


AWM78
**Reports of Proceedings,
HMA Ships and Establishments**

HMAS HOBART (I and II)

Item number: 141/7 Part 2

Title: June-October 1968



AWM78-141/7PART2

AWM 78

141/7
[Part 2]

Protocol - 100 pgs.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN

HMAS Hobart -

Reports of Proceedings

SECRET GUARD 18/206/1392

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

MINUTE PAPER

HMAS HOBART

JUNE 1968
Report of proceedings

AS(NS) 15/8

D OF O 16/8

DCNS 18/8

1NM 24/8

2NM 24/8

3NM 24/8

4NM 24/8

SEC 24/8

FAS(EG) 29/8

AS(FM) 29/8

C OF S 29/8

DPR 10/9

AS(NS) (N5) 16/9

Registrar

By Defo - Request copy be placed on 1205/24/40 "HMAS HOBART - Incident on 17/6/68" &
By N55 copy placed on file 1215/26/40 16/9

DCOP D of P D/D of P(A) DGFE DTWP D of C DNAP D of P CONS DNI } Separate
HPB DCNP DOA DMT DDM DPG DPSD DAS DNR DNES D of R ACDC FNA } Report
ACMD DMED ACTP DWE PEE MDG DSAP(M) DNS DMS D of S(A) } Circulating
D of V AS(NS)(N5) Registrar

- NOTES: (A) This report should be dealt with and passed on promptly.
- (B) On this file comments should be brief; if any matter requires comprehensive treatment, reference to another Branch, or approval of a Board Member, a new file should be raised, cross-referenced to this one.

8/19/5

SECRET GUARD

SECRET GUARD

NAVY—CANBERRA

18

206

1392

HMAS HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - JUNE, 1968

(HMAS HOBART's unnumbered letter of 6th
July, 1968.)

II

A.F. 17/30/3

The Secretary,
Department of the Navy.

1. Forwarded.

REAR ADMIRAL

Office of the
Flag Officer Commanding,
HM Australian Fleet.

PMS

7 AUG 1968

SECRET GUARD

SECRET *GUARD*

H.M.A.S. HOBART, D39,
at Subic Bay.

6 JUL 1968

The Flag Officer Commanding,
H.M. Australian Fleet.

(Copies to:- The Australian Naval Attache, Washington.
The Commander, Australian Forces, Vietnam.
The Captain, H.M.A.S. PERTH.
The Captain, H.M.A.S. BRISBANE.)

HMAS HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - JUNE, 1968

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the report of proceedings
for HMAS HOBART for the month of June, 1968.

2. On the morning of Saturday 1st June, HOBART was on station at Point BETTY, off the coast near HUE in SOUTH VIETNAM. In response to a request from the Spotter working with the 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION the ship moved south east to Point CAROLF and fired H and I's from 0230 to 0500. The targets were suspected V.C. positions and although no GDA was received, two large secondary explosions were sighted. The ship departed the line at 0730 to rendezvous with USS MAUNA KEA (AE-22) to replenish with ammunition, returning to Point BETTY at 1100. At this time a SWIFT boat closed and delivered ABOW W.C. Eaglesham, R94794 who had been in DA NANG for dental treatment since 20th May. The ship patrolled during the afternoon awaiting calls for fire. At 2200 fire was opened again this time in support of the First ARVN DIVISION; the targets were suspected V.C. positions but no GDA was available.

3. USS HULL (DD-945) arrived at Point BETTY at 2300 to relieve HOBART. Since there was time on hand, the Spotter was asked whether HOBART could be used effectively and as a result further H and I's were fired between midnight and 0200. At 0215 HOBART detached and proceeded to rendezvous with USS BOYD (DD-544) 10 miles east of TIGER ISLAND to the east of CAP LAY. Having transferred turnover material HOBART set course for SUBIC at 16 knots. Prayers were said at 0915 and during the day UNREP gear was unrigged for maintenance during the period off the line. The ship departed the Surveillance area at 1900.

4. At 0800 Monday 3rd HOBART made rendezvous with USS SACRAMENTO (AOE-1) to the south of MACCLESFIELD BANK. During the next 45 minutes a major replenishment of victualling stores was effected by VERTREP, saving many hours of work in harbour. On completion HOBART continued eastward and at 1100 closed USS KRETCHMER (DER-329). For the next 4½ hours HOBART exercised O.O.W. stationkeeping and changing station, practices for which very few opportunities exist in the current deployment. On completion of manoeuvres KRETCHMER was closed for a light line transfer before HOBART detached eastward. At 0700 the following morning the ship stopped to the southward of the entrance to SUBIC BAY and carried out a ULO-6 check prior to entering harbour. HOBART secured alongside Rivera Point 11/12 at 0858. USS EDSON (DD-946) which had been held off the berth by tugs, secured alongside HOBART at 0920.

SECRET
GUARD

...../2

1 AUG 1968

2. **SECRET GUARD**

5. The ship was listed 5 degrees to port and the Staff of USS PIEDMONT commenced replacing both 5"/54 Mount Barrels. Installation was completed by 1515, with final adjustments continuing until next morning. During the two days general maintenance was also carried out and a number of outstanding stores requests filled enabling several equipments to be reported CASCOR.

6. The Captain of USS BOSTON (CAG-1), Captain I.L. Smith, USN called at 1130 on Wednesday 5th and stayed to lunch. As the BOSTON was due to sail for the Southern Gunline on the same day as HOBART, arrangements were made for the two ships to take passage and exercise in company.

7. At 0800 on Thursday 6th colours were half masted in honour of those lost in USS SCORPION. USS EDSON and USS KRETCHMER were held off by tugs and at 0830 HOBART cast off and proceeded, anchoring off the Naval Magazine wharf at 0909. A quantity of 5"/54 VT self-destruct ammunition was offloaded followed by the embarking of HCPD. During this period I landed and called on Captain Anderson, USN who has recently assumed the duties of COMNAVSTA SUBIC. HOBART weighed at 1140 and proceeded out of the harbour; enroute through the local exercise areas an AATX and INTEX were conducted, the latter not being wholly successful due to both air warning radars not working at peak performances.

8. HOBART continued passage westward and at 1920 took station on USS BOSTON which had been conducting a missile firing exercise. Throughout the night both ships exercised surface plotting drills, ECM drills and Bridge and Operations Room Voice drills. These exercises were supplemented on Friday 7th with radar calibrations and O.O.W. manoeuvres and stationing exercises which proved of excellent value to both ships. On completion of the exercises BOSTON was closed for a high line transfer of one of my sailors who had taken passage in BOSTON for dental treatment. Both ships continued westward in company during the night of the 7th.

9. Colours were half masted on the morning of the 7th on receipt of the tragic news of the death of Senator Robert Kennedy. Colours were also half masted on 8th and 9th June.

10. HOBART was detached at 0430 on Saturday 8th and set course to rendezvous with USS BOYD near Point BARBARA, north east of HUE. Following a brief turnover of materials by boat, HOBART transitted to Point BETTY, arriving at 0640. A quiet morning patrol ended at 1106 with a brief spotted firing on a V.C. emplacement which was neutralised by 1150.

11. At 1452 I was most pleased to welcome you onboard, Sir, accompanied by your Flag Lieutenant, Lieutenant R.H. Scott, RAN.

12. The remainder of the day was quiet until 2045 when H and I was commenced in support of the 1st ARVN DIVISION and the 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION. This series of random pattern firings at a number of suspected V.C. concentration points continued until 0545 the following day, Sunday 9th, when course was set to rendezvous with USS SACRAMENTO (AOE-1). HOBART was alongside from 0655 to 0806 during which replenishment of fuel, ammunition and victualling stores was effected and empty brass returned. This fine ship was scheduled to depart for the USA a few days later and a suitable farewell gift was passed by HOBART in recognition of her efficient and friendly service. This is the custom and although it is most desirable to comply it does become expensive in time. *W*

...../3

SECRET GUARD

3. **SECRET** *GUARD*

13. HOBART returned to station at 0935 and shortly afterwards a SWIFT boat came alongside into which one sailor from USS HULL (DD-945), who had taken passage from SUBIC, was transferred to be returned to his own ship. The afternoon was again quiet with the ship patrolling off the coast at Point BETTY. At 1525 USS EDSON closed and one set of turnover material transferred by HOBART's boat. As this turnover completed, the ship's 1 MC System was used to broadcast General W. Westmoreland's farewell speech to the 7th Fleet, delivered onboard USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65). Throughout the night H and I's were again fired in support of the two army units ashore, terminating at 0550.

14. Firing commenced again at 0945 on Monday 10th for a short spotted mission which resulted in 2 structures reported destroyed and 6 damaged. In mid afternoon a SWIFT boat closed to replenish with a small quantity of fresh food which was gladly supplied. As this minor transfer completed a helo transfer occurred bringing a USN CPO, CTC J.H. BODE, 4729418; Chief Bode represented the Pacific Tactical Elint Group based in Japan and he embarked for a few days to provide an ECM briefing. Further unobserved H and I's were fired from 2215 to midnight.

15. From 0053 to 0600 on Tuesday 11th 132 rounds of H and I were fired in a random pattern in support of the 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION. HOBART departed station at 0600 and rendezvoused with TU 77.1.2 to the north east of TIGER ISLAND. The TU was replenishing and HOBART closed USS PARICUTIN (AF-18) to re-arm at 0812. On completion a helo transfer of 16 bags of mail, mostly sea mail, provided a welcome interlude before the ship closed USS MISPELLION (AO-105) to refuel. As the first line was about to be passed, the ship had to disengage as USS SAINT PAUL ordered HOBART alongside for transfer of turnover materials and more mail. During this transfer I was able to speak again to Rear Admiral Moore's Chief of Staff and the Captain, Captain R.A. Hilson, USN and receive a short but up to date briefing on Sea Dragon Operations. I assumed the duties of CTU 77.1.2 at 1030.

16. HOBART closed MISPELLION again at 1044 to refuel. During the UNREP, TO M. STANDEN, R64148 who was suffering from a back injury, was transferred. He was subsequently transferred to USS CHIPOLA (AO-63) for passage to SUBIC BAY. Unfortunately he became a forgotten man onboard the CHIPOLA and after some hours alongside at SUBIC he hailed a taxi and had himself admitted to the USN Hospital. On completion of replenishment HOBART with USS THEODORE E. CHANDLER (DD-717) the second ship of the Task Unit, in company, set course westward at 26 knots. The first firing mission of the day, against two truck parks 12 miles NW of DONG HOI commenced at 1315 with HOBART as the primary firing ship and CHANDLER Shotgun. During this mission Mount 52 suffered, for the second time in the deployment, a broken empty case ejector crosshead, rendering the mount unserviceable.

17. The S2 aircraft which was spotting was unable to observe the rounds which were fired from Mount 51 due to the distance from the target and I aborted the mission. As the TU was retiring however a WBLC was detected and HOBART engaged with Mount 51. After a short period Mount 51 suffered a cradle ejector failure and CHANDLER was assigned the target. CHANDLER fired several rounds at these and other WBLC detected nearby, assisted by spotting by the S2. The targets were eventually passed to the 7th Air Force as their final prosecution would have placed the TU, with reduced gunnery effectiveness, well within range of shore battery fire. To

SECRET
GUARD

...../4

SECRET GUARD

continue firing at long range would have been a waste of ammunition.

18. The second mission for the day was postponed from 1645 to 2130. During this firing Mount 51 which had been repaired again developed a casualty and I regrettably had to cancel the mission. The TU patrolled the coast overnight, mainly in the area near VINH where suspected WBLC's had been reported some weeks before.

19. After an uneventful night the Task Unit closed the coast 20 miles NW of CAP LAY at 0930 on Wednesday 12th for a spotted mission. Unfortunately again the S2 aircraft could not observe; the target was 3 miles inland and these aircraft are not permitted to close within 3 miles of the coast. The target was therefore fired as H and I before the two ships retired. At 1115 a Helo which had been requested, closed and took ME K. DELANEY, R94611, who was suffering from a severe throat infection, for transfer to USS YORKTOWN (CVS-10) for observation. Moving north, the TU closed the coast at 17°50N for a firing mission to be spotted by CHANDLER's SNOOPY drone. The targets, two highway bridges on Route 1A were near the coast and although SNOOPY was well positioned, the firing was unobserved. Following this mission, CHANDLER closed for a light line telephone conversation.

20. The final firing mission for the day, against a truck park near Choke Point PURPLE was fired as H and I at 2000. The Task Unit patrolled northward during the night, to latitude 19 degrees North on WBLC surveillance. Two rounds H and I fire were directed at each of two selected CD sites each watch during the night.

21. At 0900 on Thursday 13th the TU came to the action state for a planned firing on a truck park and highway bridge at latitude 17°56N. Again an S2 aircraft from YORKTOWN was assigned as Spotter and due to the proximity of the targets to the coast the pilot was able to observe; his GDA was 6 direct hits on the truck park and all rounds in vicinity of the bridge. The next mission, against Choke Point BRONZE and an adjacent highway segment, was spotted by a 7th Air Force F100 who subsequently reported most of the rounds landing within 100 yards of the targets.

22. Between planned firing missions, surveillance both visual and by radar continued. In fact very little small craft traffic is abroad by day or night and this mostly very near the shore line. Despite the excellent performance of the SPS-10 surface search radar, combined sea air surveillance over a lengthy period is the only effective detection system as surface ships are limited by the strain of a high degree of readiness from operating close enough to the coast for long periods for guaranteed small craft detection.

23. The final scheduled mission for the 13th was an H and I firing against a truck park and highway bridge which commenced at 2100. Again during patrol overnight, two rounds were fired every couple of hours at coastal CD sites. These firings are conducted using extended range procedure on a watch basis and hopefully provide at least some harrassment.

24. The TU left patrol at 0530 on Friday 14th and proceeded at 25 knots to an UNREP rendezvous. Both ships refuelled from USS MISPELLION (AO-105) and re-armed from USS HALEAKALA (AE-25) before returning to station at 1315. The first firing mission for the day was directed against 3 adjacent highway bridges some 15 miles NW of CAP LAY. Just prior to turning to the firing course at 1325H, the Unit came under fire from 6 guns located at a CD site which 4 days before had been declared unoccupied. The

...../5
SECRET GUARD

SECRET GUARD

5.

first 5 rounds fell between 50 and 75 yards on HOBART's port side and were followed by 3 rounds 200 yards off the port bow. At this time the ship was 14000 yards from the shore. In fact the spotting aircraft had reported sighting gun flashes from the shore moments earlier and a course alteration of twenty degrees was ordered, perhaps saving the ship from damage. Immediately on detection of the falling rounds the Task Unit was turned away and speed was increased to 26 knots with both ships generating smoke in accordance with my stated policy. A further 5 rounds fell 200 yards on the port quarter followed by 5 rounds 400 yards astern as HOBART accelerated to the north east. Counterbattery fire commenced and was spotted by the spotter and by the Ship's Director, resulting in the silencing of at least one gun. Strike aircraft were also requested from the Airborne Control Centre which resulted in 2 Air Force F-4 Phantom aircraft arriving at 1405 and bombing the sites which were marked by smoke shells from HOBART. Firecan and Whiff radars had been detected some 7 minutes prior to the incident. Two pieces of shrapnel were subsequently found on the upper deck.

25. The Task Unit cleared the area at 1415 and at 1430 a Helo closed and you and your Flag Lieutenant departed. It had been a pleasure to have you onboard and the firing on the Task Unit seemed a fitting climax to your first experience of Sea Dragon.

26. At 1602 a MIG ALERT was passed to forces in the TONKIN GULF. Since HOBART's return from HONG KONG, such alerts had become more common, with NVN jets undertaking more adventurous forays over land towards the south. In fact this particular alert terminated a few minutes later but brought home the necessity of having the Missile System at a suitable readiness condition and the need for reliable air warning radar. I have great confidence in the capability of the PIRAZ ships which detect these aircraft, and in their ability to pass the information quickly and accurately during Sea Dragon Operations. The same cannot be said for the situation in the vicinity of the DMZ.

27. At 2030 the Task Unit fired H and I on a highway bridge near Choke Point PURPLE at 18°15' North. On completion of this mission it was discovered that one powder case from Mount 51 had been severed circumferentially 5 inches from the base. Examination of the case indicated perforation had been caused during extraction and that the final break had occurred when the case hit the deck. The case was scratched longitudinally indicating a tight fit in the barrel. Similar incidents had been reported by USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7) and USS COCHRANE (DDG-21) both of which had recently regunned with Mark 18 Mod 3 barrels; in the worst case with WILSON a second round had been rammed into the barrel when unknowingly a portion of the previous powder case remained. Some 15 other cases were also examined in HOBART and it was found that some scratching had occurred. Initial conclusions drawn by WILSON had been that this defect was less likely to occur in a hot gun and the defect seemed to appear after the gun had fired about 1000 rounds. Under the circumstances I considered Sea Dragon Operations to be untenable as HOBART's barrels had only fired 680 and 413 respectively, moreover successful operations depended to a large extent upon surprise which was inconsistent with "warming through" with rounds in slow time. Additionally there appeared to be a very real possibility of a catastrophic casualty. I signalled CTG 70.8 accordingly concluding that I considered the guns should only be fired in emergency until the situation further clarified.

28. A mission timed for 0115 on Saturday 15th and another

SECRET
GUARD

...../6

SECRET GUARD

6.

at 0900 were cancelled; the TU continued to patrol the coast. At 0830 the Daily Helo collected CTC Bode who was most appreciative of his few days aboard and had been well pleased with the standard of training and knowledge of the Ship's Radio Operators Special. At 1145 a signal was received informing me that USS EDSON (DD-946) had been assigned from the Gunline to augment the Task Unit; EDSON carries three 5"/54 Mounts only one of which was fitted with the suspect Mark 18 Mod 3 barrels. HOBART and CHANDLER reversed course and at 1224 EDSON joined the unit.

29. At 1255 two 7th Air Force aircraft, fitted with air to ground missiles checked in to the ship on the Spotter Net. At the time a known Crosslot radar site was searching intermittently and "SHOTGUN" procedure was initiated. This procedure involves the ship identifying the radar site to the aircraft, and ensuring its own S Band radar is off: On this occasion the aircraft overflew the ship enroute to the target and fired Shrike missiles at 1304. The radar ceased transmitting at 1305 and although the aircraft could observe no damage it was hoped the radar had been destroyed. Unfortunately the radar was detected transmitting some hours later.

30. The Task Unit moved north and the day's programme of planned firing missions were rapidly revised and passed out to all authorities concerned. The first target, Choke Point SILVER near 18°N, was fired at 1700 with HOBART riding Shotgun for EDSON and CHANDLER operating the SNOOPY drone for spotting. On completion the TU moved 15 miles south and EDSON, flanked by CHANDLER firing suppression and HOBART for support in the event of hostile fire, carried out a night H & I firing at 2030 on Choke Point BLACK. The final firing mission for the night, against two highway bridges at 18°10'N, was fired at 0115 in the same way. Gradually the feeling of cohesion in the enlarged TU became apparent; the increased tempo in HOBART of manoeuvring a three ship task unit for firing missions compensated some of us at least to some extent the ship's quiet guns and the frustration this evoked.

31. As the last firing mission ceased a signal was received altering the ship's programme. An extra day was to be spent in Sea Dragon and instead of a projected 10 days on the Gunline, HOBART was to spend two days on duty in the Gulf with USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) followed by a 10 day upkeep period in Subic to include replacement of the offending gun barrels. This period of 10 days was considered excessive and I signalled CTC 70.8 indicating that 6 days would be sufficient, noting that the scheduled brief upkeep period in early August was still desired.

32. The Task Unit patrolled overnight and closed the coast 10 miles NW of CAP LAY for a firing mission scheduled for 1000. As this area was suspect in view of the CD sites firing on the 14th I was particularly keen for all ship's mounts to be effective. A casualty in HOBART's Mount 52 at 0945 therefore caused me to postpone the mission. Concurrently however EDSON detected some trucks moving on the beach ashore so the TU was quickly manoeuvred for that ship to fire at this LUCTAR. By 1045 Mount 52 had been repaired and the TU reformed and closed the coast for the planned mission against two bridges on Route 1A. In the event no CD Sites fired and withdrawal was completed by 1140.

33. Moving north, the three ships prepared for the next mission timed for 1400. CHANDLER was detached at 1300 to prepare to launch SNOOPY and EDSON, supported by HOBART, closed the coast at 17°52N to fire on Choke Point GREEN and a highway bridge nearby. SNOOPY provided excellent spotting and after some large initial

SECRET GUARD/7

SECRET GUARD

7.

errors EDSON was able to cover both targets very well before the TU retired at 1500.

34. Whilst proceeding north for the planned 2330 mission, a signal from CTU 77.1.0 (Captain I.L. Smith, USN) in BOSTON was received at 1720 ordering the Task Unit to cancel the mission and conduct surveillance from 17°22'(N) south to CAP LAY and to be alert for hostile Helos. Course was reversed and speed increased to 26 knots. The previous night, USS BOSTON had reported firing on enemy helicopters in the DMZ area which had fired at the ship and also that two SWIFT boats had been fired on by Helos closer inshore, whilst searching for survivors of another SWIFT boat that had been sunk off the DMZ. Later that same night enemy helo activity had allegedly occurred between the coast and TIGER ISLAND: one naval aircraft from USS ENTERPRISE which had been called in by BOSTON reported shooting down an enemy Helo. Some confusion had occurred as to whether lighted helos in the area were friendly or otherwise as no IFF response was received, some were stated to have flown to the USN Hospital Ship anchored further to the south. Additionally rocket fire to seaward from the DMZ area had been reported. A possible repetition of these events had prompted CTU 77.1.0 to position my Task Unit on patrol to the north of CAP LAY.

35. The TU arrived on station at 2100 and I assigned the three ships circular operating areas, radius 5 miles covering the areas between the coast and TIGER ISLAND and latitude 17°22'N. At the same time I requested information regarding any friendly aircraft participation and whether guns were free in any areas. I was aware of USS EPPERSON being to the Northward of HOBART, but otherwise there were no other ships known to be North of the DMZ. Pending receipt of these details I instructed the TU to conduct surveillance for WBLC and slow moving aircraft within our assigned area. At 0203 the reply to my request arrived in the ship. This confirmed that there was no relaxation or alteration to the Standard Rules of Engagement and established an Air Defence Space 35 miles wide from 17°10'(N) south to 16°45'(N). It also stated that CTU 77.1.0 had no knowledge of scheduled friendly aircraft in my area, however to be alert for Airforce Strikes and C.A.P. activity. This answer in fact did not alter the conditions under which the TU normally operates when in NVN waters. I interpreted the Air Defence Space as that area in which the C.A.P., under BOSTON's control, would operate.

36. At approximately 0309 a single aircraft was detected on SPS-52 radar, tracking east from the vicinity of CAP LAY towards TIGER ISLAND. The aircraft did not appear to be showing IFF and was therefore given close scrutiny. This was not unique as during the middle watch several aircraft had been detected, not showing IFF initially, which did subsequently. Also on occasions the C.A.P. aircraft were lost as they overflew CAP LAY and it took some time to re-establish their identity as they re-crossed the coast. At this time there was a continuous residual ring of IFF responses from units at a radius of 14-15 miles from the ship. The contact turned to the east of TIGER ISLAND and was indicated to AA Control as it was tracked approaching the ship. AA Control alerted look-outs and endeavoured to visually identify the contact using the night observation device. At 0313 course 305, speed 12 knots the ship was struck on the starboard side amidships by an air launched missile. The missile impact point is estimated to have been just aft of the forward personnel boat davit; the expanding rod warhead penetrated 01 deck into the CPO Mess Pantry and the adjacent passageway, penetrated the screen into the SPS-52 Radar Room, and the Missile Director Control Room and severely damaged the Secondary Conning Position. The body of the missile then passed through the outer skin of the after funnel, damaged both uptakes, penetrated the vertical king post of UNREP Station 5/6, and penetrated the

SECRET GUARD...../8

SECRET GUARD

after screen of the WDF Rooms and the forward funnel. This flying metal killed Ordinary Seaman R.J. Butterworth, R66558 and wounded ABQMG J.R. Parker, R63307 and ORDWM R.F. Davidson, R66565.

37. The explosion was the first indication that the ship was under attack. Full Ahead and maximum wheel were ordered, action stations sounded and the Task Unit informed. Meanwhile the aircraft, estimated now to be at 450 knots was tracked to the North West until it merged with the coast. An aircraft presumed to be the same one re-appeared on radar shortly afterwards, still at high speed heading for the ship. Starboard wheel was ordered and the ship was on a heading of 040, 27 knots when attacked the second time.

38. The damage caused by the first hit had rendered SPS-52, the missile system and one UHF aerial unserviceable. As fate would have it SPG-53B Auto Track capabilities had been reported suspect soon after 0300 when the system would not hold track on several small surface contacts (fishing boats). At 0307 this system was placed on 15 minutes standby to enable the fault to be rectified and despite all efforts I was not able to use this system to engage the aircraft. All units in the area and the Carrier Groups in the TONKIN GULF were informed that the ship was under attack. The ship was closing up, but had not assumed full Action Stations at the time of the second attack which proved fortuitous as more casualties would have been sustained particularly in the after end of the ship. Again the aircraft was not sighted visually on its approach. At 0316 $\frac{1}{2}$ more missiles were fired at the ship from very fine on the starboard quarter from close range with the aircraft apparently very low over the water.

39. Two missiles struck the ship almost simultaneously, one penetrated the transom just below the upperdeck on the starboard side. It passed through the Gunners Store, demolishing that area, continued through the passageway on 2 deck level, penetrating the athwartships bulkhead of the Engineers Workshop and it is believed broke up there without the warhead activating. A large piece penetrated the bulkhead into the After Seamen's Mess and 2 Deck was penetrated in several places. The second missile exploded just aft of the after personnel boat davit in the same general area as the missile in the first attack. The expanding rod went through the Fan Space, Missile Director Equipment Room, Director No.2 and the Tartar Checkout Room. Some of the warhead also penetrated the deck into the forward end of the CPO Mess causing much overhead damage, killing CFWR R.H. Hunt, R54257 and causing injuries to several sailors closing up to their Action Stations. The remainder of the body of the missile penetrated the Fan Space at the base of the after funnel and struck the deckhead of the Ikara Magazine. Part of the missile penetrated into the Ikara Magazine and a portion struck the base of the starboard support of the kingpost of UNREP Station 5/6.

40. The aircraft crossed over the ship and made a tight turn climbing to starboard and was seen for the first time being described by two reliable observers as a swept wing jet fighter. The aircraft continued its turn to starboard and appeared to be turning for a third attack. At an approximate range of 8000 yards, Mount 51, in local control, fired 5 rounds of VT and the aircraft turned away to the east and south, fading on the SPS-10 radar just south of TIGER ISLAND. The Rules for Engagement cannot be discussed in this document but it should be stated that HOBART would not have been complying with those rules had she engaged the aircraft before the first attack.

41. In the Operations Room the second hit resulted in a

SECRET GUARD...../9

SECRET GUARD

fault in gyro supply to SPS-10 causing the radar picture on all displays to rotate in a haphazard manner. Compilation of even a simple functional relative picture was impossible and the ship was therefore unable to effectively utilise the C.A.P. aircraft, made available by USS BOSTON, to intercept the attacking aircraft. In addition, this problem made 3" target designation virtually impracticable.

42. The ship continued in a north east direction while quick stock of damage was taken. Efforts had been made to bring up the SPS-40 radar from standby but the set did not provide an effective picture. At this time it was confirmed the ship had only SPS-10 radar and the 5" mounts in local control as air/surface sensors and weapons. It will be recalled that the 5 inch gun barrel/powder problem made firing hazardous and that the guns therefore could be used only in an emergency. It was obviously necessary to retire from the general area to improve chances of warning should another attack develop. At about 0330 EDSON reported being fired on by rockets from an aircraft. I ordered the Task Unit to assume an AA formation, reversing course to the west briefly to expedite CHANDLER joining. By 0414 this was achieved with EDSON south and CHANDLER to the west both at 2500 yards on an easterly course at 25 knots. At this time orders were received to join BOSTON and CTU 70.8.9 embarked in USS BLANDY (DD-943).

43. At 0515 the Task Unit joined BOSTON and together with BLANDY formed a circular AAW screen around the Cruiser on a course of north at 15 knots towards Yankee Station Forces. Internally in HOBART, repair and isolation of damage continued and care was given to the wounded. As it became light the extensive damage to the superstructure became apparent. At 0619 the damage situation was sufficiently under control for the ship to revert to Condition 3. At 0705 a Helo from USS ENTERPRISE which I had requested shortly after the attack, arrived to MEDEVAC the 2 sailors killed in action and ABOMG J.R. Parker, R63307, ME J. Holmes, R93110 and ABFC K.R. Laitv, R64209 who were considered to require further treatment in hospital in DA NANG.

44. The Ship's Company commenced clearing up the debris both above and below decks and all parts of missiles which could be located were collected together for subsequent identification; at this time items bearing the names of US manufactures were discovered. At 0740 COMDEFSQUAD 2, embarked in BLANDY instructed me to take charge of the Task Unit and resume normal operations. As this was clearly impossible, I instructed EDSON to take charge of CHANDLER and proceed to an UNREP which had been scheduled for the TU at 0730. I then informed CTU 77.1.0 in BOSTON and COMDEFSQUAD 2 of the state of the ship and that I considered the ship should proceed to SUBIC for repairs. In due course CTU 77.1.0 approved this proposal and directed EDSON to assume the duties of CTU 77.1.2. HOBART detached from BOSTON and BLANDY at 1016 and shortly afterwards rendezvoused with EDSON and CHANDLER which were replenishing from USS NAVASOTA (AO-106) and USS VIRGO (AE-30). At 1050 the ship closed EDSON for a highline transfer of CTU 77.1.2 turnover materials, together with a full and brief as possible in the short time available. The transfer completed at 1118 and on detaching, HOBART set course for SUBIC at 17 knots. At 1400 the ship was stopped for 2 hours while temporary repairs were effected to the hole in the stern.

45. Throughout the passage, the Ship's Company continued trying to restore the ship and to collect pieces of missile. I had ordered a thorough investigation of the incident and as more and more officers and sailors were interviewed and the sequence of events reconstructed, it became clear that there had been many cases

SECRET
GUARD

.... /10

SECRET GUARD

of calm and courageous actions and a minimum of disorder. I was very proud of my Ship's Company.

46. At 1600 on Tuesday 18th June, HMS INTREPID (Captain J.A.R. Troup, DSC RN), flying the flag of the Flag Officer, Second in Command Far East Fleet, Rear Admiral E.B. Ashmore, CB, DSC RN, with HMS CAPRICE (Commander T.M. Bevan, RN) in company, closed from the north. The two ships were manoeuvred across HOBART's bow and down the starboard side at a close distance from which the ship's damage was clearly visible. FO2FEF signalled his sympathy for those killed and wounded before the two ships turned southward enroute to Singapore.

47. At 1935 the ship rendezvoused with USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7) and USS COCHRANE (DDG-21). Arrangements had been made for HOBART to transfer a missile director amplidyne drive motor and couplings to WILSON and at 1945 a highline transfer commenced at Stations 1 and 2, as this was the only replenishment Station I considered safe to use. WILSON kindly provided a large amount of electric cable which would undoubtedly be invaluable during the restoration of the ship especially as a fire in SUBIC BAY had damaged the store containing cable. The transfer completed at 2045.

48. During the passage and the days that followed I was moved by the number of signals received from both RAN and USN ships and authorities expressing sympathy for the wounded and for their families and the families of the two sailors killed. Such signals were sent by numerous USN ships with whom the ship had come in contact only briefly and it confirmed my belief that HOBART is considered very much a part of the US 7th Fleet.

49. SUBIC BAY was entered at 0730 on Wednesday 19th, and HOBART secured alongside at Rivera Point in the Naval Base at 0815. At 0830 Rear Admiral Moore boarded and walked around to inspect the ship. Rear Admiral Moore had been directed by COMSEVENTHFLT to inquire into the incidents of CAP LAY on the nights of 15th/16th and 16th/17th June and had flown from his flagship USS SAINT PAUL in Japan the previous evening. A large amount of documentary evidence and some photographs were given to the Admiral's Staff, and my officers and I discussed the attack on HOBART. He was offered the missile pieces which had been picked up onboard and these he passed to the Naval Magazine SUBIC for analysis. Rear Admiral Moore addressed the Ship's Company and expressed his regrets at the incident before he departed for VIETNAM at 1150 to continue his investigation.

50. Representatives of the Ship Repair Facility also boarded during the forenoon and examined the damage in detail. At 1400 I was represented by my Weapons Electrical Officer, Commander F.O. Eliason and Engineer Officer, Lieutenant Commander D.G. Holt-house at a meeting with the SRF Planning Officers and Section Heads. The SRF presented two interim estimates for the repair of the ship: a "Patch" of 12 days and a "Mint" of 6 weeks. The former would have restored the watertight integrity of the ship and one Missile System and the latter as the name implies, a complete restoration. The advantages of the shorter estimate, particularly the morale benefit of returning to the Line in the shortest possible time seemed at the time to be the better solution. Meanwhile dockyard workman commenced cutting away damaged areas preparatory to renewal work.

51. At 1545 CINPACFLT, Admiral J.J. Hyland, USN accompanied by COMNAVBASUBIC, Rear Admiral F.B. Gilkeson, USN, arrived onboard from MANILA to inspect the damage. At this stage the Ship's Company had been informed that the missiles had been of US

SECRET
GUARD

0000/11

SECRET GUARD

11.

origin; probably SPARROW 3. Admiral Hyland in his address to the Ship's Company informed them that it had now begun to emerge that the missiles had been fired by a US aircraft and he was genuinely moved when expressing his sorrow for the incident. The Admiral also stated that the US would ensure the ship would be made as new. At 1630 the ship was turned by tugs and re-berthed starboard side to the wharf to facilitate repairs.

52. Colours were half masted in all ships at 0800 on Thursday 20th in honour of CPO Hunt and Ord Butterworth. At 0930 lower deck was cleared and a Memorial Service, conducted by Chaplain McMahon and Chaplain Riley was held on Mount 52 Deck. With more data at my disposal I called a meeting of my officers to discuss the merits of the two repair estimates as the SRF required an immediate indication of what would be required. The merits of having the short and incomplete repair effected, to be followed at some later stage by the requirement for a further 6 weeks in dockyards hands was still attractive from the morale point of view. However from every other aspect it was abundantly clear that the ship should be fully operational at the earliest date and therefore the Mint Job was required now. At 1115 accompanied by my Technical Department Heads, I attended a meeting with Captain D.H. Jackson, USN, the Commanding Officer of the SRF, and his staff. Captain Jackson was clearly relieved to hear my decision and in anticipation of your concurrence, I authorised this work to commence.

53. Work on the ship continued at an extraordinary rate. Two shifts each of 12 hours worked continuously with an enthusiasm the like of which I have never seen in a dockyard. The ship shut down the steam plants and reverted to shore power.

54. At 1000 on Friday 21st accompanied by two of my officers I visited the Naval Magazine, SUBIC. All parts of the missiles located onboard had been transferred to the NAVMAG earlier in the week and after careful scrutiny the experts there were able to identify them as portions of at least two SPARROW 3 Missiles which had been supplied to the 7th Air Force at UBON in THAILAND in May.

55. At 1625 the same day I welcomed onboard the Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC, Admiral Ulysses S Grant Sharp, USN, accompanied by The Commander, US 7th FLEET, Vice Admiral W.F. Bringle, USN; Commander Task Force 77, Rear Admiral R.W. Cousin, USN; and COMNAVBASE SUBIC, Rear Admiral F.B. Gilkeson, USN. Admiral Sharp was in the area in connection with a civil function in MANILA and I was very pleased that he could find time to visit HOBART to view the damage. The Admiral also indicated that he had directed that the inquiry into the CAP LAY incidents being conducted by Rear Admiral Moore was to be upgraded to Joint Services level which he said would provide a more meaningful conclusion. The party left the Ship at 1725.

56. At 0030 that night, Captain M.P. Reed, RAN your Chief Staff Officer (Technical), accompanied by Lieutenant Commander I.F. Holmes, RAN and Mr. J. Lee, arrived onboard having travelled by air from AUSTRALIA to MANILA thence by car from MANILA that evening. During the next 4 days officers studied the damage to the ship and conferred with Ship's Officers and authorities ashore. Captain Reed flew onto DA NANG to become associated with the inquiry on the morning of the 25th, at which time LCDR Holmes and Mr. Lee returned to MANILA for passage to AUSTRALIA.

57. At 0800 on Sunday 23rd, by kind arrangement of VADM Bringle, a P3 ORION aircraft was made available to fly me, accompanied by the Medical Officer, Surgeon Lieutenant G.R. Erwin,

SECRET
GUARD

...../12

RAN and three sailors to VIETNAM; the sailors were particular friends of the three of HOBART's crew hospitalised there. On arrival in DANANG we proceeded to the Military Hospital and I was pleased that Able Seaman Laity was sufficiently recovered to join us. The P3 was used again to fly onto SAIGON where a C1A was provided for the short hop to VUNG TAU. At the Australian Military Hospital, Able Seaman Parker and ME Holmes were visited and provided with mail, their pay, and news of the ship. Accommodation had been arranged in VUNG TAU and the following morning the party flew back to SAIGON where I called on the Commander, Australian Forces Vietnam, Major General S.M. Macdonald at the CHOLON Head-quarters. After a thoroughly interesting and worthwhile visit I returned to SUBIC arriving at 1400 on Monday 24th.

58. On Thursday 27th the ship was listed 5 degrees to port and the suspect Mark 18 Mod 3 barrels replaced by Mod 1 barrels by the Staff of USS PIEDMONT.

59. On Saturday 29th I exchanged calls with the Captain of USS FALGOUT (DER-324) Lieutenant Commander J. Hamrick, USN who kindly offered to take mail to BRISBANE the following Monday.

60. At 1130 Major General R.F. Worley, USAF, the Vice Commander United States 7th Air Force called onboard. The General delivered a personal note from the Commander of the 7th Air Force General William W. Momyer, expressing sympathy and alluding to an "operational error" on the 17th. General Worley viewed the areas of the ship where damage had occurred although by this time much of the damage had been replaced or in the process of repair. After lunching in the Wardroom, General Worley departed at 1340.

61. At 1500 I attended the official Change of Command Ceremony when Rear Admiral V.C. Lambert, USN relieved Rear Admiral Gilkeson as COMNAVBASE SUBIC. The ceremony was followed by a cocktail party at the Officers' Club.

62. On the last day of the month the ship was alongside at SUBIC BAY with action damage repairs continuing at a most satisfactory rate; hull work and re-wiring are estimated to be some days ahead of schedule and the completion of repairs depend upon timely receipt of electronic equipment. Fortunately a great deal of external closing up has been completed prior to the arrival of the wet season. The possible detrimental effects to morale of several weeks alongside in a refit condition has also been considered and the following activities initiated:-

- (a) daily interpart Volleyball competition together with an interpart softball competition
- (b) two trips per week by up to 4 sailors at a time to Manila
- (c) weekend banyans at the USN Recreation Centre on Grande Island at the entrance to SUBIC BAY
- (d) visits to BAGGIO
- (e) a civic aid project with Boystown, a home for neglected children in OLONGAPO

63. An amount of \$160 was collected in the ship during the month and sent to the Australian Olympic Appeal. This contribution was helped I am sure by the knowledge that a recent member of the Ship's Company, Leading Seaman PT R.J. Maguire, is an Olympic Team Member.

...../13

13.
SECRET GUARD

HULL AND ENGINEERING

64. Two similar defects occurred in the main plant on the night of 9-10 June. During the first watch whilst manoeuvring a shoot, the port Astern Throttle jammed partly open. The guarding valve was shut and turning gear engaged whilst the valve was opened out. It was established that the thread in one of the yoke pins had stripped. Repairs were made and the engine returned to service in some 3½ hours. Whilst blowing soot during the morning watch, the sootblower master valve in No.1 Fire Room stripped the internal thread in the bridge piece. The second boiler aft was lit off and 1 F.R. secured whilst repairs were effected. In all other respects main and auxiliary machinery have functioned well throughout the period.

65. Whilst in Subic for regunning 3-5 June the opportunity was taken to have the emergency repair to the sootblower drain on 1A boiler checked by SRF. The welds were cleaned back and tested satisfactorily. Remote operating gear for the smoke generators was installed at this time.

66. Satisfactory emergency repairs were effected on the shell and superstructure and on damaged pipe systems after the Battle Damage was sustained and by sunset 17 June the hull and structure were watertight and weatherproof. The laundry, was ready for operation by 1600 that day, but at reduced capacity. The carnage aft was so extensive that it took several hours to gain access to the Gunners Store. Necessary firemain and chilled water main isolations were quickly made remote from the damage so that flooding was rapidly controlled but as it turned out, the initial minor flooding was a great asset. As cleaning up progressed evidence of several minor fires was discovered. Those in the Gunners Store were extinguished by the chilled water main rupture and by 2 spare 50lb CO2 cylinders which had their stop valves neatly clipped off by the passage of the missile; that in 5-183-1-A Naval Stores were extinguished by the burst firemain cascading over it via penetration through the deck. It is worth remarking that when temporary watertight repairs of widespread jagged damage to decks and screens are concerned, soft wood plugs and wedges followed up by quick drying cement provides the best answer.

67. The ship shut down to shore services on 19th June for the first time in 1968. Since then SRF progress has been nothing short of astounding. With such widespread damage, both major and minor between frames 75 and 141 it is apparent that the ship will bear some scars for ever more but in the main SRF is doing everything possible to restore her to "mint" condition as promised. The shops provided an initial ETR of 6 weeks, which the Management arbitrarily cut to 4. The present indication is that providing new equipments and certain materials are supplied ex-CONUS by the due dates, this target of 4 weeks will be met. Unseasonably good weather has contributed to the speed of structural repairs but there is no question but that SRF feels a moral responsibility to do the best job possible, quickly. On the Marine Engineering side the chief problem area are the outer the outer funnels. Almost all preparation work has now been completed but no 54-54 Aluminium is available in the Philippines and an available source elsewhere has not yet been uncovered.

68. An ambitious PMS programme has been undertaken by Ship's Staff and with the assistance of SRF significant inroads are being made into the modest list of accumulated Dockyard Defects which would otherwise be held over for the Main Refit.

.....
...../14

SECRET
GUARD

14.
SECRET GUARD

WEAPONS ELECTRICAL

69. At the beginning of this month an equipment status of C-1 was set for the first time indicating that all systems were go. This was made possible by an influx of repair parts allowing a number of CASREPTS to be cleared. After two months of firings the ship re-gunned on 5-6th June with Mk 18 Mod 3 gun barrels which are of a two piece construction designed to make barrel changing easier and quicker. A complete change throughout the USN would affect logistics in Australia as numerous parts and drawings are required. On 14th June an ejected 5"/54 cartridge case from Mount 51 was found to have fractured into two pieces by a peripheral break five inches up the case from the rim. A report had been received earlier from USS HENRY B. WILSON that they had experienced this type of failure after being fitted with 5"/54 Mk 18 Mod 3 barrels. An initial NAVORDSYSCOM investigation blamed the barrel. However examination of unused cartridge cases revealed a peripheral mark 5 inches from the base indicating a flaw in manufacture which when coupled with the Mod 3 barrel apparently caused the cases to fail. This matter is still being resolved but local feeling is that the Mod 3 barrel will be absolved.

70. Damage caused by the SPARROW Missiles on the morning of the 17th included extensive damage to #2 Director, cabinets in the 51B Radar Room, and to cabling throughout the ship. No.3 Radar Room (Radar AN/SPS-52) miraculously escaped damage but gear aloft associated with this set was badly damaged. Shrapnel thrown forward onto the foremast caused some damage to antenna and cabling fitted there. The third hit at the stern cut one set of degaussing loops and caused other more minor electrical problems. Fortunately this warhead did not explode properly.

71. On 19th June SRF Subic commenced an attack on the damage with great energy so that by the end of this month over 50% of the repair work i.e. re-cabling and structural work had been completed. On 30th June SRF were awaiting details of the despatch of various components from the U.S. This information will provide them with the basis for a further assessment of completion date.

72. The shock of the attack on the ship has worn off the Ship's Company though many still find it most difficult to comprehend that a friendly aircraft could make such an error. All on-board are keen to get back to the Line as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant.



(K.W. SHANDS.)
CAPTAIN, RAN

SECRET GUARD

SECRET GUARD

APPENDIX "A" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JUNE, 1968

STEAMING FIGURES

(a)	Distance steamed during the month	5580.0
(b)	Distance steamed since commissioning	122242 4
(c)	Hours underway during the month	390 ¹¹ /60
(d)	Hours underway since commissioning	8521 ²⁹ /60

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET GUARD

APPENDIX "B" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1968

MOVEMENTS

<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
SATURDAY 1st	I CORPS SOUTH VIETNAM	SUNDAY 2nd	NGFS
TUESDAY 4th	SUBIC BAY	THURSDAY 6th	REGUN
SATURDAY 8th	I CORPS SOUTH VIETNAM	TUESDAY 11th	NGFS
TUESDAY 11th	COASTAL REGIONS NORTH VIETNAM	MONDAY 17th	ASSIGNED TO 77.1.2 SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS
WEDNESDAY 19th	SUBIC BAY	SUNDAY 30th	REPAIR OF ACTION DAMAGE

SECRET GUARD

SECRET GUARD

APPENDIX "C" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1968

FORECAST PROGRAMME

<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
-	SUBIC BAY	18 JULY	REPAIR OF ACTION DAMAGE
18 JULY	SUBIC BAY AREA	27 JULY	SET TO WORK AND WORKUP
28 JULY	I CORPS SOUTH VIETNAM	-	NGFS

NOTE: This forecast is based on data available from the
Ship Repair Facility, Subic, on 30th June, 1968

SECRET GUARD

SECRET GUARD

APPENDIX "D" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1968

SPORTS RESULTS

20.6.68	SOFTBALL	LOST TO USS DIACHENKO	27-17
22.6.68	SOFTBALL	LOST TO USS PIEDMONT	28-27
24.6.68	SOFTBALL	LOST TO USS COLLETT	
25.6.68	BASKETBALL	LOST TO USS CALIENTE	66-21
25.6.68	SOFTBALL	LOST TO USS STONE COUNTY	22-16
27.6.68	SHIPS INTERPART COMPETITION COMMENCED. SPORTS INVOLVED ARE SOFTBALL, VOLLEYBALL, BASKETBALL, TENNIS AND TUG-O-WAR.		

RECREATION AND GENERAL

Banyans have been held at GRANDE ISLAND on 23.6.68, approximately 80 attending and on 30.6.68, approximately 60 attending.

Of the sports played on an individual basis Golf and Swimming have been by far the most popular but a number of people have played squash and tennis and a few have taken advantage of the horse riding facilities available in SUBIC BAY.

SECRET GUARD

SECRET GUARD

APPENDIX "E" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1968 RECORD OF UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENTS

DATE	TIMES	RECEIVING FROM	METHOD	EMBARKATION/DISEMBARKATION	REMARKS
Saturday 1st	0834 0931	USS MAUNA KEA AE-22	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition 624 Shell 585 Powder Empty Brass 6 Loads	
Sunday 9th	0654 0805	USS SACRAMENTO AOE-1	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline Helo	FFO 242 Tons Ammunition 240 Shell 212 Powder Victualling 789 Lbs Stores	
Tuesday 11th	0813 0914	USS PARICUTIN AE-18	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition 336 Shell 273 Powder Empty Brass 8 Loads	
Tuesday 11th	1045 1120	USS MISPELLION AO-105	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO 143 Tons Stores 2 Loads Personnel One	Navigating Officer LCDR M.B. Rayment conned during approach and while alongside
Friday 14th	0737 0818	USS MISPELLION AO-105	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO 225 Tons Empty Brass 9 Loads	
Friday 14th	0856 1004	USS HALEAKALA AE-25	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition 480 Shell 312 Powder	

In addition the following personnel/stores transfers took place with USN combatant ships during the month:-

(a) Manila Highline	(i) HOBART providing	Nil
	(ii) Other ship providing	4
(b) Light Line	(i) HOBART providing	2

SECRET GUARD

SECRET GUARD

APPENDIX "F" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME(H)</u>	<u>SALVOES</u>	<u>SHELL</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>GUN DAMAGE ASSESMENT</u>
1.6.68	0238/0450	32	32 HEPD	Suspected VC Positions 32 Targets	1 Secondary Explosion Observed
1.6.68	0510/0548	143 28	HEPD AAC	AREA PREPARATION 2 Targets	2 Large Secondary Explosions. 1 Small Secondary Explosion
1.6.68	2206/2259	15	HCPD	Suspected VC Positions 3 Targets	Unobserved
1.6.68	2309/2355	53 8	HEPD W.P.	AREA PREPARATION 1 Target	All Rounds in Target Area
2.6.68	0107/0203	59	HEPD	AREA PREPARATION 1 Target	Unobserved
8.6.68	1106/1147	53	HCPD	VC Concentration Area	1 Structure Damaged
8.6.68	2043/2359	81	HCPD	Suspected VC Positions 27 Targets	Unobserved
9.6.68	0105/0552	118	HCPD	Suspected VC Positions 59 Targets	Unobserved
9.6.68	2202/2359	41	HCPD	Suspected VC Positions	Unobserved
10.6.68	0231/0329	54	HCPD	Suspected VC Positions 22 Targets	Unobserved
10.6.68	0409/0548	54	HCPD	Suspected VC Positions 27 Targets	Unobserved
10.6.68	0945	12	HCPD	VC Positions	6 Structures Damaged 2 Structures Destroyed
10.6.68	2216/2359	54	HCPD	Suspected VC Positions	Unobserved
11.6.68	0053/0600	132	HCPD	Suspected VC Positions 73 Targets	Unobserved
11.6.68	1321	26	HCPD	NVN Truck Park	Unobserved
11.6.68	1353	43	HCPD	WBLC	N i l
11.6.68	1322/1332	10	HCPD	C.D. Sites (5)	N i l
11.6.68	2135	3	HCPD	C.D. Sites (3)	N i l

SECRET
GUARD

.....
...../2

SECRET GUARD

2.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME(H)</u>	<u>SALVOES</u>	<u>SHELL</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>GUN DAMAGE ASSESMENT</u>
12.6.68	0937/0947	19	HCPD	MY DOYET Highway Bridge. C.D. Sites (2)	Unobserved
12.6.68	1318	27	HCPD	NGU HOC Highway Bridge	Unobserved (SNOOPY)
12.6.68	2022/2231	32	HCPD	C.D. Sites (7) H & I	Unobserved
13.6.68	0102/0144	8	HCPD	C.D. Sites (4) H & I	Unobserved
13.6.68	0911/0926	32 1	HCPD W.P.	NVN Truck Park & CHU CU Highway Bridge	Unobserved
13.6.68	1430/1514	52 4	HCPD W.P.	Choke Pt. BRONZE C.D. Site (1)	Most Ordnance within 100 Metres of Target
13.6.68	2058/2127	48	HCPD	NVN Truck Park C.D. Sites (4)	Unobserved
14.6.68	0134/0305	6	HCPD	C.D. Sites (3)	Unobserved
14.6.68	1318/1324	18	HCPD	HA TAN Highway Bridge C.D. Sites (4)	Unobserved
14.6.68	1326	71 43 2	HCPD AAC W.P.	Counter Battery Counter Battery Counter Battery	Battery Silenced (6 Gun Sites)
14.6.68	2033/2018	26	HCPD	XUAN KHAN Highway Bridge C.D. Site (1)	Unobserved
17.6.68	0320 0330	5 2	VTNSD VTNSD	(Unidentified (Aircraft	N i l N i l

SECRET GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

APPENDIX "G" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1968

EXERCISES CARRIED OUT

<u>TYPE OF EXERCISE</u>	TOTAL NUMBER COMPLETED	TOTAL HOURS COMPLETED	<u>DATES CARRIED OUT</u>				
			WEEK 1	WEEK 2	WEEK 3	WEEK 4	WEEK 5
1. OOW Manoeuvres	2	8		3, 7			
2. AATX	1	1		6			
3. INTEX	1	1		6			
4. SPX	3	3		6, 7			
5. ECM Exercise	5	5		6, 7			
6. TO/RP Voice Drills	6	9		6, 7			

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

APPENDIX "H" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1968

OFFICERS' MOVEMENTS

Nil movements for the Month of June, 1968

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

Copy of General William W. Momyer, USAF letter dated
23th June, 1968

Captain Kenneth W. Shands
Royal Australian Navy
HMAS Hobart
US Naval Base Subic, Philippines.

Dear Captain Shands

Although the investigation is not complete, it appears that the tragic incident involving the HMAS HOBART on the morning of 17 June 1968 was the unfortunate result of an operational error.

It is with sincere and deep regret that this resulted in casualties and damage to your ship. We in Seventh Air Force share with you the grief and mourning resulting from the loss and injury of your personnel.

The officers and men of Seventh Air Force send to you, your crew, and the families involved our deepest sympathy.

Sincerely

(Sgd) William W. Momyer

William W. Momyer, General, USAF
Commander

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET GUARD

18/6/922

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

MINUTE PAPER

June 1968
Report of proceedings

HMAS HOBART

AS(NS) 230/8

D OF O 2/9

DCNS 4/9

1NM 3/9

2NM 6/9

3NM 10/9

4NM 11/9

SEC 11/9

FAS(EG) 11/9

FAS(FM) 11/9

C OF S 18/9

DPR 20/9

AS(NS) (N5) 20/9

Registrar

ARCHIVES BRANCH

~~DCOP D of P D/D of P(A) DGFE DTWP D of C DNAP JEMP CONS DNI~~) Separate
~~HPB DCNP DOA DMT DDM DPS DESD DAS DNR DNES D of R ACDC FNA~~) Report
~~ACMD DMED ACTP DWE PEE MDG DSAP(M) DNS DMS D of S(A)~~) Circulating
D of V AS(NS)(N5) Registrar

- NOTES: (A) This report should be dealt with and passed on promptly.
- (B) On this file comments should be brief; if any matter requires comprehensive treatment, reference to another Branch, or approval of a Board Member, a new file should be raised, cross-referenced to this one.

4/3/7

SECRET GUARD

SECRET

J

18	6	922
----	---	-----

RECEIVED
C 28 AUG A.M.

NAVY REGISTRY

HMAS HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - JULY, 1968

(HMAS HOBART's 133.201.2(3) of 1st August, 1968)

II

A.F. 17/30/3

The Secretary,
Department of the Navy.

1. Forwarded.

(1) *Robb*
REAR ADMIRAL

Office of the
Flag Officer Commanding,
HM Australian Fleet.

23 AUG 1968.

PMS

SECRET GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

HMAS HOBART, D39,
at Sea.

2nd August, 1968

PRECIS OF HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - JULY, 1968

1. On Monday 1st July HOBART was in SUBIC BAY, continuing action damage repairs. At this stage work was ahead of schedule on hull repairs, pipework and electrical cabling and the completion date depended upon supply of electrical components. The ship lit off and began steaming on auxiliary on Saturday 13th. On Tuesday 16th HOBART commenced collimation of FCS 3 and SRF technicians commenced installation of the AN/SIQ-19 Hut. This equipment has been designed to detect and automatically jam selected target radars, and can combat 12 target radars concurrently. The Ikara Launcher Deck was selected as the optimum location for SIQ-19 although this involved cutting away the walkway and resiting the 02-Deck ladder.

2. Dockyard work was completed on the night of Saturday 20th, culminating with the static tests on the new Sampson post for UNREP Station 5/6 and removal of staging around the mast and superstructure on Sunday morning. At the end of the repair period the ship showed some evidence of having been in dockyard hands with large areas of the ship being worked on until the last day. SRF performed a magnificent job in repairing the ship. Workmanship was of a high order but as the Filipino worker is little concerned with finish, close supervision was required throughout. The original estimate of 4 weeks was only just exceeded and this is considered highly commendable considering the complexity of the task.

3. HOBART proceeded for sea trials at 0845 on Sunday 21st. During the day Condition 3 routine and Action Stations were exercised; gun functioning trials successfully completed; missile and gun tracking trials carried out and SPS-40, TACAN, URD-4 and IFF/SIF checked. Minor faults were detected in some equipments, however the overall state was good. At 1648 HOBART joined in a search for an RF8G aircraft from USS INTREPID (CVA-11) overdue since 1439. The ship continued searching and had to cancel all scheduled exercises until detached at 0840 Monday 22nd. During the day a successful 4-hour NGS practice was carried out and further tracking serials conducted before the ship returned to harbour at 2359. Fuel and essential stores were embarked overnight.

4. At 0912 On Tuesday 23rd HOBART proceeded for passage to SVN. The ship was judged to be ready for assignment to NGF duties in that restoration to original condition had been effected with the exception of the following:

- (a) Tartar FCS 2 was unserviceable
- (b) Radar SPS-52 was unserviceable through non-availability of waveguide and other faults
- (c) The Personnel Boat davits and associated gear had yet to be fitted
- (d) The tiling on the deck of the CPO Pantry, although laid temporarily, required permanent fitting
- (e) Serviceable IFF Test equipment was not available
- (f) Some minor items of stores and equipment had yet to be supplied.

...../2.



SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

2.

5. Bad weather was experienced throughout the passage to the Gunline. At 1900 Wednesday 24th with the wind force 8 and rough seas, speed was reduced below 10 knots, consequently delaying arrival on the Gunline until 1715 on Thursday 25th. Prior to arrival on the Gunline, HOBART replenished FFO, ammunition and victualling stores from USS CAMDEN (AOE-2). HOBART then took station at Point DEBBIE, SE of DANANG to provide support for the 2nd Bde, ROKMC. H & I's and three observed missions were fired in support of this unit.

6. HOBART was assigned to the 1st Marine Division AM Saturday 27th and during the day fired 7 spotted missions in support of Operation Allenbrooke. At 2018 the ship received a call for fire on 5 VC in a tree-line. Five rounds were fired, the last of which fell behind the spotter's position, injuring three marines. On-the-spot investigations onboard indicated that no material or navigational error had occurred and it was assumed that the spotter's assessment of his or the target location was inaccurate. I was subsequently informed by CG, 1st MARDIV, General Youngsdale USMC, via his Divisional NGLO, that HOBART was not considered to be at fault. Shortly after this incident HOBART was ordered to proceed to DANANG where H & I firings were carried out from 0048 to 0123 from inside the harbour. For the remainder of the night the ship patrolled DANANG Harbour. HOBART remained on patrol off DANANG during Monday, entering harbour to fire a spotted mission at 1625 and H & I firings from 2025 to midnight. That evening I informed CTG 70.8 by signal that I considered HOBART should remain in the present gunline assignment, rather than join TU 77.1.2 on 2nd August, because of unserviceabilities of the air warning radars and IFF.

7. AM Monday 29th the ship proceeded to Point DIANE, 20 miles NW of DANANG, still in support of the 1st MARDIV. Three observed missions were fired during the day against suspected NVA positions, resulting in 12 NVA KIA. H & I's were fired throughout the night. Spotted missions commenced at 1030 Tuesday 30th against a suspected VC arms cache followed at 1045 on suspected enemy troop movements. At 1130 heavy fire was brought down on an estimated company sized group of NVA troops, sighted entering a village. GDA included 20 probable KIA, approximately 100 cement/masonry buildings destroyed, 20 to 30 concrete bomb shelters/bunkers destroyed and some lesser GDA. As ammunition stocks were low following this engagement HOBART left station at 1430 to rendezvous with an AE for the largest ammunition UNREP to date for the deployment. The ship was back on station at 2330 and fired H & I targets throughout the early hours of Wednesday 31st. Three observed missions were fired during the day.



(K.W. Shands.)
Captain, RAN

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY.

133-201-2(3)

HMAS HOBART, D39,
at Sea.

- 1 AUG 1968

The Flag Officer Commanding,
H.M. Australian Fleet.

(Copy to: The Australian Naval Attache, Washington.
The Commander, Australian Forces, Vietnam.
The Captain, HMAS PERTH.
The Captain, HMAS BRISBANE.)

HMAS HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - JULY, 1968.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the report of proceedings for HMAS HOBART under my command for the month of July, 1968.

2. On Monday 1st July HOBART was alongside Rivera Point, SUBIC BAY. The Ship Repair Facility (SRF) SUBIC was continuing repairs to action damage sustained on 17th June. At this stage work was ahead of schedule on hull repairs, pipework and electrical cabling and the completion date depended upon supply of electronic components.

3. Chaplain A.W. Rosier R.A.N. joined on the 1st for a period of 12 days. The Direction Officer, Lieutenant Commander A.G. Ferris flew to Yankee Station the same day to spend 8 days in USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) to be followed by experience in the PIRAZ ship, USS LONGBEACH (CGN-9). During the day two officers from the staff of COMCARDIV ONE (RADM M.W. Cagle USN) called to discuss aspects of aircraft spotting in the Sea Dragon Area with ship's officers. This discussion proved most interesting and extended to other aspects of operations in the area, including targetting and provision of up to date photographic intelligence for TU 77.1.2 ships. Its purpose was to provide RADM Cagle with up to date information on SEADRAGON operations - a subject he was required to discuss with CINCPAC FLEET in PEARL HARBOUR. In addition to the general value of SEADRAGON he was interested in employment for USS NEW JERSEY.

4. On Tuesday 2nd a party of 30 sailors from the ship visited the Naval Air Station at CUBI. They were shown over USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65) as part of the tour, and also saw a Navy F4 Phantom. Apart from the normal interest an examination of this versatile aircraft might arouse, the visit had been arranged primarily for this latter purpose since it was believed an F4 was responsible for the attack on the ship.

5. The ship was dressed with masthead flags on Thursday 4th to honour American Independence Day. It is understood some 21,933 sailors from the large number of ships in port visited OLONGAPO that evening and many were turned back at the gate. This is 1100 short of the record number ever permitted into the town at one time; little of the large amount of money spent is used to improve services and utilities and the town continues to be an eyesore.

...../2.



SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

2.

6. A small party of Vietnamese children convalescing aboard the USN Hospital Ship REFUSE berthed astern were shown over the ship on the morning of the 6th. Later in the day REFUSE sailed for an estimated 90 days deployment off the coast of SOUTH VIETNAM. I had the opportunity of looking over this ship and was most impressed with its modern equipment and spaciousness. Modifications were made to the ship at the outbreak of the Vietnam conflict including the addition of a helicopter landing pad. Facilities exist for 500 patients; more may be accommodated by utilising crew living space. Over 150 patients have been admitted in one day and there have been 7000 helicopter landings in a 7 month period. The ship carries 29 doctors, 29 nursing sisters and 300 corpsmen.

7. Facilities include the latest in X-ray developing and rapid processing, taking three minutes to produce a dry film, and a Heart Lung Machine for Cardian Surgery. As well there are 3 Operating Theatres, a Recovery Room and an intensive care unit. The design of the ship leaves a little to be desired, her role having altered since World War II, nevertheless she lacks nothing in equipment and her role is an important one.

8. During the forenoon of Sunday 7th a party of 10 officers and 30 sailors was flown from CUBI to BAGUIO. The USAF provided two C-47 aircraft for the lift and the party spent 2 days at Camp John Hay returning to CUBI at 1000 Tuesday 9th. The resort, some 4000 feet above sea level has an exhilarating climate particularly by comparison to the humid conditions in SUBIC. Accommodation is excellent and golf, horseriding and other sporting facilities are available. By night various clubs on the base and nightclubs in the town provide entertainment. A second party of 6 officers, including myself and 29 sailors were flown to BAGUIO on the 9th, returning on the 11th.

9. The following calls were paid and returned during the first few days of the month.

COMNAVBASE SUBIC Rear Admiral V.C. Lambert USN

COMCARDIV 1 (CTG 77.5) Rear Admiral M.W. Cagle USN
embarked USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65)

COMCARDIV 2 (CTG 77.3) Rear Admiral L.V. Swanson USN
embarked USS AMERICA (CVA-66)

COMSERVGRU 3 Rear Admiral N.G. Ward USN
embarked USS AJAX (AR-6)

10. The Medical Officer Lieutenant G.R. Erwin flew to VIETNAM on 9th July and joined the staff of the Naval Hospital, DANANG, to gain experience in surgery and the management of field casualties, my 061030Z July NOTAL refers. Lieutenant Erwin spent the period with the surgical unit gaining much experience in the treatment and management of Major Trauma and was most impressed with the methods of handling mass casualties and with the intensive care unit. The hospital is staffed by 30 doctors, 25 nursing sisters and 400 corpsmen, and has the capacity to handle 750 patients. Daily admissions range from 90 to 300, one quarter to one third having medical problems, mainly tropical diseases of which Malaria and Leptospirosis are the most common. The Medical Officer returned onboard July 18th.

11. At 0845 on Wednesday 10th, a "standstill" inspection was carried out in the ship. The state of completion of repair work, together with all defects outstanding, both as a result of the damage

SECRET
GUARD

..../3.

SECRET

GUARD

3.

and otherwise was established. Three sailors joined later in the day.

12. A signal from SRF SUBIC received on 12th July estimated completion of repairs would be effected by midnight on the 22nd. By then it was estimated that the After Missile System would be completed having undergone an 8 day alignment period; approval had already been received from ACNB for No.2 Missile System not to be restored during the repair availability as this could not have been completed in time. Based on this completion date a trials period was proposed to local Authorities culminating with an ETA on the line of AM 27th July. Lieutenant N.J. Donaldson and LSRP LJ. Moss R41753 flew to join USS LONGBEACH on the 12th for 8 days; during this period both gained valuable experience in aircraft control.

13. The ship lit off and began steaming auxiliary on Saturday 13th; notice for steam was reduced to 8 hours at 0800. The Australian Services Attache, Acting Commander D.M. Wogan-Browne RAN and his wife visited the ship the same day and were entertained to lunch onboard. On Sunday 14th I accompanied the Wogan-Brownes to MANILA and at 0930 on Monday 15th called on His Excellency the Australian Ambassador to the Philippines, Mr. F.H. Stuart. Later in the day I visited Clark Field, Headquarters of the 13th Air Force. Lieutenant General B.O. Davis Jnr USAF, Commander 13th AF and his Vice Commander Major General K.C. Dempster USAF had asked me to make a visit if possible and though neither were present on the day I was well cared for by the Base Commander, Colonel S.C. Rawlins, USAF.

14. On Tuesday 16th HOBART was moved by tugs to Alava Pier to facilitate collimation of FCS3 and on the same day SRF technicians commenced installation of the AN/SIQ-19 Hut. This equipment has been specially designed to detect and automatically jam selected missile radars and has been installed in ships scheduled for assignment to SEADRAGON.

15. The Ikara Launcher Deck was selected as the optimum location although this involved cutting away the walkway connecting O2 Deck forward and the Ikara Deck and relocating the ladder from the Ikara Launcher Deck to O1 Deck forward. Weight compensation was not required for the temporary fit due to Ikara not having been installed. On the evening of the 16th, SRF signalled that completion of repairs would be advanced to midnight on the 19th and it was therefore requested that the trials programme be brought forward 48 hours. This allowed Saturday 20th as a spare day for preparing for sea after SRF had left but in fact it proved necessary for Dockyard work to extend to Saturday night.

16. New davits for the Personnel Boat were to be installed on the 16th but on their arrival from CONUS it was discovered the wrong type had been sent. Since the boat was not needed for a VIETNAM assignment I agreed that installation of the correct davits and return of the boat could be deferred. Static tests on the new Sampson post for Unrep Station 5/6 were completed on Saturday night and removal of staging around the mast and superstructure was not completed until the morning of Sunday 21st.

17. Throughout the 30 days the ship had been in the hands of SRF for repairs the Ship's Company had been employed progressing essential ship husbandry and planned maintenance, consistent with a policy of liberal sporting and short leave. A large number of sailors had been employed as fire and security sentries and in the latter stages technical sailors worked more and more with the civilian technicians in setting to work repaired equipment. The ship nevertheless

SECRET

GUARD

...../4.

SECRET
GUARD
4.

showed some evidence of having been in dockyard hands with large areas being worked on up until the last day. It is to be hoped enough effort can be devoted to restoring the appearance of the ship during the balance of the deployment without detriment to the rigorous but necessary watchkeeping routine.

18. I cannot speak too highly of the magnificent job performed by SRF in repairing the ship. Their results reflect great credit on the Planning Staff, the Management, Supervisors and Labour. An excellent liaison existed with Ship's Staff whose suggestions were readily considered, and the workmanship was of a high order. It must be appreciated that the Filipino worker is little concerned with finish: as a result close supervision was required. Even so, there are a few irregularly shaped patches. The original estimate of 4 weeks was only just exceeded and considering the complexity of the task this is considered highly commendable.

19. Lieutenant W.C. Williams RAN joined from Navy Office on Sunday 20th to investigate the fitting of the AN/SLQ-19 particularly with relation to the possible fitting in HMAS PERTH. Lieutenant Williams remained onboard for the sea trials period and departed on 23rd for further discussions with SRF before returning to AUSTRALIA.

20. HOBART cast off and proceeded at 0845 on Sunday 21st for Sea Trials in local exercise areas. The following additional personnel were onboard for the 2 day period:

- 2 technicians from Mobile Technical Unit 13
- 2 representatives from Hughes Aircraft Corporation
- 1 representative from GEC
- 1 representative from NSMSES (Naval Ships Missile Systems Engineering Station)

In addition two USN sailors joined the ship to maintain the AN/SLQ-19 for the balance of the deployment.

21. During the day the Ship's Company exercised Condition 3 routine and Action Stations. A gun functioning trial confirmed the serviceability of the gun system and proved the new Mark 18 Mod 1 barrels. Aircraft from NAS CUBI flew sorties to provide tracking for the missile and gun systems and to test the SPS-40, TACAN, URD-4 and IFF/SIF. Minor faults were detected in some equipments however the overall state was good. At 1648 a signal was intercepted from USS INTREPID (CVS-11) reporting an aircraft overdue since 1439. Course was altered towards the last known position of the aircraft and speed increased to 26 knots. At the same time an offer of assistance was made by HOBART. At 1745 the Search Area Commander embarked in an Air Force C130 directed the ship to a position to the east where an oil slick had been sighted by searching aircraft. On arrival at this position at 1945 HOBART commenced a close search which continued until the following morning. The ship stopped three times to investigate sightings of objects in the water but there was no trace of the missing aircraft. The search caused the loss of 2 tracking serials and several hours intended NGF navigation training; in order not to further impede progress with trials I sought permission from INTREPID, in the absence of the Air Force aircraft, to continue the trials programme. HOBART was detached at 0840 Monday 22nd and proceeded to the NGF Range where a successful 4 hour practice was carried out. Further tracking serials were conducted before the ship entered SUBIC BAY and secured alongside USS ENGLAND (DLG-22) at 2359. Fuel and essential stores were embarked overnight and three of the civilian technicians disembarked. All onboard were relieved to learn subsequently that the missing pilot had been found unhurt, his aircraft having crashed inland.

SECRET
GUARD

...../5.

SECRET
GUARD
5.

22. At 0912 on Tuesday 23rd HOBART cast off and proceeded out of harbour. The ship was judged to be ready for assignment to NGF duties in that restoration to original condition had been effected with the exception of the following:

- (a) Tartar FCS 2 was unserviceable
- (b) Radar SPS-52 was unserviceable through non availability of length of waveguide and other faults
- (c) the personnel boat davits and associated gear had yet to be fitted
- (d) the tiling on the deck of the CPO Pantry although laid temporarily required permanent replacement
- (e) serviceable IFF test equipment was not available
- (f) some minor items of stores and equipment had yet to be supplied.

It had also been arranged with SRF that any defects which came to light as a result of sea experience would be reported and attended to on return.

23. On clearing harbour it had been intended to carry out a calibration check of the ULQ-6 Jammer which had been only partially unserviceable on leaving harbour on the Sunday. However although the Jammer was repaired, the calibration unit was temporarily out of service and the check was abandoned. HOBART proceeded westward carrying out an AATX on passing through the local exercise areas. At this time the weather in the area was dominated by Tropical Storm NADINE, 240 miles to the east of LUZON, an as yet unnamed Tropical Depression 200 miles to the west and to some extent by Typhoon MARY some 1100 miles ENE of LUZON. The ship experienced Force 6 head winds and choppy seas throughout the first day of the passage and a steadily dropping barometer. Early in the morning of Wednesday 24th, winds increased to Force 7 and later in the day to Force 8 with the barometer reaching a low of 994.5 at 1900. The wind direction varied only slightly and it became apparent that the nearest Depression, which by then had been named OLIVE, was keeping pace westward with the ship about 120 miles to the north. At 1850 I decided to postpone the attempt to close the DMZ as speed had been reduced to 10 knots and the weather in the GULF of TONKIN was quite likely to result in a general exodus of shipping southward with consequent loss of sea room. Course was set westward at 8 knots and at 0600 the following morning Thursday 25th the weather moderated considerably and course was shaped north westward. It was soon possible to proceed at 26 knots as the sea state reduced rapidly and at 1345 the ship rendezvoused with USS CAMDEN (AOE-2). CAMDEN is a sister ship of SACRAMENTO and was able to rapidly supply FFO, ammunition and victualling stores using 3 rigs and VERTREP. USS SAINT PAUL (CA-73) was in company passing empty brass via the Helo. Messages of welcome were received from CTG 70.8, RADM Moore and the Captain, Captain R.A. Hilson USN. On completion of UNREP at 1500 HOBART set course to Point DEBBIE, some 10 miles south east of DANANG to provide support for the 2nd Bde, ROKMC, arriving on station at 1715.

24. Some difficulty was experienced in establishing communications on the Spotter Net but a boat closed the ship from ashore at 1840 and the following personnel embarked:

...../6.

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

6.

Major Toth, US Army - ANGLICO
Captain Durante, US Army - ANGLICO
Lieutenant (JG) Wilkes, USN - ROKMC NGLO
Major Kim, ROKMC - FCC

Lieutenant Wilkes gave a thorough briefing of the local situation, with details of air borne spotting facilities and frequencies. The party departed at 1930. At 2248 HOBART commenced H & I firings which continued until 0230 the following morning.

25. Three observed firings at Sampans in local waterways and a VC assembly area were carried out on Friday 26th. For these missions a member of the USN NGLO team spotted from a Korean piloted O - 1E BIRD DOG aircraft; the firing resulted in a number of Sampans destroyed or damaged, together with a number of wooden structures destroyed or damaged. At night H & I fire in a random pattern was directed at suspected V.C. positions from 2115 until 0400 the following morning.

26. HOBART was assigned to the First Marine Division on the morning of the 27th and during the day seven spotted missions at various targets were fired in support of Operation Allenbrooke. At 1040 a Swift Boat closed and Chaplain Rosier returned to the ship for a further period of about a week. Captain N. Mason-Jones, ARA, currently serving on the staff of the Commanding General, ARVN HQ, I Corps in DANANG also embarked. The ship left station just prior to 1400 and closed USS CAMDEN to again replenish with fuel, ammunition and victualling stores, returning to the line at 1930.

27. At 2018 a call for fire on 5 VC in a treeline was received and the ship closed to open fire. At 2026, after a delay while a Helo cleared the area, 5 rounds were fired for effect as requested by the Spotter who then ordered check fire. The spotter subsequently reported the first round on target and that the remaining 4 had crept 100 metres per round towards his position, the last one falling 50 metres behind the OP. This round caused injury to three marines who required Medevac. The location of the OP was then requested and the spotter revealed that this was some 400 metres from the target and some 28 degrees to the left of the gun target line; the spotter had not advised "Danger Close" prior to the mission, and he had contravened instructions by calling for 5 rounds before finding the target. Onboard an immediate investigation was made the results of which indicated that no material or navigational error had occurred; my 271902Z July refers. My conclusions were that either,

- (a) an intermittent fault had developed in the Mark 47 Computer, which was most unlikely.
- (b) the spotter's assessment of his or the target location or assessment of the initial round and/or salvo spread were in error.

Immediate and subsequent checks of the system strengthened the assumption in (a).

28. In response to my signal expressing concern at the incident and sympathy for the wounded, the Commanding General, 1st MARDIV, General Youngsdaile replied that his preliminary investigation noted that no adjustment fire was called for nor was the mission designated "Danger Close". The following day, the 1st MARDIV NGLO, Lieutenant T. Baines USN, embarked to assure me General Youngsdaile considered HOBART not to be at fault. This lifted a considerable load from my mind and it also made the somewhat subdued ship's company feel much easier. Nevertheless we all felt concerned for the health and well being of those injured.

SECRET
GUARD

...../7.

SECRET

GUARD

7.

29. At 2254 as the onboard investigation concluded the ship was ordered to proceed to DANANG. Speed was increased to 25 knots and at 2350 the ship passed through the entrance, stopping inside the harbour at 0015 on 28th and reporting ready. It was an eerie sensation to be darkened and stopped in a well lit harbour, with a number of brightly illuminated merchant ships nearby, preparing to carry out a warlike NGF Mission. At 0048 H & I fire was commenced at a suspected V.C. observation post on a mountain overlooking the harbour. This completed at 0123 after which the ship patrolled a small area of the harbour at slow speed. As a precaution against mortar fire, the upperdeck was cleared and when no call had been received by 0935 I decided to clear the harbour to permit normal upperdeck traffic. The spotter was assured the ship would be at 12 minutes notice to respond to calls for fire and he agreed to this proposal. I am not aware of any concentrated effort on the part of the V.C. to attack shipping in DANANG harbour. It appears that he prefers to carry out rocket and mortar attacks against targets ashore such as the airfield and stores areas. Rocket attacks have occurred at night recently.

30. At 0944 a Swift Boat called alongside and embarked an LEMP for transfer to the military hospital for eye treatment. This sailor is employed full time as the electrical maintainer in Mount 52 and he is a member of the watch gun's crew. His absence will place a severe load on the remaining Mount 52 trained maintainer. Lieutenant Baines embarked at 1230 and on leaving at 1350 was accompanied by Captain Mason-Jones who had enjoyed his brief stay and proved a most perceptive and interested visitor. A call for fire was received at 1410 and HOBART entered harbour; on arrival at the firing station it was learned no air spotter was in fact available so the ship left harbour. The ship entered again at 1625 and fired a spotted mission at a suspected V.C. assembly area before again retiring at 1817. The harbour was entered for the last time for the day at 2025; H & I fire commenced at 2155 and continued until midnight.

31. CTG 70.8 was advised by signal that evening of the Ship's state of readiness for Sea Dragon operations. Although various faults had developed in both Mounts in the 4 days the ship had been on the line sheer hard work over long hours had ensured that at least one gun was always up. I was therefore satisfied that the gun system was operational. Similarly communications equipment had proved satisfactory and the FCS 2 was serviceable. The SPS-52 radar had operated successfully that day for the first time since leaving SUBIC but SPS-40 had become unserviceable two days before. The UPM-98 test set, required for daily tests of the ships IFF/SIF equipments, was currently unserviceable and a replacement had been sought urgently. The newly fitted SLQ-19 was also down for want of a simple transformer to replace one which had been burnt out. The absence of the SLQ-19 was acceptable but I required confidence in the air warning radars to be proved by a few days continuous service and I certainly considered reliable IFF essential for assignment north of the DMZ. CTG 70.8 had indicated that HOBART, if ready, would assume CTU 77.1.2 on the 2nd August, some 9 days early, due to a gunnery fault in another ship; reluctantly I had to signal that I considered HOBART should remain in the present gunline assignment for the time being and that I would report the situation 1 week later.

32. After an uneventful patrol in DANANG harbour, the ship departed at 0548 on Monday 29th. Following a brief patrol outside the harbour orders were received to proceed to Point DIANE, some 20 miles to the north west and continue to provide support to the 1st MARDIV. Three spotted missions were carried out during the day, at comparatively close ranges against suspected NVA positions close to the coast. Two of these missions resulted in 12 KIA. At 1355 a

SECRET

GUARD

...../8.

SECRET
GUARD

Helo closed the ship and Lieutenant (JG) R. Green, USN, the NGLO for the area, embarked to provide a most comprehensive briefing of the local situation. Lieutenant Green departed at 1600. H & I fire commenced at 2053 and continued until 0555 the next morning.

33. At 0925 on the 30th a Swift Boat closed and embarked Mr. S. Horner, from MOTU 13. Mr. Horner represents the Lockheed Company and with Ship's Staff assistance had brought the SPS-40 to a serviceable state. Spotted missions commenced at 1030 against a suspected V.C. arms cache, followed at 1045 on suspected movement of enemy troops. This latter shoot was terminated at 1130 when an urgent call for fire was received from a marine patrol which on entering a village had sighted an estimated company sized group of North Vietnamese troops. A total of 187 rounds were fired which resulted in a GDA of:

- 20 probably KIA
- 20-30 concrete bomb shelters/bunkers destroyed
- 10-20 bunkers damaged
- 50 metres of trench damaged
- 9 punji pits destroyed
- 100 (approx) cement/masonry buildings destroyed
- 3 sampans destroyed.

34. This engagement, with the strong prospect of more to follow prompted me to seek an unscheduled UNREP as ammunition stocks were already low. At 1430 HOBART left station and proceeded at 26 knots to rendezvous with USS MAUNA KEA (AE-22) for the largest ammunition UNREP to date for the deployment. Some 864 shell and 740 powder, weighing 29.3 tons were embarked and 800 empty brass disembarked in a total alongside time of 1 hour 29 minutes. This was struck down by 2115 and at 2150 the ship closed USS NIAGARA FALLS for a brisk replenishment of naval and victualling stores, returning to station at 2330. It was hard work for the Ship's Company.

35. H & I fire commenced at 0013 on Wednesday 31st and continued until 0447. During the day three missions were fired, causing the destruction of one masonry building and a bunker. A secondary explosion was also caused among some V.C. moving in open ground but details of casualties were not obtainable. Lieutenant Green embarked by Helo at 1350 accompanied by another NGLO, Lieutenant Cullen USN and Lieutenants Crenshaw and Guinness USMC. These officers were attached to Infantry Regiments to advise on artillery; collectively the four officers were able to update the briefing of the 29th before they departed by Helo at 1605.

36. HOBART left station at 2015 to rendezvous with USS CHEMUNG (AO-30). Slight problems with the rigs extended the fuel replenishment and prevented offloading empty brass. One of the two USN sailors embarked to maintain the SLQ-19 was transferred for despatch to SUBIC before the ship detached and returned to station, arriving at 2345.

WEAPONS ELECTRICAL.

37. Repairs to equipment damaged by rocket attack continued through the month until PM 20th July when work completed. Very good progress was made in the restoration of Tartar system 3 and little difficulty was experienced in setting to work and getting the system up into track. The first DSOT was run on Friday 19th July with two minor problems. Tartar system 2 has yet to be rebuilt and this is scheduled for the next refit at G.I.D.. At present the subject has been fully covered by message traffic but three areas of doubt exist,

SECRET
GUARD

...../9.

SECRET
GUARD
9.

those being the date and place of delivery of required equipment and the terms of replacement of equipment.

38. The ship sailed on Sunday 21st for two days' equipment trials and shake down. Trouble was experienced from a few equipments which had recently been cold for 31 days namely ULQ-6A, SPS-52 and the gun mounts.

39. SPS-52 has just become serviceable though quite inadequate having suffered considerably from shock and "cold" effects. This has been mostly confined to the computer area. Outstanding battle damage repair on the SPS-52 is the installation of sections of waveguide to the SLS antenna and the replacement of sections to the SPA-72. On Friday 26th July, the ship resumed firing on the Southern Gun Line and ran into a spate of radar and minor gun casualties which were to be expected. Both SPS-52 and SPS-40 required an immense amount of effort to get them up.

40. On the last day of July only 10 days after a major disruption to normal operating procedures the only casualties extant apart from the unsatisfactory performance of the SPS-52 are the IFF and SLQ-19, both of which are awaiting parts.

HULL AND ENGINEERING.

41. Battle Damage repairs were completed satisfactorily by Saturday 20th. A function of management was well illustrated in this: an estimate of 6 weeks for the repair had been handed up from the Shop level and an arbitrary cut of 2 weeks applied by the (Naval) Planning and Estimating section. This revised estimate was exceeded by 48 hours largely because the Kingpost repair (Stations 5 and 6) had been delayed in the hope that aluminium pipe could be obtained for the job. Ultimately plate had to be rolled up instead.

42. A small number of jobs were not completed due to the lack of equipment. The replacement davits provided for the personnel boat were of steel and not complete. These were returned and a further order placed for aluminium units, to be installed at a future Technical Availability. Resurfacing of the CPO's pantry deck was unsuccessful and a temporary fix had to be carried out using Vinyl tiles. A very neat job of tiling was effected between 0130 and 0430 on the 23rd. Some stores remain outstanding including 2 space heater elements and a variety of D.C. items destroyed during the incident. None is critical. The entire repair was carried out efficiently and well. Perhaps more attention could have been paid to finish but in general the ship looks much as she did before 17th June.

43. Whilst in SUBIC considerable progress was made in preventive maintenance both in the Engineering plant and on the hull fittings. Some 'dockyard' work was undertaken over and above Battle Damage repairs, notably a modification to the 52 deck overhangs, port and starboard aft. These have suffered continuous cracking due to gun-blast and have accounted for a lot of maintenance hours. The modification has proved ineffectual and breaking up has continued at an accelerated rate since returning to the Gunline. This is due largely to the increased shooting at low elevations that has taken place during this very busy deployment but to an extent is also due to the stiffer construction of the overhangs. Three solutions present themselves:

- (a) to remove the overhangs complete at the screens, thereby reaping the benefit of topweight reduction

...../10

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

10.

- (b) to strengthen the entire structure by deepening the curtain plate right round the periphery, by replacing the vertical supports and attachments with stiffer members and by tying the extension deck beams into the structure of the deck proper
- and (c) to live with the problem and weld cracks as they occur. Observing the undoubted value of these overhangs in wet weather in harbour and the probability that a uniquely high prolonged gun-fire period has been taking place, the last alternative is favoured by me.

44. The main machinery has functioned well, the one defect being a repetition of the port astern manoeuvring valve failure described in the R.O.P. for the month of June. The replacement spindles manufactured by SRF SUBIC appear to have been manufactured from mild steel and the first broke up and jammed the throttle on 28th July. The second spare was fitted in 3 hours and may last until the spindle and toggle pins currently being manufactured onboard, are completed. 2A and 2B boilers were cleaned externally on passage from SUBIC and further boiler cleaning should now be unnecessary before the ship returns to SUBIC in September.

GENERAL.

45. The 30 days in SUBIC for battle damage repairs imposed a considerable strain on the Ship's Company. The humidity and heat, together with noisy dockyard work progressing 24 hours a day made conditions most unpleasant. Morale nevertheless remained high and behaviour was satisfactory. The success of the trials period followed by an immediate return to the line was most heartening and I am satisfied that with the exception of certain equipments that are not yet 100% and the absence of FCS 2, the ship is once again fully operational

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant.

(SGN) K. W. SHANDS
(K.W. Shands.)
Captain, RAN

Enclosures: Appendix A - Steaming Figures
B - Movements
C - Forecast Programme
D - Sporting Appendix
E - Record of Underway Replenishments
F - Naval Gunfire Support Records
G - Exercises Carried Out
H - Officers' Movements

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

APPENDIX "A" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JULY, 1968.

STEAMING FIGURES.

(a)	Distance steamed during the month	2,851.4
(b)	Distance steamed since commissioning	125,093.8
(c)	Hours underway during the month	245 56/60
(d)	Hours underway since commissioning	8,767 25/60

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

APPENDIX "B" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JULY, 1968

MOVEMENTS.

<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Monday 1st	SUBIC	Sunday 21st	Battle damage repairs
Sunday 21st	SUBIC excerice areas	Monday 22nd	Sea trials
Tuesday 23rd	SUBIC	Tuesday 23rd	
Thursday 25th	I Corps SOUTH VIETNAM	Wednesday 31st	NGFS

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

APPENDIX "C" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JULY, 1968

FORECAST PROGRAMME.

<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
-	I Corps SOUTH VIETNAM	11th August	NGFS
11th August	Coastal Regions NORTH VIETNAM	1st September	Assigned TU77.1.2 SEA DRAGON oper- ations
3rd September	SUBIC BAY	5th September	Upkeep
7th September	HONG KONG	12th September	Port visit
14th September	Coastal Regions NORTH VIETNAM	26th September	Assigned TU77.1.2 SEA DRAGON oper- ations
28th September	SUBIC BAY	30th September	Turnover with HMAS PERTH
5th October	MANUS	6th October	
11th October	SYDNEY	-	

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

APPENDIX "D" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JULY, 1968.

SPORTING APPENDIX

A. RESULTS.

Tuesday 2nd July	Volley Ball:	HOBART d. USS AMERICA (CVA66)	4 - 1
Sunday 7th July	Softball:	USS STODDARD d. HOBART	16 - 2
Monday 8th July	Soccer:	HOBART d. USS STODDARD (DD566)	5 - 0
Sunday 14th July	Soccer:	HOBART d. George Dewey High School	6 - 2

B. RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

In addition to the inter-ship matches listed above an inter-mess knockout competition was held in softball and volley ball. The After Petty Officers' Mess won both competitions and were subsequently awarded a trophy for their sporting prowess. In the volley ball final they defeated the Supply 'A' team 3-0, whilst in the softball final they trounced the EM's Mess 22-10.

2. During the month two one day golf competitions were held at Kalayan Golf Club, Subic Bay. Both competitions were well supported and enjoyed by those who attended.

3. On Friday 12th July a combined banyan for the ships companies of HOBART and USS COLLETT (DD 730) was held on Grande Island, Subic Bay, at the invitation of COLLETT. 8 officers and 84 sailors from HOBART attended. Volley ball, cricket and softball were played during the afternoon and plentiful refreshments were provided.

4. On Saturday 6th July 10 sailors from HOBART enjoyed a deep sea fishing trip on a 45 foot launch acquired for the day from Consolidated Special Services.

5. During the month daily swimming instruction was conducted for HOBART's five non swimmers. Only one, however, was able to pass his test before the ship sailed on Sunday 21st July. Daily P.T. instruction was also held for the Ships higher rates candidates.

SECRET
GUARD

APPENDIX 'E' TO THE CAPTAIN H.M.A.S. HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS JULY, 1968

REPORT OF UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENTS

DATE	TIMES	RECEIVING FROM	METHOD	EMBARKATION/DISEMBARKATION	REMARKS
Thursday 25th	1346 1438	USS CAMDEN AOE - 2	Spanwire (2) Modified Housefall Helo	Ammunition 302 powder 192 shell FFO 204 tons Victualling stores 6283 lbs Empty Brass 5 loads	
Saturday 27th	1603 1711	USS CAMDEN AOE - 2	As above	Ammunition 780 powder 672 shell FFO 168 tons Victualling stores 1112 lbs Empty Brass 16 loads	
Tuesday 30th	1753 1931	USS MAUNA KEA AE - 22	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition 740 powder 864 shell	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
Tuesday 30th	2150 2235	USS NIAGARA FALLS AFS - 3	Modified Housefall	Stores Naval 800 lb Victualling 14,986 lbs	Navigating Officer conned while along side.
Wednesday 31st	2130 2241	USS CHEMUNG AO - 30	Spanwire (2) Manila High Line	FFO 285 tons Personnel 1	

GUARD
SECRET

GUARD
SECRET

SECRET GUARD

APPENDIX "F" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS JULY, 1968

DATE	TIME(H)	SALVOES	SHELL	TARGET	GUN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
25/7/68	2247/260232	46	HCPD	SUSPECTED VC POS.	UNOBSERVED
26/7/68	0831	139 34	HCPD VTSD	VC SAMPANS (20) + STRUCTURES	4 SAMPANS DESTROYED 5 SAMPANS DAMAGED 4 STRUCTURES DAMAGED
26/7/68	1529	50 38	HCPD VTSD	VC ASSEMBLY AREA	4 STRUCTURES DESTROYED 3 STRUCTURES DAMAGED
26/7/68	2112/270240	74	HCPD	SUSPECTED VC POS.	UNOBSERVED
27/7/68	0819	21 4 2	HCPD CVT WP	VC TROOPS IN BUNKERS	ALL ROUNDS IN TARGET AREA
27/7/68	0919	39	HCPD	BUNKERS & FORTIFICATIONS	30 METRES ROAD DESTROYED 3 BUNKERS DAMAGED
27/7/68	0940	30 9	HCPD CVT	BUNKERS & FORTIFICATIONS	3 STRUCTURES DAMAGED
27/7/68	1131	11	HCPD	VC SNIPER POSITION	ALL ROUNDS ON TARGET SNIPER SILENCED
27/7/68	1147	13	HCPD	BUNKERS & TRENCH LINES	ALL ROUNDS ON TARGET
27/7/68	1300	60 3	HCPD WP	SUSPECTED VC POSITIONS	ALL ROUNDS ON TARGET 1 K.I.A. (BC)
27/7/68	2026	5	HCPD	FIVE VC IN TREE LINE	(MISSION TERMINATED (5 VC KIA/WIA (EST)
28/7/68	0048	38	HCPD	VC ASSEMBLY AREAS	UNOBSERVED
28/7/68	1715	46	HCPD	SUSPECTED VC POS.	GOOD TARGET COVERAGE
28/7/68	2155	36 18	CVT HCPD	SUSPECTED VC POSITIONS	UNOBSERVED
29/7/68	0835	27	CVT	VC HARBOUR AREA	GOOD COVERAGE
29/7/68	1004	3 2	HCPD WP	VC COMMAND POST	UNOBSERVED
29/7/68	1037	23 18 1	CVT HCPD WP	8 VC IN OPEN	2 K.I.A. (BC)
29/7/68	1152	65	CVT	10 VC TROOPS IN OPEN	10 K.I.A. (BC)
29/7/68	1449	62	CVT	VC COMMAND POST	UNOBSERVED
29/7/68	2043/0555	236	CVT	SUSPECTED VC POS.	UNOBSERVED
30/7/68	1029	6	CVT	SUSPECTED VC AMMUNITION DUMP	UNOBSERVED
30/7/68	1045	29 4	CVT WP	VC HARBOUR AREA	UNOBSERVED

SECRET
GUARD

...../2

SECRET

GUARD

.2.

DATE	TIME(H)	SALVOES	SHELL	TARGET	GUN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
30/7/68	1218	187 3	CVT WP	NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS	(20 KIA (PROBABLE) (20-30 CONCRETE BUNKERS/ (BOMBSHELTERS DESTROYED (APPROX. 100 CEMENT (MASONARY BUILDINGS (DESTROYED, 10-20 (BUNKERS DAMAGED, 50 (METRES TRENCHLINE (DAMAGED, 9xPUNJI PITS (DESTROYED, 3 SAMPANS (DESTROYED, GENERAL (AREA REDUCED TO RUBBLE
31/7/68	0013	56 94	CVT HCPD	SUSPECTED NVN POSITIONS	UNOBSERVED
31/7/68	0930	30 3	HCPD CVT	1 BUNKER	1 BUNKER DESTROYED
31/7/68	1014	24	HCPD	MASONARY HOUSE	TARGET DESTROYED
31/7/68	1532	81	HCPD	40-50 NVN TROOPS	1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "G" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS, JULY, 1968.

EXERCISES CARRIED OUT.

	<u>TYPE OF EXERCISE</u>	<u>TOTAL NO.</u>	<u>HOURS.</u>	<u>DATES.</u>
1.	AATX(G)	5	7½	21, 22, 23
2.	AATX(M)	5	7½	21, 22, 23
3.	TACAN, URD-4, IFF/SIF Checks	1	1½	21
4.	NGSFX	1	4	22

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET
GUARD

APPENDIX "H" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
JULY, 1968

OFFICERS' MOVEMENTS

Nil movements for the month of July, 1968

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET GUARD

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MINUTE

18/6/979.

AUGUST 1968

HMAS *Hobart*

Report of proceedings

AS(NS) *NS 1/10*

D of O *NS 3/10*

DCNS *NS 4/10*

1NM *NS 9/10*

2NM *NS 10/10*

3NM *NS 11/10*

4NM *NS 12/10*

SEC

FAS(FC) *NS 10/10*

FAS(FM)

C of S *NS 10/10* - Para 37 is of interest Vav the AGE.

DPR *NS 28/10*

AS(NS)(NS5) *NS 6/11*

ARCHIVES BRANCH

- NOTES: A. This report should be dealt with and passed on promptly.
B. On this file comments should be brief; if any matter requires comprehensive treatment, reference to another Branch, or approval of a Board Member, a new file should be raised, cross-reference to this one.

DGOP)	DPS)	ACMD)
D of P)	DNR)	ACDC)
DAP)	DNES)	ACTP)
DGFE)	DFSD)	DWE)
DUW)	MDG)	DMED)
DNSD)	DSAP(M))	PNA)
DSAW)	DNS)	PME)
D of C)	DMS)	PEE)
DNAP)	D of S(A))	DSMR)
DNI)	D of V)	DSMP)
HFB)	ASNS(NS5))	CONS)
DCNP)	ARCHIVES BRANCH)	DNQA)
DOA))	D of R)
DMT))	DAS)
DDM))	ASNS(NS5))
				ARCHIVES BRANCH)

SEPARATE
REPORTS
CIRCULATING

SECRET GUARD

7/3/10

16/10

RECEIVED
C 3 SEP P.M.
NAVY REGISTRY Telephone: 35 0444

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

NAVY—CANBERRA		
18	6	979

SECRET GUARD

PMS

OFFICE OF THE
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING,
H.M. AUSTRALIAN FLEET,
FLEET HEADQUARTERS,
GARDEN ISLAND, N.S.W. 2000

No. A.F. 17/30/3


25 SEP 1968

The Secretary,
Department of the Navy.

HMAS HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - AUGUST, 1968

Reference: HMAS HOBART letter 133.201.2 of 6th September, 1968.

1. Forwarded.
2. This has been a very full and active month for HOBART but she appears to have coped most ably with the demands placed upon her and the several defects that occurred.
3. I am pleased that she has had the opportunity to liaise with other Australian units in the area. This can only be to the benefit of morale on both sides.


Rear Admiral

Enclosure: HMAS HOBART letter 133.201.2 of 6th September, 1968.

SECRET GUARD

SECRET

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY.

GUARD

133.201.2

H.M.A.S. HOBART, D39,
at Sea.

SEP 6 1968

The Flag Officer Commanding,
H.M. Australian Fleet.

(Copies to: The Australian Naval Attache, Washington.
The Commander, Australian Forces, Vietnam.
The Captain, H.M.A.S. PERTH.
The Captain, H.M.A.S. BRISBANE.)

H.M.A.S. HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - AUGUST, 1968.

Sir,

I have the honour to report the proceedings of H.M.A. Ship under my command for the month of August, 1968.

2. On the morning of Thursday 1st August, HOBART was on station at Point DIANE, some 25 miles north of DANANG, SOUTH VIETNAM. During the first few days of the month the ship was assigned to provide fire by night in this area in support of the 1st Marine Division, and by day to move to Point DEBBIE, 10 miles southeast of DANANG, to provide support to the 51st ARVN Division. H & I fire commenced just after midnight and continued until 0500, at which time the ship departed station for Point DEBBIE.

3. Following a quiet patrol awaiting calls for fire, two air spotted missions were fired during the afternoon, in support of Operation Hung Quang, at bunkers suspected of containing V.C. troops. At 1702 HOBART proceeded to replenish with ammunition from U.S.S. MAUNA KEA (AE-22), returning to station at DIANE at 2030. H & I fire commenced at 2300 and continued through until 0540 the following morning; one secondary explosion was observed during the firings.

4. Returning to DEBBIE on the morning of Friday 2nd, two air spotted missions were fired between 0900 and 1045 at bunkers and trenches with some damage observed. At 1052 a Marine helicopter closed and I was pleased to welcome onboard the Minister of the Navy, the Honourable C.R. Kelly, M.P., accompanied by Commander P.M. Rees, R.A.N.. The Minister had been visiting R.A.N. units in VIETNAM and was joining HOBART to personally witness VIETNAM operations. The Helo also returned LEMP B.R. Back, R.50535, following eye treatment at the DANANG Military Hospital.

5. A briefing on WESTPAC in general and the ship's duties in both Seadragon and Gunline Operations was given for the Minister as the ship departed station for UNREP. It had been arranged for a dual replenishment of ammunition from U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5) and fuel from U.S.S. TAPPAHANNOCK (AO-43) but the ship's spotter had requested the ship to return to station early. The AE UNREP had therefore to be cancelled; which was clearly a disappointment for the Minister but he showed great interest in the fuel replenishment. TAPPAHANNOCK brought

SECRET

...../2.

GUARD

SECRET

2. GUARD

the first mail to the ship since leaving SUBIC on 23rd July. Shortly after return to station at 1600 a successful spotted mission was fired at bunkers and trenches, 8 of which were reported destroyed or damaged, together with 5 structures damaged. During the afternoon and evening Mr. Kelly observed firings from the Operations Room, Gun Plot and the Mounts. The ship departed station at 1719 for DIANE arriving at 1915. H & I fire commenced at 2030 and continued until 0545 the following morning.

6. HOBART proceeded to Point DEBBIE at 0600 on Saturday 3rd and during the forenoon carried out an air spotted firing at an estimated 40 V.C. in trenches and a treeline. The fire resulted in 15 huts and buildings damaged and an estimated 15 V.C. killed. At 1100 lower deck was cleared for an address by the Minister. Mr. Kelly was also kind enough to present Naval Board Commendations to the following Officer and sailors for services during the ship's first WESTFAC deployment:

Commander I.B. James, Royal Australian Navy
Mechanician 1st Class W.B. Fischer, R.54352
Petty Officer Engineering Mechanic F. Ellingworth, R.57448
Leading Engineering Mechanic T.W. Gordon, R.55624

7. During the forenoon and afternoon Mr. Kelly made an unofficial tour of all departments of the ship and spoke with members of the Ship's Company. At 1455 the ship proceeded to DIANE; en route a logistic helo closed and embarked the Minister and Commander Rees for transfer to U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) prior to subsequent return passage to AUSTRALIA.

8. Prior to departure from DEBBIE the spotter had advised that the ship was to remain at DIANE during daylight the following day, the 4th. Shortly after arrival at DIANE this was confirmed by the 1st MARDIV spotter who passed brief details of an intended helo borne assault commencing at 0830 on the 4th. The aim of the landing was to recover a number of water buffalo which the N.V.A. had stolen from local residents. Notwithstanding the incongruous nature of the operation HOBART was required for support for the whole day; a planned UNREP for the 4th was therefore undesirable. Having obtained the spotter's permission the ship arranged an unscheduled replenishment with U.S.S. HALEAKALA (AE-25) who by a most fortunate coincidence was only 22 miles distant. HALEAKALA was closed at 2231 and the ship topped up by 2338, returning to station at 0125.

9. As H & I commenced, instructions were received to proceed on relief to Point ADELIN, in the vicinity of the D.M.Z., to a station vacated by U.S.S. BOSTON (CAG-1). It was subsequently learned that surveillance of the Seadragon area was to be vested in 2 groups, TU 77.1.1 being responsible for the northern half. U.S.S. HARWOOD (DD-861) closed at 0400 and H & I fire was suspended temporarily while HARWOOD's boat closed the ship to deliver the Operations Officer, Lieutenant Kost, U.S.N.. A short but necessary and comprehensive turnover briefing was given to Lieutenant Kost before he returned to his ship at 0450. HOBART continued H & I fire until 0515 then set course at 22 knots for Point ADELIN, arriving at 0745. Some days later I learnt from HARWOOD that the operation was a success and that 200 beasts had been returned to their owners. U.S.S. EDSON (DD-946) with CTU 70.8.9, Commodore B.D. Gaw embarked, was already stationed off the D.M.Z.. The area is divided into 3 zones lying north/south of each other; EDSON was in the northernly zone, HOBART in the centre, with the southern zone unassigned. The first mission commenced at 1009 when HOBART provided cover for U.S.S. EDSON for a firing mission.

...../3.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

3. GUARD

EDSON had been fired at the previous day hence the fashion to ride shotgun for close in firings. HOBART then carried out a ground spotted firing mission at bunkers commencing at 1126; the observer reported 3 bunkers damaged or destroyed and one rocket site damaged. During the day CTG 70.8, Rear Admiral S.H. Moore, U.S.N., embarked in U.S.S. SAINT PAUL (CA-73) was advised by signal of HOBART's state of readiness for Seadragon Operations. There were two significant changes to the situation one week earlier; on the positive side, the SPS-40 had been serviceable for some days and on the negative side, the starboard ULQ-6 Jammer was down. The ship was still without the SLQ-19 Jammer, the SPS-52 was still not operational and the IFF was down presumably through lack of a test set. The reduction of Jammer effectiveness and a 50% air warning radar capability could have been acceptable but these combined with the more important lack of IFF capability made assignment north of 17°N most undesirable. I therefore signalled that I considered the ship should continue on the current Gunline assignment. A short spotted mission was fired at 1307 at a mortar site and bunkers which resulted in 3 secondary explosions causing one fire. At 1915 and again at 2010 two ground spotted shoots at active artillery positions took place; both guns were silenced. H & I fire commenced at 2030 and continued until 0142 the following morning. During the firing a call for fire was received onto a suspected V.C. position which resulted in 3 secondary explosions.

10. At 0535 5th August HOBART left station having been directed by CTU 70.8.9 to re-arm from U.S.S. RAINIER which had proceeded south from Yankee Station especially for the two ships off the D.M.Z. At this time very heavy rain was falling and some difficulty ensued locating the AE, because the SPS-10 radar became unserviceable. Visual contact was made at 0700 and replenishment commenced in driving rain which fortunately eased to a light drizzle as the UNREP progressed. Messrs. S.V. Greene and G. Phister, representatives of Hughes Aircraft Corp. who had been working on the SPS-52 radar disembarked to RAINIER. HOBART returned to station at 1045. Three ground spotted shoots were carried out during the day which resulted in a tally of two secondary explosions (one thought by the spotter to be a POL dump), 7 bunkers destroyed or damaged and one concrete structure destroyed.

11. U.S.S. EDSON was closed at 1950 for a light line transfer of a replacement part for the SPS-10; the radar was restored later in the night. H & I fire commenced at 2145 but completed shortly after 2200 when the ship was ordered to close U.S.S. CHIPOLA (AO-63). This replenishment, originally scheduled for the following day, had been advanced to 2300 then cancelled by CHIPOLA due to a collision which occurred during an UNREP with the U.S.S. DUBUQUE (LPD-8) and the U.S.S. POINT DEFIANCE (LPD-31) that evening. Some damage had been caused to the Oiler's port side and rigs. HOBART closed CHIPOLA's starboard side at 2306 to embark F.F.O. and mail. Shortly after return to station at 0100 H & I fire commenced and continued until 0303.

12. HOBART departed station again at 0345 and proceeded at 25 knots to rendezvous with U.S.S. VIRGO (AE-30). No empty brass had been transferred in the previous UNREP and it proved unfortunate that having provided the ammunition, VIRGO was unable to receive more than 1 load of brass before her winches suffered a power failure. The replenishment rig was recovered by hand in the AE and HOBART disengaged, returning to station at 0845. It had been a tiring 24 hours. U.S.S. EDSON then departed for replenishment, continuing the standard policy of one 5"/54 ship being on station in the D.M.Z. area at all times.

...../4.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

4. GUARD

13. A ground spotted mission was fired at 0930 against a suspected N.V.A. position which resulted in 2 structures being destroyed. Five calls for fire were answered between 1000 and 1500, four against active artillery sites which in each case were silenced and the last against 2 Sampans which were damaged. At 1600 an L.C.P. closed from U.S.S. POINT DEFIANCE to supply some steel plate which had been requested by HOBART to manufacture a spare part for Mount 51. These ships have excellent workshop facilities and can provide considerable maintenance support. At 1745 a helo closed from U.S.S. PRINCETON (LHP-5) to embark one sailor for an x-ray; he was returned by helo at 1930.

14. H & I fire commenced at 2139 and continued until 0600 the next day; at 0433 the 10,000th round of the deployment, other than for practice, was fired. During the night the H & I's were interrupted five times by calls for fire, resulting in a total of 3 estimated K.I.A. and two bunkers destroyed or damaged. A great deal of the area close southward of the D.M.Z. is not secure and more positive G.D.A. than "good coverage" is not possible. Spotters have reported that, particularly by night, rounds from ships have been seen to land among infiltrating enemy; it is not safe for the spotter to venture out to assess damage and by morning casualties have been removed.

15. At 0830 on Wednesday 7th an L.C.A. closed from POINT DEFIANCE and 3 officers and 6 enlisted men embarked in HOBART for the day. Due to a visit to the area ashore by the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, General Chapman, H & I fire was called for at 1123 for 50 minutes. Evidently this occurs whenever V.I.P. visits are scheduled, to keep the enemy heads down and so reduce the element of danger for visitors. POINT DEFIANCE again came to the assistance of the ship at 1325 when one maintenance sailor and the AN/VRC-46 transceiver were transferred by boat for repair. This VHF FM set is used for communication with Spotters ashore and although backed up by a small portable set on the bridge the immediate availability of the 46 is essential for rapid response to calls for fire. At 1600 U.S.S. EDSON closed for an exchange of small items of stores; as the transfer completed HOBART received a call for fire against an artillery site. This fire was completed successfully at 1706. At 1745 a duel transfer occurred when the personnel from POINT DEFIANCE were transferred to their ship by boat and at the same time a helo closed. Lieutenant Commander L. Adams U.S.N., the III MARDIV NGLO with Lieutenant (JG) P. Sullivan U.S.N. one of his assistants, embarked. Lieutenant Commander Adams provided a briefing on the situation ashore, and the two officers remained onboard overnight. Four calls for fire were answered between 1805 and 0125, resulting in two silenced artillery sites and two secondary explosions. Ammunition stocks were very low at this stage and the night H & I's between 0215 and 0435 were fired with some restraint.

16. HOBART left station at 0445 on Thursday 8th to re-arm from U.S.S. RAINIER. This was a longer UNREP than usual with 1104 shell and 975 powder being embarked and some 21 loads of empty brass and pallets returned. The ship returned to station at 1100. Shortly afterwards a helo closed to collect mail - an unusual occurrence for ships on the Gunline - and the pilot was able to transfer Lieutenant Commander Adams and Lieutenant Sullivan to U.S.S. EDSON.

...../5.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

5.

17. During the day 8 calls for fire were received at various targets, resulting in 2 silenced enemy artillery sites, 6 bunkers destroyed or damaged, a length of trench destroyed and one ammunition dump uncovered. By night, H & I fire commenced at 2214 and continued until 0230 during which period one call for fire was received.

18. Two spotted missions were fired in the forenoon of Friday 9th. The call for the second firing resulted from shore observation of 5 enemy artillery sites commencing concurrently - HOBART silenced four and 7th Air Force jets were called in to bomb the fifth. A signal was received early A.M. from U.S.S. FECHTELER (DD-870) reporting an unknown delay in SUBIC. This ship had embarked the replacement IFF test set for HOBART and had been due to transfer it on 10th August. Since the absence of this equipment was the prime reason for my proposal to CTG 70.8 for the ship to remain on the Gunline, the CTG was advised of the situation at 1000, with a request that special arrangements be made to fly the equipment to the ship. Admiral Moore's response was rapid: HOBART's scheduled assignment to Seadragon on 11th August was put back to the 18th and arrangements made to transfer the IFF Test Set by another ship. I was naturally disappointed that HOBART would be delayed in proceeding to Seadragon however the employment over the previous 5 days in the D.M.Z. area had been very interesting and there had been much satisfaction in providing close support to the troops ashore. Furthermore HOBART's presence was obviously greatly appreciated and only a very small percentage of rounds had not been spotted.

19. At 1420 HOBART departed station and replenishment with naval stores from U.S.S. POLLUX (AKS-4), then fuel, mail, free freight and ammunition from U.S.S. MANATEE (AO-58). Not all AO's carry ammunition as deck cargo; that MANATEE had a quantity of 5"/54 was a considerable bonus and the AO was delighted to be rid of this cargo. On return to station it was possible to close U.S.S. POLLUX again to embark a spare for the SFS-40 which had become unserviceable during the afternoon. On arrival at the D.M.Z. at 2330 HOBART was assigned the northern sector, which included WBLC surveillance between TIGER ISLAND and CAP LAY. No incidents occurred. Chaplain Rosier was transferred to a Swift Boat for passage to DANANG shortly after midnight; at 0213 on Saturday 10th H & I fire commenced, continuing until 0548.

20. One spotted firing was carried out, resulting in a secondary explosion, before the ship departed station at 0830 for replenishment. A relatively small amount of ammunition was required from U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5) to top up, but the AE was able to accept the large amount of empty brass which time at other replenishment ships in the previous few days had never quite permitted. On completion, U.S.S. GRAFFIAS (AF-29) was closed at 1045 and replenishment of victualling stores commenced. A wire high line Regulus rig was used at station 2 for the first time in the deployment. On this rig, which is for light loads only, the traveller inhaul and outhaul are both controlled by winches in the Supplying Ship with consequent manpower advantages for receiving ships. As the 7th load arrived onboard HOBART, the safety link parted and the load dropped to the deck. I had been advised by some U.S.N. Officers that stations 1 and 2 were not popular for replenishment as collapse was not unknown and personnel had been warned accordingly. No personnel were near the load when it landed. An investigation revealed that the load had weighed about 1000lb and the safety link, tested previously in SUBIC to the designed weight of 800lb had correctly collapsed. The safety link is designed to prevent

.....6.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

6. GUARD

damage by any twisting moment applied to Mount 51. Storing was completed at the modified housefall rig at station 8 before HOBART disengaged and returned to station, arriving at 1210.

21. The ship was assigned the centre sector and at 1325 commenced H & I fire lasting until 1715. At 1750 a call for fire was directed at a convoy of trucks some 6 miles west of CAP LAY. Unfortunately the spotter, located some miles to the south, incorrectly identified the section of road and a total correction of 5000 yards up the road was needed before fire for effect was ordered. No damage was observed although the spotter did report excellent coverage of the area. H & I's commenced at 2017 and were fired through the night until 0445. At 0216 the H & I was interrupted for a call for fire on some N.V.A. troops in the open; although rounds were seen to fall in the area no G.D.A. was possible due to darkness.

22. At 0013 on 11th, U.S.S. EDSON - suffering some 5"/54 problems - was directed to proceed to Point BETTY off HUE. This left HOBART the only ship off the D.M.Z. Two weeks previously the area had been covered by one 8", one 5"/54 and one 5"/38 unit. In addition to N.G.F. duties on both sides of the D.M.Z., the ship was also designated to interdict WBLC traffic between CAP LAY and TIGER ISLAND. This billet is usually filled by the ship with CTU 70.8.9 embarked; any fire at suspected WBLC traffic must be authorised by the CTU. At my request the Commodore indicated that this requirement was still extant, however should communications be lost between the two ships on the KY-8 UHF Speech Secrecy circuit, I would have discretion to fire. In the event at 1235 I was advised that WBLC Interdiction was temporarily in abeyance. Since 5"/54 ammunition was still in short supply, this proved an effective compromise and I resolved to seek aircraft for any interdiction necessary.

23. During the day the ship responded to five calls for fire resulting in 4 N.V.A. troops K.I.A., one W.I.A., 8 estimated K.I.A. or W.I.A. and 8 huts destroyed. Two artillery sites were fired on but no damage assessment was given. It had been hoped to send a small group of officers and sailors to U.S.S. POINT DEFIANCE as a return visit for the one on the 7th but this was not possible for a variety of reasons. H & I fire commenced at 2140 and continued until 0553.

24. HOBART left station at 0730 on Monday 12th and during the forenoon replenished with fuel from U.S.S. MISFILLION (AO-105) and with ammunition from U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5) returning to station at 1230. Chaplain C.W. McMahon Jnr U.S.N. joined from a U.S.N. Coast guard Cutter at 1430 to spend about a week onboard. During the day five observed firings were carried out, resulting in 10 N.V.A. troops K.I.A., 9 estimated K.I.A./W.I.A. and 2 artillery sites silenced. Shortly after commencing night H & I fire at 2202, casualties in both mounts imposed an unusual silence in the ship which lasted until 0400. Undisturbed sleep was most welcome during this period. Further H & I's then continued until 0630.

25. Following a quiet forenoon patrol, HOBART left station at 1100 and closed U.S.S. VIAGO for replenishment of ammunition. During the UNREP a signal was received reassigning the ship to IV Corps, to the south of SAIGON. This change in area was evidently due to gun problems in other 5"/54 ships and the need for re-programming ships

...../7.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

7. GUARD

with Commodores embarked as CTU 77.1.2 and CTU 70.8.9. A simpler solution involving less ships would have been possible if HOBART's equipment state had permitted her employment in Seadragon. (IFF, SLQ-19, ULQ-6A (Stbd), SPS-40, SPS-52 were all down or below acceptable standard.). HOBART returned to station to advise the Spotter of the impending change; one short call for fire was answered before the ship was relieved by U.S.S. EDSON. After the usual exchange of "farewell and well done" signals, HOBART departed the D.M.Z. area and proceeded south along the coast of VIETNAM at 24 knots. At midnight a reduced state of readiness was assumed for the passage.

26. An uneventful transit through I, II and III Corps Areas continued during the 14th. The opportunity was taken to hold quarterly B.T.T.'s during the day and reinstitute the maintenance effort on the upper deck. At 1800 the ship rendezvoused with U.S.S. TURNER JOY (DD-951) when 3 officers were transferred to HOBART to provide a turnover of operations in the area. The officers were returned by highline at 1900 after which HOBART proceeded west arriving on station some 25 miles south of VUNG TAU, at 2230. H & I fire at V.C. locations was fired between 0036 and 0222.

27. The tempo of N.G.F. operations in the area to the south west of VUNG TAU proved to be very slow by comparison with I Corps. The Vietcong are well established in large known areas of the MEKONG delta and they have developed reliable re-supply lines using the extensive waterways abounding there. The depth of water increases very slightly with distance from the coast; the 6 fathom line runs between 5 and 8 miles from the mangrove covered shoreline and from two principal N.G.F. target areas located 1 to 2 miles inland. Navigational fixing presents little difficulty as land areas appear to be charted accurately in the main, however reliance cannot be placed on charted soundings due to the influence of the river, moreover some areas towards Cambodia Point are noted as being unsurveyed. Spotting is carried out by air only and is dictated both by low availability of aircraft, and poor weather; a not uncommon day's programme consisted of observed firings for an hour and a half in the forenoon, a cancelled firing in the afternoon and 3 hours of H & I in the middle watch. H & I firing is not permitted by day. The low level of activity and absence of air threat permitted a relaxation in manning and reversion to a three watch organisation with a consequent increase in ship husbandry effort. This despite wet weather. Though there was an air of restlessness onboard most members of the ship's company benefitted from more sleep.

28. The ship anchored well off shore twice on Thursday 15th to carry out observed N.G.F. missions in support of the 9th ARVN Division. On both occasions the targets were known V.C. positions and damage was caused to a number of structures and sampans. With no firings expected for some hours I decided to proceed to VUNG TAU to make contact with other Australian Units as arranged earlier by signal. HOBART entered the harbour at 1715, anchoring in an assigned berth at 1755. Shortly afterwards a boat closed and the following officers embarked:

Lieutenant Colonel I.C.C. Gilmore, RAE	Commander 1st Australian Logistics Support Group
Lieutenant Commander H.J. Donahue, RAN	Visiting from DUSW
Lieutenant W.D.H. Lees, RAN	OIC, RAN CDT 3.
Lieutenant C.J. Littleton, RAN	OIC, RAN CDT 3 Designate.

...../8.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

8.

During the brief discussion that followed, arrangements were made for the exchange of personnel between the ALSG and the ship. During the time at anchor, an RAAF helicopter also closed the ship to deliver some 320 comforts parcels donated to the Australian Overseas Forces Fund. These parcels were much appreciated by all hands as they provided the only tangible evidence from home of other than Service or family interest in the ship's deployment.

29. HOBART weighed and proceeded at 1930 and returned to station where H & I firing commenced at 2153. At 0813 the following morning, Friday 16th the ship anchored in 9 fathoms 7 miles off shore and awaited an expected call for fire; in the event no spotter was available for firings in either the forenoon or the afternoon. At 1355 a Swift Boat closed and the Captain, Lieutenant R. Fione U.S.N., embarked to provide a brief on enemy locations ashore and details of friendly boat patrols. At 1530 the ship weighed and proceeded to replenish with victualling stores from U.S.S. GRAFFIAS (AF-29) and with fuel and ammunition from U.S.S. CHEMUNG (AO-30). Due to the lack of a housefall rig, CHEMUNG supplied the ammunition by wire highline which, because of the much smaller load capability, protracted the UNREP a great deal. Eventually at 2045 HOBART disengaged, returning to station at 2200. H & I fire was commenced at 0130.

30. HOBART anchored at 0826 on Saturday 17th and during the forenoon fired 3 targets resulting in 19 structures destroyed or damaged and 6 bunkers damaged. The area fired was some 25 miles further south than that covered in the previous two days and the support was provided to the 9th ARVN Division. At 1030 the anchor was weighed and HOBART proceeded again to VUNG TAU, anchoring in the harbour at 1330. By prior arrangement 4 Army Officers and 6 other ranks from the 1st ALSG embarked in exchange for 3 of HOBART's Officers and 6 sailors who were landed. Three of the OR's were brothers of personnel onboard and this executed some of the arrangements which had been initiated in April. HOBART weighed at 1355 and proceeded out of harbour. Some uncertainty existed at this time as to ship's expected employment after the 19th and in response to a signalled question, I was informed by CTU 70.8.9 that the ship would remain in IV Corps until the end of the month. This was indeed disappointing as although it meant more opportunities for inter-service exchanges, a good proportion of the spare parts required to correct casualties was en route to the ship and we were certainly fit for duty in I Corps. Prospects for being fit for Seadragon operations were also good as the IFF test set was embarked in a ship off the Viet Nam coast. It is only recently however that 5"/54 ships have been allocated to IV Corps and no doubt each ship will have to take its turn in the future. En route to station a U.S.N. P-3 Orion aircraft carried out an air drop of urgently required spares which had been flown from SUBIC. HOBART returned to station and at 2115 commenced H & I fire.

31. The ship anchored at 0651 on Sunday 18th about 50 miles south of VUNG TAU in the optimum location, dictated by depth of water, for engaging expected targets. Five air spotted and one unobserved firings took place during the day, resulting in a number of structures and bunkers destroyed or damaged. At 1830 the anchor was weighed and HOBART proceeded to rendezvous with U.S.S. MANATEE (AO-58) to replenish with fuel, ammunition, victualling stores and a large amount of most welcome mail. MANATEE is one of the larger AO's and the provision of a housefall rig permitted timely replenishment of ammunition and also enabled the offloading of some 500 empty brass which had accumulated during the previous week. Chaplain McMahon was also transferred to the MANATEE. As no H & I targets had been provided, the ship returned to station and patrolled the 10 fathom line at slow speed overnight.

SECRET

...../9.

GUARD

SECRET

9. GUARD

32. The ship anchored at 0649 on Monday 19th. Two observed missions were fired in the forenoon and two in the afternoon the targets being V.C. structures and bunker complexes. The G.D.A. for the day was 8 structures destroyed or damaged, 3 bunkers and one sampan damaged. On completion of the last shoot the anchor was weighed and HOBART proceeded north, entering VUNG TAU at 1815 and anchoring at 1837. A U.S. Army landing craft awaited the ship; the Australian Army personnel disembarked and HOBART's exchange group, after an interesting 48 hours even if somewhat uncomfortable by night, returned onboard. At 1850 a Swift Boat closed and Lieutenant Commander D.C. Bennett R.A.N., Naval Staff Officer on the staff of the Commander, Australian Forces, VIETNAM, embarked. I was disappointed that Colonel Gilmore of 1 ALSG was not able to accept my invitation to join the ship and stay for a day. The ship weighed and proceeded at 1907 and on arrival at station at 2300, commenced 3 hours H & I.

33. Following an uneventful night patrol the ship anchored at 0730 on Tuesday 20th. Three firings took place in the forenoon and three in the afternoon, resulting in some 30 V.C. structures being destroyed or damaged. A Swift Boat closed at 0925 and embarked Lieutenant Commander Bennett for return to VUNG TAU. It had been hoped that COMSEVENTHFLT, Vice Admiral W.F. Bringle, U.S.N., might visit the ship during the day; unfortunately this proved impossible as his flagship, USS PROVIDENCE (CLG-6) was at CAM RANH BAY, some 200 miles to the north east. HOBART was underway by 1630 and patrolled the area overnight at slow speed, closing to 10 miles from the coast at 2100 to carry out H & I firings for two hours.

34. The coast was closed again to $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles and the anchor let go at 0649 on Wednesday 21st. A spotted mission in support of the 9th ARVN Division commenced at 0826 but was terminated when a lookout on A.A. Control reported sighting a possible hostile swimmer 20 feet off the starboard side. My 210132Z August refers. Within minutes scare charges were dropped and the main engines turned ahead and astern while the anchor was weighed. DC state 1Z was assumed as the ship got underway at 0850 and cleared the area; visual search of the immediate area continued on departure. The ship anchored at 0916 some 4 miles south of the original location and a bottom search carried out; also scare charges were dropped. The bottom search revealed no sign of the hull having been touched, nor was any foreign object found. HOBART weighed at 1108 and returned to the original location to await a call for fire - remaining under weigh this time.

35. An internal investigation was held into the incident and my conclusion was that the sighting was valid; my 210810Z August refers. The possibility of such an occurrence had been considered on arrival in the IV Corps area. Amongst many considerations, the distance off shore and tidal stream strength, reinforced by the Mekong Delta out-flow, were the dominant factors; as a result I had considered it safe to anchor in daylight hours for N.G.F. missions some 5 to 6 miles offshore, maintaining good visual and radar lookout. At the time of the incident, the nearest fishing boat was 3 miles away and even if this craft had been an accessory, the success of the swimmer's intercept on the ship was at the least spectacular in view of the strength of the stream at the time. The incident proved an object lesson and I resolved to anchor in VUNG TAU harbour only when necessary and then with increased precautions.

36. No calls for fire were received during the afternoon. H & I fire commenced at 2130 and continued for two hours.

SECRET

...../10

GUARD

SECRET

10. GUARD

37. A defect on the Mark 47 computer curtailed the scheduled firing mission during the forenoon of Thursday 22nd. Unfortunately by the time the defect was rectified, the spotter was unable to obtain an aircraft with the result that no firing at all occurred that day. HOBART left the patrol area at 1555 and made rendezvous with USS CACAPON (AO-52) at 2015. A delay of nearly an hour occurred whilst USS SAVAGE (DER-386) was replenished before HOBART could close for fuel, ammunition, mail and a small amount of stores. This proved the longest UNREP to date for the deployment, some 4 minutes short of 4 hours, caused principally by the AO being unable to supply a pallet jack and also by slow working of the housefall rig with which her crew was unfamiliar. The absence of the pallet jack meant each load of powder and shell had to be disassembled at the dump station aboard HOBART before the next load could be accepted; the speed of supply could just be matched by the team dealing with powder but the heavier shell gradually caused a bottleneck. It would appear there is a case for supplying ships in IV Corps area with 2 transportable hydraulic lift devices - time alongside AE's would also be reduced by avoiding the need to supply pallet jacks. This has been suggested. I do not wish to imply that re-arming from oilers is ineffective. On the contrary, some oilers go quite close to the AE supply rate and further it must be remembered that others were commanderred by the U.S. Navy during World War 2. After some months as a customer one tends to compare ships supplying ammunition with the AOE's CAMDEN and SACRAMENTO and the AE's MAUNA-KEA and HALEAKALA.

38. During the UNREP instructions were received to proceed to III Corps, located to the east of VUNG TAU, to support the 1st Australian Task Force and course was altered at once. It did not help when CACAPON veered 5° to starboard before commencing her turn to port. So far as I know this is the first time an R.A.N. Ship had been assigned to support the Australian Army in the field since the Korean War and possibly since World War II. HOBART arrived off the coast to the east of CAP ST JACQUES at 0415 on Friday 23rd and commenced patrol. At 0915 the ship was instructed to enter VUNG TAU harbour for a mission request and course was set accordingly. Shortly after entering I was advised that no firing was to occur until a briefing had been given by the spotter, so course was reversed and the ship left the harbour. Entry was made again at 1305, the ship anchoring at 1349 in a berth selected for the scheduled mission. Operation Awkward State 3, modified for weapon and A.A. lookout readiness, was instituted on anchoring. At 1445 a Swift Boat closed and the following officers embarked:

Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Kelly, RAA.

Captain A.J.C. Wells, RAA.

Major M.C. Crawford

Commanding Officer
12th Field Regiment
12th Field Regiment
Operations Officer
Commanding Officer
104th Battery

Captain Wells, also representing the NGLO who was unable to attend, gave a concise briefing on operations in the area and the ship's expected tasks. Two other officers who were visiting the 1 ATF at the time also came onboard; Lieutenant Colonel R.O. Brown, CMF, Commanding Officer 6th Field Regiment in Tasmania and Major W. Murray, RAA, from 110th Battery currently in MALAYSIA. At 1523 the ship responded to a call for fire at a range of 6000 yards at a V.C. Base Camp on LON SON Island at the northern end of the harbour. The risk of ricochets made this target area unattractive.

...../11

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

11. GUARD

39. A further exchange of 2 officers and 10 sailors with 2 officers plus 9 other ranks from the 1st ALSG occurred at 1645. The ship was underway five minutes later and left harbour, arriving on patrol some 8 miles to the east of CAP ST JACQUES at 1800. H & I fire commenced at 2200 and continued until 0330. Five observed firings took place during Saturday 24th August, all spotted by a U.S. Marine Spotter embarked in O-1E Bird-Dog aircraft. The targets were V.C. Base Camps and concentration areas; dense foliage prevented more telling G.D.A.'s than "Good Area Coverage". H & I's were fired from 2100 to 0525.

40. Two further calls for fire in support of 1 ATF were fired on 25th. At 1010 the target was a V.C. Base Camp for which the G.D.A. was, again due to dense foliage, only "Good Area Coverage", and the second at 1430 was a V.C. transshipment area which resulted in 1 sampan, 2 bunkers and 1 structure being destroyed. At 1530 USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS-3) was closed and a brisk replenishment of 6 tons of victualling stores and 1000 lbs of naval stores was effected by helicopter. On completion HOBART proceeded to VUNG TAU, anchoring at 1826. Due to the full spring ebb estimated at $2\frac{1}{2}$ knots it was not considered necessary to provide anti swimmer boat patrols but other precautions were taken. The 1 ALSG personnel were disembarked and HOBART's exchange personnel returned. Earlier in the day I had been represented by the Supply Officer Commander P.A. Wood at a ceremonial opening of the Harold Holt Memorial Swimming Pool at VUNG TAU. A brief description of the event is enclosed as Appendix 'G'.

41. While at VUNG TAU an examination of Mount 51 following a missfire, revealed the breech block pivot link had failed and this rendered the mount unserviceable. Evidently this defect is not uncommon in 5"/54 mounts after firing 10,000 rounds and we were aware that 7 days - possibly at SRF SUBIC - might be required for repair. Throughout the deployment minor faults have occurred on both mounts but on each occasion ship's staff, often after many hours of hard work, have effected repair. As a result only on very rare occasions and for short durations was HOBART unable to fire with one or both mounts; this was the first occasion when the ship's gun capability was seriously affected. HOBART weighed and proceeded at 1850 and returned to patrol.

42. Shortly before the ship was due to commence H & I fire at 2200, an intermittent fault developed in the Mark 16 Mod 2 Stable Element associated with the Mark 47 computer, which rendered the gun system ineffective. The firings were postponed whilst the fault was investigated; at 0200 a CASREP signal was originated but by 0730 repair was effected. At 0430 the ship departed for a scheduled UNREP with USS TAPPAHANNOCK (AO-43) to embark fuel, ammunition and mail and to transfer empty brass. On return to the line at 1200 the ship reported ready and an hour later received a call for fire on a V.C. Base Camp. The G.D.A. for which was one secondary explosion and again "Good Area Coverage". At 1600 the stable element again became defective, due to the level and cross level servos oscillating, a different fault from the first failure. A CASREP signal was originated at 2200 while ship's staff continued to try and rectify the fault. An unusually quiet HOBART patrolled the coast to seaward of NUI DAT. overnight.

43. Early in the forenoon of Tuesday 27th a signal was received instructing USS WADDELL (DDG-24) then in I Corps to relieve HOBART and for HOBART to return to SUBIC. By this time the weapons maintenance staff had commenced stripping down Mount 51, protected from weather at the fore end by a jury waterproof "tent" and attempts to trace and repair the Stable Element were under way. At 1300 the reassignment of

...../12

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

12.

GUARD

WADDELL was cancelled and at this stage I was uncertain as to HOBART's likely movements. Shortly afterwards a jury repair to the Stable Element was achieved by shorting out a defective voltage regulator; to test the success of this repair the ship proceeded at 26 knots to the calm waters of VUNG TAU harbour for verticality checks, anchoring at 1515. The checks were successful and HOBART weighed and proceeded at 1900. Calibration firings were carried out en route eastward, further confirming the success of the temporary repair and the ship arrived on station some 45 miles east of VUNG TAU at 2200. H & I firing took place between 2340 and 0200. Whilst I was confident the gun system was serviceable, it was pointed out to CTG 70.8 and CTU 70.8.9 that a CASCOR for the system could not be issued until the defective regulator had been replaced.

44. At 1600 on Wednesday 28th HOBART's first association with the 1st AFT terminated when the ship departed the area to return to IV Corps. On arrival at 0720 it was learned that no aircraft would be available for the forenoon so the area was patrolled until departure for VUNG TAU where the ship arrived at 1320. At my invitation, Lieutenant Colonel L. Greville, Commanding Officer 4th RAR, Major R. Darlington, A New Zealand Officer in 4 RAR and Major Salmon, GS02, 1st ALSG, embarked to spend a day onboard. On completion of the boat transfer, the ship departed to rendezvous with U.S.S. CHEMUNG (AO-30) for UNREP which commenced at 1600. Due to the unusually low expenditure during the previous two days only a small amount of ammunition was embarked and brass offloaded; HOBART returned to patrol and fired H & I's from 2130 to 2305.

45. HOBART left the patrol area and arrived off the entrance to VUNG TAU at 0545 on 29th. On entering the harbour a boat closed and the visiting Army officers departed having expressed their thanks for a short but most interesting stay. En route to patrol the spotter advised that he had other priorities which prevented him observing for HOBART; the scheduled forenoon mission was therefore cancelled. Subsequently the spotter advised that his "aircraft had been stolen" and the next firing mission would be in the afternoon. At 1205 a Swift Boat closed and FTMC J.A. Froistad 465 07 22, a USN CPO Fire Control Technician embarked. Chief Froistad had been flown from MOTU 13 to assist with the repair of the Stable Element; as it turned out Ship's Staff had achieved all that was possible pending supply of the replacement part and Chief Froistad remained onboard until the ship's return to SUBIC. H & I fire commenced at 2124 but after firing 2 rounds Mount 52 became unserviceable and by the time repairs had been completed the firing clearance had terminated. No further firings occurred that night.

46. A spotter was airborne during the forenoon of Friday 30th and a successful mission was fired from 0937 with a G.D.A. of one Sampan destroyed, one damaged, one structure destroyed and ten damaged. This Sampan was one of 3 stowed in separate, camouflaged sandbagged revetments. At 1230 U.S.S. WADDELL (DDG-24) closed, having transited from I Corps. In effect the ship was to be HOBART's relief in the area although there was an overlap of 2 days with both ships on Station. The lack of work for even one ship in IV Corps made this seem an unnecessary extravagance. At 1315 the Captain, Commander L.O. Armel II, USN, with 8 of his officers embarked by boat and were given a briefing of operations in the area. A second observed mission commenced at 1524 but again was terminated early through a fault in the breech mechanism of Mount 52. Taking into account the nature of the faults which occurred the night before and bearing in mind that both mounts had fired a similar number of rounds, it was a fair assumption that Mount 52 was due for a similar failure to Mount 51. H & I fire was carried out from 2240 to 0136 without incident.

...../13

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

13. GUARD

47. The previous night I had received a personal signal from RADM Moore explaining his intentions for HOBART to return to SUBIC following the HONG KONG visit in early September. It was the Admiral's wish that the ship "return home in the best material condition that can possibly be attained from the support facilities we have at hand". In my reply I pointed out that in the forthcoming refit the Mounts would receive extensive maintenance; if it were possible to effect temporary and reliable repairs before and during the Hong Kong visit which would permit the ship to return to the line, this would be preferred in the circumstances. I undertook to discuss the matter with SkF on arrival SUBIC and keep Admiral Moore advised. Barrel wear was also discussed in these two signals. It appears to be a most attractive proposition to take advantage of the reduced cost of exchanging the barrels at SUBIC even though one is short of its useful life. The ship would benefit from this in the 1969 workup.

48. No spotter aircraft was available for firings in the forenoon of Saturday 31st. Three observed firings were carried out however in the afternoon, resulting in a G.D.A. of 10 Structures damaged. At 1625 U.S.S. WADDELL closed en route from VUNG TAU and the IV Corps NGLO, Captain W. Quinn, USMC, embarked by boat. On at least 4 occasions since HOBART's arrival in the area Captain Quinn's efforts to visit the ship had been thwarted by lack of transport; it was ironical that his visit should occur on the last day of HOBART's assignment. During our discussion it was agreed that the overlap of ships when a relief arrived was unnecessary. Captain Quinn considered that a 5"/54 ship would best be utilised in IV Corps when the LSMR stationed there was absent for 4 or 5 days re-ammunitioning at CAM RANH BAY. The substance of the discussion, together with general remarks on gun range limitation caused by shallow water and paucity of firing opportunities caused by shortage of spotting aircraft and day H and I restrictions, were passed to CTU 70.8.9. The question of whether 5"/54 ships will continue to be assigned to the area is in the hands of COMUSMAC V who informs CTU 70.8.9 of his requirement. Captain Quinn disembarked in VUNG TAU at 1900.

49. A signal was received from CTG 70.8 during the afternoon which implied HOBART was to leave IV Corps the same day. At the time H and I targets for the night had been received and an UNREP was scheduled for 0600 the following morning. Following discussion with the NGLO I signalled my intention to carry out the H and I fire and leave station on completion, replenishing enroute. The H and I's commenced at 2140 and continued until just after midnight - thereby assuring the 2 USN enlisted men embarked of Combat Pay for the month of September.

HULL AND ENGINEERING

50. Main and auxiliary machinery functioned well throughout the month there being no single defect of significance. The CASREPT raised on the port astern throttle on July 29th was made CASCOR on 5th August after the manufacture onboard of the necessary spares. 1B and 1A boiler economisers were inspected in accordance with A.F. letter 1101.51.11 dated 20th November, 1967, on the 9th and 12th August respectively. Extension of the firesides cleaning interval to 900 hours was considered practicable in each case and at the end of the month preparations were in hand for cleaning these boilers on passage to SUBIC. This will be the last time for the forward boilers this deployment.

51. The intense firings during the first weeks of the month have taken a toll of upperdeck fittings and some ventilation trunkings. None is serious but some repairs will require Dockyard attention.

SECRET

...../14.

GUARD

SECRET

14.

WEAPONS ELECTRICAL.

GUARD

52. During this month serviceability throughout all sections of the Department has been good. There have been problem areas however in the surface radars and gun mounts but trouble in the latter has come to be expected. Both SFS-40 and SPS-52 radars have continued to give trouble. The first two weeks of the month saw the SPS-52 being coaxed by two Hughes Aircraft technical representatives and the new POEWR maintainer. The set has settled down over the last two weeks and is performing satisfactorily. SPS-40 after two weeks of continuous faults performed satisfactorily for about 5 days but at that end of the month it was not operational.

53. The gun system has been in continuous use, and NGFS operations have been able to continue except for one day's interruption due to a problem on the Mk 16 Stable Element. During the month other minor problems arose on both the 47 Computer and Mk 16 Stable Element all of which were quickly rectified by ship's staff. The Mk 16 Stable Element is currently awaiting a new voltage regulator and is operating using a temporary fix. It is of interest to note that whilst this type of equipment is widely fitted in the USN and is quite reliable, spare parts are not easy to obtain. Gun mounts continue to demand excessive attention. This month there have been train regulator defects, twisted cradles, cracked pipes, broken extractors, defective switches, burnt out solenoids, broken hoist chains, defective recoil cylinders, broken links and blown seals, to name a few defects. It has been a typical month. As a finale for the month, Mount 51 wrested the upperhand by suffering a broken breech block actuating link, requiring five days of back breaking effort and many days of awaiting parts. The gun mounts have had a lot of use. It is 39 days now since leaving SUBIC and almost 8000 rounds have been fired bringing HOBART's grand total fired since commissioning to well over 24000 rounds.


54. August was a mixed month. Initially radar and IFF defects rendered the ship inadequate for Seadragon Operations; in time all radars reached a satisfactory performance level but the IFF remained down. HOBART remained on the Gunline throughout the month, experiencing a considerable diversity of activity, from the rigorous, round-the-clock NGF at the D.M.Z. to the converse in IV Corps. The final failure of Mount 51 and the same defect suspected in Mount 52 meant many hours of work for the weapons maintainers.

55. The health and conduct of the Ship's Company have been good and morale is sound despite the fact that the ship had spent 37 days at sea by the end of the month. All onboard are looking forward to the forthcoming HONG KONG visit in September, and the prospect of return to Australia is of course in everybody's thoughts.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

your obedient servant,


(K.W. Shands.)
Captain, RAN

Enclosures:

- Appendix A - Steaming figures
- B - Movements
- C - Forecast programme
- D - Sporting appendix
- E - Report of underway replenishments
- F - Naval Gunfire Support Records
- G - Opening of Harold Holt Memorial Swimming Pool
- H - Officers' movements

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "A" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS,
AUGUST, 1968.

STEAMING FIGURES.

(a)	Distance steamed during the month	8,546.2
(b)	Distance steamed since commissioning	133,640.0
(c)	Hours underway during the month	688 07/60
(d)	Hours underway since commissioning	9,455 32/60

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "B" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS,
AUGUST, 1968

MOVEMENTS.

<u>ARRIVE..</u>	<u>PLACE.</u>	<u>DEPART.</u>	<u>REMARKS.</u>
Thursday 1st	I Corps, SOUTH VIETNAM	Tuesday 13th	NGFS
Wednesday 14th	IV Corps, SOUTH VIETNAM	Thursday 22nd	NGFS
Friday 23rd	III Corps, SOUTH VIETNAM	Wednesday 28th	NGFS
Wednesday 28th	IV Corps, SOUTH VIETNAM	Sunday 1st September	NGFS

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "C" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS,
AUGUST, 1968

FORECAST PROGRAMME

<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
3rd September	SUBIC BAY	5th September	Upkeep
7th September	HONG KONG	12th September	Port Visit
14th September	Coastal Regions SOUTH VIETNAM	26th September	NGFS
28th September	SUBIC BAY	30th September	Turnover to HMAS PERTH
5th October	MANUS	6th October	
11th October	SYDNEY	-	

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "D" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS,
AUGUST, 1968.

SPORTING APPENDIX.

Due to the Ship's Operational employment, no organised sporting matches were possible. Voluntary P.T. recommenced towards the end of the month and received good support.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "E" TO THE CAPTAIN HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, AUGUST, 1968

REPORT OF UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT

DATE	TIMES	RECEIVING FROM	METHOD	EMBARKATION / DISEMBARKATION	REMARKS
Thursday 1st	1800 1855	USS MAUNA KEA AO - 22	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition - 507 shell 516 powder	Executive Officer, CMDR I.B. James conned for ap- proach and while alongside.
Friday 2nd	1330 1408	USS TAPPAHANNOCK AO - 43	Spanwire (2) Wire highline	FFO, - 132 tons Mail 16 bags Empty Brass 3 loads	Navigating officer LCDR M. B. Rayment conned while alongside.
Saturday 3rd	2231 2358	USS HALEAKALA AE - 25	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition - 664 shell 632 powder	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
Monday 5th	0726 0955	USS RAINIER AE - 5	Modified Housefall (2) Manila Highline	Ammunition - 288 shell 468 powder Personnel 2 Empty Brass 15 loads	Navigating Officer conned for approach and while along side.
Monday 5th	2306 2353	USS CHIPOLA AO - 63	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO, 275 tons Mail 12 bags Stores 21 packets	
Tuesday 6th	0622 0741	USS VIRGO AE-30	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition 192 shell, 195 powder Mail 5 bags (off) Empty Brass 1 load	
Thursday 8th	0609 0838	USS RAINIER AE - 5	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition 1104 shell 975 powder Empty Brass 14 loads	
Friday 9th	1440 1458	USS POLLUX AKS - 4	Wire Highline	Naval Stores 5 loads & Canteen stores	
Friday 9th	1643 1905	USS MANATEE AO - 58	Spanwire (2) Modified Housefall	FFO 296 tons Mail 22 bags Ammunition 576 shell 702 powder Empty Brass 9 loads	

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

2.

DATE	TIMES	RECEIVING FROM	METHOD	EMBARKATION/DISEMBARKATION	REMARKS
Friday 9th	2138 2157	USS POLLUX AKS - 4	Wire Highline	Naval Stores 1 load	
Saturday 10th	0911 1027	USS RAINIER AE - 5	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition - 192 shell 156 powder	Communications Officer, LCDR R.M. Banks conned ship for approach and while alongside.
Saturday 10th	1044 1129	USS GRAFFIAS AF - 29	Wire High Line (Regulus) Modified Housefall	Empty Brass 20 loads Victualling Stores, 19,500lbs	Communications Officer, LCDR R.M. Banks conned ship for approach and while alongside. Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
Monday 12th	0818 0909	USS MISPELLION AO - 105	Spanwire (2) Wire highline	FFO 196 tons Free Freight 2 loads Empty Brass 8 loads	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
Monday 12th	0946 1032	USS RAINIER AE - 5	Modified Housefall	Ammunition 432 shell 390 powder	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
Tuesday 13th	1252 1401	USS VIRGO AE - 30	Modified Housefall (2)	Mail 3 bags off Ammunition 507 shell 624 powder	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
Friday 16th	1646 1709	USS GRAFFIAS AF - 29	Modified Housefall (2)	Empty Brass 2 loads Victualling Stores 8,785lbs	Navigating Officer conned while alongside
Friday 16th	1820 2044	USS CHEMUNG AO - 30	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO 396 tons Ammunition 156 shell 192 powder	Navigating Officer conned for approach and while alongside.
Sunday 18th	2049 2318	USS MANATEE AO - 50	Spanwire (2) Modified Housefall Manila Highline	Mail 1 bag off Gas bottles 1 load Empty Brass 6 loads FFO 153 tons Victualling Stores 500lbs Mail 26 bags Ammunition 252 shell 195 powder Personnel 1 Empty Brass 11 loads	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.

SECRET

GUARD

.....3/.

SECRET

3.

GUARD

DATE	TIMES	RECEIVING FROM	METHOD	EMBARKATION/DISEMBARKATION		REMARKS
Thursday/ Friday, 22nd /23rd	2106 0102	USS CACAPON AO - 52	Spanwire (2) Modified Housefall	FFO Ammunition	249 tons 480 shell 546 powder	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
				Naval Stores & Mail	4 loads	
				Empty Brass	11 loads	
Sunday 25th	1550 1627	USS NIAGARA FALLS AFS - 3	Vertrep	Stores, Naval Victualling	1000lbs 6 tons	
Monday 26th	0535 0838	USS TAPPAHANNOCK AO - 43	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline Manila highline	FFO Ammunition	252 tons 384 shell 351 powder	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
				Naval Stores & Mail	6 loads	
				Personnel	2	
Wednesday 28th	1601 1708	USS CHEMUNG AO - 30	Spanwire (2) Modified Housefall	Empty Brass FFO Mail Ammunition	11 loads 202 tons 2 loads 144 shell 147 powder	Navigating Officer conned while alongside.
				Empty Brass	2 loads	

In addition to the above the following transfer took place with USN combatant ships;
 Lightline, HOBART receiving : one
 Manila Highline, HOBART receiving : two

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "F" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
AUGUST, 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME(H)</u>	<u>SALVOES</u>	<u>SHELL</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>GUN DAMAGE ASSESMENT</u>
1/8/68	0904H	107	HCPD	Suspected VC	Unobserved
		15	CVT	Positions	
1/8/68	1509	52	HCPD	VC Bunkers	Good Coverage
		4	WP		
1/8/68	1644	46	HCPD	VC Bunkers	3 Bunkers Destroyed 4 Bunkers Damaged
2/8/68	01230/0539	98	CVT	VC Company Area	1 Secondary Explosion
2/8/68	0904	27	CVT	VC Bunkers	3 Bunkers Damaged
2/8/68	0938	4	CVT	VC Bunkers	Unobserved
		2	WP		
2/8/68	1616	91	CVT	VC Bunkers	3 Bunkers Destroyed 5 Bunkers Damaged 5 Structures Damaged 5 Trenches Damaged
3/8/68	020036/0546	114	CVT	VC OP Area	Unobserved
3/8/68	0928	1	WP	Approx. 40 VC in	10 Wooden Huts Destroyed
		78	HCPD	Trenches	5 Masonry Structures
		125	CVT		Destroyed. 15 VC. KIA(EST)
4/8/68	0131	101	CVT	VC Concentration	Unobserved
		3	HCPD		
4/8/68	1127	107	CVT	VC Bunkers	2 Bunkers Damaged 1 Bunker Destroyed 1 Rocket Site Damaged
4/8/68	1306	31	HCPD	Bunkers and Mortars	3 Secondary Explosions
		70	CVT		1 Fire Started
4/8/68	1915	65	HCPD	Active Artillery	Position Silenced
4/8/68	2010	37)	CVT	Active Artillery	Position Silenced
		6)	HCPD		
4&5/8/68	2030/050142	16	HCPD	Suspected VC	Unobserved
		113	CVT	Positions	
4/8/68	2200/2253	51	HCPD	Suspected VC	3 Secondary Explosions
				Movement	
5/8/68	1135/1157	(51	HCPD	Suspected Artillery	Good Coverage
		(4	WP	Position	1 Secondary Explosion
		(10	CVT		
5/8/68	1744/1816	60	HCPD	NVA Position	5 Bunkers Destroyed 2 Bunkers Damaged 1 Secondary Explosion 1 Concrete Structure
5/8/68	1843/1928	46	HCPD	NVA Position	Destroyed
		4	WP		
5&6/8/68	2145/0303	126	HCPD	VC Infiltration	Unobserved
				Routes H and I's	
6/8/68	0930/1005	41	HCPD	Suspected NVA	2 Concrete Structures
		26	CVT	Position	Destroyed
		2	WP		
6/8/68	1009/1050	99	HCPD	Active Artillery	Position Silenced
		14	CVT	Position	
		2	WP		
6/8/68	1246/1315	31	HCPD	Active Artillery	Position Silenced
		3	CVT	Position	
6/8/68	1422/1434	24	HCPD	Active Artillery	Position Silenced
				Position	
6/8/68	1439/1509	30	HCPD	2 Sampans and Small	2 Sampans Damaged
		18	CVT	Arms Fire	S/A Silenced
		1	WP		
6&7/8/68	2139/0600	94	HCPD	H and I's	Unobserved
6/8/68	2219/2240	41	CVT	VC Movements	Excellent Coverage
		24	HCPD		
6/8/68	2322/2354	11)	HCPD	NVA in Open	Excellent Coverage
		71)	CVT		3 K.I.A.
7/8/68	0233/0241	8	HCPD	Infiltration Route	Excellent Coverage
				and Staging Area	

SECRET

...../2

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

.2.

DATE	TIME(H)	SALVOES	SHELL	TARGET	GUN DAMAGE ASSESMENT
7/8/68	0252/0256	14	HCPD	NVA Collecting Dead	Excellent Coverage
7/8/68	0437/0505	66	HCPD	VC Bunker Complex	1 Bunker Destroyed 1 Bunker Damaged
6&7/8/68	2139/0600	85	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
		3	CVT		
7/8/68	1123/1211	24	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
7/8/68	1643/1706	57	HCPD	Active Artillery	Artillery Silenced
7/8/68	1805/1827	63	HCPD	Suspected Assembly Area	1 Secondary Explosion
7/8/68	1941/1955	44	HCPD	Active Artillery	Artillery Silenced
7/8/68	2020/2041	41	HCPD	Active Artillery	Artillery Silenced
7/8/68	2258/2334	26	ILL	Suspected VC Posit.	Excellent Illum.
		20	HCPD		Coverage
8/8/68	0041/0125	73	HCPD	Suspected VC Posit. & Suspected Rocket Site	1 Large Secondary Good Coverage
8/8/68	0215/0434	66	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
8/8/68	1120/1130	15	AAC	Suspected O.P.	Excellent Coverage
8/8/68	1247/1303	25	AAC	Active Artillery	Artillery Silenced
		29	HCPD		Uncovered Ammo Dump
8/8/68	1505/1522	19	HCPD	Artillery Position	4 Bunkers Destroyed 10 metres Trenchline Destroyed
8/8/68	1641/1702	81	HCPD	NVA in Open	Excellent Coverage
8/8/68	1712/1719	5	HCPD	Active Artillery	No GDA
8/8/68	1819/1833	46	HCPD	Bunker Complex	1 Bunker Damaged
8/8/68	1842/1920	71	HCPD	Active Artillery	Artillery Silenced Excellent Coverage
8/8/68	2007/2107	60	HCPD	Troop Movement and Bunkers	1 Bunker Destroyed
8&9/8/68	2214/0238	89	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
9/8/68	0139/0151	1	WP		
		31	HCPD	Active A/A	Excellent Coverage
9/8/68	0737/0807	65	HCPD	Large Bunker and Trenchline Area	1 Bunker Destroyed
9/8/68	0843/0857	54	HCPD	Active Artillery	Excellent Coverage Position Silenced
9/8/68	0926/1012	111	HCPD	Active Artillery	4 Positions Silenced
10/8/68	0213/0548	142	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
10/8/68	0650/0758	66	HCPD	3 Artillery Sites	1 Secondary Explosion
10/8/68	1325/1718	27	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
10/8/68	1750/1824	69	HCPD	5 Trucks, 1 Jeep 100 Troops	Excellent Coverage
10&11/8/68	2017/0445	119	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
11/8/68	0216/0229	46	HCPD	NVA Patrol	Excellent Coverage
11/8/68	1217/1229	53	HCPD	6 NVA in Open	2 KIA (BC), 4 KIA (EST)
11/8/68	1351/1429	35	HCPD	7 NVA in Open	4 KIA (EST) 2 KIA (BC)
		15	VT		1 WIA (BC) 8 Grass Huts Damaged
11/8/68	1432/1436	5	HCPD	Active Artillery	NEG Effect
11/8/68	1832/1832	2	HCPD	Active Artillery	Target Cancelled
11/8/68	1915/1929	15	HCPD	Enemy Troop Movement	Excellent Coverage
11&12/8/68	2140/0553	143	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
12/8/68	1651/1657	6	HCPD	150 NVA in Open	No GDA
12/8/68	1707/1720	38	HCPD	Active Artillery	2 Guns Silenced
		6	CVT		
12/8/68	1831/1835	26	CVT	19 NVA in Open	10 KIA (BC) 9 KIA (EST)
		39	HCPD		
12/8/68	1942/1943	5	HCPD	H & I	Unobserved
12/8/68	2058/2132	7	WP	Known NVA Position	Outstanding Coverage
		1	HCPD		
		72	CVT		
12&13/8/68	2202/0525	86	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
13/8/68	0612/0638	69	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved

SECRET

...../3

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

DATE	TIME(H)	SALVOES	SHELL	TARGET	GUN DAMAGE ASSESMENT
13/8/68	1850/1910	2	WP	Known NVA Position	Excellent Coverage
		26	HCPD		1 Shelter Damaged
15/8/68	0036/0222	36	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
15/8/68	0824/0941	37	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	1 Bunker Damaged
					1 Structure Damaged
15/8/68	1325/1428	39	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	1 Structure Damaged
					1 Sampan Damaged
					1 Sampan Destroyed
15/8/68	2153/2310	40	HCPD	H & I	Unobserved
17/8/68	0129/0212	40	HCPD	H & I	Unobserved
17/8/68	0837/1016	93	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	18 Structures Damaged
					6 Bunkers Damaged
					1 Structure Destroyed
17/8/68	2115/0021	36	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
18/8/68	0814/1004	97	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	1 Bunker Destroyed
		1	WP		3 Bunkers Damaged
					10 Structures Damaged
18/8/68	1058/1059	10	HCPD	VC Positions	Unobserved
18/8/68	1406/1435	55	HCPD	VC Positions	1 Structure Destroyed
					6 Bunkers Damaged
18/8/68	1452/1509	9	HCPD	VC Structure and Bunkers	1 Structure Damaged
		1	WP		
19/8/68	0957/1021	28	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	1 Structure Destroyed
					2 Structures Damaged
					2 Bunkers Damaged
19/8/68	1033/1047	24	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	2 Structures Damaged
					1 Bunker Damaged
19/8/68	1443/1454	21	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	2 Structures Damaged
19/8/68	1503/1528	37	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures and Sampans	1 Structure Destroyed
					2 Structure Damaged
					1 Sampan Damaged
19&20/8/68	2305/0155	37	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
20/8/68	0833/0849	41	HCPD	VC Positions	7 Structures Destroyed
					2 Structures Damaged
20/8/68	0908/0934	37	HCPD	Suspected VC Ammo Cache	Good Area Coverage
20/8/68	0946/0952	18	HCPD	VC Structures	2 Structures Destroyed
					2 Structures Damaged
20/8/68	1419/1501	61	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	3 Bunkers Damaged
					3 Structures Damaged
20/8/68	1509/1525	20	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	2 Structures Damaged
20/8/68	1534/1555	42	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	7 Structures Damaged
		3	WP		2 Structures Heavily Damaged
20/8/68	2104/2256	40	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
21/8/68	0826/0839	20	HCPD	VC Bunkers and Structures	2 Structures Damaged
					1 Bunker Damaged
21/8/68	2137/2323	40	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
23/8/68	1521/1539	32	HCPD	VC Base Camp	Excellent Coverage
					1 VC KIA
23/8/68	2201/240339	43	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
		2	WP		
24/8/68	0938/1032	66	HCPD	Suspected VC Concentration	Good Area Coverage
24/8/68	1052/1110	24	HCPD	VC Base Camp	Good Area Coverage
24/8/68	1345/1433	62	HCPD	VC Assembly Area	Good Area Coverage
		3	WP		
24/8/68	1439/1459	31	HCPD	VC Base Camp	Good Area Coverage
		3	WP		
24/8/68	1513/1522	15	HCPD	Suspected Enemy Activity	Good Area Coverage
		1	WP		

SECRET

GUARD

...../4

SECRET

GUARD

.4.

DATE	TIME(H)	SALVOES	SHELL	TARGET	GUN DAMAGE ASSESMENT
24&25/8/68	2103/0525	186	HCPD	H & I's	Unobserved
25/8/68	1010/1116	51	HCPD	VC Base Camp	Good Area Coverage
25/8/68	1431/1509	42	HCPD	VC Transhipment Camp	1 Sampan Destroyed 2 Bunkers Destroyed 1 Structure Destroyed
26/8/68	1304/1331	34	HEPD	VC Base Camp	2 Secondary Explosions
		2	WP		Possible POL
27&28/8/68	2339/0159	60	HEPD	H & I's	Unobserved
28/8/68	2132/2305	30	HEPD	H & I's	Unobserved
29/8/68	2124/2125	2	HEPD	H & I's	Unobserved
30/8/68	0937/1026	74	HEPD	3 Sampans Structures	1 Structure Destroyed 10 Structures Damaged 1 Sampan Destroyed 1 Sampan Damaged
30/8/68	1520/1525	3	HEPD	Sampans and Structures	Nil
30&31/8/68	2243/0126	36	HEPD	H & I	Unobserved
31/8/68	1336	36	HEPD	VC Structures and Bunkers	4 Structures Damaged 2 Bunkers Damaged
31/8/68	1403	33	HEPD	VC Structures and Bunkers	3 Structures Damaged 1 Bunker Damaged
31/8/68	1432	4	HEPD	VC Structures and Bunkers	Nil
31/8/68	2145/0015	35	HEPD	H & I Firings	Unobserved

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "G" TO THE CAITAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
AUGUST, 1968.

The opening of the Harold Holt Memorial Swimming Pool at VUNG TAU took place at 1100 on Sunday 25th August when Mr. John Armstrong ex Lord Mayor of Sydney officially declared the pool opened.

2. The pool was constructed by the 17th Construction Squadron based at VUNG TAU, the materials being supplied from Australia by National Swimming Pools. The majority of the funds for the project were donated by the Sportsmen's Club of N.S.W.. Their donation was in excess of \$80,000 and most of this was raised at the A.J.C. meeting on Anzac Day 1967.

3. Mr. Armstrong was accompanied by Mr. Mahoney who is the Secretary of the Sportsmen's Club.

4. Present at the opening were the Australian Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, Mr. Eddy, the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshall Sir Alister M. Murdoch KBE, CB, the Commander, Australian Forces Vietnam Major General S.M. MacDonald and several other high ranking officers who were hosted by Lieutenant Colonel I.C. Gilmore the O.I.C. of the First Australian Logistic Support Unit based at VUNG TAU.

5. The R.A.N. was represented by Commander F.A. Wood, HMAS HOBART, Lieutenant Commander D.C. Bennett, Staff of Commander Australian Forces Vietnam, No.3 C.D.T. and Helicopter pilots on loan to No.9 Squadron R.A.A.F..

6. The opening of the pool was followed by aquatic sports in which the R.A.N. entered a team. The sports were well and easily won by the Australian Task Force based at NUI DAT. They were lucky to have swimming for them Peter Reynolds an Australian Olympic prospect. The R.A.N. were by no means disgraced taking a very creditable third place in the overall score.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX "H" TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS,
AUGUST, 1968.

OFFICERS' MOVEMENTS.

NIL

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET GUARD

18/6/1012

CIRCULATION LIST NO. 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MINUTE

SEPTEMBER 1968

HMAS HOBART

Report of Proceedings

AS (NS)

D OF O

DCNS

1NM

2NM

3NM

4NM

SEC

1NM - A most interesting report Dec/11

5 (FM)

12 OF S

DPR

AS (NS)(NS5)

ARCHIVES BRANCH

- NOTES: A. This copy is circulated so that Board Members may see these reports soon after they reach Navy Office.
- B. The report will be given again to Board Members with Director's comments if there is any matter of special interest in those comments.
- C. Circulation lists numbers 2 and 3 are referred to Directors and Heads of Branches.

SECRET GUARD

21/18

RECEIVED
C - NOV A.M.
NAVY REGISTRY
Telephone: 35 0444

PMS

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY
SECRET GUARD

NAVY—CANBERRA		
18	6	1012

OFFICE OF THE
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING,
H.M. AUSTRALIAN FLEET,
FLEET HEADQUARTERS,
GARDEN ISLAND, N.S.W. 2000

No. A.F. 17/30/3


28 OCT 1968

The Secretary,
Department of the Navy.

HMAS HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - SEPTEMBER, 1968

Reference: HMAS HOBART letter 133/201/2 of 4th October, 1968.

1. Forwarded.
2. HOBART's second deployment to the U.S. Seventh Fleet was very successful despite the unfortunate incident on 17th June. She acquitted herself well at all times.
3. The ship's maintainers are to be highly commended for their achievement in replacing both breech block pivot links satisfactorily in such a short time. Complete details of the repairs are given in a separate report.


Rear Admiral

Enclosure: HMAS HOBART letter 133/201/2 of 4th October, 1968.

SECRET GUARD

SECRET

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY.

GUARD

133.201.2

H.M.A.S. HOBART,
at Sea.

14 OCT 1968

The Flag Officer Commanding,
H.M. Australian Fleet.

(Copies to: The Australian Naval Attache, Washington
The Commander, Australian Forces, Vietnam
The Captain, H.M.A.S. PERTH
The Captain, H.M.A.S. BRISBANE)

H.M.A.S. HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - SEPTEMBER, 1968

Sir,

I have the honour to report the proceedings of H.M.A. Ship under my command for the month of September, 1968.

2. From 0001 to 0015 on Sunday 1st September, H & I fire, commenced the night before, was continued from a position 25 miles South West of VUNG TAU in IV Corps, SOUTH VIETNAM in support of the 7th ARVN Division. On completion, course was set eastward at 11 knots to rendezvous with U.S.S. GUADALUPE (AO-32) to replenish with fuel and transfer empty brass. At 0130 an informal signal from the AO indicated the ship to be some 3 - 4 hours behind schedule; this was confirmed an hour later. Current doctrine dictates that if replenishment ships are more than an hour outside their published FIM's, customer ships should be advised by hourly broadcast on the UNREF orestes circuit. In this case the late receipt of the information resulted in the UNREF having to be cancelled, as otherwise HOBART would have had to proceed at an unnecessarily high SOA following replenishment. Instead, speed was increased to 19 knots and courses shaped to round the south eastern coast of SOUTH VIETNAM and proceed north into II Corps.

3. At 1820 U.S.S. HENRY W. TUCKER (DD-875) closed to transfer stores by highline. These included the UPM-70 I.F.F. Test Set and other electronic equipment which TUCKER had embarked in SUBIC; transfer had been delayed due to HOBART's assignment to IV Corps. Lack of this Test Set had caused the ship's I.F.F. equipment to be non-operational for about 5 weeks. On completion of the transfer, course was set eastward across the South China Sea and Condition 3 relaxed when some 30 miles from the coast.

4. At 0655 on Tuesday 3rd HOBART stopped 5 miles south of the entrance to SUBIC BAY to carry out a ULQ-6 check. Unfortunately the port set was down and the check on the starboard set was unsuccessful. At 0745 course was set northward and the ship entered SUBIC BAY, securing alongside U.S.S. HANSON (DD-832) at Rivera Pier 11-12 at 0850. During the next two and a half days work progressed on Mount 51, the AN/SIQ-19 Hut was removed, the walkway to the Ikara Deck was replaced and work continued on minor outstanding Battle Damage repairs. Examination of Mount 52 revealed that a failure to the Breech Pivot Link had occurred similar to the defect in Mount 51. Discussion with SRF technicians confirmed that if ship's staff could be supplied with essential parts, Mount 51 could be repaired in about



SECRET

GUARD

...../2.

SECRET

GUARD

3 days, leaving complete refitting to the forthcoming refit. A spare pivot link was not available for Mount 52 so arrangements were made for one to be flown from the U.S.A. to SUBIC and then to be supplied to the ship by air. I informed CTG 70.8 by signal on the 4th of the situation and recommended that HOBART return to the gunline direct from HONG KONG rather than return to SUBIC as had been suggested. Admiral Moore subsequently concurred in this recommendation.

5. I was pleased to receive a handsome shield which had been presented to the ship by the Minister for the Navy, the Honourable C.R. Kelly, M.P.. It is intended the trophy be used for intermess tug-of-war, the first contest to be held en route to Australia.

6. Calls were exchanged with:

Commander R.J. Raffaele, U.S.N.

Commanding Officer,
U.S.S. HANSON

Commander F.J. Fleiner, U.S.N.

Commanding Officer,
U.S.S. BRAINE.

7. In the forenoon of Thursday 5th, the results of a survey of both 5"/54 barrels were received indicating that Mount 52 should be regunned immediately. The Repair Ship U.S.S. DIXIE (AD-14) advised that a barrel was available and arrangements were made to proceed alongside at 1330, cancelling a scheduled visit to the Naval Magazine to top up with ammunition. The previous day an examination of the Port Main Engine Astern Throttle Valve had revealed the ship-manufactured item was prone to jamming. SRF had received the CASREP signal for this casualty, released on 29th July but no replacement had yet been made. As a result, tugs and a pilot were requested for the move alongside U.S.S. DIXIE at No. 19 buoy, carried out in strong gusty wind conditions. The move was completed by 1420 and Ship's Staff assisted by personnel from the AD set to replace the worn barrel; this was completed at 1900. The Marine Engineering Department meanwhile continued working on the defective throttle valve. By 2345 it was evident that a new part was required and at 0230 one which had been re-worked at short notice by SRF arrived onboard. Some modification was necessary and by 0530 the repair was completed successfully. HOBART cast off and proceeded at 0619 on Friday 6th, some 14 hours behind the planned departure time for HONG KONG.

7. The weather in the South China Sea at the time gave proof that it was the typhoon season. Typhoon Bess had just crossed the entrance of the GULF OF TONKIN, resulting in a temporary evacuation by the 7th Fleet Units; Typhoon Wendy was poised at the southern tip of TAIWAN and Typhoon Agnes was some 800 miles east of LUZON. On clearing harbour course was set north westward at 22knots with a constant watch on local and broadcast indications of Wendy's movements. Good progress was made for the first 24 hours and it became apparent from the comparatively calm weather experienced and the barometer that the ship was transiting a ridge of high pressure located between the two air streams around Bess and Wendy. Speed was reduced for the final 100 miles of the journey and some speculation occurred as to the likely movement of Wendy, now tracking slowly westward towards HONG KONG.

8. Repairs to Mount 51 were completed during the passage and a successful gun functioning trial was carried out at 1500 on Saturday 7th. HOBART entered Lei-u-Mun pass at 1630 HONG KONG Summer Time, - chopping then to the Operational Control of ACNB - and secured alongside North Arm, Victoria Basin at 1700. On arrival the following ships were alongside H.M.S. TAMAR berths:

SECRET

...../3.

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

H.M.A.S. VENDETTA	Commander F.R. Burnett, R.A.N.
H.M.A.S. FARRAMATTA	Commander F.R. Woods, R.A.N.
H.M.N.Z.S. OTAGO	Captain R.T. Hale, OBE, R.N.Z.N. Senior Officer 11th Frigate Squadron
H.M.S. PUMA	Commander J.F.H. de Winton, R.N.
H.M.S. HOUGHTON	Commander J.A. Rogers, R.N. Senior Officer 6th Minecounter- measures Squadron
H.M.S. DARTINGTON	Lieutenant Commander S.G. Campbell, R.N.

9. Later that evening Typhoon Wendy accelerated westward and indications were the centre might pass close to the Colony during the succeeding two days. Typhoon Warning No.3 was hoisted at 2250, and the Commodore HONG KONG signalled ships in harbour to shorten notice for steam to one hour by 0800 on Sunday 8th. I attended a briefing at that time in the Commodore's Office; the Typhoon by then was south east of HONG KONG and its predicted track was clear to the south, Wendy's intensity had decreased and it was estimated the centre would pass to the south west by lunchtime. This proved correct and ships reverted to the normal 4 hours' notice for steam at 1330.

10. The next four days alongside proved very busy for all onboard. Approval was given for the ship to be out of routine, which permitted liberal short leave to be granted; during the first visit to the Colony in May, comparatively little shopping had been done and the Ship's Company made full use of the excellent facilities ashore on this second and last visit. Volleyball, waterpolo and soccer were played against civilian and other service teams. Jenny's Side Party did well to complete painting the Ship's side in such a short time in difficult weather conditions and the Ship's appearance at the end of the visit was better than for some months. The Breech Pivot link for Mount 52 arrived by air PM 8th and the weapons maintenance staff had restored the mount by the 11th. I advised CTG 70.8 that the ship was ready for any assignment.

11. The following calls were paid and returned:

Commodore HONG KONG	Commodore H.T.F. Wilson, R.N.
Acting Senior Australian Trade Commissioner	Mr. R.D. Holberton
The Captain, H.M.S. HOUGHTON	
The Captain, H.M.S. DARTINGTON	

12. On the 9th I entertained the Commodore and Mrs Wilson, Mr. R. Holberton, the Senior Australian Trade Commissioner and Miss F. MacMillan, the Senior Secretary to the Commander British Forces HONG KONG to lunch. On Monday 10th I entertained the Assistant Police Superintendent and Mrs. Dawson and the British Trade Commissioner and Mrs Hannan to lunch. That evening accompanied by four of my officers I dined with the Australian Trade Commission in the Mandarin Hotel.

SECRET

...../4.

GUARD

SECRET

4. GUARD

13. At 1125 on the 9th HMNZS OTAGO which had been due to sail at 0900, berthed alongside with a contaminated feed water problem. HOBART was able to supply water and after completing repairs OTAGO cast off and proceeded at 0900 on the 11th.

14. After a brief but invigorating and thoroughly enjoyable visit, preparations were made for a joint departure by the three R.A.N. ships on Thursday 12th. H.M.A. Ships FARRAMATTA and VENDETTA cast off and proceeded clear of Victoria Basin by 0850. HOBART cast off and proceeded at 0903 and the three ships formed column for departure from harbour; HOBART chopped to the operational control of COMSEVENTHFLT at 1000I. On clearing Tathong Channel, officer of the watch manoeuvres were conducted until 1600 when HOBART detached and set course for SOUTH VIETNAM. VENDETTA was ordered to take command of FARRAMATTA and proceed to SINGAPORE.

15. Successful gun functioning trials were carried out from Mount 52 at 1620 confirming the completion of the repairs. I consider considerable credit is due to the Ship's Weapons Maintainers that they were able to successfully strip and reassemble the breech mechanisms of the two 5"/54 gun mounts in such a short time. This is a very difficult and awkward task but they tackled it cheerfully, working around the clock in three watches right through their well-earned R & R period. The direct results of their efforts was an extra 4 or 5 days operational time on the line to say nothing of enhancement of the ship's reputation. Preparation for the line continued as the ship entered the TONKIN GULF in fine weather on Friday 13th.

16. At 0545 on Saturday 14th, HOBART rendezvoused with U.S.S. GUADALUPE (AO-32) to replenish with fuel. This was followed by an UNREF of ammunition from U.S.S. VIRGO (AE-30). Enroute to the assigned station, U.S.S. RENSHAW (DD-499) was closed, and HOBART was provided with turnover materials and a short briefing from RENSHAW's Operations Officer. Full condition 3 was re-assumed at 1015 and a quarter of an hour later the ship was on station at Point Diane, midway between HUE and DANANG. The state of the ship at this time was materially very good; all weapons, sensors and auxiliary equipments were up with the exception of the SPS-40 radar, and this was restored to health the following day.

17. The first call for fire was answered at 1120 when suspected V.C. positions were fired on in support of the 26th Marine Regiment. A second firing at a similar target occurred at 1417. Shortly afterwards, Lieutenant (JG) R. Greene, U.S.N., the N.G.L.O. for the area embarked by helo to provide yet another of his excellent briefings on local operations. He was accompanied by one of his assistants. The helo was used to transfer Steward I.S. Sleeman, R.63145 to the Military Hospital in DANANG for specialist treatment. Lieutenant Green disembarked shortly after 1600. H & I fire commenced at 2200 and continued until 0400 the following morning.

18. At 0959 on Sunday 15th a helo closed and I was honoured to welcome aboard the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral V.A.T. Smith CB, CBE, DSC.. C.N.S. had spent the previous day in Yankee Station onboard U.S.S. CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) the flagship of Vice Admiral R.W. Cousins, U.S.N. (CTF.77). On joining HOBART C.N.S. was accompanied by:

Mr. Barry Newbury	U.F.I.
Mr. Brian Peck	A.B.C.
Choi Kwang-Tae	A.B.C.
Lieutenant Eggers USN	F.R.O.

SECRET

...../5.

GUARD

SECRET

5.
GUARD

At 1048 HOBART responded to a call for fire which resulted in a GDA of 1 bunker destroyed, 2 damaged and "outstanding coverage of the target area". Admiral Smith observed the firing from the Operations Room and later made an informal tour of the ship before lunching in the Wardroom. The Press Party also toured the ship, taking movie and still pictures. At 1253 the helo returned and Admiral Smith and the Pressmen departed to U.S.S. HANCOCK (CVA-19) to onward COD flight to SAIGON. I was disappointed that the visit was so short but it was pleasing that the ship's material state was once again sound and C.N.S. was able to witness at least one N.G.F. action. Three more calls for fire were answered during the afternoon at V.C. positions. H & I fire commenced at 2200 and continued until 0330.

19. On completion of H & I's on Monday 16th, HOBART departed station and proceeded to the vicinity of Point Debbie, to the south east of DANANG for an unusual assignment. On arrival at 0545 a boat closed as previously arranged and Lieutenant Commander W. Ray, U.S.N., the Officer in charge of Military Sea Transport Services, DANANG, embarked. He was charged with the duty of salvaging a barge used for special lifts which had grounded on a point in the Baie de Lupin. LCDR Ray's salvage plan was to supplement flotation tanks by providing a wash to bodily lift the barge from the rocks while a tug took the strain. Following a short briefing HOBART made several high speed runs at a range of 1000 yards off the point; the ship's hull form however prevented a wash adequate for the plan and the barge remained immobile. LCDR Ray disembarked, hopeful of an alternative solution and HOBART departed for Point Diane, arriving at 0900. Two replenishments were scheduled during the day, for ammunition from U.S.S. HALEAKLA (AE-25) and fuel from U.S.S. KENNEBEC (AO-36). Due to adjustments in these ships' published TIM's the first UNREF was carried out early at 1320 and on completion the ship returned to the line. No calls for fire were received before rendezvous with KENNEBEC at 1915. This UNREF was delayed while the Hospital Ship U.S.S. SANCTUARY (AH-17) replenished. Enroute to station on completion, an urgent call was received for illumination fire to enable a helo to land on a wooded hill-top for an emergency medevac. HOBART opened fire at 2218 and four minutes later the operation was completed. H & I's were fired until 0500.

20. Ninety rounds of "area preparation" fire were fired between 0500 and 0600 on Tuesday 17th. On completion, the spotter requested another 90 rounds, which were completed by 0700. It was later learned that 3 N.V.A. defected that forenoon. The ship then departed for Point Debbie, commencing a daily procedure similar to that employed in early August, by providing support for the 2nd Bde, ROKMC at Debbie by day, and for the U.S. Marines at Diane by night. Shortly after arrival, the ROKMC N.G.L.O. Lieutenant (JG) R.O. Wilkes, U.S.N. embarked by boat and provided a updated briefing on operations in the area. Lieutenant Wilkes who had briefed us on previous occasions departed at 1100. Expenditure of ammunition the night before had been unexpectedly high and with the next scheduled replenishment not due until the 19th, an UNREF of opportunity was arranged with U.S.S. HALEAKLA, which was still in the area. This proved convenient for the spotter, there being no aircraft available and HOBART departed station at 1145. Following a brisk UNREF of 336 rounds of shell and 390 rounds powder from this most efficient AE, the ship returned to station arriving at 1530. A call for fire against a V.C. assembly area was answered an hour later, resulting in 4 structures destroyed or damaged, and a length of tree line destroyed.

21. HOBART departed from Point Debbie at 1800 and arrived on station at Diane two hours later. H & I's commenced at the now stereotyped time of 2200 and were fired until 0255; at 0040 the 15000th round for the deployment, excluding practice rounds, was fired.

SECRET

GUARD

...../6.

SECRET

6.
GUARD

22. The ship departed for Point Debbie at 0600 on Wednesday 18th, arriving at 0730. From 1000 to 1800 seven observed firings were carried out with a total G.D.A. for the day of:

- 21 Masonry structures destroyed or damaged
- 9 Wooden structures destroyed or damaged
- 4 Bunkers destroyed or damaged
- 200 Metres of treeline destroyed or damaged
- 1 Large secondary explosion, thought to be an ammunition cache

This was most gratifying following as it did relatively quiet days with minor damage assessments. At 1811 the ship proceeded to Diane and shortly after arrival fired a successful spotted shoot with starshell. At 2130 a Swift Boat exchanged identities and closed to deliver Steward Sleeman, following treatment at the DANANG hospital. H & I's commenced shortly after 2200 but were terminated early due to friendly aircraft movement.

23. At 0330 on Thursday 19th course was shaped to intercept U.S.S. ALFRED A. CUNNINGHAM (DD-752) and half an hour later HOBART's boat was used to collect turnover materials, one U.S.N. sailor and free freight, all for subsequent transfer to other ships. On return to station, 60 rounds of preparation fire were delivered in a 24 minute burst into a selected area in which a particular operation was planned for later in the day. At 0548 HOBART departed to rendezvous with U.S.S. HALEAKALA, taking up station in the waiting position at 0720. U.S.S. SAINT PAUL (CA-73) was already alongside the AE's port side and a 30 minute delay ensued while the two ships reversed course in 5 degree steps. When finally alongside I was able to speak with RADM Moore, embarked in SAINT PAUL. It had been planned during the UNREF to carry out a practice underway missile transfer but at the last moment the AE cancelled the arrangements, due to lack of space on deck. This was particularly unfortunate as this was the last occasion during the deployment when the evolution was possible. The UNREF completed at 0930 and the ship set course for Point Debbie, arriving at 1200.

24. At 1350 a Swift Boat closed and embarked the sailor and freight ex U.S.S. CUNNINGHAM for subsequent transfer to U.S.S. CLARION RIVER (LSMR-409) which was operating a few miles to the south. Thirty minutes later HOBART opened fire for the first of four air spotted firings during the afternoon; G.D.A. was several structures damaged or destroyed, a length of treeline destroyed and a brushfire started. The ship departed for UNREF at 1605 to rendezvous with U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). On arrival alongside personnel on the upperdeck were entertained by a four man Beatle type musical combo which set feet tapping and accelerated the dispersal of the victualling stores embarked. As HOBART was the ninth ship alongside ALUDRA that day tribute is due to the vocal chords of the leader of the group. The replenishment completed at 1920; HOBART returned to Point Diane at 2000 and carried out H & I fire for 6 hours overnight.

25. The ship departed Diane at 0600 on Friday 20th and following a replenishment of fuel from U.S.S. PLATTE (AO-24) en route, arrived at Debbie at 1200. Four observed firings took place in the afternoon resulting in a number of structures, bunkers and lengths of treeline being destroyed or damaged. At 1830 HOBART departed the area, replenishing with ammunition from U.S.S. VESUVIUS (AE-15) and arriving at Diane at 2115. Shortly afterwards a most successful illumination firing was carried out before commencing night H & I's at 2300. It is worth mentioning that immediately northward of DANANG there are one or two local hazards to N.G.F. at night. In the first place it is necessary to shoot many targets from positions inside 5000 yards of strongly held NVA/VC areas. Secondly some 200 fishing boats put to sea at dusk every night

SECRET

GUARD

...../7.

SECRET

7.
GUARD

though they do tend to congregate in large groups. Thirdly there is a continuous stream of LCM - type craft and tug-drawn lighters between DANANG and CUA VIET; there are seldom less than 6 on the plot within 10 miles but sometimes this figure increases to 10 or 12. The most frightening single hazard was encountered at about 0300 one morning when it was necessary to go full astern due to the immediate proximity of a Swift boat ditching empty cartridge cases aft at 15 knots "with nobody up front looking out - sorry about that". At 0400 a signal was received reassigning the ship to IV Corps and having informed the Spotter and obtained his approval, HOBART set course southward at 0150 at 20 knots. For the last period on the line I had hoped for a period of Sea Dragon operations, with an alternative some brisk action at the DMZ. To waste one of the last 5 days in transit and to then conclude the deployment with a few days in IV Corps was most disappointing.

26. A quiet passage in calm sunny weather was made down the coast of SOUTH VIETNAM during Saturday 21st. At 1210 an alert lookout sighted an aircraft drop tank some 4 miles to starboard and a brief detour was made to identify and report the tank before sinking it with small arms fire. At 1705 U.S.S. ORLECK (DD-886) closed and turnover materials were transferred from HOBART by light line. The transfer took a little longer than had been expected and as a result the ship had to reverse course on completion to close U.S.S. CACAPON (AO-52) to replenish with fuel. This UNREI was not strictly necessary but the AO had stores and mail onboard which might otherwise have not been delivered prior to leaving WESTPAC. Passage was continued at 1840 at 23 knots, the ship passing to the west of FULAU CECIR DE MER during the first watch in driving rain.

27. At 0400 on Sunday 21st when some 30 miles due south of VUNG TAU, a Swift boat closed by prior arrangement and embarked one sailor for transfer ashore and subsequent passage to AUSTRALIA on compassionate leave. On completion, HOBART proceeded south west and at 0600 closed U.S.S. BERKELEY (DDG-15). A brief turnover was provided by telephone during transfer of turnover materials before HOBART disengaged and BERKELEY set course for SUBIC BAY. Two observed firings were carried out in the forenoon 55 miles south west of VUNG TAU in support of the 9th ARVN Division. A slight instability in the Mark 47 Computer Stable Element had developed which produced unpredictable fall of shot and neither shoot was successful; ship's staff commenced work on the Stable Element on completion. The PM firing was cancelled due to the defect but in the event poor weather in the target area would have prevented the spotter getting airborne. At 1900 the IV Corps N.G.L.O., Captain W. Quinn, USMC embarked by arrangement in VUNG TAU and indicated that little if any change had occurred in the local situation since HOBART was last in the area in late August. The ship returned to harbour briefly at 2100 to disembark Captain Quinn before proceeding to station. The defect on the Stable Element was repaired at 0100 and H & I fire commenced at 0220, completing at 0400.

28. Poor weather inland which would have prevented adequate spotting, caused the cancellation of the scheduled firing in the forenoon of Monday 23rd. Three firings were carried out in the afternoon however, resulting in one secondary explosion and a number of sampans and structures damaged. HOBART departed station at 1600 to rendezvous with U.S.S. CHIFOLA (AO-63) to replenish with fuel, freight and to transfer empty brass. The AO also provided the first Australian mail received since HONG KONG. Shortly after returning to station at 2115, H & I fire commenced and continued until 2320.

29. The last observed firing of the deployment commenced at 0850 on Tuesday 24th in support of the 9th ARVN Division. The assessment was reported as 9 structures destroyed or damaged, 4 bunkers damaged and one secondary fire. Poor weather again prevented any observed firings in the afternoon. At 1815 Army Vessel 1356, the CLIVE STEELE, en route to VUNG TAU, was closed and mail transferred; there was quite a reaction when it was announced by loud hailer that HOBART was due to depart for home via SUBIC the next day. H & I were fired for 3 hours from 2300.

SECRET
GUARD

...../8

SECRET

8.

GUARD

30. Throughout the forenoon of Wednesday 25th the ship stood by for calls for fire in support of the 10th ARVN Regiment which was making a sweep through the area ashore. In the event no calls were received and the last day of the operational deployment became something of an anti climax. At 1115 HOBART proceeded south east and closed U.S.S. BORIE (DD-704) at 1200. Turnover briefings were given by phone while materials were transferred by light line. HOBART disengaged at 1300 and set course for SUBIC at 20 knots.
31. At 1200 on Thursday 26th the ship closed to investigate and photograph a large wooden fishing craft stopped in the middle of the South China Sea, some 270 miles from land. Having ascertained all was well, HOBART proceeded, and reported the sighting by signal. An A4 aircraft from NAS CUBI joined at 1030 on 27th and an AATX was carried out as a pre-refit trial; records taken indicated the trial was successful. At this time Typhoon Elaine was to the east of LUZON and the possibility existed of it causing uncomfortable weather in the MANILA SUBIC area; in the event the storm continued west-north-west causing only heavy rain, and moderate winds throughout the period in port.
32. HOBART entered SUBIC BAY at 1330 on Friday 27th and anchored off the Naval Magazine shortly afterwards. Approval had been gained from CTG 70.8 to retain the 5"/54 ammunition held in excess of the 25% permitted on departing WESTFAC; the small excess will be useful during the workup in 1969. Certain other ammunition stocks were disembarked and a number of Sheridan Missiles and explosive stores embarked for transport to AUSTRALIA. Identities were exchanged with USS NEW JERSEY (BB-61) during the time at anchor. The Battleship was completing Type Training prior to deployment to VIETNAM; it was a pity HOBART was not able to see this great ship in action before completion of attachment to the Seventh Fleet. After one false alarm, a berth became available at the Naval Base and the ship weighed and proceeded, securing alongside Rivera Pier 11-12 at 1832.
33. The next two and a half days were very busy ones. A large amount of stores was embarked, including the outstanding items from FCS2, one Land Rover and the Personnel Boat. Although replacement davits arrived from the United States in time to be fitted, again they were the wrong type and the boat was secured into chocks on Mount 52 deck. USS MARKAB (AR-23) provided assistance to regun Mount 51 and small items of outstanding battle damage repairs were progressed. HMAS PERTH (Captain D.W. Leach, RAN) arrived during the forenoon of Sunday 29th and berthed alongside USS FINCH (DER-328) outboard of HOBART. A VFL grand final type cheer greeted the arrival of the first heaving line. For the rest of the day officers and sailors from both ships conducted a turnover while various WESTFAC assets were transferred for fitting into PERTH.
34. I paid a farewell call on COMNABASE SUBIC Rear Admiral V.C. Lambert, USN, on Saturday 29th, and accompanied by Captain Leach paid an informal farewell call on COMNAVSTA, Captain Clyde Anderson, USN, the following afternoon.
35. HMAS PERTH and USS FINCH cast off on Monday 30th and were moved clear by tugs; HOBART cast off at 0622 and proceeded clear of the berth. After an hour's delay while waiting for some laundry to arrive, the ship proceeded out of SUBIC BAY at 0800H, chopping to ACNB at 0830H. The weather on the short passage to MANILA did not auger well for the proposed day's events, there being a strong south south westerly wind and choppy seas. However, as progress into MANILA BAY was made the sea became calm and the wind dropped; HOBART came to single anchor off the South Breakwater at 1209. I left by boat to call on the Flag Officer-in-Charge, Philippine Navy, Commodore Isamel Lomibao at 1315 and was accompanied by the Australian Services Attache, Commander D. Wogan-Browne, RAN.

SECRET

...../9.

GUARD

SECRET

9.

GUARD

36. The purpose of the ship's visit to MANILA was to entertain the Australian Community, many of whom had provided hospitality to members of the Ship's Company when the ship was in SUBIC BAY during the 6 months in WESTPAC. It had been arranged for the guests to be ferried to the ship in U.S.N. boats but the political climate dictated a change and the Philippine Navy kindly provided the transport. Some 78 adults and children, including the Australian Ambassador Mr. F.H. Stuart, one Philippine Navy Officer and one officer from the recently formed Philippine Coastguard Service embarked at 1300. The guests were entertained to lunch and were taken on tours of the ship by assigned hosts. HOBART weighed at 1430 and proceeded for a short trip around MANILA BAY, during which there were demonstrations of Mount 51 laying and training, providing a Tartar Missile at the launcher and clearance diver gear. HOBART anchored at 1605 and shortly afterwards the guests, all of whom appeared to have greatly enjoyed their afternoon, disembarked. Though much work was placed on the shoulders of Commander Wogan-Browne to arrange the details, it was a very straight forward task for the ship and one quite out of proportion to the goodwill demonstrated. The hosts did their jobs admirably and I believe our small Community in MANILA will talk about their day at sea in HOBART for a long time to come. Our two Filipino guests who represented Commodore Lomibao also expressed much appreciation for their brief tour of the ship.

37. HOBART weighed at 1740 and proceeded out of harbour, transiting VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE in the first watch en route to MANUS ISLAND.

HULL AND ENGINEERING.

38. 1A and 1B boilers were cleaned externally on passage from the line to SUBIC, 1st - 3rd September. For the first time in HOBART use was made of the qualified approval contained in A.F. Letter 1101.51.11 dated 20th November, 1967 to extend fireside hours to 900 between cleans. The condition of these boilers at 937 and 961 hours respectively was not demonstrably different from that of the aft boilers which were cleaned at 583 and 590 hours respectively on passage back to the line 12th - 14th September. Rain catchments and drains had been dry cleaned earlier however. Should further experience of 900 hours intervals in R.A.N. DDG's generally support this experience there would be grounds for extending the cleaning interval to 900 hours with a rain catchment drain dry clean at 450 hours. During VIETNAM operations of course cleaning intervals are more or less set by the deployment schedule and sometimes have to be reduced well below 600.

39. On return to SUBIC 3rd September it was found that SRF SUBIC had overlooked the manufacture of replacement toggle and spindle for the Port Astern throttle in spite of CASREFT and Work Request action having been taken (R.O.P. for month of July refers). On inspection the elements fitted were found to be in imminent danger of failure and it was decided to install the set which had been made up onboard. The throttle was subsequently stripped and re-assembled 3 times but on each occasion the operating gear seized almost immediately steam was admitted. The fault lay in the use of a similar material (CRES) for the spindle and for the toggle pins. SRF SUBIC provided modified elements at 0230 on 6th September and the ship sailed at 0619 some 14 hours late.

40. Whilst in SUBIC, the design office was called back in to look at the 52 deck overhangs which had broken up extensively during the period of heavy gunfire on the Line. Time precluded a further re-design but SRF cut out and remade the worst affected areas and rewelded others so that the ship sailed with this area intact. Ship's Staff was able to keep up with the damage which occurred subsequently. ECM set AN/SLQ-19 was removed during this period in SUBIC.

SECRET

...../10

GUARD

SECRET

10.
GUARD

41. Only minor routine maintenance was necessary in HONG KONG and the Engineering Department was able to join in and enjoy 5 days R & R. This was the first in-port period of the deployment where this has been possible. HOBART was able to supply HMNZS OTAGO with feed water to assist in her recovery from a feed system contamination, during 9th - 10th September. The service was subsequently extended to U.S.S. HUBBARD in SUBIC on 27th - 28th September and on this occasion 150 psi saturated steam was also supplied to help her light off.

42. During emergency refractory repairs in the superheated cavity of 2B boiler on Friday 13th September some toolmarking of 13 superheater elements was sustained. This matter was reported fully in HOBART letter 63.1.10 dated 19th September, 1968.

43. The balance of the WESTIAC assets were removed between 27th and 30th September and the Engineering Department handover was successfully accomplished at all levels.

WEAPONS ELECTRICAL.

44. This month began with all equipment serviceable with the exception of radar SPS-40 and the gun mounts. The breech block pivot links of both mounts had failed due to fatigue. Departure for SUBIC on 1st September was therefore welcomed as it gave the maintenance teams a chance to pick up the required replacement parts quickly. Work continued on these defects throughout the return passage to SUBIC, whilst there, and during the R & R period in HONG KONG. By 11th September both mountings were operational and the ship was able to return to gun line duties straight from HONG KONG.

45. SPS-40 continued to give trouble, this time in the power amplifier tube assembly where the plate tuning cavity had been intermittently arcing. The cavity was replated by SRF SUBIC. Setting up problems held the set down until the middle of the month.

46. Later in the month the MK 16 Stable Element vertical began to wander slightly and since then, all the efforts of ships staff have been to no avail. A competent techrep is not available at SUBIC and consequently the ship returns home with the problem unsolved. The lack of good techrep and the delays in getting repair parts for the MK 16 Stable Element is cause for some concern. The whole gun system depends upon this complicated piece of equipment.

47. The end of September brought the end of gun line activities and the end to the deployment. On the 29th September, the handover to PERTH took place. Ships staff were only too pleased to pass across items of equipment and stores to help her get off to a good start.

48. The health and conduct of the Ship's Company has been good throughout the month and the morale is sky high, all onboard are naturally looking forward to the arrival in SYDNEY on 11th October. I cannot speak too highly of the manner in which this young ship's company has stuck to the task. The hours have been long and the demands on patience, fitness and skill have been considerable. There have been one or two serious disciplinary cases during the six months deployment but in general I have heard nothing but praise for the behaviour and bearing of the men ashore. Onboard they have teamed together to give the ship a most valued reputation within the Seventh Fleet.

...../11

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

11.

GUARD


49. The ship's second deployment with the US Seventh Fleet has now concluded. I consider the 6 month period to have been a successful one, marred only by the missile attack in June and the need to spend some 30 days in SUBIC BAY for repairs. Many lessons have been learned and valuable experience gained. On departure most appreciative signals were received from COMSEVENTHFLT, CTG 70.8 and CTU 70.8.9 and it is with a sense of fulfilment that the ship now returns home. The following are brief statistics for the deployment:

Distance steamed	:	35,942 miles	
Rounds fired exclusive of practice	:	16,370	
Days at sea 117	:	Sea Dragon	19
		I Corps	47
		III/IV Corps	20
		Passage/Exercises	31
Days in harbour 66	:	SUBIC & KAO HSIUNG	55
		HONG KONG	11
Replenishments 95	:	UNREI Ships	68
		Other	27

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,


(K.W. Shands)
Captain, RAN.

Enclosures:

- Appendix A - Steaming Figures
- B - Movements
- C - Forecast Programme
- D - Sporting Activities
- E - Report of Underway Replenishments
- F - Naval Gunfire Support Records
- G - Officers' Movements

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX 'A' TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS SEPTEMBER, 1968

STEAMING FIGURES

(a)	Distance steamed during the month	6,406.9
(b)	Distance steamed since commissioning	140,046.9
(c)	Hours underway during the month	476 04/60
(d)	Hours underway since commissioning	9,931 36/60

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX 'B' TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS SEPTEMBER, 1968

MOVEMENTS

<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Sunday 1st	IV Corps, SOUTH VIETNAM	Sunday 1st	NGFS
Tuesday 3rd	SUBIC BAY	Friday 6th	Upkeep
Saturday 7th	HONG KONG	Thursday 12th	Port Visit
Saturday 14th	I Corps, SOUTH VIETNAM	Saturday 21st	NGFS
Sunday 22nd	IV Corps, SOUTH VIETNAM	Wednesday 25th	NGFS
Friday 27th	SUBIC BAY	Monday 30th	Turnover with HMAS PERTH

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX 'C' TO THE CAPTAIN, HEAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS SEPTEMBER, 1968

FORECAST PROGRAMME

<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
October 5th	MANUS	October 6th	Fuel
October 11th	SYDNEY	-	

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX 'D' TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS,
SEPTEMBER, 1968

SPORTING ACTIVITIES.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>SPORT</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
September 9th	HONG KONG	Volleyball	Hobart d FARRAMATTA 3 - 0
September 10th	HONG KONG	Volleyball	HOBART d VENDETTA 3 - 0
September 11th	HONG KONG	Water Polo	HOBART d HONG KONG Fire Dept. 11 - 6
September 12th	HONG KONG	Soccer	HONG KONG Fire Dept. d HOBART 8 - 1

As was the case for August, sporting and recreational activities were greatly curtailed due to the ship's operational employment. Whilst in SUBIC BAY and again in HONG KONG, however, training was conducted for the ship's non swimmers.

Voluntary P.T. was held daily while the ship was deployed in IV Corps and whilst on passage.

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX 'E' TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, SEPTEMBER, 1968

REPORT OF UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENTS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIMES</u>	<u>RECEIVING FROM</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>EMBARKATION/DISEMBARKATION</u>		<u>REMARKS</u>
Saturday 14th	0545 0626	USS GUADALUPE AO - 32	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO Empty Brass	120 Tons 5 Loads	Navigating Officer (LCDR M.B. RAYMENT) conned ship while alongside
Saturday 14th	0730 0826	USS VIRGO AE - 30	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition	480 Shell 468 Powder	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside
Monday 16th	1325 1404	USS HALEAKALA AE - 25	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition	380 Shell 390 Powder	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside
Monday 16th	1956 2109	USS KENNEBEC AO - 36	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO Empty Brass Gas Bottles	156 Tons 9 Loads 5 Loads	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside
Tuesday 17th	1349 1429	USS HALEAKALA AE - 25	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition	336 Shell 390 Powder	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside
Thursday 19th	0753 0926	USS HALEAKALA AE - 25	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition	735 Shell 786 Powder	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside
Thursday 19th	1838 1919	USS ALUDRA AF - 55	Modified Housefall	Victualling Stores	14186 Lbs	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside
Friday 20th	0920 1023	USS PLATTE AO - 24	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO Empty Brass Stores/Mail	285 Tons 9 Loads 4 Loads	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside

SECRET

GUARD

...../2

SECRET

GUARD 2.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIMES</u>	<u>RECEIVING FROM</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>EMBARKATION/DISEMBARKATION</u>		<u>REMARKS</u>
Friday 20th	1903 1955	USS VESUVIUS AE - 15	Modified Housefall (2)	Ammunition	240 Shell 312 Powder	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside
Saturday 21st	1756 1841	USS CACAPON AO - 52	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO Stores/Mail Empty Brass	114 Tons 2 Loads 4 Loads	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside
Monday 23rd	1625 1907	USS CHIPOLA AO - 63	Spanwire (2) Wire Highline	FFO Stores/Mail Empty Brass Gas Bottle	176 Tons 4 Loads 6 Loads 1	Navigating Officer conned ship while alongside

In addition, 4 Light Line transfers were carried out with USN Combatant Ships and one with AV1356, the CLIVE STEELE

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX 'F' TO THE CAPTAIN HMAS HOBART REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS SEPTEMBER, 1968

DATE	TIME (H)	AMMO No.	TARGET	GDA
1968				
14th Sep	1120	HCPD 8 WP 5	Preparative Area	Good Coverage
14th Sep	1417	HCPD 13 WP 4	Preparative Area	Good Coverage
14th Sep	2200/0001	HCPD 52	V.C. Positions	Unobserved
15th Sep	0002/0355	HCPD 104	V.C. Positions	Unobserved
15th Sep	1100	HCPD 55 CVT 17	V.C. Bunkers	1 bunker Destroyed 2 bunkers Damaged
15th Sep	1424	HCPD 20 WP 2 CVT 10	V.C. Base Camp	1 bunker destroyed (Heavy foliage precludes better GDA).
15th Sep	1552	WP 3 HCPD 2	V.C. Bunkers	Nil
15th Sep	1753	WP 2 HCPD 15	Suspected V.C. Pos.	Good coverage
15th Sep	2200/2359	HEPD 40	Suspected V.C. Pos	Unobserved
16th Sep	0001/0332	HEPD 80	Suspected V.C. Pos	Unobserved
16th Sep	2216	ILLUM 8	NIL	NIL
16th Sep	2204/2354	HEPD 20	Suspected V.C. Pos	Unobserved
17th Sep	0026/0344	HEPD 80	Suspected V.C. Pos	Unobserved
17th Sep	0503/0553	HEPD 90	Preparatory Fire	Unobserved
17th Sep	0630/0659	HEPD 90	Preparatory Fire	Unobserved
17th Sep	1630/1646	HEPD 28	V.C. Assembly Area	2 structures destroyed 2 structures damaged 20 metres of tree line destroyed.
17th Sep	2201/2355	HEPD 50	Suspected V.C. Pos	Unobserved
18th Sep	0005/0255	HEPD 65	Suspected V.C. Pos	Unobserved
18th Sep	0957/1031	HEPD 47	V.C. Assembly Area	3 large St. destroyed 1 large St. damaged 20 Met. tree line destroyed.
18th Sep	1040/1105	HEPD 26 CVT 20	V.C. Assembly Area	2 structures destroyed 4 structures damaged
18th Sep	1207/1300	HEPD 41 WP 2	V.C. Bunkers & Structures.	4 Masonry St. destroyed 3 Masonry St. damaged 1 Bunker destroyed 1 Secondary Exp.
18th Sep	1310/1354	HE 54	V.C. structures & Bunkers	2 Masonry struct destroyed 1 structure damaged 20 metres tree line destroyed.
18th Sep	1648/1655	HE 13 WP 1	V.C. bunkers and structures & rice storage areas	1 wood struct destroyed 1 wood struct damaged 1 bunker damaged 25 metres tree line des,
18th Sep	1710/1720	HE 10	V.C. Area	1 Structure Damaged 1 Masonary struct des.
18th Sep	1722/1758	HE 30 HE 52	V.C. Bunkers and structures	2 Masonary struct des 1 wood struct destroyed 5 structures damaged 2 bunkers destroyed 50 metres tree line des
18th Sep	2037/2129	ILLUM 16 HE 9	Suspected enemy position	Excellent Illum Coverage

SECRET

GUARD

.....2/.

SECRET

GUARD

2

18th Sep	2242/2336	HE	44	H & I	Unobserved
19th Sep	0019/0040	HE	20	H & I	Unobserved
19th Sep	0511/0535	HE	60	Prep Firings	Unobserved
19th Sep	1420/1727	HE	18	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	1 Masonary struct dam 30 mtrs treeline des
19th Sep	1435/1448	HE	33	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	1 Masonary struct des 3 Masonary struct dam 40mtrs treeline destroyed
19th Sep	1455/1528	HE	38	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	1 Wooden Struct. Des 3 large mason struct dam 30 mtrs treeline des
19th Sep	1535/1601	HE	23	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	1 Masonary struct des 3 Masonary struct dam 20mtrs treeline des
19th Sep	2204/0000	HE	57	Suspect V.C. Pos	Unobserved
20th Sep	0005/0348	HE	104	Suspect V.C. Pos	Unobserved
20th Sep	1427	HEPD	30	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	1 Masonary Str. Des 2 Masonary Str. Dam 1 Large Bunker Dam
20th Sep	1454	HEPD	23	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	1 Wood Str Destroyed 20 metres treeline des
20th Sep	1507	HEPD	38	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	1 Bunker Destroyed 2 Wood Str. Damaged
20th Sep	1535	HEPD	29	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	Nil
20th Sep	2147	ILLUM	30	Enemy Movement	Excellent illum 2 pos KIA
20th Sep	2309	HEPD	36	Suspected V.C. Pos	Unobserved
21st Sep	0023	HEPD	36	Suspected V.C. Fos	Unobserved
22nd Sep	0824	HEPD	21	V.C. Structures	Unobserved
22nd Sep	0930	WP	2		
22nd Sep	0930	HEPD	50	V.C. Structures	2 secondary bush fires
		CVT	10		
		WP	3		
23rd Sep	0220	HEPD	40	Suspected V.C. Pos	Unobserved
		CVT	8		
23rd Sep	1359	HEPD	48	Suspected V.C. Ammo	1 possible secondary cache
23rd Sep	1456	HEPD	40	V.C. meeting place & Ammo cache	60% in target area, good coverage.
23rd Sep	1531	HEPD	55	Sampans & Structures	6 sampans damaged 1 structure destroyed 8 structures damaged 1 bunker damaged
23rd Sep	2130	HCPD	40	Suspect enemy posit	Unobserved
24th Sep	0850	HEPD	72	V.C. Bunkers & Structures	8 Structures damaged 4 bunkers damaged 1 secondary fire 1 structure destroyed
		HCPD	22		
		WP	2		
24th Sep	2306	HCPD	9	Suspected V.C. Position	Unobserved
		HEPD	7		
25th Sep	0047	HEPD	32	Suspected V.C. Position	Unobserved

SECRET

GUARD

SECRET

GUARD

APPENDIX 'G' TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS SEPTEMBER, 1968

OFFICERS' MOVEMENTS

N I L

SECRET

GUARD

~~RESTRICTED~~
CONFIDENTIAL

18/6/1050

CIRCULATION LIST NO. 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MINUTE

HMAS HOBART

Report of Proceedings

OCTOBER 1968

AS (NS)

D OF O

DCNS

1 NM

2 NM

3 NM

4 NM

SEC

AS (EC)

AS (FM)

C OF S

DPR

AS (NS)(NS)

ARCHIVES BRANCH

- NOTES: A. This copy is circulated so that Board Members may see these reports soon after they reach Navy Office.
- B. The report will be given again to Board Members with Director's comments if there is any matter of special interest in those comments.
- C. Circulation lists numbers 2 and 3 are referred to Directors and Heads of Branches.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~RESTRICTED~~

CONFIDENTIAL
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

NAVY—CANBERRA

18

6

1050

RECEIVED

C 21 NOV P.M.

Telephone:

NAVY 35 0444

PMS

OFFICE OF THE
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING,
H.M. AUSTRALIAN FLEET,
FLEET HEADQUARTERS,
GARDEN ISLAND, N.S.W. 2000

19 NOV 1968

No. A.F. 17/30/3

The Secretary,
Department of the Navy.

HMAS HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - OCTOBER, 1968

Reference: HMAS HOBART letter 133.201.2 of 2nd November,
1968.

Forwarded.

[Signature]
Rear Admiral

[Signature] Enclosure: HMAS HOBART letter 133.201.2 of 2nd November,
1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

133.201.2

H.M.A.S. HOBART, D39,
at Sydney.

2nd November, 1968.

The Flag Officer Commanding,
H.M. Australian Fleet.

(Copies to:- The Australian Attache, Washington D.C.
T Captain, HMAS PERTH,
The Captain, HMAS BRISBANE.)

H.M.A.S. HOBART - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - OCTOBER 1968

Sir,

I have the honour to report the proceedings of H.M.A. Ship under my command for the month of October, 1968.

2. On the morning of Tuesday 1st October the ship cleared SAN BERNADINO STRAIT en route from SUBIC BAY and set course for MANUS ISLAND. Good weather was experienced throughout the four day passage enabling much needed ship husbandry to be progressed, together with some fuel consumption trials at speeds up to 20 knots. During the forenoon of the 3rd a gun functioning trial was carried out from Mount 51 proving the serviceability of the new barrel which had been installed at SUBIC. The ship chopped to your Operational Control on entering the Australian Station at 1300Z the same day.

3. HOBART entered SEEADLER HARBOUR at 0810K on Saturday 5th and secured alongside Lombrum Wharf at 0900. TARANGAU had arranged a full programme of social and sporting events, the highlight of which was a reception for the entire crew by the officers and ship's company of HMAS TARANGAU. The Naval Officer in Charge, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, Commander J.G. Stacey, RAN called at 0910 and at 1245 the District Commissioner Mr. A. Gow called. In the afternoon the ship was open to inspection when some 380 visitors including TARANGAU families and a Mission Party of 20 toured the ship.

4. After a most enjoyable visit HOBART cast off at 0800 on Sunday 6th and on clearing harbour proceeded southward. Fresh south easterly winds and contrary currents in VITIAZ Strait and the SOLOMON SEA were experienced for the next two days. During the passage Machinery Space Ventilation trials were carried out, the results of which will be reported separately. The ship cleared JOMARD PASSAGE at 2235K on 7th. On entering the CORAL SEA the weather moderated considerably and this was most convenient for the annual Full Power Trial on Tuesday 8th.

5. Training activities during the voyage included a Section I Promotion Board in which 22 candidates passed from a total of 29. Common Sea Training Category and Naval Lore Exams were taken by the ship's 26 Ordinary Seaman, of whom all but one passed.



CONFIDENTIAL

19 NOV 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

. 2 .

6. Units participating in Exercise SHADOW were sighted to seaward of CAPRICORN CHANNEL on Wednesday 9th. At 0030 on 10th HOBART entered MORETON BAY, anchoring off File Light at 0530; a customs launch and a workboat from HMAS MORETON arrived alongside shortly afterwards. Having embarked three customs officers and disembarked QUEENSLAND liberymen the ship weighed and proceeded at 0642, clearing the Bay at 0850 when course was set southwards for the final leg of the passage home. NOIC Queensland's punctual assistance in this regard was much appreciated. An AATX was carried out to the eastward of SYDNEY as a prerefit trial.

7. HOBART entered SYDNEY HARBOUR at 0910 on Friday 11th October stopping in WATSON BAY to embark a party of press representatives and securing at West Dock Wharf, Garden Island at 1000K. The East Australia Area Band provided a musical greeting and hundreds of friends and relatives of the Ship's Company were on the wharf to meet the ship. I was most pleased to welcome you on-board at this time.

8. Generator trials were carried out on Saturday 12th and Monday 14th. The ship was open to Public Inspection on Sunday 13th when 1250 visitors toured the ship.

9. During the forenoon of Monday 14th, fifteen ships from Exercise CORAL SANDS entered harbour and at 1145 I called on you Sir, onboard HMAS MELBOURNE.

10. Monday heralded a busy week for HOBART as preparations were made to commence the refit on Monday 21st. During the day most of the free freight carried from SUBIC was landed, as were naval/clothing stores and the ships' charge books outfit.

11. The programmed move to SUTHERLAND DOCK for a Tilt test on Tuesday was delayed till Wednesday 16th due to a strike by Shipwrights at the dock. At 1620 on Tuesday, thirty members of the 1967 N.S.W. Industrial Mobilisation course visited the ship and were given a guided tour by my Heads of Departments and myself. These gentlemen showed great interest in the tour and many were most complimentary in their thanks.

12. The ship proceeded under her own power soon after 0800 on Wednesday 16th and subsequently with the aid of tugs entered SUTHERLAND DOCK at 0920. At 1000, I called on the Flag Officer-in-Charge, East Australia Area, Rear Admiral D.C. Wells. The tilt test was completed satisfactorily by 1325 and HOBART was moved out of the dock at 1409 and secured port side to Sutherland Wharf whilst main engines were warmed through. Shortly after 1500, HOBART cast off and proceeded to Garden Island, berthing at West Dock Wharf at 1545. That evening a highly successful Ship's Ball was held at the Wentworth Hotel.

13. HOBART cast off and proceeded to sea at 1100 on Thursday 17th for a most enjoyable and successful Family Day. As well as the 197 relatives, the Hull Potential Survey team was embarked to carry out the hull survey whilst the ship remained in the vicinity of Shark Island. Weather and sea conditions

.....3/.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

. 3 .

were ideal for the occasion as HOBART, steamed to the 100 fathom line to discharge ballast. A highlight of the day was a demonstration of the ship's capability to counter several simulated air attacks made by a VENOM from HMAS ALBATROSS. HOBART re-berthed at West Dock Wharf at 1512.

14. At 0810 on Friday 18th October, the ship was moved by tugs to number 5 bouy. The change in programme brought about by the Shipwrights strike at Cockatoo led to the need to use an unsatisfactory crane. Despite this difficulty de-ammunitioning commenced at 0905. During the forenoon I had the pleasure of receiving onboard Mrs Dorwood, the mother of Petty Officer Dorwood, a member of the ship's company. On behalf of the Ship's Company, I accepted from Mrs Dorwood a most handsome shield presented by her in memory of the late CPO R.H. Hunt. The shield will be known as the Ray Hunt Memorial Shield and will be presented annually to the best all-round mess in the ship.

15. De-ammunitioning was completed by 1530 and with the aid of tugs HOBART secured alongside West Dock Wharf at 1625. T.C.V. COLAC was positioned outboard of HOBART at 1630 and tank cleaning commenced soon after, continuing till Sunday 27th.

16. HOBART's refit officially commenced on Monday 21st October. My initial doubts about Security arrangements during the refit were allayed during the week after consultation with the Fleet Communications Officer and the receipt of several signals on the subject from ACNB which clarified the security classification of some compartments.

17. On Tuesday 22nd the ship provided the berthing party for HMAS BRISBANE (Captain A.A. Willis, R.A.N.) at the Overseas Terminal Circular Quay.

18. I attended the Captain's Meeting at Fleet Headquarters on Wednesday 23rd and that evening, together with five of my officers and their ladies I attended the Cocktail Party for the visiting R.N. Officers onboard HMAS SYDNEY.

19. By Thursday 24th, the initial reactions to the new Group Pay System were in evidence. Whilst there were no cases of open hostility towards the scheme, it was evident that some sections of the ship's company were very dissatisfied and baffled by the groupings they had been allocated. Many of course were well pleased with the details. I addressed the ships company at 1300 and made arrangements for an adequate number of copies of the rates and conditions pamphlets be distributed throughout the messes. Between 0800 and 0915 on Friday, Divisional Officers and I were in attendance in messdecks endeavouring to answer questions and gathering written queries which I later forwarded. At 0905 you, Sir, spoke to the ships company on the Group Pay System. During the weekend 26th and 27th I attended the Symposium at HMAS PENGUIN as result of which I was reasonably well placed to further brief the Ship's Company on the Group Pay Scheme on Monday 28th. I was most grateful that three of your Senior Staff Officers were able to visit the ship during the following days to discuss the scheme with the senior sailors of various categories. The personal interest shown by yourself and those officers has provided me with very welcome assistance during the period concerned.

.....4/.

CONFIDENTIAL

HULL AND ENGINEERING

20. Fuel consumption trials were effected at a range of speeds between 12 and 24 knots on the passage from Subic and the results achieved followed closely the tentative curve forwarded earlier in the year. Indeed they suggested that the "dirty bottom" curve was unduly pessimistic. The opportunity was also taken during the passage to progress as far as possible the cleaning of fuel tanks at least to the stage where they could be deballasted without fear of discharging oil sullage. To this end some 5000 gallons of Dieso were transferred to TARANGAU during the stopover.

21. On 6th October a controlled Machinery Space Ventilation trial was carried out at speeds between 12 and 26 knots, the results being forwarded separately. It was concluded that conditions were acceptable without need for modification to existing arrangements. The pre-refit full power trial was carried out on 8th October, a mean rpm of 279.7 being achieved. The trial report will be forwarded separately. Generator trials were carried out on 12 and 14 October and a Tilt Test was effected in Sutherland Dock on Wednesday 16th. Tanks were deballasted at sea during Family Day on Thursday 17th and the ship went "cold iron" late pm Friday 18th October. De-fuelling of FFO and Dieso were carried out over the weekend.

22. During the period 21st to 26th October inclusive, 16 fuel tanks, 8 FFO heaters, 2 machinery space bilges and 4 boiler externals were cleaned with the assistance of TCV COLAC, the hands being employed until 2000 each night except Friday 25th when the Dockyard pulled out. Additionally, pre-refit water pressure tests of all 4 boiler externals were completed and work began on Cycle overhauls of a main blower, one main feed pump and an ACC compressor. On Monday 28th October, Internal cleans began and by the end of the month only one boiler remained to be cleaned. Hands were employed in 3 watches throughout this week.

23. The month has been extremely busy but such a pace has been necessary in order to prepare the ship for a smooth start to the Refit. Some members of the Department report that they are looking forward to leave! It may be of interest to DDG watchers that the ship's mean draught is now only 12'3".

WEAPONS ELECTRICAL


24. The early part of October was spent finalising the defect list and preparing ship's staff work lists in preparation for the main refit period. Nearly 50% of the department commenced the first part of 47 days leave due during the month. Those remaining have commenced the ship's staff content of the refit and in addition have been actively employed on tasks to ensure physical security of equipment and documents whilst in dockyard hands.

25. The health and morale of the ships company is high though the effect of the introduction of the Group Pay system caused a considerable amount of concern in certain categories. This has been reported upon separately.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,



(K.W. Shands)
Captain, RAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 119 NOV 1968

PAGE 1 OF ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO A.F. 17/30/3 OF

APPENDIX 'A' TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS OCTOBER, 1968

STEAMING FIGURES

(a)	Distance steamed during the month	4,250.0
(b)	Distance steamed since commissioning	144,296.9
(c)	Hours underway during the month	233 36/60
(d)	Hours underway since commissioning	10,165 12/60

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 6 OF ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO A.F. 17 / 30/3 OF

APPENDIX 'B' TO THE CAPTAIN, HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS OCTOBER, 1968

MOVEMENTS

<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Saturday 5th	MANUS IS	Sunday 6th	Refuel
Thursday 10th	MORETON BAY	Thursday 10th	Land libertymen embark customs officers.
Friday 11th	SYDNEY		

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 7 OF ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO A.F. 17 / 30 / 3 OF 19 NOV 1968

APPENDIX 'C' TO THE CAPTAIN HMAS HOBART'S REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS OCTOBER, 1968

FORECAST PROGRAMME .

REFIT TILL JULY, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL



Australian War Memorial

Item control



005192385