire when the enemy has been closed to about 12,000 yards. I then intend that cruisers shall close the enemy until the range is about 10,000 yards, at which range a radical turn away or reversal of course probably will be made to avoid possible enemy torpedo zones. CRUISERS will then continue the gun action at range in excess of 10,000 yards until it is deemed prudent to close to more effective range.

(vi) CRUISERS opening fire will automatically release DESTROYERS who will be led by their divisional commander-s to favourable range for fighting their gun and torpedo armament.

AT ANY TIME, HOWEVER, ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK ON A SUITABLE TARGET MUST IMMEDIATELY BE SEIZED AND THE ATTACK PRESSED HOME.

(vii) It is a reliable rule that if the enemy is within starshell range, and unless certain of being able to spot fall of shot without illumination, always use starshell when opening fire with other guns.

(viii) DO NOT USE SEARCHLIGHT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. If it is ESSENTIAL to use a searchlight, expose the beam INTERMITTENTLY and do not overlook the danger of silhouetting own ship.

(ix)..... /

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(ix) Whenever battle disposition (Special Cruising Disposition X-RAY or ZEBRA) is formed, all ships will turn on I.F.F. if not already switched on.

(x) All ships must be ready to identify themselves instantly by -

(a) three letter reply on white light
and(b) by switching on VF identification if under fire from friendly forces.

(D) Condition - Day Surface Action

(i) In the event of Task Force 74 becoming engaged in day surface action with enemy forces, the handling and fighting of the force will depend on many factors, e.g. our object, composition of enemy force etc.

(ii) The following broad principles shall apply:-

(a) Initial disposition will probably be Special Cruising Disposition ZEBRA (para. ~~8~~(C) (ii)).
(b) CRUISERS will normally remain concentrated.
(c) With CRUIS ERS CONCENTRATED it will be my aim to deploy and fight them at mean range 12,000 - 14,000 yards (against cruiser targets).
(d) If the enemy has a force of DESTROYERS, the primary function of Task Force 74 destroyers is to break up enemy torpedo attacks launched at OUR CRUISERS.
(e) In normal visibility, NO attempt should be made (unless favourable opportunity offers) by Task Force 74 destroyers to deliver a torpedo attack on the enemy until opposing cruisers are heavily engaged. When delivered, the attack should be pressed home.

9. ~~11~~. ANY SHIP FORCED TO FALL OUT OF THE FORMATION during day or night surface action, should do so if possible on the disengaged side and -

(a) follow the course of the action at her best speed if she can be of any potential use in mopping up enemy damaged ships, towing our own damaged ships etc.

or

(b) retire towards a friendly base if unable to take any further useful part. In this case, make radio signal advising interested authorities of position, condition and intention.

10. ~~12~~. RETIREMENT:-

The direction of GENERAL RETIREMENT (when ordered) will be promulgated.
If the direction of retirement has not been promulgated, ships will retire towards nearest friendly base or supporting force (naval or air).
If Task Force 74 has been broken up and ships or groups are retiring independently, they shall advise by radio message their composition, position and intention.

11. ~~13~~. FIGHTER DIRECTION TEAM:-

~~It is expected that~~ An Air Force fighter director team ~~will~~ is embarked in "SHROPSHIRE" (fighter director ship for Task Force 74).
"RALPH TALBOT" will be stand-by fighter director ship.

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12. TOWING:

All ships this force be prepared to tow or to be taken in tow.

13. LOGISTICS - Forward Area:

(a) Most logistic requirements can be fulfilled at TULAGI or PORT PURVIS.

(b) FUEL is also available at HATHORN STRAIT.

(c) Ammunition replenishments for "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" are being moved from ESPIRITU SANTO to TULAGI.

(d) Ammunition replenishments for "WARRAMUNGA" and "ARUNTA" are being sent to SOPAC area.

14. (a) COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with ANNEX ONE.

(b) Use ZONE LOVE time.

15. This operation order is effective upon receipt.

ANNEX I - COMMUNICATIONS
ANNEX II - MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION
ANNEX III - SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

V. Crutchley

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74

Distribution:-

"AUSTRALIA" (4)
"SHROPSHIRE" (4)
COMDESRON 4 (1)
"RALPH TALBOT" (2)
"HELM" (2)
"WARRAMUNGA" (2)
"ARUNTA" (2).

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MOST SECRET

A.F. 1060/23.

ANNEX NO. 1 TO C.T.F.74 OPERATION ORDER 5A-43.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Commander South Pacific Communication Plan 16-43 effective.

2. Voice and key call signs from Communication Addendum for Task Force 74. CTF 74 COMPLAN 5-43 in abeyance.

3. STANDARD RADIO WATCHKEEPING:

All Ships

NPM FOX	Continuously
TBS	Continuously
Warning Net (3445 kc/s)	1800L - 0600L, in low visibility, and in compliance with para.5 below. To be guarded continuously when enemy surface forces are known to be within 100 miles.

Guards

"AUSTRALIA"	LOTE Task Force Commander's AOIC 4295 as requisite.	
"SHROPSHIRE"	Port Wave 355) 2716)	USF 70(A), 1341(8).
	4295 as ordered by signal.	
"RALPH TALBOT"	4295 as ordered by signal.	
"HELM"	500 kc/s continuously.	

4. Annex A to COMSOPAC COMPLAN 16-43, 4200(1) 1. - change to this organisation will be ordered by signal.

5. REPORTING RADAR CONTACTS OF AIRCRAFT:

(a) (i) "SHROPSHIRE" is designated Radar Reporting Ship.
(ii) Warning Net will be used as Radar Reporting Wave.
(iii) All ships are to set watch on Warning Net as soon as a raid is reported within 30 miles.
(iv) The order to break W/T silence for Radar reporting will be passed by O.T.C. on TBS.
(v) Reference to AIRCRAFT under C SOPUS and D SOPUS are in abeyance in TF 74. Amend PAC-10 Appendix 8 Article 10 paragraph (a) accordingly.
(vi) Code for radar reports follows.

(b) CSP 1846, Chapter X in force modified as follows:-
(i) BUS flag will not be used.
(ii) After first reports (by visual) ALL reports are to be made by D.S.L. - see paragraph (c). This will be in addition to radio reports on Radar Reporting Wave once radio silence has been broken vide para.(a) (iv).
(iii) Reference CSP 1846, Chapter X, Article 64(a). By night, or in low visibility, use TBS for the first report (paragraph (a) (iv) applies) if unidentified aircraft are detected approaching the Task Force within 30 miles.

(c) ...../

(c) Procedure for Radar Reports of Aircraft by D.S.L.

(i) After first reports (by visual) all reports are to be made by D.S.L.

(ii) Reports are to be made in accordance with CSP 1846, Chapter X: without any call, made twice through, separated by IMI and terminated by prosign AR.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NO. II TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 5A-43.

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

1. HYDROGRAPHICAL.

(a) The exact location of the Western coast of BOUGAINVILLE is unknown but it is certain that it lies somewhat to the eastward of the location shown on all current charts.

(b) Numerous shoals, charted and uncharted, exist within a radius of 30 miles of C. TOROKINA.

2. TACTICAL POINTS.

(a) Comsopac has established the following tactical points :-

BACKDOOR	09-00; 160-30
BLACKJACK	08-00; 165-00
BUGJUICE	13-35; 160-00
BUZZ	06-40; 156-20
CATFISH	03-00; 154-20
CRUNCH	06-40; 153-18
FILTER	07-20; 158-00
FUNNEL	08-08; 157-05
GLIDE	11-50; 171-10
HANG	12-00; 158-24
HECKLE	06-30; 158-17
HIGHWAY	07-45; 155-35
MICE	08-00; 158-10
MOLASSES	12-30; 166-30
NIGHTSTICK	10-00; 168-30
PASSION	00-10; 151-55
PAUSE	08-30; 156-30
PROWL	07-25; 156-45
SLAM	09-08; 155-30
TIMBER	04-30; 157-00
TRAFFIC	08-00; 156-44

AREAS (e.g. Area BACKDOOR, Area GLIDE, etc.) are of radius 100 miles with the tactical point as centre.

(b) C.T.F. 31 has established additional points :-

BUNCH	10-44; 161-07
CROWD	09-21; 158-08

3. ALLIED SUBMARINE ROUTEING.

(a) C.T.F. 72 has established the following points to be used as reference points when routeing submarines :-

ACE	25-40 154-40	HORSE	23-00 156-00	RUBY	5-00 156-15
BALL	12-30 155-00	JOVE	20-00 152-00	SHOE	12-00 152-30
BLUE	7-20 160-00	MAST	11-22 150-35	SKY	21-30 157-00
BOX	26-00 155-00	MILL	21-00 155-00	STAR	16-35 146-20
CART	5-48 147-30	ODOR	2-00 155-00	SWIM	8-15 151-10
CAT	26-30 155-20	PEAK	18-00 148-00	VAN	27-05 153-42
DAMP	21-20 154-00	POND	22-20 154-30	WHITE	8-21 160-28
FATE	10-00 151-25	RED	10-00 158-00	WIND	9-25 159-15

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(b) When ordered bombing restrictions will be enforced in a lane 20 miles either side of the route of a submarine and 100 miles ahead and 100 miles astern of the estimated position of the submarine.

4. ROUTEING OF SHIPPING.

(a) SHIPPING BETWEEN NOUMEA AND ESPIRITU SANTO.

The following reference points are established :-

APPLE	23-30 : 167-30
BEER	21-45 : 169-00
CORNCOB	17-30 : 167-30

Northbound ships pass 5 miles EAST of reference points.
Southbound ships pass 5 miles WEST of reference points.

(b) Shipping between ESPIRITU and GUADALCANAL.

The following reference points are established :-

BEANS	09-55; 161-30
DUSTY	09-50; 161-05
HAM	11-30; 164-00
PORK	13-20; 164-00
SMOKY	10-35; 161-05

ROUTE ASPIRIN :- Northbound convoys. Route 5 miles SOUTH of point HAM and point BEANS.

ROUTE BROMIDE :- Southbound convoys. Route 5 miles NORTH of point BEANS and point HAM.

ROUTE CALOMEL - Southbound - Route through points DUSTY, SMOKY, PORK. (Usually for slow ships).

(c) Shipping from GUADALCANAL to forward area.

The following points are established :-

A	-	9-12; 159-44
B	-	9-12; 159-10
C	-	8-58; 157-52
G	-	8-54; 157-48½
H	-	8-54; 159-16
M	-	8-22½; 157-22½
N	-	8-25; 157-13
O	-	8-10; 156-43
R	-	8-54; 157-42
S	-	8-25; 157-30
T	-	7-30; 155-32
U	-	6-47; 154-46
V	-	6-24; 155-00
W	-	7-52; 156-32
X	-	8-01; 156-43

Outward route to EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY or TREASURY ISLAND is normally through points R, C, S, T, U and V.

Return route is normally through points V, U, T, S, C and H.

These routes are shown on MOVEMENT CHART NO. 4 which has been issued to all ships.

5. GEOGRAPHICAL POINTS FOR ORBITING FIGHTERS.

In the BOUGAINVILLE AREA the following geographical

points...../

points are used for orbiting fighters. The points are described by a single letter.

A - NUMA NUMA
B - MOBIRE
C - ARAWA BAY
D - MOTUPENA
E - TOROKINA
F - C. MOLTKE
G - KOMALI POINT
H - TREASURY ISLAND.

6. MINEFIELDS - BOUGAINVILLE AREA.

Despatches indicated are briefed with complete information.

(a) Jap Fields (from captured document).
CO 2nd Para Bn 312055L

1. North tip Masamasa Id., thence 015 True to Lat. 6-41, thence Northwest tip Oema Isd., thence to North tip Ovau Isd. South tip Ovau Isd. 120 True to Fauro Isd. North tip Fauro Isd. to Masamasa Isd.
2. West tip Ballale Isd. 040 True to Nusakoa Isd., thence 095 True to Koroaku Isd. (Off Fauro), thence 210 True to East tip Munia Isd., thence 285 True to Ballale Isd.
3. Between Latitudes 6-51 and 6-58, between Longitudes 155-31 and 155-40.

(b) U.S. Fields.
Oema - Torau Bay fields
CTU 31.8.2 020250

1. Origin bears 172 True distance 9 miles from Otua Isd. Two rows on axis 105 True, distance 4.2 miles.

Comindiv 1 082355
2. Origin 6-36.2 S, 156-07.4 E. Three rows on axis 267 True, distance 4.4 miles.
3. Origin 6-36 S, 156-01.6 E. Two rows on axis 284 True, distance 4.25 miles.

Cape Moltke field
CTU 31.8.1 020010

1. Origin bears 340 True, distance 3000 yards from Cape Moltke. Three rows on axis 250 True, distance of Northern and middle rows 4 miles, Southern row 6.5 miles long.

Shortland field
(published)

1. Origin bears 204 True from centre of Munia Isd., on 100 fathom curve. One row on line 250 True to 100 fathom curve at a point bearing 162 True from South tip Ballale Isd., thence bending 1000 yards to the South. Two additional rows run parallel to the first and to seaward, 400 yards between rows.

Buka Fields.

1. Aerial mines have been laid in both the Eastern and Western entrances to Buka Passage.

Tonolei[illegible] fields.

1. Aerial mines have been laid over a broad area between Moila Point and Pupukuna Point off Southern Bougainville Shore.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NO. III TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 5A-43.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.
(Up to 14 November, 1943)

As a consequence of the occupation by SOUTH PACIFIC forces of TREASURY ISLAND and EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, the Japanese on 3rd NOVEMBER dispatched a task force of 7 CA and 2 CL and some 8 - 10 destroyers to strengthen the force of 2 CA, 2 CL and 12 - 15 destroyers already at RABAUL.

2. The advance force at RABAUL was dealt with on night 1st-2nd November by T.F.39. The new arrivals received their punishment on 5th November when cruisers were hit by T.F.38 and on 11th November when destroyers were hit by T.G.50.3 and to a lesser extent by T.F.38.

3. On 12th November no cruisers and only 2 destroyers (one of these damaged) were sighted at RABAUL. See APPENDIX 1.

4. Japanese air strength has also suffered considerably.

(a) The assault on BOUGANVILLE has compelled the complete evacuation of airstrength from the SOLOMONS where only one field (BONIS) is now kept serviceable as an advanced base. Strength from the SOLOMONS has reinforced RABAUL with some 40 Aircraft. RABAUL has also received a considerable proportion of the aircraft of Cardiv 1. Comcardiv 1 is now shorebased at RABAUL and ZUIHO and SHOKAKU have both returned to JAPAN (probably to collect more aircraft). The only carrier left at TRUK is ZUIKAKU whose aircraft may also be shorebased. Cardiv 1 planes are probably responsible for recent night torpedo attacks using flares. They are known to have exercised this form of attack for some months.
To some extent KAVIENG is being used as a rear-base, particularly for bombers. The use of KATE's (dive bombers) in the attack on T.G.50.3 indicates a shortage of bomber types as this is a somewhat outmoded type. The number of BETTY's used on 11th November was unusually small. In general the earlier predominance of bombers at RABAUL has largely given way to fighter-strength.

(b) On 2nd November, before S.W.PACIFIC air strike, strength at RABAUL was - 29 light bombers, 37 medium bombers, and 171 fighters.
Heavy losses on 2nd November were replaced by Aircraft from CARDIV 1 and from SOLOMONS. On 5th November (including KAVIENG) strength was - 21 VB (light) 52 VB (medium), 196 VF, 7 F/P. Some of the VF may have been VDB.
On following days S.W.PACIFIC forces whittled away strength at RABAUL and destroyed 30 Aircraft in transit at MADANG. On 11th November some 113 Aircraft were lost. Strength (at RABAUL) on 12th November was - 16 VB (light) 22 VB (medium) 52 VF, 26 F/P.

(c) As predicted KAPINGAMARANGI has recently become an important seaplane (fighter and patrol) centre.

5. SUBMARINES.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

5. SUBMARINES:

About 5 submarines continue to be seen at RABAUL. CHOGEI, sub-tender, which for a long time was at RABAUL, has not been seen since the raid of 12th October. Regular sightings of submarines passing CAPE ORFORD have ceased. There are some indications that supply submarines now run north of NEW BRITAIN. One or two submarines may be in the western SOLOMONS SEA, one (possibly two) indicated in the eastern SOLOMONS SEA (especially TREASURY - NEW GEORGIA Area). A submarine is frequently indicated between CAPE ST. GEORGE and WOODLARK ISLAND, and there have been two sightings south of CAPE ST. GEORGE. No submarine attacks have been reported.

6. REINFORCEMENTS:

(a) SOLOMONS:

The steady stream of small ships into the SOLOMONS has ceased. Two small marus may have got to BUKA on 5th November and a special run of 4 ships and barges was made to BUKA on night of 7th November; the BUIN area is already cut off. On 12th November, 12 barges were seen in that area. 98 barges were seen in the BUKA area. Japanese have left central CHOISEUL for the N.W.part of the island.

(b) NEW BRITAIN:

Sudden activity in reinforcing outposts in NEW BRITAIN at end of OCTOBER has since declined. Only report is of 14 unidentified "ships" at REIN BAY and 2 small AK at BORGEN BAY on 9th November.
In VITIAZ STRAIT no enemy are left in LONG ISLAND and TOLOKIWA Situation in UMEOI probably the same. Enemy camps reported in SAKER ISLAND.

(c) RABAUL:

The important reinforcement convoys which came in three echelons from SHANGHAI suffered severely en route. Of the first 2 echelons (total 4 CL, 3 XCL, 3 DD, 1 unknown) 1 CL was damaged, 1 XCL was sunk, 2 CL were damaged (one only got as far as KAVIENG), 1 unknown was sunk. It is not certain that the 3rd echelon even reached RABAUL. HIEI MARU was damaged by torpedo,- NICHIEI MARU (AO) was bombed, taken in tow and may not even have reached TRUK. KAMIKAZE MARU and 3 DD alone were unscathed. On 9/11 some six ships from TRUK and PALAU reached RABAUL. On 12th November, a similar convoy (9 ships less one lost en route) was southbound off MANUS IS. Several tankers have also reached RABAUL. On 12th November (prior to arrival of above convoy) merchant shipping at RABAUL totalled 21 vessels (approximately 104,000 tons). With arrival of convoy off MANUS ISLAND total would reach about the current normal of 130,000 tons. It is noted that of shipping sighted on 12th November, only about 70% is believed serviceable.

7. AVAILABLE JAPANESE NAVAL STRENGTH AS OF 14TH NOVEMBER:

(a) RABAUL Area:

2 DD (one, possibly both, damaged) and submarines probably sufficient to have 4 - 5 on offensive patrols and up to 10 on supply shuttle.

(b) TRUK:

6 - 7 BB: MUSASHI, YAMATO MUTSU, NAGATO, KONGO, HARUNA, possibly FUSO.
1 CV: ZUIKAKU (Aircraft possibly shore-based).
4 + 2 CA: TIKUMA, SUZUYA, CHOKAI, KUMANO, MOGAMI (damaged) MAYA (damaged).
5 + 2 CL: NOSHIRO, AGANO (both damaged), TAMA, ISUZU, NAKA, OYODO, NAGARA (possibly damaged).
2 Training CL: KASHIMA, KATORI

(c) JAPAN

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(c) JAPAN:

3 - 4 BB: YAMASHIRO, ISE, HYUGA, possibly FUSO.

10 CV: SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, HITAKA, HAYATAKA (damaged 5th Nov.), RYUHO, HOSHO, CHUYO, UNYO, CHITOSE, OTAKA (damaged 18th Oct.). (Last 6 of little importance except for training and transport.)

1 + 5 CA: AOBA (damaged in APRIL), ATAGO, TAKAO, HAGURO, MYOKO (en route from TRUK, all damaged NOVEMBER), TONE (returned 5th NOVEMBER for unknown reason).

2 + 2 CL: KISO (possibly damaged), YUBARI (probably damaged), WAKAMIYA, TATSUTA, Also 1 CL (completion not yet indicated.)

(d) N.E. AREA (KURILES):

1 CA: NACHI.

1 CL: ABUKUMA.

(e) N.E.I. AREA:

1 CA: ASHIGARA.

4-5 CL: OI, KITAGAMI, KUMA, INU, possibly NATORI.

1 TRAINING CL: KASHII.

8. <u>DESTROYERS</u>:

Of 20 - 25 DD recently in the RABAUL Area, maximum claim is 7 sunk, 15 damaged. A more probable estimate is about 6 sunk (4 in night action) and about 10 damaged (mostly in air attacks). Special intelligence confirms 2 sunk 5 damaged. Practical evacuation of RABAUL is best testimony of damage.

Probably a generous estimate available at TRUK and south thereof on 1st NOVEMBER would be 45 DD. Present availability therefore is about 40 less about 10 damaged. Some 26 - 30 DD are dispersed in other theatres.

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APPENDIX I TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 5A-43.

Information to date (13th NOVEMBER) indicates condition of cruisers recently in RABAUL Area as follows:-

TIKUMA) - Returned to TRUK about 9th NOVEMBER - condition
SUZUYA) not known.

ATAGO) - Damaged 5th NOVEMBER, arrived TRUK about 9th
TAKAO) NOVEMBER and departed for YOKOSUKA 11th NOVEMBER.

HAGURO) - Damaged night action 1-2 NOVEMBER. Photo shows
MYOKO) one of these hit by bomb 5th NOVEMBER. Japanese hoped to send these back to TRUK 3rd NOVEMBER but apparently condition did not permit this. Appear to have arrived TRUK about 9th NOVEMBER, departing for SASEBO 12th NOVEMBER.

MOGAMI - Damaged, arrived TRUK about 9th NOVEMBER.

MAYA - Damaged 5th NOVEMBER and probably again 11th NOVEMBER. With DD's left RABAUL Area for TRUK 11th NOVEMBER.

NOSHIRO - Damaged 5th NOVEMBER and possibly 11th NOVEMBER. Left RABAUL for TRUK 11th NOVEMBER.

AGANO - Damaged 5th NOVEMBER and further damaged 11th NOVEMBER. Sightings indicate was one of group leaving RABAUL for TRUK 11th NOVEMBER, but most secret information shows still at RABAUL.

NAKA) - Departed RABAUL for TRUK early 6th NOVEMBER
ISUZU) apparently having survived attack. However a photo shows a cruiser of NAKA class receiving a bomb hit.

NAGARA - Probably in night action 1 - 2 NOVEMBER. Probably undamaged. CL reported hit by 3 bombs when 20' south of KAVIENG early 5th NOVEMBER may have been NAGARA. However until further information is received, count as serviceable.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ENCLOSURE NO. VIII To TF 74 DIARY OF PROCEEDINGS.

MOST SECRET

Flagship.
19 November, 1943.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER NO. 5B - 43.

Commander Task Force 74 - Operation Order 5A-43 with the following additions and amendments shall become Operation Order No. 5B - 43.

(i) Replace pages 1, 2 and 6, with new pages 1, 2 and 6 herewith.

(ii) Paragraph 8(B)(ii), amend (c) to read:

"(c) Withholding of gunfire unless an attack has clearly developed".

(iii) Paragraph 8(B)(ii), line 9

for "NIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DISPOSITION"
read "SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITION 'NAN'".

(iv) Paragraph 8(B)(ii), after line 15

add "This is a NIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DISPOSITION".

(v) Page 4, paragraph 8C(ii) after line 12

Add "OR SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITION 'OBOE' which is established with the following details:-

CRUISERS - In column 1200 yards between ships.

DESTROYERS - Formed in two separate divisions ABLE and BAKER, stationed on the side towards the contact, 40 degrees either side of contact bearing and distant 5000 yards from Flagship. (Example:- Radar contact has been made on a bearing 320 degrees (true) distant 36000 yards. On signal 'Form special Cruising disposition OBOE', Desdivs ABLE and BAKER will take station 5000 yards from Flagship and on true bearings 280 and 000 FROM the Flagship).

(vi) Page 4, paragraph 8(c)(ii)

Amend last line to read:
"Cruising Dispositions OBOE, X-RAY and ZEBRA are BATTLE DISPOSITIONS".

(vii) Page 5, paragraph 8(c)(ix), at end of line 1 add "OBOE".

(viii) ANNEX NO. I is superseded by new ANNEX NO. I herewith.

(ix) Add new pages 4 and 5 (herewith) to ANNEX NO. II.

(x) ANNEXES NO. II and NO. III:
Change heading to read:
.....C.T.F.74 OPERATION ORDER NO. 5B - 43.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

MOST SECRET.
A.F.1060/24.

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
19 November, 1943.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER NO. 5B-43.
(Short Title: CTF 74 Oporder five B dash forty-three.)

TASK ORGANISATION:

Task Force 74	Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY.
Task Group 74.1 (Cruiser Group)	"AUSTRALIA" (CTF 74) "SHROPSHIRE"
Task Group 74.2 (Destroyer Group)	"RALPH TALBOT" (Captain Walker, COMDESRON 4) "HELM" "WARRAMUNGA" "ARUNTA"

Destroyer Group will assume following Divisional Organisation:

Desdiv ABLE	"RALPH TALBOT" (Comdesron 4) "HELM"
Desdiv BAKER	"WARRAMUNGA" (Commander DECHAINEUX) "ARUNTA".

INFORMATION.

1. SOWESPAC AREA.

(a) SOWESPAC FORCES now hold the eastern coastline of PAPUA and NEW GUINEA as far north as the SONG RIVER (north of FINSCHHAFEN).

(b) Re-supply and reinforcement of allied elements in the advanced area is proceeding preparatory to further offensive action.

(c) The defence and overwater supply and reinforcement of advanced positions is being assisted by the following 7th Fleet forces:-

Task Group 70.1	P.T. Boats.
Task Group 73.1	Naval (search) aircraft based SAMARAI and JENKINS BAY.
Task Force 76	Amphibious Force (comprising Destroyer Squadron 5 plus MUGFORD and BAGLEY, APDs, LST, LCT, LCI Flotillas, etc.) DESRON 5 ("SHAW", "DRAYTON", "FLUSSER", "LAMSON", "MAHAN", "PERKINS", "SMITH", "CONYNGHAM", "REID") plus "MUGFORD" and "BAGLEY" constitute Task Group 76.6 (Based on BUNA).

(d) Task Force 72 (submarines) is supporting allied operations by maintaining offensive reconnaissance patrols on Japanese shipping routes to his advanced bases.

(e) In NEW GUINEA AREA, considerable allied fighter and bomber strength is judged to be available. R.A.A.F. Fighters operate from airfields on WOODLARK, KIRIWINA and GOODENOUGH ISLANDS. U.S. Fighter and Bomber Squadrons (5th Air Force) operate from airfields in PAPUA and NEW GUINEA.

2. SOPAC AREA. (a)..../

2. SOPAC AREA.

(a) Allied advance positions at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY (west coast BOUGANVILLE Island), on MONO ISLAND (Treasury Group) and in NEW GEORGIA GROUP, are being consolidated in preparation for further offensive action.

(b) Re-supply and reinforcement of allied elements in the advanced area is proceeding by overwater movement. Transport movements in this connection are ordered by C.T.F.31 (COMAMPHIBFOR SOPAC) and are promulgated by despatch. Naval cover for these transport movements is arranged by Commander 3rd Fleet and usually consists of a cruiser and destroyer task group.
At present available are Task Force 39 (Rear-Admiral MERRILL) with "MONTPELIER", "COLUMBIA" and "CLEVELAND", and CRUDIV 9 (Rear-Admiral AINSWORTH) with "NASHVILLE" and "ST.LOUIS".
In emergency, Task Force 74 may be called upon.

(c) In the advanced area, U.S. PT boats are operating from EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, TREASURY and VELLA LAVELLA.

(d) Forward of GUADALCANAL, SOPAC fighter planes are operating from BARAKOMA (Vella Lavella), ONDONGO (Hathorn Strait), MUNDA, SEGI and RUSSELLS. Strong formations of U.S. Navy dive and torpedo bombers are based at MUNDA.
An air field is under construction at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY.

3. Miscellaneous information is given in ANNEX TWO.

4. Enemy intelligence is given in ANNEX THREE.

5. TASK FORCE 74 WILL:

(a) base at MILNE BAY

(b) be prepared to operate in SOWESPAC or SOPAC area of SOLOMON SEA as directed.

6. Enemy naval undertakings with surface forces in SOLOMON SEA are likely to consist of:-

(a) Support of a major landing attempt, either an initial landing or a reinforcement operation.

(b) Attack upon our sea communications to our advanced positions or attack upon our naval forces protecting our advanced positions or covering our sea communications to them.

(c) Bombardment of our advanced bases or advanced positions.

Owing to the strength of Allied Air Forces in the NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS AREAS, these enemy naval undertakings are likely to be carried out at night by forces composed of cruisers and/or destroyers

7. Whilst it is ...../

12. TOWING.

All ships this force be prepared to tow or to be taken in tow.

13. LOGISTICS.

(a) SOWESPAC AREA.

Fuel, provisions and munitions available at MILNE BAY.
There is usually a tanker at BUNA.
YUNNAN (Ammunition Supply Ship) based on MILNE BAY.

(b) SOPAC AREA.

Most logistic requirements can be fulfilled at TULAGI or PORT PURVIS.
Fuel is also available at HATHORN STRAIT.
Ammunition replenishments for "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" are being moved from ESPIRITU SANTO to TULAGI.
Ammunition replenishments for WARRAMUNGA and ARUNTA are being arranged.

14. (a) COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with ANNEX ONE.

Part I - S.W.PAC Area,
or
Part II - SOPAC Area,
will be brought into force by despatch.

(b) Use ZONE LOVE time.

15. This operation order is effective upon receipt.

ANNEX I - COMMUNICATIONS.
ANNEX II - MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.
ANNEX III - SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

V. CRUTCHLEY

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

Distribution:-

"AUSTRALIA"	(4)
"SHROPSHIRE"	(4)
COMDESRON 4	(1)
"RALPH TALBOT"	(2)
"HELM"	(2)
"WARRAMUNGA"	(2)
"ARUNTA"	(2)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

MOST SECRET

A.F. 1060/24/1.

ANNEX NO. 1. TO C.T.F. 74 OPERATION ORDER 5B-43.

PART 1. SOWESPAC COMMUNICATIONS.

AT SEA AND IN HARBOUR.

(1) All Ships.

Bells		...	Continuously
T.B.S. 65.34 Mc/s	(P)	...	Continuously.
72.5 Mc/s	(S)		
Warning Net 3265 kc/s	(P)	..	1800L-0600L and in low visibility and in accordance with instructions for RADAR reports
3005 kc/s	(S)		
Port Wave 425 kc/s..		...	In accordance with A.C.D. 653(43) Table 2(d)

(ii) Guards.

"AUSTRALIA"	NPM Fox. Task Force Commanders. A.O.I.C.	
"SHROPSHIRE"	Fighter Direction.	As requisite.
"HELM"	Commercial.	

(iii) Co-operation with T.F. 76.

In the event of direct co-operation with T.F. 76, additional guards may be ordered by signal :-

"AUSTRALIA"	T.F. 76 Dog Circuit	4610 kc/s.
"SHROPSHIRE"		2510 kc/s.
"RALPH TALBOT"	T.F. 76 Charlie Circuit	kc/s.
		kc/s.

(iv) In harbour only. Warning Net need not be guarded except during Air Raid Warning RED.

(v) Voice and Key Call signs.

Voice and Key Call signs for use within the T.F. are as laid down in Commander South Pacific Communication Plan 16-43 Addendum for T.F. 74.

(vi) Tactical Clock Code and Voice Card within T.F. 74.

(a) Commander South Pacific Communication Plan 16-43 Article 6300 (e) effective.

(b) Voice card will not be used.

PART II. SOPAC COMMUNICATIONS.

Commander South Pacific Communication Plan 16-43 effective throughout.

AT SEA AND IN HARBOUR.

(i) All Ships.

NPM Fox			Continuously.
TBS	65.34 Mc/s.	(P)	Continuously.
	72.5 Mc/s.	(S)	
WARNING NET	3445 kc/s.	(P)	1800-0600L. in low
	3135 kc/s.		

.....visibility/

(i) All Ships - Cont'd.

Port Wave 355 kc/s. 2716 kc/s. visibility and in accordance with instructions for RADAR reports. In accordance with U.S.F. 70(A) Article 1341 (8).

(ii) Guards.

"AUSTRALIA" LOTE
Task Force Commanders 4205 kc/s (P) 4295 kc/s. (S)
AOIC.

"SHROPSHIRE" - Fighter Direction. As requisite.

"HELM" - Commercial.

(iii) Task Forces Combined Organisation.

Warning Net 3265(P) 3155(S) Will be ordered to be guarded in lieu of the above warning net in the event of combined T.F. operation.

Common Task Force 275(P) 2336(S) May be ordered to be guarded in addition to the above for all ships in the event of combined T.F. operation.

(iv) In harbour only, warning net need not be guarded except during Air Raid Warning RED.

(v) Voice and Key Callsigns.

As laid down in the addendum for T.F. 74 in the above Communication Plan.

Part 1 SOWESPAC COMMUNICATIONS effective on receipt.

Part II SOPAC COMMUNICATIONS will be brought into effect by signal.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

MOST SECRET

A.F. 1060/24/2.

ANNEX NO. 2 TO C.T.F. 74 OPERATION ORDER 5B-43.

7. STANDARD AIR SEARCHES - Long Range Reconnaissance.

(a) SOPAC area.

(1) From GUADALCANAL (datum) by PBY and PB4Y aircraft.

Aircraft call.	Sector. True bearings from datum.	Distance from Datum.
7 V 29	310 - 319	800 miles
18 V 29	319 - 328	800 "
53 V 29	328 - 337	800 "
17 V 29	337 - 346	650 "
55 V 29	346 - 355	650 "
39 V 29	355 - 004	650 "
5 V 29	004 - 013	800 "
13 V 29	013 - 022	800 "
9 V 29	022 - 031	800 "
51 V 29	031 - 040	800 "
31 V 29	040 - 049	800 "
28 V 29	049 - 058	800 "
3 V 29	058 - 067	800 "

(ii) From GUADALCANAL (datum) by VENTURA aircraft.

Aircraft Call.	Sector. True Bearings from Datum.	Distance from Datum.
2 V 30	240 - 255	350
34 V 30	255 - 270	350

(iii) From ESPIRITU SANTO (Datum) by PBY and PB4Y. aircraft.

Aircraft Call.	Sector. True bearings from datum.	Distance from Datum.
4 V 55	340 - 350	525
29 V 55	350 - 000	550
50 V 55	000 - 009	600
11 V 55	009 - 018	650
22 V 55	018 - 027	725
16 V 55	027 - 036	675
8 V 55	036 - 045	675
45 V 55	045 - 054	675
32 V 55	054 - 063	675

.....(b) /

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

(b) SOWESPAC Area.

(i) From MILNE BAY by Beaufort aircraft.

AREA "Q" 0900S 15200E to 0500S 15240E to 0500S 15320E and return to base via 0900S 15200E.

AREA "R" 0900S 15200E to approximately 0500S 15345E to 0600S 15345E and return to base via 0900S 15200E. Aircraft is not to proceed to the Eastward of longitude 15400E.

AREA "S" General reconnaissance from MILNE BAY to Eastward area Louisiade Archipelago to longitude 15500E.

Areas "Q" and "R" to be completed to Datum (0900S 15200E) by 1300L daily.

Area "S" performed every three days.

(ii) From SAMARAI and JENKINS BAY with Catalinas by Task Group 73.1.

(a) Area A. JENKINS BAY - 0600S 14800E
0410 S 14455 E - 0315 S 14800 E.
0540 S 14815 E - JENKINS BAY.

(b) Area B. JENKINS BAY - 0540 S 14815 E
0430 S 14910 E - 0320 S 15110 E.
0410 S 15125 E - Coastal to Cape Gloucester.
- JENKINS BAY.

(c) Area C. JENKINS BAY - KITAVA ISLAND - ARAWE - Coastal to CAPE ARCHWAY - 0500 S 15330 E - 0700 S 15300 E - 0610 S 15150E
0635 S 15050 E - KITAVA ISLAND - JENKINS BAY.

NOTE:- These searches are carried out each night. Circuit is varied irregularly.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ENCLOSURE NO. VI TO TF 74 DIARY OF PROCEEDINGS.

MOST SECRET.
A.F.1060/25.

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
26 November, 1943.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION PLAN ONE.
(Short Title : CTF 74 Opplan One)

TASK ORGANISATION:

Task Group 74.2 "RALPH TALBOT (Captain Walker, Comdesron 4)
"HELM"
"WARRAMUNGA"
"ARUNTA"

1. This Operation Plan is derived from Commander 7th Fleet despatches timed 240939 and 250831 November.

2. TASK GROUP 74.2 will bombard targets in GASMATA-LINDENHAFEN area during night 29-30 November.

Targets selected:

(a) Village northern AWRIN ISLAND.
(b) Dump area west ANWEK RIVER mouth.
(c) RINGRING plantation.

Task Group will depart vicinity KITAVA ISLAND at dusk 29 November and commencing Midnight will bombard assigned targets for about twenty minutes then retire to arrive departure point about dawn 30 November and return to MILNE BAY.

Ammunition allowance one hundred rounds per gun.

Destroy enemy forces encountered.

3. Two U.S.Navy ASV fitted (night) Catalina aircraft of Task Group 73.1 will co-operate with Task Group 74.2. Prior to bombardment these planes will carry out coastwise search from ST.GEORGES CHANNEL to target area with the object of locating shipping. Any vessels found will be reported and attacked.

At the scheduled time of commencing the bombardment these aircraft will be over the RING RING target prepared to provide flare illumination.

PROVIDED THAT THE AIRCRAFT ARE CERTAIN OF THEIR POSITION behind (on inland side of) the RING RING PLANTATION target, these aircraft on signal starshell bursting over GASMATA, drop flares on an EAST-WEST line behind RING RING plantation and if possible continue this illumination for the duration of the bombardment (20 minutes). These aircraft may also drop incendiaries if it is judged that these would add to the confusion of the enemy.

Task Group 73.1 co-operation aircraft will endeavour, throughout the operation, to avoid close contact with Task Group 74.2.

Communications and I.F.F. - See Annex A.

4.(a) 9th...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

4. (a) 9th Operational Group (Advanced Headquarters at GOODENOUGH) will have fighter aircraft on ground alert at No. 14 Fighter Sector (Goodenough), No. 15 Fighter Sector (Woodlark) and No. 16 Fighter Sector (Kiriwina).

This fighter support will provide five squadrons available on call.

(b) Wing Commander CONAGHAN, R.A.A.F., and Fighter Director team will transfer from "SHROPSHIRE" to "RALPH TALBOT" for this operation. "RALPH TALBOT" becomes No. 27 Sub-Fighter Sector.

(c) Communications and Fighter direction - Annex A.

5. Task Force 76 special destroyer bombardment group consisting of Comdesron Five in "PERKINS" with "SHAW", "FLUSSER" and "MAHAN" will bombard targets in MADANG area during the night 29-30 November. This force will leave vicinity of FINSCHHAFEN at dusk 29 November, start 20-minute bombardment about 0100 (Zone-11) 30 November and on completion retire along reverse route at maximum speed.

6. C.T.G.70.1 (PT boat squadron 7th Fleet) has cancelled all PT boat operations for night 29-30 November and has ordered two boats stand-by at KIRIWINA for call by COMDESRON FOUR and four boats to stand by in FINSCHHAFEN vicinity for call by COMDESRON FIVE.

PT boat operating frequency 3120 Kc/s.

7. Major VICKERY, M.C., A.I.F., from "AUSTRALIA" will embark in "WARRAMUNGA" and Captain CALDER, A.I.F., from "SHROPSHIRE" will embark in "ARUNTA" to witness the bombardment.

8. Intelligence regarding enemy set forth in ANNEX BAKER.

9. Fuel, provisions and munition replenishments available at MILNE BAY.

10. COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with ANNEX ABLE.

11. This Operation Plan effective upon receipt.

12. Commander Task Force 74 in H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA" at MILNE BAY.

V. CRUTCHLEY.

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

ANNEXES:

A - Communications.
B - Intelligence regarding enemy.

DISTRIBUTION:

"AUSTRALIA"	(1)	C.T.G. 73.1	(2)
"SHROPSHIRE"	(1)	5th AF Advanced Echelon	(1)
COMDESRON 4	(1)	9th Ops Group Advanced HQs	(1)
"RALPH TALBOT"	(2)	Commander 7th Fleet) with	
"HELM"	(2)	A.C.N.B.) WAR DIARY.	
"WARRAMUNGA"	(2)	C.T.F. 76	(1)
"ARUNTA"	(2)	COMDESRON 5	(1)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION PLAN ONE

ANNEX "A" - COMMUNICATIONS

1. ALL SHIPS GUARD:-

BELLS Continuously
TBS Continuously.

"AUSTRALIA" & TASK GROUP 74.2:-

TF 76 DOG circuit

0700L - 1900L	4705 kc/s
1900L - 0700L	2510 kc/s.

This circuit will provide direct communication between COMDESRON 4 and his bombardment group - COMDESRON 5 and his bombardment group - CTF 74 - CTF 76.

2. COMDESRON FOUR will arrange for the following additional frequencies to be guarded:-

(a) Port Wave 425 kc/s	-	In accordance with ACD 653(43) Table 2(1).
(b) PT boat frequency	-	3120 kc/s 1900L - 0700L.
(c) By "RALPH TALBOT"	-	AOIC - continuously (4350, 8770, 13050 kc/s). Fighter direction - as requisite. Communication with Navy Cats - see para. 3.

3. COMMUNICATION WITH TASK GROUP 73.1 SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT:-

will be on 7020 kc/s (voice) and "RALPH TALBOT" will guard this frequency at night using call ZOMBIE. Call signs CAT ONE and CAT TWO allocated to TG 73.1 supporting planes.

4. VOICE AND KEY CALL SIGNS:-

Impromptu Calls

COMTASKFOR 74		SCOTTY	ZG
TASK FORCE 74		SUE	WO
"AUSTRALIA"		MODOC	WW
"SHROPSHIRE"		MIXER	VO
COMDESRON 4		SICKLE	SF
DESRON 4		DUSTY	QO
"RALPH TALBOT"		FUZZY	XD
"HELM"		FRISKY	WY
"WARRAMUNGA"		ROASTER	BN
"ARUNTA"		BARON	PZ

5...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

5. TACTICAL CLOCK CODE AND VOICE CARD:-

Commander South Pacific Communication Plan 16-43 Article 6300(e) is effective, namely:-

"This code is based on a combination of the circular diagram and associated words for course, speed, bearing distance, turn and deploy.

KEYWORD - DIAL.

D 000
I 100
A 200
L 300

Signal	Code Equivalent
Corpen	Cloverleaf
Speed	Gravity
Bearing	Timken
Distance	Ruler
Turn	Taxi
Deploy	Kick off.

A combination of the numerals following the code equivalent for course, speed etc. is obtained by adding an increment to the 0, 100, 200 and 300 degree points represented by D, I, A and L in the circular code. When speed or distance is coded, the last zero is dropped as appropriate.

Examples:

Corpen 115 - Cloverleaf ITEM plus 15.
Speed 20 knots - Gravity ABLE.
Deploy 310 - Kickoff LOVE plus 10.
Bearing 048 - Timken DOG plus 48.

This code should be memorized by all concerned. When actually in action or in actual emergencies voice codes will NOT be used. "

Voice Card will NOT be used.

6. 27TH FIGHTER SUB-SECTOR:

"RALPH TALBOT" use call sign ZOMBIE primary and CHORAL secondary. In the event of separation or breakdown of "RALPH TALBOT" (Fighter Director Ship), O.T.C. remaining ships will break R/T silence on 6445 kc/s using call sign CHORAL and will communicate with No. 16 Fighter Sector (KIRIWINA) call sign LOOPHOLE requesting (en clair) fighter cover giving position in fighter grid coordinates. In the event of fighter director ship being operative and force dividing, the fighter director controller in "RALPH TALBOT" will arrange air cover for group separated from fighter director ship. Senior Officer of detached ships advise COMDESRON 4 of position and intentions.

7. Task Group 73.1 planes will be equipped with Mark II I.F.F. which will be turned on when reaching 20 miles from Target Area. U.S. Model SC Radar will trigger direct. Interrogator BL and British Type 286 will NOT trigger Mark II I.F.F.

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COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION PLAN ONE.

ANNEX "B" - INTELLIGENCE REGARDING ENEMY.

1. For some months Jap. shipping on south coast of NEW BRITAIN has been infrequent. At the end of October 3 DD's. made a supply run to VAHSEL HARBOUR (33 miles east of GASMATA) and 2 DD took supplies to JACQUINOT BAY.

On 24th November a further supply run (probably by DD) to VAHSEL HARBOUR was expected in the near future. Barges have been rarely routed along the south coast of NEW BRITAIN but with the change to the North West season giving average weather conditions and smooth to slight seas on this coast, barge traffic may be started.

Enemy positions in Southern NEW BRITAIN have presumably relied on submarines for supply. In September as many as 5 or 6 submarines may have called weekly at GASMATA with 50 men and 20-40 tons cargo each. At the end of October, this traffic declined and recent sightings of Southbound submarines suggest that GASMATA is now receiving but one visit a week. The last trip was reported on 24th November.

2. There is a road between GASMATA and LINDENHAFEN.

3. The aerodrome at GASMATA has been used only as an advanced base.

Besides the aerodromes in the RABAUL area, the enemy has other dromes at CAPE HOSKINS and CAPE GLOUCESTER (2 Strips).

4. After 11th November, RABAUL was practically cleared of Naval shipping.

On 22nd November, YUBARI (CL) and 9 DD were seen in RABAUL, probably all in connection with transport movements to GAROVE (YUBARI and 2 DD - in which YUBARI may have been sunk by air attack) and to BUKA (6 DD - of which 4 or 5 were destroyed by DESRON 23 on the night 24 - 25 November).

Remaining Naval Force at RABAUL must therefore be small and in view of situation in the MARSHALLS - GILBERTS it is unlikely that fresh units will be available for reinforcement.

PT boats are believed to be at RABAUL. One or two of these operated in vicinity of LAE but there has been no indication of their presence in GASMATA area.

One or two submarines may be in the general area south of NEW BRITAIN.

5. The enemy is thought to have been alerted against the possibility of Allied attack on the south coast of NEW BRITAIN.

6. GASMATA AREA - GUN DEFENCES.

The information shown on sketch (attached) is possibly incomplete and may not be wholly accurate.

7. RING RING - LINDENHAFEN - GUN DEFENCES.

Existence of surface guns has not been reported. AA guns are probably mounted.

8. JAPANESE AIR RECONNAISSANCE - SOLOMON SEA.

The following information has been extracted from Commander South West Pacific Force Advanced Intelligence Centre Intelligence Report dated 8th November, 1943 :-

.....(1)/

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

(i) Searches are done principally by Japanese Naval Air Service. The planes generally used are the twin-engined bombers "Betty" and "Nell". The usual search radius of these planes is 700 miles and their cruising speed about 200 knots.

(ii) There is evidence that long range bombing aircraft and perhaps some of the newer float planes have a type of radar which will at least enable them to detect our own radar signals.

(iii), Float planes are operating from LINDEN PLANTATION near GASMATA on coastal reconnaissance and anti-submarine work.

(iv) AIR SEARCHES.

These searches are not necessarily standard. The schedules and routes are altered to fit conditions of the moment.


(a) Land based planes leave RABAUL or KAVIENG possibly every other day to cover GOODENOUGH, FERGUSON, KIRIWINA, WOODLARK and occasionally MILNE BAY.
This area is sometimes covered in a much more cursory manner by plane originating from BUKA covering southern SOLOMON SEA then returning via WOODLARK and KIRIWINA to RABAUL.

(b) Search despatched from RABAUL to search for our shipping in FINSCHHAFEN, HOPOI, LAE, MOROBE, BUNA area.

(c) Sightings enable the identification of a definite search possibly from RABAUL, along the south coast of NEW BRITAIN. This plane pays particular attention to the Cape ORFORD and GASMATA areas and is frequently accompanied by fighter escort. It passes Cape ORFORD in the afternoon between 1400L and 1600L.

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GASMATA AREA



ROUGH SCALE

⊗ PROBABLE COAST DEFENCE GUNS
(Possibly 6 inch)

⊕ PROBABLE A.A. POSITIONS (type unknown)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
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MOST SECRET

A.F. 1060/25

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
28th November 1943.

CHANGE NO. 1
to
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION PLAN ONE
Dated 26 November 1943

1. Para. 2 - delete "(a) Village northern AWRIN ISLAND".

2. Add new paragraph 4A and 4B as follows:-

"4A. British-American Rescue Ship "CALEDONIAN SALVER" will be available in case of emergency and will co-operate as follows regarding the operation assigned to COMDESRON 4 and that outlined in para. 5:-

(a) "CALEDONIAN SALVER" will be sailed from MILNE BAY AM 29th November by N.O.I.C. NEW GUINEA.

(b) Vessel will proceed via BELI BELI, GOODENOUGH IS., and inside route and will arrive at anchorage off BOLI POINT, KIRIWINA at 1700L and remain there at immediate readiness to proceed on call.

(c) "CALEDONIAN SALVER" will guard 2716 kc/s continuously. See Annex A - Communications - para. 8.

4B. (a) Details of "CALEDONIAN SALVER" - see ANNEX "C".

(b) Communications with "CALEDONIAN SALVER" - see ANNEX "A". "

3. Para. 7 - add "Captain ELDER, A.I.F., from "AUSTRALIA" will embark in "HELM".

4. To list of ANNEXES add:-
ANNEX "C" - Details of B.A.R.S. "CALEDONIAN SALVER".

5. ANNEX "A", Communications, - add new para. 8 as follows:-

"8. COMMUNICATION WITH B.A.R.S. "CALEDONIAN SALVER":

(a) "CALEDONIAN SALVER" has been provided with Naval Cypher No. 5 and CSP 1270 and will guard 2716 kc/s continuously. Mercantile Secret Call Sign MM4EM. Signal Letters VFJR.

(b) N.O.I.C. NEW GUINEA Will guard 2716 kc/s.

(c) COMDESRON 4 or COMDESRON 5 may communicate with "CALEDONIAN SALVER" -

(i) Direct on 2716 kc/s
or (ii) through CTF 74 or CTF 76 who will relay to N.O.I.C. NEW GUINEA for action, messages concerning her. "

6. New ANNEX "C" attached.

V. Crutchley

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74

To:-
All holders of OPPLAN ONE.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION PLAN ONE

ANNEX "C"

Details of "CALEDONIAN SALVER" - British American Rescue Ship:

Length 230 feet.

Beam 39 feet.

Draught 14 feet.

Tonnage 1650 displacement.

Speed 14 knots. Maximum for short period 16.5 knots.

H.P. 3900.

Crew 62 including 3 Salvage Officers. Welders, Divers etc.

Armament 2 Oerlikons.

Searchlights: 1 - 36"
1 - 24"
2 - 12".

Echo-Sounding Gear.

Towage: Estimated to be able to tow 10,000 ton ship at 10 knots.

Fire-fighting: Water and foam.

Pumping Capacity: 4,500 tons per hour.

Fully equipped for all types of salvage work.

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ENCLOSURE No. VIII To TF 74 DIARY OF PROCEEDINGS.

MOST SECRET.
A.F.1060/26.

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
28 November, 1943.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER NO. 6-43.
(Short Title: CTF 74 Oporder six dash forty-three.)

TASK ORGANISATION:

Task Force 74	Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY.
Task Group 74.1 (Cruiser Group)	"AUSTRALIA" (CTF 74) "SHROPSHIRE" "NASHVILLE"
Task Group 74.2 (Destroyer Group)	"RALPH TALBOT" (Captain Walker, COMDESRON 4) "HELM" "WARRAMUNGA" "ARUNTA"

Destroyer Group will assume following Divisional Organisation:

Desdiv ABLE	"RALPH TALBOT" (Comdesron 4) "HELM"
Desdiv BAKER	"WARRAMUNGA" (Commander DECHAINEUX) "ARUNTA".

INFORMATION.

1. SOWESPAC AREA.

(a) SOWESPAC FORCES now hold the eastern coastline of PAPUA and NEW GUINEA as far north as the SONG RIVER (north of FINSCHHAFEN).

(b) Re-supply and reinforcement of allied elements in the advanced area is proceeding preperatory to further offensive action.

(c) The defence and overwater supply and reinforcement of advanced positions is being assisted by the following 7th Fleet forces:-

Task Group 70.1	P.T. Boats.
Task Group 73.1	Naval (search) aircraft based SAMARAI and JENKINS BAY.
Task Force 76	Amphibious Force (comprising Destroyer Squadron 5 plus MUGFORD and BAGLEY, APDs, LST, LCT, LCI Flotillas, etc.) DESRON 5 ("SHAW", "DRAYTON", "FLUSSER", "LAMSON", "MAHAN", "PERKINS", "SMITH", "CONYNGHAM", "REID") plus "MUGFORD" and "BAGLEY" constitute Task Group 76.6 (Based on BUNA).

(d) Task Force 72 (submarines) is supporting allied operations by maintaining offensive reconnaissance patrols on Japanese shipping routes to his advanced bases.

(e) In NEW GUINEA AREA, considerable allied fighter and bomber strength is judged to be available. R.A.A.F. Fighters operate from airfields on WOODLARK, KIRIWINA and GOODENOUGH ISLANDS. U.S. Fighter and Bomber Squadrons (5th Air Force) operate from airfields in PAPUA and NEW GUINEA.

2. SOPAC AREA. (a)..../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

2. SOPAC AREA.

(a) Allied advance positions at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY (west coast BOUGANVILLE Island), or MONO ISLAND (Treasury Group) and in NEW GEORGIA GROUP, are being consolidated in preparation for further offensive action.

(b) Re-supply and reinforcement of allied elements in the advanced area is proceeding by overwater movement. Transport movements in this connection are ordered by C.T.F.31 (COMAMPHIBFOR SOPAC) and are promulgated by despatch. Naval cover for these transport movements is arranged by Commander 3rd Fleet and usually consists of a cruiser and destroyer task group.
At present available are Task Force 39 (Rear-Admiral MERRILL) with "MONTPELIER", "COLUMBIA" and "CLEVELAND", and CRUDIV 9 (Rear-Admiral AINSWORTH with "ST. LOUIS").
In emergency, Task Force 74 may be called upon.

(c) In the advanced area, U.S. PT boats are operating from EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, TREASURY and VELLA LAVELLA.

(d) Forward of GUADALCANAL, SOPAC fighter planes are operating from BARAKOMA (Vella Lavella), ONDONGO (Hathorn Strait), MUNDA, SEGI and RUSSELLS. Strong formations of U.S. Navy dive and torpedo bombers are based at MUNDA.
An air field is under construction at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY.

3. Miscellaneous information is given in ANNEX TWO.

4. Enemy intelligence is given in ANNEX THREE.

5. TASK FORCE 74 WILL:

(a) base at MILNE BAY

(b) be prepared to operate in SOWESPAC or SOPAC area of SOLOMON SEA as directed.

6. Enemy naval undertakings with surface forces in SOLOMON SEA are likely to consist of:-

(a) Support of a major landing attempt, either an initial landing or a reinforcement operation.

(b) Attack upon our sea communications to our advanced positions or attack upon our naval forces protecting our advanced positions or covering our sea communications to them.

(c) Bombardment of our advanced bases or advanced positions.

Owing to the strength of Allied Air Forces in the NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS AREAS, these enemy naval undertakings are likely to be carried out at night by forces composed of cruisers and/or destroyers

7. Whilst it is ...../

7. Whilst it is impossible to advise in advance, my intentions when this or that opportunity or emergency presents, my intentions should certain conditions apply can be imported.

8. CTF 74 INTENTIONS - TF 74 ENGAGED ON AN OFFENSIVE MISSION:

(A) Condition - Action Against Enemy Submarine

The object of any operation upon which this Task Force engages will probably be quite definite and it will NOT be the destruction of enemy SUBMARINES.
It is my intention, therefore, that attack or counter attack on enemy submarine, whether it has been detected by sight, sound or radar, shall be continued ONLY till the submarine is no longer a menace to the force and that the attacking destroyer shall then rejoin WITH ALL DESPATCH.
Cruising Disposition SUGAR THREE (attached) establishes an A/S disposition which may be ordered.

(B) Condition - Action Against Enemy Aircraft

(i) By Day

Cruising Disposition VICTOR THREE (attached) has been established to provide a suitable cruising disposition which may be ordered when air attack by day is likely.

(ii) By Night

Delivery of air attacks at night is being undertaken more and more frequently by the enemy.
It has been the experience of SOPAC forces that best avoiding action at night is:-

(a) radical manoeuvring of the force
(b) use of smoke
(c) withholding of gunfire, unless an attack has clearly developed.

If ordered to take up SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITION "NAN" CRUISERS will form in column in loose order (1200 yards apart). DESTROYERS will form on cruisers as follows, distant 2000 yards:-

"RALPH TALBOT" (or "HELM") - 045 relative) from leading
"HELM" (or "RALPH TALBOT") - 315 relative) cruiser.
"WARRAMUNGA" (or "ARUNTA") - 135 relative) from rear
"ARUNTA" (or "WARRAMUNGA") - 225 relative) cruiser.

This is a NIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DISPOSITION.

If subjected to attack, force will be manoeuvred by ship - turn alterations.
All ships be prepared to lay smoke.

(C) Condition - Night Surface Action Against Enemy Forces (likely to contain only cruisers and destroyers):

(i) Opposition by enemy submarines and aircraft is likely to be met in SOLOMON SEA. Before contact is made with enemy surface forces, Task Force 74 will, therefore, form with cruisers in column and with destroyers providing normal A/S screen or special night anti-aircraft disposition (vide (B)(ii) above).
This is a CRUISING or APPROACH DISPOSITION.

(ii)...../

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(ii) On making contact with enemy surface force, Task Force 74 will be ordered to form SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITION X-RAY, which is hereby established with the following details:-

CRUISERS - In column 1200 yards between ships

DESTROYERS - Formed in two divisions.
Division ABLE stationed 5000 yards 000 relative to flagship.
Division BAKER stationed 3000 yards 180 relative to flagship.

OR special CRUISING DISPOSITION ZEBRA which is hereby established with the following details:-

CRUISERS - In column 1200 yards between ships.

DESTROYERS - Formed as one division, stationed 5000 yards 000 relative to flagship.

OR special CRUISING DISPOSITION OBOE which is hereby established with the following details:-

CRUISERS - In column 1200 yards between ships.

DESTROYERS - Formed in two separate divisions ABLE and BAKER, stationed on the side towards the contact, 40 degrees either side of contact bearing and distant 5000 yards from flagship.

Example: Radar contact has been made on a bearing 320 degrees (true) distant 36000 yards. On signal "Form special cruising disposition OBOE", Desdivs ABLE and BAKER will take station 5000 yards from Flagship and on true bearings 280 and 000 from the flagship.

Cruising Dispositions OBOE, X-RAY and ZEBRA are BATTLE DISPOSITIONS.

(iii) It is NOT intended that the battle dispositions described above shall be treated as rigid formations.

Until released, I shall expect the Commander-s of Destroyer Division-s to keep their division-s concentrated and roughly in assigned station-s.

I leave it to the initiative of Commander-s to assume the divisional formation-s which best suit-s the tactical situation which is developing and so as to be ready to move off immediately on being released.

Commanding Officers of CRUISERS will be expected to adjust bearing from the Cruiser Guide as necessary to fight their ships most effectively.

(iv) When formed in Battle Disposition it will be my endeavour to make all course changes by ship turn movement (all ships turning together).

(v) In most night actions fought by Japanese surface forces, they have used their torpedo armament with great skill and often with considerable effect. It will, therefore, be my general policy that CRUISERS shall fight at about the limiting range of enemy effective torpedo fire, until the enemy torpedo attack has been launched. Accordingly cruisers will engage in blind fire when the enemy has been closed to about 12,000 yards. I then intend that cruisers shall close the enemy until the range is about 10,000 yards, at which range a radical turn away or reversal of course probably will be made to avoid possible enemy torpedo zones. Cruisers will then continue the gun action at range in excess of 10,000 yards until it is deemed prudent to close to more effective range.

(vi)...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

(vi) CRUISERS opening fire will automatically release DESTROYERS who will be led by their divisional commander-s to favourable range for fighting their gun and torpedo armament.

AT ANY TIME, HOWEVER, ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK ON A SUITABLE TARGET MUST IMMEDIATELY BE SEIZED AND THE ATTACK PRESSED HOME.

(vii) It is a reliable rule that if the enemy is within starshell range, and unless certain of being able to spot fall of shot without illumination, always use starshell when opening fire with other guns.

(viii) DO NOT USE SEARCHLIGHTS UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. If it is ESSENTIAL to use a searchlight, expose the beam INTERMITTENTLY and do not overlook the danger of silhouetting own ship.

(ix) Whenever battle disposition (Special Cruising Disposition OBOE, X-RAY or ZEBRA) is formed, all ships will turn on I.F.F. if not already switched on.

(x) All ships must be ready to identify themselves instantly by -

(a) three letter reply on white light
and (b) by switching on VF identification if under fire from friendly forces.

(D) Condition - Day Surface Action

(i) In the event of Task Force 74 becoming engaged in day surface action with enemy forces, the handling and fighting of the force will depend on many factors, e.g. our object, composition of enemy force etc.

(ii) The following broad principles shall apply:-

(a) Initial disposition will probably be Special Cruising Disposition ZEBRA (para. 8 (C)(ii)).
(b) CRUISERS will normally remain concentrated.
(c) With CRUISERS CONCENTRATED it will be my aim to deploy and fight them at mean range 12,000 - 14,000 yards (against cruiser targets).
(d) If the enemy has a force of DESTROYERS, the primary function of Task Force 74 destroyers is to break up enemy torpedo attacks launched at OUR CRUISERS.
(e) In normal visibility, NO attempt should be made (unless favourable opportunity offers) by Task Force 74 destroyers to deliver a torpedo attack on the enemy until opposing cruisers are heavily engaged. When delivered, the attack should be pressed home.
(f) Coloured dyes - "SHROPSHIRE" Yellow ~~"PHOENIX"~~

9. ANY SHIP FORCED TO FALL OUT OF THE FORMATION during day or night surface action, should do so if possible on the disengaged side and -

(a) follow the course of the action at her best speed if she can be of any potential use in mopping up enemy damaged ships, towing our own damaged ships etc.

or

(b) retire towards a friendly base if unable to take any further useful part. In this case, make radio signal advising interested authorities of position, condition and intention.

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10. RETIREMENT:-

The direction of GENERAL RETIREMENT (when ordered) will be promulgated.
If the direction of retirement has not been promulgated, ships will retire towards nearest friendly base or supporting force (naval or air).
If Task Force 74 has been broken up and ships or groups are retiring independently, they shall advise by radio message their composition, position and intention.

11. FIGHTER DIRECTION TEAM:

An Air Force Fighter Director Team is borne in "SHROPSHIRE". Prior to sailing, this team will transfer to "NASHVILLE", designated Fighter Director Ship for Task Force 74. "SHROPSHIRE" will be Radar Reporting Ship and Stand-by Fighter Director Ship. Attention is invited to PAC-10 Article 6100 (green page) paras. 9, 10 and 11.

12. TOWING:

All ships this force be prepared to tow or to be taken in tow.

13. LOGISTICS:

(a) SOWESPAC AREA:

Fuel, provisions and munitions available at MILNE BAY.
There is usually a tanker at BUNA.
"YUNNAN" (Ammunition Supply Ship) based on MILNE BAY.

(b) SOPAC AREA:

Most logistic requirements can be fulfilled at TULAGI or PORT PURVIS.
Fuel is also available at HATHORN STRAIT.
Ammunition replenishments for "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" are being moved from ESPIRITU SANTO to TULAGI.
Ammunition replenishments for "WARRAMUNGA" and "ARUNTA" are being arranged.

14. (a) COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with ANNEX I.
PART I - S.W.PAC Area,
or PART II - SOPAC Area,
will be brought into force by despatch.

(b) Use ZONE LOVE time.

15. This operation order is effective upon receipt.

ANNEX I - COMMUNICATIONS.
ANNEX II - MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.
ANNEX III - SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

V. Crutchley

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

Distribution:-

"AUSTRALIA"	(2)	"RALPH TALBOT"	(1)
"SHROPSHIRE"	(2)	"HELM"	(1)
"NASHVILLE"	(2)	"WARRAMUNGA"	(1)
COMDESRON 4	(1)	"ARUNTA"	(1).

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

RCDIG1073435

TF 74 - CRUISING DISPOSITIONS (Paras. 8(A) & (B) of Oporder):
(Circles in Thousands of Yards)

1. Cruising Disposition S3 (Sugar Three):-

(a) Suitable for a small task force containing three cruisers and any number of destroyers.

(b) It is established for daytime cruising when air attack is unlikely.

(c)

(d) Guide will occupy lettered position A which is in Fleet Centre.

(e) Rotation of the axis will be about the Guide.

(f) Stations:

	Lettered Position	Station from Fleet Centre
CRUISERS	A	0 - 000
	B	0.8 - 130
	C	0.8 - 230
DESTROYERS	Form A/S screen. Occupy stations from Fleet Centre according to number present. Use PAC-10 Table No. 1 or Table No. 2 (facing page III-3) depending on sound conditions.	

2. Cruising Disposition V3 (Victor Three):-

(a) Suitable for small task force containing three cruisers and four destroyers.

(b) It is established for daytime cruising when air attack is threatening.

(c)

(d) Guide will occupy lettered position A which is the Fleet Centre.

(e) Rotation of the axis will be about the Guide.

(f) Stations:-

	Lettered Position	Station from Fleet Centre
CRUISERS	A	0 - 000
	B	1.5 - 145
	C	1.5 - 215.
DESTROYERS	Numbered Position	Station from Fleet Centre
	1	1.5 - 070
	2	1.5 - 290
	3	2.5 - 145
	4	2.5 - 215.

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ANNEX NO. I TO CTF 74 OPERATION ORDER NO. 6 - 43

PART I - SOWESPAC COMMUNICATIONS - At Sea and In Harbour:-

1. All Ships:

BELLS		Continuously
TBS	65.34 mc/s (P) 72.5 mc/s (S)	Continuously
Warning Net	3265 kc/s (P) 3005 kc/s (S)	1800L - 0600L and in low visibility and in accordance with instructions for radar reports. In harbour only, warning net need not be guarded except during air raid warning RED.
Port Wave	425 kc/s	In accordance with A.C.D. 653(43) Table 2(i). Tribal Destroyers may close down in harbour between 0600L and 1800L but watch must be set between these times should TBS fail and during air raid warning RED.

2. Guards:

"AUSTRALIA"	NPM Fox Task Force Commanders A.O.I.C.
"NASHVILLE"	NPM Fox for own requirements only LOTE for own requirements only Fighter Direction - as requisite.
"SHROPSHIRE"	Fighter Direction - as requisite Commercial - Loudspeaker watch only.

3. Cooperation with TF 76:

In the event of direct cooperation with TF 76, additional guards may be ordered by signal.

TF 76 Dog Circuit	4705 kc/s 2510 kc/s	0700L - 1900L 1900L - 0700L
TF 76 Charlie Circuit	4495 kc/s 2550 kc/s	0700L - 1900L 1900L - 0700L
TF 76 PT Boat Frequency	3120 kc/s	1900L - 0700L.

4...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

4. Voice and Key Call Signs:

(a) The following voice and key call signs are established for use within Task Force 74 for operation and exercise:-

TYPE	OPERATIONAL			EXERCISE		
	Voice	Key	Fire Control Key	Voice	Key	Fire Control Key
C.T.F. 74	CASEY	AQ	XF	GAMECOCK	BR	CO
T.F.74	KEWPIE	CL	ZJ	RUPERT	CO	DD
Commdr. CRUISERS	SHANTY	FJ	MV	SICKLE	MP	ER
CRUISERS	LEOPARI	HQ	NN	ROLAND	NV	KL
"AUSTRALIA"	ANDREW	BF	OH	MOONBEAM	OX	LY
"SHROPSHIRE"	APRICOT	DH	QV	GINGER	RB	MN
"NASHVILLE"	BRUCE	GK	SD	POSSUM	SM	QP
SPARE CRUISER 1.	DEMON	JR	US	RUSTY	TD	AD
SPARE CRUISER 2.	EMORY	LX	BW	VINCENT	WN	DC
Commdr. DESTROYERS	SNUFFY	LA	VD	BOILER	PR	HF
DESTROYERS	WHIPCORD	QD	WW	REFIT	SO	KH
"ARUNTA"	BONNIE	BC	XN	BENZINE	TC	NL
"WARRAMUNGA"	BRIAN	DV	XY	CORONA	UJ	PQ
"HELM"	CHEERFUL	EF	NR	SKIPPER	VQ	TU
"RALPH TALBOT"	EDGAR	HB	RU	PROSPECT	WE	VP
SPARE DESTROYER 1.	HUBERT	JG	PS	MEDINDIE	XV	QK
SPARE DESTROYER 2.	JESSIE	NK	SQ	UNLEY	ZA	WU
SPARE DESTROYER 3.	LUKE	OW	VM	TOORAK	GG	YT
SPARE DESTROYER 4.	NELLY	RG	ZU	COLLINGWOOD	BT	ZH

(b) OPERATIONAL call signs are to be used at all times when under way. otherwise use EXERCISE call signs. When communication is required between ships under way and ships not underway, use EXERCISE call signs.

(c) VOICE call signs are to be used on all frequencies on which voice communication is being employed.

(d) KEY call signs are to be used on all frequencies for internal Task Force communication, except FIRE CONTROL LINES.

(e) FIRE CONTROL KEY call signs are to be used on all Task Force FIRE CONTROL LINES. e.g. BOMBARDMENT, CONCENTRATION, AIRCRAFT SPOTTING, etc.

(f) Aircraft Call Signs:

"AUSTRALIA" V14ØA
"NASHVILLE" -

A/C	Voice	CW
1	Pick One	P1
2	Pick Two	P2
Ship	SMITTY	YU.

Frequency used "NASHVILLE" to and from aircraft - 3785 kc/s.

5...../

5. Tactical Clock Code and Voice Card:

Commander South Pacific Communication Plan 16-43 Artice 6300(e) is effective, namely:-

"This code is based on a combination of the circular diagram and associated words for course, speed, bearing, distance, turn and deploy.

KEYWORD - DIAL

D 000
I 100
A 200
L 300.

Signal	Code Equivalent
Corpen	Cloverleaf
Speed	Gravity
Bearing	Timken
Distance	Ruler
Turn	Taxi
Deploy	Kickoff.

A combination of the numerals following the code equivalent for course, speed etc. is obtained by adding an increment to the 0, 100, 200 and 300 degree points represented by D, I, A and L in the circular code. When speed or distance is coded, the last zero is dropped as appropriate.

Examples:

Corpen 115 - Cloverleaf ITEM plus 15.
Speed 20 knots - Gravity ABLE.
Deploy 310 - Kickoff LOVE plus 10.
Bearing 048 - Timken DOG plus 48.

This code should be memorized by all concerned. When actually in action or in actual emergencies voice codes will NOT be used."

Voice Card will NOT be used.

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PART II - SOPAC COMMUNICATIONS - At Sea and In Harbour:

1. All Ships:

NPM Fox	Continuously
TBS 65.34 mc/s (P) 72.5 mc/s (S)	Continuously
Warning Net 3445 kc/s (P) 3135 kc/s (S)	1800L - 0600L and in low visibility and in accordance with instructions for radar reports. In harbour only, warning net need not be guarded except during Air Raid warning RED.
Port Wave 355 kc/s 2716 kc/s	In accordance with USF 70(A) Article 1341(8). Tribal Destroyers may close down in harbour between 0600L and 1800L but watch must be set between these times should TBS fail and during Air Raid warning RED.

2. Guards:

"AUSTRALIA"	LOTE Task Force Commanders 4205(P) 4295(S).
"NASHVILLE"	Fighter Direction - as requisite.
"SHROPSHIRE"	Fighter Direction - as requisite. Commercial - Loudspeaker watch only.

3. Task Forces Combined Organisation:

Warning Net 3265 kc/s (P) 3155 kc/s (S)	Will be ordered to be guarded in lieu of the above warning net in the event of combined TF operation.
Common Task Force 275 (P) 2356 (S)	May be ordered to be guarded in addition to warning net for all ships in the event of combined TF operation.

4. Voice and Key Call Signs:

As for SOWESPAC (Part I).

5. Tactical Clock Code:

As for SOWESPAC (Part I).

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ANNEX NO. II TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 6 - 43.

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

1. HYDROGRAPHICAL.

(a) The exact location of the Western coast of BOUGAINVILLE is unknown but it is certain that it lies somewhat to the eastward of the location shown on all current charts.

(b) Numerous shoals, charted and uncharted, exist within a radius of 30 miles of C. TOROKINA.

2. TACTICAL POINTS.

(a) Comsopac has established the following tactical points :-

BACKDOOR	09-00; 160-30
BLACKJACK	08-00; 165-00
BUGJUICE	13-35; 160-00
BUZZ	06-40; 156-20
CATFISH	03-00; 154-20
CRUNCH	06-40; 153-18
FILTER	07-20; 158-00
FUNNEL	08-08; 157-05
GLIDE	11-50; 171-10
HANG	12-00; 158-24
HECKLE	06-30; 158-17
HIGHWAY	07-45; 155-35
MICE	08-00; 158-10
MOLASSES	12-30; 166-30
NIGHTSTICK	10-00; 168-30
PASSION	00-10; 151-55
PAUSE	08-30; 156-30
PROWL	07-25; 156-45
SLAM	09-08; 155-30
TIMBER	04-30; 157-00
TRAFFIC	08-00; 156-44

AREAS (e.g. Area BACKDOOR, Area GLIDE, etc.) are of radius 100 miles with the tactical point as centre.

(b) C.T.F. 31 has established additional points :-

BUNCH	10-44; 161-07
CROWD	09-21; 158-08

3. ALLIED SUBMARINE ROUTEING.

(a) C.T.F. 72 has established the following points to be used as reference points when routeing submarines :-

ACE	25-40 154-40	HORSE	23-00 156-00	RUBY	5-00 156-15
BALL	12-30 155-00	JOVE	20-00 152-00	SHOE	12-00 152-30
BLUE	7-20 160-00	MAST	11-22 150-35	SKY	21-30 157-00
BOX	26-00 155-00	MILL	21-00 155-00	STAR	16-35 146-20
CART	5-48 147-30	ODOR	2-00 155-00	SWIM	8-15 151-10
CAT	26-30 155-20	PEAK	18-00 148-00	VAN	27-05 153-42
DAMP	21-20 154-00	POND	22-20 154-30	WHITE	8-21 160-28
FATE	10-00 151-25	RED	10-00 158-00	WIND	9-25 159-15

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(b) When ordered bombing restrictions will be enforced in a lane 20 miles either side of the route of a submarine and 100 miles ahead and 100 miles astern of the estimated position of the submarine.

4. ROUTEING OF SHIPPING.

(a) SHIPPING BETWEEN NOUMEA AND ESPIRITU SANTO.

The following reference points are established :-

APPLE	23-30	: 167-30
BEER	21-45	: 169-00
CORNCOB	17-30	: 167-30

Northbound ships pass 5 miles EAST of reference points.
Southbound ships pass 5 miles WEST of reference points.

(b) Shipping between ESPIRITU and GUADALCANAL.

The following reference points are established :-

BEANS	09-55	; 161-30
DUSTY	09-50	; 161-05
HAM	11-30	; 164-00
PORK	13-20	; 164-00
SMOKY	10-35	; 161-05

ROUTE ASPIRIN :- Northbound convoys. Route 5 miles SOUTH of point HAM and point BEANS.

ROUTE BROMIDE :- Southbound convoys. Route 5 miles NORTH of point BEANS and point HAM.

ROUTE CALOMEL - Southbound - Route through points DUSTY, SMOKY, PORK. (Usually for slow ships).

(c) Shipping from GUADALCANAL to forward area.

The following points are established :-

A	-	9-12; 159-44
B	-	9-12; 159-10
C	-	8-58; 157-52
G	-	8-54; 157-48½
H	-	8-54; 159-16
M	-	8-22½; 157-22½
N	-	8-25; 157-13
O	-	8-10; 156-43
R	-	8-54; 157-42
S	-	8-25; 157-30
T	-	7-30; 155-32
U	-	6-47; 154-46
V	-	6-24; 155-00
W	-	7-52; 156-32
X	-	8-01; 156-43

Outward route to EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY or TREASURY ISLAND is normally through points B, C, S, T, U and V.

Return route is normally through points V, U, T, S, C and H.

These routes are shown on MOVEMENT CHART NO. 4 which has been issued to all ships.

5. GEOGRAPHICAL POINTS FOR ORBITING FIGHTERS.

In the BOUGAINVILLE AREA the following geographical

points...../

points are used for orbiting fighters. The points are described by a single letter.

A - NUMA NUMA
B - MOBIRE
C - ARAWA BAY
D - MOTUPENA
E - TOROKINA
F - C. MOLTKE
G - KOMALI POINT
H - TREASURY ISLAND.

6. MINEFIELDS - BOUGAINVILLE AREA.

Despatches indicated are briefed with complete information.

(a) Jap Fields (from captured document).
CO 2nd Para Em 312055L

1. North tip Masamasa Id., thence 045 True to Lat. 6-41, thence Northwest tip Oema Isd., thence to North tip Ovau Isd. South tip Ovau Isd. 120 True to Fauro Isd. North tip Fauro Isd. to Masamasa Isd.
2. West tip Ballale Isd. 040 True to Nusakoa Isd., thence 095 True to Koroaku Isd. (Off Fauro), thence 210 True to East tip Munia Isd., thence 285 True to Ballale Isd.
3. Between Latitudes 6-51 and 6-58, between Longitudes 155-31 and 155-40.

(b) U.S. Fields.
Oema - Torau Bay fields
CTU 31.8.2 020250

1. Origin bears 172 True distance 9 miles from Otua Isd. Two rows on axis 105 True, distance 4.2 miles.

Comindiv 1 082355
2. Origin 6-36.2 S, 156-07.4 E. Three rows on axis 267 True, distance 1.4 miles.
3. Origin 6-36 S, 156-01.6 E. Two rows on axis 284 True, distance 4.25 miles.

Cape Moltke field
CTU 31.8.1 020010

1. Origin bears 340 True, distance 3000 yards from Cape Moltke. Three rows on axis 250 True, distance of Northern and middle rows 4 miles, Southern row 6.5 miles long.

Shortland field
(published)
1. Origin bears 204 True from centre of Munia Isd., on 100 fathom curve. One row on line 250 True to 100 fathom curve at a point bearing 162 True from South tip Ballale Isd., thence bending 1000 yards to the South. Two additional rows run parallel to the first and to seaward, 400 yards between rows.

Buka Fields.
1. Aerial mines have been laid in both the Eastern and Western entrances to Buka Passage.

Tonolei[illegible] fields.
1. Aerial mines have been laid over a broad area between Moila Point and Pupukuna Point off Southern Bougainville Shore.

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7. STANDARD AIR SEARCHES - Long Range Reconnaissance.

(a) SOPAC area.

(i) From GUADALCANAL (datum) by PBY and PB4Y aircraft.

Aircraft call.	Sector. True bearings from datum.	Distance from Datum.
7 V 29	310 - 319	800 miles
18 V 29	319 - 328	800 "
53 V 29	328 - 337	800 "
17 V 29	337 - 346	650 "
55 V 29	346 - 355	650 "
39 V 29	355 - 004	650 "
5 V 29	004 - 013	800 "
13 V 29	013 - 022	800 "
9 V 29	022 - 031	800 "
51 V 29	031 - 040	800 "
31 V 29	040 - 049	800 "
28 V 29	049 - 058	800 "
3 V 29	058 - 067	800 "

(ii) From GUADALCANAL (datum) by VENTURA aircraft.

Aircraft Call.	Sector. True Bearings from Datum.	Distance from Datum.
2 V 30	240 - 255	350
34 V 30	255 - 270	350

(iii) From ESPIRITU SANTO (Datum) by PBY and PB4Y. aircraft.

Aircraft Call.	Sector. True bearings from datum.	Distance from Datum.
4 V 55	340 - 350	525
29 V 55	350 - 000	550
50 V 55	000 - 009	600
11 V 55	009 - 018	650
22 V 55	018 - 027	725
16 V 55	027 - 036	675
8 V 55	036 - 045	675
45 V 55	045 - 054	675
32 V 55	054 - 063	675

.....(b) /

(b) SOWESPAC Area.

(i) From MILNE BAY by Beaufort aircraft.

AREA "Q" 0900S 15200E to 0500S 15240E to 0500S 15320E and return to base via 0900S 15200E.

AREA "R" 0900S 15200E to approximately 0500S 15345E to 0600S 15345E and return to base via 0900S 15200E. Aircraft is not to proceed to the Eastward of longitude 15400E.

AREA "S" General reconnaissance from MILNE BAY to Eastward area Louisiade Archipelago to longitude 15500E.

Areas "Q" and "R" to be completed to Datum (0900S 15200E) by 0300L daily.

Area "S" performed every three days.

(ii) From SAMARAI and JENKINS BAY with Catalinas by Task Group 73.1.

(a) Area A. JENKINS BAY - 0600S 14800E
0410 S 14455 E - 0315 S 14800 E.
0540 S 14815 E - JENKINS BAY.

(b) Area B. JENKINS BAY - 0540 S 14815 E
0430 S 14910 E - 0320 S 15110 E.
0410 S 15125 E - Coastal to Cape Gloucester.
- JENKINS BAY.

(c) Area C. JENKINS BAY - KITAVA ISLAND - ARAWE - Coastal to CAPE ARCHWAY - 0500 S 15330 E - 0700 S 15300 E - 0610 S 15150E
0635 S 15050 E - KITAVA ISLAND - JENKINS BAY.

NOTE:- These searches are carried out each night. Circuit is varied irregularly.

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ANNEX NO. III TO CTF 74 OPERATION ORDER NO. 6 - 43.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING THE ENEMY (28th November).

1. Estimated Disposition of Effective Japanese Naval Units.

MARSHALLS :- 4 CA (Chokai, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma).
4 CL.
About 14 DD.

CAROLINES :- 6 BB (Musashi, Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, Kongo, Haruna).
2 CV (Zuitaku, Zuiho).
1 CV (Shokatu) due 1st December.
3 ACV (Unyo, Chuyo, Chitose).
3 CL.
1 Training CL.
About 7 DD.

RABAUL :- Possilby 1 CL, 9 DD (at most).

MARSHALLS - CAROLINES - BISMARCK IDS : About 24 DDs. additional DDs. scattered about the area on various missions.

N.E.I. AREA:- 1 ACV (Hitaka or RYUHO - ferrying planes).
1 CA (Ashigara).
4 - 5 CL.
1 Training CL.
About 12 DD.

KURILES :- 1 CL.
About 6 DD.

JAPAN :- 4 BB (Ise, Kyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro).
1 Training CV (Hosho) plus new construction.
1 CA (Completing Construction).
2 CL plus 3 CL new construction.
1 Training CL.
3 XCL - about 11 DD.

2. Japanese Submarine Activity.

Since the opening of Allied offensive in the GILBERTS, Japanese submarines have been ordered to concentrate in that area. Sightings, A/S contacts and D/F reports indicate that a number of submarines have reached the area or are en route.

Aerial reconnaissance of RABAUL on 22nd November showed no submarines there, whereas five or six have usually been sighted when the port is reconnoitred. However, submarine activity in the SOLOMON SEA is at present unusually apparent, particularly between RABAUL - BUKA - BOUGAINVILLE. There have been several recent reports of submarines between CAPE ORFORD and GASMATA and indications of submarines between WEWAK and VITIAZ STRAIT probably running supply shuttle to points on the NEW GUINEA COAST. Supply trips by submarines from RABAUL to CAPE GLOUCESTER, SIO and GASMATA are also undertaken. At present westbound submarines appear to pass along the North Coast of NEW BRITAIN when bound for any point between SIO and MADANG. Having discharged their load they frequently return by route south of NEW BRITAIN. Supply shuttle from RABAUL to BUIN by submarine is also indicated.

Very few RABAUL-based submarines appear to be usually available for offensive or reconnaissance missions. One of these is frequently found around KIRIWINA - WOODLARK or occasionally near CAPE WARD HUNT along the shipping lane. Others are usually to be found on the shipping routes to GUADALCANAL and from GUADALCANAL to our positions in the CENTRAL SOLOMONS

3. Japanese Air Activity.

Although in the NEW GUINEA AREA the scale of enemy air

.....activity/

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activity has been weak, his policy of bringing in additional aircraft and holding them in rear bases has been continued.

Extensive development continues at HOLLANDIA where two new airfields are under construction. It is evident that this base will be an important link in the enemy's lines of communication.

Actual enemy air strength in NEW GUINEA area is now higher than at any time since mid-August.

Estimate of Enemy Land-based Air Strength in N.E. AREA on 25th November was as follows :-

	F	2/EF	L/B & M B	T/B & D/B	F/B	F/P	Obs. & Trans.	Total 25/11	COMPARATIVES. 24/11	18/11	25/10
NEW BRITAIN	110	14	40	20	2	24	8	218	179	177	172
NEW IRELAND	26	---	15	21	-	12	-	74	74	75	34
NEW GUINEA	90	5	99	---	-	6	6	206	206	185	170
SOLOMONS	---	-	---	---	-	8	-	8	8	8	52

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Enclosure No. II to A.F.1140/38 dated 3rd January, 1944.

M-O-S-T S-E-C-R-E-T

A.F. 1060/27

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship,
12th December 19

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER 7-43
(Short Title - C.T.F.74 Oporder 7-43)

TASK ORGANISATION:

Task Force 74	Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY		
Task Group 74.1 (Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY)	"AUSTRALIA") "SHROPSHIRE")		T.U. 74.1.1
	"WARRAMUNGA") "ARUNTA")	Desdiv ABLE	T.U. 74.1.2 (Cmdr.DECHAINEUX in "WARRAMUNGA"
	"HELM") "RALPH TALBOT")	Desdiv BAKER	
Task Group 74.2 (Captain SPANAGEL in "NASHVILLE")	"NASHVILLE") "PHOENIX")		T.U. 74.2.1
	DESDIV 48 ø		T.U. 74.2.2

ø Upon reporting.

1. INFORMATION:

(a) Summary of OWN and ENEMY intelligence - Annex II.

(b) The NEW BRITAIN FORCE will establish control over western NEW BRITAIN by air borne and overwater operations.

(c) This Operation Order concerns only the first phase of these operations in which the ARAWE Task Force by overwater movement will land in the ARAWE area on Z-Day and seize, occupy and defend that area.

(d) (i) TASK FORCE 76 will embark, transport and land at ARAWE on Z-DAY, elements of the ARAWE Task Force. H-hour is the time set for the major landing on Z-day.

(ii) Commander Task Force 76 movement plan for this operation is briefly summarised as follows:-

1st Echelon: 2 APD's leave BUNA 1530 (Z-1 day) with 2nd Echelon, break off at H-3½ hours on Z day with 2 DD escort and arrive at selected landing beaches at H-1 hour on Z day. Retire to BUNA independently at best speed after boats have landed.

2nd Echelon: "WESTRALIA" (APA) and "CARTER HALL" (LSD) escorted by 9 DD's (DESRON 5 plus "MUGFORD", "BAGLEY 2 PC's, 1 YMS, 2 SC's leave BUNA 1530 Z-1 day, speed of advance 13 knots, arrive selected beach at H-2 hours on Z day. When troops are embarked in boats "WESTRALIA" and "CARTER HALL" with 3 DD's, 2 PC's and 2 SC's retire at best speed towards CAPE WARD HUNT. On completion of assigned missions (including bombardment), remaining 7 DD's overtake "WESTRALIA" and "CARTER HALL" and provide additional escort.

3rd Echelon: 7 LCT and 7 LCM with 1 SC and 1 YMS escort, depart CAPE CRETIN at 1900 Z-1 day, speed 6 knots, arrive ARAWE area H plus 1½ hours on Z day. LCT's with 1 SC and 2 YMS as escort, leave at 1900 Z day return to CAPE CRETIN. LCM's remain.

4th Echelon ..../

4th Echelon: 6 LCT's with 1 SC and 1 YMS escort depart CAPE CRETIN at 1900 Z day speed 6 knots arrive ARAWE area 0800 z-plus-1 day, depart 1900 same day returning to CAPE CRETIN.

5th Echelon: 6 APD's escorted by 4 DD depart BUNA 1700 Z-plus-2 day arrive ARAWE 0100 Z-plus-3 day depart 0200 and return BUNA. Passage speed 20 knots.

Echelons 6 to 11: Each echelon consists of 6 LCT's escorted by 1 SC and 1 YMS. Echelons leave CAPE CRETIN on Z-plus-2, Z-plus-4, Z-plus-5, Z-plus-8, Z-plus-10 and Z-plus-13 days. Schedule in each case is to leave CAPE CRETIN 1900, arrive ARAWE 0800 next day, leave again at 1900 and reach CAPE CRETIN at 0800 the following day.

(iii) CTF 76 in "CONYNGHAM" from Z-1 day.

(e) Task Group 70.1 will maintain a PT boat patrol during nights Z-1, Z and Z-plus-1 covering DAMPIER and VITIAZ STRAITS.

Two PT boats will maintain a nightly patrol on south coast NEW BRITAIN, eastward of LUSCHAN HARBOUR. These boats will leave SIA (North end KIRIWINA) at about 1700 and will keep to EASTWARD of longitude 151° E. until reaching latitude of 7° S. PT's will switch on I.F.F. (Mark III) from sunset to sunrise and in returning will keep to eastward of 151° E. when south of 7° S.

(f) Black Cats of Task Group 73.1 will carry out night offensive reconnaissance, anti-submarine and anti-surface craft patrol, bombing and rescue missions.

(g) Reporting and bombing line: South of a line joining FORTIFICATION POINT (06° 17' S. 147° 47' E.) - TUAM ISLAND (05° 59' S 148° 04' E.) - ARAWE - CAPE BALLI (6° 18' S. 149° 43' E.) - position 8° 00' S. 151° 00' E., surface craft will not be reported or attacked by friendly planes.

2. Commander 7th Fleet has directed that Task Force 74:-

(a) cover our amphibious movements scheduled for the night (Z-1 day) - (Z day).

(b) withdraw to KIRIWINA area during daylight Z day.

(c) cover our captured position at ARAWE during night (Z day) - (Z-plus-1 day) against enemy naval bombardment.

(d) during Z-plus-1 day, retire to MILNE BAY, then

(e) base at MILNE BAY on TWO HOURS readiness.

3. COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 INTENTIONS:

(a) Task Group 74.1 "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", "WARRAMUNGA", "ARUNTA", "HELM", "RALPH TALBOT" will provide the cover ordered by Commander 7th Fleet para. 2 (a) and (c).

Task Group 74.2 "NASHVILLE", "PHOENIX" will meantime remain at MILNE BAY at short notice in support.

(b) Schedule ..../

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(b) Schedule of Movements of Task Group 74.1:

Task Group 74.1 will depart MILNE BAY at 0700 on Z-1 day and after passing east of NORMANBY and KIRIWINA Islands will, as far as possible, adhere to the following schedule of movements:-

Z-1 day: At 1900 pass through position
(m) 8 20' S. 151 10' E.

Z day: Pass through following positions -
(n) 7 07' S. 148 58' E. at 0100
(o) 6 30' S. 149 23' E. at 0400
(p) 6 33' S. 149 38' E. at 0500
(m) 8 20' S. 151 10' E. at 0830.

Subsequently remain east and south of KIRIWINA then turn NORTH again so as to pass through positions -
(m) 8 20' S. 151 10' E. at 1800 and

Z-plus-1 day:- (q) 6 25' S. 149 16' E. at 0001.

From 0001 to 0300, Task Group 74.1 patrolling vicinity of position (q), then -
(q) 6 25' S. 149 16' E. at 0300
(m) 8 20' S. 151 10' E. at 0900

and retire to MILNE BAY via route EAST of KIRIWINA and NORMANBY Islands so as to arrive about 1830.

(c) Subsequent to arrival MILNE BAY and refuelling of TASK GROUP 74.1. Task Force 74 will assume 2 hours readiness to proceed upon orders of Commander 7th Fleet.

4. FIGHTER COVER:

Allied Air Force will afford fighter cover as follows for Task Group 74.1:-

Z-1 day: RAAF aircraft KIRIWINA and GOODENOUGH on GROUND ALERT.

Z day: From first light plus flying time from KIRIWINA, Task Group 74.1 will be covered by RAAF fighter aircraft at AIR ALERT. (RAAF fighters will also sweep south coast of NEW BRITAIN from GASMATA to WIDE BAY).
When within 60 miles of KIRIWINA, Task Group 74.1 will be covered by RAAF fighters on GROUND ALERT.

Z-plus-1 day: From 2300 (Z day) till 0200, Task Group 74.1 will be covered by an RAAF Beaufighter at AIR ALERT.
From 0200 to 0330 - cover by one Type P47 at AIR ALERT.
From first light plus flying time from KIRIWINA, Task Group 74.1 covered by RAAF fighter planes at AIR ALERT.
From when within 60 miles of KIRIWINA, cover by fighter planes on GROUND ALERT.

5. FIGHTER ./

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5. FIGHTER DIRECTION:

(a) An RAAF controller and fighter director team will be embarked in "SHROPSHIRE".

"SHROPSHIRE" is designated FIGHTER DIRECTOR SHIP and will operate as 27TH SUB FIGHTER SECTOR in accordance with Fighter Command Letter of Instruction No. 71.

Aircraft will be controlled on 4475 kc/s (common frequency) except aircraft fitted VHF equipment, which will be controlled by CHANNEL "C" (world guard).

(b) "RALPH TALBOT" is designated stand-by fighter director ship for Task Group 74.1.

6. REFERENCE POINTS established by Commander Allied Naval Forces are as follows:-

(A)	7°00' S. 148°00' E.	(H)	4 00' S. 150 00' E.
(B)	7 00' S. 150 00' E.	(X)	4 00' S. 148 00' E.
(C)	6 00' S. 147 50' E.	(I)	4 00' S. 147 00' E.
(D)	5 00' S. 148 00' E.	(J)	5 20' S. 147 40' E.
(E)	5 00' S. 149 00' E.	(K)	7 00' S. 151 00' E.
(F)	4 00' S. 150 00' E.		

7. ALL TIMES IN THIS OPORDER ARE LOVE (Zone -11).

8. Z-day is tentatively set at 15th December and H-hour at 0630L on Z-day.

9. Paragraphs 7 to 10 inclusive of my Oporder 6-43 are effective.

10. Prior departure from MILNE BAY on Z-1 day "AUSTRALIA" will land her aircraft and will discharge aviation spirit.

11. All ships Task Force 74 be prepared to tow or to be taken in tow. (AT) "SONOMA" at MOROBE from Z-1 day to Z-plus-1 day.

12. COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with ANNEX I.

13. This operation order effective upon receipt.

ANNEX I - COMMUNICATIONS
ANNEX II - INTELLIGENCE - OWN AND ENEMY.

V. Crutchley

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

Distribution:

"AUSTRALIA"	(4)				CTF 72	(1)	ø
"SHROPSHIRE"	(4)	COM VII	(1)		NOIC New Guinea	(1)	ø
"NASHVILLE"	(6)	COMSOWESPAC-			CTG 70.1	(1)	¥
"PHOENIX"	(6)	SEAFRON	(1)	ø	CTG 73.1	(1)	¥
"WARRAMUNGA"	(1)	COMADVON 5	(1)	ø	COMDESRON 5		
"ARUNTA"	(1)	AOC 9th Op.Gp.			in "SHAW"	(1)	¥
"HELM"	(1)	Adv.HQ's	(2)	ø	Capt.ANDERSON		
"RALPH TALBOT"	(1)	CTF 76	(2)		in "REID"	(1)	¥

ø Less ANNEX I & II.
¥ Less ANNEX II.

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ANNEX NO. I TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 7-43.

COMMUNICATIONS.

Internal and external communications for Task Force 74 which do not directly affect UNITS of Task Force 76 will be in accordance with PAC-10, Appendix 8.

DIRECT CO-OPERATION WITH TASK FORCE 76.

Communications in accordance with ANNEX D to Task Force 76 OPERATION PLAN 3A-43 (copies attached herewith for ships of T.F.74).

NOTE A. C.T.F.76 TACTICAL CIRCUIT.

APPENDIX 10. "D" and "S" circuits effective 0600L December 15th. Prior to this time

"D"	4705 Kc/s Day.	"S"	4495 Kc/s Day.
	2510 Kc/s Night.		2550 Kc/s Night.

"D" circuit will be used by C.T.F.76 to contact all task Group Commanders, T.F.74 and all CA, CL, DD, APD.

In Task Force 74 "AUSTRALIA" and "NASHVILLE" will guard this circuit - this will be in lieu of "AUSTRALIA" Task Force Commander guard vide PAC-10, Appendix 8, Article 7, PART I.

If any units of the Task Force become detached they must guard this circuit, or in the case of a group, the O.T.C. must arrange a guard amongst them.

NOTE B. CALL SIGNS.

PAC-10, Appendix 8, will be used on all occasions until direct communication with T.F.76 UNITS occurs, then in accordance with T.F.76, ANNEX D.

On C.T.F.76 TACTICAL ("D") CIRCUIT use ANNEX D Call Signs.

NOTE C. GUARDS.

In addition to guards detailed in PAC-10, Appendix 8, Article 7, PART I,

"SHROPSHIRE" guard Primary RECCO.
"AUSTRALIA" guard PT Boat Frequency 3120 Kc/s.
"RALPH TALBOT" guard Commercial (Loudspeaker only).

Every precaution must be taken to prevent compromise of British and Combined British-U.S. Signal publications. Ships are to retain their normal complement of signal publications but are NOT to carry into the assault area any reserve editions which are not required for this operation.

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ANNEX NO. II TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 7-43.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

1. GENERAL SITUATION.

(a) Allied Forces hold the eastern coastline of PAPUA and NEW GUINEA as far north as BONGA (about 10 miles N. of FINSCHHAFEN).
Allied Forces control all of the SOLOMONS south of BUIN-FAISI and have established a beach head and landing strip at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY on west coast of BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.

(b) In the operational area, the enemy holds NEW BRITAIN and controls the northern coast of NEW GUINEA, westward from VITIAZ STRAIT.

(c) The importance of VITIAZ STRAIT to further allied advance suggests that the enemy will vigorously resist any allied attempts to gain a foothold in western NEW BRITAIN or to improve and extend our position on HUON PENINSULA.

2. ESTIMATED DISPOSITION EFFECTIVE ENEMY MAIN NAVAL UNITS.

KURILES: - 1 CL, 4 DD.

JAPAN: - 4 BB (Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro).
2 ACV (HITAKA, RYUHO) or en route from SINGAPORE.
2 ACV (UNYO, CHUYO) or en route to TRUK.
1 CV (training) (HOSHO).
3 or 4 CA (MYOKO, AOBA, TONE, HAGURO) may be repaired and effective.
1 CL
12 DD.

N.E.I.PHILLIPINES, MALAY - 1 CA (ASHIGARA)
4 or 5 CL
12 DD.

CAROLINES: - 6 BB (MUSASHI, YAMATO, NAGATO, MUTSU, KONGO, HARUNA)
2 CV (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU)
1 ACV (CHITOSE)
1 CL
8 DD

MARSHALLS - 4 CA (CHOKAI, AUMANO, SUZUYA, TIKUMA)
4 CL (two claimed sunk in recent U.S.carrier strike).
14 DD.

NEW GUINEA-BISMARKS - 6 DD.

MARSHALLS - CAROLINES - BISMARKS : 24 DD.

3. Enemy...../

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3. ENEMY SUBMARINES.

Submarine supply shuttle from RABAUL to SIO to GASMATA apparently continues.

Very few RABAUL-based submarines appear to be available for offensive or reconnaissance missions probably because of:

(a) successful allied ship and plane attacks during November.

(b) dispersal of strength to MARSHALLS-GILBERTS to meet Allied offensive in that area.

4. PT BOATS.

An enemy PT boat was recently sunk in ARAWE area. There has been no other evidence of enemy PT boats outside RABAUL.

5. ENEMY BARGE TRAFFIC.

Enemy barge traffic has been continued particularly from SIO to east and along north coast of NEW BRITAIN. A few barges have been sighted near ARAWE and at ROOKE ID.

6. ENEMY AIR STRENGTH.

Enemy appears to be keeping his air strength at rear bases (e.g. KAVIENG, ADMIRALTY IS. AND WEST OF WEWAK) more removed from allied attacks and will bring planes forward as required.

There is some indication that planes from ZUIKAKU may be again shore-based at RABAUL.

Estimate of enemy land-based air strength in N.E. Area on 7th December was:

	F	2/EF	L/B M/B.	T/B D/B	F/B	F/P	OBS. & TRANS.	TOTAL.	COMPARATIVES. 30 NOV.	7 NOV.
NEW BRITAIN	125	14	40	24	2	24	8	237	233	214
NEW IRELAND	26	-	15	21	-	12	-	74	74	51
NEW GUINEA	81	5	85	-	-	6	5	182	194	128
SOLOMONS	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	8	8	25

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ENCLOSURE No. III To AF.1140/38 of 3 Jan. '44.

MOST SECRET.

A.F.1060/28.

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
22 December, 1943.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER 8-43.

TASK ORGANISATION.

Task Force 74 - Rear Admiral CRUTCHLEY.

Task Group 74.1 (Rear Admiral CRUTCHLEY)	"AUSTRALIA"	T.U. 74.1.1
	"SHROPSHIRE"	T.U. 74.1.1
	"WARRAMUNGA"	T.U. 74.1.2. (Commander DECHAINEUX in "WARRAMUNGA")
	"ARUNTA"	T.U. 74.1.2. (Commander DECHAINEUX in "WARRAMUNGA")
	"HELM"	T.U. 74.1.2. (Commander DECHAINEUX in "WARRAMUNGA")
	"RALPH TALBOT"	T.U. 74.1.2. (Commander DECHAINEUX in "WARRAMUNGA")
Task Group 74.2 (Captain SPANAGEL in "NASHVILLE")	"NASHVILLE"	T.U. 74.2.1
	"PHOENIX"	T.U. 74.2.1
	"BUSH"	T.U. 74.2.2 (Captain PETERSEN in "BUSH".)
	"AMMEN"	T.U. 74.2.2 (Captain PETERSEN in "BUSH".)
	"MULLANY"	T.U. 74.2.2 (Captain PETERSEN in "BUSH".)
	"BACHE"	T.U. 74.2.2 (Captain PETERSEN in "BUSH".)

Commander Destroyers Task Force 74 - Captain PETERSEN in "BUSH".

INFORMATION.

1. (a) This Operation Order concerns the second phase of the operations of the NEW BRITAIN Force (Operation DEXTERITY).

(b) Refer Commander Task Force 76 Operation Order 3B-43.

2. COMMANDER 7TH FLEET HAS DIRECTED THAT TASK FORCE 74:

(a) Cover the overwater transport of the Amphibious Force which will land in the CAPE GLOUCESTER Area on D-day.

(b) During the assault, conduct shore bombardment against assigned objective and targets of opportunity.

and that subsequent to withdrawal of Task Force 74 from combat area after the landing on D-day:-

(c) CRUISERS will base at BUNA at short notice

(d) TASK FORCE 74 DESTROYERS will provide surface cover in the combat area every night.

3. Task Units 74.1.2 and 74.2.2 will normally provide the surface cover at night in the combat area in accordance with the Schedule described in ANNEX NO. 1.
The Task Unit which is withdrawn for fuel, munitions and rest will base at BUNA.

4. Commander 7th Fleet may at any time change the cover schedule by ordering the whole Task Force into the Combat Area or by ordering all Task Force 74 destroyers into the combat area.
Accordingly all ships this Task Force will at all times be prepared for combat at short notice. Fuelling and replenishment of munitions will be conducted with despatch.

5. INTENTIONS...../

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5. INTENTIONS - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

(i) D minus 2: TASK FORCE 74 will depart MILNE BAY at 1700, will clear RAVEN CHANNEL prior dark and will proceed Northward by inside (coastal) route.

(ii) D minus 1:

(a) TASK FORCE 74 will pass Cape WARD HUNT at about 1130. When Cruising Disposition is formed, T.U. 74.1.2 take STARBOARD screening stations. TASK FORCE 74 will overtake Task Force 76 assault echelons and by 1900 will be ahead of the leading echelon.

(b) TASK FORCE 74 will cover the assault echelons from ahead throughout the approach to the combat area.

(c) In an endeavour to avoid being sighted before dark by enemy lookout posts which must be assumed to exist at FORTIFICATION POINT and along the New Guinea coast to the Northward, TASK FORCE 74 will give greater offing to this coast than is allowed for the assault formations following along Route YOKE.

(iii) NEGOTIATION OF VITIAZ STRAIT and APPROACH TO COMBAT AREA - D minus 1 and D-day.

(a) TASK FORCE 74 in Cruising Disposition "S" (PAC-10). T.U. 74.1.2 in STARBOARD screening stations.

(b) At 1900, D minus 1, Guide will pass through position 06°18'S, 148°05'E, steering 318° at 12 knots.

(c) Route YOKE will then be followed, course and axis will be altered WITHOUT SIGNAL as follows:-

To 000 at about 2235 in position (N)

To 052 at about 0020 in position (O)

To 089 at about 0110 in position (P)

(d) When passing South of TOLOKIWA ISLAND, destroyers close in towards the axis as necessary for safe navigation between TOLOKIWA I. and shoal six miles south eastward (Chart AUS.F.C.23) and again when passing North of SAKAR ISLAND.

(e) At 0445 WITHOUT SIGNAL:

(1) "AUSTRALIA" lead "SHROPSHIRE" round to westerly course; "HELM" and "RALPH TALBOT" screen ahead; "WARRAMUNGA" and "ARUNTA" follow astern.

(ii) C.T.G.74.2 take charge his Task Group, detach to Eastward, and at scheduled time for commencing bombardment, enter Gunfire Support Area No. 2, steering Westerly course.
C.T.G.74.2 formulate and promulgate to his Task Group, plan whereby necessary movements may be carried out (if possible without breaking TBS silence before 0545).

(f) Task...../

(f) Task Group 74.1

At about 0530 when "AUSTRALIA" leads round to port, WITHOUT SIGNAL, to course 070°, Task Group 74.1 take up Firing Disposition (Annex No. II, Part I, paragraph 3), WITHOUT SIGNAL.
Five minutes after commencing this turn, cruisers will reduce speed to 8 knots, WITHOUT SIGNAL.

(g) Fire support groups Able and Baker enter respective Gunfire Support Areas and conduct scheduled shore bombardment in accordance with Annex No. II.

(x) TASK FORCE 74 - MOVEMENTS IMMEDIATELY SUBSEQUENT TO COMPLETION OF SCHEDULED BOMBARDMENT OF ASSIGNED TARGETS - D-day.

Fire Support Groups Able and Baker manoeuvre independently in and in vicinity of respective Fire Support Areas; be prepared to engage targets of opportunity or to engage targets on call.

(y) TASK FORCE 74 - WITHDRAWAL FROM COMBAT AREA.

At about H + 45 minutes when released by C.T.F.76, TASK FORCE 74 will be formed by signal and will withdraw at high speed to westward and south through VITIAZ STRAIT.

(yi) TASK FORCE 74 - MOVEMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO WITHDRAWAL FROM COMBAT AREA ON D-DAY.

(a) See paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and Annex No. I.

(b) The Covering Force (normally a Task Unit of 4 destroyers) operating at night in the combat area, will

(i) leave vicinity cape CRETIN at 1600,

(ii) pass through position N) 5°47'S, 147°36'E at 1830,

(iii) take route between TOLOKIWA and LONG ISLANDS,

(iv) between 2200 and 0300, patrol in an area three miles either side of a line joining positions 05108 14830E and 05208 14855E.

(v) at 0300 commence retirement by reverse route

(vi) pass through position (N) again at about 0700,

(vii) be in vicinity Cape CRETIN about 0930 and then either remain in general vicinity south and west of Cape CRETIN until required to start run up to combat area again, or, if withdrawing to BUNA, continue retirement at about 25 knots and arrive BUNA about 1430.

(c) A destroyer...../

(c) A destroyer Task Unit which has been withdrawn to BUNA for fuel, munitions and rest, will, when scheduled to provide cover in the combat area,

(i) depart BUNA at 1000,

(ii) pass Cape CRETIN at 1500 and then carry out the covering schedule described in paragraph (b) above.

6. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO TASK FORCE 74.

(i) Submarine Contact.

If submarine contact is made in the combat area or on the route to it, it is essential that the submarine be hunted to destruction since it would otherwise be a constant menace to the large amount of naval shipping which is required to move in the combat area and along the route to and from it.
Therefore unless otherwise directed at the time, a destroyer making submarine contact will continue to hunt until the submarine is destroyed or until the destroyer is recalled.
Attention is called to PAC-10, Articles 4451, 4452 and 4453.

(ii) Action against enemy aircraft.

(I) By Day.

Cruising Dispositions "V" series (PAC-10) have been established to provide a suitable cruising disposition which may be ordered when air attack is likely.

(II) By Night.

Delivery of air attack at night is being undertaken more and more frequently by the enemy.
It has been the experience of Pacific Fleet forces that best avoiding action is:

(a) radical manoeuvring of the force

(b) use of smoke

(c) withholding of gunfire unless an attack has clearly developed.

At night, when air attack is expected, cruising dispositions SV, V series or N (PAC-10) may be ordered.

(iii) Night Action against enemy surface forces.

Enemy surface forces threatening our operations would most likely contain only cruisers and destroyers.

(a) Before contact, it is likely that the Task Force or Task Group will be formed in cruising disposition S or N (PAC-10).

(b) Subsequent to deployment, it is NOT intended that the battle disposition shall be treated as a rigid formation.
Until released, Commanders of the forces in the Van and Rear will keep their forces concentrated and

roughly in...../

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(iii) Night Action against enemy su face forces (Ctd).

(b) (Ctd.)

roughly in assigned statio s. These Commanders will order a divisional fo mation which best suits the tactical situation whi h is developing and so as to be ready to move off immediately on being released.
Commanding Officers of Cru sers will be expected to adjust bearings from th Cruiser Guide as necessary to fight their s ips most effectively.

(c) In most night actions foug t by Japanese surface forces, they have used the r torpedo armament with great skill and often with considerable effect. It will, therefore, be my eneral policy that CRUISERS shall fight at ab ut the limiting range of enemy effective torpedo fire, until the enemy torpedo attack has been la nched. Accordingly cruisers will engage in bl nd fire when the enemy has been closed to about 1 ,000 yards. I then intend that cruisers shall close the enemy until the range is about 10,000 ards, at which range a radical turn away or rever al of course probably will be made to avoid poss ble enemy torpedo zones. Cruisers will then continu the gun action at range in excess of 10,000 yards ntil it is deemed prudent to close to more effective range.

(d) CRUISERS opening fire will automatically release DESTROYERS who will be led by their divisional commander-s to favourable ange for fighting their gun and torpedo armament.
AT ANY TIME, HOWEVER, ANY PPORTUNITY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK ON A SUITABLE TARGE MUST IMMEDIATELY BE SEIZED AND THE ATTACK PRES ED HOME.

(e) It is a reliable rule that if the enemy is within starshell range, and unles certain of being able to spot fall of shot witho t illumination, always use starshell when opening fir with other guns.

(f) DO NOT USE SEARCHLIGHTS UN ESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. If it is ESSENTIAL to use a searchlight, expose the beam INTERMITTENTLY and do not overlook the danger of silhouetting own ship.

(g) Whenever battle disposition is formed, all ships will turn on I.F.F. if not already switched on.

(h) All ships must be ready to identify themselves instantly by -

(a) three letter reply on white light

and

(b) by switching on VF identification if under fire from friendly forces.

(iv) Day Action...../

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(iv) Day Action against Enemy Surface Forces.

(I) In the event of Task Force 74 becoming engaged in day surface action with enemy forces, the handling and fighting of the force will depend on many factors, e.g. our object, composition of enemy force, etc.

(II) The following broad principles shall apply:-

(a) CRUISERS will normally remain concentrated.

(b) With CRUISERS CONCENTRATED it will be my aim to deploy and fight them at mean range 12,000 - 14,000 yards (against cruiser targets).

(c) If the enemy has a force of DESTROYERS, the primary function of Task Force 74 destroyers is to break up enemy torpedo attacks launched at OUR CRUISERS.

(d) In normal visibility, NO attempt should be made (unless favourable opportunity offers) by Task Force 74 destroyers to deliver a torpedo attack on the enemy until opposing cruisers are heavily engaged. When delivered, the attack should be pressed home.

(v) ANY SHIP FORCED TO FALL OUT OF THE FORMATION during day or night surface action, should do so if possible on the disengaged side and -

(a) follow the course of the action at her best speed if she can be of any potential use in mopping up enemy damaged ships, towing our own damaged ships etc.

or

(b) retire towards a friendly base if unable to take any further useful part. In this case, make radio signal advising interested authorities of position, condition and intention.

(vi) AIR SUPPORT AND FIGHTER DIRECTION.

(a) See C.T.F.76 Operation Plan 3B-43, Annex "H".

(b) Copies of Allied Air Support Plan will be issued to C.T.F.74, "SHROPSHIRE", C.T.G. 74.2, "PHOENIX".

(c) Attention is drawn to paragraph 1(b)(1) of C.T.F.76 Operation Plan 3B-43 regarding Beach Neutralisation strike by aircraft prior to the landing on D-day. Allied Aircraft taking part in this strike will be low and will be approaching from Seaward.

(d) Fighter Direction.

(I) "SHROPSHIRE" with R.A.A.F. Fighter Director team embarked is Fighter Director Ship Task Force 74 and Task Group 74.1, "PHOENIX" with U.S. Army Aircraft Fighter Director team embarked is stand-by fighter director ship for Task Force 74 and Fighter Director Ship for Task Group 74.2

(II) Task Force 74 fighter director ship will operate as No. 27 sub-Fighter Sector, Call ZOMBIE.

(III) If Task...../

(vi) AIR SUPPORT AND FIGHTER DIRECTION (Ctd.)

(d) Fighter Direction (Ctd.)

(III) If Task Group 74.2 is at sea independently, or if ordered to take over fighter direction for Task Force 74, "PHOENIX" will become No. 27 sub-Fighter Sector and will use Call CHORAL.

(IV) Fighter Protection in combat area, D-day.

Ship control of fighters will be exercised by ZOMBIE until TASK FORCE 74 withdraws, when ZOMBIE will retain Western Sector and hand over Eastern Sector to DUCKBUT (Shaw).
When TASK FORCE 74 is within ground alert range of FINSCHHAFEN, control of all air-alert fighters will be handed to DUCKBUT.

(VII) RADAR.

(a) Attention is drawn to PAC-1), Article 6100.

(b) During night approach to combat area (night D minus 1 - D day), assume radar condition "B" with exception of "SHROPSHIRE" who may use her air warning radar intermittently and with discretion.

(c) In the combat area on D-day, "NASHVILLE" and "BUSH" take responsibility for sectors A and B, "PHOENIX" and "AMMEN" take responsibility for sectors F and G. All other ships conduct all round air warning sweep unless otherwise ordered by Fighter Director Controller.

(d) "SHROPSHIRE" will normally be Radar Guardship and Radar Reporting Ship and "PHOENIX" stand-by, but when Sectors are assigned such as in paragraph (c) above, ships assigned a definite sector of responsibility will be guard and reporting ship for that sector.

(viii) CRUISER PLANES.

Cruiser planes will base at MILNE BAY.
Aviation Spirit will be discharged into tanker or lighter.

(ix) All ships be prepared to tow or to be taken in tow.

7. REFERENCE POINTS: C.T.F.76 Operation Plan 3B-43.

8. ALL TIMES IN THIS OPERATION ORDER ARE LOVE (Zone - 11).

9. D-day is tentatively set at 26th December and H-hour at 0745L.

10. COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with Annex No. II.

11. This Operation Order is effective upon receipt.
My Operation Orders 6-43 and 7-43 are cancelled.
Annex No. II to my Operation Order 6-43 is to be retained for information.

ANNEX I...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX I - Task Force 74 - SCHEDULE OF MOVEMENTS.

ANNEX II - GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

ANNEX III - COMMUNICATIONS.

ANNEX IV - SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

ANNEX V - ALLIED COAST WATCHERS - NEW BRITAIN AND KING ISLAND.

V. CRUTCHLEY.

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

DISTRIBUTION:

"AUSTRALIA"	(4)	COMDESWESPAC SEAFRON	(1)	Less Annex V
"SHROPSHIRE"	(4)			
"NASHVILLE"	(4)	C.T.G.73.	(1)	Less Annexes
"PHOENIX"	(4)	C.T.G.70.1	(1)	II, IV, V.
COMDESDIV 48	(1)	N.O.I.C. NEW GUINEA	(1)	Less Annexes
"BUSH"	(2)			II, IV.
"BACHE"	(2)			
"AMMEN"	(2)	C.T.F.72 ("FULTON")	(1)	Less Annexes
"MULLANY"	(2)	COMNAVBASE MILNE BAY	(1)	II, IV, V.
"WARRAMUNGA"	(2)	COMGEN FAF	(2)	
"ARUNTA"	(2)	COMGEN 2nd ATF	(2)	
"HELM"	(2)	COMGEN 5TH A.F. ADV. HQ	(1)	(Less Annexes
"RALPH TALBOT"	(2)	AOC 9 OPS GROUP AD. HQ.	(2)	II, III,
COM. 7th FLEET	(1)	COMSERFOR 7TH FLEET	(1)	IV, V.
C.T.F.76	(1)	COMGEN 5TH FIGHTER		
COMDESRON 5	(1)	COMMD. AIR H.Q.	(2)	
COMDESRON 24	(1)	DESRON 5	(17)	

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ANNEX NO. 1 - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 8 - 43.

SCHEDULE OF MOVEMENTS - TASK FORCE 74.

1. Detailed Schedule.

D minus 2.

Task Force 74 (4 Cruisers, 8 destroyers) departs MILNE BAY 1700, clears RAMEN CHANNEL prior dark and proceeds Northward by inside (coastal) route.

D minus 1.

Task Force 74 will

(a) pass Cape WARD HUNT at about 1130 steering North

(b) at 1900 pass through position 06°18'S, 148°05'E, steering 318° at 12 knots.

(c) from position (N) at 2135, follow Route YOKE.

D day.

(i) Task Force 74 will

(a) carry out scheduled bombardment

(b) at about H + 45 commence retirement at 27 knots by route YOKE.

(c) be in vicinity Cape CRETIN at about 1330.

(ii) Task Group 74.1 and Task Unit 74.2.1 continue retirement to BUNA, arriving about 1815.

(iii) Task Unit 74.2.2 will

(a) detach from Task Force 74 in vicinity Cape CRETIN.

(b) depart Cape CRETIN 1600,

(c) pass through position (N) at about 1830, then take route west and north of TOLOKIWA and reach patrol area at 2200.

D plus One.

(i) CRUISERS at BUNA.

(ii) Task Unit 74.2.2 will

(a) depart patrol area 0200,

(b) take route north and west of TOLOKIWA,

(c) pass through position (N) at about 0700,

(d) pass Cape CRETIN about 0930 and retire to BUNA at 25 knots, arriving about 1430.

(iii) Task Unit 74.1.2 will

(a) depart BUNA at 1000 proceed North,

(b) pass Cape CRETIN at 1500,

(c) pass through point (N) at about 1830, then take route west and north of TOLOKIWA and reach patrol area 2200.

D plus Two...../

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D plus Two:

(1) CRUISERS and Task Unit 74.2.2 at BUNA

(11) Task Unit 74.1.2 will

(a) leave patrol area at 0[illegible]00

(b) take route north and w[illegible]st of TOLOKIWA,

(c) pass through position (N) at about 0700,

(d) pass Cape CRETIN about 0930 and remain generally in vicinity south and [illegible]ast of the Cape.

(e) pass Cape CRETIN 1600 [illegible]orthward,

(f) pass through Point (N) [illegible]t about 1830, then take route west and north o[illegible] TOLOKIWA and reach patrol area at 2200.

D plus Three.

Repetition of D plus One with the Task Units in (11) and (111) interchanged.

D plus Four.

Repetition of D plus Two with the Task Units in (1) and (11) interchanged.

D plus Five.

Repetition of D plus One.

D plus Six.

Repetition of D plus two.

etc.

2. Hence unless the schedule is changed by Commander 7th Fleet, who may at any time order the whole Task Force, or perhaps all destroyers, into the Combat Area, Task Force 74 cover in the area will be as follows:

Night	D minus 1 - D	: Task Force 74.
Night	D - D plus 1	: Task Unit 74.2.2
Night	D plus 1 - D plus 2	: Task Unit 74.1.2
Night	D plus 2 - D plus 3	: Task Unit 74.1.2
Night	D plus 3 - D plus 4	: Task Unit 74.2.2
Night	D plus 4 - D plus 5	: Task Unit 74.2.2
Night	D plus 5 - D plus 6	: Task Unit 74.1.2
Night	etc. etc.	

3. Position (N) is 5°47'S, 147°36'E, i.e. 25 miles south of TOLOKIWA.

4. When providing night surface cover in the combat area, Task Force 74 covering force will patrol in an area 3 miles either side of the line joining

Position (i) 05°10'S, 148°30'E.
Position (ii) 05°20'S, 148°55'E.

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ANNEX NO. II TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74. OPERATION ORDER 8-43.

GUNFIRE SUPPORT PLAN.

PART I - FIRE SUPPORT GROUP ABLE (TASK GROUP 74.1).

1. Naval Gunfire Support - Plans Able and Baker.

Refer CTF 76 Operation Plan 3B-43 Annex C Plan A paragraph 3 and Plan B paragraph 3.

2. Fire Support Group ABLE.

"AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", "WARRAMUNGA", "ARUNTA", "HELM", "RALPH TALBOT".

3. Firing Disposition.

"WARRAMUNGA", "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", "ARUNTA", column 600 yards apart in the nominated sequence, "HELM" and "RALPH TALBOT" providing A/S screen to seaward. Course 090 - 110 approximately, speed 8 knots. Group will be manoeuvred so that "WARRAMUNGA" enters gunfire support area No. 3 at H-1 hour 45 minutes for Plan A and at H-1 hour 30 minutes for Plan B.

4. Method of Covering Assigned Targets.

(a) Ships will endeavour to fire according to the attached time schedule. If an interruption occurs, caused either by enemy action or by engaging a target of opportunity (see paragraph 5 below), resume bombardment at point of interruption and fire remaining serials with decreased time interval and increased rate of fire.

(b) Targets are shown accurately on trace attached and in Appendix 3 of Annex B to CTF 76 Operation Plan 3B-43. Latest intelligence on targets will be communicated as soon as received.

(c) When spreading for range and deflection, spots are to be irregular to prevent the enemy anticipating fall of shot.

(d) Commanding Officers are to arrange the rate of fire in any one serial as they desire. When two consecutive serials are allotted to the same target, the ammunition of both periods may be combined at discretion of Commanding Officers.

(e) Convergence at all sights is to be set at infinity to increase the deflection spread.

5. Targets of Opportunity.

(a) Ships are to take under fire any targets of opportunity in the general vicinity of their target areas, which are considered to be of greater importance than maintaining the scheduled bombardment. Cruisers may also expend 4" ammunition on targets of opportunity up to the limits specified in Annex C paragraph 11 of CTF 76 Operation Plan 3B-43.

(b) "HELM" and "RALPH TALBOT" engage targets of opportunity as screening duties permit or if directed to do so.

6. In Plan A there is to be no bombardment fire between H-25 minutes and H hour. Targets of opportunity may be engaged during preliminary bombardment and after H hour.

7. Attention is called to Annex C, paragraph 3b and paragraph 11.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NO. II TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 8-43.

GUNFIRE SUPPORT PLAN.

PART II - FIRE SUPPORT GROUP BAKER (TASK GROUP 74.2).

1. Naval Gunfire Support Plans ABLE and BAKER.

Refer CTF 76 Operation Plan 3B-43, Annex C, Plan A, paragraph 4 a, b, c, d, e and f, paragraph 9 a, b, c, d, paragraph 11 and paragraph 12, also Plan B, paragraph 4 a, b, c, d, e and f, paragreph 9, a, b, c, paragraph 11 and paragraph 12.

2. Firing Disposition.

Commander Task Group 74.2 is to arrange disposition of ships in gunfire support area No. 2 and is to designate Fire Support Unit No. 3 of Fire Support Group BAKER

3. Method of Covering Assigned Targets.

Commanding Officers are to arrange their own firing schedules bearing in mind the following points:-

Gunfire Plan A

(a) Not more than 60% of cruiser ammunition allowance is to be expended during the intermittent bombardment from H-1 hour 20 minutes to H-28 minutes.

(b) Remainder of ammunition allowance is to be expended in close support fire.

(c) During preliminary intermittent bombardment, "NASHVILLE" is to engage her targets in the sequence 1, 5, 2, 1, 5 2, devoting 25% of ammunition specified in sub-paragraph (a) above, to target 2, and the remaining 75% between targets 1 and 5.

(d) "PHOENIX" is to engage targets 3 and 4 equally during preliminary intermittent bombardment.

Gunfire Plan B.

(e) Times of fire to be adjusted to conform; other details as for Plan Able.

4. Parallax is to be set to infinity.

5. Spotting for coverage of targets is to be in irregular steps to prevent the enemy anticipating fall of shot.

6. Fire on assigned targets is not to be continued beyond times specified in CTF 76 Operation Plan 3B-43, paragraphs 4, A, b, c, d, e and f, and 9d.

7. Attention is called to Annex C, paragraph 4f and paragraph 8 of CTF 76 Operation Plan 3B-43.

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FIRE SUPPORT GROUP ABLE - SCHEDULE FOR GUNFIRE PLAN ABLE.

Serial No.	1	2	3	4	5	6
Period in minutes	Six	Four	Four	Four	Four	Four
From	H hour - 1 hour 45 mins	H-1 hr 39 mns	H-1 hr 35 mns	H-1 hr 31 mns	H-1 hr 27 mns	H-1 hr. 23 mns.
To	H hour - 1 hour 39 mins	H - 1 hr. 35	H - 1 Hr. 31	H - 1 hr. 27	H - 1 hr. 23	H - 1 hr. 19
"AUSTRALIA"	Register and engage target 16 with 8 four gun salvoes spread for range. Then register Hill P. 21 with maximum of 8 single gun salvoes	Target 23B	Target 24	Target 23A	Target 16 Spread for Range	Target 16 Spread for Range
"SHROPSHIRE"	Register western edge of Target 19, switches to Hill P.21 and registers. Then engages Target 21B. Total ammunition 40 shell fired as requisite.	Target 21A Spread for Range	Target 20	Target 22 Spread for Range	Target 20	Target 21B 4 Salvoes.

Unless otherwise stated for each serial Cruisers fire six four gun salvoes spread for deflection

"WARRAMUNGA"	Target 17 10 Broadsides.	Target 17 4 Broadsides	Target 16 6 Broadsides Spread for range.	Target 16 6 Broadsides Spread for range	NIL	NIL
"ARUNTA"	Target 18 8 Broadsides	Target 28 6 Broadsides Spread for range & line	Target 19 6 Broadsides	NIL	Target 18 6 Broadsides	NIL

Unless otherwise stated targets are to be covered by broadsides spread for deflection

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

FIRE SUPPORT GROUP ABLE :- SCHEDULE FOR GUNFIRE PLAN ABLE.

Serial No.	7	-	8	9	10	11
Period in Mins.	Four	Seven	Six	Four	Six	Four
From	H - 1 hr. 19	H - 1 hr. 15	H - 1 hr. 8	H - 1 hr. 02	H - 58 mins.	H - 52.
To	H - 1 hr. 15	H - 1 hr. 8	H - 1 hr. 2	H - 58 mins.	H - 52	H - 48
"AUSTRALIA"	Target 23A	TURN	Target 24 3 salvoes pause one minute 4 salvoes	NIL	Target 23B	Target 24 5 salvoes
"SHROPSHIRE"	Target 27 Spread for range & line	1800	Target 22 Spread for Range	Target 28 Spread for range & line	Target 21A Spread for Range	Target 20 5 Salvoes

Unless otherwise stated for each serial Cruisers fire six four gun salvoes spread for deflection.

"WARRAMUNGA	Target 16 8 Broadsides Spread for Range	TO STARBOARD TOGETHER	NIL	Target 17 4 Broadsides	NIL	Target 17 4 Broadsides Pause one minute 3 Broadsides
"ARUNTA"	Target 19 4 Broadsides		Target 19 4 Broadsides Pause one minute One Broadside	NIL	Target 19 5 Broadsides	Target 18 3 Broadsides

Unless otherwise stated targets are to be covered by broadsides spread for deflection.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

FIRE SUPPORT GROUP ABLE - SCHEDULE FOR GUNFIRE PLAN ABLE.

Serial No.	12	13	-	14	15
Period in Minutes	Four	Six	Seven	Three	Three
From	H - 48 mins.	H - 44 mins.	H - 38 mins.	H - 31 mins.	H - 28 mins.
TO	H - 44	H - 38	H - 31	H - 28	H - 25.
"AUSTRALIA"	Target 23A 4 Salvoes	Target 23B 6 salvoes pause two minutes 3 salvoes	TURN 180° TOGETHER	Target 23A 8 Salvoes	Target 23B 3 Salvoes
"SHROPSHIRE"	NIL.	Target 22 6 Salvoes spread for Range		Target 21A 8 salvoes spread for range	Target 21B 7 Salvoes

Unless otherwise stated for each serial, Cruisers fire six four gun salvoes spread for deflection.

"WARRAMUNGA"	Target 17 4 Broadsides	Target 16 5 Broadsides Spread for range		STARBOARD TOGETHER	Target 16 6 Broadsides spread for range	Target 16 6 Broadsides spread for range.
"ARUNTA"	Target 17 6 Broadsides Spread for range & line	Target 18 3 Broadsides Pause one minute 2 Broadsides			Target 19 4 Broadsides Pause one minute 2 Broadsides	Target 18 3Broadsides Pause one minute 3Broadsides

Unless otherwise stated targets are to be covered by broadsides spread for deflection.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

FIRE SUPPORT GROUP ABLE - SCHEDULE FOR GUNFIRE PLAN BAKER.

Serial No.	1	2	3	4	5	6
Period in Mins.	Six	Four	Four	Four	Four	Four
From	H hour - 1 hr. 30 mins.	H-1 hour 24	H-1 hour 20	H-1 hour 16	H-1 hour 12	H-1 hour 8
To	H hour - 1 hr. 24 mins.	H-1 hr. 20	H-1 hr. 16	H-1 hr. 12	H-1 hr. 8	H-1 hr. 4
"AUSTRALIA"	Register & engage Target 16 with 8 four gun salvoes, spread for range. Then register Hill P.21 with maximum of 8 single gun salvoes.	Target 25B 5 Salvoes	Target 24 6 Salvoes	Target 23A 5 Salvoes	Target 16 6 Salvoes spread for range.	Target 16 5 Salvoes spread for range.
"SHROPSHIRE"	Register western edge of Target 19, switch to Hill P.21 and register. Then engage Target 21B. Total ammunition 32 shell fired as requisite.	Target 21A 5 Salvoes spread for range	Target 20 5 Salvoes	Target 22 5 Salvoes spread for range.	Target 20 6 Salvoes	Target 21B 4 Salvoes.

Unless otherwise specified Cruisers fire four gun salvoes spread for deflection.

"WARRAMUNGA"	Target 17 7 Broadsides	Target 17 4 Broadsides	Target 16 6 Broadsides Spread for Rannge.	Target 16 4 Broadsides Spread for Range.	NIL.	NIL.
"ARUNTA"	Target 18 7 Broadsides	Target 28 5 Broadsides Spread for range & line	Target 19 5 Broadsides	NIL	Target 18 4 Broadsides	NIL.

Unless otherwise specified Destroyers are to cover targets with broadsides spread for deflection.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

FIRE SUPPORT GROUP ABLE - SCHEDULE FOR GUNFIRE PLAN BAKER.

Serial No.	7	-	8	9	10	11	12
Period in Mins.	Four	Seven	Six	Four	Six	Four	Four
From	H - 1 hr. 4	H- 1 hour	H - 53 mins.	H - 47 mins.	H - 43 mins.	H - 37 mins.	H - 33 mins.
To	H - 1 hr.	H - 53	H - 47	H - 45	H - 37	H - 33	H - 29
"AUSTRALIA"	Target 23A 5 Salvoes	RETURN 180° TO STARB'D	Target 24 3 Salvoes Pause one minute 2 Salvoes	NIL	Target 23B 5 Salvoes	Target 24 5 Salvoes	Target 23A 4 Salvoes
"SHROPSHIRE"	Target 27 6 Salvoes Spread for range & line		Target 22 6 Salvoes Spread for range.	Target 28 6 Salvoes Spread for range & line	Target 21A 6 Salvoes Spread for range.	Target 20 4 Salvoes.	NIL.

Unless specified otherwise Cruisers fire four gun salvoes spread for deflection.

"WARRAMUNGA"	Target 16 8 Broadsides Spread for Range	TO GUNLINE	NIL	Target 17 4 Broadsides	NIL	Target 17 6 Broadsides	Target 17 4 Broadsides
"ARUNTA"	Target 19 4 Broadsides		Target 19 4 Broadsides Pause one minute 1 Broadside	NIL	Target 19 5 Broadsides	Target 18 3 Broadsides	Target 27 5 Broadsides Spread for range & line.

Unless otherwise specified Destroyers are to cover targets with broadsides spread for deflection.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

FIRE SUPPORT GROUP ABLE - SCHEDULE FOR GUNFIRE PLAN BAKER.

Serial No.	13	-	14	15	16	17
Period in mins.	Six	Seven	Three	Three	Six	Four
From	H - 29 mins.	H - 23 mins.	H - 16 mins.	H - 13 mins.	H - 10 mins.	H - 4 mins.
To	H - 23	H - 16	H - 13	H - 10	H - 4	H.
"AUSTRALIA"	Target 23B 6 Salvoes Pause one Minute 1 Salvo.	TURN 180° TO STARB.	Target 23A 6 Salvoes	Target 23B 3 Salvoes	Target 24 6 Salvoes	Target 16 5 Salvoes Spread for Range.
"SHROPSHIRE"	Target 22 5 Salvoes Spread for Range.		Target 21A 5 Salvoes Spread for Range	Target 21B 5 Salvoes	Target 20 6 Salvoes	Target 22 6 Salvoes Spread for Range.

Unless otherwise specified Cruisers fire four gun salvoes spread for deflection.

"WARRAMUNGA"	Target 16 5 Broadsides Spread for Range	TO CENTRE.	Target 16 4 Broadsides Spread for Range	NIL	Target 16 8 Broadsides Spread for Range	Target 16 6 Broadsides Spread for Range
"ARUNTA"	Target 18 3 Broadsides Pause one minute 2 Broadsides		Target 19 4 Broadsides	Target 18 4 Broadsides	Target 18 4 Broadsides	Target 19 6 Broadsides

Unless otherwise specified Destroyers are to cover targets with Broadsides spread for deflection.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NO. III TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 8-43.

COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Internal and external communications for Task Force 74 which do not directly affect UNITS of Task Force 76 will be in accordance with PAC-10 Appendix 8, with the following amendments:-

(i) CALL SIGNS.

Article 9. Make pencil corrections to OPERATIONAL VOICE CALLS

Destroyer	E	AMMEN	PICKLE
	F	BUSH	BIRDBRAIN
	G	MULLANY	SHAKESPEARE
	H	BACHE	BRICKTOP

Appendix 8 Call Signs will be used on all T.F. 74 Circuits except as stated under 2 below.

(ii) GUARDS.

Article 7 PART 1 para. 2 make pencil corrections amending to read :-

CRUISER A	"AUSTRALIA"	- NPM FOX. T.F.76 DOG CIRCUIT. A.O.I.C. T.F.76 BAKER CIRCUIT (LOUDSPEAKER ONLY). 3140 KC/S DURING BOMBARDMENT & ONE HOUR AFTER. COAST WATCHER (6900 KQS)
B	"PHOENIX"	COMMERCIAL (LOUDSPEAKER ONLY) STAND-BY FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AS DESIGNATED BY C.T.G.74.2.
C	"SHROPSHIRE"	FIGHTER DIRECTION. PRIMARY RECCO. COAST WATCHER (6900 KQS)
D	"NASHVILLE"	T.F. 76 DOG CIRCUIT. AND AS DESIGNATED BY C.T.G. 74.2.

2. DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH UNITS OF TASK FORCE 76.

ANNEX D to C.T.F. 76 OPERATION PLAN 3B-43 will be followed entirely for co-operation with units of Task Force 76.

When any units of Task Force 74 become separated from their Task Group Commanders ("AUSTRALIA" and "NASHVILLE") they are to set watch on Task Force 76 Dog Circuit immediately.

CALL SIGNS.

On any circuit laid down in Annex D to C.T.F. 76 Operation Plan 3B-43 use call signs from that annex.

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Attention is called to :-

(i) Key call signs;

(ii) Additional voice and key call signs for

T.U. 76.1.5,
T.U. 76.1.51,
T.U. 76.1.52.

CIRCUITS ITEM AND JIG:

Will not be used by ships of T.F. 74 unless the force is broken up and individual Unit Commanders desire. Use instead the Group and Unit Frequencies as laid down in Appendix 8 PAC-10.

3. Call signs and guards effective 1200L December 23rd.

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ANNEX NO. IV - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 8-43.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

1. Estimated Disposition Effective JAPANESE Warships - 21 December.

JAPAN:

BB - ISE, HYUGA, YAMASHIRO.

CV - SHOKAKU; possibly ZUIKAKU (both may be about to ferry planes south; planes from these carriers are probably shorebased BISMARKS); probable new carrier (may be TAIHO, the possible name for converted SCHARNHORST).

CA - NACHI (expected ready for sea 22nd December).

CL - TATSUTA (may be repairing); YAHAGI; MANJU (probably not complete); MIYAKE (escorting CHINA coast); GOKOKU MARU; ASAKA MARU; AKAGI MARU (probably refitting).

DD - 12.

TRUK:

BB - MUSASHI, NAGATO, MUTSU, FUSO, KONGO, HARUNA; YAMATO arriving from JAPAN carrying troops.

CV - ZUIHO and UNYO (arrived ferrying planes and materials for MARSHALLS); HITAKA and RYUHO (due from SINGAPORE, possibly with planes from N.E.I. - PHILLIPINES); possibly ZUIKAKU.

CA - KUMANO, SUZUYA, TIKUMA, CHOKAI (of INNER SOUTH SEAS DIVERSION ATTACK FORCE); HAGURO, MYOKO, TONE (expected to leave JAPAN shortly carrying troops for KAVIENG); ATAGO (expected to leave JAPAN 17th - 22nd December).

CL - NOSHIRO (believed INNER SOUTH SEAS DIVERSION ATTACK FORCE); TAMA and OYODO (no recent information); KATORI (18 Knot Training CL); SEIKO MARU (possibly).

DD - 14.

CAROLINES - MARSHALLS - BISMARCKS.

DD - 24.

MARSHALLS:

CL - NAKA, ISUZU, NAGARA (INNER SOUTH SEAS TRANSPORT UNITS); AMAKUSA (assisting above).

DD - 8.

RABAUL:

DD - 6.

SIGHTINGS:

14th December at KAVIENG: 1 CR at anchor (hit by bombs).
15th December at KAVIENG: 2 DD.
16th December at RABAUL: 1 DD and probable LYONS MARU (AAPV).

17th December at RABAUL: 4 DD.

19th December..../

RABAUL (Ctd):

SIGHTINGS (Ctd):

19th December:

(a) 80' W. of NEW HANOVER: 2 CL with 2 AK, Course: 085°, 8 knots.

(b) 30' S.W. of KAVIENG: 2 DD with 3 AP, 1 AK, Course: 160°, 6 knots.

(c) 60' S. of NEW HANOVER: 1 CL with 3 ships (probably (a) above). 3 hits on CL.

There have been indications of 2 DD being expected in the Area but no indications of any cruisers being expected.

N.E.I. - SINGAPORE:

CA - ASHIGARA; ACBA (believed en route from JAPAN).

CL - OI, KITAGAMI, KUMA, KINU: Possibly NATORI; KANJU (escorting SINGAPORE - FORMOSA); KASHII (18 Knot Training CL); NOSHIRO MARU.

DD - 12.

KURILES:

CL - ABUKUMA.

DD - 4.

2. Submarines.

Supply runs RABAUL - SIO continue regularly. There have possibly been supply runs to BUKA. Japanese submarines appear to be operating mainly in the area VITIAZ STRAIT - MOROBE and RABAUL - BUKA, probably on reconnaissance. On 17th December, 4 submarines were seen at RABAUL. On 19th December 3 or more submarines were estimated in the SOLOMONS SEA east of 152°E.

3. Aircraft.

There is good reason to believe aircraft of SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, are shore-based in the BISMARCK Area. These may possibly be joined by planes of CARDIV 2 shorebased in MARSHALLS. There has been a further tendency to maintain air strength in reserve in NEW IRELAND. Considerable reinforcements are again probably available at TRUK, though some must be ear-marked for the MARSHALLS. Army air reinforcements are being staged from the N.E.I. into western NEW GUINEA air bases. Air attacks on ARAWE have been quite considerable but not very effective.

Estimated...../

ANNEX NO. IV - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 8-43.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

3. Aircraft (Ctd):

ESTIMATED JAPANESE AIR DISPOSITION.

	F.	2/F	L/B & M/B	T/B D/B	E/B	F/P	TRANS. & OBS.	TOTAL. 17 Dec.	10 Dec.	16 Nov.
NEW BRITAIN	123	9	40	-	2	24	8	206	208	193
NEW IRELAND	35	-	14	45	-	12	-	106	98	75
NEW GUINEA	82	5	88	-	-	6	5	186	189	175
SOLOMONS	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	8	8	8

4. Supplies.

Barges are very active on NEW GUINEA coast; few indications of barge traffic along north coast NEW BRITAIN. Supply runs by destroyers appear to have ceased except that there were some indications of a DD near ARAWE on night 18/19th December and of a possible TOKYO EXPRESS (possibly only 1 DD) night 20/21st December. Shipping to RABAUL and WEWAK has been considerable. Troop reinforcements are expected in KAVIENG.

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MOST SECRET.

INTELLIGENCE DECEMBER 23RD - INFORMATION RECEIVED SINCE ISSUE OF ANNEX NO. IV.

TRUK : Fair indication HARUNA not at TRUK December 21 and may possibly be in JAPAN.
ZUIHO indicated as leaving TRUK to return to JAPAN.

NEW BRITAIN :

(i) Reconnaissance over RABAUL December 22 sighted

7 DD			
5 SS			
22 Aircraft		RAPOPO	This disposition is about normal.
42	"	VUNAKUNAU	
77	"	LAKUNAI	
Nil	"	RAKADA	
17 Float Planes			

(ii) Indication that JAPS will make DD supply runs RABAUL to GAROVE during night 22nd-23rd and 23rd-24th, possibly 2 DD each run.
Another DD Supply run may have been made 21st-22nd.
On previous occasions, supply DDs. have arrived GAROVE 2030L after 8 hour run from RABAUL.

NEW GUINEA :

December 22 2 DD sighted off WEWAK.

JAP. SUBMARINES :

(1) Annex No. IV para. 2 last line for "east" read "west".

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ANNEX NO. V TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 8-43.

ALLIED COAST WATCHERS - NEW BRITAIN & LONG ISLAND.

1. The following are the call-signs and approximate locations of Allied Coast Watchers:-

CALL SIGN.	LOCATION.
5 EM	5 miles inland from centre of OPEN BAY (04°55'S, 151°50'E).
4 RE	10 miles west of Cape TURNER (05°05'S 151°53'E)
7 FE	15 miles north-west of Cape ORFORD (05°17'S, 152°00'E).
3 SS or 3 YP	20 miles S.S.E of THE FATHER (05°10'S, 151°15'E).
VHBK	20 miles South of BANGULA BAY (05°48'S, 150°55'E).
8 HA	East coast LONG ISLAND (05°20'S, 147°10'E).
8 HAB	South coast LONG ISLAND (05°22'S, 147°07'E).

2. All stations work on 6900 KC/S from 0615L - 2000L and on 4010 KC/S from 2000L - 0615L and may use voice or CW.

3. A.I.B. Base Stations :

MILNE BAY	VIJ
PORT MORESBY	VIG
GOODENOUGH	5DY
KIRIWINA	6HT

MILNE BAY or PORT MORESBY station answers coast watcher transmissions. VIJ (Milne Bay) rebroadcasts the transmissions. KIRIWINA and GOODENOUGH are intercept stations as are 1AF just installed at ARAWE and 2 DK to be installed at GLOUCESTER.

4. Coast Watcher Reports :

(a) Unless recognised as friendly, aircraft proceeding away from enemy territory are reported in plain language or simple code form. If in simple code, the form of the message may be :

CALL SIGN.	BOMBERS.	HEIGHT.	FIGHTERS.	HEIGHT.	COURSE.	TIME.
7 FE	15	15000	27	18000	230	1152
or 7 FE	15B	15000	27F	18000	230	1152

but most parties prefer to give reports in plain language, such as

"7 FE - 15 bombers, 15000 feet, South West, 1152."

(b)/.....

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NO. V TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 8-43.

(b) Aircraft proceeding towards enemy territory, unless recognised as friendly when no report is made, are reported in special code.
Ship sightings and other Intelligence are reported in code.
N.O.I.C. NEW GUINEA is able to break encoded reports from coast watchers and he will transmit to Task Force 74 in naval system, any items of operational interest contained in these reports.

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RESTRICTED

(See file 72/51/50)

CONFIDENTIAL. J Bailey 29/11/60

2 A.F. 1140/38

A.F.537/61.

H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA".
Flagship.
5 April, 1944.

TASK FORCE 74 - PRACTICE PROGRAMME.
(Short Title "KP")

INTENTION.

1. On Friday, 7th April, and Saturday, 8th April, 1944, TASK FORCE 74 will conduct underway training exercises in local training areas and south of CHINA STRAIT.

SORTIE.

2. (a) "ARUNTA", "AMMEN", underway as directed by "ARUNTA" to carry out SERIAL ONE.

(b) "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", underway pointed for leaving harbour at 1130. Ships will proceed in company and will start SERIAL TWO at 1300.

(c) "MULLANY", "WARRAMUNGA", underway as directed by "MULLANY" so as to rendezvous at North entrance to CHINA STRAIT at 1600 ready to proceed for SERIALS FOUR and FIVE.

3. SERIAL ONE (AM & PM) "ARUNTA" "AMMEN" A/S TRAINING EXERCISE WITH S.42.

(a) "ARUNTA","AMMEN", carry out underway A/S training with S.42 as previously arranged.

(b) At 1600 in vicinity KANA KOPA, "ARUNTA", "AMMEN", and S.42 rendezvous with M.L. Transfer liaison officer to M.L. and turn over escort of S.42.

4. SERIAL TWO (1300-1430) "AUSTRALIA" "SHROPSHIRE" LONG RANGE A.A. FIRING.

(a) (i) Sleeve target towed by T.G.73.1 plane at maximum height or cloud base.

(ii) Plane rendezvous over area BAKER at 1300 ready to start runs.

(b) (i) Plane make direct attack (crossing) runs from alternate sides, passing over leading or rear ship as ordered.

(ii) One ship only will fire in each run.

(iii) C.T.F.74 will designate (by T.B.S.) ship which is to engage the target.

(c) COMMUNICATIONS.

Towing plane voice call TRACTOR.
C.T.F.74 (in "AUSTRALIA") voice call ZOG.
Frequency 3780 Kc/s.

(d) Movements on Completion.

(i) C.T.F.74 will order towing plane to return to base.

(ii) "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", carry out SERIAL THREE.

5. SERIAL THREE...../

5. SERIAL THREE (1500-1530) "AUSTRALIA" "SHROPSHIRE" SURFACE TRACKING EXERCISE.

(a) Initial positions and ZERO TIME will be signalled. General direction of advance will be Westerly.

(b) (i) At ZERO TIME:

"AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", pass through respective initial positions steering in general direction of advance.. Maximum speed allowed 23 knots.

(ii) Both ships make radical changes of course and speed. When changes are made, advise other ship by WARNING NET using British Self Evident Code (OECS, OESP, OECO, OSTA, etc.) as though reports emanate from a shadowing vessel.

(iii) Sub-calibre throw short may be fired if desired.

(c) The exercise will terminate by order of C.T.F.74.

(d) Movements on Completion.

At 1600, TASK FORCE 74 will concentrate in North entrance to CHINA STRAIT and will proceed into Northern CORAL SEA.

6. SERIAL FOUR (2000-2130) TASK FORCE 74 TASK FORCE 75 NIGHT TACTICAL EXERCISE.

(a) Objects.

(i) To exercise tactical handling of cruiser task forces in surface action at night.

(ii) To exercise all units in (simulated) night surface action.

(iii) To exercise starshell illumination and countermeasure by making funnel smoke.

(b) Forces taking part.

RED.	BLUE.
TASK FORCE 74	TASK FORCE 75

Maximum speeds allowed : CA & CL - 18 knots.
DD - 23 knots.

(c) General Idea.

(i) RED and BLUE FORCES are both making an offensive sweep in an area where cruiser and destroyer forces of both sides have been generally operating.

(ii) RED and BLUE both seek decisive action with any opposing forces encountered.

(d) Method of Execution.

(i) At 2000, BLUE FORCE will pass through Reference Point SAND (11°10'S, 150°30'E) steering between 240° and 300°.

(ii) At 2000, RED FORCE pass through approximate position 11°10'S, 150°05'E, steering between 060 and 120°.

(iii) RED and BLUE FORCES act in accordance with the General Idea.

(iv) Starshell may...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

6. SERIAL FOUR (Ctd)

(iv) Starshell may be fired but C.O's are to avoid excessive expenditure.

(v) In order to test funnel smoke counter-measure to starshell illumination, it is particularly desired that opposing units within starshell range, open up whether or not they would actually have done so in practice. Units illuminated by starshell will endeavour to counter with funnel smoke. Brief reports of the effectiveness of the smoke counter measure are to be forwarded to C.T.F.74 and C.T.F.75 on return to harbour.

(vi) SERIAL FOUR will terminate by order of C.T.F.74. C.T.F.75 is requested to advise C.T.F.74 when he is ready to cease the exercise.

(e) Movements on completion.

(i) TASK FORCES 74 and 75 act independently.
During the night TASK FORCE 74 remain to EASTWARD of longitude 150°30'E and TASK FORCE 75 to WESTWARD of this longitude.

(ii) "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" will cruise in company, generally to Southward.
DESTROYERS act independently, cruise in company under O.T.C. in "ARUNTA", keeping North of 11°35'S.

(iii) TASK FORCE 74 carry out SERIAL FIVE.

SATURDAY, 8TH APRIL.

7. SERIAL FIVE. (0400-0500) TASK FORCE 74 NIGHT TACTICAL EXERCISE.

(a) Forces taking part.

RED.	BLUE.
"AUSTRALIA"	"ARUNTA"
"SHROPSHIRE"	"WARRAMUNGA"
	"MULLANY"
	"AMMEN".

Maximum speeds allowed : Cruisers - 18 knots.
Destroyers - 23 knots.

(b) Objects.

(i) To exercise destroyers in night interception and attack.

(ii) To exercise all ships in night surface encounter.

(c) General Idea.

(i) RED FORCE retiring from bombardment mission is constrained to pass through CHINA STRAIT in daylight.

(ii) BLUE FORCE has reached an intercepting position between RED FORCE and CHINA STRAIT and has orders to attack RED FORCE before dawn.

(iii) At 0200, BLUE...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

7. SERIAL FIVE (Ctd.)

(iii) At 0200, BLUE tracking plane gave position of RED FORCE as 12°00'S, 150°50'E, course 345°, speed 17 knots.

(iv) O.T.C. BLUE decides to make his attack between 0400 and 0500.

(d) Method of Execution.

(i) At 0200, RED FORCE pass through position 12°00'S, 150°50'E, steering within 10° of 345° and at speed between 15 and 18 knots.

(ii) RED and BLUE FORCES act in accordance with the General Idea.

(iii) One ship in each RED and BLUE group turn on I.F.F. so that contacts may be differentiated from other shipping which may be in the area.

(iv) Starshell may be fired.

(v) SERIAL FIVE will terminate by order of C.T.F.74.

(e) Movements on Completion.

(i) "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE" proceed in company to BENTLEY ISLAND, prepare to carry out SERIAL SIX.

(ii) DESTROYERS enter by CHINA STRAIT, carry out SERIALS SEVEN, EIGHT and NINE, in local training areas.

8. SERIAL SIX "AUSTRALIA" "SHROPSHIRE" SHORE BOMBARDMENT.

(a) "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", put shore fire control parties on BENTLEY ISLAND and on completion bombardment practice by TASK FORCE 75 units, carry out bombardment.

(b) On completion, "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", re-embark S.F.C.P's and return to harbour.

9. SERIAL SEVEN. (0830-1000) "ARUNTA" "AMMEN" LONG RANGE A.A.FIRING.

(a) (i) Radar sleeve towed by Task Group 73.1 plane. Sleeve at maximum height or cloud base.

(ii) At 0830, "ARUNTA" and "AMMEN" in local training area BAKER steering Easterly.

(iii) Plane make direct attack (crossing) runs from alternate sides. Firing ships fire in turn or together in each run as desired.

(b) COMMUNICATIONS.

Towing plane voice call TRACTOR.
"ARUNTA" (OTC) voice call INCENSE.
Frequency 3780 Kc/s.

(c) Movements on Completion.

(i) O.T.C. order plane to return to base.

(ii) "ARUNTA" and "AMMEN" prepare for SERIAL NINE.

10. SERIAL EIGHT...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

10. SERIAL EIGHT. (AM & PM) "MULLANY" "WARRAMUNGA" A.S.EXERCISES WITH S.42.

(a) (i) At 0830, "MULLANY" and "WARRAMUNGA" rendezvous with S.42 and M.L. escort north of CHINA STRAIT.

(ii) O.T.C. in "MULLANY" release M.L. escort after rendezvous and embarkation of liaison officers. Carry out A/S exercises with S.42.

(b) Movements on completion.

(i) "MULLANY", "WARRAMUNGA", and S.42, return to harbour. "MULLANY" and "WARRAMUNGA" top off with fuel prior anchoring.

11. SERIAL NINE. (1000-1100) "ARUNTA" "AMMEN" CLOSE RANGE A.A. FIRING.

(a) (i) Sleeve target towed by "NASHVILLE" planes.

(ii) Planes rendezvous with firing ships at 1000 in area BAKER.

(iii) Course of firing ships Westerly.

(iv) Planes make one passing run each side followed by direct attack (crossing) runs from each beam for both ships.

(b) COMMUNICATIONS.

"NASHVILLE" planes voice calls PLATTER ONE and TWO.
"ARUNTA" (OTC) voice call INCENSE.
Frequency 3780 kc/s.

(c) Movements on Completion.

(i) O.T.C. in "ARUNTA" instruct "NASHVILLE" planes to act in accordance with previous instructions given by C.O., "NASHVILLE".

(ii) "ARUNTA" and "AMMEN" return to harbour, top off with fuel prior anchoring.

12. REPRESENTATION OF GUNFIRE AND TORPEDO FIRE.

In SERIALS FOUR and FIVE, gunfire will be represented by a short flash on a signalling projector at the time of firing each salvo.

Torpedo fire will be represented by the firing of a Green Very's light.

13. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

In all SERIALS, at discretion of Commanding Officers. Excessive expenditure of starshell is to be avoided.

14. TIMES - All times are ZONE - 10.

15. NAVAL OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, NEW GUINEA is requested:

(a) to issue necessary warnings regarding movements of Task Force 74 and to warn regarding all SERIALS in which gunfire is intended.
SERIAL FOUR; approximate time and position of encounter will be 2100 Friday, 7th April, 11°10'S, 150°20'E.

SERIAL FIVE...../

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SERIAL FIVE, approximate time and position of encounter will be 0430 Saturday 8th April,
$11^{\circ}20'S$, $150^{\circ}40'E$.

(b) to advise TASK FORCE 74 and TASK FORCE 75 of shipping likely to be met within 100 miles of CHINA STRAIT during night Friday 7th - Saturday 8th.

(c) to advise of names of tankers available MILNE BAY Saturday 8th for refuelling of forces.

(d) to arrange M.L. escort vide SERIALS THREE and TEN.

16. A.O.R. MILNE BAY is requested advise friendly aircraft to keep clear during SERIALS.

17. ANCHOR BERTHS.

"AUSTRALIA")
"SHROPSHIRE") as before.
"ARUNTA")

"WARRAMUNGA" - may secure alongside "AUSTRALIA".

"MULLANY") in vicinity KING line or nest inside boom
"AMMEN") as desired.

TASK FORCE 74 raise steam for 23 knots accordingly.

V. CRUTCHLEY

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

DISTRIBUTION.

"AUSTRALIA".....(4)
"SHROPSHIRE".....(4)
"ARUNTA".....(2)
"WARRAMUNGA".....(2)
"MULLANY".....(2)
"AMMEN".....(2)
C.T.F.75.....(1)
"PHOENIX".....(1)
"BOISE".....(1)
C.D.S.24.....(1)
C.T.F.72 Adv.Hq.....(1)
ComEsMinRon.....(2)
S.42.....(1)
C.T.G.73.1.....(1)
NOIC, NEW GUINEA.....(1)
A.O.R.MILNE BAY.....(1)
COMMANDER (D) MILNE BAY(1)
COMNAVBASE MILNE.....(1)
"NASHVILLE".....(2) for SERIAL NINE.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ENCLOSURE No. 1 TO LTF 74 AF 1140/38 of 27 Apl '44.

RESTRICTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

A.F.537/60. (See file 72/51/50) D.B. Bailey 29/11/60

H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
4 April, 1944.

TASK FORCE 74 - PRACTICE PROGRAMME.
(Short Title "JP")

INTENTION.

1. On Thursday, 6th April, TASK FORCE 74 will conduct underway exercises in local training areas B,C, D.

SORTIE.

2. (i) "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", underway independently so as to pass through initial positions for SERIAL ONE at 0800.

(ii) "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", "MULLANY", "AMMEN", underway as directed by Senior Officer in "ARUNTA" so as to be ready for SERIAL FIVE at 1115 having completed SERIAL FOUR.

3. SERIAL ONE. (0800-0830) "AUSTRALIA" "SHROPSHIRE" RADAR TRACKING EXERCISE.

(a) (i) Initial positions at 0800:

"AUSTRALIA" 10°23'S, 150°44'E.
"SHROPSHIRE" 180° six (6) miles from "AUSTRALIA".

(ii) At 0800, "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" proceed in general easterly direction of advance with complete freedom of manoeuvre. Maximum speed allowed - 23 knots.

(iii) Both ships make radical changes of course and speed. When changes are made, advise other ship by WARNING NET using British Self evident code (OECS, OESP, OPRT, etc.) as though the reports emanate from a shadowing vessel.

(iv) Sub-calibre throw short may be fired if desired.

(v) The exercise will terminate without signal at 0830.

(b) Movements on completion.

Ships will form column and proceed on Easterly course for SERIAL TWO.

4. SERIAL TWO. (0845-1015) "AUSTRALIA" "SHROPSHIRE" LONG RANGE A.A. FIRING.

(a) (i) Sleeve target towed by T.G.73.1 plane at maximum height or cloud base.

(ii) Plane rendezvous over area CHARLIE at 0845 ready to start runs.

(b) (i) Plane make direct attack (crossing) runs from alternate sides, passing over leading or rear ship as ordered.

(ii) One ship only will fire in each run.

(iii) C.T.F.74 will designate (by T.B.S.) ship which is to engage the target.

(c) COMMUNICATIONS. .../

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4. SERIAL TWO (Ctd)

(c) COMMUNICATIONS.

Towing plane voice call TRACTOR.
C.T.F.74 (in "AUSTRALIA") voice call ZOG.
Frequency 3780 Kc/s.

(d) Movements on completion.

(i) C.T.F.74 will order towing plane to return to base.

(ii) "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", carry out SERIAL THREE.

5. SERIAL THREE. (1015-1115) "AUSTRALIA" "SHROPSHIRE" CLOSE RANGE A.A. FIRING.

(a) (i) Sleeve target towed by "NASHVILLE" planes.

(ii) Planes rendezvous at 1015 in Area DOG. Firing ships will be in column on westerly course.

(iii) "NASHVILLE" planes make one passing run each side followed by direct attack (crossing) runs from each beam for both ships.

(b) COMMUNICATIONS.

"NASHVILLE" planes voice calls PLATTER ONE and TWO.
C.T.F.74 voice call ZOG.
Frequency 3780 Kc/s.

(c) Movements on completion.

(1) C.T.F.74 will order "NASHVILLE" planes to return to base.

(11) TASK FORCE 74 carry out SERIAL FIVE.

6. SERIAL FOUR "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", "MULLANY", "AMMEN". DIVISIONAL MANOEUVRES & SURFACE TRACKING.

(a) Destroyers Task Force 74 carry out Divisional manoeuvres and surface tracking exercise as arranged by O.T.C. in "ARUNTA". This SERIAL is to be completed in time to commence SERIAL FIVE at 1115.

7. SERIAL FIVE. (1115-1200) TASK FORCE 74 DESTROYER NIGHT ATTACK ON CRUISER UNITS.

(a) (i) Target line - "AUSTRALIA" "SHROPSHIRE" - maximum speed 18 knots.

Attack Force - "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", "MULLANY", "AMMEN".) Maximum speed 23 knots.

Night conditions are to be simulated - Visual sighting range 4 miles.

(ii) At 1115 Target line will pass through approximate position 225 MID SAND BEACON 3 miles steering to WESTWARD. It is to be assumed that target line is closely engaged with enemy ships to NORTHWARD.

(iii) Attack Force close from WESTWARD and execute torpedo attack pressed home on disengaged side against secondary battery fire when within visual range (4 miles). "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", each fire one torpedo with practice heads set to run under and set to run to 8000 yards.

(iv) Target line...../

7. SERIAL FIVE (Ctd)

(iv) Target line has freedom of manoeuvre to avoid torpedoes whilst continuing to engage enery to the northward.

(v) C.T.F.74 will give (by TBS) a timing signal for watches in CRUISERS, "ARUNTA", and "WARRAMUNGA", for record purposes.

(b) Movements on completion.

(i) All ships act independently. "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", recover torpedoes.
"AUSTRALIA" carry out SERIAL SIX commencing 1300.
"SHROPSHIRE" carry out SERIAL SEVEN commencing 1315.
"AMMEN" join "ARUNTA", return to harbour, carry out tracking exercise en route, as arranged by "ARUNTA" and keeping clear to WESTWARD of SERIAL EIGHT.
"WARRAMUNGA" join "MULLANY" carry out SERIAL EIGHT.

8. SERIAL SIX (1300-1415) "AUSTRALIA" ADJUSTMENT OF MAGNETIC COMPASSES.

(a) "AUSTRALIA" carry out adjustment of magnetic compasses in northern half of Area DOG.
(b) On completion, carry out SERIAL NINE.

9. SERIAL SEVEN (1330-1430) "SHROPSHIRE" (a) 4" DIRECT BOMBARDMENT.
(b) 4" RADAR CALIBRATION (Radar shell)

(a) "SHROPSHIRE" in southern half area DOG carry out 4" direct bombardment of SHORTLAND ISLAND and 4" radar calibration using radar shell.

(b) Movements on completion.

Carry out SERIAL TEN in Area DOG.

10. SERIAL EIGHT. (1315-1430) "MULLANY" "WARRAMUNGA" CLOSE RANGE A.A. FIRING.

(a) (i) Sleeve Target towed by "PHOENIX" planes.
(ii) Planes rendezvous at 1330 in Area CHARLIE; firing ships in column on westerly course.
(iii) Planes make one passing run each side followed by direct attack (crossing) runs from each beam for both ships.

(b) COMMUNICATIONS.
"PHOENIX" planes voice calls DORMER ONE and TWO.
"MULLANY" (OTC) voice call BANGLE.
Frequency 3095 Kc/s.

(c) Movements on completion.

(i) "WARRAMUNGA" recover sleeve.
(ii) "MULLANY" direct planes rendezvous with "SHROPSHIRE" for SERIAL TEN in Area DOG.
(iii) "MULLANY", "WARRAMUNGA", carry out SERIAL ELEVEN.

11. SERIAL NINE. (1430-1600) "AUSTRALIA" 8" FIRING AT GRANT ISLAND.

(a) "AUSTRALIA" in eastern part of Area CHARLIE, carry out 8" Full Charge firing at GRANT ISLAND with full radar control.

(b) Movements on completion.
Return to harbour.

12. SERIAL TEN...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

12. SERIAL TEN. (1445-1530) "SHROPSHIRE" SIMULATED TORPEDO ATTACKS WITH A.B.U. FIRING.

(a) (i) At 1445 "PHOENIX" planes (released on completion of SERIAL EIGHT) and "BOISE" planes, rendezvous with "SHROPSHIRE" in Area DOG.

(ii) Planes make co-ordinated (simulated) torpedo attacks on "SHROPSHIRE".

(iii) "SHROPSHIRE" exercise use of auto-barrage unit (A.B.U.) firing tubes from turrets.

(b) COMMUNICATIONS.

Leader "PHOENIX" planes voice call DORMER ONE.
Leader "BOISE" planes voice call CABLE ONE.
"SHROPSHIRE" voice call ALWIN.
Frequency 3095 Kc/s.

(c) Movements on Completion.

Return to harbour.

13. SERIAL ELEVEN. (1430-1600) "MULLANY" "WARRAMUNGA" LONG RANGE A.A. FIRING.

(a) (i) Sleeve target towed by T.G.73.1 plane at maximum height or cloud base.

(ii) Firing ships in Areas BAKER and CHARLIE.

(iii) Plane rendezvous at 1430 ready to start runs.

(b) (i) Plane make direct attack (crossing) runs from alternate sides.

(ii) One or both ships will fire in each run as ordered by O.T.C.

(c) COMMUNICATIONS.

Towing plane voice call TRACTOR.
"MULLANY" (OTC) voice call BANGLE.
Frequency 3780 Kc/s.

(d) Movements on completion.

(i) O.T.C. will order towing plane to return to base.

(ii) "MULLANY", "WARRAMUNGA", return to harbour.

14. TIMES - All times are ZONE - 10.

15. NAVAL OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, NEW GUINEA is requested to issue necessary warnings regarding SERIALS 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 11.
A.O.R. MILNE BAY is requested to warn friendly aircraft to keep clear during SERIALS 2, 3, 8 and 11.

16. ANCHOR BERTHS...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

16. ANCHOR BERTHS on return to harbour.

As before.

17. FUELLING - Topping off with fuel will be deferred until return to harbour on Saturday, 8th April.

18. TASK FORCE 74 raise steam for 23 knots accordingly.

V. CRUTCHLEY

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

DISTRIBUTION.

"AUSTRALIA".....(4)
"SHROPSHIRE".....(4)
"ARUNTA".....(2)
"WARRAMUNGA".....(2)
"MULLANY".....(2)
"AMMEN".....(2)
C.T.F.75.....(1)
"PHOENIX".....(2) - for SERIALS EIGHT & TEN.
"NASHVILLE".....(2) - for SERIAL THREE.
"BOISE".....(2) - for SERIAL TEN.
COMDESRON 24.....(1)
COMESMINRON.....(1)
C.T.F.72 (Adv.Hq).....(1)
C.T.G.73.1.....(2) - for SERIALS TWO & ELEVEN.
COMMANDER (D) MILNE BAY...(1)
N.O.I.C. NEW GUINEA.....(1)
A.O.R. MILNE BAY.....(1)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ENCLOSURE No. 4 To bTF74 AF1140/38 dd 27 Apl 44.

TOP SECRET.

A.F.1060/36.

H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
13 April, 1944.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER 2-44.

TASK ORGANISATION.

Task Force 74 - Rear Admiral CRUTCHLEY.

"AUSTRALIA"
"SHROPSHIRE"
"ARUNTA") DD Section ABLE.
"WARRAMUNGA") DD Section ABLE.
"MULLANY") DD Section BAKER.
"AMMEN") DD Section BAKER.

Commander Destroyers T.F.74 - Commander BUCHANAN in "ARUNTA".

INFORMATION.

1. (a) This Operation Order is derived from Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan 4-44 and Commander Task Force 77 Operation Plan 3-44.

(b) South West Pacific Forces covered and supported by Fifth Fleet will seize and occupy by simultaneous overwater operations, the AITAPE - HUMBOLDT BAY - TANAHMERAH BAY areas of NEW GUINEA; isolate hostile forces to the eastward; establish at AITAPE minor air and naval facilities and in the HUMBOLDT - TANAMERAH BAY areas a major air base, minor naval base and an intermediate supply base, for the purpose of supporting further operations to the Westward.

2. Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan 4 - 44 assigns to TASK FORCES 74 and 75 the following operational tasks:-

(a) During approach and assault,

Task Forces 74 and 75 act under the operational control of Commander Attack Force as escort and fire support groups.

(b) On release by Commander Attack Force about 1800 D-day,

TASK FORCE 74 join TASK GROUP 78.2, TASK FORCE 75 join TASK GROUP 78.1.
Task Forces 74, 75 and 78, form the Naval Covering Force, Seventh Fleet. NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN issued by Commander Allied Naval Forces is reproduced as ANNEX TWO to this Operation Order

3. TASK FORCE 74 will

(a) On D-7 day arrive SUDEST and report to Commander Attack Force (CTF 77).

(b) Depart SUDEST in such time as to rendezvous with Attack Forces in position 1°35'S, 146°35'E (Point GUN) at 0700 on D-2 day, having had destroyers top off with fuel in ADMIRALTY ISLANDS area.

(c) During the ...../

(c) During the approach and assault, act under the operational control of Commander Attack Force as escort and fire support group. Refer C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 3 - 44.

(d) When released by Commander Attack Force at about 1800 on D-day, proceed so as to rendezvous with TASK GROUP 78.2 in daylight on D plus 1 day and then operate in accordance with NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN (Annex Two)

4. D-DAY - APPROACH AND SUPPORT BOMBARDMENT.

Refer Charts (i) NOORDKUST NIEUW-GUINEE
Van de WAKDE-EILANDEN tot de GRENS

(ii) MATTERER-BAAI tot TANAH-MERAH-BAAI
(Reprint from DUTCH CHART 379)

(iii) B.A.CHART 3250 - Cape D'URVILLE to WUVULU ISLAND.

(a) TASK FORCE 74 will be with the WESTERN ATTACK GROUP (TASK GROUP 77.1), which will land troops at TANAH MERAH BAY. Until released at about 1800 on D-day, Task Force 74 will act under the operational control of Commander WESTERN ATTACK GROUP (C.T.G.77.1).

(b) Western Attack Order No.1-44 issued by Commander Western Attack Group is distributed under the same cover as C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 3-44. Western Attack Order No.1-44 becomes effective upon parting Company with Central Attack Group (Task Group 77.2) at 0130 D-day.

(c) At 0400 on D-day T.F.74 (T.U. 77.1.5 - Fire Support Group A) will act independently in accordance with Western Attack Order No.1-44 and will disengage to the Westward - cruisers in column, destroyers in A/S screen ("ARUNTA" 1, "AMMEN" 2, "WARRAMUNGA" 3, "MULLANY" 4). Course and speed will be ordered by T.B.S..

(d) The time and direction of approach to enter Fire Support Areas will be governed by the landfall. However it is my intention:-

(i) At H-1h 30 "AUSTRALIA", with "SHROPSHIRE" in company 1000 yards on port beam, pass 1800 yards off KIAKEBO ISLAND steering 130° at 10 knots.

(ii) At H-1h 10 "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE", by signal, turn together to 040° and take the way off the ships. Owing to the lack of manoeuvring room in Fire Support Area No.6, "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" will be stopped whilst carrying out scheduled bombardment. Selected firing positions are:-

"AUSTRALIA"	085°	3800 yards from TG WANJA.
"SHROPSHIRE"	076°	4600 yards from TG WANJA.

(iii) DESTROYERS will have been released by signal and will enter Fire Support Areas as follows:-

"ARUNTA":- independently enter Fire Support Area No.6 so as to be underway, between KIAKEBO and TG WANJA, 3000 yards off the coast, at H-1hr.

"WARRAMUNGA" :- independently enter Fire Support Area No.6 so as to be stopped in firing position 050 TG WANJA 2500 yards at H-1hr.

"ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA"...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

"ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA" keep westward of cruisers during their approach to firing positions.
"MULLANY", "AMMEN" - as a unit, keep clear to northwestward of cruisers, "ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA" when they are taking up firing positions in Fire Support Area No.6. Then pass east of "ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA" and west and south of cruisers in time to enter Fire Support Area No.5 at H-36 mins..

(e) Details regarding Bombardment are given in ANNEX NO.3 - FIRE SUPPORT PLAN.

(f) MOVEMENTS ON COMPLETION OF SCHEDULED BOMBARDMENT.

(i) "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA" complete scheduled bombardment at H-30 mins. and will be ordered form Cruising Disposition V2.

"AUSTRALIA" Position 1. "SHROPSHIRE" Position 2.
"ARUNTA" 1. "WARRAMUNGA" 2.

AXIS - 310°

(ii) When "MULLANY" and "AMMEN" join on being relieved in Fire Support Area Five by Fire Support Unit Five, stations in V2 will be as follows:-

"AUSTRALIA" Position 1. "SHROPSHIRE" Position 2.
"ARUNTA" 1. "AMMEN" 2.
"MULLANY" 3. "WARRAMUNGA" 4.

AXIS 310°

(iii) Formation will be manoeuvred in general vicinity of Fire Support Area No.6. All alterations of course will be made by TURN signal.

5. WHEN RELEASED BY COMMANDER ATTACK FORCE.

About 1800 on D-day - TASK FORCE 74 will shape course to rendezvous with TASK GROUP 78.2 in daylight on D plus 1 in position yet to be designated by him. NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN issued by Commander Allied Naval Forces and reproduced as ANNEX TWO to this Operation Order is the plan under which Task Forces 74, 75 and 78 will operate subsequent to D-day.

6. OPERATIONS AS A COVERING FORCE.

(a) In accordance with ANNEX TWO.
(b) U.S.F.10A should be studied in regard to operations with Carrier Task Forces.
(c) Attention is drawn to paragraph (X)(1) of ANNEX TWO.
(d) Fleet Air Wing 17 is under the operational control of Commander Advanced Echelon Fifth Air Force. Commander Allied Naval Forces will arrange for "TOMCAT" co-operation with cruiser covering forces as necessary.

7. ALL TIMES in this Operation Order are ZONE - 10 (KING).

8. D-day is tentatively set at 22nd April and H-hour at 0700K.

9. Communications in accordance with

(a) USF70A, (b) USF10A, Appendix 6 corrected by P.I.2,
(c) CANF COMPLAN 2-44, (d) ANNEX "J" to C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 3-44 (as applicable).

10...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

10. Special JAN GRID for this operation is established with origin 5°S latitude 144°E longitude. Sides 300 minutes.

11. This Operation Order effective upon receipt.

V. CRUTCHLEY.

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

ANNEX ONE - FIRE SUPPORT PLAN.
ANNEX TWO - NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN (reproduced from C.A.N.F. Operation Plan 4-44).
ANNEX THREE - SUMMARY OF LATEST INTELLIGENCE (to be issued about D-4).
ANNEX FOUR - REFERENCE POINTS (reproduced from C.A.N.F. Operation Plan 4-44).

DISTRIBUTION:

"AUSTRALIA".....(4)
"SHROPSHIRE".....(4)
"ARUNTA".....(2)
"WARRAMUNGA".....(2)
"MULLANY".....(2)
"AMMEN".....(2)
COMMANDER 7TH FLEET. Adv.HQ(5). Less ANNEXES TWO, THREE and FOUR.
C.T.F.77.....(2) Less ANNEXES TWO, THREE and FOUR.
C.T.F.75.....(1) Less ALL ANNEXES.
COMDESRON 24.....(1) Less ANNEXES THREE and FOUR.
COMMANDER 7TH FLEET. AdMin.(5) Less ANNEXES TWO, THREE and FOUR.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NO.1 - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 2 - 44.

FIRE SUPPORT PLAN.

To be read in conjunction with (a) ANNEX "C" TO WESTERN ATTACK ORDER NO.1-44 AND APPENDICES THERETO, and
(b) ANNEX "C" TO C.T.F.77 OPERATION PLAN NO.3-44.

1. INTENTION:

T.F.74 will bombard targets in the vicinity of TANAHMERAH BAY in accordance with the above references. The following instructions are supplementary to basic orders.

2. INFORMATION:

Intelligence data is meagre. There is no indication of enemy installations, but activity has been observed in target areas 176 and 191.

3. METHOD:

(a) Cruisers will bombard whilst stopped in a position close to the SOUTHEAST boundary of F.S.A.6 and heading about 040°; ships 5 cables apart with "SHROPSHIRE" to the Northward.

(b) "WARRAMUNGA" will bombard targets 214 and 215 between H-60 mins. and H-30 mins using 150 rounds 4.7" H.E. Fire need not be continuous. Ship is to be stopped between 3000 and 4000 yards 340° from Target 214.

(c) "ARUNTA" will bombard KIAKEBO POINT Area between H-60 mins. and H-30 mins. using 150 rounds 4.7" H.E.. Fire need not be continuous. Ship is to be underway between KIAKEBO POINT and Tg. WANJA and about 3000 yards off the coast.

(d) "MULLANY" and "AMMEN" will pass South of cruisers at H-36, and will commence bombarding at H-30 using guns which will bear until in Longitude 140° 20' E, when all guns will be brought to bear, and ships stopped.
"MULLANY" engage Targets 168 and 169, and
"AMMEN" engage Targets 170, 171, 173 as in Annex C to Western Attack Order 1-44.

4. GENERAL:

(a) Target Coverage: Method of covering targets is at discretion of Commanding Officers.
(b) Counter Battery: Fire on scheduled targets or other area neutralisation targets is secondary to Counter Battery Fire. If Counter Battery Targets requiring cruiser fire arise, "SHROPSHIRE" take responsibility for targets North of boat lane, and "AUSTRALIA" for those South of boat lane.
(c) Lookouts: ALL upper deck personnel not otherwise employed are to be used as additional lookouts, to report retaliation, enemy posts, or activities on shore.
(d) All ships will open fire at scheduled time without signal unless otherwise directed.
"WARRAMUNGA" and "ARUNTA" may subsequently check fire on their assigned targets if it appears that they do not warrant expenditure of full ammunition allowance.
(e) Charges: Cruisers are to use reduced charges between H-60 mins. and H-30 mins., and are to revert to full charge settings at first opportunity after H-30 mins.

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(f) Convergence: Guns are to be parallel in area shoots.

(g) Grid: The grid on Gunfire Target Area Chart issued as Appendix 2 (Sheet 1) to C.T.F.77 Op. Plan 3-44 is NOT accurate and is NOT to be used for Fire Control. The standard grid for the operation is the yard grid on the 1:20000 Photomaps of the area.

(h) Communications: "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" pass to C.T.F.74 any tactical information obtained on the S.F.C.P. frequencies. "AUSTRALIA" guard 3375 Kc/s and "SHROPSHIRE" guard 3195 Kc/s between 0700 and 1800 D-Day with loud speaker watch ONLY.

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ANNEX TWO - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 2-44.

NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN.

This plan is reproduced from Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan No. 4-44.

TASK ORGANIZATION.

Commander Seventh Fleet.	Vice Admiral Kinkaid.
Covering Force.	Vice Admiral Kinkaid.
(a) Task Force 74.	Rear Admiral Crutchley.
"SHROPSHIRE", "AUSTRALIA"	2 CA
"WARRAMUNGA", "ARUNTA", "AMMEN", "MULLANY".	4 DD
(b) Task Force 75.	Rear Admiral Berkey.
Crudiv 15.	3 CL
Desron 24, less "AMMEN", "MULLANY"	6 DD
(c) Task Force 78.	Rear Admiral Davison.
Task Group 78.1	Rear Admiral Ragsdale.
CarDiv 22.	4 CVE
DesRon 2 plus "LANSDOWNE", "LARDNER"	8 DD
Task Group 78.2	Rear Admiral Davison.
CarDiv 24	4 CVE
DesRon 48	9 DD

1. The General Situation and probable enemy dispositions are in accordance with Annex B to Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan No. 4-44.

(a) Situation:

(1) ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and EMIRAU are under our control. SEEADLER HARBOUR is in use as a base by our forces. Air has been established and is operating from MOMOTE. Our surface forces and air operations have severed enemy communication lines from the north and west into BISMARCK SEA. Our eastern flank is secure.

(2) The Fifth Fleet will:
- (a) Destroy enemy naval and air forces and merchant shipping at PALAU and mine entrance channels
- (b) Destroy or contain enemy naval forces.
- (c) Without prejudice to the foregoing which is the governing task, the Fifth Fleet will commencing on D-1 day and extending until D plus 2 day with Fast Carrier aircraft:
  - (1) Neutralize enemy airdromes in the HOLLANDIA WAKDE ISLAND area.
  - (2) Provide air support for the attack on TANAH MERAH BAY and HUMBOLDT BAY.
- (d) Local coordination will be arranged by the Commander Seventh Fleet.

(b) Enemy Capabilities:

It is considered that the most probable enemy reaction will consist of an attempt to disrupt and destroy our effort:

(1) By vigorous air attack, initially by the land-based air forces now present in the immediate theater of operations and later by reinforcement of land-based air from the N.E.I. theater and the PHILIPPINE - HALMAHERA theater.

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(b) (2) By submarine attacks upon targets of opportunity.
(3) By intervention of light naval forces (cruiser, destroyer task forces) from the Western Carolines, Philippines, or Halmahera areas.

HUMBOLDT BAY to	TRUK	885 miles -	35.5 hrs. at 25 kts.
	PALAU	700 miles -	28 hrs. at 25 kts.
	DAVAO	1080 miles -	44 hrs. at 25 kts.
	HALMAHERA	750 miles -	30 hrs. at 25 kts.

(c) Our Capabilities:

Our air searches, unless prevented by weather, should give us early advance information of any enemy surface forces approaching the landing areas. Our submarines will be so dispersed as to provide maximum offensive reconnaissance in areas most productive of intelligence of enemy movements into our theater of operations, and for offensive action against the enemy. Our Black Cats will conduct night searches within the limits of their capabilities. Our Escort Carrier and Cruiser Forces are mutually supporting in this operation. The Cruisers by joining the Escort Carriers are able to take advantage of the Escort Carrier Air Cover. A Cruiser Force with its escorts also provides to the Escort Carrier Force better security against enemy submarines, air and surface attacks. This plan is therefore based upon use of Cruiser and Escort Carrier Forces operating in conjunction.

2. This Force will:

(a) Destroy enemy forces which may threaten our convoys and our landing operations.
(b) Destroy enemy surface forces threatening night attacks upon our positions in the TANAH MERAH BAY - HUMBOLDT BAY - AITAPE areas.
(c) Provide cover for landings and close air support as practicable to ground forces in the TANAH MERAH BAY - HUMBOLDT BAY area, in order to safeguard our forces engaged in the HOLLANDIA operation.

3. (a) Task Force 74. Escort and fire support group during the approach and assault, rendezvous with Task Group Seventy Eight point Two during daylight D plus 1 at a point to be designated by Commander Task Group Seventy Eight point Two. Thereafter operate under the operational control of Commander Task Group Seventy Eight point Two except by prepared to conduct night sweeps and special bombardment missions as directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

(b) Task Force 75. escort and fire support group during the approach and assault, rendezvous with Task Group Seventy Eight point One during daylight at a point to be designated by Commander Task Group Seventy Eight point One about D plus 1. Thereafter, operate under the operational control of Commander Task Group Seventy Eight point One except be prepared to conduct night sweeps and special bombardment missions as directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

(c) Task Group 78.1. When released by Commander Attack Force as Close Support group during the approach and assault on Blue beach on D day retire toward ADMIRALTY ISLANDS for replenishment. Rendezvous with Task Force Seventy-Five during daylight enroute or at a point to be designated by you about D plus 1. Fuel DDs at sea or from tankers in ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and replenish ammunition as necessary. Depart in time to arrive northward of Red and White beaches by dawn on D plus five relieve Task Group Seventy Eight point Two and take over cover mission. Destroy enemy surface forces which may threaten our convoys and landing operations and deny enemy seaborne reinforcement and supply. Provide air cover over landing operations and provide air

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striking groups in the general area Red and White beaches, and provide air cover over Fourth Convoy about D plus seven as practicable and commensurate with the tactical situation. Provide own air cover and anti-submarine patrols. Provide air cover for Allied Air Force bombers over the target area as arranged by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

(d) Task Group 78.2. When released by Commander Attack Force as Close Support group during the approach and assault on Blue Beach about D plus one retire to the North and fuel destroyers as practicable. Rendezvous with Task Force Seventy-Four during daylight D plus one at a point to be designated by you. Return from fueling area to arrive northward of Red and White beaches when Fast Carriers withdrawn from area but not later than dawn of D plus three and take over covering mission. Destroy enemy surface forces which may threaten our convoys and landing operations and deny enemy seaborne reinforcement and supply. Provide air cover over landing operations and provide air striking groups in the general area Red and White beaches as practicable and commensurate with the tactical situation. Provide own air cover and anti-submarine patrols. Provide air cover for Allied Air Force bombers over the target area as arranged by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

When relieved by Task Group Seventy Eight Point One dawn of D plus five; or earlier if directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces, retire toward ADMIRALTY ISLANDS for replenishment. Fuel DDs at sea or from tankers in ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and replenish ammunition as necessary. Depart in time to provide air cover for Fourth Convoy daylight period prior to the landing if practicable, and to cover landing operations at Red and White Beaches on D plus eight, D plus nine, D plus ten as requested by Convoy Commanders.

(x) (1) Task Force Seventy-Four and Seventy-Five or units thereof will be prepared to conduct night sweeps and special bombardment missions as directed by Commander Allied Naval Force. It is presently planned to conduct bombardment of airdromes and enemy installations on WAKDE ISLAND and SARMI if activated one or more times during this operation.

(2) When land-based fighters are firmly established at AITAPE, escort carriers will be withdrawn. If necessary, supplemental orders will be issued to cover operations subsequent to D plus ten by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

(3) Commanders Task Forces Seventy-Four and Seventy-Five arrange with Commander Task Force Seventy-Seven to top off DDs in ADMIRALTY ISLANDS on D minus three if practicable.

4. Fuel and ammunition available at ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and FINSCHHAFEN.

5. (a) Cruiser Task Forces (TF 74, 75) while operating in conjunction with Escort Carrier Task Groups are under the tactical command of the respective Commanders of the Escort Carrier Groups.
(b) Escort Carrier Groups when operating in the same general area and with a common mission will be under the tactical command of the Commander Escort Carrier Force.
(c) Communications accordance Annex D to Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan Number 4-44.
(d) Use Minus Ten Zone Time.
(e) Commander Allied Naval Forces at Headquarters - to be announced later.

~~APPENDIX.~~ 1. ~~Predicted Employment of Covering Forces.~~

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TOP SECRET.

A.F.1060/36.

H.M.A S."AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
17 April, 1944.

TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 2 - 44.
CHANGE NO. 1.

Commander, Seventh Fleet, has ordered following change to his NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN (ANNEX TWO to C.T.F.74 Oporder 2-44):

Paragraph 3(c): Change first sentence to read:-

"When released by Commander Attack Force as close support group during the approach and assault on BLUE beach on DOG PLUS ONE DAY retire towards ADMIRALTY ISLANDS for replenishment."

and has instructed that:

TASK GROUPS 78.1 and 78.2 carry out remainder of schedule set forth in paragraph 3(c) and 3(d) as far as practicable.

Also that TASK FORCE 75 - paragraph 3(b) - when re-released retire to ADMIRALTY ISLANDS independently and join TASK GROUP 78.1 there or at a point to be designated by C.T.G.78.1.

Commander Attack Force has been further instructed to release TASK GROUP 78.1 as soon as situation will permit.

V. CRUTCHLEY

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER, TASK FORCE 74.

DISTRIBUTION:

"AUSTRALIA".....(4)
"SHROPSHIRE".....(4)
"ARUNTA".....(2)
"WARRAMUNGA".....(2)
"MULIA NY".....(2)
"AMMEN".....(2)

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ENCLOSURE No. 3 TO C.T.F. 74 A.F. 1140/38 of 27 Apl. '44

S E C R E T.

FROM: The Commander, Task Force 74, H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA".

TO: The Commander, Task Force 77, U.S.S. "BLUE RIDGE".

DATE: 23 April, 1944. No. A.F.1140/38.

SUBJECT: TASK FORCE 74 - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS COVERING PERIOD 15TH APRIL, 1944, TO 23RD APRIL, 1944.

1. The following report of proceedings of Task Force 74, covering the period 15th April, 1944, to 23rd April, 1944, when under your operational command, is forwarded.

SATURDAY, 15TH APRIL.

2. At 0630, Task Force 74 composed:

H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA" (Captain E.F.V.DECHAINEUX, R.A.N.)
H.M.A.S."SHROPSHIRE" (Captain J.A.COLLINS, R.A.N.)
H.M.A.S."ARUNTA" (Commander A.E.BUCHANAN, R.A.N.)
H.M.A.S."WARRAMUNGA" (Commander N.A.MACKINNON, R.A.N.)
U.S.S. "MULLANY" (Commander B.J.MULLANEY, U.S.N.)
U.S.S. "AMMEN" (Commander H. WILLIAMS, Jr., U.S.N.)

Arrived at SUDEST and reported for duty to Commander Task Force 77 in "BLUE RIDGE".

Task Force 74 had sailed from MILNE BAY the previous afternoon and had proceeded to SUDEST by RAVEN CHANNEL and coastal route.

SUNDAY, 16TH APRIL.

3. During the forenoon, a conference of Commanding Officers was held on board "AUSTRALIA" to discuss pending operations.

MONDAY, 17TH APRIL.

4. Task Force 74 at SUDEST.

TUESDAY, 18TH APRIL.

5. At 0600, Task Force 74 sailed from SUDEST proceeding to SEEADLER to top off with fuel prior to joining the ATTACK FORCE on 20th April (D-2) for "RECKLESS" operation.

WEDNESDAY, 19TH APRIL.

6. At 1100, Task Force 74 entered SEEADLER Harbour and all ships topped off with fuel from tankers "VICTORIA" and "LEOPARD".

At 1800, the force sailed from SEEADLER and during the night cruised generally to the north westward.

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OPERATION "RECKLESS".
(Refer Commander Task Force 77 Operation Plan 3-44 and Commander Task Force 74 Operation Order 2-44.)

THURSDAY, 20TH APRIL (D minus 2)

7. At 0700, units of the ATTACK FORCE, including Task Force 74, joined company in vicinity of point GUN (1°35'S, 146°35'E). ATTACK FORCE Cruising Disposition was formed by order of the ATTACK FORCE Commander (C.T.F.77 in "SWANSON") and the whole force proceeded.

8. During the day, the ATTACK FORCE was covered by fighter aircraft from ADMIRALTY ISLANDS.

9.

0800	01°25'S,	146°20'E.
1200	01°07'S,	145°54'E.
2000	0°52'S,	144°44'E.

FRIDAY, 21ST APRIL (D minus 1)

10. Task Force 74 proceeding with ATTACK FORCE.
During the day, A/S air patrols and combat air patrols were provided by Task Force 78 (eight CVE) which operated generally astern of the ATTACK FORCE cruising disposition.

11. During the afternoon the EASTERN ATTACK GROUP which would make the assault at BLUE beach was detached and headed towards AITAPE.

12. At 1800, Task Force 74 with the APAs, LSD, LCIs and 4 DDs (including flagship of ATTACK FORCE Commander) of the WESTERN ATTACK GROUP increased speed and drew ahead of the CENTRAL ATTACK GROUP and other units of WESTERN ATTACK GROUP.

13. At about 2030, aircraft contacts were detected by "AUSTRALIA" S.G. radar, about 20 miles ahead.
Plotting showed these planes to be manoeuvring as though forming up. Contact was lost with the planes proceeding in the general direction of HOLLANDIA. Shore-based aircraft of Fifth Air Force were scheduled to strike HOLLANDIA during the night and it was thought that the aircraft contacts may have been of planes in this strike.
At about this time, a flickering glow in the sky over HOLLANDIA, 50 miles away, was evidence that fires had already been started by Fifth Air Force planes.

14.

0800	01°07'S,	143°04'E.
1200	01°20'S,	142°32'E.
2000	01°52'S,	141°22'E.

SATURDAY, 22ND APRIL (D day)

15. At 0300, when 11 miles in the offing of TANAMERAH BAY, Commander RED ATTACK FORCE released Task Force 74.
Task Force 74 disengaged to the westward with cruisers in column and destroyers in A/S screen. The night was moonless and there were rain showers along the coast but all prominent features were showing clearly on the P.P.I. of the S.G. radar and navigational position and reckoning were never in doubt.
A shore light of unknown character was showing in DEMTA BAY.

16. At 0425...../

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16. At 0425, when off BESAR ISLAND and no surface contact had been made, Task Force 74 returned to the eastward to enter respective fire support areas.

The final approach to the fire support areas was made exactly in accordance with the intentions outlined in my Operation Order 2-44.

17. At 0600, "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" commenced scheduled bombardment of shore targets.

Task Force 74 destroyers carried out their bombardments in accordance with schedule.

There was no return fire and no spectacular results. No targets of opportunity were observed. Expenditure of ammunition in this scheduled bombardment was as follows:-

"AUSTRALIA"	269	8-inch H.E.
"SHROPSHIRE"	285	8-inch H.E.
"ARUNTA"	75	4.7-inch H.E.
"WARRAMUNGA"	88	4.7-inch H.E.
"MULLANY"	275	5"(38) A.A.C.,
	783	40 m.m.
	396	20 m.m.
"AMMEN"	292	5"(38) A.A.C.

"ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA" target areas were obviously desolate and did not warrant further expenditure of ammunition.

18. At 0630, on completion of scheduled bombardment, "AUSTRALIA", "SHROPSHIRE", "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", formed A.A. disposition and commenced covering patrol in the vicinity of the transports. "MULLANY" and "AMMEN" joined the disposition when, on completion of their scheduled bombardment they were relieved in their fire support area by "NICHOLSON" and "GILLESPIE".

19. Operations at TANAHMERAH BAY were apparently proceeding satisfactorily. Fighter cover and support aircraft being provided by CVs and CVLs of Task Group 58.3 arrived on station and the landings at RED ONE and RED TWO beaches were made on schedule and without opposition.

20. Shortly before 0900, I intercepted a report from a support aircraft advising of the sighting of a cargo ship, barges and activity in a bay about 12 miles north west of RED beach. From the chart it appeared that DEMTA and MOERIS bays probably contained the craft referred to in this report.

21. Commander WESTERN ATTACK FORCE gave approval to take "AUSTRALIA", "ARUNTA" and "AMMEN", to investigate this report and I proceeded with these ships after instructing "SHROPSHIRE" to take charge of "MULLANY" and "WARRAMUNGA" and to continue covering patrol.

22. When the entrance to DEMTA BAY was open, it was seen that there were three luggers or large barges inside the bay and that at the head of the bay there were many substantial buildings of native type construction, which might be in use by the enemy as storehouses.

Support Aircraft were making low strafing runs on the barges (luggers) and fires had been started in two of the three.

"AUSTRALIA", "ARUNTA" and "AMMEN" engaged targets in DEMTA BAY in turn. An area bombardment of the buildings area was undertaken with "AUSTRALIA" 8-inch and some fires were started. "AUSTRALIA" 4-inch and destroyers guns got all three barges (luggers) well alight. One blew up and another burnt so fiercely with dense

black smoke...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

black smoke that it is thought probable that it was loaded with some type of fuel oil or spirit.

At this time "GRAYSON" stationed seaward of TANAHMERAH BAY and carrying out duties of fighter director ship reported sighting two barges North West of BESAR ISLAND and I detached "AMMEN" to investigate this report.

As "AUSTRALIA" finished firing at targets in DEMTA BAY, two barges - one being of large size - were seen in MOERIS BAY and were taken under fire with "AUSTRALIA" 4-inch. Both barges were hit and set afire. No personnel were seen but the smaller barge was underway when first sighted and therefore a crew at least must have been on board.

At the head of this bay, too, there were large native type buildings suitable as storehouses and I directed "ARUNTA" to take them under fire, whilst in "AUSTRALIA" I returned to resume command of the covering patrol.

No personnel, native or enemy, had been seen whilst the targets in DEMTA and MOERIS Bays were being engaged. However, aircraft had reported enemy activity in the area; the barge or lugger which exploded and the one which burnt so fiercely most probably contained inflammables which one would not expect natives to possess; the light sighted in DEMTA BAY during Task Force 74 sweep to the westward prior to entering fire support areas, might well have been a sign of enemy unloading operations: enemy interest in DEMTA and MOERIS BAYS had been noted in intelligence reports. There must therefore be the possibility that the gunfire employed on targets in DEMTA and MOERIS Bays produced results in destruction and enemy casualties far exceeding those actually observed.

Credit for the destruction of the three barges or luggers in DEMTA BAY must be shared by aircraft, "AUSTRALIA", "ARUNTA" and "AMMEN". "AUSTRALIA" and "ARUNTA" share credit for destruction of two in MOERIS BAY. "AMMEN" was unassisted in destroying one barge and one 100 foot small ship westward of BESAR ISLAND.

23. On rejoining the covering patrol, I found that a small boat had been sighted seaward of Cape TANAMERAH and that "SHROPSHIRE" had sent "MULLANY" to investigate. The boat was found to contain Sergeant LANCELOT, only survivor of a Dutch and A.I.F. intelligence party, landed in the area some time previously by U.S.submarine "DACE", and four friendly natives. "MULLANY" embarked this party, proceeded into TANAHMERAH BAY and transferred them to "SWANSON", flagship of Commander WESTERN ATTACK FORCE. "MULIANY" then rejoined covering patrol.

24. "ARUNTA" rejoined at about Noon, reporting that the two barges in MOERIS BAY had been hit again and that further fires had been started in the building area at the head of the bay.

25. Returning from BESAR ISLAND vicinity, "AMMEN" also put some shots into MOERIS BAY. Regarding the barges reported by "GRAYSON" which "AMMEN" had been sent to investigate, he reported that two craft had been sighted and dealt with. One was a barge, with crew of three to eight, which broke in two and sank; the other was a larger craft about 100 feet long with small-ship lines and this had been set on fire and was burning briskly.

26. Ammunition expended by "AUSTRALIA", "ARUNTA" and "AMMEN", in engaging targets in DEMTA and MOERIS BAYS and in "AMMEN" destroying the barge and small ship west of BESAR ISLAND, was as follows:

"AUSTRALIA"	:	30 8-inch H.E.; 4 8-inch S.A.P.; 121 4-inch H.E.
"ARUNTA"	:	165 4.7-inch H.E.
"AMMEN"	:	208 5"(38) A.A.C.

27. During the...../

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27. During the afternoon, Task Force 74, formed in A.A. disposition, continued patrol covering the entrance to TANAHMERAH BAY. The weather deteriorated and up till about 1600 when there was an improvement, there were frequent showers, a low overcast and poor visibility.

28. At about 1330, "NASHVILLE" (carrying General MACARTHUR, C.in C. S.W.P.A.) and two destroyers arrived from WHITE beach (HOLLANDIA) and entered TANAHMERAH BAY. This detached cruiser group (Task Group 75.3) sailed again at 1645, proceeding to BLUE Beach area (AITAPE).

29. At 1345 and again at 1430, air alarm was given in Task Force 74 when bombs were observed to fall about five miles seaward of the force. On each occasion the visibility was poor and the planes dropping the bombs were only briefly seen and were not definitely identified. It is presumed that these two alarms were caused by carrier aircraft jettisoning their bombs before returning to their carrier bases. The weather had probably made it impossible for the planes to expend their bomb loads on land targets.

30. At 1600, the APAs ("HENRY T. ALLEN", "MANOORA", "KANIMBLA") which had disembarked troops on RED beaches, sailed from TANAHMERAH BAY ahead of schedule.

31. At 1655 Commander WESTERN ATTACK FORCE released Task Force 74 and in accordance with basic plans, I departed from TANAHMERAH BAY, shaping course to rendezvous at 0800 the next morning in position 2°30'S, 143°00'E with TASK GROUP 78.2.

32. At 2200, Task Force 74 made radar contact with RED and WHITE sections of ECHELON R2 and friendly identities were established. These sections were scheduled to land reinforcements on RED and WHITE beaches at 0700 the next day (D plus 1).

SUNDAY, 23RD APRIL.

33. At 0700, Task Force 74 met Task Group 78.2 and I reported for duty to the Task Group Commander.

34. All hands in Task Force 74 were very glad to have been included again in a most successful major amphibious operation.

35. Action reports rendered through me by individual ships will be forwarded without delay.

V. CRUTCHLEY

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

Copies to:

Commander, Seventh Fleet) with Diary of
Australian Commonwealth Naval Board) Proceedings for
Task Force 74.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO A.F. 1140/38.

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
13th May, 1944.

S E C R E T.

A.F.1063/12.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER 3-44.

TASK ORGANIZATION.

Task Force 74 - Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY.

"AUSTRALIA" (F)
"SHROPSHIRE"

"ARUNTA")
"WARRAMUNGA") DD Section ABLE.

"MULLANY")
"AMMEN") DD Section BAKER.

Commander Destroyers T.F. 74 - Commander BUCHANAN in "ARUNTA".

INFORMATION.

1. (a) This Operation Order amplifies Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan 6A-44 and Commander Attack Force Operation 4-44 (Revised), which latter deals with the WAKDE operation.

(b) South West Pacific Forces will in two successive phases, seize and occupy by overwater movement the WAKDE area, followed ten days later by the seizure of BIAK ISLAND, and establish at WAKDE and BIAK air and light naval facilities for the purpose of supporting further operations to the westward.

2. Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan 6-44 assigns to Task Forces 74 and 75 the following operational tasks:-

(a) During the approaches and assaults, operate under the tactical control of Commander Attack Force as escort and fire support groups.

(b) Upon release by Commander Attack Force, during each phase, operate in accordance with Naval Covering Force Plan (reproduced as ANNEX TWO to this Operation Order).

(c) Destroy enemy surface forces which may threaten our convoys and landing operations and deny enemy seaborne reinforcements and supply as directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

3. For Task Forces 74 and 75, the WAKDE operation has two phases.

PHASE ONE. The approach and assault in which Task Forces 74 and 75 operate under the tactical control of Commander Eastern Attack Group (CTG 77.2), as escort and fire support groups.

PHASE TWO. The period following the assault in which Task Forces 74 and 75 operate as Covering Forces A and B in accordance with Naval Covering Force Plan (Annex TWO).

4...../-

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

4. PHASE ONE. - WAKDE OPERATION.

Operations under the tactical control of Commander Eastern Attack Group (CTG 77.2) during the approach and assault.

(a) Task Forces 74 and 75 will proceed in company from SEEADLER HARBOUR at 1500 Monday 15th May and taking route through positions

(X) 1°45' S 146°30' E (Z) 2°00' S 144°00' E

at speed of advance 15 knots and will arrive vicinity of Point IVY (2°07½' S 140°09½' E) at 2000 Tuesday 16th May (D-1)

(b) Task Forces 74 and 75 will be formed in Cruising Disposition SV (USF 10A - green page). "AUSTRALIA" Station 1 "SHROPSHIRE" Station 3. TF 74 destroyers form starboard screen (stations 3, 5, 7, 9). Remaining stations as assigned by CTF 75 and Comdesron 24.

(c) From vicinity point IVY, Task Forces 74 and 75 formed in Cruising Disposition SV will proceed along Route FOX at about 9 knots and keeping about 10 miles ahead of ECHELON S2.

(d) At 0430 D-day when approaching Point JAW, Task Forces 74 and 75 act independently without signal.

(e) (i) Task Force 74 will disengage to the WESTWARD and form cruising disposition V2.

(ii) On signal "Proceed on mission assigned" at about 0530

"ARUNTA" - prolong the line astern of cruisers.
"WARRAMUNGA" - proceed to firing position about 8000 yards north of SARMI.
"MULLANY" "AMMEN" - keep clear to North and East until time to enter FSA No. 4 to carry out scheduled bombardment.

(iii) "AUSTRALIA" will lead "SHROPSHIRE" and "ARUNTA" so as to pass through position 027° E -end VANDOEMOEAR 7000 yards steering 160° at 10 knots at H-70 (presently 0605).

(iv) Scheduled bombardment will be carried out in accordance with basic orders (Annex C to CTF 77 Operation Plan 4-44) and amplifying instructions in ANNEX ONE to this Operation Plan.

(v) On completion of scheduled bombardment (H-40) "AUSTRALIA" "SHROPSHIRE" will be manoeuvred as a unit in FSA No. 5. "ARUNTA" "WARRAMUNGA" screen cruisers to northward at 1500 yards distance conforming generally to their movements.

(vi) When "MULLANY" and "AMMEN" complete their scheduled bombardment, they will prolong the line ahead and astern of cruisers.

(vii) After H-HOUR, TF74 will form Cruising Disposition V2 and will be manoeuvred as a whole.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

PHASE TWO. - WAKDE OPERATION.

5. Operations under the terms of Commander 7th Fleet Naval Covering Force Plan.

(a) It is unlikely that enemy surface forces will attempt to interfere in WAKDE - SARMI area during daylight. Enemy air attack by day is a likely threat and Naval Covering Force Plan (reproduced as Annex Two to this operation order) directs the naval force covering WAKDE - SARMI to operate within range of shore based fighter cover during daylight.

(b) Headquarters Advanced Echelon Fifth Air Force has advised that the practical limit of shore based fighter cover is within 150 miles from HOLLANDIA.

Therefore, whilst acting as the covering force in the WAKDE - SARMI area, Task Force 74 will operate DURING DAYLIGHT in the area between 0° 30'S. and 2° 00'S. between longitudes 139°E. and 140° 30'E.

(c) "SHROPSHIRE" is designated fighter director ship for Task Force 74. A U.S.A.A.F. fighter director controller is embarked.
"AUSTRALIA", with a qualified R.A.A.F. fighter sector controller, will be the stand-by fighter director ship for the Task Force.

(d) OUTLINE PLAN OF MINIMUM FIGHTER COVER which will be provided for the naval covering force in the WAKDE - SARMI area, has been given tentatively as follows:-

(i) During Daylight:- One flight of four planes on air alert over the covering force. Planes will be type P-40 or P-38.

During Dawn and Dusk periods:- One flight of two night fighters on air alert over the covering force. Night fighter planes will be twin engine type P-70 (A-20 attack bomber type).

(ii) Ground alert is expected to consist normally of two squadrons ready to scramble upon call by Task Force Commanders through the Fighter Sectors at HOLLANDIA (call CAMPHOR) or TADJI (call WELCOME) in the event of air attack.

(iii) To execute rendezvous with first mission, fighter director ship will call up before dawn take off and advise grid position on fighter grid for the day.

(iv) Grid co-ordinates will be used for all reference points.

(v) The cover by night fighters during dawn and dusk periods is dependent upon field conditions at HOLLANDIA and also upon weather conditions.

(vi) Communications with fighter planes will be on 4475 Kc/s (H/F common tactical frequency). Voice calls for fighter director ships Task Forces 74 and 75 will be signalled by Comadvon 5.

(vii) I.F.F. will be turned on and kept on by the flight leader and deputy flight leader at all times. In the event of a "scramble" in which planes become separated, all individual planes will turn on I.F.F. and keep it on.

(e)...../-

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

(e) TOMCAT RECONNAISSANCE AT NIGHT.

(i) Naval Covering Force Plane advises that TOMCAT reconnaissance will be provided at night when Covering Forces are West of HOLLANDIA.

(ii) Commanders, Task Forces 74 and 75 have agreed that enemy surface forces approaching the WAKDE-JARMI Area at night are most likely to do so from the north-west, in the sector between the true bearings of 293° and 000° from WAKDE. Therefore at night, the naval covering force (T.F.74 or T.F.75) in the WAKDE Area, will patrol North-West of WAKDE in the sector between the coast and a line drawn 000° (from WAKDE) to a limit of 70 miles.
When T.F.74 is the covering force in the WAKDE Area, the night patrol sector will be entered at about 2000 each evening.

(iii) Commanders, Task Forces 73, 74 and 75 have agreed that the nightly TOMCAT reconnaissance will be conducted to the north-westward of the naval covering force (T.F.74 or T.F.75) and will cover the sector between the true bearings 270° and 000° from WAKDE and between the distance limits of 90 and 140 miles (from WAKDE) in this sector.

(iv) The night reconnaissance planes (TOMCATS) will be provided by Task Unit 73.1.2 and will operate from tender SAN PABLO at HOLLANDIA.
BLACKCATS of this Task Unit will be conducting nightly, an offensive prowl for shipping in the GEELVINK BAY area. It has been arranged that BLACKCATS proceeding between HOLLANDIA and GEELVINK BAY will take a track along the coast from WAKDE to Cape D'URVILLE and thence through JAPEN STRAIT. BLACKCATS returning to HOLLANDIA will follow reverse track. This gives added assurance that an enemy force approaching through GEELVINK BAY will be detected. The BLACKCAT first-off will leave HUMBOLDT BAY at about dusk.

(v) The primary object of the TOMCAT reconnaissance at night is to detect and to report the movements of enemy surface forces. After making initial contact report of an enemy force detected, the TOMCAT will endeavour to ascertain and to report to the Covering Force Commander, the composition and disposition of the enemy force.

(vi) The TOMCAT will be armed only with depth bombs and will carry flares.

(vii) I.F.F. TOMCATS will have I.F.F. turned on throughout their mission.
Two ships of the Naval Covering Force will have I.F.F. turned on at night.

(viii) COMMUNICATIONS:

(a) U.S.S. "SAN PABLO" (at HOLLANDIA)	CW call	3SI
	Voice	FORTHWITH
C.T.U.73.1.2 (in "SAN PABLO")	CW call	LX2T

(b) Call signs for CATS.

The CW call sign changes daily at 0001K BUT a plane never changes its call sign after starting off on a mission, i.e. a TOMCAT or CAT which takes off before 0001K will retain its original call sign throughout its mission.
The following CW calls are used by TOMCATS and CATS -
TOMCATS and CATS -
CW calls of TOMCATS are followed by a slant sign and numeral picked at random indicating an individual plane; CW calls of CATS are followed by slant sign and letter denoting mission. (TOMCATS are co-operating only with Task Force 74 and 75).
The voice call will remain constant throughout the operation and will be "TOMCAT".

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
RCDIG1073435

Date	CW	Date	CW
May 14	QU8	May 23	I33
15	8EU	24	QU8
16	XQ3	25	8EU
17	3CY	26	XQ3
18	U85	27	3CY
19	PI3	28	U85
20	3AQ	29	PI3
21	AN4	30	3AQ
22	4DN	31	AN4

Voice calls for Cats on night gunfire spotting may be changed by despatch.

(c) Ships and authorities in the Naval Covering Forces (T.F.74 and T.F.75) will use voice and CW Calls as listed in C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 4-44 (revised) which reproduces CANF Complan 2-44.

(d) Frequencies guarded by TOMCATS will be

Reconnaissance -

Primary	1st Alternative	2nd Alternative	Times
7420	6490	7805	0900K - 1900K
4275	3760	3915	1900K - 0900K

Tactical Circuit - Ship - TOMCAT.

primary 142.56 mc/s voice.
secondary 5995 kc/s voice.

(e) Unless otherwise advised by C.T.U.73.1.2 TOMCATS operating with Naval Covering Forces willhave VHF. (Remember the range limitation of VHF).

(f) TOMCATS will be testing communications with tender after take off, between 1730 and 1830, and will make a short "ON STATION" report to base when in assigned search sector.

(g) Naval Covering Force Commander will NOT break silence on reconnaissance frequency unless desiring to give instructions which cannot be passed by VHF. This means therefore that recco reports will NOT be receipted.

6. All times in this Operation Order are ZONE-10(KING).

7. "D-day for WAKDE Operation is tentatively set as 17th May and H-hour at 0715K. ~~at 0715K.~~

(WAKDE OPERATION).

COMMUNICATIONS/in accordance with (a) USF70A, (b) USF10A appendix 6 corrected by PI3, (c) CANF COMPLAN 2-44, (d) Annex ITEM to C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 4-44 (revised), (e) paragraph 5 (c) (viii) of this Opplan, and (f) Annex No. 1 of this Opplan - all as applicable.

9. This Operation Order effective upon receipt.

V. CRUTCHLEY.

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

Date	CW	Date	CW
May 14	QU8	May 23	I33
15	8EU	24	QU8
16	XQ3	25	8EU
17	3CY	26	XQ3
18	U85	27	3CY
19	PI3	28	U85
20	3AQ	29	PI3
21	AN4	30	3AQ
22	4DN	31	AN4

Voice calls for Cats on night gunfire spotting may be changed by despatch.

(c) Ships and authorities in the Naval Covering Forces (T.F.74 and T.F.75) will use voice and CW Calls as listed in C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 4-44 (revised) which reproduces CANF Complan 2-44.

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Tactical Circuit - Ship - TOMCAT.

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secondary 5995 kc/s voice.

(e) Unless otherwise advised by C.T.U.73.1.2 TOMCATS operating with Naval Covering Forces willhave VHF. (Remember the range limitation of VHF).

(f) TOMCATS will be testing communications with tender after take off, between 1730 and 1830, and will make a short "ON STATION" report to base when in assigned search sector.

(g) Naval Covering Force Commander will NOT break silence on reconnaissance frequency unless desiring to give instructions which cannot be passed by VHF. This means therefore that recco reports will NOT be receipted.

6. All times in this Operation Order are ZONE-10(KING).

7. ~~D-day is tentatively set as 17th May and H-hour at 0715K.~~ (WAKDE OPERATION).

8. COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with (a) USF70A, (b) USF10A appendix 6 corrected by PI3, (c) CANF COMPLAN 2-44, (d) Annex ITEM to C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 4-44 (revised), (e) paragraph 5 (e) (viii) of this Opplan, and (f) Annex No. 1 of this Opplan - all as applicable.

9. This Operation Order effective upon receipt.

V. CRUTCHLEY.

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX ONE - FIRE SUPPORT PLAN. (WAKDE OPERATION).

ANNEX TWO - NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN (reproduced from CANF Operation Plan 6-44)

ANNEX THREE - SUMMARY OF LATEST INTELLIGENCE.

DISTRIBUTION.

"AUSTRALIA" (4)
"SHROPSHIRE" (4)
"ARUNTA" (2)
"WARRAMUNGA" (2)
"MULIA NY" (2)
"AMMEN" (2)
COMMANDER 7TH FLEET (5) - Less Annexes TWO and THREE.
COMMANDER 7TH FLEET (Advanced H.Q's.) (5) - Less Annexes TWO and THREE.
CTF 75 (12) - Less Annexes TWO and THREE.
CTF73 (2) - Less all Annexes.
CTU 73.1.2 (2) - Less Annexes ONE and THREE.
COMADVON 5 (5) - Less all Annexes.
CTG 70.1 (1) - Less all Annexes.
CTF 72 (2) - Less all Annexes.
CTG 77.2 (2) - Commander Eastern Attack Group - Less Annexes TWO and THREE.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NO. 1 - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 3-44.

FIRE SUPPORT PLAN. (WAKDE OPERATION).

To be read in conjunction with Annex C to C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 4-44 (Revised).

1. INTENTION.

Task Force 74 will bombard targets in the vicinity of SARMI and SAWAR in accordance with the above reference. The following instructions are supplementary to basic orders.

2. INFORMATION.

Enemy shore defence installations are detailed in the target maps issued with C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 4-44. General areas only are given and pin-pointed positions of defences are not known.

3. METHOD.

(a) "AUSTRALIA" with "SHROPSHIRE" and "ARUNTA" in column at 1000 yards distance, will pass through position 027° East END VANDOEMOEAR IS. 7000 yards at H-70 on a course of 160° speed 10 knots.

(b) "WARRAMUNGA" act independently at about 0530 and move to area about 8000 yards North of SARMI for scheduled bombardment.

(c) "MULLANY" and "AMMEN" keep clear to the North and East until time to enter Fire Support Area 4 to carry out scheduled bombardment.

(d) At H-60 "AUSTRALIA" lead column to course 120°.

(e) On completion of their scheduled bombardment, "WARRAMUNGA" and "ARUNTA" screen to Northward and conform to the general movements of the cruisers.

(f) At H-40, Cruisers will be turned together to the westward and will patrol southern portion of F.S.A. No. 5 until H-hour.

4. GENERAL.

(a) Spotting Aircraft:

Spotting aircraft are being provided for "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" by C.T.F.75.

(b) Target Coverage:

Method of covering targets at discretion of Commanding Officers.

(c) Counter Battery:

Fire on scheduled targets or other area neutralisation targets is secondary to counter battery fire. In all firing at targets of opportunity "SHROPSHIRE" take primary responsibility for the area from Target 1 to Target 25 inclusive, and "AUSTRALIA" from Target 26 to 37 inclusive.

(d) Lookouts:...../

(d) Lookouts:

All upper deck personnel not otherwise employed are to be used as additional lookouts to report retaliation, enemy posts and all activity ashore.

(e) All ships open fire at scheduled time without signal unless otherwise ordered.

(f) Ammunition:

Cruisers fire H.C. shell with REDUCED charges, 25 per cent set to Super Quick, 25 per cent steel nose plug, 50 per cent Normal.

(g) Convergence:

Guns are to be parallel in area shoots.

(h) Communications:

With spotting aircraft:

	Call Sign Ship.	Call Sign Aircraft.	Frequency.
"AUSTRALIA"	KENNEL ("BOISE" plane No.2)	KING LINOTYPE	6650 kc/s
"SHROPSHIRE"	PASSWORD ("NASHVILLE" plane No.2)	KING KNAVE	3785 kc/s
"ARUNTA"	KNIFE		6650
"WARRAMUNGA"	KILLJOY		3785
"MULLANY"	LINSEED		6650
"AMMEN"	KEEL		3785

"ARUNTA" and "MULLANY" keep loudspeaker watch on 6650 kc/s, "WARRAMUNGA" and "AMMEN" keep loudspeaker watch on 3785 kc/s.

After H-hour, "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" keep loudspeaker watch on Shore Fire Control Party G3 and G4 respectively, passing tactical information to C.T.F.74.

SECRET.

ANNEX TWO - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 3-44.

NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN. 14.5.44.

This plan is reproduced from Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan 6A-44.

TASK ORGANIZATION.

COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET	Vice Admiral	Kinkaid
(a) Covering Force A (T.F. 74)	Rear Admiral	Crutchley
SHROPSHIRE, AUSTRALIA.		2 CA
WARRAMUNGA, ARUNTA, AMMEN, MULLANY.		4 DD
(b) Covering Force B (T.F. 75)	Rear Admiral	Berkey
PHOENIX, NASHVILLE, BOISE		3 CL
DesRon 24 less AMMEN, MULLANY, BUSH plus TRATHEN		6 DD

1.(A)(a) The general situation is set forth in Intelligence Annex A and current summaries. Intelligence which may further affect this plan will be disseminated by despatch.

(b) Current Intelligence Reports indicate that there are Japanese Naval Forces in the DAVAO-TAWITAWI Area estimated to be a maximum of: 6 BB, 5 CV, 11 CA, 3 CL, 25 DD.

The remaining major components of the Japanese Fleet are believed to be located in Empire waters and it is estimated that these, consisting of the following, will not be available in the Southwest Pacific Area to oppose our operations: 3 BB, 5 CL, 1 CV, 4 CVE, 25 DD, 23 SS.

(c) There are approximately 18 enemy air strips within 400 miles of WAKDE and 21 enemy air strips within 400 miles of BIAK Island.

(d) Enemy reactions to our operations will probably consist of harassing air attacks and submarine attacks. The enemy may also attempt to harass our land positions and naval forces by night surface attack by a task force consisting of cruisers and destroyers.

The enemy has assembled strong striking forces in a high degree of readiness at TAWITAWI and in the DAVAO GULF. Such Forces could arrive off BIAK Island from TAWITAWI in 42 hours at 25 knots (1070 miles) or at WAKDE in 50 hours, (1260 miles). They could arrive off BIAK Island from DAVAO in 31 hours at 25 knots, (780 miles) or at WAKDE in 39 hours (970 miles).

(e) Allied Naval Task Forces based at either MANUS Island or HOLLANDIA can be in covering position in operational area before an enemy Task Force can arrive from either DAVAO GULF or TAWITAWI provided that early intelligence as to enemy movements is obtained and promptly disseminated.

(B) Our Capabilities:

Our air searches, unless prevented by weather, should give us early advance information of any enemy surface forces approaching the landing areas. Our submarines, as practicable, will be so disposed as to provide maximum offensive reconnaissance of distant enemy bases.

Our land based air at HOLLANDIA will provide fighter cover during daylight within range of fighter aircraft from HOLLANDIA for the WAKDE Operation. Fighter Cover from WAKDE will be provided for the BIAK Operation. Our land based bombers will attack enemy surface forces threatening our operations, operating as practicable from HOLLANDIA and WAKDE.

2...../-

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

2. This Force will support the ALAMO Force by escorting and protecting the assault convoys, furnishing fire support during the assault, and thereafter covering the landing areas, in order to assist in the seizure and occupation of the WAKDE and BIAK Areas.

3. (a) Covering Force A (T.F. 74) report to Commander Attack Force at HUMBOLDT BAY on D minus one day and on Z minus two day and operate under his tactical command as escort and fire support group during the approach and assault on the WAKDE and BIAK Areas.

WAKDE Operation - Upon release by Commander Attack Force operate in a covering position to northward of WAKDE until relieved by Covering Force B on D plus four day, unless otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces. When relieved by Covering Force B, on D plus four day return to HUMBOLDT BAY and replenish fuel and ammunition. Thereafter be prepared to concentrate with Covering Force B on short notice.

BIAK Operation - Upon release by Commander Attack Force return to HUMBOLDT BAY and replenish fuel and ammunition. Be prepared to concentrate with Covering Force B on short notice. Proceed to covering position to eastward of BIAK and relieve Covering Force B on Z plus four day, unless otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

Operate within range of shore based fighter cover during daylight. Destroy equal or inferior enemy forces encountered. In the event of the approach of a superior enemy force, engage in retiring action in order to draw the enemy into a favourable position for attack by our land based bombers.

(b) Covering Force B (T.F. 75) report to Commander Attack Force at HUMBOLDT BAY on D minus one day and on Z minus two day and operate under his tactical command as escort and fire support group during the approach and assault on the WAKDE and BIAK Areas.

WAKDE Operation - Upon release by Commander Attack Force return to HUMBOLDT BAY and replenish fuel and ammunition. Be prepared to concentrate with Covering Force A on short notice. Proceed to covering position to northward of WAKDE and relieve Covering Force A on D plus four day, unless otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces. Return to arrive at HUMBOLDT BAY on D plus eight (Z minus two) day. Replenish fuel and ammunition.

BIAK Operation - Upon release by Commander Attack Force operate in a covering position to eastward of BIAK until relieved by Covering Force A on Z plus four day, unless otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces. When relieved by Covering Force A on Z plus four day, return to HUMBOLDT BAY and replenish fuel and ammunition. Thereafter be prepared to concentrate with Covering Force A on short notice.

Operate within range of shore based fighter cover during daylight. Destroy equal or inferior enemy forces encountered. In the event of the approach of a superior enemy surface force, engage in retiring action in order to draw the enemy into a favorable position for attack by our land based bombers.

(x)(1) When Covering Forces are west of HOLLANDIA, fighter cover will be furnished by day and Tomcat reconnaissance at night. Covering Force Commanders make detailed arrangements with ComGenAdVon Five and Commander Task Force 73 respectively.

(2) Depending upon development of situation, Covering Force B may be directed to relieve Covering Force A about Z plus eight day.

(3) Covering operations will be continued until otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

4. (a) Fuel, provisions and ammunition available at SEEADLER HARBOUR and FINSCHHAFEN.
(b) Fuel, provisions, ammunition and water afloat will be made available at HUMBOLDT BAY.

5. (a) Covering Forces A & B (T.F. 74 & 75) while operating as escort and fire support groups of Attack Force are under the tactical command of Commander Attack Force.
(b) Communications in accordance with Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area Operation Plan Four dash Forty-Four as modified by Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan Number Six A dash Forty-four.
(c) Use Minus Ten Zone Time.
(d) Commander Allied Naval Forces at Headquarters, BRISBANE.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

S E C R E T.

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX TWO.

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX TWO, COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 3-44.


ESTIMATED EMPLOYMENT TASK FORCES 74 AND 75

DAY	COVERING FORCE A TASK FORCE 74	COVERING FORCE B TASK FORCE 75
D-1	HUMBOLDT BAY with CTF77	HUMBOLDT BAY with CTF77
D-1 D Day	Escort and Fire Support with TF 77	Escort and Fire Support with T.F. 77
D to D/4	Covering position, WAKDE	HUMBOLDT BAY
D/4 to D/8	HUMBOLDT BAY	Covering Position WAKDE.
D/8 (Z-2)	HUMBOLDT BAY	HUMBOLDT BAY
Z-2 - Z day	Escort and Fire Support with TF 77	Escort and Fire Support with TF77
Z to Z/4	HUMBOLDT BAY	Covering position, BIAK
Z/4 to Z/8	Covering position, BIAK	HUMBOLDT BAY

Z to Z/8 missions may be repeated depending upon the tactical situation, alternating the covering forces.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL



RCDIG1073435

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
29 May, 1944.

SECRET.
A.F.1063/23.

CHANGE NO.1 TO C.T.F.74 OPERATION ORDER 4-44.
Effective upon receipt.

1. Page One -

Insert revised TASK ORGANISATION effective 1200K 28th May, 1944.

TASK FORCE 74 - Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY.

"AUSTRALIA"(F).
"NASHVILLE".
"ARUNTA") DD Section ABLE.
"WARRAMUNGA") DD Section ABLE.
"ABNER READ" (CDD48)) DD Section BAKER.
"MULLANY".) DD Section BAKER.
"AMMEN".) DD Section BAKER.

Commander Destroyers Task Force 74 - Commander BUCHANAN in "ARUNTA".

2. Page 4 -

paragraph 5 (c) - Substitute "AUSTRALIA" for "SHROPSHIRE" in two places.

3. Page 5 -

paragraph 5 (o)(i) -
Delete column headed "SAN PABLO"
Delete last two lines.

4. ANNEX NO.4 - COMMUNICATIONS.

(i) paragraph 3(b) line 1 - after "AUSTRALIA" add "ABNER READ"
(ii) paragraph 3(d) and (e) - delete "SHROPSHIRE" and substitute "NASHVILLE".
(iii) Radio Watchkeeping Table.
(a) Delete "SHROPSHIRE" and substitute "NASHVILLE".
(b) Square 1I Change "C" to "G".
Square 2I Change "G" to "C".
Square 6I Insert "C".
(c) Insert new column 7 for "ABNER READ" with identical watchkeeping assignments as "ARUNTA" (line 3) but omitting any notation in Square 7S (corresponding to Square 3S for "ARUNTA".).

DISTRIBUTION:-

As for C.T.F.74 OpOrder 4-44.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
24 May, 1944.

S-E-C-R-E-T.

A.F.1063/23.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 - OPERATION ORDER 4-44.

TASK ORGANISATION.

Task Force 74 - Rear-Admiral CRUTCHLEY.

"AUSTRALIA" (F).
"SHROPSHIRE".

"ARUNTA".)
"WARRAMUNGA".) DD Section ABLE.

"MULLANY".)
"AMMEN".) DD Section BAKER.

Commander Destroyers T.F.74 - Commander BUCHANAN in "ARUNTA".

INFORMATION.

1.(a) This Operation Order amplifies Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan 6A-44 and Commander Task Force 77 (Commander Attack Force) Operation Plan 5-44.

(b) South West Pacific Forces will seize and occupy by overwater movement, BIAK ISLAND and establish at BIAK air and light naval facilities for the purpose of supporting further operations to the Westward.

2. Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan 6A-44 assigns to Task Forces 74 and 75 the following operational tasks:-

(a) During the approach and assault, operate under the tactical control of Commander Attack Force as escort and fire support groups.

(b) Upon release by Commander Attack Force, operate in accordance with Naval Covering Force Plan (reproduced as ANNEX TWO).

(c) Destroy enemy surface forces which may threaten our convoys and landing operations and deny enemy seaborne reinforcements and supply as directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

3. For Task Forces 74 and 75, the BIAK operation has two phases

PHASE ONE - The approach and assault, in which Task Forces 74 and 75 operate under the tactical control of Commander Attack Force (C.T.F.77) as escort and fire support groups.

PHASE TWO - The period following the assault, in which Task Forces 74 and 75 operate as Covering Forces A and B respectively in accordance with Naval Covering Force Plan (Annex TWO).

4. PHASE ONE.

Operations under the tactical control of Commander Attack Force during the approach and assault -

(a) Task Force 74 will proceed from HUMBOLDT BAY at 2200 Thursday, 25th May (Z-2) and will proceed to north westward at speed of advance 15 knots, keeping about five miles to starboard of Route GEORGE.

(b) At about 0700 Friday 26th May (Z-1) Task Force 74 will overtake the MAIN BODY (Echelon H1) which will have departed Point KID at 1700 the previous day, proceeding along Route GEORGE at 8½ knots.

(c) On signal from Attack Force Commander, the MAIN BODY and Task Forces 74 and 75 will form Cruising Disposition C2 (day). Cruising Instructions and details of Cruising Dispositions are contained in Appendix 2, Annex B to C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 5-44.

(d) During approach, Task Force 74 will be prepared to operate in conjunction with Task Force 75 to destroy enemy surface forces threatening the convoy and will provide protection against enemy air forces and submarines. If forming with Task Force 75, cruisers take following natural numbers:

"AUSTRALIA" 1, "PHOENIX" 2, "SHROPSHIRE" 3, "NASHVILLE" 4, "BOISE" 5. Natural order of cruisers will be 1,3,2,4,5.

(e) When.....

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(e) When Cruising Disposition C3(night) is formed by order of Attack Force Commander, Task Force 74 will form T.F.74 Cruising Disposition "S" and open out to assigned station (20-060).

APPROACH AND DEPLOYMENT.

(f) Shortly before MAIN BODY (Echelon H1) reaches Point ERG, Task Force 74 will move in so as to be 4000 yards ahead of Guide in Fleet Centre before passing the line Tg WARARI-WOENDOEMIMAS Shoal.

When moving in, destroyers will form WITHOUT SIGNAL as follows:

DD Section ABLE - 2315.
DD Section BAKER - 2045.

(g) From Point FOG, Cruisers and DD Section ABLE will take route between OWI and AUKI thence between OWI and ROERBAS.

(h) On passing through point FOG, DD Sections ABLE and BAKER act independently WITHOUT SIGNAL. DD Section BAKER comply with Annex C Part II, paragraph 2 (a), C.T.F.77 Opplan 5-44. DD Section ABLE proceed in column along above route keeping about one mile ahead of cruisers. After passing ROERBAS, DD Section ABLE keep clear to Southward until cruisers have passed and then comply with paragraph 3 (iii) of T.F.74 Fire Support Plan (Annex No.1).

Cruisers will be led by above route and so as to pass 2500 yards north of ROERBAS on course 270°. Cruisers will be turned together by signal to 300° so that Flagship passes through position 300°N-point ROERBAS BEBA 6000 yards at 8 knots at H-45 and will turn together by signal to 065° at the western limit of Fire Support Area Number 4.

(i) On completion of scheduled bombardments Task Force 74 will be manoeuvred in Fire Support Area No.4 in accordance with paragraph 3 (b) T.F.74 Fire Support Plan (Annex No.1).

(j) When released by Commander Attack Force, Task Force 74 will withdraw to HUMBOLDT BAY to replenish and then stand by on short notice.

5. PHASE TWO - BIAK OPERATION.

Operations under the terms of Commander 7th Fleet's NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN.

DAY COVERING OPERATIONS.

(a) It is unlikely that enemy surface forces will attempt to interfere in BIAK Area during daylight. Enemy air attack by day is a likely threat and the Naval Covering Force Plan (reproduced as Annex Two to this Operation Order) directs the naval force covering BIAK to operate within range of shore based fighter cover during daylight.

(b) 150 miles from base has been given as the practical limit of shore based fighter aircraft operating over the sea.

Commander 7th Fleet has therefore directed that during daylight, the naval covering force will operate WEST of 138°30'E and within 150 miles of WAKDE.

Note:...../

Note: This area is shown diagrammatically in ANNEX THREE.

(c) "SHROPSHIRE" call "LITTLE JOE" is designated fighter director ship for Task Force 74 and "DALY" call "RED APPLE" is designated fighter director ship for Task Force 75. U.S.A.A.F. fighter director officers are embarked in both these ships - Captain CRESPI aboard "SHROPSHIRE", and Captain CHRIST aboard "DALY".

(d) COMAFADVON FIVE has advised that minimum daylight fighter cover over the naval force (T.F.74 or T.F.75) in the covering position will be one flight of P-40 or P-38 'planes.

(e) LONG RANGE SEA RECONNAISSANCE.

Relevant details of SOWESPAC Search Plan ABLE, to be initiated not later than 27th May are as follows:

FROM WAKDE	- PB4Y	Sector	1	286°-295°	640 miles.
"	"	"	2	295°-304°	800 "
"	"	"	3	304°-313°	800 "
FROM MOMOTE	- PB4Y	Sector	4	293°-302°	1000 "
"	"	"	5	302°-311°	800 " ø Note.
"	"	"	6	311°-320°	800 " ø Note.
"	"	"	7	320°-330°	800 " ø Note.
"	"	PBY "	E	330°-342°	500 "
"	"	"	D	342°-354°	500 "
"	"	"	C	354°-006°	500 "
"	"	"	B	006°-018°	500 "
"	"	"	A	018°-030°	500 "

Note ø : These searches extended to 1000 miles from D-3 to D plus 2.

NIGHT COVERING OPERATIONS.

(f) Naval Covering Force Plan advises that TOMCAT reconnaissance will be provided at night for naval covering forces (T.F.74 or T.F.75).

(g) Enemy surface forces intending to strike in BIAK area at night are likely to approach either North or South of NOEMFOOR ISIAND and thence into JAPEN STRAIT or from North or North West of the SCHOUTEN ISLANDS.

(h) Sortie of an enemy surface force from PALAU would likely be detected by our submarines watching that base and later by our long range air searches conducted from MOMOTE - see sub-para (e) above. Enemy approach from the WESTWARD (from HALMAHERA or DAVAO) is not so likely to be detected by our submarine patrols since they are thinly covering a wide expanse of water, but this approach is also covered by our long range air searches from WAKDE - see sub-para (e) above.

(i) Since our naval covering force cannot simultaneously patrol on the lines of enemy approach west of BIAK and East of BIAK, distant detection and tracking of the enemy force by search aircraft, is essential in order to allow time for the Covering Force Commander to move his force into an intercepting position.

(j) The relevant details of our long range air searches (SOWESPAC Search Plan ABLE) are given in sub-paragraph (e) above. These are daylight searches.

(k) As an additional insurance that the approach of an enemy surface force intending to strike in BIAK area at night will be detected and reported to the Naval Covering Force in the area,

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C.T.F.74, C.T.F.75 and C.T.U.73.1.2 have agreed that commencing night (Z-1 day) - (Z day) Catalinas of Task Unit 73.1.2 based at HOLLANDIA will carry out night searches of following sectors:-

SECTOR ONE

ORIGIN - Tg.WARARI (eastern tip of BIAK ISLAND).
Sector between the true bearings 260° and 300° from ORIGIN and between the distance limits of 70 miles and 150 miles from ORIGIN. This sector will be searched nightly by a BLACKCAT with an offensive reconnaissance combined with his TOMCAT mission. Plane takes off from HOLLANDIA about 1730, proceeds to Cape D'URVILLE thence through Japen Strait and into assigned Sector. When entering his sector, plane will look into the channel South of NOEMFOOR ISLAND, then cover East and North of NOEMFOOR ISLAND, next cover between NOEMFOOR and MANOKWARI and then commence regular search of assigned sector. Plane will make "ON STATION" report on entering assigned sector at about 2100 and will discontinue search at about 0300 to return to base.
Plane will be armed with bombs and flares.

SECTOR TWO.

ORIGIN - Tg.WARARI (eastern tip of BIAK ISLAND).
Sector between the true bearings 300° and 000° from ORIGIN and between the distance limits of 70 miles and 120 miles from ORIGIN. This sector will be searched nightly by a TOMCAT. Plane takes off from HOLLANDIA about 1730, proceeds to ORIGIN and thence to commence search of assigned sector starting on the 300°(T) bearing limit. Plane will make "ON STATION" report on entering assigned sector at about 2100 and will discontinue search at about 0300 to return to base.
Plane will be armed with depth bombs and flares.

Note: ANNEX THREE diagrammatically shows these search sectors.

(l) In event of a radar failure in BLACKCAT or TOMCAT, the plane with the effective radar will at once commence a to and fro search on the distance arc 70 miles from ORIGIN (Tg.WARARI) between the true bearings 260° and 320°.

(m) In the event of detecting an enemy surface force proceeding towards BIAK, the primary object of the BLACKCAT or TOMCAT (whichever makes the contact) will be to trail and report the movements of the enemy force. After making initial contact report of a force detected, plane will endeavour to ascertain and to report to the Covering Force Commander, the composition and disposition of the enemy.

(n) I.F.F.

BLACKCAT and TOMCAT will show I.F.F. throughout the mission. Two ships of the Naval Covering Force will have I.F.F. turned on at night.

(o) COMMUNICATIONS WITH BLACKCAT AND TOMCAT.

(i) Task Unit Commander and tender at HOLLANDIA,

	"SAN PABLO"	"ORCA"
C.W. Call.:	3SI	3SI
Voice. :	FORTHWITH	PICTURE
C.T.U.73.1.2 :	LX2T	LK1A

"ORCA" will relieve "SAN PABLO" on or about 27th May. Change-over will be advised by despatch.

(ii) Call signs for CATS...../

(ii) Call signs for CATS.

CW call sign changes daily at 0001K BUT plane never changes its call sign after starting off on a mission, i.e. TOMCAT or BLACKCAT which takes off before 0001K will retain its original call sign throughout its mission. CW calls of TOMCATS and BLACKCATS operating from HOLLANDIA with Task Forces 74 and 75 are followed by a slant sign and a numeral (when the slant sign is followed by a letter, Catalinas are operating from MANUS and are not directly concerned with this operation). In case it becomes necessary for the BLACKCAT TO assume the TOMCAT mission (vide paragraph 5(1) above), BLACKCAT will retain its original call signs and will NOT assume any of the TOMCAT calls.

(iii) CW calls for CATS.

Date	CW Call	Date	CW Call
May 25	8EU	June 1	U85
26	XQ3	2	3CY
27	3CY	3	XQ3
28	U85	4	PI3
29	PI3	5	3AQ
30	3AQ	6	AN4
31	AN4	7	I33
		8	4DN
		9	QU8
		10	8EU

(iv) Voice calls for CATS

Voice calls will remain constant throughout the operation and will be TOMCAT and BLACKCAT.

(v) Voice and CW call for ships and authorities in naval covering forces (T.F.74 and T.F.75) will be as listed in C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 5-44 which reproduces CANF Compilan 2-44.

(vi) Frequencies guarded by CATS will be:-

Reconnaissance.

Primary	1st Alternative	2nd Alternative	Times.
7420	6490	7805	0900K- 1900K
4275	3760	3915	1900K- 0900K

Tactical Circuit - Ships-CAT.

Primary 142.56 mc/s voice.
Secondary 5995 mc/s voice.
Normally TOMCAT will have VHF and BLACKCAT will NOT have VHF.

(vii) CATS are able to man two HF lines simultaneously as well as VHF (if fitted) so that in establishing communication on Tactical Circuit, the CAT operation of Reconnaissance Circuit is not upset.

(viii) TOMCATS and BLACKCATS will both be testing communications with the tender (at HOLLANDIA) between 1730 and 1830 daily after take-off.

(ix) ON STATION REPORTS vide paragraph (k) above, will be made on Recco frequency encoded by C.S.P.1270 and will be in the form "TOMCAT (or BLACKCAT) on station".

Note: The only means of identifying the respective slant numbers of the TOMCAT and BLACKCAT will be from this ON STATION report.

(x) The Naval...../

(x) The Naval Covering Force Commander will NOT break silence on recco frequency unless desiring to give instructions, which cannot be passed by VHF, to the CATS. This means therefore that recco. reports will NOT be receipted.

(p) AREA IN WHICH TASK FORCE 74 WILL CONDUCT NIGHT PATROLS.

Selection of the area in which the Task Force will patrol at night is governed by

(a) necessity of searoom for freedom of manoeuvre
and (b) patrol area must be situated such that the force is able to intercept an enemy force detected by our BLACKCAT or TOMCAT approaching the area, BEFORE that enemy force can reach our holdings on BIAK or our forces at or in the vicinity of our holdings.

Therefore at night, Task Force 74 will operate in the area included by the following points:

(i) 0°40'S 137°00'E (ii) 1°35'S 137°00'E
(iii) 1°30'S 135°40'E (iv) 0°20'S 136°20'E.

Note: This area is shown diagrammatically in ANNEX THREE..

6. All times in this Operation Order are ZONE-10 (KING).

7. Z-day is tentatively set at 27th May and H-hour at 0715K.

8. COMMUNICATIONS. In accordance with ANNEX FOUR.

9. This Operation Order effective upon receipt.

V. CRUTCHLEY.
REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

ANNEX ONE - FIRE SUPPORT PLAN.

ANNEX TWO - NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN (reproduced from CANF Operation Plan 6-44).

ANNEX THREE - SKETCH SHOWING TASK FORCE 74 DAY AND NIGHT PATROL AREAS (as covering force), also NIGHT SEARCH SECTORS COVERED BY TOMCATS AND BLACKCATS.

ANNEX FOUR - COMMUNICATIONS.

ANNEX FIVE - SUMMARY OF LATEST INTELLIGENCE.

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DISTRIBUTION.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 4-44.

	OPORDER 4-44.	ANNEX 1	ANNEX 2	ANNEX 3	ANNEX 4	ANNEX 5
"AUSTRALIA"	4	4	4	4	4	3
"SHROPSHIRE"	4	4	4	4	4	3
"ARUNTA"	2	2	2	2	2	2
"WARRAMUNGA"	2	2	2	2	2	2
"MULLANY"	2	2	2	2	2	2
"AMMEN"	2	2	2	2	2	2
C.T.F.75	12	12	12	12	12	4
Commander 7th Flt. (Admin).	5	5	-	5	5	-
Commander 7th Flt. (Advd. H.Q.'s)	5	5	-	5	5	-
C.T.F.77	3	3	-	3	3	-
C.T.F.73	2	-	-	2	2	-
C.T.U.73.1.2	2	-	2	2	2	-
C.T.F.72	1	-	-	1	-	-
C.T.G.70.1	1	-	-	1	-	-
COMADVON 5	5	-	-	5	-	-
5TH FIGHTER COM'D.	1	-	-	1	-	-
F.S.H.Q. HOLLANDIA.	1	-	-	1	-	-
F.S.H.Q. WAKDE.	1	-	-	1	-	-
5TH BOMBER COM'D.	1	-	-	1	-	-
308 BOMB WING.	1	-	-	1	-	-
309 " "	1	-	-	1	-	-
310 " "	1	-	-	1	-	-
13TH AIR TASK FORCE.	1	-	-	1	-	-
COMDESRON 2	1	-	-	1	-	-
COMDESRON 19	1	-	-	1	-	-
COMDESDIV 38	1	-	-	1	-	-
COMCORTDIV 25	1	-	-	1	-	-
COMCORTDIV 29	1	-	-	1	-	-
COMCORTDIV 37	1	-	-	1	-	-
COMCORTDIV 40	1	-	-	1	-	-

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SECRET.

ANNEX NO.1 - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 4-44.

FIRE SUPPORT PLAN.

To be read in conjunction with ANNEX C to C.T.F.77
OPERATION PLAN 5-44.

1. Intention:

Task Force 74 will bombard targets in the BOSNIK-MOKMER area in accordance with the above reference. The following instructions are supplementary to basic orders.

The particular role of the Task Force is to assist the advance of the troops along the coastal area West of the landing beaches. This will be effected subsequent to the preliminary bombardment by intermittant bombardment in our sector of responsibility. The object of this bombardment is to harass the enemy, to prevent his reorganisation of counter-measures, to break up such counter-measures as he succeeds in putting into effect, to deny him the use of the vital roads in our sector, and to destroy such installations as are identified.

2. Information:

Enemy shore defence installations are detailed in the target maps issued with C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 5-44. Some defences are pin-pointed and others are indicated as general areas.

3. Method:

(a) Preliminary Bombardment.

(i) "MULLANY" and "AMMEN" act independently WITHOUT SIGNAL on passing through Point FOG (at about 0530). Enter Fire Support Area 2 and carry out bombardment of targets as detailed in Appendix 1, Annex C to C.T.F. 77 OpPlan 5-44. "MULLANY" engage Western Group of targets and "AMMEN" the Eastern group. On conclusion of firing on scheduled targets, rejoin C.T.F.74 passing South of OWI Island keeping clear of Fire Support Group 77.4.2.

(ii) "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" with "ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA" in company follow route as described in paragraph 4(h) C.T.F.74 OpOrder 4-44.

"AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" engage targets within the limits as prescribed in Appendix 1, Annex C, to C.T.F.77 OpPlan 5-44 between H-45 and H-hour.

(iii) Spotting aircraft are being provided for "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" by C.T.F.75 as from H-45.

(iv) "ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA" (and "MULLANY" and "AMMEN" on rejoining) screen to Southward during cruiser bombardment unless counter-battery targets are observed or ships are detailed to engage targets of opportunity. "ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA" watch Western side of OWI Island for counter-battery fire.

(b) Bombardment Subsequent to H-hour.

(i) On conclusion of firing on scheduled areas, Task Force 74 will be manoeuvred in Fire Support Area 4 to carry out intermittent bombardment of targets of opportunity, in answer to calls for fire from spotting aircraft or Shore Fire Control Party, or of targets detailed by C.T.F.74.

(ii) "SHROPSHIRE", "MULLANY" and "AMMEN" take coastal area from

target 64 to 71...../

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target 64 to 71 inclusive as primary sector of responsibility. Also watch Western side of OWI Island for counter-battery fire.

"AUSTRALIA", "ARUNTA" and "WARRAMUNGA" take coastal Area from target 72 to 84 inclusive as primary sector of responsibility.

(iii) Intermittent bombardment will continue until about 1700 Z Day or until the Task Force is released by Commander Attack Force.

(iv) Services of spotting aircraft subsequent to preliminary bombardment are being sought.

4. GENERAL:

(a) Targets of Opportunity:

(a) Upon observation or engagement of a target of opportunity the ship concerned will report the location and description of that target to C.T.F.74.

(b) Location of Front Line Units:

The assault troops will indicate the position of their front line by:

(i) displaying red markers prominently on the beach.
(ii) releasing short "spurts" from flame throwers overhead.

On no account will targets to the East of such indicators be engaged without reference to the land forces.

When engaging targets in close proximity to the front line of the land forces, firing ships should endeavour to keep their line of fire at right angles to the axis of advance of the troops. Cruisers should not fire closer than 500 yards to the front line and destroyers not closer than 300 yards.

(c) Target Coverage:

The method of covering targets is left to the discretion of Commanding Officers.

(d) Convergance:

Guns are to be parallel in area shoots.

(e) Ammunition:

Cruisers fire H.C. shells with REDUCED charges. For area shoots, set 25 per cent to Super Quick, 50 per cent Normal, and 25 per cent Steel Nose Plug. For counter-battery fire use 75 per cent Steel Nose Plug and 25 per cent Normal, or S.A.P. set to non-delay.

(f) Counter Battery:

Fire on scheduled targets, or other area neutralisation targets is secondary to counter-battery fire.

(g) Lookouts:

All upper deck personnel not otherwise employed are to be used as addition lookouts to report retaliation, enemy posts, and all activity ashore.

(h) Communications:

With Spotting Aircraft:

"AUSTRALIA".....

	Call sign ship.	Call sign A/C.	Frequency.
"AUSTRALIA"	KENNEL	KING LINOTYPE	6650
"SHROPSHIRE"	PASSWORD	KING KNAVE	3785
"ARUNTA"	KNIFE	KING LINOTYPE	6650
"WARRAMUNGA"	KILLJOY	KING LINOTYPE	6650
"MULLANY"	LINSEED	KING KNAVE	3785
"AMMEN"	KEEL	KING KNAVE	3785

Destroyers keep loudspeaker watch on the frequencies assigned.
After H-hour, "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" keep loudspeaker watch on Shore Fire Control Party G3 and G1 respectively.
Any tactical information obtained on these circuits is to be passed to C.T.F.74.

S E C R E T.

ANNEX TWO - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 3-44.

NAVAL COVERING FORCE PLAN. ~~14.5.44.~~

This plan is reproduced from Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan 6A-44.

TASK ORGANIZATION.

COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET	Vice Admiral	Kinkaid
(a) Covering Force A (T.F. 74)	Rear Admiral	Crutchley
SHROPSHIRE, AUSTRALIA.		2 CA
WARRAMUNGA, ARUNTA, AMMEN, MULLANY.		4 DD
(b) Covering Force B (T.F. 75)	Rear Admiral	Berkey
PHOENIX, NASHVILLE, BOISE		3 CL
DesRon 24 less AMMEN, MULLANY, BUSH plus TRATHEN		6 DD

1.(A)(a) The general situation is set forth in Intelligence Annex A and current summaries. Intelligence which may further affect this plan will be disseminated by despatch.

(b) Current Intelligence Reports indicate that there are Japanese Naval Forces in the DAVAO-TAWITAWI Area estimated to be a maximum of: 6 BB, 5 CV, 11 CA, 3 CL, 25 DD.

The remaining major components of the Japanese Fleet are believed to be located in Empire waters and it is estimated that these, consisting of the following, will not be available in the Southwest Pacific Area to oppose our operations: 3 BB, 5 CL, 1 CV, 4 CVE, 25 DD, 23 SS.

(c) There are approximately 18 enemy air strips within 400 miles of WAKDE and 21 enemy air strips within 400 miles of BIAK Island.

(d) Enemy reactions to our operations will probably consist of harassing air attacks and submarine attacks. The enemy may also attempt to harass our land positions and naval forces by night surface attack by a task force consisting of cruisers and destroyers.

The enemy has assembled strong striking forces in a high degree of readiness at TAWITAWI and in the DAVAO GULF. Such Forces could arrive off BIAK Island from TAWITAWI in 42 hours at 25 knots (1070 miles) or at WAKDE in 50 hours, (1260 miles). They could arrive off BIAK Island from DAVAO in 31 hours at 25 knots, (780 miles) or at WAKDE in 39 hours (970 miles).

(e) Allied Naval Task Forces based at either MANUS Island or HOLLANDIA can be in covering position in operational area before an enemy Task Force can arrive from either DAVAO GULF or TAWITAWI provided that early intelligence as to enemy movements is obtained and promptly disseminated.

(B) Our Capabilities:

Our air searches, unless prevented by weather, should give us early advance information of any enemy surface forces approaching the landing areas. Our submarines, as practicable, will be so disposed as to provide maximum offensive reconnaissance of distant enemy bases.

Our land based air at HOLLANDIA will provide fighter cover during daylight within range of fighter aircraft from HOLLANDIA for the WAKDE Operation. Fighter Cover from WAKDE will be provided for the BIAK Operation. Our land based bombers will attack enemy surface forces threatening our operations, operating as practicable from HOLLANDIA and WAKDE.

2...../-

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2. This Force will support the ALAMO Force by escorting and protecting the assault convoys, furnishing fire support during the assault, and thereafter covering the landing areas, in order to assist in the seizure and occupation of the WAKDE and BIAK Areas.

3. (a) Covering Force A (T.F. 74) report to Commander Attack Force at HUMBOLDT BAY on D minus one day and on Z minus two day and operate under his tactical command as escort and fire support group during the approach and assault on the WAKDE and BIAK Areas.

WAKDE Operation - Upon release by Commander Attack Force operate in a covering position to northward of WAKDE until relieved by Covering Force B on D plus four day, unless otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces. When relieved by Covering Force B, on D plus four day return to HUMBOLDT BAY and replenish fuel and ammunition. Thereafter be prepared to concentrate with Covering Force B on short notice.

BIAK Operation - Upon release by Commander Attack Force return to HUMBOLDT BAY and replenish fuel and ammunition. Be prepared to concentrate with Covering Force B on short notice. Proceed to covering position to eastward of BIAK and relieve Covering Force B on Z plus four day, unless otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

Operate within range of shore based fighter cover during daylight. Destroy equal or inferior enemy forces encountered. In the event of the approach of a superior enemy force, engage in retiring action in order to draw the enemy into a favourable position for attack by our land based bombers.

(b) Covering Force B (T.F. 75) report to Commander Attack Force at HUMBOLDT BAY on D minus one day and on Z minus two day and operate under his tactical command as escort and fire support group during the approach and assault on the WAKDE and BIAK Areas.

WAKDE Operation - Upon release by Commander Attack Force return to HUMBOLDT BAY and replenish fuel and ammunition. Be prepared to concentrate with Covering Force A on short notice. Proceed to covering position to northward of WAKDE and relieve Covering Force A on D plus four day, unless otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces. Return to arrive at HUMBOLDT BAY on D plus eight (Z minus two) day. Replenish fuel and ammunition.

BIAK Operation - Upon release by Commander Attack Force operate in a covering position to eastward of BIAK until relieved by Covering Force A on Z plus four day, unless otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces, When relieved by Covering Force A on Z plus four day, return to HUMBOLDT BAY and replenish fuel and ammunition. Thereafter be prepared to concentrate with Covering Force A on short notice.

Operate within range of shore based fighter cover during daylight. Destroy equal or inferior enemy forces encountered. In the event of the approach of a superior enemy surface force, engage in retiring action in order to draw the enemy into a favorable position for attack by our land based bombers.

(x)(1) When Covering Forces are west of HOLLANDIA, fighter cover will be furnished by day and Tomcat reconnaissance at night. Covering Force Commanders make detailed arrangements with ComGenAdVon Five and Commander Task Force 73 respectively.

(2) Depending upon development of situation, Covering Force B may be directed to relieve Covering Force A about Z plus eight day.

(3) Covering operations will be continued until otherwise directed by Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.

4...../-

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4. (a) Fuel, provisions and ammunition available at SEEADLER HARBOUR and FINSCHHAFEN.
   (b) Fuel, provisions, ammunition and water afloat will be made available at HUMBOLDT BAY.

5. (a) Covering Forces A & B (T.F. 74 & 75) while operating as escort and fire support groups of Attack Force are under the tactical command of Commander Attack Force.
   (b) Communications in accordance with Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area Operation Plan Four dash Forty-Four as modified by Commander Allied Naval Forces Operation Plan Number Six A dash Forty-four.
   (c) Use Minus Ten Zone Time.
   (d) Commander Allied Naval Forces at Headquarters, BRISBANE.

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S E C R E T.

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX TWO.

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX TWO, COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 3-44.
4

ESTIMATED EMPLOYMENT TASK FORCES 74 AND 75

DAY	COVERING FORCE A TASK FORCE 74	COVERING FORCE B TASK FORCE 75
D-1	HUMBOLDT BAY with CTF77	HUMBOLDT BAY with CTF77
D-1 D Day	Escort and Fire Support with TF 77	Escort and Fire Support with T.F. 77
D to D/4	Covering position, WAKDE	HUMBOLDT BAY
D/4 to D/8	HUMBOLDT BAY	Covering Position WAKDE.
D/8 (Z-2)	HUMBOLDT BAY	HUMBOLDT BAY
Z-2 - Z day	Escort and Fire Support with TF 77	Escort and Fire Support with TF77
Z to Z/4	HUMBOLDT BAY	Covering position, BIAK
Z/4 to Z/8	Covering position, BIAK	HUMBOLDT BAY

Z to Z/8 missions may be repeated depending upon the tactical situation, alternating the covering forces.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

SECRET.

ANNEX NO.4 - COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 4-44.

COMMUNICATIONS.

1. This Communication Annex becomes effective with C.T.F.74 Operation Order 4-44.

2. Communications in accordance with:-

(a) C.A.N.F. Communication Plan 2-44 (as applicable).
(b) Annex J of C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 3-44 (as applicable).
(c) Annex I of C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 5-44 which modifies (b).
(d) Annex 4 of C.T.F.74 Operation Order 4-44.

3. Radio Watchkeeping Plan.

In accordance with the Radio Watchkeeping Table and as follows:-

(a) Task Force 74 Common is to be guarded between 1800K and 0600K and in low visibility and in accordance with instructions for Radar Reports, article 6184 C.T.F.74 additions to USF10A. This wave may be kept either as a loudspeaker or a split-phone line when guarding Task Force 77 Common in addition.

(b) Task Force 77 Common will be guarded constantly by "AUSTRALIA" and "ARUNTA". The remainder of the Task Force will guard from 0600K (Z-1) to 0800 (Z plus 1).

(c) The Senior Officer of any detached group of ships, or a single ship MUST guard Task Force Commanders' circuit immediately on being detached, or losing touch with the force.

(d) Loudspeaker listening watch on H/F Air and Submarine Warning Circuit is to be kept. This includes "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" but logs must be kept by these two ships.
Attention is called to C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 5-44 Annex D and Appendix 4 to Annex I regarding the use of this circuit.

(e) Reconnaissance frequency and TOMCAT-BLACKCAT VHF/HF Tactical Circuit will not be guarded constantly by any ship. On each night when there are CATS co-operating directly with the Task Force, these waves are to be guarded by "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" from 1700K to 0600K and by destroyers between 2000K and 0600K. Refer C.T.F.74 Operation Order 4-44, paragraph 5 (o).

(f) Naval Gunfire Support Communications are to be established by individual ships as required by Naval Gunfire Support Plan (Annex C and Appendix 7 to Annex I C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 5-44). Refer also Annex 1 to C.T.F.74 Operation Order 4-44.

(g) P.T. Boat frequency will be guarded by "AUSTRALIA" depending upon P.T. Boat operations in the vicinity of the Task Force.

(h) Port Wave is to be guarded in accordance with ACD 653(43), Table 2(i).

(i) The radio guards for Task Force 74 as detailed herein and for Task Force 75 as detailed by C.T.F.75 will NOT alter if Task Forces 74 and 75 combine.

(j) If Task Forces 74 and 75 combine, use Task Force 74 Common Task Force Wave for inter-communication.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

RADIO WATCHKEEPING TABLE.

LINE NUMBER.		1	2	3	4	5	6
		AUSTRALIA	SHROPSHIRE	ARUNTA	WARRAMUNGA	MUNLANY	ANTEY
LINE LETTER.	CIRCUITS.						
A	BELLS	I	I	I	I	I	I
B	T.B.S.	G	G	G	G	G	G
C	TASK FORCE 74 COMMON	G	G	G	G	G	G
D	TASK FORCE 77 COMMON	G	I	C	I	I	I
E	TASK FORCE COMMANDERS	G		I			
F	PORT WAVE	I	I	I	I	I	I
G	H/F AIR AND SUBMARINE WARNING	C	G	L	L	G	L
H	AIR OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE	I					
I	FIGHTER DIRECTION	C	G				
J	RECONNAISSANCE	G	I	L	L	L	L
K	CATS - VHF/HF TACTICAL	G	G	L	L	L	L
L	S.F.C.P. BOMBARDMENT	G	G	G	G	G	G
M	AIRCRAFT SPOTTING	G	G	C	C	C	C
N	P.T. BOATS	I					
O	COMMERCIAL		L				
P	SEVENTH FLEET COMMAND	T					
Q	SHIP SHORE H/F		T				
R	PORT WAVE H/F				T		
S	NEW GUINEA NET			T			
T							

G - GUARD - Continuous receiver watch with transmitter ready for instant use (30 seconds).

C - COVER - Continuous receiver watch with transmitter calibrated and available, but not necessarily ready for instant use (3 minutes).

I - INTERCEPT - Continuous receiver watch maintaining complete log.

L - LISTEN - Continuous receiver watch for reception of traffic addressed to unit concerned, with complete log optional.

T - TRANSMIT - Transmitter only to be kept ready for immediate use. (SEE ALPAC 50)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ENCLOSURE No. 2 To A.F. 1140/38 of 11 June 1944.

S E C R E T.

A.F.1063/25.

H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
7 June, 1944.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 5-44.

TASK ORGANISATION.

Combined Task Force 74 (less "NASHVILLE") and 75 (~~less "PHOENIX"~~) - Rear Admiral CRUTCHLEY (C.T.F.74).

"AUSTRALIA"(F), "BOISE", "PHOENIX". 1 CA, 1 CL.

Desron 24, less "BUSH", plus "TRATHEN" - 8 DD

Desdiv 42 - 4 DD

"ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA" - 2 DD

O.T.C. Combined Task Forces - C.T.F.74

Commander Destroyers - COMDESRON 24.

INFORMATION.

1. (a) On south coast BIAK our land forces hold an area which extends as far west as the eastern outskirts of MOKMER aerodrome. These forces are currently fighting to extend to the westward and to capture the air strips at MOKMER, SORIDO and BOROKOE. Seaborne reinforcement and re-supply are currently proceeding in accordance with C.T.F.77 Opplan 5-44 and as arranged by C.T.F.77 and promulgated by despatch.

(b) Landing on BIAK ISLAND of seaborne enemy reinforcements is considered a likely enemy reaction. It is further considered that such a reinforcement operation would most probably be attempted at night and that the troops would be carried in enemy naval vessels, probably cruisers and destroyers.

It is considered that WARDO and/or KORIM BAY are the points most likely to be selected by the enemy for the landing of his troop reinforcements.

(c) Allied Air Force in addition to carrying out Search Plan Able, will conduct afternoon and night searches over the most probable hostile approach routes towards BIAK and will destroy hostile forces detected.

(d) When ordered by Commander 7th Fleet, Combined Task Forces 74 (less "NASHVILLE") and 75 (~~less "PHOENIX"~~) will operate in a covering position to intercept and destroy equal or inferior enemy forces encountered. In case superior forces are encountered, our force will retire towards HOLLANDIA.

(e) During daylight, our Combined Task Force operate South of the EQUATOR and East of longitude 135°43'E.

During the night, our Combined Task Force will operate South of the EQUATOR and East of longitude 134°50'E.

It is assumed daylight begins 0615K and night begins 1915K.

Bombing restrictions..../

Bombing restrictions have been imposed accordingly. If battle or pursuit of the enemy takes our force or any part of it outside these areas, O.T.C. will broadcast instructions on 4475 Kc/s to all aircraft, to ADVON FIVE and to C.T.F.73, to refrain from bombing all surface vessels in the battle area. Receipts are to be obtained from ADVON FIVE and C.T.F.73.

In event of C.T.F.74 (or O.T.C.) deciding NOT to engage, he will broadcast such decision on 4475 Kc/s. This signal automatically removes night bombing restrictions westward of 136° 25'E.

(f) Fifth Fighter command will provide daylight air cover for our Combined Task Force.

Primary fighter director ship is "BOISE", call RED APPLE.

Stand by fighter director ship is "AUSTRALIA".

(g) TOMCAT co-operation has been arranged with C.T.F.73 and C.T.U.73.1.2.

Details in ANNEX TWO - Air Support.

2. When ordered by Commander Seventh Fleet, this combined Task Force will depart HUMBOLDT BAY and proceed to covering position to operate against enemy forces attempting to land seaborne reinforcements on BIAK.

3. Whilst on covering patrol it is my intention to operate to eastward of BIAK during the day, closing the island so as to be in the general vicinity of Point ERG (1°00'S, 136°34'E) by 1900 daily.

This vicinity has been chosen for night patrol area because our force must be prepared to proceed to either side of BIAK ISLAND on receiving reports from our TOMCATS in Sector One or Two.

4. CRUISING DISPOSITION.(Refer T.F.74 Supplement to Appendix I, USF.10A.)

In the covering area there is much air activity but so far there has been no report of enemy submarines in the area.

With a combined Task Force of 2 cruisers and 14 destroyers I intend to use 10 destroyers as a close A.A. screen and to station 4 destroyers (DESDIV 42) as an A/S and outer A.A.screen.

COMDESDIV 42 will be given station assignment by POSIT CHARLIE and will form the ships of his division equally each side of the assigned TRUE BEARING, ~~2000~~ 1800 yards between ships and on circle given by TACK DISTANCE.

Normally DESDIV 42 will be stationed towards the direction of advance and on circle ~~FIVE~~ SIX to act as A/S screen.

However, when the force is under threat of air attack, DESDIV 42 will be re-oriented to stations in the direction from which the attack is expected.

CRUISING DISPOSITION V. ..../

CRUISING DISPOSITION V.

Station Assignments:

Cruisers:

"AUSTRALIA" 000 (Guide)
"BOISE" 1.5 180

Destroyers:

(1)	1.5 025)		(2)	1.5 335)	
(3)	1.5 070)	DESDIV 47.	(4)	1.5 290)	DESDIV 48
(5)	1.5 120)		(6)	1.5 240)	
(7)	2.5 145)		(8)	2.5 215)	

(9) 3 165) "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA".
(10) 3 195)

DESDIV 42 - Stationed by POSIT C Tack DISTANCE as described above.
Circles in thousands of yards.
Rotation of the axis will be about the Guide.
Deployment - as directed below.

5. DEPLOYMENT.

(a) To deploy from a circular or nearly circular cruising disposition takes appreciable time.

(b) If contact is made ahead I may reverse the course of our disposition BY SHIP TURN SIGNAL in order to gain time for regular deployment and for our destroyers to move out, BEFORE THE HEAVY SHIPS OF BOTH SIDES ARE IN GUN RANGE. The next step would be to deploy, whilst still proceeding in roughly the same general direction of advance as the enemy. In this step ~~"AUSTRALIA" and "BOISE"~~ CRUISERS will be ordered to form column and the signal PREP DEPLOY COURSE (-) will order destroyer divisions to take station ready for deployment to the course ordered. The final step, signal DEPLOY COURSE (-) may now be made and cruisers will turn in succession to the deployment course - or the whole force may first be turned towards the enemy before the signal DEPLOY COURSE (-) is executed.

(c) If the position of the enemy is known (e.g., by TOMCAT tracking), deployment will probably be ordered before contact is made.

(d) STATIONS OF DESTROYERS IN DEPLOYMENT.

With fourteen destroyers present, it is my intention that in deployment they will form FOUR DIVISIONS, namely DESDIV 47, DESDIV 48, DESDIV 42 and a fourth division composed of "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA".
The stations of DESDIVS 47 and 48 on deployment will be determined by the basic rule, viz., the division on the side of the axis TOWARDS the direction of deployment will become the VAN force and the division on the side of the axis AWAY from the direction of deployment will become the REAR FORCE.
On signal PREP DEPLOY COURSE (-) or DEPLOY COURSE (-) COMDESRON 24 and COMDESDIV 48 will concentrate their divisions in deployment stations (see Figure 8 on page 4-12 of USF10A and also green page Article 4230).

DESDIV 42...../

DESDIV 42 will form a third division on deployment. O.T.C. will assign deployment station by POSIT CHARLIE tack DISTANCE.

"ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA" will form a fourth division and will support the attack of either the VAN or REAR division as ordered by O.T.C. On signal PREP DEPLOY COURSE (-) or DEPLOY COURSE (-), "WARRAMUNGA" will form on "ARUNTA" and this division will keep about 3000 yards on the disengaged side ready to move out to support the Van or Rear division as ordered.

6. If required to proceed to the west of BIAK to prevent an enemy landing attempt, our force will proceed between OWI and BIAK.

Before reaching restricted waters, DESDIVS 47 and 48 will form column on their divisional commanders and will precede cruisers.

DESDIV 42 and "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", will follow cruisers.

When to Westward of OWI, DESDIVS 47 and 48 maintain station one on either bow of cruisers, distant about 3000 yards, DESDIV 42 remain on starboard quarter of rear cruiser, distance about 1500 yards and "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", in a similar position on port quarter.

Retirement from west side of BIAK will probably be made passing to southward of PADEAIDO Island.

7. "SONOMA" (AT) will be at HOLLANDIA at short notice.

8. COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with Annex No. I.

9. This operation order effective when ordered by despatch.

V. CRUTCHLEY

REAR-ADMIRAL
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

ANNEX I - Communications.
ANNEX II - Air Support.

DISTRIBUTION:

"AUSTRALIA".....(4)
"BOISE".....(4)
"PHOENIX".....(4)
C.T.F.75.....(2)
COMDESRON 24.....(1)
"HUTCHINS".....(2)
"DALY".....(2)
"BEALE".....(2)
"BACHE".....(2)
"TRATHEN".....(2)
COMDESDIV 48.....(1)
"ABNER READ".....(2)
"MULLANY".....(2)
"AMMEN".....(2)
COMDESDIV 42.....(1)
"FLETCHER".....(2)
"RADFORD".....(2)
"JENKINS".....(2)
"LA VALLETTE".....(2)
"ARUNTA".....(2)
"WARRAMUNGA".....(2)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NO. 1 COMMANDER, TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 5-44.

1. This Communication Annex becomes effective with C.T.F.74 Operation Order 5-44.

2. Communications in accordance with :-

(a) C.A.N.F. Communication Plan 2-44 (as applicable).
(b) Annex J of C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 3-44 (as applicable).
(c) Annex I of C.T.F.77 Operation Plan 5-44 (which modifies (b)).
(d) Annex I of C.T.F.74 Operation Order 5-44.

3. Radio Watchkeeping Plan.

In accordance with the Radio Watchkeeping Table and as follows :-

(a) Task Force 74 Common is to be guarded between 1800K and 0600K and in low visibility. This wave may be kept either as a loudspeaker or a split phone line until action is joined. See (c) (ii) below - this wave will not be used for Radar Reports of aircraft.

(b) The Senior Officer of any detached group of ships, or a single ship, MUST guard Task Force Commander's Circuit immediately on being detached, or losing touch with the force.

(c) (i) Loudspeaker listening watch on H/F Air and Submarine Warning Circuit is to be kept constantly, with a low power voice transmitter ready for instant use.

(ii) Modify C.T.F.74 additions to U.S.F.10A, Article 6184. H/F Air and Submarine Warning Circuit will be used VOICE, as the Radar Reporting Wave by day and TBS by night as follows:-

BY DAY : Make any necessary reports of aircraft on H/F Air and Submarine Warning Circuit.

BY NIGHT : Make reports of aircraft approaching within 50 miles of the Task Force by TBS.

(iii) The reason for the provision of this circuit is to reduce the congestion on other tactical circuits (TBS, 4475 kc/s). No orders will be given for breaking or maintaining of radio silence on H/F Air and Submarine Warning Circuit. Ships are therefore to make reports of aircraft as they consider necessary.

(d) Reconnaissance frequency and TOMCAT - BLACKCAT VHF/HF Tactical Circuit will not be guarded constantly by any ship. On each night when there are CATS cooperating directly with the Task Force, these waves are to be guarded by AUSTRALIA and BOISE from 1700K to 0600K and by destroyers between 2000K and 0600K. Refer Annex TWO.

(e) P.T. Boat frequency will be guarded by AUSTRALIA depending upon P.T. Boat operations in the vicinity of the Task Force.

(f) Port Wave is to be guarded in accordance with ACD 653(43) Table 2 (i) where and when applicable.

(g) In the combined Task Force, Task Force 74 Common Task Force Wave will be used for intercommunication as a secondary tactical circuit or when out of TBS range. This wave will be used Keyed C.W.

(h) Set sea watches on sailing and harbour watches on arrival in harbour.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

RADIO WATCHKEEPING TABLE.

LINE NUMBER.		1	2	3	4	5	6
LINE LETTER.	CIRCUITS.	AUSTRALIA.	BOISE.	HUTCHINS.	FLETCHER ARUNTA ABNER READ.	REMAINING DESTROYERS.	
A	BELLS	I	I	I	I	I	
B	T.B.S.	G	G	G	G	G	
C	TASK FORCE 74 COMMON.	G	G	G	G	G	
D	TASK FORCE 77 COMMON.	G	I	C			
E	TASK FORCE COMMANDERS.	G		I	I		
F	PORT WAVE	I	I	I	I	I	
G	H/F AIR AND SUBMARINE WARNING.	G	G	G	G	G	
H	AIR OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE.	I					
I	FIGHTER DIRECTION.	G	G	L			
J	RECONNAISSANCE.	G	I	I	L	L	
K	CATS - VHF/HF TACTICAL.	G	G	L	L	L	
L	P.T. BOATS.	I					
M	COMMERCIAL.		L				
N	SEVENTH FLEET COMMAND.	T					
O	SHIP SHORE H/F.		T				
P	NEW GUINEA NET.			T			
Q							

G-GUARD - Continuous receiver watch with transmitter ready for instant use (30 seconds).

C-COVER - Continuous receiver watch with transmitter calibrated and available, but not necessarily ready for instant use (3 minutes).

I-INTERCEPT - Continuous receiver watch maintaining complete log.

L-LISTEN - Continuous receiver watch for reception of traffic addressed to unit concerned, with complete log optional.

T-TRANSMIT - Transmitter only to be kept ready for immediate use.

(SEE ALPAC 50).

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX TWO - C.T.F.74 OPERATION ORDER 5-44.

AIR SUPPORT.

1. FIGHTER COVER.

Daylight fighter cover will be provided by Fifth Fighter Command.
Primary fighter director ship "BOISE" using call RED APPLE.
Stand by fighter director ship "AUSTRALIA".

2. DAY RECONNAISSANCE.

Relevant details of SOWESPAC search Plan ABLE are as follows:-

FROM WAKDE:

PB4Y, Sector	1	286 - 295	640 miles.
	2	295 - 304	800
	3	304 - 313	800

FROM MOMOTE:

PB4Y, Sector	4	293 - 302
	5	302 - 311
	6	311 - 320
	7	320 - 330

3. NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE.

FROM WAKDE:

XB - 24, Sector	(X)	301 - 316	600 miles
	(Y)	316 - 331	600

4. TOMCAT CO-OPERATION.

(a) When Combined Task Force is in the covering area, TOMCATS of T.U. 73.1.2 based at HOLLANDIA will nightly, between 1930K and 0400K, search the following sectors, reporting and tracking any enemy forces detected.

SECTOR ONE:

Origin : Cape WARARI (east end BIAK)

Sector between true bearings 260 and 300 degrees from Origin and between distance limits 70 and 130 miles from Origin.

SECTOR TWO:

Origin: Cape WARARI (east end BIAK).

Sector between true bearings 300 and 000 degrees from Origin and between distance limits 70 and 120 miles from origin.

(b) TOMCATS will be armed only with flares.

(c) ON STATION reports will be made about 1800K.

(d) Planes will show I.F.F. throughout their mission.

(e) COMMUNICATIONS...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

(e) COMMUNICATIONS WITH TOMCATS.

(i) C.T.U. 73.1.2 in "ORCA" at HOLLANDIA.

C.W. CALL : 3SI
Voice : PICTURE
C.T.U.73.1.2 : LK1A

(ii) TOMCATS will use C.W. call 3AQ1 followed by plane number and will use TOMCAT and sector number in body of message.

TOMCATS will use voice call TOMCAT ONE or TWO.

(iii) Frequencies guarded by TOMCATS will be:

Reconnaissance:

Primary.	1st Alternative	2nd Alternative	Times.
7420	6490	7805	0900K-1900K
4275	3760	3915	1900K-0900K

Tactical Circuit - Ships - CAT.

Primary 142.56 mc/s Voice

Secondary 5995 mc/s Voice.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

SECRET

A.F.1063/36.

H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
13 July, 1944.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 6-44.

TASK ORGANISATION.

(a) Task Force 74:

"AUSTRALIA"
"SHROPSHIRE"
"ARUNTA"
"WARRAMUNGA"
"AMMEN"
"BACHE"

(b) Aircraft of 71st Wing R.A.A.F. (based AITAPE).

(c) Piper CUB plane provided by AITAPE Task Force.

SITUATION.

1. (a) Enemy land forces have been isolated by our holding at AITAPE and our northerly advance from MADANG.

(b) A strong element of these enemy forces has concentrated to the eastward of AITAPE and threaten our position. Blue forces in contact with the enemy have today (Thursday, 13th July) formed on the line of the DRUINIMOR River.

(c) Supplies and reinforcements of enemy troops are moving westward from WEWAK area by barge and by land trails.

(d) Enemy gun positions sited on the coast between YAKAMUL and WEWAK continue to harass our PT boats which are operating against enemy barge traffic.

2. In support of the operations of the AITAPE Task Force, and in support of our PT boats, whose operations against enemy barge traffic are colaterally in support of the same operations,

Task Force 74 will

(i) At 0800 King (H-hour) on Friday, 14th July, commence simultaneous bombardment of objectives at YAKAMUL, MARUBIAN, MATAPU and SOWAM, in accordance ANNEX No. 1.

(ii) Base at AITAPE.

(iii) Be prepared to render further support as arranged between C.T.F.74 and Comgen AITAPE Task Force

71st Wing R.A.A.F. will

(i) Provide BEAUFORT plane for spotting ship bombardment of targets at MARUBIAN, MATAPU and SOWAM.

(ii) Between H-5 and H-hour, spotting plane will drop a stick of 4 x 250 and 2 x 500 bombs over above target areas as markers and will report mean point of impact with relation to target areas outlined in ANNEX No. 1

AITAPE Task Force will

Provide Piper CUB plane for air spotting at YAKAMUL for bombardment by "AUSTRALIA" and "WARRAMUNGA".

3. On completion...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

3. On completion of scheduled bombardment

(a) "AUSTRALIA", "WARRAMUNGA", will be prepared during daylight to render call fire in support of the operations of the units of the AITAPE Task Force engaged with the enemy in the DRUINIMOR RIVER area.
"AUSTRALIA", "WARRAMUNGA", will return to AITAPE prior dark.

(b) "SHROPSHIRE", "ARUNTA", "AMMEN", "BACHE", return to AITAPE harbour.

4. PT boat and R.A.A.F. officers familiar with the coast and with knowledge of the targets, will embark in each ship.

5. Air spotting for scheduled bombardments has been arranged. Communications with spotting planes are outlined in ANNEX No. 1.

6. Friendly PT boats will be clear of the area of operations by 0500 King, Friday, 14th July.

7. Request has been made for restrictions on allied bombing of ship targets between 0500K and sunset Friday, 14th July, of any ship targets between AITAPE and 143°20'E and within 20 miles of the coast.

8. An enemy submarine assumed to be on supply mission has been sighted on several occasions recently in the vicinity of SOWAM - TENDANYE ISLAND.

9. COMMUNICATIONS ~~normal~~ - ANNEX N°2. Communications with spotting planes as outlined in ANNEX No. 1.

10. This operation order effective on receipt.

JOHN COLLINS

COMMODORE.
COMMANDER, TASK FORCE 74.

ANNEX NO. 1 - Bombardment Instructions.
ANNEX NO. 2 - COMMUNICATIONS.

DISTRIBUTION:

"AUSTRALIA"	(4)	
"SHROPSHIRE"	(4)	
"ARUNTA"	(2)	
"WARRAMUNGA"	(2)	
"AMMEN"	(2)	
"BACHE"	(2)	
Comgen AITAPE Task Force	(4)	
ComMTBRon 7	(2)	
C.O.71 Wing R.A.A.F.	(2)	
Commander 7th Fleet	(5)	Deferred distribution.
A.C.N.B.	(1)	
C.T.F.75	(1)	
Comdesron 24	(1)	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX ONE TO C.T.F.74 OPERATION PLAN 6-44 -
BOMBARDMENT INSTRUCTIONS.

INTENTION.

Task Force 74 will bombard targets as detailed with the object of supporting further operations of PERSECUTION TASK FORCE and operations of M.T.B.'s.

INFORMATION.

2. Targets as detailed contain guns up to 75 mm. calibre, troop concentrations and store dumps. All target areas are accurately located as follows:-

(a)
(i) Vicinity of YAKAMUL - Troop concentrations and enemy Headquarters.
(ii) "AUSTRALIA" 263390 - 400 yards SOUTH, 200 yards EAST and WEST.
(iii) "WARRAMUNGA" 239398 - 300 yards SOUTH, 150 yards EAST and WEST.

NOTE - Line of fire MUST be clear of our troops WEST of DRINIUMOR RIVER.

(b)
(i) Vicinity of SOWAM - Supply areas and gun positions.
(ii) "SHROPSHIRE" - Rectangle 500 yards Deep and 300 yards wide, centered on 735291.
(iii) "AMMEN" 760297 - 200 yards SOUTH, 250 yards EAST and WEST.

(c)
(i) Vicinity of MATAPAU - Supply Area.
(ii) "BACHE" - 300 yards Square centered on 623301.

(d)
(i) Vicinity of MARUBIAN - Supply area and Barge hideout.
(ii) "ARUNTA" Target 1 - 200 yards Square centered on track junction at 416346.
Target 2 - Barge hideouts along both river banks 200 yards S.W. from 405353.

METHOD.

3. (a) Ships open fire at 0800.
(b) Targets are to be covered equally.
(c) Total ammunition allowance:-
(i) 8" H.C. or H.E. and reduced charges - 100 rounds per ship.
(ii) 5" or 4.7" A.A.C. or H.E. - 200 rounds per ship.
(d) Range at the discretion of Commanding Officers.
(e) Convergence - Guns to be parallel.
(f) Aircraft spotting

SHIP.	CALL SIGN	AIRCRAFT	CALL SIGN	FREQUENCY.
"AUSTRALIA"	ICE CONE TWO	PIPER CUB	ICE CONE ONE	33mc/s.
"WARRAMUNGA"	ICE CONE THREE	" "	" " "	33mc/s.
"SHROPSHIRE"	PASSWORD	BEAUFORT	HAROLD	6650
"AMMEN"	KEEL	"	HAROLD	6650
"BACHE"	SWEETCORN	"	ABLE	3095
"ARUNTA"	KNIFE	"	MARY	3785

Note 1:...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

Note 1: "WARRAMUNGA" and "AMMEN" will be ranged after cruisers have been spotted "on".

Note 2: At 0740 ships initiate call to aircraft - long call of about one minute and then listen out. If aircraft does not answer repeat the call each five minutes.

(g) MAPS.

Use 1/63360 Maps. Sheets SUAIN WEST, SUAIN EAST, BUT WEST.

ANNEX NUMBER TWO TO C.T.F.74 OPERATION ORDER 6-44.
COMMUNICATIONS.

A. HEADQUARTERS COMGEN AITAPE.

1. A special circuit has been set up between Task Force 74 and Headquarters of COMGEN AITAPE.

2. "AUSTRALIA" will keep continuous watch on this circuit: other ships set watch as required.

3935 kc/s(C.W.) Primary.
4960 kc/s(C.W.) Secondary.

3. Cryptographic Systems held are:-

SIGTON - 4 (Santa)
C.S.P.1607 (JP)
C.S.P.1270
C.S.P.1683

4. Authentication by either Word of the Day
or S.I.S.M. Authentication Card.

5. Additional Circuits continuously manned by Headquarters Comgen Aitape are:-

(1) 6525 kc/s CW 0600K - 2000K.
3550 kc/s CW 2000K - 0600K.

(2) 5985 kc/s CW 0700K - 2100K.
2915 kc/s CW 2100K - 0700K.

(3) 4475 kc/s VOICE 0700K - 1900K.

(4) 3120 kc/s VOICE 1900K - 0700K.

B. CALL SIGNS.

	C.W.	VOICE.
COM GEN AITAPE	YN68	YELLOWSTONE.
C.T.F.74	LN8J	MINISTER.
"AUSTRALIA"	LK5D	KENNEL.
"SHROPSHIRE"	LO9D	PASSWORD.
"ARUNTA"	LLØJ	KNIFE.
"WARRAMUNGA"	LK6G	KILLJOY.
"AMMEN"	LK8C	KEEL.
"BACHE"	LS9B	SWEETCORN.

P.T. Boat call signs from current call sheet.
P.T. Boat circuits:-

4475 kc/s VOICE 0700K - 1900K.
3120 kc/s VOICE 1900K - 0700K.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

A.F.1063/37.

S E C R E T.

H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA",
Flagship.
15 July, 1944.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 7-44.

TASK ORGANISATION.

(a) Destroyer Force:

"ARUNTA" (Senior Officer)
"WARRAMUNGA"
"AMMEN"
"BACHE"

(b) P.T. Boat Force:

PT 129 and 134 of MTBRon 7.

(c) Spotting (BEAUFORT) Aircraft of 71st Wing R.A.A.F.(based AITAPE).

SITUATION.

1.(a) Enemy land forces have been isolated by our holding at AITAPE and our northerly advance from MADANG.

(b) A strong element of these enemy forces has concentrated to the eastward of AITAPE. Units of the AITAPE Task Force are in contact with the enemy in the DRINIUMOR RIVER area.

(c) Enemy supplies and troop reinforcements are moving westward from WEWAK area by barges and on inland trails. Considerable barge traffic at night is expected along the coast between SOWAM and MARIBOU.

(d) Enemy gun positions sited on the coast have supported barge traffic by harassing our PT boats operating against this enemy activity.

(e) Enemy submarine assumed to be on supply mission has been sighted on several recent occasions in the area Cape DJERUAN - SOWAM - TENDANYE Island.

(f) The area south of Cape ULEKUP (Kairiau Id.), within a radius of FOUR MILES is dangerous to navigation owing to allied minefield. There are possibly drifting mines outside this danger area.

(g) Movements of other friendly forces in the area of operations - see paragraph 6.

2. In support of the operations of the AITAPE Task Force and of our PT boats, whose operations against enemy barge traffic are colaterally in support of the same operations, this force will:-

(a) during the night 15th - 16th July, conduct co-ordinated destroyer - PT boat operations against enemy barge traffic between SOWAM and MARUBIAN.

(b) bombard enemy positions at KARAWOP and BOIKEN commencing 0700K Sunday, 16th July, utilising two destroyers (AMMEN, BACHE) and plane spotting as outlined below.

3. NIGHT 15TH-16TH JULY...../

3. NIGHT 15th-16th JULY : OPERATIONS AGAINST BARGE TRAFFIC.

(i) At 1900K Saturday, 15th July, DESTROYER FORCE and PT BOAT FORCE depart AITAPE and proceed in company to conduct joint operations against enemy barge traffic between SOWAM - MARUBIAN terminii.

(ii) "ARUNTA", "WARRAMUNGA", "BACHE", operate between the limits of 143°00'E and 143°10'E - Area ABLE.
"AMMEN" and PTs 129 and 134 conduct co-ordinated operations between the limits of 142°50'E and 142°55'E - Area BAKER.
The gap 142°55'E to 143°00'E between above areas ABLE and BAKER is "NO Man's Land".

(iii) PT Officer will embark in each destroyer prior sortie from AITAPE.

(iv) Details regarding method of carrying out assigned operations will be decided in conference, but I desire the DESTROYER FORCE to observe the following general principles:-

(a) The object of the operations is to destroy enemy barges. Shore batteries which disclose their presence by opening fire should be engaged. It is unlikely, however, that the destruction of such batteries will be achieved in a firing of this nature.
Opportunity should be taken to engage any trucks or enemy troops seen on the coast road if this can be done without detriment to the primary object.

(b) Undue risk, navigational or of serious damage from enemy shore battery fire, is NOT to be taken as I judge that the maintaining of destroyers in efficient condition for pending operations is of more importance than this particular mission.

(c) If searchlights are used because starshell illumination is inadequate, the beam should be exposed INTERMITTENTLY only, when ships are within effective range of enemy shore guns.
In the 3-destroyer group it should be possible to arrange for one ship to be ready immediately to undertake counter battery fire if a ship burning a searchlight should be taken under fire from the shore.

(v) Destroyers and peetees will have I.F.F. turned on throughout the mission.

(vi) At daylight, Sunday, 16th July, destroyer and peetee forces proceed as outlined in paragraph 4 below.

4. At daylight, Sunday, 16th July:

PT Force	-	act as ordered by Squadron Commander.
"ARUNTA"	-	return to AITAPE. Enter harbour and fuel from "AUSTRALIA".
"WARRAMUNGA"	-	return to AITAPE. Establish underway A/S patrol and be ready to answer army call for fire.
"AMMEN") "BACHE")	-	Conduct bombardment KARAWOP and BOIKEN in accordance with paragraph 5. Open fire at 0700K.

5. BOMBARDMENT...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

5. BOMBARDMENT OF KARAWOP AND BOIKEN - Sunday, 16th July.

INFORMATION.

(a) Targets.

(i) Vicinity of CAPE KARAWOP - Concentration of guns.
Area 400 yards to WEST and 500 yards to SOUTH of CAPE KARAWOP at 090240.
To be engaged by "AMMEN".

(ii) Vicinity of BOIKEN - Fuel and ammunition dump.
Area 600 yards N.W. and 600 yards S.E. from centre of BOIKEN VILLAGE at 123222.
To be engaged by "BACHE".

(b) Enemy Gun Positions.

In addition to gun concentration at CAPE KARAWOP, many guns are suspected or known to be located as under:-

Location.	Map Reference.	Calibre & Type.
CAPE WOM	273120	Coast Defence.
" "	283117	5" Coast Defence Gun.
MUSCHU ISLAND	234210	5" " " "
" "	239228	5" " " "
" "	228263	5" " " "
KAIRIRU ISLAND	207290	50 MM A.A. Gun.
" "	225295	75 mm Gun.
" "	230295	75 mm Gun.
DAGUA	985245	3" Gun.
BANAK	037237	3" Gun.

(c) METHOD.

(i) Ships open fire at 0700K.
(ii) Target coverage at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.
(iii) Total ammunition allowance 300 rounds 5 inch A.A.C.per ship.
(iv) Convergence - Guns to be parallel.
(v) Aircraft spotting has been arranged.

SHIP.	CALL SIGN.	AIRCRAFT CALL SIGN.	FREQUENCY.
"AMMEN"	KEEL	Beaufort HAROLD	6650
"BACHE"	SWEETCORN	" ABLE	3095

NOTE: At 0640 ships initiate call to aircraft - long call of about one minute and then listen out. If aircraft does not answer repeat the call each five minutes.

(d) Between 0655K and 0700K each spotting plane will drop a stick of bombs on the assigned target areas. After reporting position of mean point of impact with relation to the centre of target area, the planes will stand by to spot fall of shot of ship bombardment fire.

(e) On completion bombardment mission, "AMMEN", "BACHE", return to AITAPE, enter harbour and fuel from "AUSTRALIA" and "SHROPSHIRE" respectively.

6. During the night 15th-16th July, two peetees will be operating in the area BUT-UNEI Island and another pair will be operating in the area KAIRIRU-MURIK LAGOON.

These peetees leave their operating areas at daylight and will return to AITAPE by route northward of TENDANYE Island.

7. Restrictions on bombing by allied 'planes of ship targets in the water area between AITAPE and WEWAK within 20 miles of the coast, are effective from 1800K 15th July to 1200K 16th July.

8. COMMUNICATIONS - Annex No.1.

9. This Operation Order effective upon receipt.

10. C.T.F.74 in "AUSTRALIA" at AITAPE.

JOHN COLLINS.

COMMODORE.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

ANNEX NO.1 - Communications.

DISTRIBUTION:

"AUSTRALIA".....(1)
"SHROPSHIRE".....(1)
"ARUNTA".....(2)
"WARRAMUNGA".....(2)
"AMMEN".....(2)
"BACHE".....(2)
COMGEN AITAPE.....(4)
C.O. 71 Wing RAAF.(2)

COM MTB RON 7.....(2)
COM MTB RON 8.....(2)
COM. 7TH FLEET.....(5))
A.C.N.B.....(1)) Deferred
C.T.F.75.....(1)) distribution.
COMDESRON 24.....(1))

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

ANNEX NUMBER ONE TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 7-44.

COMMUNICATIONS.

1. This Communication Annex supplements Annex No.2 to my Operation Order 6-44.

2. WATCHKEEPING TABLE.

	T.B.S.	3935 kc/s	4475 kc/s 3120 kc/s	3095 kc/s	6650 kc/s
	1	2	3	4	5
COMGEN AITAPE		X	X		
C.T.F.74	X	X	X	X	X
"ARUNTA"	X	X	X		
"WARRAMUNGA"	X	O	X		
"AMMEN"	X	X	X		X
"BACHE"	X	O	X	X	
P.T. BOATS			X		

X - TRANSMIT and RECEIVE.
O - OPTIONAL.

3. Spotting frequencies to be manned as required: if necessary "AMMEN" and "BACHE" drop circuit 3 to comply.

4. Ships manning circuit 2 are to keep in touch with YN68 by calling occasionally.

5. Note - C.T.F.74 and COMGEN AITAPE are on immediate call by voice as well as CW (circuits 2 and 3).

6. The ONLY Crypto channels common to destroyers and COMGEN AITAPE are:-

CSP 1607
CSP 1270
CSP 1683

Use these systems for ALL messages of interest to COMGEN AITAPE which are passed on circuits guarded by him.

7. Call signs as in Annex 2 to C.T.F.74 OPORDER 6-44.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

A.F.1063/38.

S E C R E T.

H.M.A.S."AUSTRALIA"
Flagship.
16 July, 1944.

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74 OPERATION ORDER 8-44.

TASK ORGANISATION.

Destroyer Group:

Comdesron 24 in "HUTCHINS with "BEALE".

SITUATION.

1.(a) Enemy land forces have been isolated by our holding at AITAPE and our northerly advance from MADANG.

(b) A strong element of these enemy forces has concentrated to the eastward of AITAPE. Units of the AITAPE Task Force are in contact with the enemy in the DRINIUMOR RIVER area.

(c) Enemy supplies and troop reinforcements are moving westward from WEWAK area by barges and on inland trails. Considerable barge traffic at night is expected along the coast between SOWAM and MARIBOU.

(d) Enemy gun positions sited on the coast have supported barge traffic by harassing our PT boats operating against this enemy activity.

(e) Enemy submarine assumed to be on supply mission has been sighted on several recent occasions in the area Cape DJERUAN - SOWAM - TENDANYE Island.

(f) The area south of Cape ULEKUP (Kairiau Id.), within a radius of FOUR MILES is dangerous to navigation owing to allied minefield. There are possibly drifting mines outside this danger area.

(g) Friendly Peetees will be operating to eastward of the area of operations - details will be promulgated by despatch.

2. In support of the operations of the AITAPE Task Force and of our PT boats, whose operations against enemy barge traffic are colaterally in support of the same operations, this force will:-

during the night 16th-17th July, operate against enemy barge traffic between MATAPAU and MARUBIAN, i.e. between longitudes 142°50'E and 143°02'E (Chart AUS.056).

NOTE: On the gridded maps, the longitude overlay relative to the coast differs from Chart AUS.056.

3. PT Officer will embark in each destroyer prior sortie from AITAPE at 1900K 16th July.

4. Method of carrying out assigned operations will be left to COMDESRON 24, but I desire the DESTROYER GROUP to observe the following general principles:-

(a) The object of the operations is to destroy enemy barges. Shore batteries which disclose their presence by opening fire should be engaged. It is unlikely, however, that the destruction of such batteries will be achieved in a firing of this nature.
Opportunity should be taken to engage any trucks or enemy troops seen on the coast road if this can be done without detriment to the primary object.

(b) Undue risk,...../

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1073435

(b) Undue risk, navigational or of serious damage from enemy shore battery fire, is NOT to be taken as I judge that the maintaining of destroyers in efficient condition for pending operations is of more importance than this particular mission.

(c) If searchlights are used because starshell illumination is inadequate, the beam should be exposed INTERMITTENTLY only, when ships are within effective range of enemy shore guns. In a 2-destroyer group it should be possible to arrange for one ship to be ready immediately to undertake counter battery fire if a ship burning a searchlight should be taken under fire from the shore.

5. At daylight, Monday 17th July, destroyer group return to AITAPE.

6. Restrictions on bombing by allied 'planes of ship targets in the water area between AITAPE and WEWAK within 20 miles of the coast have been requested.

7. COMMUNICATIONS - In accordance C.T.F.74 AITAPE COMPLAN 1-44.

8. This Operation Order effective upon receipt.

9. C.T.F.74 in "AUSTRALIA" at AITAPE.

JOHN COLLINS

COMMODORE.
COMMANDER TASK FORCE 74.

DISTRIBUTION:

COMDESRON 24.....(2)
"HUTCHINS".....(2)
"BEALE".....(2)
COMGEN AITAPE.....(4)
C.O.71 Wing R.A.A.F.....(2)
COM MTB RON 7.....(2)
COM MTB RON 8.....(2)

COM. 7TH FLEET.....(5))
A.C.N.B.....(1)) Deferred distribution.
C.T.F.75.....(1))

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