New Zealand's Identity and New Zealand-Japan Relations: 1945-2014

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A thesis
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Relations

Victoria University of Wellington

2015
ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to understand the role of New Zealand’s national identity in the Japan-New Zealand relationship to examine how identities and values have shaped New Zealand’s policies and diplomatic interaction with Japan. Four key identities are identified which contribute to New Zealand’s national self-image as a whole and illustrate the malleability of identity; the historically cultural British identity, the “search for independence” moral identity, the construction of an Asia Pacific state identity and the perception of New Zealand as a ‘good international citizen’ with liberally democratic values. To explore the role these identities and New Zealand’s perceptions of Japan have had on shaping bilateral relations, this thesis analyses multiple issues and policy decisions from 1945 till 2014 using the theoretical framework of Constructivism. It draws from a range of secondary literature, government documents, news sources, official speeches and various organisation’s publications from throughout this time frame. The research seeks to give a better understanding of how New Zealand’s national identity has evolved over time in response to domestic affairs and examine how it has contributed to shaping New Zealand’s relationship with Japan. It uncovers that the Japan-New Zealand relationship has developed significantly in the last seventy years and the role of identity can offer explanations regarding the ways in which New Zealand’s understanding of itself has helped shape its bilateral relationship with Japan.
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INTRODUCTION

An analysis of the development of New Zealand’s relations with Japan over approximately the last sixty years may be considered a useful case study as it reveals New Zealanders changing perspectives and attitudes to their own country and to other states. The notion that a states domestic situation and identity inform their foreign policies is not a new theory, and has been used as an explanatory tool in much international analysis. New Zealand’s different identities explain much about the origins of the nation’s interests in their foreign policy choices and relationship with Japan. This thesis will trace the New Zealand-Japan relationship from the end of the Second World War until the present day, while focusing on how the nature of the relationship has evolved due to New Zealand’s response to Japan difference. The Japan-New Zealand relationship has developed significantly in the last seventy years and the role which identity has played can offer explanations about the ways in which the New Zealand understanding of itself has helped shape its relationship with Japan.

Despite a predominantly strong relationship, New Zealand has encountered various problematic and conflictual situations in their bilateral relations with Japan. The initial uncertainty as to whether to establish relations with Japan, the difference in culture and a lack of common understanding have created challenges. Environmental issues, such as the New Zealand nuclear free policy and Japan’s whaling programme, have illustrated the differences and misunderstandings between both countries. These issues have created tension in an otherwise harmonious relationship. However, both countries also have many shared interests and these are founded in common values which raises a number of questions. Why have these disputes and differences arisen? Why has the relationship remained strong despite significant challenges? I argue that an important part of the answer lies in New Zealand national identity and how this has shaped the country’s foreign policy with Japan.

RESEARCH QUESTION

How have New Zealand perceptions of, and relations with, Japan evolved from 1945 to the present, and to what extent has New Zealand’s own identity influenced this development?

The research question of this thesis is concerned with the changing perception and relationship New Zealand has had with Japan and the situations and issues which have strained the otherwise strong economic and diplomatic relationship. This thesis argues that
a constructivist analysis is more convincing in explaining New Zealand’s evolving relationship with Japan than a rational account. I therefore argue that the challenges, difficulties and issues which have arisen in the bilateral relationship can be attributed to difference in national identities between both countries.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The following pages consider four key identities that all contribute to New Zealand’s national self-image as a whole and illustrate the malleability of identity. By looking at how New Zealand's identity or perception of what kind of state it is and wants to be with regards to other states, it becomes apparent how this identity influences its interests and foreign policy. This thesis will argue that a state will make decisions regarding its national interest based on its notion of what kind of state it is and how this is different to other states. These identities have evolved over time in response to domestic affairs and a changing international context and have contributed to shaping New Zealand’s relationship with Japan. After providing an overview of the extant literature on New Zealand-Japan relations, scholarship surrounding New Zealand national identity in foreign policy, and establishing the theoretical framework, the research will discuss the following. 

First, it will outline the identity that emerged from New Zealand’s historical and cultural ties with Britain, which was most apparent during the early years of contact with Japan. An analysis of this identity will demonstrate how this culturally Western influence shaped New Zealand’s perceptions of Japan and Japanese people during the post war decade and how these attitudes were reflected in foreign policy choices and interaction with Japan in the following decade. It will then consider New Zealand’s emerging Asia Pacific identity and how the construction of this identity caused the New Zealand government to pursue policies and actions which would give it a greater understanding of Japan and take steps to minimise the inherently different cultural identities which caused challenges within the relationship. New Zealand’s growing sense of being an Asia Pacific state and the values this entails informs this identity. The cultural barrier and lack of common sentimentality and traditions which New Zealand shares with traditional partners prompted New Zealand to make efforts to strengthen cultural, diplomatic and economic relations with Japan. It will then analyse New Zealand’s moral identity, in which it’s “search for independence” created a national self-image which New Zealand presented externally as one which sought to be a moral example to the rest of the world. Domestic affairs and an emerging nationalism saw the evolution of a nuclear free norm and a broader identity of an environmentally responsible,
pacifist and strongly independent country. This identity has played a significant role in influencing New Zealand’s bilateral relations with Japan and has been the source of much of New Zealand’s conflict and disagreement with Japan, in particular the nuclear issue and Japan’s scientific whaling programme in the South Pacific Sea. Finally, it will consider how New Zealand’s democratic political system and culture with a strong commitment to multilateralism, a rules based international order and belief in a capitalist free market economy has formed a foundation upon which the bilateral relationship has been built. Ultimately, the thesis will demonstrate that New Zealand’s views of Japan, and therefore its interactions with the country, have been overwhelmingly shaped by its own domestic affairs and identity.
1 BACKGROUND AND EXTANT LITERATURE

1.1 Overview of Relations

In 2000, Foreign Affairs Minister Phil Goff said of the New Zealand-Japan relationship:

“Today our relationship with Japan is rich and multidimensional. Arguably no other Asian country has had more impact on our economy and our lifestyles than Japan. It is no exaggeration to say that the Japan-New Zealand relationship today is a fine example of both countries ability to establish ties across traditional cultural boundaries.”

While the claim that Japan is New Zealand’s most important trading partner in Asia may no longer true, it is clear that the Japan-New Zealand relationship is a unique one in the sense that Japan was the first country in which New Zealand was required to use a strategy to respond to Japan difference and ensure a mutually beneficial relationship. Subsequent close relations followed with other Asian nations, such as China, but Japan was the first Asian state which New Zealand encountered significant challenges which arose due to difference in history, language and culture. As Ann Trotter claims, New Zealanders have perceived Japan with varying degrees of “ignorance, interest, indifference and intensity.” Japan has evolved from “menace to major trading partner” and the New Zealand government and public had to consider a unique policy in its dealings with Japan.

Since World War Two New Zealand has maintained a close relationship with Japan and it has been one of the most important and beneficial relationships New Zealand has shared with any country. While the advantages of trade, cooperation and consultation have been more significant for New Zealand due to the disparities of size, influence and economic power, the Japanese still view this “strong, friendly, and co-operative bilateral relationship” as beneficial.

While the claim made in 1968 that “there is no country in Asia with which New Zealand has wider contacts than Japan” may have been true, and to an extent remained equally valid for many decades, it has also been clear from early relations that, “it is important not to disregard the very considerable differences of power and perspective between New Zealand and Japan

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3 Ibid.
4 Fumio Kishida, “From one island nation to another - let’s talk peace and prosperity,” The New Zealand Herald, 7/06/2013.
nor the variations of objective that already exist, or may develop, between them.” Despite the presence of many common characteristics, these differences in interests and perspectives have caused friction and challenges in the otherwise strong partnership.

These observations of New Zealand-Japan relations illustrate the reality of a strong yet strained relationship. The early economic contact between both countries built a foundation upon which further cultural and diplomatic ties were developed. Largely harmonious relations with regards to trade and security concerns have existed but tensions have arisen at various times since the 1950’s which arose primarily from moral and cultural differences. It is these differences which created a tense relationship at various points in the history of relations between both countries and caused the government to pursue policy choices that would minimise these differences to enable effective relations.

1.2 New Zealand Identity in Extant literature

Despite the increasing prominence of Constructivist scholarship and the role of identity in International Relations, few political scientists or historians have sought to understand New Zealand’s foreign policy using identity as an explanatory tool. As David Capie and Gerald McGhie state in *Representing New Zealand: Identity, Diplomacy and the Making of Foreign Policy*, literature on New Zealand’s foreign policy has been largely limited to historians and former diplomats. In their chapter, Capie and McGhie use the utility of identity as a means to understand New Zealand’s foreign relations, demonstrating the fluid nature of New Zealand’s self-identity and how specific national identities have played a role in foreign policy. Using case studies of the Pacific and the USSR the authors demonstrate that there is no single national identity which determines New Zealand’s foreign policy and relations with other states. The examples of the Pacific and the Soviet Union make apparent that New Zealand’s interactions with other countries are not shaped solely by the material factors of geography, size and resources. National interests are not ‘natural’ but rather are formed out of political processes which take into consideration what kind of country it is and ought to be as well as what New Zealand might gain or lose by certain interactions.

The authors identification of some key identities, including New Zealand’s identity being primarily shaped by its sense of itself as a small, geographically isolated ‘Western’ state that

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10 Ibid, p.238.
was closely linked to the United Kingdom, have influenced foreign policy and provide a valuable base on which to further explore national identity.\textsuperscript{11} Capie and McGhie also highlight the attempts to link changing perceptions of identity to developments in foreign policy, pointing to Jock Phillips analysis of the rise in confidence of New Zealanders and how this contributed to an ‘emerging nationalism’ in the 1980’s and its influence on the breakdown of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS).\textsuperscript{12} They also argue that there is no single ‘national identity’ which shapes foreign policy decisions and demonstrate how New Zealand’s sense of identity has evolved over the last seventy years and will continue to do so.\textsuperscript{13}

As mentioned, Capie and McGhie argue that there is no single ‘national identity’ which shapes New Zealand’s foreign policy decisions and this is demonstrated in the various national self-images which New Zealand has cultivated over the last century. This national identity is reflected in New Zealand’s perception of its international roles and relationships and its perception of other states. If identities are situational and dependent on the international context in which they are engaging,\textsuperscript{14} this is especially applicable to New Zealand given it’s characteristics as a small, geographically isolated state. However, as Capie and McGhie demonstrate, “determining the identity of a state or nation or who is inside and outside a given community is an inherently political and contested process.”\textsuperscript{15}

While there has been little analysis of identity in New Zealand foreign policy, there has been a particular focus on New Zealand’s search for ‘independence’. Malcolm McKinnon’s *Independence and Foreign Policy* covers the period 1935-1991 and uses the concept of independence as a framework of analysis to look at how New Zealand’s early foreign relations were shaped by its affiliation with the Commonwealth. This caused foreign policy to be shaped by two overarching factors, “vigorous assertion of interest”\textsuperscript{16} and independence as “a form of dissent.”\textsuperscript{17} Assertion of interest is seen as an “independence” in decision making or a way of “speaking up” to pursue its own advancement despite the influence of other actors, first commonwealth countries and later United Nations (UN) member states.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid. p.232.
\textsuperscript{13} Capie and McGhie, *New Zealand Identities: Belonging and Longing to Be*, p.231.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. p.232.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p.231
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. p.3.
The second form of independence, loyal dissent, is explained as "progressive critique of an existing patter, which did not, however, challenge its underlying structure." McKinnon argues that both these forms of independence have become central to New Zealand’s foreign policy history. This analysis of foreign policy issues such as the nuclear issue, sport, race and the commonwealth influence contribute to the overall understanding of the role the concept of independence has played in New Zealand’s foreign policy tradition. However, McKinnon’s writing is primarily an historical account and he argues that “it did not seem to me that the evolution of identity explained foreign policy, even that it had much to do with it.”

In *New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1945-88*, Jock Philips contributes to the literature on New Zealand’s identity by focusing on the disintegration of the ANZUS agreement with the United States as a result of New Zealand’s decision to deny entry to nuclear ships. Baker sees this period of New Zealand’s history as demonstrating the emergence of a “distinctive New Zealand national self-consciousness and a new vision of itself as Aoteroa, a Maori and South Pacific country and a moral exemplar to the world.” In Philip’s chapter he illustrates the considerable attitudinal change of New Zealanders prior to this period in history and discusses the significance of this to New Zealand’s relations with other countries. While a valuable contribution to the discussion of New Zealand national identity, Philips, like McKinnon, distances himself from the possible interpretation that his analysis of identity comes from a foreign policy perspective. According to Philips “history always seems to me to be about trade and capital flows and the detailed negotiations of very clever diplomats” and that his “perspective is not that of a foreign policy expert.” Notwithstanding the authors description of his chapter as an historical account and dismissal of it being a foreign policy analysis based in International Relations theory, his contribution to the literature on New Zealand national identity is a valuable foundation upon which to build further identity analysis. There have been few significant changes in the area of foreign policy with changes of political parties in government. James Headley and Andreas Reitzig argue that this is

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18 Ibid. p.3.
19 Ibid. p.xi.
23 Ibid. p. 184
because “over the past three decades, an idea of New Zealand’s role in the world and its foreign policy orientation has emerged which the two parties share: adherence to free trade; close economic and defence relations with Australia; a focus on the South Pacific and the wider Asia-Pacific region; a commitment to multilateral and international intuitions such as the UN, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Pacific Islands Forum; and the promotion of certain principles, such as nuclear disarmament, human rights and democracy.”

This bipartisan consensus on foreign policy reflects New Zealand’s identity which, while evolving, remains an identity that reflects the New Zealand situation as a whole. It is important to note that identity is “not a permanent and static possession” and that “the nation has from time to time be reinvented.” These shifting conceptions of national identity can be seen in the New Zealand-Japan relationship. Headley and Reitzig present a number of characteristics that potentially offer an insight into what constitutes the New Zealand national identity, “New Zealand can potentially be considered a member of the group of small states, of liberal democracies, of British settler societies or of South Pacific states. Gradually, the dominant conception has shifted from New Zealand being an outpost of the British Empire towards it becoming a fully independent state in the South Pacific.”

According to the authors, it is a mixture of these and other factors which create the dominant identity narratives which influence collective agents and individuals at many levels of policy and decision making.

Furthermore, in The Construction and Use of National Identity in Contemporary New Zealand Political Discourse, Peter Skilling argues that New Zealand “faced the global from a unique historical, cultural and geo-economic position.”

New Zealand’s late settlement as a nation and its geographic location and economic structure “has meant that the country has always had an identity constructed with one eye on global markets, investors and migrants.” This is important in understanding how New Zealand’s various national identities have been influenced by its situation as a modern democracy with little economic influence. Without the hard power to pursue interests by military or economic might, international reputation is important. Values therefore play a significant role in driving New

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Zealand foreign policy and explains New Zealand’s emphasis on supporting international institutions and the system of rules based international behaviour in order to encourage global stability and to attain New Zealand interests.  

If identities are situational and contextual as Capie and McGhie argue, New Zealand’s identity in the context of its relationship with Japan is particularly interesting, given both states simultaneous acceptance of being in Asia’s sphere while maintaining a distinct separateness.

Finally, in *Ethnicity, National Identity and ‘New Zealanders’*, Donna Cormack and Carey Robson look at the relationship between ethnicity, citizenship and national identity. They argue that in colonial societies such as New Zealand, “understandings of ‘race’ and ethnicity intersect with conceptualisations of national identity in both formal and informal ways.” The evolution of national identity in a settler context is the result of relations between “settlers, the Native Other and various other Others.” The authors argue that the creation of nations requires processes of inclusion and exclusion which is attained through the identification of difference, either formally through citizenship and immigration or informal processes. The authors see this marking of difference as fundamental to the development of relations between the white settler society and ‘natives’ in New Zealand, in addition to ‘non-native Others’. They point to the discriminatory legislation that was apparent in the 19th and 20th century and aimed at Chinese and other ‘undesirable’ immigrants, highlighting the claim that “physical exclusion of Chinese from New Zealand, and by extension from the intellectual construct of ‘New Zealand’, was instrumental in the formation of New Zealand’s national identity.” Therefore, demarcating who was considered as belonging, and who was not, was necessary in creating a national identity. Ultimately, the authors argue that the marking of the ‘native Other’ as different, and the “exclusion of and discrimination against the ‘alien Other’” have been central to the production of New Zealand’s national identity. Their work is a valuable contribution in understanding the construction of an identity within a society by looking at the role of ‘other’ in a domestic context. However, the role of identity

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33 Ibid. p.2.

34 According to the authors, ‘Other’ is used in this paper in its sociological sense to refer to “anyone and anything deemed capable of disrupting the social fabric and integrity of its imaginary identity: strangers, foreigners, intruders and so-called racial and ethnic minorities, for example.”


in an international context is largely not addressed and leaves room for this to be considered further.

New Zealand national identity has been analysed from various sociological, historical and political perspectives. These analyses all look at different aspects of New Zealand identity and do not come to any one conclusion, attributing significance to different factors. There has been no one single, comprehensive study which has summarized and explained the New Zealand identity, nor is there likely to be. There has been little consideration of the role of identity in foreign policy; attempting to identify and discuss a unified national identity which has shaped New Zealand’s foreign affairs would be a difficult task. Authors have explicitly distanced themselves from their analyses of New Zealand identity being used to explain New Zealand’s foreign relations. However, the wide ranging sociological, historical and political discussions surrounding the New Zealand identity in scholarship and literature provide a strong foundation upon which to build an analysis of the New Zealand identity which is useful in understanding New Zealand’s relationship with Japan. The extent to which New Zealand values and norms relating to the country’s national identity and interests have been explored still leave room for a further discussion in general, and to New Zealand’s relations with Japan in particular.

1.3 Japan and New Zealand Relations in Extant Literature

Ann Trotter argues that following the Second World War, New Zealanders perceptions of Japan have developed with varying levels of “ignorance, interest, indifference and intensity” as a result of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan changing from enemy to key trading partner. Ann Trotter’s comprehensive account of New Zealand-Japan relations in the years following the Second World War, *New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952*, draws upon primary sources to examine New Zealand’s role and influence in the Far Eastern crime trials, in the Commonwealth Occupation Force and in the Peace Treaty debate. Trotter highlights that while New Zealanders “consciousness of Japan” was limited in that people were largely ignorant of Japan and its culture up until the 1940’s, New Zealanders had strong opinions regarding Asia in general. Japanese and Chinese were seen as undesired immigrants as an anti-Asiatic stance had “been characteristic of a lengthy period of New Zealand history.” Immigration policy around this time reflected the attitudes towards Asian nations.

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41 Ibid. p.14.
that was based on a fear of the ‘yellow peril’ and a belief in the superiority of New Zealanders of British origin. Trotter points out that as late as 1954 the government’s stance on immigration policy was that “people whose stock originated in Britain shall always have the overwhelming predominance in the total people of New Zealand.”

New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952 gives a valuable account of the influence of New Zealand’s identity on its perception of Japan in the years immediately following World War Two, leaving room for further analysis of New Zealand’s changing perception of Japan and its people in the following decades. Ann Trotter has also contributed two more recent summaries of Japan-New Zealand relations in volumes two and three of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA) publication series New Zealand in World Affairs. In “From Suspicion to Growing partnership: New Zealand and Japan” and “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan” Trotter looks at the growing connections between the countries in addition to the disagreements from 1957 until 1990. She concludes, “It was clear in 1990 that the Japanese market and Japanese culture would continue to present opportunities and to provide a challenge to the abilities, initiative and sensitivity of all New Zealanders in the decades to come.”

A comprehensive study of New Zealand-Japan relations up until the late 1990’s can be found in Roger Perens (ed.) Japan and New Zealand: 150 Years which follows the relationship from the minimal contact in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, through the war years up until the 1990’s. In particular the contributors highlight the considerable change in the period from the 1970’s to the 1990’s which saw contact and partnership between the two countries increase dramatically as a result of a number of factors, including the development of Asia-Pacific cooperation in the 1990’s. Apparent during this period is the establishment of associations including “state-to-state, business-to-business and people-to-people relations” which is significant in that Japan was the first country outside the Anglo-European sphere in which New Zealand forged these links. Peren states that while “the categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’ remain a template which is resorted to when other explanations of phenomena are not to hand”, there are further developments in the relationship, “including a readiness to look on Japanese as people first and nationals of their

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country second.”45 Through an account of both Japan and New Zealand and the links between them at the time, the book recognises the mutual gains of a growing relationship and argues that it would be facilitated by an increased knowledge about Japan, including an improvement on the part of New Zealanders of the Japanese language.

Significant additions to the literature surrounding New Zealand-Japan relations from the 1950’s to the 1990’s include the comprehensive works of Marteen Wevers and Ian Kennedy, both former diplomatic representatives in the Japanese embassy who examine the domestic and external changes Japan experienced during this time and the links formed between the two countries. In Japan Its Future and New Zealand, published by the Institute of Policy Studies in 1988, Wevers explores how in a relatively short period of time Japan became a country that was of huge significance for New Zealand, while highlighting the contrasts in history and the difficulty in contending with the considerable differences between the societies, cultures and traditions of both countries.46 Wevers is careful to highlight that while the structure of Japanese society demonstrates considerable differences from New Zealand at the time, the differences should not obscure the many similarities.47 He correctly predicted that the relationship between the two countries would not be limited to economic areas and views New Zealand and Japan’s increasing contact and ties as constructive, amicable and forward looking.48 Following this is Ian Kennedy’s Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value which does not attempt to replicate the detail covered in Wevers work but rather examines the changes that occurred both within Japan and internationally since 1988, particularly regarding the implications of these changes for New Zealand.49 Ultimately, these two works give an account of both Japan and New Zealand, while looking at the range and nature of the links that were apparent between them at the time and the means by which New Zealand may forge more links. These reports were not intended to be limited to economic and trade matters and it covers a wide range of links between the two countries. It does, however, leave room for the role and influence of identity in creating these associations to be explored.

Perhaps the most recent overview of bilateral relations and potentially problematic disagreements is Andrew Sullivan’s Distant, Amicable and Enduring: The New Zealand Japan Relationship which argues that while the Japan-New Zealand relationship is beneficial

48 Ibid. p.10.
for both countries and has been long standing, it is also “largely asymmetric and indirect.” Political interests are for the most part shared but the economic relationship is relatively asymmetric. Cultural ties are strong and the two countries are linked through third parties in official security relations. Sullivan sees a strong future in this relationship but highlights potential influences such as bilateral disputes, changing regional power structures and a weakening trade relationship. The two countries have been able to maintain these beneficial relations through shared regional interests such as trade, tourism and education which have facilitated growing cultural ties. Sullivan argues that relations between the two countries also has the potential to influence the role both countries play in Asian regional institutions and networks. Shared interests in the Asia Pacific region has led to Japan and New Zealand supporting the common interest of stability in the region. Japan’s political sway has been sought by New Zealand which has less influence in the Asia Pacific. Sullivan also argues that for the most part political ties are based on shared regional interests and trade, tourism and education. A strong trade relationship and cultural ties have been facilitated through exchanges, education and tourism. However, Sullivan highlights that some issues, such as agricultural trade liberalisation, transport of nuclear weapons, fisheries management and most significantly the diplomatic issue of whaling, need to be addressed so the future relationship of the two countries is not threatened.

While theoretical framework has not been utilised in any significant way to understand the New Zealand-Japan relationship, scholars and observers have presented general assumptions and conclusions regarding the relationship. Namely, that the relationship has been strong since its inception, and based on economic ties. There has also been recognition that a number of disputes have arisen despite this relatively close relationship. The literature surrounding foreign policy post World War Two has largely focused on economic relations and the importance of trade. While this aspect of the relationship is undeniably important, the significance of values and norms in shaping the diplomatic relationship, the economic relationship and the development of people-to-people relations remains largely unexamined. Questions such as why disputes and challenges have arisen, and why the relationship has still remained strong despite these difficulties have not been clearly answered. The strength of the relationship is often attributed to strong economic ties, but in some cases the difficulties that both countries encountered threatened to disrupt these trading associations.

51 Ibid. pp.60-80.
These are questions that a general overview of relations in a historical or diplomatic sense fail to address fully. While New Zealand’s perception of Japan and Japanese people has been explored to some extent in the time following World War Two until the 1990’s, the influence of identity on these attitudes has not been comprehensively explored, nor has it been applied to how they have shaped foreign relations with Japan. The last two decades have seen little interest in literature regarding changing perceptions and developing people to people relations or an examination of how this has affected foreign policy choices or stances concerning relations with Japan.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Theoretical Framework

An investigation of the literature on New Zealand’s relationship with Japan as well as New Zealand’s foreign relations in a general sense reveals that the role of ideational factors have not been comprehensively explored. Norms and identity appear to some extent within cultural studies but the role of identity in bilateral relations is not prominent. This thesis will utilise the International Relations\textsuperscript{52} theory of Constructivism to explain the evolving relationship between New Zealand and Japan, in particular how values and norms have shaped New Zealand policies and diplomatic disputes with Japan.

Constructivism first emerged as a paradigm in International Relations in the 1980’s as a challenge to the established dominant theory of Realism. Scholars such as Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie and Peter Katzenstein emphasized the social construction of international politics, therefore presenting Constructivism as an alternative to the traditional theories of analysing International Relations such as Realism and Liberalism. Rational IR theory has largely dismissed factors such as national identity and culture as relatively unimportant factors in determining state behaviour. Classical Realist theory, such as that discussed in the work of Han J Morgenthau,\textsuperscript{53} argues that states actions are designed to promote their interests in terms of power, and that the reasons for this behaviour can be found in human nature itself. In this sense, material power in the form of military or economic strength is the most significant influence in international relations. The foundation of such Realist approaches was the notion that the accumulation of relative power in an international structure of anarchy informs states actions as a rational actor.\textsuperscript{55} Expanding on Morgenthau’s Classical Realist assumptions, Kenneth Waltz advanced Neorealism, or ‘structural’ Realism. This moved the focus away from human nature and instead focussed on the structure of the international system. Neorealism isolates internal factors from external factors in the international system in order to focus on the structure and how individual states seek to survive in an anarchic system.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{52} In this thesis, IR or International Relations refers to the discipline while international relations refers to what is understood as its empirical subject matter.
Both Realism and Neorealism argue that internal and domestic factors, such as identity, are relatively insignificant in determining and explaining state interests. Liberalism and Neoliberalism maintain this approach. However, while Realist approaches explain how states pursue their interests through conflictual means, Classical Liberalism and Neoliberalism maintain that self-interest is the primary motivator for state actions but that these actions can be promoted via either conflict or cooperation and that interests need to be analysed in a broader way than just survival and security. Neoliberalism focuses on the significance of international institutions and organisations and looks at how states and other actors are able to achieve cooperation through the growth of international institutions.\[58\] Neoliberal scholars such as Robert Keohane developed models that, like Neorealism, view states as unitary and rational actors. Keohane argues that if conflict exists, the “institutionalized patterns of cooperation are particularly in need of explanation.”\[59\] Neorealism and Neoliberalism share a number of assumptions and aim to demonstrate that it is possible for rational actors to cooperate in an anarchical system. However, Neoliberals consider states to focus on the absolute gains they receive from cooperation, while Neorealists assume that states will be concerned with the relative gains, or “how well the other states are doing as well as how it is doing.”\[60\] Neorealism and Neoliberalism are clearly more aligned than Classical Realism and Liberalism. While the latter disagree on the “harmony or disharmony of interests” and the “importance or unimportance of domestic structures”, both Neoliberalism and Neorealism base their theoretical assumptions on “the facts of anarchy and of the rational egoism of states.”\[61\] Therefore, Realism, Neorealism, Liberalism and Neoliberalism all maintain that rational interests are the starting point for an analysis of foreign policy.

Constructivism does not disagree with the notion that states act according to their interests or that their behaviour can be either conflictual or cooperative, but asks various questions that traditional theories do not consider, such as how state interests are determined. In this sense, Constructivism assumes that interests are not given or part of ‘nature’ but are socially determined and constructed so that the international system is based on “the ways in which human beings think and interact with one another.”\[62\] Rationalist theories are therefore

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\[61\] Ibid. p.47.

limited to an understanding of international politics based on static material assumptions and this fails to take into account the difference in interests which states exhibit in their interactions with other actors.

Nicholas Onuf first introduced the term constructivism in *World of Our Making* (1989), challenging the ascendancy of rational choice approaches to International Relations. Onuf aimed to emphasise the importance of social relations and incorporate political character into IR theory. He argued that “social relations make or construct people--ourselves--into the kind of beings that we are.” In this sense, he posits that people “make the world what it is, from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other.” When Onuf first introduced this term it referred broadly to postpositivist approaches and he put forward the idea of Constructivism as a way of understanding social relations as opposed to a theory. Onuf’s ideas were later popularized and turned into an IR theory by Constructivists such as Wendt, which allowed Constructivism to gain more prominence as a theory. In 1992, Alexander Wendt challenged the dominance of rational approaches to IR theory in *Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*. Wendt argued that the Realist and Neorealist notion of anarchy was not sufficient in explaining state interaction and behaviour. Wendt acknowledged the structural reality of anarchy in the international system but that it was individual actors which decided how to manage that anarchy, essentially that “anarchy is what states make of it”. He challenged the Neorealist and Neoliberal emphasis given to materialism, by demonstrating that the underlying attributes of structure are not given by nature but are instead constructed by social practice. Without a ‘given’ nature of the identities and interests of the actors in the international system, behaviour cannot be explained by anarchy and therefore the Neorealist conception of ‘structure’ cannot explain a great deal, “it does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on.” If anarchy cannot explain the behaviour of actors then Neorealism’s emphasis on the material structure of the international system is illogical.

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66 Ibid.
67 Dunne, Kurki and Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, p.172.
69 Ibid. p.396.
70 Ibid. pp.396–399
Constructivist approach at a time when established IR theory could not sufficiently explain events following the end of the Cold War. Both Realism and Liberalism had failed to predict the events and could not clearly explain them, which contributed to legitimating Constructivist theories. Following the Cold War, the most significant issue was understanding how different groups perceived their identities and interests.\textsuperscript{72} The end of the Cold War allowed Constructivists such as Wendt to argue for the importance of social learning in IR theory and use the historical events to demonstrate the lack of ‘natural’ interests in world politics. Ultimately, traditional IR theories emphasize external factors in explaining international interactions and the perceived weaknesses of mainstream theoretical approaches led to an increasing emphasis on the domestic and social sources of foreign policy. Constructivism highlighted the relevance and influence of a state’s national characteristics on the states relations with other actors.

However, there are many debates within the adherents to Constructivism in IR and it is problematic to view it as one single, homogenous theory. There are many strands within Constructivism and an understanding of these different divisions is important for an understanding of it as a theoretical framework as a whole. It is also necessary in order to identify the analytical framework which guides this thesis. The debates within the Constructivist school will first be outlined, followed by the central Constructivist tenets which form the foundation of it as a theory and distinguish it from traditional approaches. Finally, a discussion of the Constructivist approach that will form the analytical framework of this thesis will be presented.

Perhaps the most commonly discussed division among constructivist approaches is the differentiation between the strands of critical and conventional Constructivism.\textsuperscript{85} Reus-Smit asserts that “constructivism is divided ... between those who remain cognizant of the critical origins and potentiality of their sociological explorations, and those who have embraced constructivism simply as an explanatory or interpretive tool.”\textsuperscript{86} In this sense, conventional Constructivism is viewed as occupying the middle ground between rational and post structural theories and is distinguished from its critical alternatives which include poststructuralism.\textsuperscript{87} Important in this distinction is the role of ontology and epistemology.

\textsuperscript{87} Dunne, Kurki and Smith (eds.) \textit{International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity}, p.172.
Constructivists disagree with the individualist ontology of rationalism which treats the individual as the central unit of analysis. Instead, Constructivism is based on a social ontology, “they emphasize how ideational or normative structures constitute agents and their interests.” Conventional Constructivists differ in ontology but do not diverge in any significant way from rational approaches on the issues of epistemology or methodology. In this sense, while adopting an intersubjective ontology, conventional Constructivism accepts the assumptions of a positivist approach which includes hypothesis testing, causality and explanation. Ultimately, conventional Constructivists concentrate on a social ontology which differentiates them from mainstream IR theory, but they utilize a positivist epistemology. Critical Constructivists differ due to their focus on the role of critical social theory in Constructivism. They reject the positivist approach of conventional Constructivism and emphasize a postpositivist approach. Therefore, rather than focusing on how identities influence state behaviour, they seek to understand how these identities are socially constructed. This approach highlights discourse and linguistic methods and how language relates to the social construction of identities and interests and emphasizes the lack of empirical analysis in conventional Constructivism. To summarize, conventional Constructivists aim to understand how identities are possible causes of action while critical Constructivism seeks to explore how these identities are created and “elaborate on how people come to believe in a single version of a naturalized truth.”

In *The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory*, Ted Hopf outlines this relationship between the two strands by highlighting the features of critical social theory that constructivism has retained or developed. One area in which conventional and critical Constructivists diverge is the origins of identity. Hopf explains this difference, “conventional Constructivists accommodate a cognitive account for identity, or offer no account at all, critical Constructivists are more likely to see some form of alienation driving the need for identity.” In other words, conventional Constructivism identifies the existence of identities and seeks to understand their effects and articulate how those identities can indicate certain

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89 Ibid, p.171.
91 Dunne, Kurki and Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, p.172.
92 Ibid.
94 Dunne, Kurki and Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, p.173.
97 Ibid. pp.184.
actions, whereas critical Constructivists use critical social theory to further understand the origins of identity. The ‘critical’ school is prominent in Europe and is associated with concepts of norms and identity while the conventional approach is dominant in the United States and is seen to concentrate on ideas surrounding power and discourse. 99

These two strands are discussed further in how they differ with regard to the importance given to the role of ‘difference’ in the construction of identity. Bahar Rumelili highlights the difference in these two schools of IR constructivism, labelling them liberal and critical Constructivism. 103 Liberal Constructivism is founded in the ideas of symbolic interactionism, in the sense that identities are formed through a process of socialisation in which an individual perceives themselves in the way others do. 104 Therefore, liberal Constructivism is focused on state socialisation. The social structure of international relations is established through norms, institutions, ideas and collective meanings and states “come to see themselves and each other in terms of the subject positions that are constituted by the social structure of international politics.” 105 If democracy is an identity that is socially constructed through the norms, ideas and collective meanings which define it, then states become ‘democratic’ only if these characteristics are recognised by other states. Critical Constructivism differs from liberal Constructivism by constituting identity in relation to difference. Rather than arguing for the existence of objective social structures, critical constructivism highlights that discourses on norms, ideas and collective meanings are understood in relation to what they oppose. For example, in order for democracy to be a recognised identity, it is necessary to presuppose an opposite identity, non-democracy. 106

Another way in which Constructivists differ in their approach to the theory concerns the level of analysis used. Constructivism has been categorised into the three divisions of systemic, unit level and holistic. Systemic constructivism concentrates on interactions between unitary state actors in the international system, as opposed to non-systemic factors such as domestic politics. While this approach acknowledges pre-social interests such as an interest in survival, it deemphasizes domestic sources of state identity like political culture in favour of the system wide structures in creating identities. The writings of Wendt

103 See Bukh (2009). Bukh identifies the liberal branch as corresponding to conventional or “thin” constructivism in opposition to critical or post-structural constructivism.
105 Ibid. p.31.
106 Ibid.
exemplifies this systemic constructivist approach. Unit level Constructivism differs by focusing on the role of domestic sources rather than systemic pressures in accounting for state identities and interests. According to Reus-Smit, this approach concentrates on “the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states”, with Katzenstein and Hopf utilizing this framework. Finally, holistic Constructivism attempts to integrate both domestic and international structures to explain how state identities and interests are constituted. Martha Finnemore uses this approach in her work on how internationally driven identities can affect state identities. By looking at how the domestically created identities interact with the norms of international society, holistic Constructivism offers “a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and the international as two faces of a single social and political order.” This approach is apparent in the writings of John G. Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil.

In addition to the differences between Constructivists concerning the level of analysis and ontology, Reus-Smit argues there are also different approaches regarding methodology. This distinction includes ‘positivist’ and interpretive or ‘postpositivist’ Constructivists. Positivist scholars focus on “uncovering top-down/deductive mechanisms and causal relationships between actors, norms, interests and identity.” Interpretivist or “post positivist” use inductive research methods “that targets the reconstruction of state/agent identity, with the methods encompassing a variety of discourse-theoretic techniques.” Conventional Constructivists are associated with positivism while interpretivist scholars are aligned to critical constructivism.

While the differences in these strands of Constructivism are clear, they all recognize the role of identities, ideas and culture in International Relations. It is apparent that Constructivists have not “sung from a single hymn sheet” but they converge in their critique of the static material arguments put forward by traditional IR theory. They emphasize social elements

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115 Dunne, Kurki and Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, p.169.
and argue that there is no one single mind-set of ‘rationality’ within a state and that ideological causes such as different national identities with shared norms can explain the non-homogeneity of states actions and behaviour, rather than the external, material causes that Realism and Liberalism give importance to, such as security and trade. The main assumptions which challenge rationalist theories are as follows.

First, Constructivists argue there is no one single objective reality. Traditional IR theory concentrates on identifying regularities and ways in which states are the same. Constructivism suggests difference in identities and interests emerge among all states as a result of social construction.120

Constructivism highlights the social dimension of international relations and emphasize the significance of norms, beliefs, ideas, concepts, rules, languages and discourses. These social environments are constituted through differences among people and how they are influenced by collective social institutions.121 Actors do not function independently from these social environments, state interests develop from them and therefore shape the actors interaction with others in the international system.122 In other words, state interests are a reflection of state identities and these identities are shaped by norms and shared beliefs. These identities are not “fixed but relative and relational.”123

Finally, the international system is viewed as socially constructed and not pre-given. As Onuf suggests, international relations is “a world of our making.” 124 Constructivists emphasize the role of interaction, with an international system that “is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place.” 125 While actors may not be able to choose their circumstances, through the process of interaction with other actors, they make choices which “bring historically, culturally and politically distinct ‘realities’ into being.” 126 The material environment is still important, but states interpret it according their intersubjective beliefs. States do not react as rational individuals as traditional theories suggest but interact in a system which is socially constructed.

120 Ibid. p.168.  
122 Ibid.  
123 Ibid. p.33.  
126 Dunne, Kurki and Smith (eds.) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, p.169.
Identity can be defined in different ways. Peter Katzenstein define it as “images of individuality and distinctiveness (‘selfhood’) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others’.”\textsuperscript{128} This self-identity then shapes a states behaviour as the state attempts to act in a way that is consistent with a particular identity.\textsuperscript{129} For example, according to Wendt, “it matters whether Europeans define themselves primarily in national or continental terms; whether Germany and Japan redefine their pasts in ways that encourage their adopting more active international roles; and whether the United States embraces or rejects its identity as ‘global policeman’.”\textsuperscript{130} The importance of the ‘other’ is another significant factor in a constructivist analysis, in the view of Adler and Barnett, “national and state identities are formed in relationship to other nations and states… the identities of political actors are tied to those outside the boundaries of the community and the territory respectively.”\textsuperscript{131} Wendt explores this idea that a states behaviour must be considered in relation to how it views itself with regards to other states, relations between states is therefore “an on-going process of states taking identities in relation in Others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the result.”\textsuperscript{132}

2.2 The Significance of Constructivism in Understanding New Zealand-Japan Relations

The above analysis of Constructivism as an International Relations theory will provide a framework with which to explore the role of identity in New Zealand foreign policy with Japan. Firstly, this thesis will use a holistic Constructivist approach. Domestic variables have informed a large part of New Zealand identity but this has been shaped by internationally driven identities in the form of external pressures and New Zealand’s involvement in international and regional organisations. New Zealand’s interests are based on domestic social discourses but this previously constructed identity is affected by interaction at the systemic level. The analytical framework is informed by a conventional Constructivist approach. Therefore, a deductive methodology will be utilized to examine causal

\textsuperscript{129} Capie and McGhie, \textit{New Zealand Identities: Belonging and Longing to Be}, p.231.
\textsuperscript{130} Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” p.41.
relationships between actors, norms, interests and identity. It will analyse the role of norms and identity in shaping New Zealand-Japan relations by using a social ontology without diverging in any significant way from rationalist approaches in terms of epistemology. The social structure of New Zealand’s relations with other states is formed through established norms, institutions, ideas and collective meanings. New Zealand sees itself and other states in terms of these factors and states recognise these factors in their interaction with New Zealand. The norms, values and ideas which inform New Zealand’s national identity are causes of action which can be used to understand New Zealand’s interaction with other states. The key traits which inform the New Zealand national identity as a whole will be identified and their role in shaping New Zealand’s foreign policy with Japan will be analysed.

Constructivism as an IR theory provides a useful tool in understanding how specific identities are produced by domestic factors and how these identities then shape New Zealand’s interests and behaviour. The ways in which New Zealand views of Japan have been overwhelmingly influenced by its own domestic affairs and identity can be analysed using this framework of understanding. While ‘rational’ or ‘natural’ material interests such as trade, power and security are apparent in the relationship, they cannot sufficiently explain the development of Japan-New Zealand relations, nor the diplomatic interaction and challenges between both countries. A Rationalist approach would overlook the domestic political development of New Zealand and how this provides an understanding of foreign policy decisions that cannot be explained by materialism alone, such as the refusal of nuclear ships or the country’s emphasis on involvement in international organisations.

While strong trading ties have created a foundation upon which the New Zealand-Japan relationship is built, identity has largely shaped this economic interaction. Rationalist theories offer little in the way of explaining the diplomatic difficulties New Zealand encountered in its dealings with Japan in the latter half of the twentieth century, such as the environmental disputes during this time. Although economic relations were strong, misunderstandings and challenges in communication and diplomatic interaction arose due to a difference in values which cannot be explained by material interests alone. New Zealand’s desire to engage with Japan on a closer and more personal level, and the policies initiated as a result of this, can also only be fully understood from the perspective of New Zealand’s evolving identity and the interaction of the various traits of this national identity. For instance, New Zealand’s gradual move away from strong association with Britain and
the imperial, colonial values this represented to be being seen as an open, tolerate and socially liberal country with a multicultural identity. A difference in values also created conflict and tension in New Zealand’s relations with Japan over the issue of nuclear power in New Zealand and Japan’s scientific whaling programme. These disputes were driven not by material interest but by values, values which in fact threatened the material interests. By looking at significant aspects of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan during this time it is possible to analyse the extent to which these factors were influenced by New Zealand’s own self-identity. The significance of analysing key issues in the New Zealand-Japan relationship, and drawing conclusions on how the past relations have developed into the current relationship, offers insight to the evolutionary nature of the relationship and how this has reflected changes in New Zealand perceptions of Japan.
3 NEW ZEALAND IDENTITY

3.1 Identity One: A Historically Cultural British Identity

The identification by many authors of New Zealand’s sense of identity being primarily shaped by its sense of itself as a small, geographically isolated ‘Western’ state that is closely linked to that of the United Kingdom is useful. These factors have influenced foreign policy and provide a valuable base on which to further explore national identity.

New Zealand’s colonial history and the outcome of World War Two has had a significant influence on New Zealand’s identity and foreign policy. Following World War Two New Zealand maintained a close relationship with Britain and the commonwealth due to various economic, political and sociological factors. Identifying largely with the characteristics of being a small, remote, rural and economically restricted country, New Zealand avoided the international politics and alliances which saw Australia become increasingly aligned with the United States. However, these self-identities arguably encouraged a “psychology of dependence” on powerful but distant states, initially Britain and then increasing with the United States.

Many shared symbols and stories which formed the basis of a New Zealand national identity have been shaped by a sense of ‘Britishness’ which drew on imperialistic and colonial values.

The way in which New Zealand has maintained a sense of “Britishness” and the values both countries share is illustrated in the New Zealand Government’s description of its ties with Britain:

“The relationship between New Zealand and the UK has, since the earliest years, been based on complex trading and financial links, warm relations and a detailed understanding of each other and the way we do business. Our close ties have endured through times of prosperity and of hardship. We share many perceptions of the world at large. Our soldiers have fought side by side in two World Wars, and have worked together as peacekeepers around the globe. Commerce between us is facilitated by our shared language and history, our common legal and cultural backgrounds, making working together easy and congenial.”


159 Cormack and Robson, Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’, p.2.

These values which were derived from common cultural norms can offer explanations as to why New Zealand involved itself in Britain’s wars and why New Zealand has been described as a “reluctant nation”. New Zealand’s strong attachment to the UK created some reluctance to pursue an entirely independent policy in foreign relations.162

In the early years of contact with Japan, New Zealand maintained strong symbolic and material ties with Europe. Cormack and Robson argue that “white settler” values and norms are reinforced through the institutional links, dominant language, the holidays that are celebrated and constitutional arrangements.163 The importance of loyalty to, and dependency on, Britain were values which were manifest in the early New Zealand national identity. From British settlement until the mid-twentieth century, New Zealand’s view of Britain as ‘Home’ and the imperial values this entailed became the core of the country’s identity at the time. New Zealand’s foreign policy and military commitments reflected this loyalty to the British Empire, including the county’s involvement in the Boer War, and both World Wars.164 New Zealand’s sacrifice in these conflicts demonstrated New Zealand’s commitment to the values and norms which Britain represented, such as liberal democracy, a commitment to a rules based international order an a free market economic system. These values underly the development of New Zealand’s democratic political culture and commitment to being a ‘good international citizen’, which will be explored later in the chapter. Another norm and value system upon which the “Britain of the South Seas” mentality was built was the belief in a form of racial hierarchy.165 The ethnic composition of New Zealand was predominantly formed through immigration from the United Kingdom and many New Zealanders claimed to be ‘native-born Britons’, or ‘New Zealanders and Britons’. Sinclair points to a book entitled Nation Making. A Story of New Zealand Savagism v. Civilisation, in which a settler wrote that the “‘English race’ had been the pre-eminent ‘Mother and Maker of Nations’ in modern times.”166 The settler population emphasised the idea of “superior stock” which was enabled through its ties with Britain.167 James Belich suggests that in early colonial New Zealand, the “game was to demonstrate New Zealand

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163 Cormack and Robson, Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’, p.23.
164 Vaughn, The United States and New Zealand: Perspectives on a Pacific Partnership, p.37.
165 A discussion of Maori identity, New Zealand as a bicultural state and the influence of this on national identity can be can be found in Vaughn (2012) and Cormack and Robson (2010).
167 Cormack and Robson, Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’, p.2.
distinctiveness, even qualitative though not quantitative superiority.”  

168 The homogeneity which resulted from British immigration was accentuated, with the idea the New Zealand was “98.5 percent British” in order to market New Zealand as a desirable place for settlement. This led to the manipulation of statistics in order to conceal the numbers of other ethnic and racial groups such as the Irish and Chinese, and portray New Zealand as a “Better Britain.”  

169 As James Belich and Lydia Wevers argue, a good way to find out “what countries think they are is by looking at who and what they try to keep out”, and for much of New Zealand’s history the country’s immigration policy reflected ethnic prejudices and the notion of maintaining a “Better British New Zealand, if not a wholly white one.”  

170 In the first half of the twentieth century New Zealand was described as “Britain’s other farm” and the population was over 90 per cent European, principally of British origin.  

Initially New Zealand was hesitant to join regional security agreements with non-Western states in the Asia Pacific region. One senior New Zealand diplomat held the view in 1949 that “New Zealand does not look upon itself as an Asiatic Government but rather as an extension into the southern Pacific of Western Europe.”  

180 Following the Second World War, regional defence concerns arose as a result of the demise of the Chian Kai Chek government in China and the 1950 Korean War. As Capie and McGhie argue, New Zealand struggled with the notion of reconciling its identification of itself as a British or European nation with its role in the Pacific. It didn’t readily join regional security agreements with ‘Asiatic’ states such as the Philippines.  

181 After the Second World War the British influence in the Asia Pacific region began to decline while links with the United States became increasingly significant, reaching a peak with the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. Despite New Zealand’s growing relationship with the United States, its links with Britain did not diminish.  

182 At this time, Walter Nash’s observation that “history has shaped New Zealanders into a people British in sentiment, tradition and economic interest” was still apparent but New Zealand was forced to contend with reconciling its sense of British and

169 Cormack and Robson, Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’, p.3.  
180 Corner cited in Capie and McGhie, New Zealand Identities: Belonging and Longing to Be, p.233.  
181 Capie and McGhie, New Zealand Identities: Belonging and Longing to Be, p.233.  
182 Ibid. p.232.  
183 McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935, p.26
European identity with its increasing prominence in the Pacific and Asia.

In the decades following the Second World War, a growing number of factors began to influence this staunchly British influence on New Zealand’s identity. Baker’s interest in identity change, international relationships and the ‘national filter’s’ people of each country apply to relationships offers a further analysis of how New Zealand’s national identity has been shaped and how it is demonstrated. Jock Philips’ article, *New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1945-88*, looks at the individual factors that have shaped New Zealand’s perceptions of the outside world and how this outlook has been influenced by consensus or internal differences. One of the most significant aspects of New Zealand’s identity which Phillips identifies is the easily observable, decreasing British involvement in the country, specifically news, television, films and books and therefore an easily observable rise in “a self-confident national culture.” It was clear in a 1974 brief for the visit of a Prime Minister of Japan to New Zealand that the country had “taken a new look at [itself] in recent years.” Specifically, this different view of New Zealand’s place in the world could be attributed to the shift away from traditional ties with Britain and the end of the bipolar world.

According to a 1974 brief for the visit to New Zealand of the Prime Minister of Japan, New Zealand saw itself as a South Pacific country with vital interests in East and South-East Asia. While New Zealand may not have been geographically part of Asia, the country was in Asia’s area of influence. The claim at this time was, “For a long time we saw Asia through other peoples eyes – first British eyes and then America eyes. Now we are consciously setting out to see things through our own eyes.” However, the report is careful to point out that New Zealand was not about to part company with its ‘Western friends’, but instead create a more independent foreign policy by forging new associations which inevitably prompted a shift in balance and perspective.

The decline of British influence did not lead to New Zealand seeking a new overseas replacement, such as the United States, but rather a new focus on our own history and traditions. According to Phillips this came about as the population of New Zealand became

185 Phillips, ‘New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing national self perceptions, 1945-88,’ p.188.
186 MFAT: New Zealand External Relations Japan, Brief for the visit to New Zealand of the Prime Minister of Japan, October 28-31, 1974, Agenda 3: Regional Questions: New Zealand Foreign Policy Towards Asia/Pacific NZ Commission: Hong Kong Jan 74 – Dec 74, 64/10/1.
187 MFAT: Brief for the visit to New Zealand of the Prime Minister of Japan, 64/10/1.
188 Ibid.
capable of generating its own norms, largely as a result of an increasingly highly educated workforce which allowed the country to engage more internationally and created a new social class.\textsuperscript{189} Phillips’s argument, therefore, is that “since World War II New Zealand has seen the emergence of a new social class, and this class has the self-confidence and intellectual training to start producing visions and goals for itself.”\textsuperscript{190} This gradual transition away from Britain’s sphere of influence will be discussed later in the chapter.

It has also been suggested by Trotter that during the years following the war, New Zealanders thought in terms of the ‘tyranny of distance’ which disconnected them from ‘kin’ in other parts of the world. Therefore, the feeling of remoteness is argued as influencing the New Zealand psyche. Elements such as New Zealand’s bush, mountains and the surrounding ocean heightened New Zealand’s sense of being a remote nation and as a result of this, “of the peoples who lived on its rim and inhabited its small islands to their north, the average New Zealander knew very little.”\textsuperscript{191} This feeling of remoteness and isolation would have arguably contributed to New Zealand realisation that it was far from Europe and instead was surrounded by Asian and Pacific nations with different values and norms than Britain.

The identity discussed above, which was formed through New Zealand’s historical and cultural ties with Britain, was most apparent during the early years of contact with Japan. However, the colonial and ‘British’ values and norms which had shaped the New Zealand identity up to this point would come to have less significance as the emergence of a strong, Asia Pacific identity became prominent in New Zealand society.

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid. p.190.
\textsuperscript{191} Trotter, \textit{New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952}, p.8.
3.2 Identity Two: Construction of an Asian Pacific Identity

Demographic changes in the last three decades have begun to redefine what constitutes being a New Zealander and the country’s place in the Asia Pacific region. It has also raised the need to re-evaluate New Zealand’s national identity and the increasing role that ties with Asia have had in redefining New Zealand’s self-image as presented externally. While a burgeoning Asian identity can be found almost since the establishment of ties with Japan, New Zealand’s Asian identity was established in a tangible way during the major debates which led to the hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Auckland in 1999.\textsuperscript{192} Since then, New Zealand’s Asia Pacific identity has continued to develop in various spheres. The 2013 brochure for New Zealand’s bid for membership on the United Nations Security Council refers to the “distinct Asia-Pacific identity” New Zealand demonstrates and draws on this “multicultural, Asia-Pacific identity” as a strength.\textsuperscript{193} During a speech to mark the Asia New Zealand Foundation’s twentieth anniversary in 2014 anniversary the foundation’s executive director, John McKinnon, made the following observation about the organisations formation:

“\textit{It was established at one of those seminal moments, which seem to occur about every ten years or so, when New Zealand ‘discovers’ Asia. Or, put more correctly, when the political leaders of the time recognised that there was a gap between our interactions with Asia and our knowledge of it, and by ‘our’ they meant not just, or even mainly, the official community which engaged with Asia but the broader New Zealand world who were caught up in it, whether they knew it or not.”}\textsuperscript{199}

Clearly, in the last decade New Zealand had begun to acknowledge the increasing role of Asia in its future and that improving knowledge and encouraging interaction with Asian nations would be beneficial. The thesis will take a close look at how New Zealand came to realise the emergence of this new identity and see the importance of reconciling existing national identities with that of a new Asian identity and the values this represented.

By the 1960’s the New Zealand identity had begun to take on new dimensions. There was a move away from the British connection which had shaped New Zealand’s self-image and a stronger sense of an identity located in the South Pacific. Central to this developing Asia

Pacific identity was a growing emphasis on the value of diversity with the emergence of debates surrounding the issue of whether New Zealand was a bicultural or multicultural nation. A significant part of this was also if New Zealand was to perceive itself as an Asian nation, a Pacific state or a country that was still part of the United Kingdom. In the decades which followed the 1960’s there was a growing sense that New Zealand was an Asia Pacific nation and that this should be reflected in its foreign policy and relations with other countries. Part of this desire to be an Asia Pacific nation was the need to embrace the idea of New Zealand as a multicultural society with ties to other regional states. This view of New Zealand as a multicultural society rested on the values of wanting to be viewed as tolerant and open with importance placed on social liberalism. This belief in the value of multiculturalism was illustrated in 2002 when Prime Minister Helen Clark described New Zealand as “a land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity.” Changes in immigration policies from the 1980’s reflected a strong departure from early New Zealand values of based on a white settler society towards one which celebrated a socially liberal, open and tolerant society. This brought visible changes to the country’s demography and New Zealanders faced the challenge of reconciling a largely bicultural society with that of a multicultural society. Bruce Robert Vaughn highlights how changes in the constitutional and cultural position of Maori people in New Zealand being more incorporated into the national identity changed the country’s view of itself as a “small corner of England out in the Pacific.” New Zealand began to recognise and incorporate Maori identities which created a more inclusive national identity and allowed the country to increase links with the Pacific and Asia. According to Vaughn, “the demographics of New Zealand’s growing Māori, Pacific Islander and Asian populations will likely continue to influence New Zealand’s national identity.”

An understanding of New Zealand’s Asia Pacific identity and the values and norms this identity is centred on is important in order to understand New Zealand’s regional interests and approach to foreign policy in the Asia Pacific region. Due to the increasing sense of New Zealand as an Asian Pacific nation, there is a norm that New Zealand will involve itself and play a constructive role in regional concerns. This expectation of involvement and values

201 Ibid. p.5
203 Vaughn, The United States and New Zealand: Perspectives on a Pacific Partnership, p.5
204 Ibid.
based in New Zealand as a multicultural and involved neighbour in the region has influenced, and will continue to influence, the country’s future engagement in the region.

**A Pacific Identity**

In looking at New Zealanders perceptions of themselves around the time of the Second World War, Trotter argues that the growth of New Zealand’s ‘Pacific consciousness’ and the country’s identification of itself as a Pacific nation were a significant part of “a more confident late twentieth-century New Zealand nationalism.” 206 However, this psychological realisation of the country as a Pacific nation was a slow and gradual one. It was not until the breakdown of ANZUS and Britain entering the European Common Market in the 1970s that New Zealand began to embrace its role as a Pacific nation. There was a growing acknowledgement that New Zealand “took a long time to make up its mind that it was a Pacific country, not a European outpost.” 207

The development and manifestation of this identity has been apparent in many ways. New Zealand’s South Pacific identity is another aspect of self-perception which was developed largely in the decades following the fall of Singapore when New Zealand began to look to the Pacific Rim countries of Southeast Asia, Japan and the United States. While New Zealand may have increasingly looked geographically towards Asia, Western economic and political interests were still promoted and this was the foundation of the country’s involvement in Korea, Malaya, Singapore and Vietnam. Philips highlights this South Pacific identity as being significant as “it has strengthened a self-perception of New Zealand as another island of surf and sun, a paradise that should be protected from outside pollution.” 209

However, Trotter argues that the outbreak of war in the Pacific caused New Zealand to consider its geographical position in a way it had not before and how it would fit into this new perception of the region. It seemed to Trotter that New Zealanders did not see themselves specifically as a pacific nation and were susceptible to forgetting that New Zealand was a Pacific country in any way. 210

The evolution of New Zealand’s understanding of its role in the Pacific and as a Pacific nation is an integral part of its national identity. Its emergence was apparent as early as 1941, when A.J. Campbell of the Christchurch Teachers Training College made the observation

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that, “The Pacific seems to be the part of the world of which New Zealanders know least and in which they are least interested. Perhaps it is because we think of ourselves in terms of Great Britain and not of ourselves as a Pacific power …. It is necessary to think deeply of the Pacific.”

In 1944, the Listener asserted that New Zealand had been placed in the Pacific, not the Atlantic Ocean, and this was an important realisation to make. In the editorial titled ‘We belong to the Pacific’, it projected “Whether we realize it or not, like it or not, we have to find our place in a world occupied for centuries by tens of millions of Orientals.”

New Zealand’s relationship with Pacific nations has been a significant one that has demonstrated New Zealand values such as supporting security and prosperity in the region. It has demonstrated this support with diplomatic engagement in places such as Bougainville, Timor-Leste, and The Solomon Islands. A 2007 White Paper titled “Our Future with Asia” recognized four specific challenges which New Zealand needed to address, one of which was “Being a good neighbour”. These values which New Zealand’s ‘rules based’, democratic identity dictates are apparent in the country’s 2010 White Paper which states: “It is in New Zealand’s interest to play a leadership role in the South Pacific for the foreseeable future, acting in concert with our South Pacific neighbours. A weak or unstable South Pacific region poses demographic, economic, criminal, and reputational risks to New Zealand ... It will remain in our interests for Pacific Island states to view New Zealand as a trusted member and friend of the Pacific community.”

While rational, material based interests no doubt come into play in New Zealand’s engagement with the Pacific, the country’s evolving national values with regards to the traits of a growing affinity with Asia-Pacific states, as well as New Zealand’s role as a ‘good neighbour’, have shaped these interactions. The weakening of governments and trade have caused New Zealand to become involved in the Pacific region, to prevent any adverse effects on New Zealand as well as to uphold ideals, demonstrating the relationship between rational interests and identity values.

New Zealand’s origins as a country with Polynesian and Maori people, increasing immigration from Pacific nations, in addition to its geo-political position, has formed a
foundation of New Zealand’s identification as a Pacific nation. Official functions often involve traditional Maori customs and traditions and New Zealand has a Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs which supports the social, economic and culture development of Pacific people in New Zealand. Vaughn argues that while the country’s colonial ties to the United Kingdom once dominated the official view of New Zealand’s national identity, there was increasing “political space” for other traits to contribute to shaping New Zealand’s self-image and that this is a key aspect of the country’s evolving identity. 216

An Asia Identity

New Zealand’s developing self-perception as an Asian nation has contributed to shaping the country’s values in international affairs. An ‘independence of action’ has become a value in New Zealand foreign relations and has influenced New Zealand’s support for the UN, closer ties with the United States, and a Free Trade Agreement with China. This is in addition to its strong policies regarding climate change, the environment and nuclear issues. 217 This is a clear indication of New Zealand’s move away from identifying with a foreign policy aligned with Britain to one which is centred on New Zealand having a constructive, strong and independent foreign policy approach to the Asia Pacific region.

Andrew Butcher explores the idea of “demography, diaspora and diplomacy” as being connected. 218 Butcher argues that New Zealand’s future engagement with Asia will be shaped by both the country’s geographical proximity to the area as well as New Zealand’s increasing Asian minority population. As demographic changes occur and the Asian population of New Zealand begin to involve themselves politically with both their country of origin and New Zealand this will, according to Butcher, “shape, in profound and yet undetermined ways, how New Zealand as a nation relates to the Asian region and its peoples within its own borders.” 219 This growth in numbers and significance of New Zealand’s Asian population will therefore have a significant influence on New Zealand’s national identity and public policy. He argues it will present challenges such as “terrorism, natural disasters and self-inflicted troubles” as well as the opportunities it offers. As the number of New Zealanders who identify with an Asian identity will continue to grow over the coming

216 Vaughn, The United States and New Zealand: Perspectives on a Pacific Partnership, p.5.
217 Ibid. p.36.
219 Ibid. p.152.
decades, which statistical projections suggest they will, Butcher argues that this will raise a number of questions regarding what a growing Asian-Pacific demographic will mean for New Zealand’s national identity and foreign policy. What connections they will have with other ethnic groups? What role might they play politically? How might they distinguish themselves and be distinguished by others from migrant populations from Asia? What about those who share Asian-Pacific ethnicities? Butcher contends these are significant questions for New Zealand’s future and are “unique to New Zealand’s history, central to New Zealand’s identity, crucial for the measure of New Zealand’s various ethnicities and necessary to both ask and answer to understand New Zealand’s place in the world.”

Another component in the development of an Asia Pacific identity is the relationship New Zealand has with other states in the region. Butcher raises the issue of how diplomatic challenges are presented as a result of New Zealand’s growing involvement in Asia, in terms of both New Zealand’s increasing Asian population and the growing numbers of New Zealanders living in Asia. He points to the diplomatic challenges New Zealand has faced with China as an example of this. The controversy leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the protests against human rights abuses as a situation in which New Zealand and China encountered conflict as a result of different values. Anti-China sentiment was again expressed in 2010 when negative feelings towards Asia were attributed to China’s interest in purchasing portions of the Crafar dairy farms. This anti-China rhetoric was expressed by the media and politicians as well as the general public. While the mainstream rhetoric was rarely explicitly race related, Butcher highlighted the “irony of this particular debate” by pointing to other significant financial interests among Australian and American investors in New Zealand’s agricultural sector and the lack of debate raised in opposition to investors from those nationalities acquiring New Zealand property. Butcher refers to the New Zealand Herald columnist Bernard Hickey who asked, “Why is it worse than, say, the Australian banks owning 91 percent of our financial system or an Australian retailer owning one of our two grocery chains, Progressive, or Australian media companies owning our three biggest media companies, APN, Fairfax and Mediaworks?”

The role of ethnicity in the attitudes and perceptions New Zealanders hold towards Asia have played an important part of identity formation and are discussed in the following pages.

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220 Ibid. p.138.
3.2.1 Current Attitudes Towards Asia and Japan – The Role of Ethnicity in Identity Formation

In their studies of the intersections between ‘race’, ethnicity and nation in settler societies, Cormack and Robson look at how official ethnic categories overlap with concepts of citizenship and nationality. This will likely continue to have an influence on New Zealand’s national identity as a result of the country’s significant and increasing Asian minority population. As these Asian populations continue to participate in political ways with their countries of origin, and an increasing number of New Zealanders engage with Asia, Butcher argues these connections will shape how New Zealand relates to Asian countries and people.

A wide ranging account of New Zealand’s evolving perception of Asia and Asian peoples over the past decade can be found in the Asia New Zealand Foundation polls which have been undertaken since the late 1990’s. These were commissioned to look at New Zealand’s place in Asia and demonstrate the significant changes in demography that increasing Asian populations have had on the country. From a political and diplomatic perspective these reports provide a valuable contribution in understanding how New Zealand’s place in the Asia Pacific region is evolving and how this will affect New Zealand’s national identity as both New Zealand and other countries perceive it. This changing view of Asia offers an interesting and significant comparison to attitudes towards Japan and Asia in recent decades. The statistics reflect not only a growing belief in the importance of Asia to New Zealand’s future but also to a growing feeling of warmth to Asian immigrants and culture. However, it also suggests a common feeling that while Asia is important to the growth of the country, New Zealand is not considered by many to be part of Asia.

Since the first study in 1997, the majority of New Zealanders (between 70 percent and 80 percent) have considered Asia as important to New Zealand’s future. Additionally, the average percentage of New Zealanders who regarded Asia as important or very important to New Zealand’s future increased from 70 percent between 1997 and 2000 to 77 percent between 2007 and 2011. This demonstrated a growing perception among New Zealanders of Asia’s importance during that time, from an already high level in the late 1990’s. Unsurprisingly, the studies reveal that New Zealanders have different perceptions towards

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225 Cormack and Robson, *Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’.*
different Asian countries. The gradient in the “warmth” of feeling among New Zealanders is highest towards Japanese while lowering towards smaller South East Asian states, likely reflecting the differing levels of experience in, and knowledge of, the different countries.\textsuperscript{232}

While Japan may generate a higher percentage of feelings of ‘warmth’, when New Zealanders think about Asia they think first of China, followed by Japan. Therefore, perceptions of Asia are more indicative of perceptions of China but Japan nonetheless is viewed as a significant part of Asia. The importance of Japan likely reflects the strong economic ties the countries have shared and the shared tragedies of earthquakes in both Japan and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{233} This was consistent in the 2013 results which indicated that when New Zealanders thought of Asia they initially thought of China or Japan, with 60 percent mentioning China first and 13 percent mentioning Japan first.\textsuperscript{234}

A considerable change in attitude towards Asian immigration to New Zealand is also apparent. New Zealanders who rated Asian immigration to New Zealand as positive or very positive has been increasing over the last fifteen years. This demonstrates a significant increase in positive attitudes and a changing perception of Asian immigration. However, opinion polls revealed New Zealanders viewed the economic impacts of Asian immigration more positively than the social impacts. Statistics after 1997 also reported that a significant proportion of the New Zealand population held the view that the number of immigrants from Asia was too high.\textsuperscript{235}

In 1997, only 32 percent of New Zealanders viewed Asian immigration as positive, despite the benefits from trade and tourism between Asia and New Zealand. This can be interpreted as New Zealanders recognising the benefits of business with Asia and Asian tourists but not being happy with the idea of Asians immigrating permanently to New Zealand. A number of both positive and negative perceptions are held by New Zealanders towards Asian immigrants. There was a common perception that Asian immigrants were wealthy, and many viewed Asians as having a reputation for being “polite, courteous, quiet, obedient and well behaved.”\textsuperscript{236} There was also a sense of admiration for what New Zealanders perceived as “the Asian work ethic and commitment and their strong sense of honour – expressed in

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{235} Asia New Zealand Foundation, \textit{New Zealanders’ Perceptions of Asia and Asian Peoples: 1997-2011}.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.
honesty and loyalty among Asians.” However, there were also negative perceptions of many Asian immigrants apparent insularity and the “tendency of recent Asian immigrants to isolate themselves and stick together, choosing to speak their own language rather than English (in front of other New Zealanders), refusing to mix and generally acting as if they were not interested in becoming ‘integrated.’ A description of some New Zealanders of Asians as “cold”, “clinical” and “unsponstaneous”, were qualities that New Zealanders would be forced to compete with and which could have a negative consequence for New Zealand’s relaxed, laid back culture. Concerns that Asian immigrants were buying large amounts of real estate and “invading” desirable areas of New Zealand cities was another factor in these negative perceptions. There was also the perception that highly motivated and competitive Asian immigrants were competing with (other) young New Zealanders for employment.

The studies also provided significant insight into New Zealanders belief that while they viewed it was important to develop strong cultural and economic ties with Asia there was a strong barrier to doing that in the form of a lack of cross-cultural understanding. In 2012, 84 percent of New Zealanders believed that it was quite or very important that New Zealand developed cultural and economic ties with Asia. There were also clear ideas about how this could be achieved. Fifty seven percent believed that New Zealand needed to do more to assist young people in engaging confidently with Asia while fifty eight percent saw the importance of encouraging New Zealanders to better understand Asian cultures and traditions. These cultural barriers to understanding included New Zealanders knowledge of Asian people and cultures, Asian people’s understanding of New Zealand people and cultures, and communication barriers.

These studies demonstrate a growing recognition among New Zealanders of the importance of developing ties with Asia. The majority of New Zealand’s population view Asia as important to New Zealand’s future and believed that there were economic benefits to establishing a strong relationship with Asia. One of the significant perceived disadvantages of closer ties with Asia, was the “loss of identity and kiwiana”. The survey posits that the growing attitudes of ‘warmth’ towards Asian people could be attributed to the growing Asian populations in New Zealand. The survey attributes the increase since 2011 to the hosting of

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237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.

the Rugby World Cup and the shared tragedies of the Christchurch and Japan earthquakes. 

The changing demography of New Zealand and the changing perceptions of New Zealanders towards Asia and people of Asian descent is likely to have a significant influence on the country’s emerging Asian identity.
3.3 Identity Three: New Zealand as a Moral Example

Domestic influences through state society relations have seen the evolution of a nuclear free norm and a broader identity of an environmentally responsible, pacifist and strongly independent country. These norms have been a driving force in New Zealand’s foreign policy and bilateral relations with Japan throughout the twentieth century. Capie and McGhie highlight the attempts to link changing perceptions of identity to developments in foreign policy, pointing to Jock Phillips analysis of the rise in confidence of New Zealanders and how this contributed to an ‘emerging nationalism’ in the 1980’s and its influence on the breakdown of ANZUS.241

While there has been little analysis of identity in New Zealand foreign policy, Malcolm McKinnon uses the concept of independence as a framework of analysis to look at how New Zealand’s early foreign relations were shaped by its affiliation with the Commonwealth. As previously outline, McKinnon argues that New Zealand’s ‘independent’ foreign policy has been shaped by two overarching factors “vigorous assertion of interest”242 and “a form of dissent.”243 McKinnon argues that both these forms of independence have become central to New Zealand’s foreign policy history. However, McKinnon’s writing is primarily an historical account and not based in International Relations or Political Science theory.

Central to this search for independence is the notion of New Zealand being a moral example to the rest of the world. Jock Phillips argues this has a precedence in New Zealand’s history as a settler society. New Zealand presented itself as a utopia, or “Gods own country” in order to encourage immigration and “give validity to its place in world history.”244 As this “new world” that New Zealand offered was based largely on improved domestic conditions, New Zealand was set to the “social laboratory of the world” and reforms were implemented to protect New Zealand from the industrial and urban problems of the places the immigrants had left.245 However, instead of being a “social laboratory” New Zealand demonstrated its ability to be a moral example to other countries. It can be argued this idea of New Zealand adopting the role as a moral example complements the small size of the country which has prevented New Zealand from having any meaningful influence through force or economic strength. While New Zealand may have been limited in its political and economic impact, it was possible for New Zealand to have a sense of influence by acting as an example for the

243 Ibid. p.3.
245 Ibid.
rest of the world. New Zealand was able to express its moral disagreement with the actions of other states by sending a frigate to Mururoa Atoll in 1973 and its opposition to the 1981 Springbok Tour.246 At the time of New Zealand’s exclusion from ANZUS and the moral stand this represented, such actions were taken by the New Zealand government which reiterated this ‘moral’ leadership. The closure of the South African consulate and the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa indicated New Zealand’s opposition to apartheid and was illustrative of New Zealand’s growing attention and sensitivity to morality in its international relations.247

Arguably the most renowned example of this “utopian moralism”, which Philips refers to, was the country’s non-nuclear policy which refused entry to nuclear ships. In ‘New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1945-88’ Jock Phillips explores the emergence of a “distinctive New Zealand national self-consciousness and a new vision of itself as Aoteroa, a Maori and South Pacific country and a moral exemplar to the world” which resulted from New Zealand’s stand in 1984 against allowing entry to nuclear ships.248 This “port call crisis” which saw New Zealand adopt a nuclear-free stance in 1984 marked an important period in New Zealand history and demonstrated itself as an issue of national importance. This “anti-nuclear” policy resulted in New Zealand being suspended from the ANZUS Treaty which had provided a foundation for the country’s security policy since 1951. In Phillip’s view, the decision to ban nuclear ships was founded on this emerging nationalism and not to do with any specific attitudes towards the United States.249 David Lange attempted to convey this by insisting that New Zealand’s position should be seen as “anti-nuclear” rather than “anti-American or anti-ANZUS.”250 While America had most prominently been negatively impacted by this stance, it sent a message to the international community and had a considerable influence in shaping New Zealand’s international reputation and identity in addition to influencing future foreign relations. The decision to award New Zealand a seat on the 1993-94 UN Security Council can be attributed to the international reputation the country had established as a result of its non-nuclear policy.251

This wish to be seen as “independent’ emerged as early as 1969, when Norman Kirk was

246 Ibid. p.198.
asked whether New Zealand was to be satisfied with a ‘me too’ foreign policy, or “will we as a small nation take our courage in both hands…” 252 By 1984, it was clear that the emergence of a distinctive, outward-looking and independent foreign policy was a fundamental goal of the New Zealand government. New Zealand’s disagreement with the United States over the nuclear weapons issue clearly illustrated the country’s “desire for self-determination in matters affecting our own destiny.” 253

While the loss of the security guarantee that ANZUS provided was undoubtedly significant, it perpetuated New Zealand’s self-image of an environmentally responsible, pacifist and intensely independent country. It clearly demonstrated how domestic influences shaped the emergence of a clear anti-nuclear movement, a strong sense of environmental responsibility and pacifism which would play a determining role in foreign policy. This, Baker argues, turned New Zealand’s considerable isolation into a role New Zealand had pride in. Rather than viewing the country’s isolation as having the potential to cause embarrassment and a feature that had to be compensated for, New Zealanders began to see it “as giving them an Olympian detachment from the world and a special duty to nudge the world in a peaceful direction.” 254 It was a sense of nationalism that New Zealand had formed itself as opposed to an identity generated by our British roots and therefore all the more palpable. Norman Kirk propagated this identity for New Zealand in the 1970’s by presenting the country as a “progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to our national identity” and contributed to shaping the role of the country as one which was compatible with New Zealand’s strengths, essentially “being a good international citizen.” 255

New Zealand’s gradual detachment from Britain’s cultural, political and economic influence allowed the country to create an independent and unique identity for itself which had an inevitable influence on its foreign relations with other states. In defining its identity, New Zealand incorporated the physical, cultural and political aspects of the country which made it distinctive. McKinnon’s ideas relating to the forms of ‘independence’ which New Zealand gained over its history and Baker’s ‘moral utopianism’ which have been shaped by New Zealand’s isolation and small size provide a foundation on which to analyse the ways in which New Zealand’s identity have influenced its foreign relations and place in the world.

252 Prime Minister’s Office Series (Rt. Hon. David Lange) – Miscellaneous including Listener ANZUS Article, Japan, Speeches, 1984, (R17841066).
253 Ibid.
According to Phillips, “This awakening of Aoteroa to a new vision of itself has been the most challenging and exciting development of the last twenty years in New Zealand.”

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New Zealand has a national identity and political culture founded in democratic tradition and an open political system. An important aspect of this democratic identity is New Zealand’s strong commitment to multilateralism and international institutions and support of such principles as nuclear disarmament and the promotion of human rights. These principles were made apparent in a 2010 New Zealand Defence White Paper which defined the country’s national interests in the following way:260

• A safe and secure New Zealand, including its border and approaches
• A rules-based international order which respects national sovereignty
• A network of strong international linkages
• A sound global economy underpinned by open trade routes

These point to a values based national interest, with the report asserting that “a rules-based international order based on values sympathetic to New Zealand’s own,” is a priority in New Zealand’s national security interest.261 The values which are apparent in New Zealand as a democratic society include the importance New Zealand gives to humanitarian and developmental assistance in other countries, in particular the Asia Pacific region. New Zealand is also strongly involved in the United Nations and emphasises international peace and stability. This role as a ‘good international citizen’ and the values associated with it centre on the country’s promotion of a rules-based international order.262

As outlined above, New Zealand’s identity emerged during the twentieth century as one which drew heavily on the values of a nation which was an extension of a Western, Atlantic centred English speaking world. As O’Brien argues, a notion of ‘Western-Enlightenment’ formed the foundation of this Atlantic worldview, “where secularism, rational thought and scientific achievement were conceived as basic values for human improvement.”263 These Western values, such as the spreading democracy to promote peace, were a significant part of shaping a Western, Democratic identity.264 It also placed New Zealand in the Western camp for both World Wars and New Zealand identified with the Western alliance during the Cold War. This idea of predictability and a rules based international order is based on the

261 Ibid. p.17.
262 Vaughn, *The United States and New Zealand: Perspectives on a Pacific Partnership*, pp.4-8.
264 Ibid.
commitment to following an international and multilateral approach with the promotion of international organisations like the United Nations. According to Terence O’Brien, this “confers legitimacy on international endeavour and provides a vast store of rules, principles and norms developed over half a century.” An important aspect for New Zealand of these norms is the value of seeking to be a ‘good international citizen’. New Zealand actively maintains this image with peace keeping and nation building involvement both regionally, such as Bougainville, Timor-Leste and The Solomon Islands, and further afield in Iraq and Bosnia. O’Brien also points to New Zealand’s image as a modern, unthreatening democracy with “capacity for impartiality and evenhandedness” and “reconciliation established through the Waitangi process” as significant values upon which our democratic identity is based. Ultimately, the values and norms of democracy, good governance, the importance of international institutions, promotion of human rights and a belief in free market economies have shaped New Zealand’s image as a ‘good international citizen’ and identity as a liberally democratic, Western nation.

4 IDENTITY IN NEW ZEALAND-JAPAN RELATIONS

It is clear that there is no one, overarching factor which informs New Zealand’s national identity as a whole. The above identities have all played a role in shaping New Zealand relations with other countries. These traits are not fixed, but evolve and interact with each other which is demonstrated in an analysis of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan.

The two countries share a wide range of interests and attitudes, including a high living standard, with a democratic form of government and an open society, a dependence on trade and a focus on encouraging regional cooperation. Both are island states disconnected physically from the continent of Asia which has meant an interest in regional involvement while maintaining some detachment. A further aspect of relations is both countries close cooperation and association with other countries such as the United States, Australia, Canada, The United Kingdom and some South East Asian states. While both states have a clear interest in how Asia is developing they are also concerned with their wider international interests and relationships. Japan’s declaration that its foreign policy is based on the

266 Vaughn, *The United States and New Zealand: Perspectives on a Pacific Partnership*, p.3.
267 O’Brien, “Interests and values in international relations,” p.16.
principles of support for the United Nations, close relations with the free world, and friendly ties with the countries of Asia are principles which New Zealand would undoubtedly also endorse.\textsuperscript{269} When Prime Minister Kirk was asked in 1973 about New Zealand’s general views on its relationship with Japan he replied he believed Japan to be affluent but that this affluence had given Japan the character of a nation in Asia but not of it, like New Zealand.\textsuperscript{270} In this sense, Japan and New Zealand shared the common values and norms of a liberally democratic, free market economy. This also meant both nations were firmly with the Western alliance during the Cold War. New Zealand and Japan shared many common interests in the Asia Pacific region and both countries views align on many international issues. Despite the issues created by a difference in identity, with regards to the UN and many international organisations both nations “invariably find [themselves] on the same side, striving to achieve progress towards the same goals.”\textsuperscript{271}

While this has formed a foundation for the relationship, and arguably kept it as strong as it has been, New Zealand’s other identity traits have played a significant role in shaping relations. From the beginning of diplomatic contact following the Second World War, New Zealand has sought to engage with Japan and strengthen contact. Both interests and values have driven this increased interaction. These values and norms derive traditionally from areas other than Asia but as the relationship continues to grow, it is increasingly being shaped by identities which have their origins in many different domestic changes.

As discussed previously, an overview of the literature on Japan-New Zealand demonstrates that there is little consideration of domestic social influences in shaping the bilateral relationship. While some identity theorising can be found in historical and cultural studies of relations between the two countries it has not led to the application of a national identity to foreign relations in any significant way. While New Zealand and Japan do share values drawn from their belief in democratic society and liberal international markets, other values have demonstrated a difference in interests in the bilateral relationship. These key differences can be attributed to a difference in history, language, and cultural experience. While the shared value in democracy and a liberal economy have created a basis upon which the countries have built a strong relationship, other conflicting values have been at the centre

\textsuperscript{269} MFAT: New Zealand Affairs External Relations Japan, General, Part 5 August 1, 1971 – May 31, 1972, 58/12/1.

\textsuperscript{270} MFAT: Visits - From Japan to NZ - Prime Minister 1974-1977, TKY 25/2/8.

of differences of opinion and these areas of value difference ultimately have an impact on policy. The influence of these identities on New Zealand’s relationship with Japan will be explored in the following chapters.
4.1 Early Contact: New Zealand Identity in Shaping Initial Bilateral Relations

New Zealand’s early contact with Japan was shaped significantly by a strong historically and cultural British identity. The colonial values this represented were centred on keeping New Zealand as ethnically British as possible while viewing non British immigration with uncertainty. While New Zealanders’ consciousness of Japan before the war was low, if not non-existent, increasing interaction with Japan and the role of Japan as the ‘enemy’ during the war contributed to reinforcing New Zealand’s culturally Western and ‘British’ identity. New Zealand had not yet discovered the significance of its place in the Pacific and there was a distinctive sense of New Zealand as a European nation which was distinct from the Asian nations it was surrounded by. An understanding of the attitudes and perceptions New Zealand held towards Japan, and the identity they represented, is necessary in order to understand how they would influence the relationship in early contact and in later decades.

How New Zealand viewed Japan and Japanese people, and the influence of a British identity among New Zealanders on this perception, would shape early diplomatic contact with Japan. Before the war there was little evidence to suggest New Zealanders had any knowledge of Japan or its potential for influence in the Pacific. It was acknowledged that New Zealanders knew little, if anything, about Japan or its cultural identity. As one historian described, “New Zealand opinion about Japan has been a little uncertain, largely, no doubt, because of ignorance.”

While in the late nineteenth century a very small number of New Zealanders visited Japan, they compared it with Europe and in their conclusions it was apparent they viewed it with a mix of “superiority, curiosity and banality.” Malcolm McKinnon presents the argument that this assumption of superiority was a result of the difference they recognised between Japan and Europe, with a perspective that the power relationship was considerably leaning in Britain’s favour. The New Zealanders that visited Japan were “affluent, educated and well-travelled” and they regarded Japanese as not demonstrating these characteristics.

Early New Zealand travellers often perceived themselves as British, using British passports, while viewing the Empire as “ours” and the other countries as foreign. According to McKinnon, these travellers to Japan, “made no distinction between being New Zealand and being British; they were both.”

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323 Malcolm McKinnon, Historical Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, p. 4, Japan and New Zealand Historical Connections: proceedings of a colloquium held in Wellington, 20 February 1997. Wellington, New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies, Massey University.
324 Ibid. p.4.
325 Ibid. p.7.
language they encountered in Japan reinforced this belief of New Zealand as an extension of
Britain and not an Asian state.

Peren argues a significant part of New Zealand’s view of Japan and Japanese people, both
before and in the immediate post war years, was Edward W. Said’s notion of
“orientalism”. 326 In Orientalism, Said critiqued the ”subtle and persistent Eurocentric
prejudice against Arabo-Islamic peoples and their culture” which stemmed from the West’s
inaccurate, exaggerated representation of Asian and Middle Eastern culture. When New
Zealand did embark on a diplomatic relationship with Japan following the Second World
War, New Zealanders perspectives on Japan were founded on what little they knew, as a
predominantly European population, of the “Orient”. Accordingly, the “prism of
‘Orientalism’” carried with it the expectation that Japan, like the rest of the ‘Orient’, would
inevitably be different, unaccountable and inexplicable.” 327 The belief among many
nineteenth century Europeans that the difference between east and west, and also European
and non-European went beyond the obvious differences to the extent of the existence of
superiority (European) and inferiority ( ‘Native’) which formed the basis of this orientalist
view. 328 Peren argues that the influence of ‘orientalism’ could remain regardless of whether
the perception of Japanese people was positive or negative. When there was no threat,
Japanese were viewed as “charming, quaint and picturesque”, but if they appeared to pose a
threat they could be seen as “ill-educated and underdeveloped, hostile, aggressive, even less
than human.”329 This ‘Orientalist’ perspective was a significant aspect of New Zealand’s
relations with Japan in the decades after the Second World War. New Zealand’s foundation
as an ethnically ‘British’ state informed this view of Japan as being different and a country
with which New Zealand had little in common.

While the average New Zealander had not been exposed to Japan or Japanese cultural norms
there were clear general perceptions of Asians, or as they were described, ‘Asiatics’. 330 At
the top of the most undesired immigrant list were Chinese and Japanese immigrants who
constituted the largest pre-war Asian community. Trotter argues that for a significant part of
New Zealand’s history “bitter anti-Asiatic feeling” had been typical and that perceptions of
Asia “were racist to a high degree.”331 According to McKinnon, “Japan’s rise was seen as

326 Roger Peren, Japan and New Zealand 150 Years (Tokyo: New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies,
1999), p.16.
327 Malcolm McKinnon, “Japan and New Zealand Historical Connections,” p.4.
328 Roger Peren, Japan and New Zealand 150 Years, p.16
329 Ibid. p.17.
331 CHECK REFERENCE
more threatening than that of the United States, its wartime military record more controversial than Germany’s and its foreign investment less acceptable than that of Britain, Australia or the United States.”332 A clear hierarchy emerged in which New Zealanders of British origin were placed at the top and those of Asian descent at the bottom due to a fear of the ‘yellow peril’ and feelings of racial superiority. These attitudes were apparent in immigration acts from the 1880’s.333 By 1941, New Zealand was still largely only familiar with Anglo-Saxon culture and ignorant of Japan. War breaking out perpetuated an already hostile attitude and Japan’s perceived undesirable racial and national characteristics were emphasised, reiterating New Zealanders already held prejudices against the Japanese.334 McKinnon argues the soldiers visiting Japan appeared to have an “angels or demons” view, as their view towards Japanese people could change from demonising to romanticising them.335 Arguably, the pre-war attitudes and perceptions towards Japan had not been completely altered by New Zealand’s involvement and experience in the war.336 Japan and Japanese people were often presented in an often false and exaggerated way which had the effect of strengthening New Zealand’s perception of Japan. Japan and its cultural identity was viewed as markedly distinct from New Zealand’s people and culture and supported the notion of New Zealand as a culturally British state.

This identification of New Zealand as an ethnically British state with a wariness of Asia had a significant influence on shaping New Zealand’s relations and perceptions of Japan in the decade following World War Two, in which the first substantial contact was established between the two countries. At the end of World War Two, New Zealand’s perception of Japan was still influenced by ‘orientalism’ but the following decades would see the beginning of New Zealand developing an Asia Pacific identity. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, New Zealand struggled with maintaining its identity as a British state while realising its place in the Pacific.

4.1.2 Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

While the Japanese Peace Treaty was ratified in 1951, the fears and concerns of New Zealanders towards Japan were still strong. A 1952 publication titled “Must We Trust Japan?” from the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs reflected these fears.339 The

332 McKinnon, “Japan and New Zealand Historical Connections,” p.6.
333 Trotter, New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952, p.41.
334 Ibid. p.15.
335 McKinnon, “Japan and New Zealand Historical Connections,” p.12.
336 Ibid.
eight contributors make clear their concerns regarding the perceived inadequacies of the Treaty and “had New Zealand had an independent foreign policy” a different set of requirements would have been demanded.\textsuperscript{340} As Peren points out, New Zealand and Japan lie geographically to each other’s north and south but in all other respects the relationship was still distinguished by a culturally opposing east and west relationship. To New Zealanders at this time, Japan was still viewed primarily as an ‘eastern’, non-white, non-European country. To Japan, New Zealand was plainly a ‘western’, European, British colony.\textsuperscript{341} Prejudice still remained after the war and as late as 1954 a Labour Department spokesperson made clear the prevailing view that immigration policy was to reflect the attitudes of the New Zealand public, in that ‘people whose stock originated in Britain shall always have the overwhelming predominance in the total people of New Zealand’.”\textsuperscript{342} These attitudes would shape initial contact with Japan.

While both the government and the population of New Zealand held these concerns about Japan, this did not stop the New Zealand government establishing formal diplomatic relations with Japan in 1952. This was a significant move for the New Zealand government who at the time did not have a reputation for developing New Zealand’s representation overseas, particularly with regard to Asia and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{345} This was in part ideological in the sense that it was not an option to deny Japan’s necessity to trade as the contributors to \textit{Must We Trust Japan?} make clear, “Japan must not be punished in a way as to prevent her earning a living.”\textsuperscript{346} Establishing diplomatic relations was also, as Trotter argues “to secure the convenience of a post in an area of acute diplomatic sensitivity at the time.”\textsuperscript{347} As the views in a NZIIA publication demonstrate, New Zealand by no measure completely trusted Japan or were unconcerned about possible future Japanese aggression and this desire to ‘watch’ Japan was necessary.\textsuperscript{348}

It is also apparent that the New Zealand understanding of Japan and the Japanese evolved during the war due to personal contact and changing attitudes. During and immediately after the war, the Japanese were for many New Zealanders objects of hatred. However, in the decades following the war this perception underwent a significant change, with many New Zealanders.

\textsuperscript{340} C.A. Blythe (et al.) “Must we trust Japan?: eight views on the Japanese Peace Treaty”, \textit{New Zealand Institute of International Affairs} (1952), p.18.
\textsuperscript{341} Peren, \textit{Japan and New Zealand 150 Years}, p.16.
\textsuperscript{345} Trotter, ”From Suspicion to Growing Partnership: New Zealand and Japan,” p.195.
\textsuperscript{346} C.A. Blythe (et al.) “Must we trust Japan?: eight views on the Japanese Peace Treaty,” p.7.
\textsuperscript{347} Trotter, \textit{New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952}, p.6.
\textsuperscript{348} C.A. Blythe (et al.) “Must we trust Japan?: eight views on the Japanese Peace Treaty.”
Zealanders beginning to see the Japanese as people to respect and encourage friendly ties with. Notwithstanding this transformation in attitude towards the Japanese, the notion that Japan was fundamentally different to New Zealand would remain a significant aspect of New Zealand’s sense of identity with regards to its interactions with Japan. The collective image of Japan as an Asian people sharing little commonality with New Zealand was often the starting point in New Zealand policy makers and officials considerations of interactions and policies towards Japan. This would remain a factor in the Japan-New Zealand relationship for the following decades.

In 1958 when New Zealand signed an economic agreement with Japan, New Zealand’s search for Asia Pacific neighbours was already apparent. This caused the New Zealand government to make a fundamental policy decision to strengthen the country’s contact with Japan in political, social, economic and cultural areas. New Zealand’s changing attitude towards Japan following the Second World War has been well documented. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT) reports acknowledge the concern for New Zealand’s security from possible Japanese aggression in the early years after the war but this was influenced by New Zealand troops serving in the occupation forces and representatives appointed in order to express views on Japanese affairs. During this decade both countries made efforts to strengthen and broaden relations and contacts. There was an increase in official discussions, prime ministerial visits and diplomatic representation was raised to Embassy level. New Zealand supported Japan’s entry to the UN, friendship societies were established and in 1958 both countries signed a Treaty of Commerce.

After the Second World War until the 1960’s Japan experienced a period of social reform which saw the introduction of democratic values by Allied countries including New Zealand. New Zealand and Japan shared these democratic and capitalist values and this formed a basis upon which the relationship could be developed. Due to growing personal contact in many areas in the twenty years following the war, the New Zealand perception of Japanese people changed from that of being the enemy to one of friendship and respect. As New Zealanders learned more about Japanese culture through contact, New Zealand as a whole created a foundation for improved bilateral relations. These changing perceptions of Japan had a significant influence on New Zealanders subsequent attitudes towards other states in Asia. The government made some efforts to change the ‘orientalist’ perspective such as

356 MFAT: New Zealand Affairs External Relations Japan, 58/12/1.
357 Ibid.
membership in the Institute of Pacific Relations. McKinnon argues the relationship between both countries had the most potential when New Zealand viewed the Japanese without “the blinkers of Orientalism, or otherness.”

According to Trotter, “The story of New Zealand’s relations with Japan since 1945 runs parallel with the story of New Zealand’s psychological and economic detachment from the United Kingdom. But in the period 1945 to 1952 this detachment was at most partial, foreshadowed rather than accepted.” The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of a shift for New Zealand away from Britain, in which Japan, the United States and the importance of the country’s place in the Pacific came to be recognised and acknowledged.

4.1.2 Conclusion

The new establishment of diplomatic ties and the beginning of trade between both countries arguably marked a departure from the previous relationship. While it was a slow process, attitudes towards Japanese began to change and this was reflected in the evolving relationship over the next several decades. New Zealand progressed from viewing Japan first as a threat to having a greater understanding of the culture and tradition through increased contact with Japan and its people which ultimately resulted in better bilateral relations. Ann Trotter argues that this changing perceptions of Japan would have an important influence on New Zealanders perspective of Asia in the following decades.

This section has shown that New Zealand progressed from viewing Japan as the enemy to acknowledging the importance of establishing relations with the country, despite the difference in identities and perceptions of each other. These perceptions of animosity and ignorance of Japan changed over time to curiosity and a recognition of New Zealanders limited knowledge of Japan. New Zealand’s identity as a Western, English-speaking, British state informed New Zealand’s perception of Japan as an Asian state which did not share a common history, cultural identity or language. This in turn made the government more aware of the potential to increase relations and New Zealanders understanding of Japan. The construction and evolution of a New Zealand-Asia Pacific identity would play a large role in New Zealand’s wish to pursue closer relations with Japan. This will be explored in the following section.

361 Ibid. p.6.
362 Ibid.
4.2 Cultural Identity

The New Zealand-Japan relationship is clearly one characterized by size, with New Zealand as a small nation with limited resources and Japan a large and populous state with economic strength. Successive New Zealand governments have demonstrated the ability to maintain close relations with larger states, the strong alliances with Britain, Australia and the United States have illustrated this. However, as New Zealand and Japan’s relationship continued to grow and ties were increased, New Zealand was faced with difficulties and challenges it had not encountered with traditional partners. Japan differed markedly from these other nations in language, civilisation and cultural norms. Alexander MacLeod highlighted these challenges in 1972, “in its intercourse with Britain, the United States and Australia, New Zealand has been able to employ a common language and move confidently within a shared cultural tradition which, although there may be variations of accent, emphasis and style, enables the partners readily to assimilate each other’s thoughts and actions. In attempting to promote friendly and enduring relations with Japan, New Zealand is in no such advantageous position.”\(^\text{363}\) New Zealand and Japan did not just encounter a disparity in size, they faced ‘in-built’ differences related to history, cultural identity and social patterns.\(^\text{364}\)

The sense of New Zealand as a geographically misplaced European nation gradually declined as a stronger Asia Pacific identity emerged which would shape relations with Japan in a new way. However, tensions relating to geography and different identities remained a part of New Zealand’s foreign policy with Japan. New Zealand was conscious of retaining strong ties with the ‘old world’ but an increasing identification as a multicultural nation of the Pacific with a duty to become more engaged regionally influenced the relationship between both countries and the economic foundation it was based on. Immersing itself in the Asia Pacific region required New Zealand to pursue policies and approaches that would allow it to forge new relationships in foreign environments. New Zealand had to reconcile traditional norms and customs with different ones which countries such as Japan presented them with. Japan represented a distinct and different culture which required a specific understanding and professional knowledge in order for the relationship to advance. While New Zealand did encounter misunderstandings and difficulties in its relationship with Japan

\(^{364}\) Ibid. p.488.
throughout much of its diplomatic and economic history, interactions were eased by the foundation of sharing liberally democratic values with a common belief in free market economics. As the influence of a European, British identity began to decline in New Zealand, and an Asia Pacific identity gained strength, the values of regional engagement and a desire to become more multicultural caused New Zealand to pursue policies to learn more about Asia, in particular Japan.

It was clear as late as 1985 that while links were strong and trade was growing, New Zealand business elites and officials still did not have a strong understanding of Japan and that a difference in norms and customs was the source of some difficulty in the relationship. A speech to the Japan New Zealand Business Council Reception for the Japanese Prime Minister noted, “a relationship such as ours cannot thrive on business alone. What we see of Japan, we like. But we do not see enough of you. Japan’s importance to New Zealand is not going to diminish – if anything it will increase, yet we do not really know you very well. We need to get to know each other better.”

New Zealand’s relations with other important countries at the time were largely founded and sustained by “common bonds of culture, family networks and shared history and traditions.” This was not found in the relationship with Japan but taking initiatives to become more familiar with Japan, both in the private and public sector, was made a priority. There had been some success as a result of cultural exchanges between the two countries which had been initiated to cover a wide range of interests and skills. These had enhanced the relationship by increasing the knowledge and understanding of each other which was made more difficult by not having a common language or cultural norms.

Throughout the history of economic relations with Japan, Japan has been a significant, and at times the largest, trading partner to New Zealand. However, unlike New Zealand’s traditional trading partners of Australia, the United States and Britain, there is not the simplicity of a common language, history and cultural identity to easily facilitate contact and communication between the two countries. This is arguably changing as New Zealand looks increasingly to Asia, but for much of New Zealand’s history Japan has played a unique role in this regard. Japan was the first Asian country the New Zealand government was required

367 Ibid.
368 Ibid.
to initiate and encourage the development of educational and cultural ties in order to effectively pursue a strong economic relationship. New Zealand was lacking in the skills, expertise and knowledge of Japan to pursue the potential for economic growth that trade links would create.

By the 1970’s it was apparent that the relationship between Japan and New Zealand had grown steadily with good relations and frequent visits at the leadership and official level. However, it was also apparent at this time that despite a strong basis in the relationship there was room for improvement in a number of fields. New Zealand and Japan had never shared a common cultural identity, historical experience or language and this resulted in people from both countries having a lack of knowledge about each other.

4.2.1 Lack of Common Roots

“Clearly New Zealand had no leverage with Japan. She had no constituency in Japan, no ties of sentiment or tradition. New Zealand’s politicians, diplomats and exporters were operating in what was for them a more difficult environment than any other important market. Furthermore the previous relatively sheltered experience of New Zealand exporters had not left them particularly well-equipped to perform in this environment. General ignorance of New Zealand in Japan was only to be expected.”369

As Ann Trotter argues in this summary of relations between Japan and New Zealand, in the 1960’s, New Zealand was set to face challenges in its dealings with Japan as a result of a lack of common understanding, language and culture. It was clear that New Zealand wanted to pursue stronger ties with Japan but this would be a more difficult task than its “cosy” relationship with countries like Britain and to develop these ties “would require vigour, sensitivity and imagination.”370 According to Trotter, “there was unlikely to be a dramatic breakthrough. New Zealand had to plan for the long haul.”371

This was an important realisation for both the New Zealand government and public, and demonstrated how New Zealand identity as an English speaking, culturally Western nation would have a detrimental influence on shaping the country’s relations with Japan, unless changes were made to remedy this. While retaining a foundation in a culturally British identity, New Zealand’s self-image was evolving as it began to recognise its place in the

370 Ibid. p.225.
371 Ibid.
Pacific and the desire to become a more regionally engaged state gained traction. This had a noticeable influence on diplomatic and business relations in the early 1970’s and prompted both governments to encourage people-to-people programmes and to raise awareness of each other’s culture and achievements to ensure that different cultural and linguistic identities would not cause issues that could not be overcome. After a visit to Japan, Brian Talboys, then Minister of Agriculture, claimed “…the goodwill is there, but there is not much knowledge.” New Zealand clearly recognised the need to remedy this situation.

A 1976 Ministry of Foreign Affairs report on the state of New Zealand relations with Japan reveals an uncertain, mixed assessment of progress in overcoming the challenges that emerged from the countries different identities. The report acknowledges the growing interest in Japan but is hesitant to claim any effective understanding of the country, “Interest in Japan among New Zealanders has grown rather fitfully and we are a long way yet from the sort of understanding of Japanese language, attitudes, culture, history and behaviour that we claim (not always correctly) to have instinctively of Britain, Australia and the United States.” Since the war there had been a growing curiosity among New Zealanders about Japan and this has led to attempts to emulate aspects of the Japanese culture, including Japanese arts, sports and pastimes as well as an increase in numbers of New Zealanders visiting Japan. However, there was the impression that the “overall picture ha[d] been patchy”. While there had been an increasing interest, New Zealanders in the political and academic fields had not yet developed a specialist interest in Japan, and media representatives stationed in Japan did not sustain an active interest in the country once they had left. Also expressed was the concern that the business community did not view the mastery of the Japanese language as an important attribute in its commercial conduct with Japan. The author of the report was under the impression that, “Japan has never held for New Zealanders the romantic appeal exerted by China”, and while conscious efforts had been made since the 1950’s to improve the relationship with Japan, there were still “some New Zealanders for whom old animosities and suspicions lie not far below the surface.” Accordingly, New Zealand required further initiatives in order to achieve “that degree of

375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
informed awareness of Japan upon which a truly friendly and confident relationship must rest.”

A 1981 speech by Japanese Ambassador Takashi Oyamada reiterated the Japanese perception that New Zealand’s understanding of Japan was vastly different to that of their understanding of Europe. Oyamada acknowledged the growing trade relations and increasing frequent human contact and made clear that New Zealand must be “called upon to adjust to a new situation, one in which our knowledge and values must extend far beyond particular societies and national boundaries, and to understand not only the political or economic behaviour of Japan, but the ways of living, modes of thinking, in other words, the cultural make-up of the Japanese.” While New Zealand could claim an easy understanding of Europe, with it being “part of the mainstream of civilisation which flows so vigorously in New Zealand”, a knowledge and understanding of Japan and Japanese culture “belong to another heritage of human history.”

It was clear to Oyamada, as arguably it was to many in New Zealand, that while New Zealand would undoubtedly retain strong ties with the United Kingdom being the source of much of the country’s cultural heritage, there was the realisation that stronger relations with Asia and the Pacific were inevitable.

While Oyamada makes clear he would not “fall into the trap” of drawing elaborate and artificial parallels between the situations of two countries, he does highlight the significance of the relative geographic proximity and strong economic ties between both states. He also draws attention to the common factor of enforced and self-induced isolation which may have influenced both countries perceptions of the Asia Pacific region. Like Japan’s experience with cultural and political isolation, New Zealand’s relations with the surrounding region had been influenced by its cultural and economic isolation in the physical sense and it’s near exclusive relationship with Britain. In both cases, Oyamada argues this inhibited progress in the development of relations with the surrounding region.

New Zealand’s limitations in size arguably made it more difficult for the government to pursue every opportunity and made it necessary for the government to build up the “limited

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377 Ibid.
378 Takashi Oyamada, “New Zealand and Japan”. In Terrence John Hearn (ed.), New Zealand and Japan: the papers of the sixteenth Foreign Policy School, Foreign Policy School series; 16th (1981), Department of University Extension, University of Otago. p.7
379 Ibid.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid.
382 Ibid. p.9.
leverage that is naturally available to New Zealand.” According to a Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’s report it was possible, with a “concerted effort on the part of government
departments in Wellington and our overseas posts” to greatly strengthen New Zealand’s
general relations and in particular, its dealings with Japan. Realising the reality of New
Zealand’s size, officials recognized that, “There is not much scope for the dramatic, but the
cumulative effect of many small actions and activities that gradually build up the image of
an intelligent, understanding, sometimes influential, and always reliable friend is likely to
be more effective and long lasting.”

Differences in Language and Cultural Identity

By the 1970’s the immediate post war perception many New Zealanders had about Japan
had begun to change, largely due to increased knowledge and interaction. The ‘white settler’
values no longer formed the foundation of New Zealanders identity, due to a growing Asia
Pacific identity which valued a commitment to multiculturalism and increased regional
engagement. New Zealand no longer held the view of Japan it had following the war, partly
due to a transition away from perceiving itself as a primarily European outpost in the Pacific
to a view of it being an Asia Pacific nation with a duty to become engaged regionally and
understand its Pacific neighbours more. Cultural and economic ties with Britain were
gradually declining relative to what they had been and New Zealand was receptive to
understanding Asia in a way that was different to initial perceptions of Asian nations,
especially Japan. A 1971 description of Japan and its people celebrated the “complexity and
delicacy of its civilisation, the infinite resource of its skilled and disciplined people, and the
extraordinary partnership of industry, government, bureaucracy and labour that it can
assemble in pursuit of its national goals.” Also apparent is the support of Japan’s liberal
constitution, changes in the historic position of the Emperor and a democratic government
which pursued many forms of social change. Japan’s post war domestic strategies in terms
of the reconstruction of the economy, the reestablishment of industry and the pursuit of trade
are praised, with a work force described as being “conspicuously disciplined and loyal.”
New Zealand was clearly beginning to see Japan in a new way. However, New Zealand had
not completely rejected its position as a ‘British’ state in the Pacific and some negative
attitudes and difficulties still remained.

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383 MFAT: New Zealand Affairs External Relations Japan, 58/12/1.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
While it may have been true that “New Zealand has a Western society with a substantial Polynesian overlay” and Japan “an Asian society with a Western overlay”\(^{390}\), this Western influence was clearly not enough to facilitate an ease of contact and communication which New Zealand shared with other nations that had a foundation in a common identity. A 1971 report highlighted some of the more significant challenges New Zealand officials faced when dealing with the Japanese. The report came to the conclusion that constant and close attention to the various difficulties were vital in order to “realise the potential of our relationship.”\(^{391}\) According to the report the Japanese were “very self-centred” and it was important to demonstrate to them how New Zealand and Japanese interests coincided. This was due to the perception that there was no “natural New Zealand constituency” in Japan as New Zealand had with Australia, Britain, and to some extent the United States.\(^{392}\) It became clear in various reports that New Zealand was aware of more than a difference in language, there were also clear perceived differences in cultural norms and national character. These Ministry reports recounted that, “By history and temperament the Japanese were not easy mixers” and that “In any crisis, the Japanese tended to remain distinct and separate.”\(^{393}\) However, despite these perceived cultural differences there was also the opinion that the governments of both countries had a predominantly warm and well developed relationship.\(^{394}\)

Even by the late 1990’s, it was acknowledged that one of the most significant challenges New Zealand faced in its dealings with Japan was that of language. From the start of trading relations in the 1960’s there was a limited number of businesspeople who spoke Japanese and even fewer had first-hand experience of Japan itself.\(^{395}\) In the early 1970’s, MacLeod noted that, “The complexities of Japanese culture and society, it is fair to say, are virtually a closed book to the mass of New Zealanders whose upbringing and education have been dominated for the most part of European concepts and whose perception of Asia is generalised and peripheral.”\(^{396}\)

The culture of business also differed greatly between the two countries. The perceived “rough and ready” style of New Zealanders demonstrated a marked difference from the more

\(^{390}\) Ibid.
\(^{391}\) Ibid.
\(^{392}\) Ibid.
\(^{393}\) MFAT: Visits - From Japan to NZ - Prime Minister 1974-1977, “Paper by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on New Zealand’s Overall Relationship with Japan.” TKY 25/2/8.
\(^{394}\) Ibid.
\(^{395}\) MacLeod, “New Zealand and Japan: a deepening relationship,” p.487.
\(^{396}\) Ibid.
formal Japanese traditions and tendencies. MacLeod points to the example of New Zealand businessmen who, after having contact with their Japanese counterparts, would ‘express mystification’ at the close ties which were apparent in the Japanese commerce and government spheres. According to MacLeod, “This is only one instance of an inability to comprehend the Japanese way of doing things.” There was equal confusion on the part of the Japanese in understanding New Zealanders, not only linguistically but also in customs and attitudes. The difficulties encountered by the lack of Japanese speakers in New Zealand when Japanese officials, businessmen and private tourists visited New Zealand were compounded by differences in culture. MacLeod argues that the “beer, Rugby, racing” syndrome which was characteristic of New Zealand people and culture was difficult for foreigners, especially Japanese, to appreciate and led to “genuine points of difficulty.” For example, many Japanese businessmen had difficulty understanding why New Zealand would all but ‘close down’ for the period between Christmas until late January. This was clearly a custom Japan did not have experience with and many Japanese viewed this as a practice which inhibited commercial dealings. The challenge posed by this variance in attitudes and the language barrier was equally true at the political level and was exhibited in Japan’s contact with other states. These differences meant it was rare for any Head of Mission, other than the United States Ambassador, to interact with Japanese Ministers except in formal situation in which it was impossible to achieve any form of real communication.

Another issue raised in the contact with Japan at this time was the perceived difference in the Japanese “method of thinking”. A report from the New Zealand Atomic Energy Committee acknowledged the advantage of acquiring a knowledge of the Japanese language but held the opinion that it was of more importance to have an understanding of the Japanese “method of thinking”. In this respect it was perceived to be important to appreciate when they said “yes” what they more likely meant was “no” or “I don’t know” as a probable means to “save face” which was a situation the average New Zealander had not experienced. There was also still an uncertain, confused image of Japan among the New Zealand public.

399 Ibid.
400 Ibid.
401 MFAT: New Zealand Affairs External Relations Japan, 58/12/1.
In the early 1980’s, one in three New Zealanders regarded Japan as either a ‘dictatorship’ or a ‘communist’ regime. Furthermore, in the political sphere, the Japanese bureaucratic structure made it difficult to facilitate the roundtable interdepartmental talks to which New Zealand officials were accustomed. In addition to this, New Zealand officials regarded Japanese government departments to be “highly independent, mutually suspicious and to lack coordination of overall policy towards other countries.” This meant good relations with Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Gaimusho, did not necessarily equate to similar good relations with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Norinsho.

This sentiment of a significant but challenging relationship was again expressed in 1985 when Prime Minister Nakasone visited New Zealand. The importance of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan was reiterated, having increased significantly since the early 1970’s. It was acknowledged during his visit that Japan was one of New Zealand’s largest trading partners despite not having the ease of contact or familiarity that New Zealand shared with countries like Australia, Britain and the United States. Despite efforts made in the previous decade to build up knowledge and expertise on Japan, much of the potential of the New Zealand-Japan relationship remained untapped. It was therefore viewed as important to continue to “encourage the development of educational and cultural ties between the two countries, to match the growth of economic links.”

Acknowledgement of Difficulties

There was a noticeable disparity between the speed with which both countries were heading towards a strong political and economic relationship and the only just emerging mutual awareness among the general population. MacLeod believed, in 1972, that while economic profit may arise from such a narrow relationship, the potential for weakness could arise if the countries encountered difficulties and neither government could rely on a well-informed population. He viewed the relationship as lacking “a popular dimension almost entirely, and it should be a high priority of both governments to foster a basis of knowledge and mutual appreciation among the peoples on whose behalf policies are formulated and pursued.”

407 Ibid.
408 Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Residual Management Unit: International Liaison - Japan - Japan New Zealand relations, 1985-1987, Visit to New Zealand by His Excellency Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone Prime Minister of Japan 1985. IL/3/JPNZ.
When Prime Minister Kirk was asked in 1973 about New Zealand’s general views on its relationship with Japan he replied that it seemed to him that “Japan was at the crossroads.”

He believed Japan to be affluent but that this affluence had given Japan the character of a nation in Asia but not of it, like New Zealand. It was made apparent that the next decade would inevitably see a stronger relationship but one that would remain dominated by the disparities of the two countries. By the 1970’s it was clear that Japan would play a very important role for New Zealand but New Zealand would arguably remain of only peripheral importance to Japan. It would therefore be more difficult for New Zealand to reduce the significance of these differences. As a result of this respective disparity in power and influence there was a sense of New Zealand making efforts to encourage the growth and development of the relationship. It was important “by the use of our energies and our imagination, to build upon the sound foundations of the existing relationship” in order to make New Zealand’s judgement “reflect an understanding of Japan’s special interests and objectives.”

As a result of this, New Zealand government officials were of the view that the country had to make, and be seen to be making, a conscious effort to learn and understand more about Japan. The previous decade had seen the origins of such an approach, with exchange visits of a range of people and a growing interest in Japanese arts and methods, in particular the Japanese language. However, the report argued there was more to be done and the minimal amount of contact at to this point “merely exposes how much more remains if our image of Japan is to become more clearly defined if we are to achieve a better understanding of a people that is one of the most talented and complex on earth.” An important step to address what was seen a shortfall on New Zealand’s part to be able to interact and operate effectively in Asia was the establishment of the Asia New Zealand Foundation in 1994.

Officials began to be aware of the indirect effect on Japan of New Zealand’s relationship with Britain and Europe and of the importance of this in the respective perceptions of each other. Accordingly, it was viewed that New Zealand’s “dual identity as a Pacific nation and a projection of Europe” gave New Zealand a special status in Japanese eyes. It was clear New Zealand officials viewed this perception as beneficial, holding the belief that it was “a

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410 MFAT: Visits - From Japan to NZ - Prime Minister 1974-1977, TKY 25/2/8.
411 Ibid.
412 MFAT: New Zealand Affairs External Relations Japan, 58/12/1.
413 Ibid.
415 MFAT: New Zealand Affairs External Relations Japan, 58/12/1.
kind of status that many of them have probably vaguely aspired to, and they envy the way it has come naturally to us.”\textsuperscript{416} Therefore, there was an advantage in strengthening New Zealand’s organic as well as cultural relations with Europe in order to improve the country’s relationship with Japan, such as full membership of OECD.\textsuperscript{417} Another area which was seen as a way to strengthen Japan’s perception of New Zealand was continued active involvement in the UN. Japan at this time placed a great deal of importance on the UN and the degree of prestige and involvement that New Zealand maintained in the various United Nations bodies was seen to give New Zealand some leverage with Japan and create a general sense of community. \textsuperscript{418} New Zealand and Japan’s shared liberally democratic values and commitment to multilateralism was therefore seen to play a significant part in developing a strong New Zealand relationship with Japan.

The acknowledgement of problems within the bilateral relationship were made clear in a 1978 speech to the NZIIA, given by the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, Brian Talboys. He spoke of the “very complex issues” which were proving difficult to overcome due to a lack of common understanding between both countries. He highlights the belief that obstacles to communication between the countries should not be underestimated, acknowledging the significance of the difference in language and its usages as well as social customs. He was of the belief that the New Zealand government was “greatly disappointed that these problems remain unsolved.”\textsuperscript{420} However, over the preceding two decades and the differences that have arisen, both countries had come to a “more realistic assessment of each other.”\textsuperscript{421} In referencing Prime Minister Sato’s 1969 speech regarding the idea that the closer the countries came to each other, the more problems would naturally arise, Talboys highlights the need for both countries to talk openly about such issues before they become severe. He claimed one thing was certain, “that is that New Zealanders and Japanese are now acquiring a considerably greater knowledge of each other and of each other’s society. That itself must lead to better understanding and so improve the relationship.”\textsuperscript{422}

The necessity for New Zealand politicians, officials and traders to learn how to manage its interactions with Japan involved an understanding of how to deal with considerably foreign

\textsuperscript{416} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{418} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{421} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{422} Ibid.
and unfamiliar procedures. In 1976 this was acknowledged in a report on how to strengthen and expand the relationship between Japan and New Zealand, “No-one in New Zealand these days questions the importance of the relationship but we have not been easily persuaded that it needs to be considered special and to be pursued in a special way.” It reiterates the idea that New Zealand’s dealings with Japan were of equal importance to those with Britain, the United States and Australia but they were of a different nature and required a different approach. There was little similarity in New Zealand’s interaction and communication with Japan due to the lack of cultural and sentimental links that New Zealand naturally maintained with other Western states. Therefore it was only in Japan that New Zealand was “confronted with a major trading partner that differs profoundly from us in history, language, culture.” In cultural norms and values New Zealand maintained strong symbolic ties with the United Kingdom, even as New Zealand attitudes towards its role in the Asia Pacific region and its relationship with Japan were changing. The ‘white settler’ values and norms, which included a loyalty to, and dependency on Britain still remained.

While New Zealand recognised the importance of developing stronger ties with Japan, New Zealand still maintained institutions and norms shaped by a sense of “Britishness” which drew on imperialistic and colonial values. The contact between the United Kingdom and New Zealand had been “facilitated by our shared language and history, our common legal and cultural backgrounds” which made the relationship “easy and congenial” but this shared sense of identity was not apparent in New Zealand’s dealings with Japan. The lack of a common identity, other than that of a shared commitment to liberal democratic values, was a significant challenge and led the New Zealand government to implement policies which attempted to strengthen relations between the two countries and minimise these cultural and linguistic challenges. This was due to a growing sense that New Zealand was an Asia Pacific nation. An important aspect of this was the perception of New Zealand as a multicultural society which was actively engaged in understanding neighbouring countries. New Zealand’s relationship with Japan was an important aspect of New Zealand reconciling its existing identities, especially its sense of being a culturally British nation, with an emerging

427 Ibid.
429 Ibid. p.2.
430 MFAT, New Zealand High Commission London, United Kingdom: New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
Asian identity. These initiatives to build on and strengthen the already existing commonality of being democratic, free market countries are outlined in the following pages.

4.2.2 Efforts to Build a Constituency

The 1970’s marked a significant period in relations between both countries. While political and economic relations between the two countries grew in the 1970’s, people-to-people relations were not strong. Contact between people grew in the next twenty years, specifically in the areas of tourism and language but this failed to extend to the mass media. Central to the relationship developing was the necessity of both countries being able to communicate effectively despite significant language and cultural differences. A number of initiatives were introduced to build a constituency and understand one another’s culture which allowed for the growth of people-to-people relations.

There was a strong recognition of the benefits of a stronger relationship between the two countries and it became apparent that in order to strengthen the relationship, New Zealand businessmen, politicians and the public had to become more effective when communicating with Japanese. As a result, Trotter states, the 1970’s and 1980’s were “marked by efforts in both the public and private sector in New Zealand of one another’s culture, build a constituency and broaden the basis of New Zealand’s contacts with Japan.”437 A number of organisations were established during this time in order to encourage a stronger understanding of Japan and Japanese culture among New Zealanders. These sporting, cultural and semi-official organisations helped to promote cultural links between the two countries. In 1976 the Japan Advisory Committee (JAC) was established to encourage a closer relationship with Japan and its people by increasing contact with people from the private sector, universities and government. This would lead to later initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Japan New Zealand Business Council (JNZBC), Japan societies and Sister Cities.438 Exchange visits of both officials and school students contributed to changing stereotypes and introduced Japanese culture to New Zealanders who had previously had little or no contact with Japan. Ann Trotter argues that “by 1990 it could be claimed with some justification that, as a result of the work of these organisations, the average New Zealand citizen was now better informed about Japan and Japanese culture of which many had some direct experience in New Zealand or Japan.”439

The New Zealand-Japan relationship relied on contact between political leaders, officials

438 Ibid. p.218.
and business people. These were reinforced through ties such as sister city associations, educational and research institutions and other ‘people-to-people’ exchanges. The parliamentary exchange initiative of the Japan-New Zealand Diet members Friendship League was established in 1977 which aimed to endorse the significance of stronger bilateral relations with Japan among Members of Parliament in New Zealand. It was also designed to promote New Zealand’s connections with influential policy-makers in Japan in areas that would benefit New Zealand. The organisation received support in Japan and was largely effective in building a constituency in Japan. The initiative received further encouragement from the New Zealand government when the New Zealand and Japan Foundation was established to mark the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Ohira. The Foundation, like the other initiatives, was designed to promote closer ties and a stronger understanding between the two countries. The Japan New Zealand Foundation received funding from the Japanese government for cultural programmes and it spent approximately $250,000 each year on New Zealand related activities. Additionally, the Japanese Ministry of Education had a similar expenditure on scholarships for New Zealand students to study in Japan and every year a Japanese language teacher was despatched to New Zealand.

Exchange programmes were another initiative the New Zealand government pursued to raise awareness of Japan in New Zealand and improve the general understanding of Japanese society and culture in the population. These programmes were designed primarily for youth and introduced a number of educational and cultural exchanges after the government directed funding in 1974 towards the project. Most of the government funding for these programmes came from the Education Department and went to the development of Japanese teaching in New Zealand schools and tertiary institutions. The New Zealand-Japan Working Holiday Scheme was another agreement between both countries that encouraged young adults to visit each other’s countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also funded the Special Japan Programme which was a visitor programme established in 1977 in order to encourage trade and economic links by bringing influential Japanese leaders to New Zealand.

Roger Peren argues that it was these human exchanges that gave “the best

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440 Kennedy, Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value, p.64
442 Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Residual Management Unit: International Liaison - Japan - Japan New Zealand relations, 1985-1987, Visit to New Zealand by His Excellency Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone Prime Minister of Japan 1985. IL/3/JPNZ.
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid.
446 Visit to New Zealand by His Excellency Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone Prime Minister of Japan 1985, IL/3/JPNZ.
opportunities to ensure the real understanding necessary to confront any differences” and that “the exchanges touch more New Zealanders, and Japanese, than can be documented.”

These initiatives all had the same aim, to increase New Zealand’s understanding and knowledge of Japanese culture in order to strengthen relations with Japan and become more involved in the Asia Pacific region. New Zealand recognised the limitations that a primarily Western focused foreign policy approach would present and took these steps to reconcile an identity founded on British primacy to one which engaged the Asia Pacific region.

4.2.3 Education Initiatives and Economic Cooperation

This desire to deepen its understanding and appreciation of Japan led to further education initiatives and policies to ease economic interaction. New Zealand’s growing perception of itself as an Asia Pacific state required it to increase its understanding and knowledge of other regional nations. The New Zealand government identified improving communication between Japan and New Zealand as an area which needed attention and as a result the Ministry of Education encouraged the teaching of Japanese in secondary schools in the mid-1970’s. The study of the Japanese language had been introduced in the late 1960’s at the Universities of Auckland, Canterbury and Massey but as New Zealand increased its links with Japan, learning the Japanese language as a subject became increasingly popular. In 1990 Victoria University of Wellington began offering Japanese language studies. Further progress was made in 1985 when the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone prompted Massey University to establish The New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies. It received funding from Japanese sources, Massey University and the New Zealand-Japan Foundation and sought to promote the significance of Japan for New Zealand and facilitate greater knowledge, understanding and expertise with regards to Japan. Part of this emphasis on educational and cultural exchanges was New Zealand’s strong involvement in the JET programme in which New Zealand graduates were hired to teach English in Japanese secondary schools. The programme proved to be successful in New Zealand and by 1990 there were about 100 New Zealanders recruited under this programme.

However, by the late 1980’s, it was still argued that there was a lack of knowledge about each other, which according to Wevers, was a result of two factors, “the low priority given within the education systems of each country to teaching about the other, and the lack of

447 Roger Peren, “Toward greater understanding”. In Malcolm McKinnon, Historical Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, p. 20, Japan and New Zealand Historical Connections: proceedings of a colloquium held in Wellington, 20 February 1997. Wellington, New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies, Massey University.
449 Ibid.
emphasis accorded by the local media and information services to Japan or New Zealand affairs.”

Studies by both Victoria and Otago Universities concluded in 1991 that:

“Building a more Asia-literate society is a long-term task, in reality that of a whole generation. It requires a broad national consensus, the support of the wider community and leadership from government, business and the universities. It also requires pressure, not least from students and parents, and industry sectors like tourism, from whom the Asia market provides strong growth potential. There are some positive signs in New Zealand, but the issue has not been grasped here as wholeheartedly as it has been in Australia.”

“There is an imbalance between New Zealand’s growing connection with Asia-Pacific and the lack of Asian studies in the education system. Asia impinges upon New Zealand’s interests on a variety of fronts and will loom large in its concerns well into the foreseeable future. Teaching Asian studies is a necessary part of the process of redefining this country’s identity and attachments. The educational and cultural reasons for studying Asian languages and civilisations have been reinforced in recent times by compelling economic and political arguments …”

While not disagreeing with these statements, Kennedy highlights the considerable growth of public interest in Japan and how this had influenced the improvement of educational results. The study titled ‘Japanese Language in New Zealand Secondary Schools’ by Terrence Aschoff demonstrated the significant increase in numbers of secondary schools which offered Japanese language study, from 100 in 1988 to 189 in 1991 (out of a total of 410 schools). There was also an increase in numbers of students who passed stage III Japanese language at New Zealand universities. According to Kennedy, this “picture is one of considerable progress and commitment.”

When Japanese Prime Minister Ohira visited New Zealand in 1981 the concept of the Pacific Basin Community was being endorsed in both Japan and Australia, although New Zealand’s

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450 Wevers, Japan, Its Future, and New Zealand. Quoted in Kennedy, Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value, p.129.
451 Lindsay Watt, Report to the Vice-Chancellor (on the Centre for Asia/Pacific Law and Business) and the Asian Dimension at Victoria University, February 25th 1991. Quoted in Kennedy, Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value, p.129.
452 Bairam Thakur and Ng Barsby, Asian Studies at Otago 1991. Quoted in Kennedy, Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value, p.130.
453 Kennedy, Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value, p.130.
view towards it was cautious. There was concern over a lack of possible participation among the smaller Pacific Island states and “New Zealand’s perception of itself as a spokesman for small states” meant New Zealand needed to address this issue.\textsuperscript{455} New Zealand took part in the 1980 conference which recommended setting up the Pacific Cooperation Committee and New Zealand and Japan became founding members of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) which involved the government, the private sector and academic representatives. According to Trotter, New Zealand’s support for an Asia Pacific community had increased by 1989 due to the growth and diversification of New Zealand’s trade in the region and the growing diplomatic relationships this resulted in.\textsuperscript{456} It was during this time that New Zealand began to make significant shifts away from historical ties with Europe and towards a role of importance in the Asia Pacific region. New Zealand’s trading issues with the European Union and the success of Closer Economic Relations (CER) with Australia prompted discussions of the potential for New Zealand to involve itself more in regional organisations. New Zealand supported the 1989 initiative for the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and saw Japan’s involvement in this forum as equally important. While some Southeast Asian states, such as Malaysia, did not perceive New Zealand and Australia as being entirely valid members of any potential Asian organisations, New Zealand none the less became part of a broad-Pacific group. Japan supported the creation of APEC and did not support the concept of an exclusively East Asian economic bloc. This contributed another political and economic layer to the New Zealand Japan relationship.\textsuperscript{457}

4.2.4 Conclusion

By 1985 it was apparent that New Zealand’s relationship with Japan was the most important relationship New Zealand had with any Asian nation in terms of trade and diplomatic contact, which made it a partner as equally valuable as Australia, the United States and Britain.\textsuperscript{461} Largely as a result of the various policies to improve relations it was claimed that “In a host of areas, the Japan-New Zealand relationship is deeper than politics or trade or strategic interests. It is reaching new dimensions which we must track, and foster.”\textsuperscript{462} It was becoming increasingly apparent that New Zealand and Japan shared many common interests

\textsuperscript{455} Trotter, “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan,” p.221.
\textsuperscript{456} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{457} Trotter, “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan,” p.221.
\textsuperscript{461} Japan/New Zealand Business Council Reception for the Japanese Prime Minister 1985, Speech notes (R17841066).
\textsuperscript{462} Roger Peren, “Toward greater understanding,” p.20.
in the Asia Pacific region and both countries views aligned on many international issues. Despite the issues created by a difference in identity, in the UN and many international organisations both nations “invariably find [themselves] on the same side, striving to achieve progress towards the same goals.”\textsuperscript{463} New Zealand and Japan built on this foundation of shared liberally democratic and free market values to develop the relationship, but in cultural norms and many values New Zealand remained close with the United Kingdom and an identity shaped by a sense of ‘Britishness’. While both New Zealand and Japan shared a commonality in their commitment to similar democratic and economic values, the lack of a common identity in history, culture and language was a significant challenge and led the New Zealand government to implement policies which attempted to strengthen relations between the two countries and minimise these cultural and linguistic challenges. New Zealand’s relationship with Japan was an important aspect of New Zealand reconciling its existing identities, especially its sense of being a culturally British nation, with an emerging Asian identity. Brian Lynch argues that during its history New Zealand had been faced with two options: “stand tall and seek to forge a new place in the world, or retreat into remote south Pacific irrelevance.”\textsuperscript{464} Arguably, New Zealand chose the former option and attempted to reconcile its small state, ‘British’ identity with one that engaged actively with other countries. As a result Lynch argues that New Zealand’s relationship “with much of the rest of the world has been transformed” and allowed New Zealand to become a “richly diverse, multicultural society.”\textsuperscript{465}

This chapter has reviewed the efforts and decisions the New Zealand government undertook in order to bridge the cultural and communication barriers which the countries different identities had presented. Unlike New Zealand’s strong relationships with other partners, New Zealand and Japan have never had a shared history, language or culture in which an overlap in identities would help ease interaction and prevent potential conflict. This difference in identities emerged as a potential challenge almost immediately after establishing diplomatic contact in the 1950’s and were a significant influence on the relationship over the following decades. There was steady progress in many areas and an increase in interest among New Zealanders in engaging more with Japan. A number of initiatives introduced by the New Zealand government to strengthen relations between the two countries attempted to minimise these cultural and linguistic challenges. New Zealand’s relationship with Japan played a

\textsuperscript{463} Japan/New Zealand Business Council Reception for the Japanese Prime Minister 1985, Speech notes (R17841066).
\textsuperscript{464} Lynch “Dealing with the reality of small and distant,” p.20.
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid.
significant part in New Zealand reconciling its existing identities, namely that of a culturally British nation, with an emerging Asian identity. As New Zealand grew and expanded its international involvement, differences in culture and history presented themselves in contact with other states but not on the scale they had in Japan. Japan was one of New Zealand’s strongest trading partners and was arguably the first country which New Zealand was required to develop a large-scale strategy in order to address the differences and ensure these differences did not impede a strong relationship. The next chapter will analyse how a third major existing identity, that of New Zealand’s ‘moral’ identity would create tension and conflict in the Japan New Zealand relationship in the 1980’s and the decades after.
4.3 Environmental Issues

In the 1980’s New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and environmental issues created tension between New Zealand and Japan and demonstrated a divide in common interest despite a close relationship. Ann Trotter highlights the idea that while both countries may share ‘common interests internationally’, the importance of these issues and how they viewed them was different.\textsuperscript{486} Relations between both countries had been growing steadily in the preceding decades but environmental points of contention demonstrated that there still remained areas in which both states disagreed and required careful communication. While both countries had active anti-nuclear and environmental lobbies, the influence given to the interests of these lobbies by their governments differed significantly. The Japanese government was sensitive to how New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policies could affect its relationship with the United States and was careful to distance itself from New Zealand at the time. The relationship was also strained in the late 1980’s due to New Zealand’s concern over driftnet fishing issues. The Japanese government publicised the issue and considered New Zealand to be sacrificing the relationship for domestic considerations. As a result of tension both countries took steps to re-affirm the relationship and political confidence with official visits of Prime Ministers and Ministers between the two countries. It prompted considerable political debate and affected New Zealand’s relations with Japan in addition to the change in relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{487}

New Zealand’s ongoing transition away from Britain’s cultural, political and economic influence allowed New Zealand to create an independent identity for itself which reflected values unique to the country. These new values and norms incorporated the physical, cultural and political aspects of the country which made it distinctive. This identity was shaped significantly by the growing sense of ‘independence’ and the notion of New Zealand as a ‘moral utopia’ with a self-image as an environmentally responsible, pacifist and independent country. This anti-nuclear movement and a strong sense of environmental responsibility would have a strong influence on shaping New Zealand’s bilateral relationship with Japan when the issues of Japan’s whaling programme and the ramifications of New Zealand’s heavily anti-nuclear stance created difficulties in the relationship.

4.3.1 Nuclear Issue

New Zealand’s policy of prohibiting port visits by nuclear warships was one of the most significant foreign policy decisions in the country’s history and placed New Zealand in the

\textsuperscript{486} Trotter, “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan,” p.216.
\textsuperscript{487} Lynch “Dealing with the reality of small and distant,” pp.210-211.
international spotlight. The outcome of New Zealand’s exclusion from the ANZUS Treaty was clearly unfavourable but the government was committed to demonstrating such a strong stand by the force of party opinion.488 As the relationship between New Zealand and Japan had been growing over the previous two decades due to Prime Ministerial visits and annual talks, this made the tension created by the nuclear dispute between New Zealand and the United States considerably more concerning for the Japanese government. New Zealand’s close political and security relationship with the United States had played an important part in Japan’s perception of New Zealand, contributing to the importance Japan placed on its relationship with New Zealand despite the disparity in size and economic power.489

Japan’s attitudes to nuclear issues have been unique and varying. For many years New Zealanders have commended Japan’s ‘nuclear allergy’ while arguably failing to take into account Japan’s heavy dependence on nuclear power.490 Japan relied heavily on nuclear power but there is a clearly adverse Japanese domestic public opinion to nuclear weapons.491 During this time, visits of nuclear powered vessels to Japanese ports had not been an issue. However, Japanese policy regarding nuclear weapons was defined by the “three non-nuclear principles”, introduced in 1968, which state that Japan will not manufacture, possess or allow any nuclear weapons to be introduced into Japan.492 While the Japanese government clearly enunciated these principles, the security relationship with the Japanese government attracted criticism by opposition parties at the time. When an opposition Member of Parliament brought up the issue of New Zealand’s stance on nuclear issues in the Japanese Diet, the Foreign Minister at the time, Mr Abe, replied:

“I think Japan’s three non-nuclear principles are excellent principles. The New Zealand Labour Party has also been strongly asking that nuclear weapons not be brought in. On this point, they are exactly the same as us. I have not studied in details whether their policy has a form of three non-nuclear principles. However,... the Labour Party at least insisted on not letting nuclear armed ship visit New Zealand. Therefore, concerning this point, their request is the same as Japan’s…”493

Both governments were aware of the significance of anti-nuclear lobbies but addressed them

490 Peren, “Toward greater understanding”, p.16.
491 Visit to New Zealand by His Excellency Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone Prime Minister of Japan 1985, IL/3/JPNZ.
492 Ibid.
493 Ibid.
very differently. The tension between New Zealand and the United States forced the Japanese government to look at their own domestic anti-nuclear lobby while trying to accommodate the conflicting demands of its security relationship with the United States, creating unsought friction. This caused Japan to distance itself from New Zealand and its anti-nuclear policies in order not to complicate relations with its strongest ally and trading partner. New Zealand’s relationship with the United States had been an important aspect of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan. The ANZUS Treaty reflected the fundamental interests and values that New Zealand, the United States and Australia had in common in the Pacific. Relations between these countries could be traced back through centuries. Ultimately, this meant that “The Treaty exist[ed] because of the historical, political, cultural security and personal links, not the other way around.” The ANZUS relationship had, up till this point, demonstrated the extent of trust, consultation and strong ties between New Zealand and the United States and this played a role in Japan viewing New Zealand in a positive light. Close relations with the United States also strengthened the idea of New Zealand as an advanced Pacific nation, which would make New Zealand a reliable player in the possible establishment of a Pacific Basin Community.

Politically, at this time, changes in policy of both countries began to question previously aligning areas of mutual perception. Japan was concerned that New Zealand’s non-nuclear policies would weaken the United States-New Zealand relationship which would indirectly impact on the democratic coalition which all three countries were a part of and therefore weaken this close relationship. Uneasiness between the United States and New Zealand was worrying for Japan and signs began to emerge that “the normally placid atmosphere of Japanese/New Zealand communication had become somewhat clouded.”

Early discussions with Japan in 1975 regarding New Zealand’s concept for a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific revealed a difference of opinion on the nuclear issue. It was clear that New Zealand and Japan shared “a sense of urgency and danger about the nuclear arms race” and a common objective “of seeking to reduce the potential for nuclear conflict.”

However, the Japanese representative in the New Zealand Japan Official Talks explained that while Japan was, of course, a nuclear-free country it had no concept of a nuclear free

495 Prime Minister’s Office Series (Rt. Hon. David Lange) – Miscellaneous including Listener ANZUS Article, Japan, Speeches, 1984, (R17841066).
497 Ian Kennedy, Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value, p.64.
zone in its own territory. There was a “nuclear allergy” in Japan and anything to do with nuclear issues in the country had considerable political implications. Japan was under the “America nuclear umbrella” and the government was subject to both domestic and international considerations. However, the government had made clear that entry of nuclear weapons into Japan was unacceptable.\textsuperscript{499}

The nuclear issue was raised again in the mid-1980s. While there was an apparent discrepancy between Japan’s three non-nuclear principles and the US-Japan Security Treaty, the Japanese government took the stance that the United States respected its non-nuclear principles and in accordance with the Treaty would consult with Japan before it brought nuclear weapons into Japan. However, the United States maintained its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its naval vessels, a policy which New Zealand took significant issue with. Clearly, public opinion had manifested itself in New Zealand in a way it had not in Japan.\textsuperscript{500} The coyness and wish to avoid formal press conferences during Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to New Zealand in 1985 can be attributed to these differences in Japanese and New Zealand policies towards visits by United States naval vessels. The Prime Minister was “playing very much to his Japanese audience” and was therefore aware of the issue being placed in the spotlight of the Japanese public and opposition parties. There was an “extraordinary sensitivity of Japanese domestic public opinion to nuclear issues”\textsuperscript{501} that the Prime Minister was clearly aware of. It was apparent that one of the Japanese government’s fears was that if New Zealand established the precedent of refusing entry to American ships which it believed were nuclear-armed, “the pressure will be on Japan to do likewise.”\textsuperscript{502}

The Labour Government’s intention to exclude nuclear weapons from New Zealand was itself the reflection of a substantial movement of public opinion in New Zealand. Concern about the possibility of nuclear war and the desire to take some constructive action to control nuclear arms developed rapidly in New Zealand in the last decade, underlined by a growing awareness that the destructive potential of the nuclear power eliminated any possibility that


\textsuperscript{500} Visit to New Zealand by His Excellency Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone Prime Minister of Japan 1985, IL/3/JPNZ.

\textsuperscript{501} Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Residual Management Unit: International Liaison - Japan - Japan New Zealand relations, 1985-1987, ANZUS and Ship Visits: Japanese policy on nuclear issues, IL/3/JPNZ.

\textsuperscript{502} Visit to New Zealand by His Excellency Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone Prime Minister of Japan 1985, IL/3/JPNZ.
New Zealand might somehow escape the results of nuclear war. 503 A New Zealand representative acknowledged the New Zealand public’s strong stance on the nuclear issue and said that there was a “great deal of misunderstanding on nuclear matters”, as “elements of the public were inclined to see all nuclear power as evil.” 504 He believed the “nuclear allergy” was exacerbated by a number of things. Visits of nuclear ships, whether or not they were carrying nuclear weapons were unequivocally opposed. In addition to this, “a vocal section of the community contested the proposition that New Zealand needed nuclear power stations and felt that, even if they were necessary, the country should not have them.” 505

There was also strong opposition to French nuclear testing in the South Pacific and support for disarmament generally. 506

In discussions regarding the ANZUS/Nuclear Free Zone, the point was raised that “there were two schools of thought in New Zealand about our position in the world.” 507 The traditional view perceived New Zealand as an integral part of the Western world and that it should be prepared to “accept without question the protection offered by the United States nuclear umbrella as a necessary deterrent.” 508 The other view, while acknowledging that New Zealand was a member of the Western world, believed that the country’s situation was such that New Zealand should not have to rely on the United States nuclear umbrella, and that to do so could be dangerous. The report then made clear that “the present Government was seeking a course between the two schools. It was not prepared to take the latter view to its logical conclusions but, on the other hand, it had made it plain that it was not a party to the alliance at all costs and in all circumstances.” 509 Evidently, the New Zealand government was more inclined to act in accordance with public opinion and willing to shape its stance on the nuclear issue with more regard to national identity than security concerns.

In addition to the nuclear issue, in the late 1980s the New Zealand government became concerned about driftnet fishing by various other countries in the southern ocean. This method of fishing, which involved setting a long net to drift with the currents of the ocean, was seen in New Zealand as especially destructive. Tighter restrictions in the northern fishing waters had, however, forced vessels south. When agreement between the affected

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503 Prime Minister’s Office Series (Rt. Hon. David Lange) – Miscellaneous including Listener ANZUS Article, Japan, Speeches, 1984, (R17841066).
505 Ibid.
506 Ibid.
507 Ibid.
508 Ibid.
509 Ibid.
coastal states and the distant water fishing nations could not be reached, New Zealand, to
the irritation of the Japanese who considered New Zealand to be sacrificing bilateral relations
for domestic political considerations, publicised and politicised the issue in an address by
the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This
move, in October 1989, was an effective ploy by New Zealand in its own interests and on
behalf of small island nations. It was strongly supported by the United States. A UN
resolution, of which New Zealand and the United States were the principal sponsors,
provided for a moratorium on all driftnet fishing by 1992. Japan announced in July 1990 that
it would comply by 1991. This was seen in New Zealand as a major concession and, in
recognition of the fact that more frequent and better consultation between the two
governments might have avoided or ameliorated the tension in the relationship caused by
this issue, efforts were made to re-establish the relationship on a firm footing. Prime Minister
Palmer revisited Japan in July 1990 and an agreement was reached for more frequent
ministerial consultations and for the initiation of a number of projects in the environmental
research area.510

Ultimately, the environmental issues that became apparent in the 1980’s caused tension and
the breakdown of the ANZUS Treaty placed considerable strain and uncertainty on the New
Zealand-Japan relationship. The absence of Prime Ministerial visits to Japan in the 1980’s
and Yasuhiro Nakasone’s 1995 visit as the only high ranking Japanese official between 1982
and 1993 illustrated this unease.511 New Zealand’s strong aversion to any form of nuclear
activity in the country and the subsequent difficulties this caused with the United States, in
addition to other foreign relations like those with Japan, clearly expressed New Zealand’s
“desire for self-determination in matters affecting our own destiny.”512 This affected New
Zealand’s security arrangement and general diplomatic relations with other countries but
demonstrated New Zealand’s identity as an environmentally responsible, pacifist and
intensely independent country. It was a sense of identity formed through domestic influences
and had not been shaped by New Zealand’s British roots.

511 MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2006b), “Japan-New Zealand Relations,” Online:
512 Prime Minister’s Office Series (Rt. Hon. David Lange) – Miscellaneous including Listener ANZUS
Article, Japan, Speeches, 1984, (R17841066).
4.3.2 Whaling

The issue which has put the most publicised strain on the relationship has been the ongoing disputes regarding Japan’s whaling programme. New Zealand’s strong sense of environmentalism and belief that commercial whaling is destructive has caused New Zealand to unequivocally condemn the Japanese whaling programme and the Japanese government for the role they have played in allowing it to continue. Within the otherwise cooperative and friendly framework the countries work in, Japan’s ongoing whaling in the Southern Ocean has created significant diplomatic disputes. In 1982 the International Whaling Commission (IWC) issued a moratorium on commercial whaling but Japan continued its whaling programme. Japan maintained its whaling programme was in accordance with the International Whaling Commissions requirements due to scientific reasons. Japan argues that some whale species, such as the Minke whale are “abundant,” and that the “limited, sustainable use of such whale species does not pose any overall risk to stocks.”514 Additionally, the Japanese government claims that are a traditional aspect of Japanese culture “with links to artefacts, monuments, culinary history, art, literature, and festivals.”515

New Zealand policy opposes all whaling and supports the absolute protection of whales, except under the IWC’s Aboriginal Subsistence Quota which permits some countries the use of traditional methods which abide by the commissions criteria.516 MFAT has given the following reason for the New Zealand government’s stance on whaling:

“Even in relatively recent times, most great whale species were exploited to near-extinction by commercial whalers from many industrialised countries, including New Zealand. Whales have therefore come to symbolise the excesses of unrestrained human activity and their recovery is seen as an indication as to whether we can restrain ourselves for the benefit of future generations.”517

New Zealand requires that a number of conditions must be met before it can support the resumption of commercial whaling; whale population numbers must recover significantly, and the issues of alternative uses of whales, health implications of consuming whale meat

515 Ibid.
and humane slaughter methods must be addressed.\textsuperscript{518} New Zealand has also demonstrated strong support for regional initiatives such as the establishment of a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary (SPWS) and the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) \textsuperscript{519}

Tensions over the whaling issue have become increasingly prominent over the last decade. In a statement in 2000, Foreign Minister Phil Goff stated that both countries would continue to have different viewpoints on the issue of whaling and that “The New Zealand Government and public remain unconvinced that Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, undertaken in the name of scientific research, is necessary.”\textsuperscript{520} This somewhat subdued and unthreatening rhetoric gradually became more tense as Japan continued unabated its whaling programme over the following years. The Foreign Minister was clear to point out that “notwithstanding our differences over this issue” New Zealand and Japan would continue to maintain the friendly and cooperative relationship both countries have shared.\textsuperscript{521}

Public opinion on whaling in New Zealand has been strong and consistent, with many New Zealanders strongly against the IWC criteria which allows for limited catching for research purposes.\textsuperscript{522} New Zealand has joined numerous other countries in applying diplomatic pressure on Japan’s government to stop its whaling programme in the Southern Ocean. In 2006, New Zealand’s view on the matter was made clear:

\begin{quote}
“The New Zealand government is strongly opposed to Japan’s ‘scientific’ whaling programme. There is no scientific justification to use lethal methods to provide information on whale populations … Whales are iconic mammals which New Zealanders value highly. Of particular concern are plans by Japan to expand its lethal research programme to include catching and killing endangered humpback and fin whales.”\textsuperscript{523}
\end{quote}

However, Japan has maintained the official line that it was operating legally and justified in its whaling programme due to cultural reasons. In 2010, the Foreign Minister, Katsya Okada, said that he did not see any need for a review of Japanese policy, “We have a tradition in Japan where we have been eating whale meat. It would be a different story if it were an endangered species… but, if not, I think the average Japanese would like to consume whale

\textsuperscript{518} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{520} New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs Record (speeches), Volume 8, Number 8, February 2000 (accessed National Library of New Zealand).
\textsuperscript{521} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{522} Peren, “Toward greater understanding,” p.20.
\textsuperscript{523} Herald Online Staff, “NZ in diplomatic protest on whaling” The New Zealand Herald, 18/01/2006.
meat into the future.” However, under the Democratic Party of Japan, which took power briefly in 2009, mixed messages emerged. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama stated he did not like whale meat and made a budget promise that included eliminating some of the subsidies and perks for retired bureaucrats that have influenced the continuation of whaling. The cultural importance of whaling is most prevalent among the elderly population of Japan and the “tradition of Showa nostalgia”, which is based on the symbolism of whale meat in times of war and hardship, plays a significant role in it. However, this is arguably changing among Japan’s younger population. These values and justification for whaling clearly clash with New Zealand’s stance on Japan’s whaling programme.

Diplomatic tension escalated in 2000 when Prime Minister Helen Clark and senior Japanese officials publically condemned each other. Japan’s response to Foreign Affairs Minister Phil Goff’s letter on whaling was a suggestion to the New Zealand government to discontinue its support of Greenpeace’s anti-whaling campaign. In a letter to Fisheries Minister Pete Hodgson, the Japanese Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Tokuichiro Tamazawa advised that the New Zealand governments support for Greenpeace’s anti-whaling campaign could have a harmful influence on New Zealand’s image in Japan. According to Tamazawa, there was concern over “the prudence of a prime minister of a country, who publicly expresses support for Greenpeace, an international body known to be forcing its tenets on others by means of violent actions.” However, this diplomatic confrontation continued when Clark directed advice back to the Japanese Minister, “I’d advise him to stick to the issues and get the facts right. Greenpeace is not an organisation dedicated to violent protest. On the contrary, it is an organisation dedicated to nonviolent action, and it is an organisation which over the years New Zealand governments have had quite a lot to do with. So I think we will continue to deal with Japan on the substance of the issue and ignore the jibes.” Clark appeared unperturbed about any impact this might have on New Zealand’s export trade with Japan, declaring that the protest came “from well down the pecking order” and she would have had more concern if the response had come from her Japanese counterpart rather than Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister. Bringing to a close the heated diplomatic discussion, Shigeo Matsutomi, a counsellor at the Japanese embassy, disputed the Prime Minister opinion that it was a low level response, stating, “That’s her opinion.

525 Ibid.
526 Victoria Main, “Jibes from Japan will be ignored says Clark,” The Dominion Post, 26/01/2000.
527 Ibid.
528 Ibid.
This is a serious reaction. This is the official reaction of the Japanese Government.”

Following this exchange of rhetoric, in November 2000 there was further strain put on the diplomatic relations between both countries and both governments were “avoiding high level meetings lest they add to the friction.” Helen Clark described Japan’s whaling programme as “barbaric” and the Conservation Minister Sandra Lee made the assertion that protected whale species were ending up in Japanese fish markets. The Japanese embassy first secretary Michio Iwanami described whaling as a big thorn in the side of diplomatic relations, and stated “scientific whaling is not commercial whaling in disguise, which is the criticism of the Government of New Zealand. Scientific whaling is truly scientific research, and we do hope for the cooperation and participation of New Zealand in that research.”

Another source of tension is the actual conflict which whaling activities that occur in waters near New Zealand have created. The involvement of Greenpeace vessels and ships like the Sea Shepherd in Japanese whaling activities has garnered much media attention. Relations became tense in 2006 when it was reported that the Japanese Fisheries Agency was considering involving the Maritime Police Agency to dispatch military aircraft, while some in New Zealand were in support of sending a frigate to observe the situation. In 2010, New Zealand Foreign Minister, Murray McCully attempted to begin dialogue again after the sinking of the Sea Shepherd boat, the Ady Gil, in the Southern Ocean after a collision with a Japanese whaling vessel. According to the New Zealand Herald newspaper, it was due to “luck, rather than good management” that none of the six person crew were killed in the collision. The incident of a physical dispute created a significant turning point and arguably an event which had been building up over the preceding decade. While recognising that previous attempts at a solution had failed, he argued that “the diplomatic process is the only one that offers some prospect of significant success.”

The latest diplomatic dispute occurred in February 2014 when a vessel from a Japanese whaling fleet entered New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone. After the incident, Japan's ambassador in Wellington, Yasuaki Nogawa, was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade where New Zealand’s concern was expressed by deputy secretary Gerard van Bohemen at the Japanese Whaling vessels decision to follow the protest vessel Steve Irwin into New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). McCully stated the meeting was to communicate the “deep disappointment of the New Zealand Government that Japanese whalers had been insensitive to the views of New Zealanders by entering New Zealand’s EEZ against our wishes.”

He also reiterated that "While the Japanese whalers' decision to ignore New Zealand's strong wishes in this respect has no legal implications, clearly it was deeply disrespectful." Labour's foreign affairs spokesman David Shearer also highlighted the diplomatic concerns, "The fact that the Japanese Government was aware, and appeared to sanction, the ship's entry into New Zealand's EEZ, when it knew of New Zealand's continued opposition to whaling is deeply concerning." The government had not ruled out further action of greater weight, such as requiring the Japanese Ambassador to meet with McCully as Foreign Affairs Minister which would put the diplomatic response on the same level as New Zealand’s response to French nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in the mid-1990’s.

In March, 2014 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Japan’s scientific whaling programme in the Southern Ocean was for commercial rather than scientific purposes. The ICJ provided Japan with “clear guidelines” for future whaling and what would be permitted as scientific. When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was questioned whether Japan would resume whaling in the Southern Ocean on a visit to New Zealand, he avoided the question and stated that Japan would abide by the ruling of the ICJ regarding its whaling programme. Key said that while Japan was investigating how it would be able to resume scientific whaling in accordance with the ICJ criteria, he expressed to Abe that New Zealanders had a “real concern” about whaling and that “New Zealand's view is there's no place for whaling scientific or otherwise.” Despite otherwise close relations, Key also made clear that both countries had different views when it came to the issue of whaling.

538 Ibid.
539 Ibid.
543 Ibid.
Japan’s whaling programme has also highlighted a deviation from its traditional support of international institutions and multilateralism, a commonality New Zealand and Japan have largely shared as liberally democratic nations with vested interests in these norms. The issue of Japan’s alleged ‘vote buying’ and its contravention of the 2014 ICJ ruling regarding the illegality of its whaling fleet demonstrate this.

The issue of Japan’s whaling programme created diplomatic tension with accusations at the IWC of Japanese ‘vote buying’. Evidence supporting this claim led the New Zealand government to declare its opposition to Japan’s action, with Prime Minister Helen Clark stating in a press release that “New Zealand and other countries opposed to whaling have long suspected that Japan was using overseas development aid money to persuade poorer nations, without any direct interest in whaling, to support Japan’s pro-whaling stance at the International Whaling Commission.” In a speech to an IWC meeting, New Zealand’s Minister of Conservation, Sandra Lee, reiterated this position, stating that “[t]aking advantage of the poverty or vulnerability of developing countries and small island states to buy their votes can only be regarded as a serious misuse of power and influence by a wealthy nation,” and that “[i]t is disappointing that Japan is using such tactics as we have confidently worked alongside Japan in the United Nations and many other international fora.” Vote-purchasing heightened the severity of the situation and undermined values both Japan and New Zealand claim to share, such as the importance of democratic institutions while eroding trust and understanding.

Despite a ICJ court ruling in March 2014 which ordered Japan to end its whaling programme in the Antarctic as it violated and international moratorium on commercial whaling, Japan announced it was making preparations to continue, maintaining the justification as scientific research purposes. While initially halting the activities of its whaling fleet after the ICJ ruling, the Japanese government announced it would proceed this year with a research programme in the Pacific, while making preparations for a trip to the Antarctic in 2015. This decision was supported by a large proportion of the Japanese public, with 60 percent of respondents in an Asahi Shimbun poll believing that research whaling should continue, and 23 percent in support of ending the practice. Almost half of the respondents who were in

support of the whaling programme continuing did not eat whale meat,\textsuperscript{547} pointing perhaps to the prominence of a belief in whaling for traditional or cultural reasons. This refusal to adhere to international organisations, such as the IWC, marks a departure away from Japan’s commitment to multilateralism and a rules-based international order, values which have provided a foundation for its relationship with New Zealand.

Japan and New Zealand have traditionally shared a belief in the value of a rules based international order and support of international institutions. However, the strain on the relationship due to New Zealand’s strong opposition to Japan’s whaling has deepened due to Japan’s alleged ‘vote buying’ and flouting of the ICJ’s decision which demonstrate a move away from the international norms that both countries had historically shared over recent decades. A resolute opposition to Japan’s whaling programme in the form of diplomatic censure and legal action demonstrate New Zealand’s distinctive sense of environmental nationalism and a belief in the value of protecting the environment both within the country and further afield. New Zealand’s small stature in economic and diplomatic influence has not deterred New Zealand from pursuing a foreign policy line which potentially threatens its strong relations with more powerful states, including the United States and Japan. This desire for an independent foreign policy that reflects New Zealand’s core values and beliefs and its self-image as a ‘moral’ leader has clearly contributed to shaping New Zealand’s stance towards many issues, in particular its active opposition to Japan’s whaling programme.

4.3.3 Conclusion

In the 1980’s New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and environmental issues created tension between New Zealand and Japan and demonstrated a divide in common interest despite a close relationship. Following this, Japan’s scientific whaling programme proved to put even greater strain on diplomatic relations between the two countries. The emergence of a distinct nationalism and its foundation in an evolving sense of being bound by a ‘moral’ identity and search for independence created a national self-image which shaped New Zealand policy towards Japan on numerous issues. A collective identity narrative created a nuclear free norm in the country and a sense of the nation as pacifist, environmentally aware and fiercely independent. This recurring conflict regarding matters founded on a sense of identity and value threatened to upset the trust and stability that Japan and New Zealand had shared for

much of their history. While difficult issues, ultimately these disagreements have been addressed in a way which has not escalated the conflict and both countries have continued to share a solid relationship.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Current Relations

Contact between New Zealand and Japan has evolved considerably in the last twenty years. Both states have ties in many areas and the development of Asia Pacific cooperation in the 1990’s has influenced the relationship and given it new significance. There is now a variety of diplomatic, state and people-to-people relations that have come about as a result of Japan being the first country outside the Anglo-European sphere that New Zealand has developed these numerous, globalised ties with. There is a growing tendency to view Japan’s citizens as people first and nationals of their country second. While there has been an upsurge of interest in Japan among New Zealanders, there has also been a decline in trade. Trade in relative terms can be expected to become less important but political and cultural ties can be expected to grow. Even in 1992, it was clear that these growing ties were evidence that “the Japanese dimension in the New Zealand consciousness has become much larger. It has acquired a momentum of its own.”

A number of ties and shared values have formed a foundation upon which the current Japan-New Zealand relationship stands. Bilateral consultation between both countries is regular. Exchanges and study tours help to improve mutual understanding of each other’s parliamentary systems such as the New Zealand Prime Minister’s Fellow programme which was established in 1990 to encourage an interest in and understanding of New Zealand affairs among Japanese officials. The ‘New Level of Engagement’ programme was established to improve bilateral relations and to improve contact with regards to “the areas of tourism, people-to-people exchanges, science and technology, forestry, education, and trade and investment facilitation.” On the whole, both countries share similar views and policies regarding global issues. On his 2013 visit to New Zealand, Japan’s Foreign Minister, Kishida, celebrated the “excellent government-level bilateral relationship” both countries have formed through the many “multi-layered cultural interactions” and people-to-people relations in a variety of areas. Kishida acknowledged that while Japan and New Zealand may not be close in geographical terms, “we have formed such a close connection based

550 Ian Kennedy, Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value, p.70.
553 Fumio Kishida, “From one island nation to another - let’s talk peace and prosperity,” The New Zealand Herald, 7/06/2013.
upon our shared interests and values.”

In this speech, Kishida reiterated the strong relationship the countries share and the vital roles both countries play in the Pacific. He reaffirmed the shared values of democracy and the rule of law and expressed his wish for both countries to be a part of strengthening regional organisations, such as APEC, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum as well as strengthening relations with Pacific nations. He acknowledged the earthquake disasters both countries experienced in 2011 and the bonds that were formed following the disasters. While the issue of whaling was not directly addressed, the Foreign Minister spoke of the national interest of both countries “to make the seas in the region open, free, and peaceful through assuring the rule of law at sea,” while suggesting that as two Pacific Ocean countries, “it is important to reaffirm our co-operative strategic relationship which shares a vision of the Asia-Pacific region based on such universal values.” While the issue of Japan’s whaling programme is still a source of conflict in the relationship, the last decade has seen relatively strong and close relations between the two countries.

5.2 Conclusion

A clearer understanding of New Zealand’s foreign policy depends on a better understanding of the various key traits that contribute to New Zealand’s national identity as a whole. These include its historic and cultural ties with Britain, its search independence and a ‘moral’ self-image, a growing conceptualisation of itself as an Asian Pacific nation and its role as a liberal democratic ‘good international citizen’. History and geography have played a significant role in shaping these conceptions which have changed over time. Attention to the value differences with other nations, and how these values have evolved and interacted, contribute to an understanding of how they have affected the Japan-New Zealand partnership. While New Zealand and Japan have the commonality of being liberal democratic nations with a belief in free market economics, which has created a strong basis upon which the relationship is built, differences in values have led to various disagreements and challenges in the relationship. New Zealand’s values have evolved over the relationship and this has influenced its relationship with Japan. In the years following the Second World War, New Zealand’s initial desire to retain a strong European connection and remain as

554 Ibid.
555 Ibid.
556 Ibid.
“British” as possible has largely been replaced by a growing sense of independence and a national sense of being a regionally engaged, multicultural Asia Pacific nation. Differences in values and norms that arose as a result of these developing identities can contribute to explaining past differences, and a more nuanced understanding of these differences as well as aspects of commonality, can help inform the nature of relations and policy decisions New Zealand will take. Without the sense of closeness which is evident in New Zealand’s relationship with countries like the United Kingdom and Australia which shared a history and culture, an analysis of the Japan-New Zealand partnership demonstrates that the relationship needs particular attention in order to reach its full potential. Values and ideational social factors, as well as interests, inform a significant part of the relationship and play a vital role in explaining the challenges that have arisen despite the relatively close relations these two democratic nations share.

While New Zealand national identity has been analysed from various sociological, historical and political perspectives, there has been little attention given in literature to the role identity has played in understanding New Zealand’s foreign relations. The insight offered by considering the role of New Zealand’s identity in its relationship with Japan demonstrates the significance of values and norms in explaining New Zealand’s foreign policy. While the relationship has been discussed in literature from a historical perspective, an application of identity to the relationship offers an understanding of events and policy decisions which other theoretical approaches cannot explain, and which a general overview of relations in a historical or diplomatic sense fail to address fully.

An analysis of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan demonstrates that there is no one, single, over riding identity that informs New Zealand’s contact and dealings with other countries. It is equally apparent from this example that New Zealand’s interactions with other countries are not determined solely by ‘rational’ or ‘natural’ material interests such as trade, power and security. These interests are clearly important but cannot adequately explain the evolution of Japan-New Zealand relations, nor the nature of the interactions between both countries. While rational choice approaches can contribute to an understanding of some situations, they are inadequate in explaining state interactions due to their failure to acknowledge the significance of reification and social constructions in bilateral relations between countries. The power of self-identity on international perceptions is clear throughout the Japan-New Zealand relationship.
This research has presented an analysis of the challenges regarding New Zealand relations with, and perceptions of, Japan from the end of the Second World War until the present. It has explored the varying ways in which New Zealand’s own domestic affairs and identity have influenced official and popular understandings of Japan. New Zealand’s multiple identities have created perceptions among both New Zealand leaders and the public which have caused them to view Japanese people and the importance of Japan in a certain way. National identity is not fixed or static, it is malleable and constantly changing due to both internal and external factors. Nor is a national self-image informed by one identity, nations have multiple social identities which contribute to determining “who they are” in a situation and therefore how to behave. The different identities seen to be held by New Zealand illustrate this.

New Zealand’s interactions with Japan serves to reinforce the idea that domestic agendas and attitudes played a significant role in the construction of the country’s Japan policy. There were a number of areas and ways in which identity perceptions shaped diplomatic relations. New Zealand’s “orientalist” view of Japan informed early contact following World War Two and this remained to some extent throughout the twentieth century. Concern and distrust over the Japanese national character initially created apprehension and uncertainty as to whether New Zealand should pursue contact with Japan and this influenced New Zealand policy with regards to the country. Suspicion and wariness gave way to trust and a realisation of Japan’s importance to New Zealand’s future and the acknowledgment that New Zealand needed to implement policies and improve the means to facilitate increased interaction with Japan. However, New Zealand again encountered difficulty aligning its own identity as that of an English speaking, culturally European state with that of Japanese culture. Policies and initiatives established and encouraged by both the New Zealand government and public sought to improve social, political and economic relations and these were successful to varying extents.

It is clear these national interests are born from a range of domestic and political processes which consider not only the costs and benefits of its behaviour and interactions with other states, but also “what kind of country New Zealand is and ought to be.”558 The difficulties and challenges faced by New Zealand officials and policy makers in their relations with Japan are a social construct. They have been shaped through historical interactions and informed by New Zealand’s sense of self and how it views Japan and Japanese people.

558 Capie and McGhie, New Zealand Identities: Belonging and Longing to Be, p.238.
Despite some challenges in the relationship, the Japan-New Zealand partnership is founded on a similar set of ideals, interests and values while both sharing important roles in the Asia Pacific region. This has allowed for a strong relationship since diplomatic contact was first established and has meant the foundation of the relationship has remained strong even in politically difficult times.

Shared values, traditions and history have connected New Zealand to Anglosphere nations and this has in large part shaped New Zealand’s identity. Throughout most of the two countries bilateral history, Japan has ranked in importance with New Zealand’s other major partners of Britain, Australia and the United States, in its dealings with Japan. There has been little commonality in New Zealand’s association with Japan, having lacked the common historical experience, cultural and sentimental links that New Zealand has shared with other countries. For much of New Zealand’s history, it was only in Japan in which New Zealand was confronted with a significant international partner which differed profoundly from it in terms of history, culture and language. New Zealand therefore faced new challenges in its association with Japan and came to realise the limits of its power. The manner in which New Zealand responded to Japan difference and the way in which it illustrates New Zealand’s evolving perceptions and attitudes to itself and the rest of the world makes the development of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan an interesting case study.

However, this relationship in undergoing a profound change as New Zealand’s demography and changing relationship with other states have demonstrated the emergence of a new identity for New Zealand. The predisposition that shaped New Zealand in the twentieth century are changing as New Zealand develops ties and undergoes a shift in perspective about how it sees the rest of the world. New Zealand’s interests and values once aligned with the Atlantic, English speaking countries. However, the country’s changing identity and place in the world has caused it to seek relations with nations very different from its original values. Japan was arguably the first significant diplomatic and economic partnership in which New Zealand was required to do this.

New Zealand continues to redefine its self-image and re-position its role in the international arena. Japan is certainly an established Asian nation but as New Zealand’s identity and interests change, New Zealand is endeavouring to position itself within the developing Asian regional framework and forge an identity as an Asian nation. Shared values, history, traditions and ideals can explain New Zealand’s partnerships with Anglo-European nations. However, New Zealand is increasingly under the impression that it must be prepared to know and appreciate the interests and identities of the states it has ties with, both old and new.
The relationship has expanded from initially narrow beginnings to a partnership which includes not only political and economic relations, which primarily involve the government, but also contact on many other levels such as in cultural, academic, and commercial areas. Cultural linkages have steadily increased over the recent decades and current trends support this strong connection. Many of these ties are ongoing and embedded. Both nations have shared these links since the establishment of diplomatic contact following the war. While the relationship may not have the rapid expansion and enthusiasm which New Zealand’s relationship with China has taken on, it is evident the relationship for many years has been “mature, steady, and dependable” and will likely continue to be so.

The New Zealand-Japan relationship is currently multi-faceted and encompasses relations in both governmental and non-governmental spheres. While trade with Japan, in relative terms, has decreased in importance for New Zealand, it can be expected that cultural and political ties will continue to develop and strengthen. Despite issues that may arise in the relationship, it is likely that the bond between Japan and New Zealand will stay resolute, with a growing mutual understanding of each other. In many areas bilateral relations between the countries is deeper than politics, trade or strategic interests. It has many dimensions which it is important New Zealand identifies and fosters if the full potential of the relationship is to be reached. This thesis argues that a more nuanced understanding of New Zealand identity and the values this represents, will enable continuing advances in bilateral relations. The importance of identity by both Japan and New Zealand will have a significant influence on the nature of the relationship in the future.

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