Abstract

This thesis seeks to begin the conceptualisation of the ‘Joint in Intelligence. Through theorising the isolationist tendencies of Intelligence Studies, it will first position itself between foundational and peripheral knowledge bases to enable its claim to originality. From this integrative position, it will identify ‘Joint Intelligence’ as a term that describes a phenomenon in a governmental context. In contrast to existing organisational accounts, it will proceed to address the localised origins of this phenomenon through a specific conceptual lens. By acknowledging the broader system within which Joint Intelligence emerged, this thesis will argue that its immediate origins lie within the extended operationalisation of the Joint concept, denoted by a cascade of Joint institutional forms ending with the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) in 1936. In an effort to grasp the origins of the concept itself, this thesis will first engage in the task of conceptual substantiation. In doing so, it will locate the three ‘paternal elements’ (i.e. centralisation, inter-cooperation, and the committee-forum) that comprise the Joint concept within British constitutional administration. Following the partial enactment of the elements in the 1900-18 period, it will then observe the collective enactment of the elements in the Joint institutions of the 1920s, within which the Joint concept will begin to become formalised.

Having established the origins and initial operationalisation of the concept in the foundations, its extension to the peripheral realm of intelligence-related knowledge will be undertaken. Taking a broad view of the inter-war intelligence situation, the paternal elements will be employed to traverse the landscape with a view to the functions of intelligence. This will pave the way for the inter-play between the elements, the functions, and the location within which the Joint concept came to be extended to Intelligence in 1935-38 via the JIC. The localised examination will then conclude with an analysis of the 1939-42 period, where the beginnings of the concept’s manifestation within Intelligence were instigated. Finally, the shift to the Commonwealth context will be undertaken. Starting from the premise that Britain’s ‘Joint Internationalisation’ effort occurred after the war, the respective wartime experiences of three Dominions will be drawn upon to illuminate their responses to London’s post-war plans for ‘Joint’ Intelligence and Defence. By placing the presence and absence of the model JICs in a broader context, it will be revealed that 1942 was a significant year for the Joint concept in each Dominion: for Canada, it was the creation of its own JIC; for Australia, the onset of the MacArthur Coalition; for New Zealand, the decision not to reorientate to the Pacific. Through discussing these developments in an integrative fashion, with attention being placed on Wellington, the Joint Intelligence integration and Defence disintegration in the Commonwealth will be cast in a new light.
Acknowledgements

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List of Abbreviations

AJIC  Australian Joint Intelligence Committee
APS  Axis Planning Section [Britain]
ATB  Advisory Committee on Trade Question in Time of War [Britain]
BRUSA  Britain–United States of America (Agreement, 1943)
CCOS  Canadian Chiefs of Staff
CIB  Combined Intelligence Bureau [New Zealand]
CID  Committee of Imperial Defence [Britain]
CJIC  Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee
COIC  Combined Operational Intelligence Centre [New Zealand]
COS  Chiefs of Staff [Britain]
DCOS  Deputy Chiefs of Staff [Britain]
DMO&I  Director, Military Operations and Intelligence (War Office) [Britain]
DND  Department of National Defence [Canada]
DNS  Director of Naval Services [Canada]
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation [United States of America]
FCI  Industrial Intelligence Foreign Countries Committee [Britain]
FO  Foreign Office [Britain]
FOES  Future Operations (Enemy) Section [Britain]
FRUMEL  Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne
FRUPAC  Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific
GC&CS  Government Code & Cypher School [Britain]
IIC  Industrial Intelligence Centre [Britain]
IS(O)  Intelligence Section (Operations) [Britain]
ISIC  Inter-Service Intelligence Committee [Britain]
JIB  Joint Intelligence Bureau [Britain]
JIC  Joint Intelligence Committee [Britain]
JIC(W)  Joint Intelligence Committee (Washington)
JIS  Joint Intelligence Staff [Britain]
JPC  Joint Planning Committee [Britain]
JPS  Joint Planning Staff [Britain]
MEW  Ministry of Economic Warfare [Britain]
MI1b  British Military Intelligence, Section 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MI5</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Section 5; The Security Service [Britain]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence [Britain]</td>
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<td>NZCID</td>
<td>New Zealand Committee of Defence</td>
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<td>NZCOS</td>
<td>New Zealand Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>NZJIC</td>
<td>New Zealand Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZJIO</td>
<td>New Zealand Joint Intelligence Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONS</td>
<td>Organisation for National Security [New Zealand]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services [United States of America]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>Pacific Ocean Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force [Britain]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCN</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIS/MI6</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service; colloquially Military Intelligence Section 6 [Britain]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPA</td>
<td>South Pacific Ocean Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPWA</td>
<td>South West Pacific Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Situation Report Centre [Britain]</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJIC</td>
<td>United States Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
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Introduction: Intelligence Studies and its Missing Dimension

‘Twenty-first century intelligence suffers from long-term historical amnesia,’ observed Christopher Andrew in *The Secret World* (2018).¹ This deficit of intelligence memory embodies a duality of meaning: on one hand, it refers to the ahistorical (‘lessons unlearned’) quality of contemporary intelligence practice within government; on the other, it implies a critique of intelligence scholarship within the academy. In *Secret World* these meanings are intertwined. To recover the so-called ‘lost history of global intelligence’ serves both as a lesson to the work of amnesic practitioners, and as a response to the isolationist tendencies of those who engage in its study. These meanings echo Andrew’s remarks some thirty-five years ago in *The Missing Dimension* (1984), where he and David Dilks observed that ‘intelligence never makes sense in isolation.’³ The respective audiences within Andrew’s readership are of course distinct and, as such, his insights will yield differing epistemological implications depending on the reader’s occupation—be it professional or academic. There is, however, a peculiar epistemic connection between practitioners and scholars within the disciplinary location of *Secret World*. ‘Intelligence Studies’, as it is now known, was not formalised by academic-scholars; rather, its institutionalisation occurred by virtue of the work undertaken by practitioner-scholars.⁴ As Andrew implies and Johnston corroborates, Intelligence Studies was at first an area of study located within professional practise.⁵ Indeed, *Studies in Intelligence*—the first formalised journal in Intelligence Studies—was founded by the CIA.⁶ In the first issue of *Studies*, Sherman Kent, a foundational thinker in intelligence analysis, observed that while intelligence was a profession, it was something of an outlier; for it lacked what Andrew describes as a ‘serious literature’.⁷ Kent went on to issue a prophetic warning in his 1955 article, observing that

As long as the discipline lacks a literature, its methods, its vocabulary, its body of doctrine, and even its fundamental theory run the risk of never reaching full maturity.⁸

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² Ibid.
⁶ The first academic peer-reviewed journal—*Intelligence and National Security*—was not established until 1986.
In Kent’s view, intelligence was not merely a profession—but a growing discipline, for it exhibited certain characteristics associated with a branch of knowledge. In 1955, the ‘missing dimension’ was the lack of a professional literature base, a deficiency of ‘institutional mind and memory’ within intelligence practice. In 1984, the missing dimension was the almost complete absence of academic literature on the subject—an omission that Andrew (and others) sought to remedy, beginning with the publication of The Missing Dimension and, in the following year, Secret Service (1985). Intelligence Studies, then, is a relatively recent phenomenon; a novel area of study that describes both a professional discipline and an academic field of enquiry. As such, it is perhaps only natural that the academic field still exhibits signs of scholarly immaturity. To be sure, progressive government declassifications on both sides of the Atlantic have reduced the amount of ‘speculative, unreliable, and sometimes wholly without merit’ pieces of literature that once plagued the field. And indeed, it can no longer be said that intelligence is so unknowable that it constitutes the missing dimension to the puzzles of the twentieth-century. Yet, as Walton points out in a recent article, the missing dimension phrase now has cliché status within the field, and it ‘like many clichés, is based on an element of fact.’ This element of fact is evident in Britain—the localised context from which the first Part of this thesis will operate within—though it is more stark beyond Britain, but for a different, more fundamental reason than that which implicates the former mother country.

The recent proliferation of Official Histories within the so-called ‘British School’ of Intelligence Studies has served to reduce the mystery which has shrouded intelligence organisations in Britain, but the same cannot be said for those countries formerly Dominions of its Commonwealth of Nations. Australia and Canada both exhibit modest literature bases, though gaps remain; the size and output of their respective epistemic communities’ pale in comparison to the likes of Britain and the United States. New Zealand is certainly the most undeveloped of these countries. The field is broadly rudimentary in New Zealand scholarship: scholars who specialise in the subject are

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
13 Andrew and Dilks, "Introduction."; Andrew, The Secret World, 731.
few and far between; courses on the subject are noticeably absent from mainstream curricular, and the literature base is minute. The reason why this is so is partly to do with the country’s small size, but more fundamentally it stems from a restrictive attitude toward declassifications long held by Wellington. This presents a particularly significant barrier for scholars working in the New Zealand Intelligence Studies field. After all, in the countries where Intelligence Studies is most mature, governments are far more ‘liberal’ in terms of declassifying material. It is no coincidence that prior to such declassifications, the British and American literature exhibited the ‘speculative’ and ‘unreliable’ characteristics denoted above.

The second Part of this thesis will shed light on some of these missing dimensions in the former Dominions, though its contribution does not stem from the telling of untold histories within the old Commonwealth of Nations or Britain. Indeed, there is another element of fact attached to the field’s cliché: Intelligence Studies itself exhibits a missing dimension of scholarly practice. As the forthcoming sections will discuss, the problem facing Intelligence Studies enables the position and location of this thesis—the means by which that we can identify and fulfil a claim to originality in the knowledge bases.

i. Position: The Integrative Sub-Disciplinary Periphery

A broad consensus exists among leading scholars in Intelligence Studies that the foremost challenge for the field is gaining legitimacy in the academe. Lowenthal, a notable practitioner-scholar, argues that intelligence is not yet accepted as ‘a legitimate field of study and knowledge’, largely due to the disciplinary prejudices of senior faculty. Yet Jervis, in contrast to Lowenthal and others, implies that some of the onus for this marginalisation must fall within Intelligence Studies itself. The ‘arcane’ character of the field means that a ‘great deal of specialized knowledge’ is a prerequisite for entry. A continued inward focus may well yield benefits internal to the existing discourse, but it would also serve to further isolate Intelligence Studies from what Jervis calls the ‘home disciplines’—namely, international relations, political science, and history. In this vein, Omand, another notable practitioner-scholar, implies that Intelligence Studies will never reach full disciplinary maturity because ‘…in the real world intelligence is a subsidiary craft in the

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17 Ibid., 116.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 117.
services of government. Here, Omand appears to endorse the view that the normative academic place for Intelligence Studies is within a sub-disciplinary periphery. Yet disciplinary subordinacy need not be synonymous with scholarly immaturity. Marrin, somewhat provocatively, suggests that Intelligence Studies scholarship is representative of ‘a generalized failure to ensure knowledge accumulation and aggregation over time.’ The issue, he suggests, is that a great deal of Intelligence Studies literature is ‘anything but cumulative regarding its own intellectual history.’ It is this issue that this thesis will seek to remedy within the location of its subject-matter. Before turning to demarcate this location and to provide an overview of the thesis at hand, it is necessary to provide some indication of the means by which this thesis, as a sustained piece of academic enquiry, will position itself in approaching the field.

The question of approach is partly a question of location—that is, where the subject of this thesis is located both within and between other related areas of academic enquiry. Yet it is also a question of intra-field positioning: to indicate any given approach to Intelligence Studies is to express a normative preference as to the best path toward legitimacy. Some of the perspectives denoted in Johnson and Shelton’s survey present the differing paths as something of a binary choice: either scholarship continues the path inward, or it moves outward toward the home disciplines. In other words, should Intelligence Studies embrace its isolation, or should it seek integration? If the next so-called ‘revolution in intelligence scholarship’ is to reach an audience beyond a contained ‘inner circle’, as May implies, the answer must be one of integration. This is not to suggest that Intelligence Studies should be subsumed by the home disciplines. It is simply an acknowledgment that intelligence never makes sense in isolation: it cannot, as Andrew implied in The Missing Dimension, be explained only with reference to itself. Such is the shared reality of intelligence as a professional and academic craft—a reality born of the epistemic connection between practitioners and scholars in the dual-field. To integrate is not to subsume, it is the means by which intelligence can be clarified (and thus legitimised) within wider intellectual discourses. It is in this sense that Kislenko views integration as sensible: the home disciplines provide the grounding for ‘everything

20 Ibid., 118.
21 The term ‘sub-disciplinary periphery’ is not used explicitly by Omand, though it aligns closely with his remarks. See: ibid.
22 Stephen Marrin, "Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline," ibid.31, no. 2 (2016): 266.
23 Ibid., 269.
24 It should be noted that the authoritative scholarship cited in this thesis is not immature, though it is at times arcane and isolated from the home disciplines.
intelligence-related’ and, as such, it is not possible to have a legitimate academic field unconnected to foundational knowledge bases.\(^{27}\) Hence, to be truly cumulative requires paternal disciplinary connection; to operate within a sub-disciplinary periphery is a step toward achieving such a capacity.

The answer to the question of the location of this study serves as a reminder that disciplinary boundaries are not always neat. The position of the integrative sub-disciplinary periphery does not in of itself provide a clear demarcation, and rightly so. By virtue of the ‘Studies’ term, the field does not maintain its own elements of disciplinary professionalism, though if it is to be integrative it must seek to draw from the paternal disciplines where necessary. The ‘sub’, after all, requires us to ‘stand on the shoulders of giants’, so as to avoid the amnesia implied in *Secret World*, and the isolation that plagues the field as a whole.\(^{28}\) Simultaneously, the ‘periphery’ permits a sphere of intelligence-related knowledge that is distinct (but not entirely isolated from) the paternal disciplines. It is true that the solution of the integrative position is not exactly a new idea in Intelligence Studies.\(^{29}\) However, the platform that it provides for the location of this thesis enables something of an original approach. Indeed, the absence of any prescribed disciplinary regime entails a degree of flexibility in this respect. To define the location requires us to consider the object of analysis—it is this, the subject-matter, that informs the location of the study.

ii. Location: Joint Intelligence as a Concept

‘Why Joint Intelligence?’, asks Michael Goodman in the beginning Chapter of *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee*.\(^{30}\) In the account that follows, the question of origins—temporally bound to the 1936-39 period—is answered, forming the first part of three within the volume. The answer is methodical: a detailed historical narrative is presented, the rationale for creation convincingly retold.\(^{31}\) The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) *Official History* is, after all, part of the *Government Official Histories Series*—a now 100-year-old edited collection, known for its authoritative accounts of ‘important episodes or themes of British history.’\(^{32}\) The JIC has long been regarded as

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Here, I am appropriating Marrin’s use of the phrase. See: Marrin, "Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline," 269.

\(^{29}\) Andrew promotes this idea to an extent in *The Secret World*.


\(^{31}\) Ibid., 9-35.

one of these ‘episodes’, though for much of its history it remained a mystery; a ‘missing dimension’ in the British School. ‘This volume should fill that gap,’ present day JIC Chairman Sir Jon Day remarked in the Forward of the History.\textsuperscript{33} Some five years after its publication, Sir Jon’s prediction turned out to be correct: Goodman’s account is now recognised as definitive, and the JIC is no longer the episodic missing dimension it once was. \textit{The Official History} thus shed light on a darkened dimension, addressing the particular circumstances that led to the beginning of the ‘JIC episode’,\textsuperscript{34} its rise to ‘influence and respect’ in 1945,\textsuperscript{35} and its activities in the Suez Crisis in 1956.\textsuperscript{36} As an organisation that has, since 1936, ‘been involved in every single defining moment of British diplomatic and military history,’ Goodman’s masterful \textit{History} unveiled the first few decades of a committee that became a ‘indispensable element of central government.’\textsuperscript{37}

It will be evident by now that this thesis does not locate itself within the British (Organisational) School.\textsuperscript{38} The Joint Intelligence ‘knowledge gap’ in that sub-field has been filled, as Sir Jon rightly asserts. By virtue of the ‘Joint’ subject matter that will be discussed throughout this thesis, however, its location certainty implicates the School. It was indicated earlier that the field’s missing dimension lies within its default location in the periphery (i.e. the sphere of distinct intelligence-related knowledge). The issue, which we deduced from the likes of Omand and Marrin, lies in the fact that there exists a disconnect between the foundational knowledge bases and the periphery. The integrative position was then presented as a means to approach the isolation of the periphery—that being, to position the thesis to integrate the peripheral sphere into the foundational. Through employing the integrative sub-disciplinary periphery, the platform for this thesis was accordingly demarcated. Now, we shall make sense of this platform with reference to the Joint Intelligence subject-matter, staking out the specific claims to originality in this thesis.

Throughout \textit{The Official History}, the functions and work of the JIC across the 1936-56 period are described in great detail. As the first commissioned volume, it comprises some 471 pages. Because Goodman treats the subject of Joint Intelligence as synonymous with a singular committee, the origins of ‘Joint Intelligence’ are viewed through a lens that is explicitly organisational. To elaborate on the discussion of origins alluded to above, Goodman begins his initial account asking the question ‘Why Joint Intelligence?’, prefacing his answer with a heading entitled ‘The Need for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33} Goodman, \textit{The Official History}, xv-xvi.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 9.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 147.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 368.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 1.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{38} Regarding the School, see: Gill and Phythian, ”What Is Intelligence Studies?,” 8.}
Thereafter, we are told that the origins of ‘Joint Intelligence’ lay with the creation of a singular committee in 1936, whose functions were inspired by another committee from the late 1920s. This implies that ‘Joint Intelligence’ originated as functional activity in the late 20s, and was formalised later in 1936. In the context of the British School, this is a perfectly valid and historically correct proposition. However, if we are to move outside of the School (and some of the ontological assumptions therein), the answer to the question of origins becomes less knowable. If we separate the ‘Joint’ from ‘Intelligence’, we may observe that the operative term embodies an abstract concept that yields meaning in a manner that is almost a priori. That is to say, we can deduce whether or not a thing is ‘Joint’ by the general laws of lexical semantics. To this end, ‘Joint Intelligence’ may be described prima facie as information that is ‘shared, held or made by two or more [entities] together’. Thus, at the level of abstraction, the Joint concept is sufficiently ‘knowable’ without empirical (or historical) observation via the JIC form. In Concepts: A User’s Guide, Goertz suggests that a considerable amount of the literature devoted to concepts is emblematic of this semantic approach. ‘There is no difference,’ Robertson tells us, ‘between defining a word and providing an analysis of a concept.’ In advancing the conceptualisation of ‘the Joint’ in Intelligence, however, this thesis does not subscribe to the rigidity of the semantic approach, though it remains important for its animation of the distinction between concept and JIC form.

‘A good concept’, argues Goertz, ‘involves a theoretical and empirical analysis of the object [and/or] phenomenon referred to by the word.’ To begin, we cannot ignore the empirical fact that ‘Joint Intelligence’ refers to a real phenomenon within a contemporary and historical context. Intelligence, as Omand points out, does exist in ‘the real world’, as it is a subsidiary craft in government. We may further observe that this craft or activity is, in fact, synonymous with the work of the JIC, as discussed throughout The Official History. To this end, the Joint concept in ‘Intelligence’ empirically refers to the activities and/or functions of the JIC—a committee whose history which cannot be encapsulated by mere semantics. In this Joint context, ‘Intelligence’ refers to that which is military in character: the analysis of enemy and/or adversarial capabilities for the end product. Here, the purpose of the end product is to provide ‘meaningful maps of the

40 ‘The First Tentative Steps to Joint Intelligence’, ibid., 13-14.
41 In drawing upon the Oxford English Dictionary, the ‘people’ has been redacted in favour or ‘entities’.
It should be emphasised that ‘Military Intelligence’ is distinct from the more intentions-focussed ‘Special Intelligence’, which is the concern of the so-called ‘secretive’ organisations. This should not be taken to infer that Special Intelligence will be entirely discounted in this thesis, though our principal focus will generally remain on Military Intelligence, in the Joint context.

While this discussion provides some empirical insight, we are still left wondering what the Joint concept theoretically refers to in this context. Indeed, concepts must exhibit ‘substantive content’ in both empirics and theory to be useful, Goertz tells us. Here, it is crucial to appreciate that by ‘theory’ we are not referring to a priori knowledge, but rather knowledge that is a posteriori. To reappropriate the insights detailed in Gordon’s work, the theoretical substantiation of a concept must take place within a context. In this sense, the Joint concept should be seen as being ‘historically conditioned’ within a system of meaning. We can think of these insights as entailing a guiding ethos for this project—one that originates from a novel cross-disciplinary place, Goertz being from the social sciences and Gordon from the humanities (viz: intellectual history). In briefly observing aspects of the JIC literature concerning the 1936-40s, we can deduce both a system of meaning and the (implicit) operationalisation of the Joint concept throughout. This deduction will in turn form the basis for Chapters One and Two of this thesis.

In Goodman’s analysis, the Joint concept is implicitly operationalised in his original account. Here, Goodman can be observed as arguing that the concept embodies centralisation by way of inter-Service cooperation in a committee forum. These features, Goodman later observes, resemble the idea of ‘joined-up’ discussion, the origins of which he attributes to the early 1920s via the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (COS). Similarly, Herman describes the British intelligence assessment experience in the 1940s as illustrative of inter-departmental arrangements that enable departments to cooperate in a collegial fashion, with central forms of intelligence on top. Here, the system of meaning for these italicised features is that of British constitutional administration. The features of centralisation, inter-departmentalism, and the committee-forum all derive from Cabinet

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48 For example: GC&CS (GCHQ), MI6 and MI5.
49 Special Intelligence is discussed in Chapter Two with respect to inter-cooperation.
53 Ibid., 30-31.
government, ‘the core of the British constitutional system,’ Jennings tells us. These features, the literature infers, were all ‘enacted’ in Joint form through the JIC and, in Goodman’s account, the COS. It is the argument of this thesis that these features constitute what we shall refer to as the ‘paternal elements’ of the Joint concept. As Goodman briefly implies in his citation of the COS, the concept beneath the JIC’s existence ‘was, in itself, nothing new’. To be sure, the Joint concept’s extension to Intelligence in 1936-39 was new, underpinned by the understanding that intelligence had to ‘take on a wider and more central role within government.’ But its operationalisation in British constitutional administration was not. The COS, for example, represented the first enactment of all three paternal elements in the realm of defence in the early 1920s, thereby representing the first operationalisation of the Joint concept in institutional form. It is no coincidence, after all, that the COS was the Committee which extended the Joint concept to Intelligence, by creating the JIC in 1936.

Through observing these a posteriori theoretical and empirical representations, we have begun to develop a rudimentary notion of what the ‘Joint’ concept entails, with a view to its extension in Intelligence. In doing so, we have also developed a claim to originality. This thesis will be the first of its kind to engage in what we shall call ‘Joint conceptual substantiation’. It will achieve this inaugural task through elucidating the paternal elements of the concept: centralisation, inter-cooperation, and the committee-forum. Accordingly, the primary focus of this thesis will centre around tracing the elements and their enactment in Joint conceptual (and, often by implication, institutional) forms; first in a localised context and, later, in the international context vis-à-vis the British Commonwealth. This thesis will not, however, examine the empirical phenomenon of ‘Joint Intelligence’ (i.e. analysing Joint Intelligence assessments), for that has already been undertaken within the British School. But the way the acceptance of the concept facilitated the actual work of intelligence assessments will be touched on in Chapter Two.

57 Ibid., 30-31.
58 Goodman, among others, has done this.
Part I. From London: Centralisation

“In the British constitution no reform is ever so radical that all relics of the superseded system are removed…”

— Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government.⁵⁹

“… we have formed the opinion that our intelligence organization requires some modification to cope with modern conditions.”

— Deputy Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (1936).⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Jennings, Cabinet Government, 124.
Chapter One: The Origins of the Joint Concept in the Foundations

This Chapter seeks to trace the origins of the Joint concept. In order to substantiate the concept, it will theorise the paternal elements of ‘the Joint’. These elements—centralisation, inter-cooperation, and the committee-forum—will be observed from within the foundation. Here, it is the foundation of British constitutional administration that will act as the system of meaning (to which the elements are assigned), and as the localised context from which all three elements came to be ‘enacted’ in Joint form through the administrative institutions. The means by which this Chapter addresses the task of conceptual substantiation can be expressed as two-fold. First, it will locate the origins of the Joint concept in a search for the enactment of its paternal elements in the 1900-18 period. In accounting for the absence of the concept in the institutions examined, it will suggest that the period’s significance lies with the partial enactment of the elements and the heightened degree of awareness and understanding around the operation of the central system, particularly in the War Cabinet of 1916-18. This will in turn provide the background necessary for the second means of conceptual substantiation. Through identifying the first phenomenon of the Joint concept as the ad hoc enactment of all three elements in 1922, the second section will illustrate that the resultant formalisation of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (COS) represented the primary incarnation of the Joint concept in the inter-war period. By enacting the elements located in the first section, it will be observed that the inter-war COS began to instigate what would become a professional central system of its own, beginning with the creation of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee (JPC) in 1926 and ending with the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) in 1936. Because the latter institution represents an extension of the Joint concept to Intelligence, it will become apparent that the origins of the ‘Joint Intelligence’ phenomenon are in fact interconnected with the Joint concept itself. The forging of the relationship between foundation and periphery will be undertaken in Chapter Two, where the extension and manifestation of the concept in Intelligence will be made sense of.
i. Locating the Origins: The Elements

Before the War: 1900-14

A long-standing interpretative characteristic of British constitutional administration is the idea of the central system. In Sir Ivor Jennings’ authoritative text, the Cabinet is portrayed as the unifying core of constitutional administration.61 It is the ‘supreme directing authority’.62 A highly centralised committee-forum in which the Prime Minister and his or her departmental Ministers exercise what Walter Bagehot called, the ‘great efficient object’ of the constitution: the governance of the many.63 Here, it is important to note that in employing the ‘origins’ term in this section, we are not concerned with the voluminous history of the central system itself—that would derail our focus to a conciliar age of government.64 We are instead concerned with the ‘modern’ central system and the means by which its derivative elements were intended to be applied for a specific purpose (greater defence centralisation) in a demarcated period of time (1900-14).

We may observe the evolution of the central system from its classical variation (i.e. the Privy Council) toward its modern incarnation (i.e. Cabinet) as a series of transitions toward the perfection of the efficient object, driven by a gradual change in the conventions of power across the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Yet these transitions, particularly the conversion of the centralised theories of the eighteenth century to practice in the nineteenth century, were distinctively civilian in character.65 That is to say, the reach of the modern central system was limited to the civilian-composed centre of political authority, namely the Cabinet, a body whose interests did not, historically speaking, extend to the military policy or administration of its two Service branches, the Royal Navy and Army.66 ‘In general,’ observes F.A. Johnson in the inaugural study Defence by Committee, ‘the remote, complex and uninteresting questions of military policy were treated lightly … governments did not rise or fall on the issue of defence policy.’67 After all, the conditions of the nineteenth century, particularly those stemming from industrialisation, were such that domestic issues were most often at the forefront of those in

61 Jennings, Cabinet Government, 1.
62 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 13.
Cabinet.\(^{68}\) Even as the thirty year period of ‘splendid isolation’ was beginning to reach its end,\(^{69}\) there was little reformative will among politicians to alter the defence *status quo ante* where strategic planning occurred in a compartmentalised fashion: cooperation and co-ordination between the Services was absent, and the political central system remained rather detached from imperial defence.\(^{70}\) Moreover, the Services, both of which were historically independent from one another, remained averse to any centralised body that would jeopardise such a prized principle.\(^{71}\) Beyond the Secretary for War and First Lord of the Admiralty, who provided a departmentalised link to Cabinet, the central system was almost entirely absent in matters of defence.\(^{72}\)

With these factors in mind, the reasons behind the failure of the first attempt to instigate centralised, inter-Service departmental cooperation within the committee-forum are not difficult to grasp. Indeed, with little or no political or military will, the Defence Committee (1895-1902) was fated to be an ineffective instrument.\(^{73}\) The reformative will of Cabinet would only be found following the humiliations of The Second South Africa War, 1899-1902.\(^{74}\) South Africa—that ‘forcing-house of change’—left a lasting impression: in the face of great power consolidation in Europe, splendid isolation had to be abdicated for a ‘new realism’, in which statesmen began to contemplate the possibly of a war, by land and at sea, in Europe.\(^{75}\) The subsequent enquires would symbolise a landmark for the progression of the so-called ‘defence by committee’ ideal, but the resultant institution would not exactly exhibit all three elements in practice.

The *Elgin Commission* (1903) and the War Office (Reconstitution) or *Esher Committee* (1904) reaffirmed, unsurprisingly, that the existing administrative machinery was unfit for purpose. Beyond the immediate need for intra-departmental reform in that ‘citadel of administrative chaos’,\(^{76}\) the War Office, the *Elgin Report* revealed that the Defence Committee had not brought the two Services together in South Africa. Inter-cooperation, whether between the Services, or

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\(^{68}\) Ibid., 12.


\(^{70}\) Johnson, *Defence by Committee*, 12-13.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 13.

\(^{72}\) Regarding departmentalisation and Cabinet, see: Jennings, *Cabinet Government*, 125.

\(^{73}\) Johnson, *Defence by Committee*, 34-35.


\(^{76}\) Johnson, *Defence by Committee*, 14-16.
between the civil and military spheres, was not evident. The Director of Military Intelligence (later DMO&I), 77 for instance, ‘knew nothing’ about the Committee. 78 As Gooch recounts, the evidence accompanying Elgin ‘… revealed both the compartmentalisation of the Victorian defence planning machinery and the apparent ineptitude with which the War Office had used [its] instruments.’ 79

Compartmentalisation, therefore, was a relic of the Victorian system. It was prohibitive of the inter-Service cooperative ideal deemed necessary by Elgin and Esher. 80 Accordingly, Elgin recommended that the Defence Committee be superseded with a new, more effective military coordinative council. 81 Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, facing pressure from his own Cabinet, was forced to begin the reconstitution of the old Defence Committee toward the new, later known as the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID). 82 Throughout its first few years, the CID took the shape of a somewhat modern administrative incarnation of the constitution: it was solidified as a flexible strategic-advisory forum beneath Cabinet, the Prime Minister was recognised as the committee chair and ex officio member, endowed with the power to summon officials on any matter of defence, and the Secretariat system—a particularly important system for the technical matters of defence—came into being. 83 In respecting the central authority of Cabinet and bringing the civil and military officials together in theoretical ‘equality’, the peacetime committee had, by 1905, Johnson argues, embodied changes ‘overwhelmingly important’ to central defence organisation. 84

In light of the emergence of the new Committee, we can see Balfour’s integration of the modern constitution as a virtue, for the political central system became responsible for the Committee’s transformation away from its original Defence Committee form. It is prudent to observe that the central system embraced a rather loose system of control in the form of departmentalism. Within this system, Cabinet is the central authority, though it does not assume centralist control: departmental primacy via ministerial responsibility remains the orthodoxy. 85 In the words of Lord Haldane, Cabinet thought it best ‘…to trust departments freely than to engage in a futile attempt

77 Director, Military Operations and Intelligence (War Office).
79 See: ibid., 55.
80 As noted below, Esher recommended an inter-Service body.
81 Johnson, Defence by Committee, 51.
83 Bond, "Introduction," xv.
84 Johnson, Defence by Committee, 59.
at supervision in detail. Of course, that trust may be upset by belated revelations of departmental disfunction—something that Haldane himself knew: as Secretary of State for War (1905-12), he implemented many of the executively sanctioned recommendations in the War Office from Elgin and Esher.

Departmentalism, therefore, may also be seen as something of a virtue: both Services made ‘great progress’ in modernisation and preparation for war, though post-Esher the Army’s planning divisions via the General Staff became more advanced than the Navy’s. Yet, it was a variant of this virtue that came to undermine part of the Committee’s raison d’être as a pre-war central organ of inter-Service cooperation. In the period before the war, cooperation did take place—not between the departments, but within the departments. It was not ‘inter’, but ‘intra’ in reach. Contrary to the claims of Johnson, the pre-war CID acted less as a ‘centre of strategic planning’ and more as an ‘uncertain’ and ‘somewhat suspect’ sub-central system. Strategic matters were discussed in the Committee, but it did not act as the centralised organ of inter-cooperation envisioned by Elgin and Esher. The specific Esher recommendation for a ‘supra-departmental’ CID-nucleus would not emerge. Such a cross-General Staff body—consisting of inter-Service and inter-Empire forces—was too drastic a reform. Compartmentalisation, not cooperation, was the norm.

Through the lens of military departmentalism, the prevalence of ‘intra’ cooperation was natural: the formulation of plans for war, for example, lay within the departments. In a theoretical sense, the ideal of inter-Service cooperation expressed by Elgin and Esher was not impaired. However, as Sir Sidney Low would remind us, the theory is so often different than the practice in the English constitution. The CID, it will be remembered, was not endowed with executive power—its

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89 Bond, "Introduction," xv-xvi.
90 See: Johnson, Defence by Committee, 82.
93 Ibid., 25.
95 Bond, "Introduction," xv.
function was advisory, the forum operating at the sub-Cabinet level. This meant that the Committee had no technical means to induce inter-Service cooperation. As an advisory committee-forum and not an executive organ, it was reliant on the will of the Services to come together in the spirit of ‘collegiality’. The only executive power near the committee was that of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. It is worth noting, then, that soon after the Committee’s transition under Balfour, H. H. Asquith took office.

In the first years of his tenure (1907-11), the new Prime Minister in the chair exhibited little interest in defence. His preoccupation with domestic matters permitted planning to ‘continue in separate compartments along opposing lines’. Indeed, the system ‘indulged excessive departmentalism’ which, in turn, permitted the Services to ‘go their own ways’. The attitude of Admiral John Fisher (First Sea Lord of the Admiralty), who was instinctively opposed to ‘staff work, joint planning and co-operation with the 'rival service”’, for instance, was allowed to fester, and it would continue to do so in the forthcoming war. In reality, therefore, the theory of military departmentalism was being practised as military compartmentalisation, as foretold by Elgin. The pre-war central system, with its lack of executive-political will, tolerated the consequences that arose from the practice—namely, the reaffirmation of an age-old single-Service culture. Compartmentalisation barely permitted inter-Service association, let alone cooperation. Not all relics, Jennings’ epithet reminds us, disappeared in the reformed system.

Thus, the achievement of the necessary pre-war planning uniformity between the Services did not naturally emerge from a spirit of ‘collegialism’ in a ‘centre of strategic planning’. Indeed, the CID’s only pre-war enquiry concerning the ambit of its raison d’être—Service co-ordination and grand strategy—took place in the wake of the Agadir crisis in 1911. In what was a ‘most dramatic’ illustration, the effects of compartmentalised planning were made apparent. In the end, inter-

98 Mackintosh, "The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914," 497-98.
100 Fisher was in command between 1904 and 1910, and again between 1914 and 1915. See: Bond, "Introduction," xvi. Fisher’s attitude continued in the war. See: Johnson, Defence by Committee, 191.
101 The idea of the CID inducing ‘collegialism’ is interrogated by Gooch, while the naïve claim that the CID acted as the pre-war ‘centre of strategic planning’ is suggested by Johnson. See: Gooch, "Adversarial Attitudes: Servicemen, Politicians and Strategic Policy, 1899-1914," 74. See also: Johnson, Defence by Committee, 82.
Service planning uniformity was achieved by executive imposition: Asquith forced the Admiralty to adopt the plans of the more organised War Office. Beyond the fulfilment of planning uniformity, the notion of inter-Service cooperation was not manifest in any substantive way. Prior to its temporary wartime disbandment, the CID continued its pattern as a forum for occasional discussion of defence matters in the 1911-14 period. One innovation came with the development of a network of ad hoc sub-committees on matters deemed material to imperial defence. But prior to its wartime disbandment, neither the paternal committee nor its sub-committees solicited centralised inter-Service cooperation. Compartmentalisation remained the dominant mode of operation. “The greatest significance,” Gooch writes of the period, ‘lay in the fact that the essentials of British strategy in a war with Germany had at last been decided.” As a means to an end, then, compartmentalisation may be thought of as constitutionally permissible. It would take the experience of war in its totality for civil and military officials to realise that the relic of centuries past had to be superseded—and thus, for the impetus for the Joint concept to emerge.

During the War: 1914-18

Asquithian Compartmentalisation

Throughout the initial enactment of the central system in the war—embodied by the early Asquithian ‘inner-Cabinets’—success was seen through the lens of compartmentalisation. The ‘pursuit of narrow political, service or national goals’ was deemed the means to the war’s end. The defective relic, it seems, was set to continue as the dominant mode of operation. The Service branches maintained that the war could be fought independent of one another, with little interference from Cabinet. The politicians, who anticipated a short war, condoned the mode of operation. Thus, the early ‘wisdom’ was that reforms in the way of improved inter-cooperation—be it internal (i.e. between the Services, or within civil-military relations), or external (i.e. between

104 Ibid., 237.
105 Peter Catterall and Christopher Brady, "Cabinet Committees in British Governance," Public Policy and Administration 13, no. 4 (1998): 70.
106 Mackintosh, "The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914," 502-03.
108 For an overview of the inner-Cabinets, see: Robert Livingston Schuyler, "The British War Cabinet," Political Science Quarterly 33, no. 3 (1918): 376-95.
110 Bond, "Introduction," xvi.
111 Ibid.
the allies)—was not necessary. Nonetheless, compartmentalisation did not produce full isolation. Internally, departmentalism still provided something of a civil-military link via the Cabinets; externally, the belief was that ‘… the war could be won in association with, rather than in cooperation with, [the] allies.’ However, as the realities of world conflict became more apparent, and the need for tighter civil-military relations more urgent, Asquith struggled in what can only be described as a ‘search for a viable form of authority in unfamiliar circumstances’. The Prime Minister did recognise that the conditions of war required expedited decision-making, but his solutions remained structurally deficient.

Suffice to say, the Asquithian ‘dual-Cabinet’ system suffered from a total lack of ‘cohesion, initiative and decision’—a disastrous set of traits for the only form of central authority between 1914 and 1916. As A.V. Dicey pointed out, the first report of the Dardanelles Commission (1916-19) indicted the inner-full Cabinet nexus: nominal management, let alone expedited decision-making, was an impossible task in such unwieldy bodies. Moreover, inter-Service cooperation was not present in any substantive sense; the Services having ‘no conception of the need to work together.’ This was especially problematic in Gallipoli, for the amphibious operation involved both military departments, and required planners to be cognisant of the interdependency of land and maritime forces. The failure of the Services to prepare joint plans for execution effectively permitted a dangerous ad hoc system predicated upon ‘strong personalities’ to delegate operational and policy responsibilities. By the end of 1916, some politicians began to realise that the existing machinery was inadequate. The Prime Minister’s search was hampered by his ‘stubborn refusal to depart from past verities’—namely those stemming from the bygone age of nineteenth century Cabinet government. Similarly, the defective relic, once condoned in 1914, was beginning to be seen as unsustainable in both the civil and military spheres. The reformist

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113 Ibid.
114 Ehrman, Cabinet Government and War, 1890-1940, 54.
115 Ibid., 57.
118 Mackintosh, "The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914," 490.
119 Ehrman, 59-60. The point regarding joint plans stems from Aston’s testimony to the Commission, see: Beach, "The British Army, the Royal Navy, and the ‘Big Work’ of Sir George Aston, 1904–1914," 166.
121 Naylor, A Man and an Institution, 11.
central system implemented by Asquith’s successor, while important for the course of the war, would not entail a full manifestation of the three elements. By 1918, however, an understanding would emerge at the highest political level, which would see the Joint concept emerge relatively early in the inter-war period.

*The Promise of the Elements: Lloyd George and the War Cabinet*

The advent of David Lloyd George to the Prime Ministership marked a demonstrable change in the administration of the war.\(^{123}\) The dissolution of the Asquithian bodies and the full Cabinet was, after all, an admission of failure: the prevalence of unwieldiness had prohibited the expediency and ‘resolute central direction’ required for the ‘practical conduct of war.’\(^{124}\) Consequently, the War Cabinet was formulated to be nimble in size, the composition of the singular body consisted of only five non-departmental ministers.\(^{125}\) Sir Maurice Hankey later described this reform, combined with the implementation of a Secretariat system (from which he became Secretary), as effectively spelling the end of the ‘humiliating and dangerous’ administrative traits of the Asquithian era.\(^{126}\) In this sense, we may observe the War Cabinet as a belated remedy to what Lord Salisbury identified as the imperfection of British constitution ‘as an instrument of war’ in the midst of The Second South African War.\(^{127}\) In the views of some, it then so follows that the War Cabinet represented a political-professional central system, where administration came to be invested in a ‘highly centralised and efficient executive authority controlling all major aspects of British strategic policy.’\(^{128}\) Lloyd George, it is contended, heralded in the ‘imaginative capping’ of the defence by committee ideal.\(^{129}\) Taking this trajectory to its logical end point, we may readily conclude that the period saw the enactment of the paternal elements of the Joint concept in the new central system.\(^{130}\) But however tempting it may be to subscribe to this trajectory, the evidence simply does not substantiate such propitiousness. To be sure, the War Cabinet did endow new meaning to the central system characteristic, but the theory of constitutional administration, Low’s *Governance of England* cautions us, should always be distinguished from the practice.\(^{131}\)

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123 Ehrman, 67.
125 Dicey, "The New English War Cabinet as a Constitutional Experiment," 790.
127 Ehrman, 25.
128 French, 79.
130 See: *Defence by Committee*, 82.
The apparent gap between the theory of the new central system and the reality of its practice is likely what Ehrman had in mind when he described the period as one of ‘short promise’ in a long period of struggle.\textsuperscript{132} Here, the greatest promise was one of centralised organ, deliberative though efficient in garnering civil-military cooperation necessary to the development of informed executive-strategic policy for war.\textsuperscript{133} In this sense, all three paternal elements may be observed as being enacted, ensuring centralised inter-cooperation with the War Cabinet acting in a committee-like capacity. The reality, however, was one of seemingly irreconcilable political-strategic positions, ‘debilitating’ civil-military conflict, and a Prime Minister who, despite having a strong inclination for executive power and strategy,\textsuperscript{134} was politically constrained until the spring of 1918.\textsuperscript{135} Institutionally speaking, therefore, the ideal of a wartime central authority was tangible and present, but conceptually speaking, centralised cooperation—at its most fundamental civil-military level—was hardly present. Political-professional animosity, rather than collegiality, was the norm.\textsuperscript{136}

In terms of inter-cooperation between the Services, it cannot be said that the relic of compartmentalisation was superseded by the new central system. To put it bluntly: the war saw the Services plan and train in ‘separate compartments’, draft estimates separately, and, often, fight separately.\textsuperscript{137} While then-Secretary Hankey would at times form a liaison link between the Services, such as his role as a ‘linchpin’ in the production of combined memoranda with the Staffs,\textsuperscript{138} it should be emphasised that liaison is distinct from inter-Service cooperation, which implicates the Chiefs of each Service (and their respective Staffs) to engage in work of joint interest. Thus, in spite of the rationale underpinning the new central system, the theory was indeed different from the practice. In this sense, French is correct in his argument that changes in institutional machinery ‘did not inevitably produce a different culture of government…’ shared understandings, he suggests, had to develop before the perfection of the constitution as an instrument of war.\textsuperscript{139} We are reminded that while formal institutions provide useful indications of elements, their enactment is predicated upon those informal conventions or understandings that underpin the essential dynamism of the British constitution—especially in the process of its ‘perfection’, as Salisbury would have it.\textsuperscript{140} Nonetheless, despite the absence of tri-elemental enactment, we may observe a

\textsuperscript{132} Ehrman, 99.
\textsuperscript{134} French, "A One-Man Show? Civil-Military Relations During the First World War," 87-89. See
\textsuperscript{135} Naylor, A Man and an Institution, 30.
\textsuperscript{136} Ehrman, 98-99.
\textsuperscript{137} This contradicts Johnson’s later claim, as noted above. See: Johnson, Defence by Committee, 207.
\textsuperscript{138} Ehrman, 85.
\textsuperscript{139} French, 106.
\textsuperscript{140} As in accordance with the uncodified nature of the English constitution. See: Low, The Governance of England, 1-12.
glimpse of the promise that enactment was to entail in what Ehrman calls the period of ‘consolidation’ (1922-39). This promise would be only be delivered by an understanding that would emerge by the war’s end.

So far, we have observed the emergence of a political central system (via the War Cabinet) for the conduct of war—the ‘essential characteristics’ of such would be resurrected in the 1939-45 period. Needless to say, those 1916-18 essential characteristics did not extend to the Services. It is with the benefit of hindsight that we approach this system, knowing that in the period of its resurrection a central political-professional advisory nexus would emerge (and become manifest, symbolised by the relationship between a future Prime Minister and his Service Chiefs). Why, then, does the first wartime system offer a glimpse at the promise of those elements connected to the Joint concept? The partial enactment of the inter-cooperative and committee elements yield insight. Throughout the 1916-18 period, a small body of committees and sub-committees, to which the still-nimble War Cabinet lay at the centre, were developed to cope with the burden of administration. In 1918, a number of inter-departmental committees were also erected, so as to cope with those problems that had intersected across administrative lines. After all, the orthodoxy of departmental isolation, as portrayed by Jennings, did not fare well in the face of those intersecting administrative ramifications, all of which stemmed from the conduct of war.

These committees were all networked to the overarching central system by a delegated Cabinet minister and the Secretariat, thereby ensuring that the departmentalised orthodoxy was appropriately modified, not superseded. To be sure, its reach was limited to the confines of the civilian departments and even so, its spread was ‘uneven’ and its hierarchy, ‘incomplete.’ Nevertheless, as part of the central system, with the War Cabinet as the singular executive-strategic organ of power and the continued emphasis on departmentalism therein, the committee system demonstrated post-factum that the element of inter-cooperation could be achieved in wartime conditions. Indeed, in hindsight it foretold the promise of a professional central system, predicated

141 See: Ehrman, 100.
142 Ibid., 99.
144 Ehrman, 96-97.
145 Ibid., 97.
146 As Jennings notes, this ‘historic separateness’ stems from the fact that ministers are personally responsible for their departments. See: Jennings, Cabinet Government, 130.
147 Ehrman, 97.
148 Ibid.
upon the enactment of the inter-cooperative and committee elements beneath the political central system. Yet, the enactment of all three elements in Joint conceptual form—that is, the enactment of the ‘defence by committee’ ideal in theory and practice—would not come out of nowhere. As this section has illustrated, the success of elemental enactment (via administrative institutions) depends on shared understandings, especially at the higher political level. By 1918, one understanding in particular had become realised, and its significance can hardly be overstated.

In essence, the experience of war in its totality had demonstrated that the relic of compartmentalisation had to be abdicated in some form. Indeed, it would need to be done so in a fashion similar to the strategic abdication of the complacency that had so characterised that period of ‘splendid isolation’ in the Victorian era. The Lloyd George Administration in its later years would have concurred, French suggests, with the sentiment of Balfour who, over a decade after his presiding over the CID’s reconstitution, wrote:

The Navy, especially in time of war, cannot and ought not to be regarded as a self-contained and separate entity. The part it plays depends upon its relations to other departments at home, and to allied governments.\(^\text{149}\)

This normative expression, composed at some point after the disaster in the Dardanelles, would have found acceptance by the war’s end in the War Cabinet. Its applicability, French observes, would have been deemed universal; from the civilian departments, to the Army, as well as that third Service branch that would, to quote the General Lord Hastings Ismay, ‘blur the frontiers of responsibility completely’, the Royal Air Force (RAF).\(^\text{150}\) Because the intelligence directorates with which we are concerned are located within the Service Staffs, these too would eventually be subject to this broad understanding, but in a way that is rather different from their paternal Chiefs. The enactment of all three elements—and the resultant incarnation of the Joint concept in the form of the professional central system—was soon to follow.

ii. Enacting the Elements, Incarnating the Joint Concept

Enacting all Three Elements: The Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee

In surveying the immediate post-war situation in London, with a view to the future enactment of the elements at hand, three background factors are worth noting. First, Britain’s ‘battered’ state

\(^{149}\) Quoted in: French, ""A One-Man Show'? Civil-Military Relations During the First World War," 106.

\(^{150}\) Ibid., See also: Johnson, Defense by Committee, 191.
meant that London had to make ends meet in its fiscal policies.\textsuperscript{151} This meant that the idea of ‘economy and efficiency’ would become central to the conduct of defence planning, procurement, and, most topically, administration, in the coming years.\textsuperscript{152} Closely related to this was the second factor: the Ten Year Rule. In 1919, the War Cabinet (then-still in session as the sole executive organ) instructed the Service departments that Britain would not be ‘engaged in any great war for the next ten years’. Consequently, Treasury obtained an ‘unchallengeable grip’ on all defence expenditure until the early 1930s.\textsuperscript{153} Naturally, this led to the prioritisation of domestic economic policy over that of defence expenditure.\textsuperscript{154} Third, the war saw the emergence of a third Service branch in the form of the RAF, and by 1918, Britain had the world’s most powerful air fleet.\textsuperscript{155} Its permanent establishment would result in an exacerbation of inter-Service animosity among the Chiefs, as Jackson and Bramall recount.\textsuperscript{156} Indeed, this factor, set against the struggle for financial resources imposed by the former two, resulted in a ‘bitter rivalry’ between the Chiefs in the 1920s period.\textsuperscript{157} Yet, this did not preclude the emergence of inter-Service cooperation and the enactment of the other two elements, as the following analysis will demonstrate.

It is beyond the scope of this section to account for the so-called ‘Campaign for a Ministry of Defence’ which occurred (and failed) during the inter-war period, and which is covered by Philpott elsewhere.\textsuperscript{158} The key point for our analysis is that the enactment of the elements was not inevitable at the time. As Philpott implies, the choice facing the governments throughout the inter-war years was binary and reoccurring: either the government resurrect the CID, which would modify the departmental orthodoxy by way of the centralised inter-cooperative committee system, or formulate a ‘true’ Ministry of Defence (MOD), which would overturn the departmental orthodoxy by way of tri-Service amalgamation in a unified Ministry.\textsuperscript{159} The former, he implies, was tried and uncontroversial; the latter, the opposite.\textsuperscript{160} These remarks certainly hold true in the case of the latter. But in the description of the former, nuance is required: while precedent existed for centralised inter-cooperation in the committee-forum by way of the War Cabinet (and, less notably, the CID),

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} Jackson and Bramall, 118.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{156} Jackson and Bramall, 117.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} See: Philpott, "The Campaign for a Ministry of Defence, 1919-36."
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 109-10.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 110.
\end{flushleft}
it had not yet been effectively applied in the context of the Services. Nonetheless, as the need for inter-Service cooperation grew increasingly apparent—with the precedents, politics, personalities, and, soon, a looming crisis generally favouring the former\textsuperscript{161}—its application to the Services (and its survival in the face of calls for the latter) appears inevitable, but only with the benefit of hindsight.

Throughout the first few years of its resurrection, the CID did little to induce inter-Service cooperation among the three Chiefs of Staff. The CID, once again, neglected to embody any sense of its raison d’être. The sub-committee charged with ‘surveying the nation’s defence commitments’ in the 1920-22 period, for example, failed to engage in its business.\textsuperscript{162} Hankey, who had retained his position as CID Secretary, described the situation as a ‘serious and complete stagnation’ in administration.\textsuperscript{163} In a curious state of affairs, the founder of the reconstituted CID exhibited little will to bring it and its sub-committee into active session. The ‘immediate stresses’ of the post-war situation, Johnson implies, meant that Balfour’s attention lay elsewhere.\textsuperscript{164} It is no surprise, then, that as Jackson and Bramall recount, the 1920-22 period saw ‘[t]he three Chiefs [going] their own ways, much as they had done in pre-war days’.\textsuperscript{165} To some extent, the authors imply, this was both an understandable and prudent state of affairs: each Service had its own issues and, as such, the departmental orthodoxy was an apt mode of administrative operation.\textsuperscript{166}

The discussion earlier in this Chapter maintained that departmentalism does not in of itself theoretically impair the ideal of inter-Service cooperation, as formally denoted in Elgin and Esher. However, in view of the policy issues that were of joint interest to all three Chiefs, it became clear that the relic of compartmentalisation—now condemned by some in higher political circles—was still the default mode of departmental operation within the Service branches during the immediate inter-war period. Moreover, the continued prevalence of ‘Chiefly’ disharmony, exacerbated by the background factors, served to further distance the Services from cooperation with another.\textsuperscript{167} The only things between the Services, therefore, were competition and rivalry. In spite of the political condemnation of the relic, the institutional reversion to the pre-war status quo ante effectively condoned the pervasiveness of the relic. After all, the lack of effective centralisation meant that

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[161]{Ibid., 118-20.}
\footnotetext[162]{Naylor, A Man and an Institution, 130.}
\footnotetext[163]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[164]{Balfour was Lord President of Council, in addition to leading the CID. See: Johnson, Defence by Committee, 194.}
\footnotetext[165]{Jackson and Bramall, 118.}
\footnotetext[166]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[167]{Ibid., 117.}
\end{footnotes}
the Chiefs had no formal responsibility to advise government. Nearly a decade after the achievement of inter-Service (planning) uniformity in 1911, the enactment of the newest ‘inter’ element was, once again, only brought about by the onset of an external crisis—and Prime Ministerial directive.

In 1922, trouble in the Dardanelles re-emerged in the form of the Chanak crisis and, faced with the prospect of conflict with Turkish nationalists, Lloyd George solicited strategic advice from the three Chiefs via the CID. Upon receipt of the plans, the Prime Minister expressed ‘disgust’ and ‘annoyance’: the three Services had, in their compartmentalised fashion, presented contradictory plans for the prospective attack—an attack that was, crucially, predicated upon the inter-dependency of the three armed forces. This is an example of what Hankey was referring to when he fleetingly wrote of the ‘most embarrassing’ situation that the CID had found itself in during 1922. As Jackson and Bramall observe, Lloyd George’s response to the Chiefs was one of explicit direction, fuelled by a ‘instinctive dislike’ for his military advisers. In a separate interview, Hankey recounts the directive, recalling that the Prime Minister made the decision personally, and gave orders that ‘inter-Service cooperation must be improved.’

Thus, in elemental terms, Lloyd George’s directive was to centrally engage in inter-Service cooperation to prepare joint plans for the prospect of an amphibious attack; by land, sea, and air. ‘Powerful indeed were the effects of [the] orders upon the machinery of national defence…’ Johnson wrote. The joint plan soon emerged in a ‘remarkably short time’. The reason underpinning the so-called powerfulness of the directive and the plan’s apparent remarkability was obvious: for the first time, if only temporarily, the relic had disappeared—and along with it, the elements had been enacted in an ad hoc fashion. The committee element was constantly being enacted and the group was a ‘COS’ in all but (official) title: every day of the crisis the three Chiefs were brought into an ‘inter-communicative’ session by their de facto Chairperson, the Colonial Secretary for the Middle

168 Ibid., 118.
169 Ibid., 127.
170 Ibid.
172 Jackson and Bramall, 127.
173 This originates from Johnson’s interview with Hankey. See: Johnson, Defence by Committee, 192.
174 Jackson and Bramall, 127.
175 Johnson, Defence by Committee, 192.
176 Jackson and Bramall, 127.
East (Sir Winston Churchill).\textsuperscript{177} And while the crisis would end in a matter of months (along with Lloyd George’s Coalition),\textsuperscript{178} the essential elements of a COS were now present: all of which were to be established on a formal basis in the following year.

The elements were now being applied and, soon, they would be extended to the realm of Service intelligence. Before turning to the periphery of intelligence, we must briefly attend to the embedding of the Joint concept in the form of what would become a professional central system. It is, after all, within the professional central system where the foundation and the periphery interact, where intelligence became ‘Joint’ in committee form.

Incarnating the Joint Concept: The Professional Central System

The permanent establishment of the COS—the institution that would eventually come to enact the elements in the years preceding (but most importantly, during) the Second World War—was, characteristically, brought about by a sub-committee of the CID, endowed by Cabinet.\textsuperscript{179} The Salisbury Committee, as it came to be known, fulfilled the calls for a post-war review of the overall machinery, satisfying desires for a new Esher-like review.\textsuperscript{180} The resultant 1923 report, composed by men of the status quo, favoured the existing machinery over that of an MOD. This represented another victory for the defence by committee ideal in face of the Campaign for the latter.\textsuperscript{181} The recommendation to permanently establish the COS was undoubtably its most important finding. The Report, which was co-authored by Hankey, described the new Committee in terms characteristic of the central system. The future Committee would provide that:

\textit{…each of the three Chiefs of Staff will have an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole … In carrying out this function they will meet together for the discussion of questions which affect their joint responsibilities. [emphasis added]}\textsuperscript{182}

The terms emphasised illustrate, in effect, the beginning of a central system within the professional military realm. First and foremost, the Salisbury recommendation reaffirmed the tenet of the central system already ‘enacted’ within the realm. The concept of ‘individual responsibility’ for defence advice embodies the theory of departmentalism via the heads of the individual Service Staffs, and their constitutional position as subordinate or advisory to the political (i.e. the Prime Minister and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Chanak led to a Conservative revolt. See: ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Hankey, \textit{Government Control in War}, 55-56.
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Johnson, \textit{Defence by Committee}, 193.
  \item \textsuperscript{181} The Report was authored by Salisbury and Hankey, who served as the Committee Secretary. See: ibid., 196-97.
  \item \textsuperscript{182} Quoted in: Jackson and Bramall, 129.
\end{itemize}
The delegation (or imposition) of ‘collective responsibility’ for defence, however, represented something new in the military realm, as Johnson suggests.¹⁸³ Yet, like anything ‘new’ in constitutional administration, it was not without precedent: collective responsibility, Jennings would tell us, originates from the political central system vis-à-vis Cabinet government.¹⁸⁴ Similarly, the enshrinement of the ‘joint’ term in the above Salisbury recommendation, which might be thought of as the COS charter of sorts, was grounded in a more refined, modern version of the CID’s raison d’être as a defence forum, as discussed earlier.

The modern notion of this forum would, much to the delight of the Chief of Air Staff, include air as the third domain of the defence situation.¹⁸⁵ General Lord Ismay later observed that tri-Service representation in the COS was ‘absolutely essential’ because the emergence of the RAF had ‘blurred the frontiers of responsibility completely’.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, Lord Hankey in Government Control in War observed that the growth and continued compartmentalisation of the Services necessitated a Committee form to ‘bring them into focus’.¹⁸⁷ The fulfilment of such a raison d’être, therefore, demanded the functional inter-play of the elements. That is to say, it required the enactment of inter-Service cooperation in a centralised advisory committee forum. Here, we can observe the framers’ first conception of ‘the Joint’—the enactment of the elements, where appropriate, to meet those tri-Service responsibilities stemming from the emerging professional dimension of the political central system. This gravity of this responsibility requirement was further expanded upon later in the report. The Chiefs were delegated the individual and collective responsibility not just for policy, but for reviewing:

…”the defence situation as a whole … ensuring that defence preparations and plans and the expenditure … are co-ordinated and framed to meet policy, that full information as to the changing naval, military and air situation may always be available to the CID … for consideration. [emphasis added]”¹⁸⁸

The gradual fulfilment of these respective responsibilities would see the COS eventually become the heart of the entire CID system, later reflected by the COS losing its ‘sub’ or subordinate title to become the Committee—that principal embodiment of the defence by committee ideal and, by implication, the means by which the elements so desired by Elgin and Esher would come to be

¹⁸³ ‘New Concept: Collective Responsibility’ is the title for the COS Chapter in Johnson’s text. See: Johnson, Defence by Committee, 191.
¹⁸⁴ See: Jennings, Cabinet Government.
¹⁸⁵ Naylor, A Man and an Institution, 131.
¹⁸⁶ Johnson, Defence by Committee, 191, 93.
¹⁸⁷ Compartmentalisation is implied by Hankey. See: Hankey, Government Control in War, 55.
¹⁸⁸ Quoted in: Jackson and Bramall, 129.
enacted.\textsuperscript{189} And of course, it represented a reform in the English constitution. Accordingly, Jennings' epithet still applies and, unsurprisingly, the relics of the old ‘system’ were never fully ‘superseded’ by the COS organisation. It will be recalled from Chapter One that not all of the constitutional relics were defective \textit{per se}. Departmentalism in terms of the Service Staffs, for example, provided some efficient intra-Service outcomes before the First World War (and the COS, as per the ‘individual responsibility’ mandate, reaffirmed its virtues).

However, as Low would remind us, the theory sometimes differs from the practice in the constitution and, as such, departmentalism was frequently being practised as compartmentalism. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the formal establishment of the COS in 1923 did not automatically entail a supersession of compartmentalism. General Lord Ismay, then one of the COS Assistant Secretaries, wrote that during the first few years of the Committee’s existence the Chiefs were ‘not exactly a band of brothers.’\textsuperscript{190} In his account, he observed a variation of the relic as prohibiting the element of cooperation that the Chiefs’ responsibilities were so predicated upon, ‘Inter-Service cooperation had never come their way, and each of them was intent on fighting his own corner.’\textsuperscript{191} Indeed, the lingering relic thrived in the face of the complacency embodied by the Ten Year Rule, with each Chief having to ‘fight’ against the Chancellor (now Churchill) and the Treasury for his own resources. The Salisbury vision of inter-Service cooperation, underpinned by ‘mutual trust’, was ‘almost impossible’ to \textit{continually} enact in the face of such ‘dictatorial policies’\textsuperscript{192}

As the COS continued as a committee-forum for inter-Service communication and animosity between 1924 and 1926, ministers in the second Baldwin Administration and members of Parliament began to doubt whether the Chiefs were actually fulfilling the collective mandates, as provided by \textit{Salisbury}.\textsuperscript{193} The doubt likely originated from the CID, which had Service ministerial representation, and considered the information/plans that were meant to be co-ordinated (i.e. joint), as denoted above. Unlike in decades past, the civilian political-executive took notice and acted—before the onset of a crisis. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin issued a warrant to each Service Chief, reminding the Chiefs that the Committee to which they held membership had a collective responsibility to advise the government.\textsuperscript{194} This was an important executively-sanctioned reminder, a symbolic reflection that some politicians now took the defence by committee ideal seriously.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 138.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
Needless to say, its receipt did not entail a full change in elemental fortunes overnight, especially as the perverseness of the Rule remained in force. However, as stated at the beginning of this section, the prevalence of inter-Service competition or animosity did not entirely rule out the possibility of inter-Service cooperation, though those elements—diametrically opposed to cooperation—certainly reduced the continual enactment of such. Indeed, the enactment of inter-Service cooperation was not exactly the default mode of operation within the COS of the 1920s. Later in 1926, however, two important developments occurred. Together, these developments would lead to the elevation of the elements.

The first development came with the implementation of a new Committee norm to fulfil the collective responsibility mandate. Johnson recounts that 1926 saw the Committee begin the yearly practice of gathering information from a variety of different departmental sources, including intelligence, in order to produce an annual report on the whole strategic-defence picture for Cabinet consideration via the CID. These reports contained ‘elaborate’ detail as to the growing issues relevant to the Services in the face of the developing strategic picture, including recommendations for intra-Service reforms. It was from this point onwards, Johnson implies, where the production of the COS reports became less ad hoc and more of a custom. Thus, we may suggest that the norm established in 1926 represented the point at which inter-Service cooperation started to become more common.

Hankey, who remained privy to all COS committee proceedings as part of his tri-Secretarial responsibilities, does not provide a specific date for when the so-called ‘tradition of team-work’ began in Government Control, but he does note that it was instigated not long after the Committee’s formal creation. These observations are further corroborated by Prime Minister’s statements pertaining to the COS in the late 1920s. According to Johnson’s analysis of Hansard, Baldwin informed the House of Commons that the COS reports had ‘proved very valuable’ to the CID and, by implication, himself and the Cabinet. Indeed, as with the pre-war CID, the Prime Minister was ex-officio Chair of both the CID and COS. The integration of the modern constitution in committee form was beginning to work in theory and practice, unlike in the case of the pre-war CID. A particularly significant piece of evidence cited for the purported utility of the

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195 Johnson, Defence by Committee, 204.
196 Ibid., 204-5.
197 Ibid.
198 Hankey, Government Control in War, 56.
199 Johnson, Defence by Committee, 205.
200 Hankey, Government Control in War, 56.
COS reports was the Shanghai crisis of 1927. The Committee monitored the Shanghai situation without being alerted to do so by Cabinet and, when conflict broke out, the COS ‘immediately presented a joint appreciation and recommendation’. Baldwin later observed that Cabinet was consistently advised throughout the crisis ‘by [the] joint committee with promptitude and wisdom.’

This should not be taken to infer, however, that the elements were being continually enacted to the extent that the Joint concept was manifest. Even Johnson, the defence by committee idealist, appears to concede that the latter half of the 1920s did not see all of the elements being enacted together—at least, not to the extent that the Joint concept was the default mode of COS operation. 1926, therefore, represented a turning point for the COS; and, in turn, it saw an elevation of the elements—but it did not entail a direct, continual manifestation of the elements, such as in the 1939-45 period. Indeed, the COS would survive the second disbandment of the CID to serve the resurrected War Cabinet under Prime Minister Winston Churchill; losing its ‘sub’ prefix to become a Committee of the Cabinet. We may observe that 1926 marked the beginnings of a new ‘joint norm’ that would be put to much use in the Second World War. Suffice to say, the issue of centralised cooperation between the political and military spheres that had so plagued Asquith and, more noticeably, Lloyd George would not be repeated in the 1939-45 period. In this sense, Jackson and Bramall characterise the WWII Chiefs as ‘Churchill’s Chiefs’.

The installation of the joint norm, however, was not the only development of 1926 which saw the COS begin to manifest the elements by the 1939-45 period. In order to fulfil the collective mandate, the COS had to expand beyond its singular committee-forum. The Chiefs were, after all, only three individuals. The COS therefore required joint machinery of its own to engage in tri-Service business, where appropriate. Besides the creation of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for more general matters of administration, this was to entail the creation of two ‘joint’ COS sub-committees that would see the elements—already applied to the top professional level—extended into other areas of the professional military sphere: first, the Joint Planning Sub-Committee (JPC), and later, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC). The JPC will be briefly attended to now, while the JIC—and its extension of the ‘Joint’ concept within the realm of Intelligence—will be

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201 Johnson, Defence by Committee, 205.
202 Ibid.,
203 See from Chapter 7 onwards: Jackson and Bramall, 179.
204 Ehrman, 126.
205 Jackson and Bramall, 179.
206 Termed ‘vice’ in fig. II.
attended to within the periphery of intelligence-related knowledge. These two sub-committees, Jackson and Bramall observe, gave the COS the Esher sanctioned General Staff ‘... in all but name.’

In our analysis, we may observe the COS and its machinery as emblematic of a professional central system. Within such a system, as Chapter Two will discuss, the Joint ‘conceptual form’ is enacted through a cascade organisation. The brief discussion below will conclude our examination of the foundation and, as such, any discussion of the other joint institutional forms will occur within the aforementioned periphery.

It will be recalled from earlier that the War Cabinet, while a nimble executive organ, required a network of ‘inter’ sub-committees in order to dispense with administrative matters that intersected across (civilian) departmental lines. By virtue of its connection to the political central system, the COS, which we can think of the institutional embodiment of the professional central system—while advisory to the political central system vis-à-vis the CID-Cabinet nexus—also required more than a singular committee ‘organ’ in order to fulfil its collective (i.e. joint) mandate. In the case of the JPC, this form of centralised dispensation is corroborated by Willson. Near to the end of 1926, he implies, the Chiefs realised that the current and future output stemming from their collective responsibilities could not be ‘fully effective’ without an additional sub-organisation. In view of the Prime Ministerial warrant that had been issued in August, it is likely that the timing of this realisation was not coincidental. This was, Willson illustrates, a further extension of the elements into the predominantly departmentalised military system. The Directors in charge of planning were the ‘immediate subordinates’ of the Chiefs—and the rationale was that they too had to be put ‘in commission’, just as their superiors were four years earlier. Predictably, the three Directors did not automatically work in concert to fulfil the collective mandate. After all, its superior committee was yet to do so on a consistent basis. In a fashion akin to the COS, however, intra-JPC norms conducive to teamwork on matters of joint interest did eventually emerge. The JPC and, later its Joint Planning Staff, (JPS), ‘increasingly became the centre of strategic planning’ within the COS-CID nexus. Indeed, as Willson implies, the norms only emerged as a result of ‘constant’ inter-communicative contact within the committee forum, on matters of common or joint

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207 Jackson and Bramall, 148. Although Esher also envisioned inter-Empire Staff, as noted earlier.
208 Regarding the foundation and periphery, refer to the Introduction.
210 The warrant was sent in August. See: ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Johnson, Defence by Committee, 243.
interest.\textsuperscript{214} Like the two other elements, inter-Service planning cooperation did not emerge overnight, as this Chapter has reminded us.

Having established the origins of the Joint concept and its paternal elements in the foundations, this Chapter will seek to discuss their enactment within the periphery of intelligence-related knowledge. It will first engage in a brief prefatory account regarding the functional inspiration of the JIC, with a view to its functional and conceptual parallels. Following that, it will turn to exert its substantive focus: to make sense of the foundational concept and its paternal elements within the unique intellectual terrain of the periphery. To do so, it will first endeavour to shed further light on the authoritative explanations regarding the apparent insularity of the inter-war intelligence organisation. By virtue of the insights gained from the system of meaning, the extension of some of the elements to several important institutional forms affected by the insularity will also be discussed. This will pave the way for the distinct place that the JIC would come to occupy in the ‘intelligence landscape’ in the mid-1930s. Here, it will be argued that the first attempt to enact all three elements to fulfil the functions of centralised co-ordination and assessment—embodied by the Inter-Service Intelligence Committee or ‘ISIC’—failed precisely because it occupied a place beyond the still-emerging joint machinery (i.e. within the professional central system).

After recounting the creation of the JIC in 1936, this Chapter will utilise its conceptual insights to argue against the authoritative explanation as to why the committee was ‘essentially ineffective’ in terms of its work in the pre-war period. Suggesting that the 1936-38 period represented a transitional era for the Joint concept’s extension to Intelligence, it will then demarcate the 1939-41 period as the beginnings of an evolutionary process toward conceptual transformation in the realm of intelligence. Two functional qualifiers to the concept will be deduced from the endowment of the 1939 JIC Reconstitution: first, ‘Joint Intelligence’ as Professional Intelligence, and second, ‘Joint Intelligence’ as Whole Intelligence. This theoretical elevation of the concept would eventually begin to become practice in 1940-41. In contrast to the pre-war period, it will be observed that the Joint concept was now understood as having to be fully extended to Intelligence, which in turn saw the JIC begin to manifest the Whole and Professional qualifiers from 1942 onwards. Finally, this full extension will be conceptualised in the form of the political-professional central system via the War Cabinet COS-JPS-JIC-JIS cascade, the success of which was predicated on the full enactment of all paternal elements within the system of wartime constitutional administration.
Extending the Elements to the Intelligence Landscape

Intelligence Centralisation Redux 1922-24

In light of the significance of the 1922-24 period for the Joint concept discussed in Chapter One, it is perhaps unsurprising that Goodman in the JIC *Official History* briefly prefaces his 1935-36 account of the committee’s organisational origins with a development that occurred in 1924. However, Goodman neglects the elements (and the intellectual histories embodied therein) in favour of alluding to the first incarnation of a ‘integrated’ governmental approach to intelligence, an inevitable omission in the British School. Citing a rather obscure CID sub-committee erected in 1923, Goodman argues that the importance of the Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War (ATB)—and its successive incarnations, the Industrial Intelligence Foreign Countries Committee (FCI [1929]) and Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC [1931])—lay in the fact that the Committees represented the ‘first step to towards a centralised intelligence machinery.’ These Committees were not, however, concerned with military intelligence in the strictest sense of the term, which remained the responsibility of each individual Service Staff section. Rather, their ambit was confined to industrial intelligence.

In spite of this fundamental difference, Goodman forges a conceptual link between ‘Joint’ Intelligence and the IIC’s (failed) attempt at becoming a ‘central clearing-house’. It is a curious linkage, though it is not without evidence *per se*. In brief, the immediate organisational origins of the JIC lay within the correspondence between two individuals: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and Hankey. Here, Goodman recounts Dill citing the IIC as an organisational precedent for intelligence centralisation in his first letter to Hankey, who eventually came to devise the JIC as a new inter-Service committee for intelligence centralisation. This account of the memoranda is further corroborated by F.H. Hinsley in *British Intelligence in the Second World War*. Thus, in the context of the British (Organisational) School, this organisational lineage is historically accurate. Accordingly, as an institutional exemplar for the function of centralised information assessment, the lineage between the IIC and JIC is valid.

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217 Ibid., 14.

218 Ibid., 14-15.

Yet, conceptually speaking, Goodman’s initial conflation between organisation and concept is at best incomplete. Following through with the requirements of integration spelt out in the Introduction, the Joint system of meaning yields insight: as centralised CID sub-committees, the institutions cited are all part of the central system. They are enactments of the committee system via the CID and Cabinet and, in the case of the 1934 IIC, a variation of the ‘inter’ element too. The IIC’s distinct approach to intelligence may have represented something of a functional ‘first step’, but it was the COS where the paternal elements were first applied and, eventually, extended to the JIC institutional form. Later in the Official History, Goodman appears to acknowledge this. However, the task of making sense of this extension requires something more than a mere elaboration of the intra-COS deliberations regarding the JIC’s conception. The task of the forthcoming section, therefore, will be to discuss the extension of the elements, but with a greater view to the periphery—which encapsulates Goodman’s (and Hinsley’s) allusion to the function of intelligence that the JIC would come to fulfil following its creation in 1935-36. In doing so, the section will make sense of the interface between the elements and the functions of intelligence. The resultant account will, in turn, led us to the 1935-36 extension with an enlarged view of the intelligence landscape. This richer appreciation will further situate the location which the Joint concept came to occupy in the 1936-45 period within the intelligence landscape.

Inter-Cooperation Before the War

In the opening Chapter of the revised edition of the voluminous British Intelligence series, F.H. Hinsley observed that much of the success of the British ‘intelligence machine’ in the Second World War lay with those ‘essential inter-departmental bodies’ that had been established during the inter-war period—namely, the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS [1919]) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6 [1921]), and the JIC [1936]. In light of the dates in which many of these bodies were established, it is tempting to subscribe to the view that the inter-war years saw the inter-cooperative element fully enacted throughout the machine. Indeed, as the last of the inter-war creations, the JIC is especially susceptible to this view. It was, after all, extending elements already enacted within the COS, in view of a worsening international situation. However, as with most institutional reforms in the English constitution, not all of the relics of the old system were fully superseded by the new bodies and, as such, Jennings’ ‘relic’ epithet—cited at the beginning of this Part—once again applies.


221 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (1993), 3.
In theory, these sporadic organisational moves toward applying inter-cooperation to the functions of intelligence should have eventuated in a machine where the element was manifest. But the theory, as Low cautions us, should always be distinguished from the practice. The situation was not one of inter-cooperation, but of departmental insularity. The inter-war intelligence organisation, Hinsley infers, did not constitute an efficient ‘intelligence machine’ in terms of the organisation of its departments or in the co-ordination of its respective functions. To reappropriate Lord Salisbury’s dictum from Chapter One, the British intelligence organisation was not yet a perfect instrument of war. Some of the imperfections stemmed from the conditions of peacetime complacency—namely, the financial restrictions, the absence of a universally-defined threat, and the resultant ‘lack of priority’ ascribed to military intelligence by senior officials.

There were, however, other imperfections that comprised the ‘intractable’ problems of the intelligence situation. In a similar fashion to the issues facing the pre-war central system, Hinsley observes that these issues could only be solved by the ‘pressure of wartime conditions’. Yet, in the interests of the elements in the intelligence landscape and the requirements of the section at hand, it is worth elucidating why the inter-war organisation was intractably insular—in spite of the enactment of the ‘inter’ element through the above bodies.

In brief, two explanations for the machine’s insularity are presented in British Intelligence—both of which can be made more intelligible in light of the system of meaning and the elements at hand. The first, Hinsley observes, arose from the attitude of insularity that ‘bedevilled’ departmental relations whenever the lines of intelligence responsibility crossed. In the Service intelligence directorates the isolation was prevalent in the form of the compartmentalisation relic identified in Chapter One. As Jennings and Lord Haldane would tell us, the central system embraced departmental separatism because of the orthodoxy of departmental primacy—what we might regard as a direct implication of the ministerial responsibility convention. Intelligence does not exist in isolation from compartmentalism precisely because it is connected to the practice of Service-departmentalism. This relic underpins Hinsley’s allusion to the ‘strong traditions’ that were ‘forceful’ in prohibiting inter-departmentalism in the inter-war period. The fact that insularity characterised departmental relations during the period was to some extent natural. After all, the

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224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 Hinsley implies this. See: ibid.
229 Ibid., 4.
‘inter’ element was, relative to the orthodoxy and the relic, a new constitutional phenomenon. In terms of the Joint concept, the promise of the inter element, along with its central and committee siblings, had only just begun to be applied to the highest of the political and professional echelons. Yet, until 1936, the ‘inter’ element and its siblings were collectively absent from the place within the intelligence landscape that they would come to be enacted within.

Hinsley’s second explanation for the insularity is complex. During the inter-war period, he observes that the machine experienced a trajectory toward greater professionalism which, in turn, saw a separation of different intelligence functions away from the singular departmental orthodoxy.230 This, in turn, ‘conflicted with the established division of responsibility among individual departments.’231 The lack of professionalisation during the First World War resulted in a messy intelligence landscape. The lines between Service and special intelligence, for instance, were ‘blurred and intermingled’.232 Separating these types of intelligence, and creating the institutional forms necessary to acquire, assess, and distribute the product—the task of the ‘inter’ organisations throughout the inter-war period—was bound to be fraught with difficulty. These tasks are, Hinsley implies, linked to the activity of ‘intelligence’ in administration. Intelligence must ‘perform’ three functions: first, information must be acquired or intercepted; second, that information must be assessed or analysed; and finally, it must be co-ordinated and distributed to ‘those who use it’.233 Prior to the inter-war period, Hinsley suggests that these functions were solely carried out by singular departments, thereby resulting in an ‘established division of responsibility’.234

In light of the connections made in the first explanation, we can observe a prima facie conflict between the singularity denoted by division of the functions before the inter-war period, and the inter character of the ‘professionalised’ organisations created during the early (and in the case of the JIC, late) inter-war period. Here, then, we may observe a connection between the first and second explanations: the professionalisation trajectory, with its emphasis on the ‘inter’ element, as denoted by the second explanation, intersects with the insularity that so bedevils inter-departmental relations as a result of the orthodoxy denoted by the first. In this sense, the two ‘explanations’ are in fact inextricably connected: the ‘intractability’ of the insularity was organisationally grounded in

230 Ibid., 3.
231 Ibid.
232 Gill Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence (London: Routledge, 2007), 33-34.
234 Ibid.
the practice of the orthodoxy, which, in turn, prohibited the moves away from insularity through the enactment of inter-cooperation (i.e. the professionalisation trajectory).

Before turning to address the last of the inter-departmental bodies—that is, the JIC in 1935-36—it is prudent to traverse the landscape, with a view to the most significant of the early ‘inter’ bodies, the GC&CS and the SIS. Doing so will reveal how the element was extended into the periphery of SIGINT and espionage intelligence. This will, in turn, qualify the extension of the Joint concept vis-à-vis the JIC—and further situate it within the landscape.

First, we shall attend to the GC&CS and SIGINT acquisition. The amalgamation of the ‘remnants of Room 40 and MI1b’ in the form of the GC&CS by the War Cabinet in 1919 represented a victory for inter-departmentalism—but the fate of the inter element (and indeed its new institutional incarnation) was by no means guaranteed. In spite of their initial support for the constitutional position of the GC&CS in the Foreign Office (FO [1919]), and later, under the FO Chief of SIS and Director of the GC&CS (1923), the Service departments, which housed Room 40 and Military Intelligence Section 1 (MI1b) in the First World War, were not easily inclined to the continued existence of GC&CS. Hinsley recounts several occasions in which the Services lobbied for a reversion to sub-division intra-Service singularity. This was, Hinsley seems to imply, the reason why the GC&CS was organisationally ‘resisted’ throughout the period. Curiously, it seems as though this sense of animosity and debate denoted in British Intelligence eventuated in a ‘inter’ compromise by 1939. The technical demands and opportunities associated with cryptanalytics, combined with an understanding of the fused nature of modern SIGINT, was conceded as taking precedence over the revival of intra-Service singularity. Operationally, for example, it was agreed by way of an inter-departmental ‘Y’ committee that all codes and cyphers intercepted by the GC&CS that were ‘easily exploitable’ would be sent to the relevant Service centres, while the ‘unsolvables’ would be retained for (or, if intercepted by the Service stations, sent to) Bletchley Park. The GC&CS, too, advised and achieved uniformity in terms of the overall interception programme across all departments.

235 See: Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service, 258.
236 Room 40 was located in the Admiralty; MI1b in the War Office.
238 Ibid., 6.
239 Ibid., 3.
240 Ibid., 6.
241 This occurred from 1938 onwards. See: ibid., 5-6.
242 Ibid., 6.
Here, Hinsley’s characterisation of inter-war insularity still stands as such collaboration did not materialise until 1938-39. But, crucially, we can observe the role of the inter element, and in at least one important instance, the committee element, in facilitating the success of the wartime machine that was to come. Indeed, as Hinsley finds, the achievement of the ‘effective fusion’ of all SIGINT processes in the war (and thus, its status as the most valuable intelligence), was organisationally rooted in the compromise between ‘total centralisation’ and sub-divisionism. But, crucially, we can observe the role of the inter element, and in at least one important instance, the committee element, in facilitating the success of the wartime machine that was to come. Indeed, as Hinsley finds, the achievement of the ‘effective fusion’ of all SIGINT processes in the war (and thus, its status as the most valuable intelligence), was organisationally rooted in the compromise between ‘total centralisation’ and sub-divisionism. That compromise could only be made by the inter and committee elements. Thus, the GC&CS eventually embodied elements which tempered the general insularity of the period. To this end, we may conclude that by 1939 the elements had become, to reappropriate Hinsley, an ‘equally powerful force’ to those of departmentalism.

Second, we shall attend to the SIS and espionage. Although the origins of the SIS date back to before 1914, its role as the external espionage department was only beginning to be solidified in the inter-war period. Its peculiar origins lay within the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau (SSB [1909]). Throughout WWI, Hinsley implies, the SSB was usually under the control of the War Office. This goes some way to explain the colloquial prevalence of the ‘MI’ or Military Intelligence titles, such as MI6 (Military Intelligence Section 6, SIS) and MI5 (Military Intelligence Section 5, the Home Section/Security Service). This sense of departmental ‘control’, however, should not be taken to infer that the SIS did not exhibit an autonomous spirit, as Jeffery’s account demonstrates. After all, the SIS had to serve three masters—the War Office, the Admiralty, and the FO. In late 1915, a form of SIS ‘charter’ emerged which foreshadowed its future autonomy and eventual ‘consolidation [of] the interdepartmental role, under FO supervision.’ In the following three years of war, the SIS managed to gain some organisational independence from the War Office, its Director ‘fending off’ the pressure to permanently amalgamate the SIS into the broader Service organisations. Jeffery observes that the inter-war period would see the SIS resisting ‘predatory [Service] attentions’, but as Hinsley points out, that attention was never so predatory that the Services came to operate their own agents.

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243 Ibid., 5-7.
245 British Intelligence in the Second World War (1993), 5.
246 MI5 will be attended to below.
248 Ibid., 40.
249 Ibid., 49.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid., 725.
252 Or at least, not after 1921. See: Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (1993), 5.
In 1921 the SIS become *the* department ‘exclusively responsible’ for espionage against foreign powers.\(^{253}\) It did not, however, result in a centralist organisation. Indeed, even following its 1921 reconstitution, the SIS hosted sections from the three Services, while the FO assumed the financial and constitutional responsibility for its existence, later through its own Chief, as cited above.\(^{254}\) Accordingly, the mode of SIS operation came to be increasingly *predicated* upon inter-departmentalism. The FO would remain at a distance; Service representation would be maintained, constrained, and reconciled; while all intelligence was to set to be acquired in a ‘inter’ fashion, and, in the case of the Service sections, assessed independently from the body through their respective Chiefs.\(^{255}\) The inter-war ‘insularity’ of the SIS, therefore, became less about the predatory behaviour of the Services, and more about financial restrictions and an inability to meet the demands of users.\(^{256}\) As the external threat grew and financial restrictions relaxed, the SIS became an ‘integral and valuable’ part of the intelligence machine—in no small part due to its effective organisational embodiment of the ‘inter’ element.\(^{257}\)

Notably, Hinsley observes that the GC&CS and SIS—the two most important inter-departmental intelligence bodies formalised in the early inter-war period—primarily performed the first function of intelligence, information acquisition.\(^{258}\) Any ‘performance’ of assessment centralisation or co-ordination, he asserts, did not occur until 1934.\(^{259}\) Careful analysis is required here. In addition to the Foreign Section alluded to earlier, the SSB also had a Home Section, known as the Security Service or MI5. In the opening of *British Intelligence*, Hinsley lists the Security Service as one of those essential inter-departmental bodies created in the inter-war period that would go on to enable the achievements of the wartime machine.\(^{260}\) However, as he later appears to concede, the Security Service was *not* an inter-departmental body—but a hybrid organisation.\(^{261}\) With its shift away from suspicion and pure sub-divisionism to hybrid department (MI5 remained as a military sub-division within the Service) via the Home Secretary in 1931, Hinsley suggests that the Security Service began to function as a centralised assessment organisation for some of the intelligence acquisition departments, though, notably, it did not move beyond its original domestic SSB remit.\(^{262}\) Thus, any functional performance of centralised and/or co-ordinated assessment by way of the ‘inter’

\(^{253}\) Ibid.  
\(^{254}\) Ibid.  
\(^{255}\) Ibid.  
\(^{256}\) Ibid.  
\(^{257}\) Ibid.  
\(^{258}\) Ibid.  
\(^{259}\) Ibid.  
\(^{260}\) Ibid., 3.  
\(^{261}\) Ibid., 7.  
\(^{262}\) Ibid.
element regarding the international situation—which was deemed to become ‘sufficiently troublesome’ in the mid-1930s—was, Hinsley rightly observes, limited to the CID and its sub-committee system. Here, it is necessary to return our attention to the functional ‘first step’ portrayed by Goodman above, and, more substantively, the extension of all three elements vis-à-vis the Joint concept to the performance of intelligence.

All Three Elements, Extended: from IIC to JIC 1935-38

It is no coincidence that the first functional step to centralized intelligence was taken by way of the three paternal elements, through the CID system. So far, we have observed the central system move from the political context (i.e. the Cabinet) to the professional context (i.e. the COS). In doing so, we have seen the gradual emergence and enactment of the elements as denoted by various institutional forms. It will be recalled from our discussion earlier that the resurrection of the CID eventually saw the promise of the administrative committee system from 1916-18 delivered upon. In that respect, our focus remained on the COS as a fulfilment of part of the pre-war CID’s raison d’être. However, it should also be noted that the CID exhibited a committee system with extensive reach to all matters relevant to ‘defence’ (although the COS was the only purely military committee). Hinsley rightly notes that the inter-war CID was ‘an innovation that was overdue’. Here, the committee element vis-à-vis the CID system is espoused in British Intelligence as a mechanism by which the central system could administrate the information, which was increasing in volume and complexity. Strikingly, both Hinsley and Johnson observe that most of these committees were inter-departmental—a fulfilment of the promise embodied by the War Cabinet system. The civilian-military (or in the case of the COS, inter-military) composition of these committees served as a working illustration of the inter-dependency of the spheres (or the ‘blurred frontier’, as General Lord Ismay would have it). As to the efficacy of the CID as an overarching political-professional central system, among other administrative and deliberative analogies, Ismay characterised it as resembling ‘a sort of … clearing house’. In view of the tendency of British central systems to delegate, it may not come as a surprise that the IIC represented the first committee to attempt to become a central clearing house for its realm of responsibility. It would

263 Ibid., 7-8.
264 Johnson, Defence by Committee, 240.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.; Johnson, Defence by Committee, 240.
268 Ibid.
269 This quote derives from Johnson’s Ismay research. See: Johnson, Defence by Committee, 240.
270 That being, industrial intelligence.
be the ‘functional successor’ of the IIC, established through the centre of the military professional system, that would come to eventually perform the functions.

It is not necessary to delve into the IIC in any great depth, though it still remains relevant for its functional significance. As discussed earlier, the 1931 IIC and its prior incarnations were seen by Goodman as what we would call, the antecedence of the Joint Intelligence concept. This claim was then briefly re-qualified, with a view to the functions of intelligence as conceived by Hinsley. The distinction between function and concept, however, still remains a fine one: the relationship between the functional role of the pre-war JIC and its conceptual origins is intimate—largely because the elements were enacted for the purpose of fulfilling the function of assessment centralisation. Accordingly, the focus for the remainder of this substantive section will be to make sense of the above connection through the extension of the three elements to the performance of the function, in light of the conditions of the 1930s. The reconstituted IIC will now be attended to, followed by the JIC.

The first real attempt at the performance of the assessment centralisation or co-ordination function occurred not in 1931 when the IIC, then a ‘small research centre’, was acquired by the FCI—but in 1934,271 a date that can hardly be considered coincidental. Wark in The Ultimate Enemy rightly points out that the ‘intelligence world’ of the 1930s cannot be seen in isolation from the worsening international situation, the period being one of ‘crisis and response’ for the inter-war organisation.272 Japan had invaded Manchuria in 1931 and the Nazi Party had gained power in Germany in early 1933.273 In 1932, the Ten Year Rule, which had been in force since 1919, was abandoned.274 In the context of this Chapter, its significance will be elaborated upon in the discussion of military intelligence organisation below. As for the demand for intelligence itself during this period, it had become clear that by the early 1930s, Whitehall was developing an ever-increasing appetite for information.275

The only organisation within the CID that was directly satisfying this appetite, Hinsley suggests, was the IIC—a body which, in 1934, was charged with the acquisition, analysis and distribution of industrial intelligence to the three Service branches, in addition to its original role.276 To this end,

272 Wark, The Ultimate Enemy, 24-25.
273 Ibid., 24. See also: the discussion in Chapter One at (ii).
274 Ibid., 25.
the 1934 IIC was set to perform all three functions of intelligence through a variation of the three paternal elements. It was around this point, Wark suggests, that the IIC—along with the Service intelligence directorates—began to become the ‘principal centres for the analysis of German war preparations’. However, this should not be taken to infer that the IIC embodied a perfect enactment of the three elements. The Service intelligence directorates, who were represented in the FCI, refused to allow the IIC perform the part of its raison d’être as the central clearing house for industrial intelligence. Even amid fears of German rearmament, the insularity denoted earlier still characterised the ‘inter’ functions in the inter-war system. The extension of the three paternal elements to the military intelligence realm would not alter the dominance of this insularity, but the consequent enactment of the Joint concept via the JIC at least ensured that it would be in the right place within the intelligence landscape to fulfil (and to exceed) its pre-war responsibilities in the forthcoming war.

In spite of its omission in the Official History (and to a lesser degree, in British Intelligence), it is crucial to appreciate that after the Ten Year Rule was abandoned in 1932 the military system, with the COS at the head, entered into a state of transition. There is, after all, a reason why Defence by Committee and The Chiefs emphasise the importance of the Ten Year Rule. It provided the explanation for Britain’s lack of material (and mental) preparation in meeting the German threat throughout much of the 1930s. The Rule, therefore, prohibited the production of long-term predictions within the military sphere. As a consequence, the intelligence directorates within the three Services were unable to engage in the production of military intelligence—that is, the analysis of enemy (or adversarial) capabilities—so as to provide ‘meaningful maps of the future.’ This resulted in what Wark describes as the ‘crippling’ of military intelligence capacity throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. As the Rule was abolished, the demands for greater intelligence funding and staffing were met, and the Service intelligence directorates began to assume their place in the aforementioned ‘principal centre’ as a result. But, as Wark rightly observes, while such demands were ‘legitimate’ (that is, in order to meet capacity), the assumption shared by military officials—which held that increased funding would solve all intelligence problems—was not.

277 Wark, 25.
278 See: Goodman, The Official History, 14:32.
279 Inter-Service rivalry was to blame in this respect.
280 Wark, 24.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid. See also: Goodman, The Official History, 12-13.
284 Wark, 24.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid., 25.
Beyond the problem of capacity—which could be solved by virtue of increased expenditure post-Rule abandonment—Wark appears to lament that the more difficult problem actually lay behind the Rule. To elaborate: the abandonment of the Rule in 1932 would see the Services act upon the immediate capacity issues, but the same could not be said for the ‘wider assumptions and historical experience’ that underpinned the Rule’s existence throughout the 1919-32 period.287 The major contribution of The Ultimate Enemy lies with Wark’s illustration of the differing ‘images’ of the Nazi threat developed in each Service directorate in the 1930s, the contents of which emerged as a consequence of those assumptions and experiences that lingered from the Rule.288 In this sense, Clayton’s characterisation of Service Intelligence as ‘a military backwater’ remains apt.289 For the purposes of our enquiry in this section, the differing contents of the images among the Service directorates are symptomatic of the limits surrounding the extension of the three elements vis-à-vis the (initial) operation of the Joint concept, within its ‘place’ in the intelligence landscape. In other words, the images highlight the distinctive form of inter-war insularity that characterised the institutional enactment of the three elements and the Joint concept in the intelligence landscape: the JIC. Its origins, in light of the elements, shall be briefly attended to now, followed by an evaluation of its 1936-38 enactment of the elements (or lack thereof).

As with most institutional embodiments of the elements—such as the ‘inter’ intelligence bodies, or more obviously, the Joint bodies—it is tempting to subscribe to the view that the institutional embodiments were all inevitable; their creations resulting in the automatic enactment of the elements to which they were so intended to embody (i.e. centralisation, inter-cooperation, and the committee-forum). The JIC, as previously alluded to, is especially susceptible to this view, for it was extending elements already enacted (in the COS and JPC). Thomas alludes to this temptation in Andrew’s volume, with his description of the JIC as being, on the face of it, ‘so sensible, not to say obvious…’290 ‘It must come as a surprise,’ he observes, ‘that it evolved … with such difficulty.’291 The findings of this project so far have cast a critical light on prima facie impressions of inevitability and ease of enactment. Such findings are, after all, evidential of the prophetic quality of Jennings’ epithet. Indeed, the JIC reform was not so radical that all relics of the prior system were removed. It was argued earlier that while the ‘operationalisation’ of the Joint concept via the

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287 Ibid., 24.
288 Ibid., 18,24.
291 Ibid.
COS and JPC entailed an elevation for the concept, its (individualistic) presence did not mean that it was manifest. Moreover, the enactment of the ‘inter’ element in the intelligence landscape has been shown to be limited—an unsurprising reality of the insularity endemic to the inter-war period. It must not come as a surprise, therefore, that the initial embodiments of the three elements failed to operationalise the Joint concept in any substantive sense. As denoted by the plural ‘embodiments’, the JIC was not the first institutional embodiment of the three elements. In fact, the first attempt at elemental enactment—that is, centralised inter intelligence cooperation in the committee forum—did not take place in the Joint ‘place’ within the intelligence landscape at all.

The first call for a new intelligence institution in 1935 did not reference the precedent of Joint operationalisation (vis-à-vis the COS and JPC), but rather ‘extolled the virtues of the IIC’.292 In contrast to the founding of the JPC, the origins of the first intelligence tri-elemental institution did not lie with the Chiefs, but the DMO&I in the War Office. Writing to Secretary Hankey, Major-General John Dill remarked that the lines of intelligence collection were becoming tangled, to the extent that danger of ‘uneconomical duplication’ was on the rise.293 Thus, if ‘two or more departments [were] equally interested [in specific aspects] of intelligence,’ the preparation of intelligence for plans would be ‘unduly delayed’ by pre-existing ‘laborious’ arrangements for cooperation or co-ordination ‘between departments which are geographically widely separated. [emphasis added]’294

Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman observe that the impetus for Dill’s letter can primarily be attributed to a key objective of his position as DMO&I—that being, ‘to ensure that intelligence was best optimised and utilised for planning purposes.’295 Hankey, who had felt ‘that existing arrangements could be improved,’ concurred.296 Here, the literature rightly stresses that the references to ‘intelligence’ in the correspondence between the DMO&I and Secretary were synonymous with military/Service intelligence—not special intelligence, which remained within the general remit of the GC&CS, SIS, MI5, and the FO.297

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293 Ibid., 11.
294 Ibid., 11.
295 Ibid., 11.
296 Ibid.
It is not necessary to recount in detail the organisational intricacies that led to the initial solution here; the *Official History* makes this process abundantly clear.\(^{298}\) Suffice to say, Hankey leveraged his tri-Secretarial and Chairman stature at various levels of the central system to ensure that the matter remained a priority.\(^{299}\) The outcome was the delegation of what would become a seminal report concerning the ‘suggestion that some central [intelligence] machinery’ by the COS to the DCOS.\(^{300}\) The *Central Machinery Report*, the key excerpt of which forms the epigraph of Part One of this thesis, was sent to the COS and CID in 1936.\(^{301}\) To elaborate, its finding was that:

… our intelligence organization requires some *modification* to cope with modern conditions. There are certain types of intelligence which can neither be comprehensively *collected* nor intelligently *interpreted* unless special arrangements are devised … \[^{302}\]

In elemental and functional terms, the subsequent recommendation was that the three elements should be *extended* to perform, where necessary, the *functions* of centralised intelligence coordination (for collection or acquisition), and in special cases, intelligence assessment.\(^{303}\) It was a timely recommendation for the Services: all three were already ‘modifying’ themselves by strengthening their respective intelligence directorates, in view of Germany’s occupation of the Rhineland in March.\(^{304}\) The ‘modern conditions’ did not require a modification to this kind of virtuous intra-departmental action—that fundamental orthodoxy was not identified as being in need of reform. The requirement for ‘modification’, then, was effectively singling out those ‘laborious’ arrangements for inter-Service intelligence cooperation. Hence, the need for those ‘special arrangements’ for ‘direct and permanent liaison between … departments.’\(^{305}\)

However, by critically engaging with Goodman in this respect, we can add some further nuance to the *Official History*. In discussing the increased intelligence professionalisation within the respective directorates post-Rhineland, Goodman implies that for all of the strength of this mobilisation, the directorates exhibited ‘remarkably little collaboration’ with one another.\(^{306}\) Yet, if we view the history of the ‘inter’ element, as traced throughout Chapter One and the substantive sections of this Chapter so far, the absence of inter-Service cooperation among the directorates is
hardly surprising. In reading Ehrman’s *Cabinet Government*, we are reminded that the emergence of the elements, while often incipient, nevertheless represented ‘change … on a scale not before experienced within a comparable period.’ In this light, what was remarkable was the fact that the impetus for tri-elemental enactment originated from DMO&I: it was not so long ago that Elgin revealed that the DMO&I-equivalent ‘knew nothing’ of the Defence Committee during The Second South African War—the first indictment of the compartmentalisation relic at the turn of the century, as discussed in Chapter One. Upon the ratification of *Central Machinery* by the COS and its formal passage by the CID in early 1936, Goodman characterised the Committee’s decision as ‘momentous’, a reform that ‘would change the face of British intelligence and define its structure.’ Jennings’ constitutional ‘relic’ epithet, however, was set to apply to the new *ad hoc* organisation, and to a lesser degree, its successor organisation.

Strikingly, the ‘place’ of the resultant institution, termed the ‘Inter-Service Intelligence Committee’ (1936, [ISIC]), comprised of all three Service intelligence directors, was not near the COS or JPC, but beneath the FCI/IIC. As depicted in the variation of fig. I, the FCI, while part of the broader central organisation through the CID, lay outside of the *immediate* remit of the COS. The reason for the ISIC’s status as a sub-committee of the FCI lay with the experience of the intelligence directors, who had all maintained representation on the FCI for industrial matters since 1930. Thus, the sourcing of Dill’s functional inspiration (i.e. the IIC, which was a sub-committee of the FCI) was understandable. However, with the IIC as a source of functional inspiration, without the corresponding Joint *conceptual* inspiration symbolised by the COS-JPC nexus, the ‘birth’ of the ISIC was, to quote Andrew’s regrettable analogy, a ‘stillborn’. While Andrew does not provide an explicit explanation for his analogy, one may be crafted. Goodman alludes to the ‘short lived’ ISIC’s ‘major problem’ as structural—‘it had no established means of dissemination’, he points out.

Here, we can shed an explanatory light on this matter through the inter-play of place, function and concept. Symbolically, the terminological fact that the Committee was prefixed with ‘Inter-Service’ and not ‘Joint’ yields insight, as the absence of the Joint term denotes a ‘place’ that is not within the COS-JPC nexus. To be sure, the three elements were present, and all of which were intended to be enacted to perform the functions, but they did not constitute an institutional embodiment

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307 Ehrman, ix.
309 Ibid., 16.
of the Joint concept. Indeed, as an FCI sub-committee, the ISIC lacked the cascading ethos inherent within the Joint concept, as denoted by the professional central system (i.e. the COS and JPC). With the benefit of hindsight, it is demonstrably clear that the FCI was never going to be the right place for the elements and the performance of the functions—precisely because it was distanced from the joint machinery, as denoted in fig. 1. In the case of the ISIC, then, we can see another variation of insularity prohibiting the fulfilment of the call for ‘inter’ professionalism. Its successor would, too, be prohibited by another variation of Hinsley’s insularity. Yet, crucially, the problem would not be the place of the elements, but rather something inherent in the understanding of pre-war intelligence that could only be solved by ‘the pressure of wartime conditions’, as Hinsley would have it.312

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Fig. 1. [REDACTED]. See: The Ultimate Enemy.313

It is not necessary to detail the period of ‘toing and froing’ that followed the realisation that the ISIC was not fit for purpose.314 The essential point was that in mid-1936 both Hankey and Dill realised that the three Service directorates required a reconstituted Committee that had the capacity to directly assist the JPC and the newly established JPS.315 This did not mean that the ISIC’s capacity as a natural forum for matters of tri-Service concern would cease to exist; in that sense the new organisation subsumed the ISIC by dint of the committee element.316 Rather, it meant that the

313 Wark, 241.
314 Aldrich, Cormac, and Goodman, 10-13; Goodman, The Official History, 14-20.
315 Ibíd., 18-19.
316 Ibíd., 21.
structural position of the sub-committee would be moved toward the Joint ‘place’, marked by that cascading COS-JPC(-JIS) organisation, as depicted in fig. 1.317 Consequently, upon ratification, the new sub-committee was endowed with the Joint prefix—and the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee was born.318 And so in June of 1936, the ‘Joint’ was finally extended to the intelligence landscape; the COS explicitly ordering the JPC to work in concert with JIC.319 Crucially, as the entirety of this Part has methodically sought to illustrate, the concept did not ‘fall from the sky’, as the organisational literature might have us believe. Indeed, it is comprised of three paternal elements, each of which exhibit long histories of their own, by virtue of their connection to constitutional administration. Constitutional administration, as stated in the Introduction, is the system of meaning we operate within; our principal means of theoretically substantiating the Joint concept.

Because the connections created throughout this Part are not ideational but conceptual, we have observed the enactment of the elements in various institutional forms in a cascading fashion (i.e. from the CID to the War Cabinet, to the COS to the JPC) across a period of some 36 years. The first enactment of the Joint concept, marked by the formalisation of the professional central system, may have taken place with the establishment of the COS in 1923—but its origins stretch back to those first calls for elemental enactment, as denoted by Elgin and Esher. It is, after all, no coincidence that Jackson and Bramall remarked that the JPC/S and JIC eventually gave the COS the Esher sanctioned General Staff ‘… in all but name.’320 Thus, the creation of the JIC, as a tangible extension of the Joint concept, was ‘momentous’, but it did not occur in conceptual isolation. That is simply not how elemental enactment occurs in the central system. By the same token, it should not come as a surprise that Jennings’ epithet—with its emphasis on the incremental character of constitutional reform—was to once again apply; especially so in the forthcoming period.

The system of meaning throughout this Part has a produced one truism (among many) that is particularly pertinent to this period: ‘elemental fortunes’ do not change overnight. Indeed, it is only through an awareness of the developmental primacy of constitutional administration that this kind of understanding may be reached. It is with this understanding—this sensitivity—that we approach the extension of the Joint concept in the 1936-38 period. In discussing the reconstitution of the three elements in JIC form, Goodman implies that the growth of the German threat led to an

318 Ibid.,
319 The new terms of reference are reproduced here: ibid., 20.
320 Jackson and Bramall, 148.
understanding among officials that ‘intelligence had to become more unified’, and as a result, the Joint concept (as per the JPC terms) was now ‘evident in the JIC’s role’.\textsuperscript{321} However, as he concedes, the pre-war JIC was ‘essentially ineffective’.\textsuperscript{322} Here, we may observe yet another repetition of the truism: if ‘Joint Intelligence’ was being enacted—and, by implication, the understanding for unification properly acted upon—Goodman’s characterisation of ‘essential ineffectiveness’ would not apply, but it does. The theory, as Low would tell us, was different to the practice.\textsuperscript{323} Why was this so? In the \textit{Official History}, Goodman claims that it was the ‘nature of British intelligence in the mid-1930s’ that was to blame. The evidence cited for this rather vague assertion is, according to the corresponding footnote, the entirety of Andrew’s \textit{Secret Service}.\textsuperscript{324} Andrew, after some research, partly attributes the issue to the ‘continued parochialism’ of Service intelligence.\textsuperscript{325} Indeed, as \textit{The Ultimate Enemy} demonstrates, tri-Service or Joint intelligence appreciations were essentially absent; the Service directorates produced a ‘montage’ of different ‘images’ regarding the capabilities pre-war Nazi state and, as such, a ‘joint lens’ (i.e. an effective JIC) did not exist.\textsuperscript{326} In this sense, it is tempting to simply conclude that the compartmentalisation relic is to blame. Such a conclusion is not necessarily wrong, nor is it without precedent. However, as with the other enactments in this Chapter, the explanation for the presence and prohibition of these three elements must be \textit{qualified} to the context at hand. The specific reason underpinning the perceived existence of the relic in the face of the (JIC) reform, between foundation and periphery, must be elucidated.

To start with, the evidence suggests that the three elements were not effectively enacted in the period.\textsuperscript{327} This did not, however, stem from inter-Service conflict, such as in aspects of the pre-1933 COS. Nor was it structural, in spite of Hinsley’s description of the JIC as a ‘peripheral body’\textsuperscript{328}. Rather, its perceived ineffectiveness—its supposed ‘manifestation’ of the relic—lay with the pre-war operationalisation of the Joint concept. In this sense, it was not the JIC itself that was at fault, it was the corresponding professional central apparatus and the understanding of intelligence therein. Hinsley initially suggests that the JIC could have taken its own initiative on matters beyond long-term Service intelligence, such as the intentions of hostile actors. But, as he

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{321} Goodman, \textit{The Official History}, 20.
\item\textsuperscript{322} Ibid., 12.
\item\textsuperscript{323} Low, \textit{Governance of England}, 5-12.
\item\textsuperscript{324} See: Goodman, \textit{The Official History}, 31.
\item\textsuperscript{325} Andrew, \textit{Her Majesty’s Secret Service}, 409.
\item\textsuperscript{326} Although the JPC would attempt to provide some coherence, as below. See: Wark, 34.
\item\textsuperscript{327} Limited instances of ‘Joint Intelligence’ were produced, although their effectiveness is unclear. See: Goodman, \textit{The Official History}, 51.
\item\textsuperscript{328} Hinsley, \textit{British Intelligence in the Second World War} (1993), 8.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
later appears to concede, that was beyond the general *understanding* of military intelligence at the time, which was almost exclusively pre-occupied with capabilities.\(^{329}\) As Andrew elaborates, the enactment of the JIC reconstitution\(^ {330}\) was, to some considerable extent, predicated on the JPC/S’s role ‘to seek intelligence assessments on inter-service questions’.\(^ {331}\) Indeed, as a tangible extension of the Joint concept and not a concept in and of itself, the JIC was at first *reliant* on the JPC/S to request inter-Service (military) intelligence, in order for it to perform the function of *co-ordinated*, centralised assessment.\(^ {332}\)

The JPC, then in active fulfillment of the 1934 terms of references endowed to it by the COS—those being, to engage in *joint* planning for the possibility of war in 1939, and to consider Germany as ‘the hostile power’\(^ {333}\)—generally did not make the JIC part of the picture.\(^ {334}\) As Andrew and Hinsley suggest, the request for JIC intelligence was rarely communicated.\(^ {335}\) Hence, there was no real ‘joint force’ to alter the mid-1930s *status quo ante* where intelligence was ‘collected individually, assessed separately and, by and large, used for internal purposes’.\(^ {336}\) This claim is later corroborated by Hinsley, who primarily attributes the continuation of the *status quo* to the JPC.\(^ {337}\) Moreover, no executive or political will to impose all three elements at the level of intelligence, which still remained rather distant from the Chiefs, was present.\(^ {338}\) Indeed, no situation analogous to the first direct *ad hoc* incarnation of the Joint concept at the highest military level (or the subsequent warrant) occurred with respect to the ‘lower’ intelligence directorates. Thus, it was not necessarily the ‘nature of intelligence’ itself that was at fault, as Goodman infers. Rather, it was the *understanding* of intelligence and the importance prescribed to it within the political and professional central system. This lack of understanding was reflected by the virtual omission of the JIC from the COS-JPC nexus in the 1936-38 period.

To be sure, Goodman’s claim as to the understanding for ‘unified intelligence’ among officials was present, but as Andrew observes, the ‘joint’ theory did not translate into practice; the JPC’s ‘good intentions’ regarding the new JIC were rarely followed by action.\(^ {339}\) The absence of joint

\(^{329}\) *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, 1, 37.

\(^{330}\) As reproduced in Goodman. See: Goodman, *The Official History*, 20.

\(^{331}\) Andrew, *Her Majesty’s Secret Service*, 409.

\(^{332}\) Ibid.

\(^{333}\) Wark, 191.

\(^{334}\) A few exceptions are noted by Goodman. See: Goodman, *The Official History*, 54.


\(^{336}\) Aldrich, Cormac, and Goodman, 10.


\(^{338}\) Regarding the COS and appeasement, see: Wark, 188-224.

\(^{339}\) Andrew, *Her Majesty’s Secret Service*, 409.
intelligence action through the JIC, as Wark seems to imply, lay squarely with the broader professional central system.340 ‘Because its importance was not understood,’ he finds, its connection to ‘[intelligence] organisation … [was] deficient.’341 Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong in *Men of Intelligence* somewhat misleadingly describes the 1930s as a period emblematic of the ‘extreme of decentralisation’.342 In spite of Strong’s experience, nuance is required here. It should be emphasised that the situation was less about ‘total decentralisation’, and more about a gradual transition toward greater intelligence centralisation through the JPC and, in some limited instances, the JIC.343

The impression of compartmentalisation, however, still remained, for the pre-war JIC was largely unable to enact its three elements within the intelligence realm. It was simply not reasonable to expect the Service directorates, all of which were in the process of intra-reform and the production of long-term capability assessments, to engage with the JIC, especially when the terms of reference required a JPC/S-JIC-Service cascade—not a Service-JIC relationship.344 Moreover, short of the three directors, it lacked its own JPS-style body to engage in drafting—a deficiency that would only be realised (and remedied) under the pressure of wartime conditions, as Hinsley would have it. Nonetheless, the JPC-COS strategic appreciations did embody some notion of ‘Joint Intelligence’, but this was largely confined to the faithfulness of the JPC’s knitting of ‘disparate’ Service intelligence assessments together, in an effort to provide ‘some coherence’ in developing a picture of the German threat.345 In this sense, contrary to Strong’s claim, the performance of the function of centralised intelligence assessment occurred insofar as a degree of ‘inter’ assessment took place through the JPC, the creation of which pre-dated the JIC by some ten years.

The 1936-38 extension of the Joint to Intelligence, therefore, should be viewed as part of a ‘transitional’ era.346 Joint elemental fortunes certainly did not change overnight, but the era was not one that resembled the decentralisation that had so characterised the Services in the pre-war CID, which may well be qualified as ‘extreme’.347 By the eve of war, however, the JIC would solidify its distinctive ‘inter’ place—both within the intelligence landscape and, crucially, as a theoretical part

340 Wark, 34.
341 Ibid.
345 Wark, 189, 223.
346 Ibid., 34.
347 This derives from Strong’s remark, cited above.
of the COS-JPC nexus. These developments, which occurred just before September 1939, will be discussed in the following section. The reason for this is simple: it was the looming pressure of wartime conditions, as Hinsley would say (or, to quote Churchill, ‘the gathering of the storm’),\textsuperscript{348} that positioned the elements to materialise in an era of ‘transformation’. As such, the years of transition (1936 to 1938) are, for the purposes of the Joint concept, distinct from the years of transformation (1939 to 1945).

ii. Toward Manifesting the Joint in Intelligence

The Beginning of Transformation: 1939-42

The 1936-38 period, as revealed earlier, saw the Joint concept extended to Intelligence, but any effective enactment of ‘Joint Intelligence’ was limited to the reliability of the JPC’s so-called ‘knitting’ activities. This resulted in four varied strategic appreciations of war against Germany between 1934 and 1939, the contents of which are analysed in Wark’s text.\textsuperscript{349} The elements comprised within the professional central system seemed to have been enacted insofar as the COD, by virtue of the last appreciation, possessed a ‘cohesive military image of Nazi Germany’ in early 1939.\textsuperscript{350} Moreover, despite the varied views espoused by the Chiefs throughout the 1930s, each Service was at least prepared to face the immediate onset of war in September.\textsuperscript{351} Nonetheless, after what can only be described as a laborious analysis of military intelligence between 1933 and 1939, Wark ends The Ultimate Enemy with the conclusion that ‘the most insightful achievement’ of the 1930s system lay not with a joint intelligence assessment, but with the words of the Director of a single directorate (that is, the DMO&I) following the invasion of Poland: ‘But that the [German] regime must go I am convinced.’\textsuperscript{352} However provocative such a claim may be, it remains the case that Joint Intelligence in terms of the elements—that is, centralised inter-Service assessment and co-ordination in the (JIC) committee forum—was not manifest in period. Yet, as the storm gathered in 1939, several developments occurred which entailed a broad elevation of the Joint concept in the intelligence landscape. These developments, both of which materialised in August, resulted in a richer conception of ‘Joint Intelligence’. They may be described as two-fold.

\textsuperscript{348} The Gathering Storm was Churchill’s description of the 1939 period, reflected in the first volume of his memoirs.
\textsuperscript{349} Wark, 188-224.
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid., 223-24.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{352} Ibid., 230.
First, we shall attend to the FO, the SRC and the expansion of ‘Joint Intelligence’. It will be recalled from the earlier discussion that the Joint Intelligence product from the JPC and Service directorates was distinctly ‘military’ in character—that is, the assessments were pre-occupied with estimating long-term capabilities.\(^{353}\) By 1939, however, it had finally become clear to officials that the external situation required that both military (i.e. capabilities) and political (i.e. intentions) intelligence had to be ‘weighed’ together.\(^{354}\) Symbolically, this led to a recognition (in 1938) that FO attendance in the JIC would be ‘beneficial’, but it was not until later in 1939 that tangible action followed. In August 1939, the JIC welcomed a de facto FO Chair: a reflection that, despite the JIC’s status as a predominantly military COS sub-committee, it was now properly understood that ‘intelligence’ had to become less departmental and more joint in character and organisation—especially as the storm clouds of war became imminent.\(^{355}\)

This greater sense of representation, which we may observe as a greater enactment of the ‘inter’ element, would also come to be reflected in the nature of the functions of the JIC itself.\(^{356}\) In March, Germany occupied the Czech rump of Czechoslovakia. By mid-April, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had expressed concern as to the pre-existing arrangements for intelligence assessment and the co-ordination of such among the Services, especially in terms of the policy-intelligence linkage.\(^{357}\) This eventually prompted a new incarnation of tri-elemental enactment, which was instigated by way of a COS demand (and endorsed by the CID and Prime Minister), the ‘Situation Report Centre’ (SRC [1939]).\(^{358}\) Owing to the rapid escalation of the Czechoslovakian crisis and the imminence of other threats, the SRC—comprised of the three Service directors, a FO Chair, and the CID Secretary (now Ismay)—collated and co-ordinated intelligence, with the object to perform a new function: that of short-term (i.e. daily and weekly) ‘inter’ assessments.\(^{359}\) Consequently, the SRC filled a ‘crucial’ gap revealed by the pressure of the war’s onset—that short-term assessments were required, for the military intelligence estimations produced by the JPC were all long-term projections.\(^{360}\) With its embodiment of all three elements and its composition


\(^{355}\) It should be noted this did not alter the jurisdictional ‘inter’ status of the SIS and GC&CS—both of which solidified in the same year. See: Goodman, *The Official History*, 28-31.

\(^{356}\) Indeed, this meant that each Service couldn’t ‘outdo’ one another. See: Michael Goodman, "Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 21, no. 1 (2008): 46.


\(^{358}\) Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* (1979), 1, 41.


\(^{360}\) Ibid., 26.
sanctioned by the COS, it was only inevitable that the SRC would be amalgamated with the JIC.\textsuperscript{361} In August, the inevitable occurred and, along with it, a development that once seemed impossible came to fruition: its FO Chair became the \textit{de facto} JIC Chair. The arrival of Chairman Stevenson, therefore, symbolised a richer conception of Joint Intelligence—both representatively \textit{and} functionally.

Second, we shall attend to the theoretical forging of the connection between Joint Intelligence, the cascade and the community. In July of 1939, some three years after its birth, the JIC produced its \textit{Reconstitution}. Its formal ratification by the DCOS in August gave licence to FO representation and the amalgamation of the SRC (as above), but more fundamentally, it clarified the JIC’s responsibilities and, indeed, the shape that the committee (and the concept) would take during the war. The first item of note was the re-iteration of the committee’s inaugural responsibility within the COS-JPC-JPS cascade, providing that the JIC should ‘co-ordinate any intelligence data which might be required’ for the cascade.\textsuperscript{362} Needless to say, this was a predictable but vital re-iteration; a recognition that ‘essential ineffectiveness’ may have reigned pre-war, but the understanding for unification, as Goodman would have it, was now \textit{more} prevalent, though it would still take the events of 1940 for it to be properly appreciated.

The JIC was therefore set to be inserted within the ‘joint’ interface \textit{in} the COS-JPC-JPS cascade. The committee’s status as the central place for ‘assessment and co-ordination of intelligence received abroad’ was solidified, especially as a means to ensure that policy was grounded in ‘reliable information’.\textsuperscript{363} This was perhaps the clearest recognition that intelligence would play a significant role in the inevitable conflict—and that the operation of the Joint Intelligence concept through the JIC form would be vital to its facilitation.\textsuperscript{364} In view of the third item (below), it is useful to offer some greater conceptual specificity to encompass the functions of the first two items. It is noteworthy that both of these functions—of central co-ordination and assessment—are innately connected to the professional central system. We may then observe a functional qualifier to the concept: what we shall call, Joint Intelligence as \textit{Professional Intelligence}.\textsuperscript{365} The third and final point of \textit{Reconstitution} serves as particularly stark demonstration of how far the Joint concept had been

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[361] Hinsley, \textit{British Intelligence in the Second World War} (1979), 1, 41. Regarding the SRC and JIC, see: Goodman, \textit{The Official History}, 26.
\item[362] Reproduced in: ibid., 30.
\item[363] Ibid., 30.
\item[364] Ibid.,
\item[365] This will be returned to below.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
elevated from the incoherent depths of the ISIC to the transitional period to the eve of war. The committee was henceforth endowed with the discretion to engage in:

The consideration of any further measures … to improve the efficient working of the intelligence organisation of the country as a whole. [emphasis added]\(^{366}\)

In Hinsley’s *British Intelligence*, this excerpt from *Reconstitution* is portrayed as a milestone. The concept of the ‘intelligence organisation as a whole’, he observes, had been in a ‘slow and haphazard’ evolution for twenty years; the developments taking place ‘in the absence of a single co-ordinating authority’.\(^{367}\) Here, we may observe another functional qualifier to the concept: Joint Intelligence as *Whole Intelligence*. This qualifier, too, is connected to the professional system—but in a different way. After all, it may strike the reader that endowment of consideration for ‘intelligence as a whole’ is reminiscent of our discussion earlier. Indeed, it will be recalled that the COS, as the first enactment of the Joint concept *viz.* the three elements in defence, was endowed by *Salisbury* with the means to consider ‘the defence situation as a whole’ in 1924. This, alongside its other responsibilities, saw the COS become the embodiment of the defence by committee ideal—and, eventually, a new (sub-)central system for defence beneath the CID and Cabinet.

By the same token, we may propose that the JIC, as the first extension of the Joint concept in intelligence, was set to become the embodiment of the intelligence by (sub)-committee ideal—as part of the War Cabinet defence system in the looming war (see: fig. II). Herein lies the linkage between Joint Intelligence and Whole Intelligence. As Hinsley implies, the JIC was ending its transitional state and beginning to transform into that single, central coordinating authority that had been so absent in earlier decades.\(^{368}\) Likewise, for Herman, *Reconstitution* ended the ‘transition to an active sense of community’—yet another cause for distinguishing the transitional period of 1936-38 and the months before war in 1939.\(^{369}\) Furthermore, Andrew in his seminal *Secret Service* describes the reconstituted JIC as representing ‘the final step’ in the acquisition of a ‘vision for the intelligence community as a whole’.\(^{370}\) We may conclude, therefore, that the transitional period (1936-38) and the beginnings of the transformation period (1939) saw the emergence and then a resurgence of a concept. That concept, ‘Joint Intelligence’, with its two functional qualifiers (Joint Intelligence as *Professional Intelligence* and as *Whole Intelligence*), would eventually become a counter-balance to the lingering relics—both the virtues and the vices—within the British intelligence.

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\(^{367}\) Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* (1979), 1, 43.

\(^{368}\) Ibid.


\(^{370}\) Andrew, *Her Majesty’s Secret Service*, 592.
organisation.\textsuperscript{371} The era of transformation had begun, though it would still be quite some time before the concept became manifest.

Yet, for all of the promises in August of 1939, it was still only the beginning of an evolutionary process toward transformation. Certainly the changes in late 1939 did start that process (the Reconstitution being clear evidence of such), but it was still technically part of what Goodman describes as the pre-war ‘creative vacuum’ period.\textsuperscript{372} There were no real ‘pressures of wartime conditions’, as Hinsley would say, only the gradual emergence—and then sudden ‘violence’—of the storm clouds.\textsuperscript{373} Still fresh from its ‘essential ineffectiveness’ in the transitional era, at the time the Reconstitution of the JIC was important simply because it appeared to promise that the committee would survive if and when war was declared.\textsuperscript{374} And so in September, the promise of survival was delivered upon, even as the CID was, once again, disbanded.

Here, it is prudent to note the presence of the elements in the wartime organisation. It will be recalled from Chapter One that after the so-called ‘search for authority’ ended, the theory of a ‘highly centralised and efficient executive authority’ (i.e. the War Cabinet) emerged, complemented by the three elements in the advisory nexus. However, as was argued earlier, the theory was different from the practice. Regarding 1939-40, Ehrman observed that the resurrected War Cabinet, with its embodiment of a series of new committees, had its foundations in the period of promise (1916-18) and the developments thereafter—what we might call the ‘consolidation’ of theory into practice (1922-39).\textsuperscript{375} The evolving enactment (and understanding of) the elements—such as in the establishment and formalisation of the professional central system through the COS—had a significant role to play in this respect. Suffice to say, the implementation of the paternal central system and its derivate elements would facilitate ‘an enduring pattern’ of administrative success between 1940 and 1945, the organisational characteristics of which are portrayed in the 1942 War Cabinet at \textit{fig. II}.\textsuperscript{376} However tempting it may be to solely ascribe achievements of the JIC to the genius of specific individuals, as those in the organisational literature so often do,\textsuperscript{377} the primacy of constitutional administration—and all of the understandings and elements that it entails—must not be underestimated; something that Thomas,

\textsuperscript{371} Hinsley, \textit{British Intelligence in the Second World War} (1993), 4.
\textsuperscript{372} Goodman, \textit{The Official History}, 83.
\textsuperscript{373} Hinsley, 3.
\textsuperscript{374} Goodman, \textit{The Official History}, 63.
\textsuperscript{375} The consolidation term is from Ehrman. See: Ehrman, 100, 26-27.
\textsuperscript{376} Ibid., 127-28.
\textsuperscript{377} Goodman identifies Andrew, Strong, and Howarth as examples. See: Goodman, “Learning to Walk,” 51.
and to a lesser degree, Hinsley and Goodman, appear to acknowledge. Intelligence does not exist in isolation, we are reminded.

By virtue of its presence within the professional central system (and therefore within the professional-political nexus) in the War Cabinet, it was clear that the Joint concept—as denoted by the COS-JPC-JPS(-JIC) cascade—had been elevated to facilitate the administration of the war effort. To this end, the most significant development for ‘Joint Intelligence’ from declaration (in September) until late 1940 was its theoretical place within this cascade, a hint that the promise of Reconstitution would eventually be fulfilled. To elaborate: the organisational cascade was present in 1939-40, and the Joint concept was thereby being operationalised—but the parts of the cascade were failing to interface with intelligence (that is, with the JIC as the final part of the cascade). The Joint concept’s intended manifestation across all functions of professional-military organisation was therefore limited to the immediate fulfilment of the promise of 1918, as denoted by Salisbury. Perhaps this is what Goodman was referring to when he observed that the ‘edifying effect’ of war in ‘unifying [administration] against a common goal was not felt immediately within the intelligence community.’

This was, however, to be expected—especially in view of the argument presented in Chapter One. To reference the sentiment of both Ehrman and Hinsley: the ‘consolidation’ of the theory (or the promise) occurred in the absence of universally-defined threat—that is to say, without the pressure of wartime conditions. Furthermore, the extension of the promise vis-à-vis the Joint concept to Intelligence occurred belatedly, relative to its extension to Planning. It was only natural, therefore, that the systems of administration would take time to settle post-Poland. Yet, as Ehrman reminds us, the forging of the ‘enduring pattern’ of administration would occur ‘early’, compared to the 1914-18 period. Intelligence, as inferred earlier, was thoroughly compartmentalised in the last period. It is with this understanding that we continue to recount the beginnings of transformation.

How, then, was the concept operating in the ‘settling’ period? The functional qualifiers deduced from Reconstitution yield insight. Throughout 1940, Goodman observes that the JIC was burdened with the ‘brunt of administrating’ the increasingly-mobilised intelligence community in the face of a now-global Axis threat. In this sense, the qualification of Joint Intelligence as Whole

380 See: Ehrman, 100.
381 Ibid., 127.
382 Ibid.
Intelligence was functioning, albeit in a rather incipient fashion. Here we may also gather a glimpse at what ‘the Whole’ meant within ‘the Joint’. Evidently, this did not entail tri-Service amalgamation in MOD-like organisation. Rather, ‘the Whole’ was manifested by way of an extension of the ‘inter’ and committee elements: SIS, MI5 and the new Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW, [1939]) were all endowed with permanent membership to the JIC in 1940. This eventually entailed the practice of the JIC receiving the intelligence acquired by its members, acting as a centralised hub in the community.

Following the process of settlement in the period, instigated in large part by Churchill, this mode of organisation, among other developments, would set forth a transformative trajectory in which the JIC would rise to de facto leadership over the entire intelligence community, giving new meaning to the ‘Whole’ qualifier. With the foundations of transformation laid, the JIC was also set to extend its local leadership to the international context—first, by virtue of its capacity as a ‘model’ (for the U.S., Canadian, and Australian incarnations) in the wartime period, and later, through the formal establishment of Joint Intelligence network in the Commonwealth. Needless to say, the move toward administrative gravitas in Whitehall (and beyond) also depended on the enactment of the other functional qualifier—Professional Intelligence. After all, the functions of centralised assessment and co-ordination were envisioned (at least by some) in the concept’s initial extension to Intelligence in 1936, while the ‘Whole’ endowment was encapsulated some three years after in Reconstitution. In contrast to the period of transition, the evidence suggests that the concept was not drowning in a continuation of ‘essential ineffectiveness’ per se, although it did not resemble effectiveness, either. The situation was nuanced: the concept was beginning to transform within the professional central system, but not in the way one might expect.

The beginning of hostilities did see the JIC perform some notion of Professional Intelligence, in spite of its limited capacity. To start with, it must be remembered that in the early stage of the war the composition of the committee was still essentially confined to the three Service directors, the Chair and a Secretary. Accordingly, while the 1939-41 committee was centralised, it did not exhibit a central system of its own. Because it lacked a Joint Staff organisation (such as that embodied by the

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384 See: Chapter One (ii).
385 This also intersected with the co-ordination portion of the Professional Intelligence qualifier. See: Goodman, The Official History, 84.
387 Ibid.
389 Goodman, The Official History, 64.
JPC-JPS\textsuperscript{390} nexus), its ability to conduct joint assessments was constrained. However, as Goodman’s careful research demonstrates, this should not be taken to suggest that the JIC was merely continuing its pre-war ‘essential ineffectiveness’ with no alteration or elevation.

The JIC, while still overburdened with administration, was engaging in the production of assessments. Following the first period of ‘settlement’ (six months after the invasion of Poland, to be exact), members from the individual Service directorates were seconded as ‘juniors’ to draft assessments, albeit on a part-time \textit{ad hoc} basis.\textsuperscript{391} This explains why many of the early JIC papers were actually composed by individual directorates, with the so-called ‘senior’ members of the JIC deciding whether or not a individualistic joint (i.e. inter-director) assessment should be crafted.\textsuperscript{392} Additionally, the Daily Situation Reports (as inherited by the SRC) were being produced.\textsuperscript{393} However, as the flow of intelligence continued to increase, the JIC’s constrained enactment of Professional Intelligence came to be judged as insufficient.\textsuperscript{394} The passing of this judgment emerged from the top of the \textit{professional} central system through the COS—a body that did not endow the early war JIC with a proper Joint Staff; a decision that we may judge as naïve, but only in retrospect.

Indeed, it was recognised that the JIC would be a ‘integral component’ of the wartime machinery—but, it was \textit{treated} in a manner that made it ‘relatively aloof’ from ‘the main set-up’.\textsuperscript{395} Hence, the final part of the Joint concept’s extension as denoted by the COS-JPC-JPS-JIC cascade was not in practice complete; an impression reflected by the decision of the Chiefs to physically house the JPC and JPS in the same area as their Committee.\textsuperscript{396} Thus, the Planners were proximate to ‘always be at hand’—but the ‘Intelligencers’ were not,\textsuperscript{397} ‘not least,’ Goodman later observed, ‘because [the JIC] had no staff at the time…’\textsuperscript{398} The realisation that the JIC and a Joint Intelligence Staff were in practice omitted from the cascade or ‘the main set-up’ would materialise, though it would not fall from the sky. As Hinsley’s \textit{British Intelligence} would tell us, the pressures and opportunities of the wartime condition necessitated (and allowed for) a new Joint Staff development—especially with the arrival of the new Prime Minister.

390 Later reorganised into the JPS Sections, as denoted by fig. II.
391 Goodman, \textit{The Official History}, 65, 84.
392 Ibid., 66
393 Later these ceased to be daily. See: ibid., 64, 81.
396 Ibid., 83.
397 Ibid., 47.
398 Ibid., 64.
As both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (Co-Ordination), Churchill enjoyed the fruits of the so-called ‘constitutional dictatorship’ that he had inherited from Lloyd George; the difference, indeed crucial, was the pre-existing central political-professional advisory nexus, symbolised by the relationship between the COS and War Cabinet. Within such a system, the Prime Minister was able to garner the Chiefs as his Chiefs, as noted in Chapter One. Moreover, he was free to enact the committee element at will: as General Lord Ismay describes in his commentary to fig. II, Churchill would do so ‘…whenever he wanted to turn up the heat on any aspect of our war effort.’ Andrew in *Secret Service* credited the rise of the JIC to the ‘the powerful influence’ of Churchill. But the truth, as Goodman rightly observes, is far more nuanced, as with any claim grounded in a ‘great man’ thesis. Nonetheless, it remains the case that Churchill’s arrival, in light of the impression of ‘intelligence failure’ after the surprise fall of Norway, would represent the impetus for Joint change. After all, Thomas recounts that Churchill ordered an instant intelligence review as soon as he became Prime Minister in May. The events that followed would see yet another elevation of the concept, though the distinction between theory and practice was to remain for some time yet.

Some seven days after Churchill’s assumption of Office, the JIC was endowed with new terms of reference. By May 17, the Committee obtained the references that further enabled it to expand its membership; symbolising the transformative beginning of Whole Intelligence, as above. The terms also marked a new chapter for Professional Intelligence; the committee now endowed the responsibility to prepare assessments ‘at any time of day or night’ for the COS and, in some cases, the Prime Minister himself. Goodman implies in an article on the origins of the JIC that without the (corresponding) endowment of a Joint Staff, this was yet another theoretical elevation. In his *Official History*, however, he appears to conclude that it was COS Committee’s endowment that was the most important development of the 1939-40 period. In contrast to Goodman’s prior assessment, this strongly implies that the endowment was a practical elevation for the JIC. Here, we

399 Johnson, *Defence by Committee*, 277.
401 Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service*, 677-78.
402 Goodman, “Learning to Walk”, 51
403 For an overview of this period, see: Goodman, *The Official History*, 69-84
405 Ibid.
406 Ibid., 228-29.
407 Ibid.
may suggest that it was the Churchillian-sanctioned review in the post-Norway environment that led not merely to an elevation, but a greater understanding that the Joint concept had to be tied in closer with the political and professional central systems through the War Cabinet. To reappropriate Goodman’s sentiment detailed above, the understanding was a move away from ‘aloofness’ and a move toward ‘the main set-up’.410

This understanding did not initially extend to the recognition that the JIC ought to be endowed with its own permanent Joint Staff. By November 1940, Churchill, still contemplating the impression of intelligence failure post-Norway, was asking questions that were ‘seemingly straightforward’ about the intelligence system of the COS, the organisational answers to which lay with Joint Intelligence. But the Chiefs, Goodman implies, seemed to not have a great deal of confidence in the JIC’s capacity to embody Professional Intelligence.411 Suffice to say, the first incarnation of what would become the Joint Intelligence Staff would not fall within the JIC’s remit, but instead within that of the COS—a decision that may have stemmed from its overburdened administrative state.412 By early 1941, however, the DMO&I-equivalent, a ‘senior’ member of the JIC, espoused common-sense to the COS; creating a body removed from the Joint cascade, as it were, would not solve the issues stemming from the constrained notion of Professional Intelligence.413 The subsequent dissolution of the Future Operations (Enemy) Section (‘FOES’) and the evolution of the initial solution (the Axis Planning Section, ‘APS’) toward Joint form (that is, to JIS form)—and the resultant forging of a JIC-JIS nexus throughout 1941—represented the ‘coming of age’ for Joint Intelligence as Professional Intelligence.414 Its implementation, in Goodman’s terms, entailed a ‘revolution’ in the JIC operation, though like any reform in the wartime constitution, continuity was present as well as change.

In the period following the JIS’s implementation, the virtues of the Joint cascade became increasingly apparent. As the ‘inner committee’ of JIC drafters in permanent session,415 the JIS was the ‘substantive’ means by which the manifestation of the Joint concept occurred in Intelligence during the war.416 Indeed, there is good reason behind its ‘revolutionary’ and ‘crucial’ status in the

410 Ibid.,
412 This is Goodman’s speculation. See: ibid.,
413 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (1979), 1, 297; Goodman, "Learning to Walk," 48.
414 Ibid., 49.
415 Hinsley, 1, 298.
Comprised of analysts from all three Services, as well as the FO and the MEW, the JIS fulfilled the Professional parts of Reconstitution and the practical absence of Intelligence in the Joint cascade; its implementation entailing a more effective Joint interface with the JPS, the COS and, in some instances, the Prime Minister himself.\footnote{Goodman, The Official History, 107; Herman “Assessment Machinery,” 16.} Its ‘revolutionary’ operation was indeed a drastic change for the meaning of ‘Joint Intelligence’, though its modus operandi was grounded in the strongest possible enactment of the ‘inter’ and committee elements. The subjects prescribed by the JIC were ‘exhaustively’ researched, discussed and, later, assessed with one unanimous joint view.\footnote{Thomas, 231.} This unanimity derives from the JIC, the COS, and, most fundamentally, the political central system vis-à-vis the doctrine of collective responsibility.\footnote{Goodman, The Official History, 93-94.} Such a ‘top-down-[top]’ system—contrasted with the pre-JIS JIC ‘top-up’ system—would become increasingly valuable in the middle-late stages of the war, especially in tri-Service operations in Europe.\footnote{Goodman implies this. See: ibid., 93.} It is beyond the limitations of this project to discuss the conceptual manifestations in these post-1941 operations. The key point is that with the JIS’s implementation in 1941 the concept had been sufficiently elevated to permit its effective operation in the 1942-1945 period. As for the concept’s broader significance for intelligence in the year at hand, Thomas observes that while the success of British intelligence in the war must lie with ‘the organisation as a whole’, it was the interface between Joint Intelligence and ULTRA/GC&CS that deserves much credit, for the JIC/JIS became the central area that ‘put the bits together’, including SIGINT, beginning in 1941.\footnote{Goodman, ”Learning to Walk,” 51; Herman, ”Assessment Machinery,” 16.}

This widening notion of Professional Intelligence within ‘the Joint’ eventually entailed a JIS ‘superstructure’ of assessment and centralised intelligence clearing, including the creation of the Intelligence Section (Operations) (‘IS(O)’, [1941]) for factual intelligence (to be used in operations such as the landings in Overlord) in December, illustrated in fig. II.\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, 1941 represented the point at which the JIC obtained a central system of its own—one that worked in concert not just with the other institutional incarnations of the Joint concept, but with departments, the Service intelligence directorates, and singular command structures that ‘ran the war’ at the lower levels.\footnote{Thomas, 231.} In the years that were to follow, this transformation permitted the Joint concept to become

\footnote{Ibid. See also: Goodman, The Official History, 109.}

\footnote{This is implicit in Herman’s account: Herman, ”Assessment Machinery: British and American Models,” 16-17.}
manifest in British Intelligence. This, in turn, created the phenomenon of ‘Joint Intelligence’ discussed in the Introduction. By 1942, the political and professional systems—and the cascading organisations therein—were all effectively integrated into the overarching defence machinery. As illustrated by fig. II, the Joint concept, with its effective fusion of the three paternal elements, was now a ‘central’ part of this machinery—the manifestation of the British constitution as an instrument of war. The instrument was not yet perfect, but its continued evolution would ensure that ‘enduring pattern of success’ in the years that were to follow.
Fig. II. [REDACTED]. See: *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay.*

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Ismay, 161.
Part II. Toward Wellington: Internationalisation

“The history of the Commonwealth … is one of continuous disintegration.”

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Hedley Bull (1959).426

This Chapter shifts from the local to the ‘international’ context. In doing so, we will start from the premise that Britain engaged in a formalised effort to solicit the Dominions’ support for a Joint Intelligence network, and a ‘Joint’ Centralisation of Commonwealth Defence at the Prime Ministers’ Conference in 1946. It will become clear that the Joint Intelligence network was a realistic proposition because it reaffirmed a concept that was either already in existence (or could foreseeably be in existence) within each Dominion. The concept of ‘Joint’ Defence Centralisation, on the other hand, was seen as incompatible with the nature of Anglo-Commonwealth relations in all but one Dominion. This Chapter will shed further light on these post-war developments—what we shall collectively refer to as ‘Joint Internationalisation’—by emphasising the salience of the wartime experience. To this end, we will periodically break with the end date stipulated in the sub-title of this thesis (i.e. 1942) to emphasise its determinative significance in the post-war period.

In terms of the connection between the foundational and peripheral knowledge bases, the Joint discussion will be continued with reference to the two ‘model’ JICs. Here, the term ‘model’ is defined as the adoption of a ‘standardised set of organisational patterns ... affected by local inputs.’ While doing so, the broader Anglo-Dominion relationship will be attended to, particularly where Joint Intelligence is absent. The resultant account will foretell the Commonwealth’s continued ‘disintegration’ in defence terms, while also alluding to its tighter integration in (Joint) Intelligence terms.

This Chapter will first examine the extent to which Joint Intelligence was modelled in the Dominions. It will be recounted that the creation of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee

427 Here, the ‘international’ refers to the old Commonwealth of Nations.

428 No specific account of this discussion appears to exist. Reynolds observes that the Joint Intelligence Bureaux (JIB) network was discussed at the Conference. However, in his analysis of the Australian archives he notes that it had clearly been omitted as part of the classification process. See: Wayne Reynolds, "Australia’s Middle-Power Diplomacy and the Atomic Special Relationship," in Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century, ed. Francine McKenzie Margaret MacMillan (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2003), 181. For the authoritative account of the JIB, see: Huw Dylan, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain’s Joint Intelligence Bureau 1945-1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

429 This is not to imply that intelligence and defence were part of a homogeneous plan, though both were presented at the conference.

430 The model term originates from (dated) colonial policing literature. Davey applies it to intelligence, see: Gregor Davey, "Intelligence and British Decolonisation: The Development of an Imperial Intelligence System in the Late Colonial Period 1944-1966" (King’s College, London, 2014), 38.
‘CJIC’ in 1942 represented the JIC model in both form and function. It will then be argued that Ottawa’s employment of the model was undertaken for its own allied ends. From this, it will be suggested that the adoption of the ‘independent’ model foretold Canada’s future intelligence and defence relationship with Britain beyond the war. Having explained the nature of the model and alluding to the distanced manner in which Ottawa saw the Commonwealth, it will then turn to the antipodean Dominions. In Australia, the case of the Australian Joint Intelligence Committee (AJIC) will be considered. The ‘functional absence’ of the AJIC, it will be suggested, lay with the localised dominance of the MacArthur Coalition (1942-45). In view of the fact that that a New Zealand Joint Intelligence Committee (NZJIC) did not exist in the period, this Chapter will then turn to address the absence of Joint Intelligence in the antipodean Dominions. The resultant discussion will shed light on the ways in which its absence informed the respective responses to Joint Internationalisation within the Antipodes. For Australia, it will be argued that residual legacy of the MacArthur Coalition led not only to a greater awareness of intelligence, but also to the geopolitical realities of the time. Hence, Canberra would be eager to participate in Joint Internationalisation, but the defence component would occur on its own terms. In New Zealand, the absence of the NZJIC will be made sense of by observing the Dominion’s place in the overall allied effort. It will be recounted that New Zealand’s inexperienced intelligence operation in the Pacific was small and decentralised. Lastly, some attempt will be made to explain New Zealand’s support for the defence component of Joint Internationalisation, and its reluctance to respond to the call for ‘networked’ Joint Intelligence. The significance here is that Wellington acts as the end point for the internationalisation of Joint Intelligence in the Commonwealth.

i. Canada: The Model and Dual Commitment

The most prominent manifestation of the wartime Joint Intelligence modelling effort came with the establishment of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee in late 1942. In organisational terms, the form of the CJIC was nearly identical to the British Joint Intelligence Committee: the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOS) established the committee beneath its purview, and the three intelligence Service directors were appointed to serve its objective to provide ‘[greater] wartime security’. For British officials it felt as though the exportable quality of the JIC model had been confirmed. They were to a large extent correct: an American JIC had been established

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432 Goodman briefly mentions internationalisation in various sections, see: Goodman, The Official History, 218-22.
earlier in the year (‘USJIC’), which complemented the existing ‘junior’ British representative body in Washington (‘JIC(W)’). The initial contribution of Anglo-American ‘Jointness’ was not a reduction in intra-alliance intelligence duplication, though its implementation stemmed from the prospect of such. Rather, the USJIC-JIC(W)’s main contribution was more fundamental: both committees provided a direct intelligence line between London and its new wartime ally, Washington. This was less about Joint Internationalisation and more about allied cooperation: post-Pearl Harbor, the two governments had agreed to a ‘complete exchange of all military intelligence’—from the JIC and USJIC, to the soon-to-be-established command HQs, the FBI and MI5, the SIS and ‘OSS’—the Anglo-American intelligence alliance had begun. This goes some way to explaining why the CJIC appears to occupy a discrete place in the broader literature concerning the wartime internationalisation of Joint Intelligence. In spite of this, it should be emphasised that the establishment of the Canadian committee was significant, for it represented the first Commonwealth adoption of the JIC model that would come to work in both form and function.

It is important to note that while the CJIC was a deliberate replication of its London counterpart, it does not appear that it was intended to function in exactly like the JIC. In Jensen’s analysis, the CJIC is portrayed as a ‘low-key committee’ designed to carry out inter-director communication as opposed to fulfilling the inter-Service collaboration precedent set by the JIC and its corresponding apparatus. To this end, the CJIC was primarily a central clearing house for matters of joint director concern, whereas the JIC had the additional function of being at the top of a larger ‘house’, whereby the activity of inter-Service assessment took place through its Staff. This differing mandate reflects the smallness of Ottawa’s intelligence operation, relative to the extensive intelligence communities in London and Washington. Yet the fact that the mandate existed in the first place was significant in of itself. As Spencer boldly asserts, prior to the war Ottawa’s intelligence activities were ‘so small, ad hoc or subordinate’ to the point of irrelevancy. In Wark’s

433 Ibid., 100-01.
434 Goodman, The Official History, 100-01.
435 Office of Strategic Services [1942].
436 BRUSA preceded the UKUSA (‘Five Eyes’) agreement.
437 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (1993), 115-16.
439 Ibid., 127.
words, ‘World War II had, for the first time in the history of intelligence in Canada, generated all the conditions necessary for full-scale activity.’

The CJIC, therefore, might be seen as a logical development toward a mild form of centralisation in Ottawa’s intelligence machine. By virtue of the history associated with the model (and the paternal element), we might conclude that the CJIC represented a continuation of Britain’s developmental influence within the Empire/Commonwealth. However, such a conclusion would only capture part of the CJIC’s raison d’être. The CJIC was an ‘independent’ adoption of the British model, but the overarching condition behind its establishment was more allied than it was imperial.

The catalyst behind the establishment of Canada’s wartime intelligence operation did not stem from Ottawa’s own experience of intelligence. The Service branches had virtually no prior experience in undertaking strategic assessments, and the national inter-war collection ‘system’ was based on newspaper reports. The foremost reason why Canada’s intelligence system even survived in the period before the war lay with London and its use of the imperial defence centres. According to Wark, the periodic intelligence summaries from British Service branches and their attachés provided a ‘thin and routine lifeblood’ to the small system. As the events abroad began to deteriorate in the 1930s, a reawakening of interest in intelligence spread among the senior officers in the Service branches. This renewed interest later came to express itself in ‘efforts to improve the organisation of Canadian intelligence’. Notably, Wark and Elliot imply that the efforts from 1935 onwards were effectively calls for greater centralisation—the same period in which British officials, such as Dill and Hankey, began to implement what became the JIC. However, the fact the centralisation effort was initially ignored by the CCOS probably stemmed from a general lack of appreciation for intelligence more than anything else. Ottawa lacked the intelligence ‘IQ’ of Britain and the United States, a fact that it would begin to confront after Washington communicated assessments of a prospective attack from Japan in 1938. In this sense, the abdication of complacency and the strength of the subsequent ‘intelligence mobilisation’ of 1939-40 was in large part due to the influence of the still-neutral United States. Yet in Ottawa’s mind, the U.S. was not simply another neutral non-combatant. The discussions of 1938 were the basis

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443 Ibid., 79-80.
446 Ibid., 82.
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid.; Elliot, "Strategic and Operational Intelligence in Canada 1939-46."
from which it would secure geostrategic protection—the first of the Dominions to do so. The corresponding commitment to the ‘joint defence’ of North America as encapsulated by the Ogdensburg Agreement preceded the congressional declaration of war.

Canada, led by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, was soon to find itself nestled within a series of alliance commitments, and intelligence was to form part of this unique situation. The development of Ottawa’s intelligence machine was therefore not seen as a national requirement per se but an allied one—the product was deemed quid pro quo for the vast amounts of intelligence it received from London and Washington. Here, the ‘product’ generally came in two forms: the ‘Y’ SIGINT work undertaken by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and the code-breaking efforts of the Examination Unit or ‘X-Unit’. The RCN’s subsequent assumption of ‘Y’ responsibility for the Western Atlantic was symbolic of a significant maturation in Ottawa’s machine—a stark illustration of its shift from ‘passive consumer’ of information to becoming a relevant player in its production, alongside the great intelligence powers. Because wartime SIGINT was innately collaborative, centralisation from the shores of the junior partner made little sense: assumptions of responsibility provided a baseline for the divisions of labour, and where intercept co-ordination was required, it was exercised from Washington. This sheds more light on why the wartime CJIC exhibited such limited centralised reach: SIGINT was Canada’s key intelligence contribution to the alliance, and the committee would not become eligible for its co-ordination until the post-war period.

This leads us to the most striking characteristic of Canada’s wartime intelligence operation: Ottawa’s employment of British models to further its own (allied) aims. Here, it is necessary to point out that this was not initially emblematic of an explicit ‘independent intelligence streak’. Prior to the discussion at the Washington Conference concerning ‘Y’ intelligence, for instance, Canadian Service officials were convinced by the British Admiralty that an adoption of the British ‘Y’ committee model would best serve Ottawa’s interests, even though such a model would be used.

452 Ibid., 85-86.
453 Ibid., 85.
454 Jensen, Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939-51, 62-63.
455 Regarding the proposal for CJIC post-war SIGINT responsibility: ibid., 127-29.
to further U.S.-Canadian cooperation.\textsuperscript{456} Washington, too, was convinced: Jensen observes that it was the model-precedent set by Britain which had facilitated the success of U.S.-Canadian ‘Y’ undertakings.\textsuperscript{457} The establishment of the CJIC continued this pattern. The committee was created independently from Britain through Canada’s own COS and was made privy to localised inputs via the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND). Its mandate was at first concerned with ‘…conduct[ing] intelligence studies to prepare such special information as may be required by higher authority’.\textsuperscript{458} In this respect, the CJIC and JIC exhibit similar centralised tendencies: the ‘localised inputs’ both being informed by each constitutional administration. Indeed, the committees differed as to nature of the Joint Intelligence product: as inferred earlier, the CJIC product was not supported by a Joint Intelligence Staff in any capacity that resembled that of the JIC-JIS nexus. The extension of the Joint concept to the CJIC therefore had individualistic connotations. This underlies Jenson’s argument that the influence of the CJIC was not to be found in the committee itself, but rather within the individual Service directors who made up its membership.\textsuperscript{459} Accordingly, the operational mandate was coloured by the committee’s function as a venue for the exchange of information deemed to be of joint interest by the directors. A similar individualistic ethos pervaded the co-ordination mandate. While the capacity of the CJIC as a local DND administrative committee gave the impression that the CJIC itself had been endowed with inter-Service co-ordination power, this appears to have been more image than substance.\textsuperscript{460} Ottawa’s CJIC furthered the inter-Service cooperation from within the country, though the manner in which this took place suggests that the committee was of a less formalised character than its British counterpart.

In light of the literature’s predominant focus on the CJIC’s national operation, it ought to be emphasised that a preoccupation with the CJIC’s local operation negates the importance of the committee’s international role \textit{vis-à-vis} allied liaison. After all, the liaison role was a central part of the committee’s original mandate.\textsuperscript{461} As noted earlier, the CJIC was an ‘independent’ entity; its implementation occurred within Canada’s own sense of constitutional administration. It was subservient to Ottawa’s DND, \textit{not} London’s JIC. To be sure, the CJIC still engaged in liaison with the JIC. But liaison, however extensive, is not synonymous with control. The committee did not

\textsuperscript{456} Ibid., 63-64.
\textsuperscript{457} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{458} Ibid., 127.
\textsuperscript{459} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{460} Ibid., 127-28.
\textsuperscript{461} Ibid.,
act as part of a homogenised British ‘unit’. Indeed, the committee did not exist in isolation from the unique circumstances of Ottawa’s dual (or ‘tri’) commitment, consisting of the bilateral U.S.-Canadian relationship; the British Commonwealth; and the wider Anglo-American intelligence alliance. It seems unlikely that the timing of the CJIC’s establishment was merely coincidental—it was created in the same year as the neighbouring USJIC. In any case, liaison with Washington was consistent with the manner in which King sought to respond to these allied commitments during the war—that is, to exist ‘beside and between’ the U.S. and the U.K. In Goodman and Spencer’s analyses, there seems to be an implied degree of irony that it was a British model that represented Canada’s first ‘independent’ form of intelligence organisation. That might be so, but it needs to be remembered that the committee was adopted into the DNS system and used for Ottawa’s own ends. These ends were not nationalist in scope, though they were not imperial either. The CJIC was part of a wider Canadian effort to facilitate the furthering of allied interests. Its creation symbolised a conscious decision on the part of Ottawa that inter-Service cooperation, and the distribution of the joint product that resulted from such cooperation, was an appropriate means to further its intelligence contribution to the overall allied effort, regardless of how small that contribution was.

This degree of awareness of—and participation in—the overall intelligence operation would ensure that Ottawa would continue to be involved with its wartime allies in the post-war period. Prime Minister King would hold on to his view that Canada should be positioned ‘beside and between’ its two major allies as a matter of national interest. To this end, Canada would join Australia in its participation in the Joint Intelligence network in 1948. However, this position—which had so facilitated Ottawa’s cooperation with London in the wartime period—would be at odds with its plan for ‘Joint’ Defence Centralisation. It was a fact that Britain, or as King would put it, those ‘centralising imperialists’, would have to confront at the Prime Ministers’ Conference in 1946.

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465 See: Dylan, *Defence Intelligence and the Cold War*, 167.

466 See: McKenzie, "In the National Interest," 557.
ii. Australia: The Model and MacArthur’s Coalition

Over in the Pacific, the beginnings of the modelling story were quite different. The Australian counterpart to the British COS had initiated the creation of a JIC during wartime. However, the exact details surrounding the wartime ‘AJIC’ are not well known: its creation does not seem to explicitly appear to be recorded in the Australian or British National Archives.\(^{467}\) We know from accessible memoranda that higher intelligence organisation simply did not exist in Australia before the war.\(^{468}\) In light of Andrew’s brief description of the AJIC’s wartime creation, we can see it as a natural continuation in Britain’s developmental influence on the Dominion’s defence machinery.\(^{469}\) Perhaps symbolically, its power to co-ordinate Service intelligence arrangements was curtailed by its place in South West Pacific Ocean Area (SPWA) in the U.S.-led Pacific coalition (1942-1945).\(^{470}\) In evaluating Australia’s Higher Defence Machinery, Secretary of Defence F.G. Shedden later remarked ‘during the war … the control of operations was vested in the Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area [SWPA] … not in the Australian Joint Service machinery.’\(^{471}\) Hence, the AJIC’s ability to co-ordinate Australia’s intelligence operations was virtually non-existent; the asymmetry of Commander General MacArthur’s Coalition meant that operational authority lay with American, not Australian, High Command.\(^{472}\)

The prospect of a Japanese military invasion enabled by Canberra’s reliance on a questionable system of imperial defence was such that Prime Minister John Curtin would ultimately embrace the United States as Australia’s new security guarantor, ‘Without inhibitions of any kind, Australia looks to America’, was how Curtin announced his decision in his 1941 New Year’s message for *The Herald*.\(^{473}\) The inter-coalition dynamics would enable a ‘exceptionally close and integrated’ intelligence relationship throughout the Pacific war.\(^{474}\) Intelligence organisation would not,

\(^{467}\) At least not from what could be gathered from each respective database (Secret Intelligence Files being the British National Archives, and the NAA, Australian).


\(^{470}\) Ibid.


\(^{472}\) Andrew, "The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community," 222.


however, be modelled upon the distinctively British Joint organisation. The formation of the Central Bureau in Melbourne, for example, was a bilateral US-Australian effort, utilising shared naval cryptological expertise, which did not in any way resemble the activities of the British JIC or its Canadian counterpart.\footnote{475} Indeed, Britain’s wider role in Australia’s wartime intelligence activities was inevitably small, for MacArthur had an administrative monopoly on the collection and assessment of intelligence in the SWPA area.\footnote{476} In the end, the model existed only in form, not function.

iii. The Antipodes and the Absence of Joint Intelligence

In light of the AJIC’s functional absence and the absence of ‘NZJIC’ modelling across the Tasman, the connection between the antipodean Dominions and Joint Intelligence might be dismissed as tenuous, a modelling effort that in no way resembled the developments in Canada. This would, however, ignore the strong connections between the wartime activities of these Dominions, and the ways in which Canberra and Wellington responded to London’s proposal for Joint Internationalisation. The focus of this section, therefore, will be to encompass the respective wartime experiences of Australia and New Zealand \textit{vis-à-vis} the Joint Internationalisation which occurred after the war. In doing so, it is suggested that the ‘significance’ of Joint Intelligence in the antipodes lies not so much in its presence but rather in its absence. A brief prefatory summary of the responses of each Dominion will now take place.

For Australia, we can observe the dual legacy of Curtin’s ‘look toward America’ and the MacArthur coalition as facilitating the manner in which Canberra engaged in its post-war relationship with Britain. The residual legacy of the largely \textit{ad hoc} coalition’s intelligence operations eventuated in sketches of a ‘national’ intelligence architecture—a reflection that Canberra had an increased awareness of the value of intelligence in the affairs of the state. Meanwhile, Curtin’s ‘look’ and his subsequent proposal for a ‘Fourth Empire’ illustrated that a revival of imperial defence would only occur if it met Canberra’s pre-conditions. As a result of these twin legacies, Australian officials would be quick to partake in the Joint Intelligence component of Internationalisation, but they would place significant limitations on any conception of ‘Joint’ Centralised Defence.

\footnote{476} Andrew, "The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community," 221-22.
In New Zealand, the initial absence of Joint Intelligence was foremost an expression of what James Belich would call, the ‘recolonial mentality’. The recolonisation thesis, which maintains that New Zealand became a modern economic and (relatedly) ideological ‘semi-colony’ of Britain for almost a century from the 1880s, provides a compelling explanation for Wellington’s behaviour as it relates to Joint Internationalisation. During the war, recolonisation sheds light on why Wellington refused to engage in a full reorientation to the Pacific. After the war, the continued adherence to the preferences of Britain ensured that New Zealand would be an enthusiastic (and lonesome) supporter of ‘Joint’ Centralised Defence. However, the absence of a full reorientation during the war left Wellington with a relative lack of understanding as to the meanings and uses of intelligence. Paradoxically, this limited understanding meant that New Zealand lagged behind its more ‘independent’ Dominion-siblings in establishing a Joint Intelligence entity. As for the depth of Wellington’s experience, SIGINT operations in the Pacific did occur, but the centralisation of the contributions was inhibited by a variety of contextual factors. These factors would persist for quite some time in the post-war period, until circumstances necessitated New Zealand participation in the Joint Intelligence network in 1949—the point at which the concept was ‘internationalised’ to Wellington.

Australia

In the case of Australia, the modelling of form and not function was emblematic of Canberra’s cooperation with the western allied powers. Curtin’s ‘look’ toward the United States foretold the perceived function of the new coalition (Australian security in the Pacific), yet it did not negate the ingrained view that Australia was in form a Dominion within an organic whole—a part of a ‘Greater Britain’. The look was a reaffirmation of Dominion’s ‘search for security’ in the Pacific. This had been a long-standing characteristic of Australia’s external outlook, which, in light of Pearl Harbor, had become a policy imperative. Thus, the reality of the time was a paradoxical position that sought to look toward Washington while still being ‘anchored in Empire’. The necessity of this position would later be confirmed when imperial defence (i.e. the Pacific primacy of British naval power) was deemed a ‘strategic illusion’, evidenced by the fall of the Singapore naval base in

480 Curran, Curtin’s Empire, 11-13.
This position, a sort of ‘halfway’ between London and Washington, was never intended to be anything more than temporary. There was a recognition held on the part of the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and the Supreme Commander of the limits which surrounded the coalition. MacArthur himself acknowledged the Empire anchor in the year of Singapore’s fall: in an address to the Prime Minister’s War Conference the Commander made it abundantly clear that the ‘look’ was ‘only temporary and specifically related to the defeat of Japan.’ This description of the coalition as distinctly ad hoc has led some to postulate that the ‘look’ had seemingly ‘left no lasting mark on Australia.’ Such a proposition is a stark contrast to traditional nationalist view, which saw Curtin’s statement as an embodiment of a national awakening toward ‘independence’ in foreign policy. Though in terms of the intelligence situation, neither of these views fully capture the reality of the war’s legacy. It will be suggested here that there is a connection to be made between the coalition and the Joint Internationalisation proposals.

It is true that the ad hoc nature of MacArthur’s coalition effectively meant that allied intelligence operations located in Australia were not required to last beyond the war. The twin forces of coalition disbandment and demobilisation spelt the formalised end of the SWPA organisations that had so helped to shorten the duration of the Pacific war. In light of the post-war organisational void, it would seem only natural for Britain to, in the words of Andrew, reassume intelligence ‘dominance’ in the post-war period. This sense of influence and tutelage, Woodward argues, exemplified Australia’s dependency to Britain. These arguments rightly discern the inevitability of London’s role in influencing the beginnings of the post-war intelligence community in Australia. Indeed, Canberra would begin to resurrect the AJIC in 1946. Similarly, Secretary Shedden would express support for the Joint Intelligence network before its formal presentation in 1946, and following the Conference, Canberra would begin to implement a Joint Intelligence

486 Andrew, "The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community," 222.
Bureau as part of the Commonwealth network. However, it should be noted that Andrew’s and Woodward’s remarks appear to omit the significant ‘influence’ derived from Australia’s own wartime experience.

For the purposes of our analysis, this influence and its impact can be observed in two ways. The first centres around the residual legacy of the MacArthur operations. The Commander did have an intelligence monopoly, but only in an administrative sense: it was Australian personnel who made up the majority of staff within the coalition intelligence systems. Further, these operations were stationed on Australian soil, the local personnel having first-hand experience of the various SIGINT victories that took place. There was a national intelligence experience and a corresponding awareness of its value. The residue was also marked in more tangible forms: the Australian Service departments, for example, developed intelligence capabilities to an ‘unprecedented’ extent within the Allied Forces. The Australian Army and Air Force had established Wireless Units to intercept Japanese traffic—a field in which local personnel maintained ‘pre-eminence’ over their U.S. allies. In spite of demobilisation, these capabilities were generally maintained after the war. The Chief Intelligence Officer of the Royal Australian Air Force would later observe that it was the MacArthur years that ‘[saw] a great advance and the institution of a satisfactory intelligence set-up’. Blaxland goes as far to suggest that the antecedence of the Australian national intelligence architecture can be attributed to this period.

Of course, the drafting of that architecture was far from an independent endeavour: it occurred ‘locally’ within an allied context. British influence would inevitably return in the post-war period but, unlike New Zealand, Australia already had the sketches of a ‘relatively advanced’ architecture of its own to draw influence from.

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491 Cain, "Signals Intelligence in Australia," 56-57.
492 Blaxland, "Intelligence and Special Operations in the Southwest Pacific, 1942–45," 164.
493 Cain, 54.
494 Blaxland, 163-64.
495 As noted above, this source was accessed via Secret Intelligence Files. See: "Organisation of the Australian Joint Intelligence Committee (CAB 176/14)".
496 Blaxland, 164.
497 Ibid.
This brings us to the second way in which Australia’s wartime experience impacted Britain’s post-war influence vis-à-vis Joint Internationalisation. The first confirmed that the post-war period would not signify a ‘full’ return to a pre-war intelligence status quo ante; contrary to the implied assertions of Andrew and Woodward, Britain’s dominance and tutelage would be tempered. Yet this sense of restrained influence relative to the pre-war position did not merely occur because Australia had its own intelligence experience. The very reason why that experience occurred in the first place lay with the changing geopolitical realities of the day. The events in the Pacific had instilled a ‘heightened awareness’ that the U.S. was important to the security of the region. Simultaneously, the anchor of Empire ensured that faith in imperial defence could be revived, as reflected by Curtin’s proposal for a ‘common policy’ within a ‘Fourth Empire’. Indeed, the look was never intended to be a ‘full turn’. However, the prospect of revival in defence terms was conditional: without the guarantee of greater Australian involvement in defence planning, faith in British-led imperial defence would—and did—falter.

This sense of conditional revival illustrates the distinctive Australian mediation between self-interest and British identity that had so begun to characterise the Dominion’s relationship with Britain in the post-war period. Prime Minister Churchill did not show up to hear Curtin’s proposal, New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser offered, in Curran’s words, ‘lukewarm support’, and King disparaged Curtin’s points, igniting a slanging match. The proposal subsequently found its fate in a ‘bureaucratic graveyard’. Some two years later, Britain would present its ‘proposals’ for Joint Internationalisation, consisting of a ‘Joint’ Defence Centralisation plan and a Joint Intelligence network. While Canberra was eager to participate in the intelligence component, implementing the network proposal in 1948, the defence component would not meet its preconditions. Prime Minister Ben Chifley and External Affairs Minister H. V. Evatt would successfully obtain a decentralised variation that suited Australia’s interests (and tempered...
Prime Minister King’s concerns). The proposal for ‘Joint’ Defence Centralisation, Darwin observes, was grounded in an old view of Empire. As such, it was almost inevitable that Prime Minister Clement Attlee had to concede to ‘a much more decentralised formula.

New Zealand

New Zealand constitutes a notable omission from the wartime modelling activities. No ‘NZJIC’ existed in form or function. The relevant literature offers no convincing explanations, only a mixture of inhibiting factors. In light of the Australian experience, one could speculate that an NZJIC may have eventuated if imperial defence had remained Wellington’s best hope for protection against Japanese aggression. However, it is critical to note that the wartime strategy of the antipodean Dominions was not homogenous. In Belich’s view, New Zealand saw the Pacific as a ‘backwater’ and the home front, a ‘backwater of a backwater.’ In this vein, he asserts that Wellington faced, but did not necessarily face up to, two Pacific threats: the first came in the form of German surface raiders, the second, the prospect of Japanese invasion. Belich’s ‘backwater’ thesis, however, must be tempered by noting that some 20,000 New Zealand troops would serve in the Pacific during 1943. Nonetheless, in Australia’s case, the ‘extremely real’ prospect of Japanese invasion necessitated a strategy that entailed a new mobilisation effort and a full reorientation toward the Pacific. This was further facilitated by the welcome arrival of General MacArthur—a ‘truly pivotal’ event for Australia, after which the nation’s focus moved to the Pacific. New Zealand too was privy to the U.S. organisation of the Pacific, falling within the South Pacific Area (SOPA) under the command of Admiral Ghormley.

Yet the SOPA-Ghormley ‘coalition’ was of a fundamentally different character than the SPWA-MacArthur coalition across the Tasman. The relationship between Ghormley and Wellington was uneasy at best and, much to the confusion of Fraser and his deputy, Walter Nash, there was no

507 Corner, "The Onset of the Cold War: Corner to McIntosh," 53.
508 Darwin, The Empire Project, 534.
509 See: ibid.
510 James Belich, Paradise Reforged, 287.
511 Ibid., 280.
514 Ibid., 25.
U.S. assumption of responsibility for the local defence of New Zealand.\textsuperscript{516} To be sure, a compromise with the Allies would eventually be reached,\textsuperscript{517} and Wellington would make some attempt to ‘make good’ on a claim to SOPA responsibility—the initial fortification of Fiji and the deployment to New Caledonia being early examples of such—but its commitments elsewhere would ultimately make the gravity of the Pacific task ‘impossibly difficult’.\textsuperscript{518} New Zealand did not engage in a full reorientation toward the Pacific: the 2\textsuperscript{nd} New Zealand Division remained firmly committed to the Theatres in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Indeed, the impossibility of full reorientation was all but confirmed in 1942 when Fraser opted to keep the Division in the Mediterranean. In the context of New Zealand’s displaced ‘frontwater’, therefore, Wellington did not need an NZJIC: British Command meant that intelligence requirements in the Mediterranean/Middle East—whether operational or assessment orientated—could be met through British machinery, including the JIC and its JIS.

Nevertheless, New Zealand still had a Pacific War experience albeit one that, paradoxically, ‘remained at a distance’, relative to the foreign Theatres.\textsuperscript{519} The SOPA-Ghormley (later, Halsey) coalition involved intelligence and, in spite of its latent character, New Zealand did contribute to the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) allied intelligence effort.\textsuperscript{520} To this end, it is plausible that New Zealand’s place in the US-authored POA structure precluded the necessity for a local JIC. As with Australia in the SPWA, it was unnecessary for New Zealand, as part of the SOPA, to engage in such a function. However, there were also other inhibitors at play: New Zealand exhibited characteristics that were not at all conducive to Joint Intelligence or associated activities, such as centralisation. The inter-play of these contextual inhibitors goes some way to differentiate the wartime intelligence experiences of the antipodean Dominions. Moreover, the inhibitors also assist our understanding of how New Zealand responded to the proposal for the Joint Intelligence network in the post-war period.

\textsuperscript{516} For an overview of the relationship, see: Reginald Hedley Newell, "New Zealand’s Forgotten Warriors: 3NZ Division in the South Pacific in World War II" (Massey University, New Zealand, 2008), 46. See also: F. W. I. Wood, "Political and External Affairs,” in The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945 (Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs; War History Branch, 1958), 244.

\textsuperscript{517} In particular, the deployment of the New Zealand 3\textsuperscript{rd} Division, and the decision to host US forces in New Zealand. See: Gerald Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield (Auckland: Viking, 2009).

\textsuperscript{518} "Political and External Affairs," 243–47.


\textsuperscript{520} It is worth noting that the Royal New Zealand Navy had combined its resources with the US Navy. See: Wood, "Political and External Affairs,” 243.
The primary inhibitor stems from New Zealand’s general lack of experience in matters pertaining to the operation of military intelligence. An insider within the New Zealand wartime operation observed that there existed ‘little understanding of its meanings and uses’ That same official saw this absence of understanding as attributable to New Zealand’s defence reliance on the Royal British Navy *vis-à-vis* imperial defence. In recounting the experience of the war, the official noted that the reliance on Britain manifested itself in a way that was not based on logic or rationale but a feeling:

The feeling was that so long as the mother country, with what help we and other members of the Commonwealth were able to furnish, could win battles in these distant areas [the British-led Theatres], New Zealand was safe.  

Thus, the idea that Europe was ‘closer, more comprehensible and important than Asia’ ensured that New Zealand exhibited a ‘related feeling of aloofness from the Asian countries’. The accumulation of these factors ensured that intelligence would play ‘only a small part in the affairs of the state’. Intelligence, therefore, was part of Belich’s notion of the facing but not the facing *up* to the immediacy of the Pacific environment. The ‘face’ was exemplified by the commitment to the deployment of the 3rd Division and Service intelligence; the lack of ‘facing’ up to illustrated by the minimal amount of personnel devoted to meeting the shared commitment, relative to the other POA allies. New Zealand was the smallest of the active POA allies, but even so, Wellington devoted ‘very small’ and at times ‘poor’ amounts of resources to its POA intelligence operation. This is in stark contrast to Australia’s extensive operations under MacArthur and even Canada’s *quid pro quo* contribution to the Anglo-American alliance. Tonkin-Covell observes that this resource deficiency stemmed from a lack of awareness among New Zealand officials regarding the ‘usefulness of timely intelligence’. That being so, the manpower issue can be seen as a derivative factor from the general lack of experience Wellington had in matters of intelligence operation; the secondary inhibiting factor to the wartime attempt at centralisation.

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522 Ibid., 3.
523 Ibid.
524 Ibid., 4.
525 Belich, 280.
526 John Tonkin-Covell, "The Collectors: Naval, Army and Air Intelligence in the New Zealand Armed Forces During the Second World War" (University of Waikato, New Zealand, 2000), 426-27.
527 Ibid.
Before moving to discuss how the aforementioned factors came to inhibit centralisation, it is worth briefly recounting the positive contributions—what Tonkin-Covell regards as the ‘notable expectations’—within New Zealand’s Service intelligence operation in the POA.\(^{528}\) Indeed, while the operation was acutely small, it ought not be forgotten that contributions of worth were made. The intelligence unit within the Royal New Zealand Air Force, for example, had become ‘well regarded’ by the war’s end for its operational contributions to the POA Allied operation, particularly during the offensive operation in the Solomon Islands—a not insignificant effort given the fact that it had begun with a single officer.\(^{529}\) The New Zealand Army too earned a positive intelligence reputation in the POA; ‘tiny in size,’ the Army ‘Y’ SIGINT unit was located in a novel geographic area which, in turn, made it useful for Allied attacks on Axis communications.\(^{530}\) However, by far the most valued contribution came from the SIGINT stations administered by the Navy.\(^{531}\) In particular, the naval ‘Y’ organisation in concert with the H/F D/F stations made a ‘small but valued’ contribution to the interception of Axis traffic.\(^{532}\) The Naval SIGNIT success was to a large degree the direct result of British Admiralty tutelage and the ‘useful and comfortable’ tenor of Navy-civilian cooperation in decades prior.\(^{533}\) It was no surprise, therefore, that their work represented New Zealand’s most important intelligence contribution to the allied effort in the POA.\(^{534}\)

In F.L.W. Wood’s seminal account within the voluminous *Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War*, the development of New Zealand’s wartime machinery is depicted as a slow, reluctant but ultimately successful endeavour, ‘… the machinery, military and administrative, was there, much of it built at the eleventh hour and untried but ready for use.’\(^{535}\) London’s early wish for a New Zealand Committee of Imperial Defence (NZCID) was eventually fulfilled, though it did not alter Wellington’s reluctance in the transition from peace to war—the NZCID’s work was not seen with any ‘great enthusiasm’ by Cabinet. Indeed, New Zealand constitutional administration in matters of defence was a living exemplar of the phrase ‘image, not substance’.\(^{536}\) Following the

\(^{528}\) Ibid., 426.
\(^{529}\) Ibid., 404-25.
\(^{530}\) Ibid., 216-26.
\(^{531}\) Until late 1941, the Royal New Zealand Navy was a division of the Royal British Navy. For SIGINT context, see: Desmond Ball, Cliff Lord, and Meredith Thatcher, *Invaluable Service: The Secret History of New Zealand’s Signals Intelligence During Two World Wars* (Waimauku: Resource Books, 2012).
\(^{532}\) Tonkin-Covell, 427.
\(^{534}\) Tonkin-Covell, 435.
\(^{536}\) Ibid., 85-86.
election of the first Labour government in 1935, the NZCID was renamed to the Organisation for National Security (ONS).\textsuperscript{537}

However this did not produce a change in fortunes: centralised planning would be absent until the eleventh hour, much to the dissatisfaction of ‘uneasy’ senior Service officials.\textsuperscript{538} Had it not been for the ‘irresistible pressure’ exerted by London in the first place, the actioning of the machinery in 1939 may not have been quite as successful.\textsuperscript{539} True to its centralised form, the ONS technically stood at the ‘top of the intelligence tree’, with the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff (NZCOS) falling within its committee remit.\textsuperscript{540} But the ONS form of ‘intelligence centralisation’ was more theory than practice: the organisation was distant from the day-to-day Service intelligence operation.\textsuperscript{541} As a means to engage in closer centralised co-ordination of the Service branches, the idea of a combined intelligence organisation was thought of, but initially neglected as the Pacific was not deemed ‘sufficiently dangerous to require action.’\textsuperscript{542} This sense of lethargy toward combined intelligence continued for quite some time, even as hostilities reached closer to New Zealand shores.\textsuperscript{543} For intelligence organisation in New Zealand, the slow and reluctant endeavour did not end at the eleventh hour—it continued well into the war, and ultimately remained incomplete.

The creation of a Combined Intelligence Bureau (CIB) early in the war signalled a greater willingness to engage in tri-Service cooperation, but good intentions did not spur centralised action—not least because two of the Service branches, the Air Force and the Army, lacked effective intelligence capabilities.\textsuperscript{544} In the absence of adequate resources and effective intra-ONS cooperation, New Zealand’s first venture into centralisation was doomed to fail.\textsuperscript{545} Even as resourcing was improved and the CIB was re-engineered as the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (COIC) in 1941, tri-Service intelligence did not materialise. The absence of prior intelligence experience entailed a natural inclination on the part of the Service branches to begin to assert singular interests, diametrically opposed to the principle of centralisation.\textsuperscript{546} As the only

\textsuperscript{537} W. D. McIntyre, \textit{New Zealand Prepares for War: Defence Policy, 1919-39} (Christchurch: University of Canterbury Press; Historical Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, 1988), 178; Tonkin-Covell, 22.
\textsuperscript{538} Wood, "Political and External Affairs," 85-89. See also, the summary of pre-war planning in: J. V. T. Baker, "War Economy," ibid. (1965), 32.
\textsuperscript{539} Wood, "Political and External Affairs," 89.
\textsuperscript{540} Tonkin-Covell, 20.
\textsuperscript{541} Ibid., 21
\textsuperscript{542} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{543} Ibid., 426.
\textsuperscript{544} Ibid., 77.
\textsuperscript{545} Ibid., 77-78.
\textsuperscript{546} Ibid., 15.
experienced intelligence Service branch, the newly titled Royal New Zealand Navy took hold of the COIC, and the production and dissemination of useful intelligence began.\textsuperscript{547} Even so, the product was never ‘combined’ in the original intention of the term; the COIC became a naval organisation by default.\textsuperscript{548}

In the U.S. organisation of the Pacific, \textit{allied} operations meant that centralised intelligence control on New Zealand soil was nonsensical. If operational requirements were made clear at the tactical level, success was best achieved by ‘small-sized, single-service component-type intelligence sections’, as evidenced by the role of the Air Force in the Solomons Offensive.\textsuperscript{549} New Zealand’s small size and inexperience meant that combined intelligence efforts would be ineffective.\textsuperscript{550} In the spirit of the BRUSA agreement, COIC SIGINT interceptions were disseminated to Britain and the United States and, from 1942 onwards, COIC’s work was fed through the SWPA via the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (‘FRUMEL’) and its affiliate, the Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (‘FRUPAC’), located in Honolulu).\textsuperscript{551} With the majority of analysis taking place across the Tasman, Hager observes that New Zealand was ‘entirely reliant’ on the POA allied system.\textsuperscript{552} These characteristics paint a telling picture of New Zealand’s wartime intelligence operation—small, inexperienced, and at times scarcely resourced, the Dominion’s intelligence experience was fundamentally different than that of its antipodean counterpart.

It can hardly be taken as a surprise, therefore, that the centralisation effort via combined intelligence was destined to fail. Wellington’s inexperience and lack of awareness ensured that combined intelligence was, as Tonkin-Covell concludes, a ‘pallid shadow … an illusion that never materialised’.\textsuperscript{553} The slow and reluctant tenor described in Wood’s analysis of the pre-war machinery would continue in the post-war period—New Zealand would in fact be the last of the Dominions to opt into the Joint Intelligence network. However, for all of Wellington’s slowness, this was not an \textit{intentional} repudiation of the Joint Intelligence network. Fraser, while sceptical of the efficacy of a peacetime intelligence operation, was nonetheless convinced by a high-ranking

\textsuperscript{547} Ibid., 123.
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid., 432-33.
\textsuperscript{549} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{550} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{553} Tokin-Covell, 13; 433.
British intelligence official to begin a modest Joint operation. Thus, contrary to the implication of Goodman’s account, the impetus did not solely come from within the NZCOS.

If the wartime experience in the Pacific had the effect of instilling a greater sense of ‘self-interest’ in Canberra, Wellington’s experience—as it relates to Britain’s post-war plans vis-à-vis ‘Joint’ Defence Centralisation—had something of the opposite effect. In Canberra, Prime Minister Robert Menzies declared war almost immediately after Chamberlain. Beaumont observes that Menzies’ dutiful declaration was an expression of a deep attachment to Britain, complemented by novel legal considerations pertaining to the King’s position in the Commonwealth. Similarly, Belich observes that the ‘extremely Anglophile lawyer’ had declared war in a manner that was more ‘reflexively colonial’ than Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage’s historic ‘Where Britain goes, we go’ declaration. However, in contrast to the prophetic quality of Savage’s sentiment, Menzies’ colonial reflex was not representative of the manner in which Canberra would behave in the Anglo-Dominion alliance. Not long after Curtin’s assumption of office, Australia was seen by British officials as engaging in ‘panic-like’ behaviour: the search for security had reached a crisis point, and the Dominion saw itself as a potential target in Japan’s line of attack through South-East Asia. By way of contrast, New Zealand’s behaviour was perfectly in-check with Belich’s backwater thesis. ‘We are full of appreciation and admiration of New Zealand’s behaviour … in contrast with Australia’s’, a senior official in the Dominions Office wrote.

As events in the backwater continued to deteriorate, Savage’s successor, Fraser, expressed concern over Britain’s lacklustre response to Japan’s move toward Malaya. The subsequent fall of Singapore was seen as a shock, but it did not yield the same posture as adopted by those across the Tasman. To be sure, Singapore—or as McIntosh put it, ‘the destruction of the illusion’—did mean that New Zealand’s notion of security would be more bound to the U.S., but it would

554 This derives from the minutes taken during JIB Director Strong’s meeting with Fraser. See: "Intelligence - NZ Joint Intelligence Bureau," in ABFK W3767 19754 15/2/1 (Box 38) (Wellington: Archives New Zealand, 1947-1957).
557 Belich, 275.
559 Ibid., 59.
560 Ibid.
562 Quoted in Orders, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 59.
always lack the ‘edge’ of Australia’s.\textsuperscript{563} As McKinnon implies, the conception of independence as interest gained unaccustomed traction in this period, though its pursuit ‘mostly reinforced’ New Zealand’s position in the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{564} The fact that New Zealand was making decisions in the name of security demonstrated its own conception of ‘self-interest’, even if this meant not entirely facing up to the Pacific Theatre, or not asserting preconditions to its involvement in the defence component of Joint Internationalisation.\textsuperscript{565} In Belich’s analysis, the adherence to the backwater ‘strategy’ is portrayed as an almost inevitable outcome: Churchill’s successful employment of various persuasive tactics against ‘frontwater’ withdrawal was enabled by Fraser’s recolonial mentality.\textsuperscript{566} In normative terms, the New Zealand ‘self’ was partially displaced in the name of the British ‘interest’—‘inchng bloodily up Italy’ was seen as preferable to ‘significant participation in the Allied reconquest of its own Pacific.’\textsuperscript{567}

New Zealand’s position in the Commonwealth as the most loyal Dominion had therefore been reinforced by the war. It was bound to continue beyond the war at the Prime Ministers’ Conference in 1946, where Deputy Prime Minister Nash stood alone with Prime Minister Attlee’s Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, in expressing his support for ‘Joint’ Defence Centralisation.\textsuperscript{568} It was yet another expression of the recolonial mentality that the Prime Minister had exhibited in 1942. But centralisation wasn’t to be. The adoption of the so-called decentralised ‘Joint’ Defence proposal, brought about by Evatt, meant that Wellington would have to further engage with Canberra in the post-war years.\textsuperscript{569} Indeed, Evatt’s variation held that each Dominion would assume responsibility for its own region ‘to maintain conditions favourable to the British Commonwealth and to accept joint responsibility for their defence in war’.\textsuperscript{570} Upon Wellington’s belated (and reluctant) inauguration into the Joint Intelligence network in 1949,\textsuperscript{571} New Zealand would begin to take on a limited sense of intelligence responsibility for its immediate region by way of a New Zealand Joint Intelligence Office (NZJIO).\textsuperscript{572} The NZCOS would subsequently succeed in its previously unheeded request for a NZJIC; its establishment occurring alongside the subordinate NZJIO.\textsuperscript{573}

\textsuperscript{563} McKinnon, Independence, 45-46.
\textsuperscript{564} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{565} Ibid., 46.
\textsuperscript{566} Ibid., 46.
\textsuperscript{567} Belich, Paradise Reforged, 286-87.
\textsuperscript{568} Ibid., 286.
\textsuperscript{569} See: Corner, ”The Onset of the Cold War: Corner to McIntosh,” 54.
\textsuperscript{570} This resulted in the ANZAM ‘alliance’, see: Jim Rolfe, ”New Zealand’s Security: Alliances and Other Military Relationships,” in Working Papers (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1997), 7.
\textsuperscript{571} Reproduced in Darwin, The Empire Project, 534.
\textsuperscript{572} Jaynes, ”The Problems of a Small Bureau,” 4.
\textsuperscript{573} See: ”New Zealand - Joint Intelligence Organisation (CAB 176/22),” Secret Intelligence Files: Taylor & Francis.
\textsuperscript{574} This is the point that Goodman omits. See: Filer, ”The Joint Intelligence Office, the Joint Intelligence Bureau and the External Intelligence Bureau, 1949–1980,” 1.
Within the NZJIC terms of reference, it was endowed with the responsibility to keep the ‘intelligence organisation as a whole’ under review.\textsuperscript{574} Some ten years after the ‘Whole’ Reconstitution endowment in London, this was the surest sign that the Joint concept had reached Wellington—the concept’s final location in its internationalisation within the old Commonwealth. Its path to Wellington, as we have briefly observed, only makes sense with reference to the wartime experience both within and beyond the field of intelligence. We are once again made aware that intelligence does not make sense in isolation, as both \textit{Secret World} and our epistemology remind us.

\footnote{574 "New Zealand - Joint Intelligence Organisation (CAB 176/22)".}
Conclusion: Filling the Missing Dimension?

This thesis has engaged in the conceptualisation of the ‘Joint’ in Intelligence. Through positioning itself to integrate foundational and peripheral knowledge bases, it has sought to fulfil the ‘missing dimension’ often inherent in Intelligence Studies scholarship—that being, its isolation from the paternal disciplines. By employing a specific conceptual lens, informed by a posteriori knowledge of the paternal elements (i.e. centralisation, inter-cooperation, and the committee-forum), new light has been shed on the Joint concept. So as to fulfil the requirements of integration, we paid attention to the developmental primacy of British constitutional administration; the ‘system of meaning’ from which the paternal elements of the Joint concept originated. From this understanding, we observed the concept’s humble beginnings in the 1900-18 period, where only partial enactments of its paternal elements occurred. We then saw the promise of that period materialise, beginning with the first tri-elemental enactment of Joint conceptual form via the ad hoc Chief of Staff Sub-Committee in 1922. The continued fulfilment of that promise resulted in the emergence of a professional central system in 1926, marked by the installation of the ‘joint norm’ among the Chiefs and the creation of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee. Thus, we witnessed the incarnation of the Joint concept in a more systematic form.

The origins of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, however, necessitated a shift away from the foundations toward the periphery of intelligence-related knowledge. Entering the periphery, we observed the elements from the foundation facilitating the functions of intelligence in several institutional forms. The subsequent creation of the JIC represented a new embodiment of all three elements and, in contrast to its predecessor, it formed part of the professional central system. By implication, we observed the extension of the Joint concept to Intelligence. The distinction between the theory of the extension and its practice was then made intelligible by virtue of the wider central system and the understandings present therein. We saw that it was a change in this understanding that led to the creation of the Joint Intelligence Staff, and the subsequent manifestation of the Joint concept and its associated phenomenon, Joint Intelligence.

We have therefore been made aware that Joint Intelligence is not a concept. It is rather a phenomenon that is, when seen through our lens, the result of a concept that was first extended and, later, manifested within Intelligence. 1942 represented the point at which this manifestation became practice within British constitutional administration. Similarly, 1942 was also significant in the international context, as demonstrated by the emergence of the Joint model in Canada and the functional absence of such in Australia because of the MacArthur Coalition. Beyond the models,
we observed the salience of the wider wartime experience within the Dominions, and the way this foretold how the Joint concept would ‘internationalise’ within the Dominion environment after the war. For different reasons, Australia and Canada would reject the centralised defence aspect of Joint Internationalisation, while embracing the notion of a Joint Intelligence network. By way of final analysis, we attended to the New Zealand experience. We noted that the ‘Toward Wellington’ subtitle of this thesis refers to the ‘end point’ of the Joint concept among the Dominions within the Commonwealth. Through observing New Zealand’s relative inexperience with intelligence in the war, Wellington’s belated participation in the intelligence component of Joint Internationalisation was made sense of. By the same token, giving primacy to the recolonisation thesis explains New Zealand’s immediate support for the centralisation of the defence component. However, the intra-Commonwealth adoption of Evatt’s decentralised variation all but guaranteed further imperial disintegration in the emerging Cold War. Thus, to qualify Bull’s epigraph, it was inevitable that the Commonwealth would continue to disintegrate in ‘Old Empire’ terms, but the internationalisation of the Joint concept—with its emphasis on local assumptions of responsibility and ‘networked’ information-sharing—would result in a more modern notion of integration in a new, bipolar world.
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